CASE DIGEST] People v. Guillen (G.R. No.

L-1477)
January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

Julio Guillen, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Manila,
Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage and threw another one toward then President Manuel
Roxas in an apparent assassination attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President over the latter's
perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the passage of the so-called parity measure.
General Castaneda managed to kick the grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death
of Simeon Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and
Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple frustrated murder filed
against him. At one point, he even tried to use the insanity excuse, but he was found to have been
mentally stable.

Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was subsequently found guilty of all the
charges and was sentenced to death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:

No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their penalties were covered by Art. 48 of
the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49. The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at
President Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
given that the victim was not able to put up a defense against the attack, even though he was not the
principal target.

And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims constitute attempted and
not frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due
to some reason or accident (General kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own spontaneous
desistance.

In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower court.

___
Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
People V. Opero 1981

G.R. No. L-48796 June 11, 1981

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable: Art. 4

FACTS:
• April 27, 1978 4 am: Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International Hotel
at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, was informed by Demetrio Barcing, another security guard, that he
picked up a 3 year-old girl loitering at the second floor of the building. Rafael Ordona, a janitor, told
Oliver that the girl is from Room 314 so Oliver called up Room 314 and when nobody answered, he and
Barcing brought the girl to Room 314. When nobody answered Oliver’s knock, he pushed the door open
and smelled foul odor from the room. He covered his nose with a handkerchief and they entered the
room where they saw Liew Soon Ping dead faced down on the bed with both feet tied, her body is
bloated and a towel covered her mouth. Oliver called up the homicide division of the Manila Police.
They saw a small baby crying and trying to get out of a crib near the bed of the dead person.
• They called her wife, Dr. Hong, who was in Cebu. He came back immediately and found their
personal effects worth P30,221 to be missing.

Diego Opero, Asteria Avila and , Milagros Villegas were picked up by the Samar P.C. and some of the
missing articles.
o Diego Opero: He and Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying up her hands and feet
stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal.
o Milagros Villegas: Identified the stolen clothes which were given to her by Opero
o Asteria Avila: she was not a party
• Dr. Angelo Singian finding that the cause of death is the pandesal
• RTC: Diego Opero for robbery with homicide together with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros Villegas
(accessory). Asteria Avila was acquitted.
• Only Diego Opero appealed
o He never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the
intention to kill her, he could have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be only
for robbery

ISSUE: W/N Diego Opero should only be liable for robbery.

HELD: NO. judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, except as to
the nonappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed, which nevertheless does not call for the modification of the penalty of
death as imposed by the lower court, is hereby affirmed.

• The intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed
into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong may
be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation
had it not slid into the neckline. According to Dr. Singian, the movements of the victim that caused
the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however, attributable to them for if they did not hogtie
her, she could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by
asphyxiation.
• What is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
• Art. 49 applied only to cases when the crime committed befalls a different person from the one
intended to be the victim
o Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from
that intended - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender
intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
• There still remains one aggravating circumstance to consider, after either one of the two
aggravating circumstances present, that of superior strength and dwelling, is offset by the mitigating
circumstance aforesaid. The higher of the imposable penalty for the crime committed, which is
reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be imposed on appellant.
 Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009

FACTS: The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down
to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him.
Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to
come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to
parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the
police regarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later
unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in
nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The
autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have
caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy. What could
have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated

RULING: The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said
condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact that the
physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of
the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is,
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court
properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum
FACTS :

A police operation to serve a search warrant in the premises of

Francisco Bello thru policemen Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor,
Jr for alleged position of rifle and submachine gun. On the night of the
execution to serve the warrant a shooting incident happened. One
vehicle which carry members of Tiongson family, driver and a priest was
fired by the operatives. Richard Tiongson died the following day while
Maria Theresa was fatally wounded. Despite the incident, the police
operative pursued its mission to haunt for Francisco Bello. When they
reached the residence of Bello’s parents they found out different types
of firearms. Thereafter, the Chief of Police, declared the search
terminated and the entire searching party left for the headquarters. Bello
and his party arrived in Daraga, Albay and stayed in the house of
Inocencia Malbas. Early in the morning successive burst of gunfire were
heard, Bello, who was in the balcony was gradually fall down, with his
hands above his head. He died due to multiple gunshot wounds.
Rosalio Andes was also shot and was killed allegedly fought back with
authorities. He died due to multiple gunshot wounds.

Issues :

Whether or not the killings (Tiongson, Bello and Andes) and

frustrated murder (MT Tiongson) were perpetrated in the course of the
performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the
lawful order of their superiors?
Ruling :

NO, the accused-appellant killed the victims and injured one

person not in the performance of their official duty as peace officers in
obedience to the lawful order of their superior. In order that the
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code
may be successfully invoked, the defense has to
prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the
performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of
such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification
becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. Armed with
only a search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went
beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other
persons of their lives.
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the
appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction.
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same
gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main
reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted

People v Mananquil
 G.R. No. L-35574, September 28, 1984G.R.

Topic: Criminal liability| How incurred | Wrongful act done be different from what was
intended
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-appellant: Valentina Mananquil
Action and ponente: Cuevas,

Facts
Convicted of parricide for killing husband - pled not guilty, convicted to reclusion
perpetua, 12k indemnity
- CA – referred appeal to SC contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting her
solely on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial confession;
2) in finding that Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained by the victim;
3) in not finding her not to have caused the death of the deceased; and
4) in not acquitting her at least on ground of reasonable doubt.

Prosecution version: 11pm she went to the Nawasa after purchasing 10 centavos
worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline station at taft avenue, which she placed in a
coffee bottle. She was angry at her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had
burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from
their house. After knocking on the door, it was immediately opened and husband
shouted at her "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". She poured the contents on him
and got a matchbox and set the polo shirt on fire.
Defense version: Before 10pm she returned from Olongapo, fed and put her grandson
to bed. After filling the tank with water, she remembered that the next day was a Sunday
and she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline with which
to clean them. She took an empty bottle of Hemo and bought 10 cents worth of
gasoline, then remembered that her husband needed gasoline or his lighter so she
dropped by. Appellant saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by
the window. As the iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door.
Appellant said that she had brought the gasoline which he needed for his lighter, but
Elias, who was under the influence of liquor, cursed her thus: 'PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON'. She trembled and became dizzy, and was beside herself. She did not
know that she was sprinkling gasoline on his face – she was dizzy and had to sit down
for a while, and remembered that her grandson was alone in the house so she left,
leaving her husband walking to and fro and ignoring her. She went to bed but could not
sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to apologize but saw police officers
present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he saw her he
chased her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife of Elias.
When she replied in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of burning her
husband. She denied the accusation. But the police took her to the headquarters, and
prepared a written statement, and was made to sign the statement upon promise of her
release. She signed it even without knowing what was in the statement.
Sgt Leopoldo Garcia tool her statement in tagalog in q&a form. then she was brought to
fiscal paredes who asked her some questions then made her subscribe and swear to
the statement. Mananquil wants to discredit her extrajudicial confession because she
did not understand the contents as she is not a tagala, and reached on primary school
and she only signed it upon promise of her release.
Issue
(1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; and
(2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia
which was the cause of the victim's death.
HELD: yes to both. judgment affirmed, indemnity increased to 30k.

WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.

It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this
Court recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon.
Minister of Justice.

RULE: Art. 4. Criminal Liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended."

Ratio: Mananquil’s assertions too flimsy. She actually knew Tagalog, having stayed in
Manila since 1951 and was in daily association with Tagalogs and she admitted during
cross-examination that she was well understood by tagalogs. She also did not complain
against the police officers for making her sign. For why will the police still resort to such
trickery when the very sworn statement given by her proved by its contents that
appellant was indeed very cooperative. Her testimony repeated what was in the
statement. The said statement replete with details which could not have been possibly
supplied by the police investigators who have no previous knowledge of, nor
acquaintance with her and the victim, especially with respect to the circumstances and
incidents which preceded the fatal incident that brought about the death of the latter.
Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive
proof of guilt when taken without maltreatment or intimidation and may serve as a basis
of the declarant's conviction. It is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven.
It was taken right after the indient and no time to fabricate any detail favorable to her,
and shock made her admit the undeniable. The burden of proof is upon the person who
gave the confession. She only testified more than 5 years after the incident in 1969 –
after having the benefit of too many consultations.
the records do not show her having seen her husband even once while the latter lay
seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death. Neither did she attend his
funeral nor was she ever present during the wake. She could have asked the court to let
her attend the wake or funeral or hospital.
Purpose of buying gasoline so late at night was absurd. Also, mananquil wants the court
to believe that her husband died of pneumonia due to liquor drinking in the hospital and
not due to burning. A doctor testified that pneumonia could not have been caused by
alcohol -- In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to
produce an almost comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a
diminution of the oxygen content of the body. OSG: liquor was not an efficient
supervening cause of his death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after
the burning.
Pneumonia caused by 2nd degree burns covering 62 percent of the body – complication
of the burns.

Rule 4 art 1: essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be
liable "even if the deceased might have recovered. every person is held to contemplate
and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. Amidst the conflicting
theories of medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to
the immediate cause of death, and thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of
the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."
Crim Law 1 Case Digest:Intod V. CA 1992

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because
of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's
house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the
witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under
Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together
with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs

• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be

incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held
liable for any crime
Labels: 1992, Case Digest, crim law 1, G.R. No. 103119, intod v. ca, Juris Doctor, October
21, SECOND DIVISION

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