Principles of European Tort Law Text and Commentary by Francesco D. Busnelli, Giovanni Comandé, Herman Cousy, Dan B. Dobbs, Bill W. Dufwa, Michael G. Faure, Israel Gilead, Michael D. Green, Konstantin (Z-lib.org

European Group on Tort Law
Principles of European Tort Law
Text and Commentary
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Preface
The European Group on Tort Law is proud to present the ªPrinciples of
European Tort Lawº, which have been drafted on the basis of an extensive
comparative research project extending over more than a decade and
focussing on the most important elements of tort law.
This book not only contains the original text of the Principles as well as
several translations thereof, but also (and most importantly) an extensive
commentary on the entire set of Articles. While only the English version
of the Principles has been authorized by the European Group on Tort
Law as a whole, the other language versions shall support and facilitate
the international discussion on our Principles. These translations have
been submitted by members or friends of the Group, for which we are
most grateful.
We owe profound thanks to Bernhard Koch and his assistants, Dagmar
Hinghofer-Szalkay and Helmut Ortner, for their very considerable efforts
to make the manuscripts ready for printing. We would also like to thank
Springer publishers for their support in the publication of this book.
We sincerely hope that this book and our Principles will contribute to and
intensify the debate on the law of torts and its harmonisation. We would
therefore like to invite you to actively participate in this discussion.
V
Contents
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................ X
The European Group on Tort Law ........................................................ XII
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW ........................................ 1
COMMENTARIES ................................................................................ 11
General Introduction .............................................................................. 11

The Principles of European Tort Law of the European Group
on Tort Law (Spier) ................................................................................ 11
Title I. Basic Norm ......................................................................... 19

Chapter 1. Basic Norm ......................................................................... 19
Art. 1:101. Basic Norm (Koziol) ............................................................ 19
Title II. General Conditions of Liability ........................................... 23

Introduction (Koziol) ........................................................... 23
Chapter 2. Damage ............................................................................... 24
Introduction (Koziol) ........................................................... 24
Art. 2:101. Recoverable Damage (Koziol) ............................................. 27
Art. 2:102. Protected Interests (Koziol). ................................................ 29
Art. 2:103. Legitimacy of Damage (Magnus) .......................................... 34
Art. 2:104. Preventive Expenses (Magnus) ............................................. 37
Art. 2:105. Proof of Damage (Magnus) .................................................. 39
Chapter 3. Causation ............................................................................ 43
Introduction (Spier) ............................................................. 43
Section 1. Conditio sine qua non and Qualifications .............................. 43
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non (Spier) ............................................... 43
Art. 3:102. Concurrent Causes (Spier) ................................................... 44
Art. 3:103. Alternative Causes (Spier) ................................................... 47
Art. 3:104. Potential Causes (Spier) ....................................................... 50
Art. 3:105. Uncertain Partial Causation (Spier) ...................................... 54
Art. 3:106. Uncertain Causes in the Victim's Sphere (Spier) ................... 56
Section 2: Scope of Liability ................................................................. 59
Art. 3:201. Scope of Liability (Spier) ..................................................... 59
VII
Contents
Title III. Bases of Liability .............................................................. 64

Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault ..................................................... 64
Introduction (Widmer) ....................................................... 64
Section 1. Conditions of Liability Based on Fault ................................ 68
Art. 4:101. Fault (Widmer) .................................................................. 68
Art. 4:102. Required Standard of Conduct (Widmer) ............................ 75
Art. 4:103. Duty to Protect Others from Damage (Widmer) .................. 86
Section 2. Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault .............................. 90
Art. 4:201. Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault in General
(Widmer) ........................................................................... 90
Art. 4:202. Enterprise Liability (Koch) ................................................ 93
Chapter 5. Strict Liability .................................................................... 101
Introduction (Koch) ........................................................... 101
Art. 5:101. Abnormally Dangerous Activities (Koch) ........................... 104
Art. 5:102. Other Strict Liabilities (Koch) ............................................ 110
Chapter 6. Liability for Others ............................................................ 112
Introduction (MoreÂteau) ..................................................... 112
Art. 6:101. Liability for Minors or Mentally Disabled Persons
(MoreÂteau) ........................................................................ 113
Art. 6:102. Liability for Auxiliaries (MoreÂteau) .................................... 115
Title IV. Defences ............................................................................ 120

Introduction (Koch) ........................................................... 120
Chapter 7. Defences in General .......................................................... 122
Art. 7:101. Defences Based on Justifications (Koch) ............................. 122
Art. 7:102. Defences Against Strict Liability (Koch) ............................. 126
Chapter 8. Contributory Conduct or Activity ....................................... 130
Art. 8:101. Contributory Conduct or Activity of the Victim
(MartõÂn-Casals) .................................................................. 130
Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors .......................................................... 138

Introduction (Rogers) ......................................................... 138
Chapter 9. Multiple Tortfeasors .......................................................... 142
Art 9:101. Solidary and Several Liability: Relation Between Victim and
Multiple Tortfeasors (Rogers) ............................................. 142
Art 9:102. Relation Between Persons Subject to Solidary Liability
(Rogers) ............................................................................ 142
Title VI. Remedies ........................................................................... 149

Chapter 10. Damages ........................................................................... 149
Introduction (Magnus) ....................................................... 149
Section 1. Damages in General ........................................................... 149
Introduction (Magnus) ....................................................... 149
Art. 10:101. Nature and Purpose of Damages (Magnus) ......................... 149
VIII
Contents
Art. 10:102. Lump Sum or Periodical Payment (Magnus) ....................... 153

Art. 10:103. Benefits Gained Through the Damaging Event (Magnus) ... 156
Art. 10:104. Restoration in Kind (Magnus) ............................................ 159
Section 2. Pecuniary Damage ............................................................. 161
Art. 10:201. Nature and Determination of Pecuniary Damage (Magnus) . 161
Art. 10:202. Personal Injury and Death (Magnus) .................................. 164
Art. 10:203. Loss, Destruction and Damage to Things (Magnus) ............ 168
Section 3. Non-Pecuniary Damage ..................................................... 171
Art. 10:301. Non-Pecuniary Damage (Rogers) ....................................... 171
Section 4. Reduction of Damages ........................................................ 179
Art. 10:401. Reduction of Damages (MoreÂteau) ..................................... 179
TRANSLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES ........................................... 183

Catalan Translation ............................................................................... 184
Chinese Translation .............................................................................. 191
Czech Translation ................................................................................. 196
French Translation ................................................................................ 202
German Translation .............................................................................. 209
Greek Translation ................................................................................. 216
Italian Translation ................................................................................. 223
Japanese Translation ............................................................................. 230
Korean Translation ............................................................................... 237
Polish Translation ................................................................................. 244
Portuguese Translation .......................................................................... 251
Russian Translation ............................................................................... 258
Spanish Translation ............................................................................... 267
Index .................................................................................................... 275
IX
List of Abbreviations
A.C. Law Reports: Appeal Cases
AcP Archiv fuÈr die civilistische Praxis
al. alinea
Art. Article(s)
BGB BuÈrgerliches Gesetzbuch
BGH Bundesgerichtshof
BGHZ Entscheidungen des (deutschen) Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivil-
sachen
Cass. Cour de Cassation, Corte di Cassazione
cf. confer
ch. Chapter
cmt. comment
Cod. civ. Codice civile
csqn conditio sine qua non
DFC Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court
ECJ European Court of Justice
e.g. for example
ed(s). editor(s)
edn. edition
E.D.N.Y. Eastern District of New York
eds. editors
EJCL Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (http://www.ejcl.org)
et al. et alii
et seq. et sequens, et sequentia
etc. et cetera
F. Supp. Federal Supplement
fn. footnote(s)
HR Hoge Raad
i.e. id est
JBl Juristische BlaÈtter
lit. litera
NBW Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek
NJ Nederlands Jurisprudentie
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
no. marginal number(s)
OGH Oberster Gerichtshof
OJ Official Journal of the European Union
X
List of Abbreviations
OR Swiss Code of Obligations

OÈ JZ OÈ sterreichische Juristen-Zeitung
p. page(s)
para. paragraph(s)
PECL Principles of European Contract Law
PETL Principles of European Tort Law Series (see p. 282)
QB Law Reports: Queen's Bench Division
S.D.N.Y. Southern District of New York
S.A. The South African Law Reports
sec. section
sent. sentence
SJ Solicitors' Journal
subs. subsection
SZ Entscheidungen des oÈsterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes
in Zivil- und Justizverwaltungssachen
vol. volume
ZBJV Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins
ZEuP Zeitschrift fuÈr EuropaÈisches Privatrecht
ZSR Zeitschrift fuÈr Schweizerisches Recht
XI
The European Group on Tort Law
Francesco D. Busnelli Pisa Italy
Giovanni ComandeÂ Pisa Italy
Herman Cousy Leuven Belgium
Dan B. Dobbs Tucson USA
Bill W. Dufwa Stockholm Sweden
Michael G. Faure Maastricht Netherlands
Israel Gilead Jerusalem Israel
Michael D. Green Winston-Salem USA
Konstantinos D. Kerameus Athens Greece
Bernhard A. Koch Innsbruck/Vienna Austria
Helmut Koziol Vienna/Graz Austria
Ulrich Magnus Hamburg Germany
Miquel MartõÂn-Casals Girona Spain
Olivier MoreÂteau Lyon France
Johann Neethling Pretoria South Africa
W. V. Horton Rogers Leeds England
Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro Coimbra Portugal
Jaap Spier The Hague Netherlands
Lubos Tichy Prague Czech Republic
Pierre Widmer Lausanne Switzerland
http://www.egtl.org
XII
TITLE I. Basic Norm
Chapter 1. Basic Norm
Art. 1:101. Basic Norm
(1) A person to whom damage to another is legally attributed is liable to
compensate that damage.
(2) Damage may be attributed in particular to the person
a) whose conduct constituting fault has caused it; or
b) whose abnormally dangerous activity has caused it; or
c) whose auxiliary has caused it within the scope of his functions.
TITLE II. General Conditions of Liability

Chapter 2. Damage
Art. 2:101. Recoverable Damage
Damage requires material or immaterial harm to a legally protected inter-
est.
Art. 2:102. Protected Interests
(1) The scope of protection of an interest depends on its nature; the higher
its value, the precision of its definition and its obviousness, the more exten-
sive is its protection.
(2) Life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and liberty enjoy the
most extensive protection.
(3) Extensive protection is granted to property rights, including those in
intangible property.
(4) Protection of pure economic interests or contractual relationships may
be more limited in scope. In such cases, due regard must be had especially
to the proximity between the actor and the endangered person, or to the
fact that the actor is aware of the fact that he will cause damage even
though his interests are necessarily valued lower than those of the victim.
2
(5) The scope of protection may also be affected by the nature of liability,
so that an interest may receive more extensive protection against inten-
tional harm than in other cases.
(6) In determining the scope of protection, the interests of the actor, espe-
cially in liberty of action and in exercising his rights, as well as public inter-
ests also have to be taken into consideration.
Art. 2:103. Legitimacy of Damage
Losses relating to activities or sources which are regarded as illegitimate
cannot be recovered.
Art. 2:104. Preventive Expenses
Expenses incurred to prevent threatened damage amount to recoverable
damage in so far as reasonably incurred.
Art. 2:105. Proof of Damage
Damage must be proved according to normal procedural standards. The
court may estimate the extent of damage where proof of the exact amount
would be too difficult or too costly.
Chapter 3. Causation
Section 1. Conditio sine qua non and Qualifications
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non
An activity or conduct (hereafter: activity) is a cause of the victim's damage
if, in the absence of the activity, the damage would not have occurred.
Art. 3:102. Concurrent Causes
In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused
the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the vic-
tim's damage.
Art. 3:103. Alternative Causes
(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have
been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in
fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent correspond-
ing to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim's damage.
(2) If, in case of multiple victims, it remains uncertain whether a particular
victim's damage has been caused by an activity, while it is likely that it did
not cause the damage of all victims, the activity is regarded as a cause of
the damage suffered by all victims in proportion to the likelihood that it
may have caused the damage of a particular victim.
Art. 3:104. Potential Causes
(1) If an activity has definitely and irreversibly led the victim to suffer
damage, a subsequent activity which alone would have caused the same
damage is to be disregarded.
3
(2) A subsequent activity is nevertheless taken into consideration if it has

led to additional or aggravated damage.
(3) If the first activity has caused continuing damage and the subsequent
activity later on also would have caused it, both activities are regarded as
a cause of that continuing damage from that time on.
Art. 3:105. Uncertain Partial Causation
In the case of multiple activities, when it is certain that none of them has
caused the entire damage or any determinable part thereof, those that are
likely to have [minimally] contributed to the damage are presumed to
have caused equal shares thereof.
Art. 3:106. Uncertain Causes Within the Victim's Sphere
The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood
that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other circum-
stance within his own sphere.
Section 2. Scope of Liability
Art. 3:201. Scope of Liability
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section 1 of this Chap-
ter, whether and to what extent damage may be attributed to a person
depends on factors such as
a) the foreseeability of the damage to a reasonable person at the time of
the activity, taking into account in particular the closeness in time or
space between the damaging activity and its consequence, or the magni-
tude of the damage in relation to the normal consequences of such an
activity;
b) the nature and the value of the protected interest (Article 2:102);
c) the basis of liability (Article 1:101);
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been violated.
TITLE III. Bases of Liability

Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault
Section 1. Conditions of Liability Based on Fault
Art. 4:101. Fault
A person is liable on the basis of fault for intentional or negligent violation
of the required standard of conduct.
Art. 4:102. Required Standard of Conduct
(1) The required standard of conduct is that of the reasonable person in the
circumstances, and depends, in particular, on the nature and value of the
protected interest involved, the dangerousness of the activity, the expertise
to be expected of a person carrying it on, the foreseeability of the damage,
the relationship of proximity or special reliance between those involved, as
4
well as the availability and the costs of precautionary or alternative meth-

ods.
(2) The above standard may be adjusted when due to age, mental or physi-
cal disability or due to extraordinary circumstances the person cannot be
expected to conform to it.
(3) Rules which prescribe or forbid certain conduct have to be considered
when establishing the required standard of conduct.
Art. 4:103. Duty to Protect Others from Damage
A duty to act positively to protect others from damage may exist if law so
provides, or if the actor creates or controls a dangerous situation, or when
there is a special relationship between parties or when the seriousness of
the harm on the one side and the ease of avoiding the damage on the other
side point towards such a duty.
Section 2. Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault
Art. 4:201. Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault in General
(1) The burden of proving fault may be reversed in light of the gravity of
the danger presented by the activity.
(2) The gravity of the danger is determined according to the seriousness of
possible damage in such cases as well as the likelihood that such damage
might actually occur.
Art. 4:202. Enterprise Liability
(1) A person pursuing a lasting enterprise for economic or professional
purposes who uses auxiliaries or technical equipment is liable for any
harm caused by a defect of such enterprise or of its output unless he proves
that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct.
(2) ªDefectº is any deviation from standards that are reasonably to be
expected from the enterprise or from its products or services.
Chapter 5. Strict Liability
Art. 5:101. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
(1) A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly
liable for damage characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and
resulting from it.
(2) An activity is abnormally dangerous if
a) it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even when
all due care is exercised in its management and
b) it is not a matter of common usage.
(3) A risk of damage may be significant having regard to the seriousness or
the likelihood of the damage.
(4) This Article does not apply to an activity which is specifically subjected
to strict liability by any other provision of these Principles or any other
national law or international convention.
5
Art. 5:102. Other Strict Liabilities

(1) National laws can provide for further categories of strict liability for
dangerous activities even if the activity is not abnormally dangerous.
(2) Unless national law provides otherwise, additional categories of strict
liability can be found by analogy to other sources of comparable risk of
damage.
Chapter 6. Liability for Others
Art. 6:101. Liability for Minors or Mentally Disabled Persons
A person in charge of another who is a minor or subject to mental disability
is liable for damage caused by the other unless the person in charge shows
that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct in supervision.
Art. 6:102. Liability for Auxiliaries
(1) A person is liable for damage caused by his auxiliaries acting within the
scope of their functions provided that they violated the required standard
of conduct.
(2) An independent contractor is not regarded as an auxiliary for the pur-
poses of this Article.
TITLE IV. Defences

Chapter 7. Defences in General
Art. 7:101. Defences Based on Justifications
(1) Liability can be excluded if and to the extent that the actor acted legiti-
mately
a) in defence of his own protected interest against an unlawful attack (self-
defence),
b) under necessity,
c) because the help of the authorities could not be obtained in time (self-
help),
d) with the consent of the victim, or where the latter has assumed the risk
of being harmed, or
e) by virtue of lawful authority, such as a licence.
(2) Whether liability is excluded depends upon the weight of these justifica-
tions on the one hand and the conditions of liability on the other.
(3) In extraordinary cases, liability may instead be reduced.
Art. 7:102. Defences Against Strict Liability
(1) Strict liability can be excluded or reduced if the injury was caused by an
unforeseeable and irresistible
a) force of nature (force majeure), or
b) conduct of a third party.
6
(2) Whether strict liability is excluded or reduced, and if so, to what extent,
depends upon the weight of the external influence on the one hand and the
scope of liability (Article 3:201) on the other.
(3) When reduced according to paragraph (1)(b), strict liability and any lia-
bility of the third party are solidary in accordance with Article 9:101 (1)(b).
Chapter 8. Contributory Conduct or Activity
Art. 8:101. Contributory Conduct or Activity of the Victim
(1) Liability can be excluded or reduced to such extent as is considered just
having regard to the victim's contributory fault and to any other matters
which would be relevant to establish or reduce liability of the victim if he
were the tortfeasor.
(2) Where damages are claimed with respect to the death of a person, his
conduct or activity excludes or reduces liability according to paragraph (1).
(3) The contributory conduct or activity of an auxiliary of the victim
excludes or reduces the damages recoverable by the latter according to
paragraph (1).
TITLE V. Multiple Tortfeasors

Chapter 9. Multiple Tortfeasors
Art. 9:101 Solidary and Several Liability: Relation Between Victim and
Multiple Tortfeasors
(1) Liability is solidary where the whole or a distinct part of the damage
suffered by the victim is attributable to two or more persons. Liability is
solidary where:
a) a person knowingly participates in or instigates or encourages wrong-
doing by others which causes damage to the victim; or
b) one person's independent behaviour or activity causes damage to the
victim and the same damage is also attributable to another person.
c) a person is responsible for damage caused by an auxiliary in circum-
stances where the auxiliary is also liable.
(2) Where persons are subject to solidary liability, the victim may claim full
compensation from any one or more of them, provided that the victim may
not recover more than the full amount of the damage suffered by him.
(3) Damage is the same damage for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b)
above when there is no reasonable basis for attributing only part of it to
each of a number of persons liable to the victim. For this purpose it is for
the person asserting that the damage is not the same to show that it is not.
Where there is such a basis, liability is several, that is to say, each person
is liable to the victim only for the part of the damage attributable to him.
Art. 9:102 Relation Between Persons Subject to Solidary Liability
(1) A person subject to solidary liability may recover a contribution from
any other person liable to the victim in respect of the same damage. This
7
right is without prejudice to any contract between them determining

the allocation of the loss or to any statutory provision or to any right to
recover by reason of subrogation [cessio legis] or on the basis of unjust
enrichment.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, the amount of the contribution
shall be what is considered just in the light of the relative responsibility for
the damage of the persons liable, having regard to their respective degrees
of fault and to any other matters which are relevant to establish or reduce
their liability. A contribution may amount to full indemnification. If it is
not possible to determine the relative responsibility of the persons liable
they are to be treated as equally responsible.
(3) Where a person is liable for damage done by an auxiliary under Article
9:101 he is to be treated as bearing the entire share of the responsibility
attributable to the auxiliary for the purposes of contribution between him
and any tortfeasor other than the auxiliary.
(4) The obligation to make contribution is several, that is to say, the person
subject to it is liable only for his apportioned share of responsibility for
the damage under this Article; but where it is not possible to enforce a
judgment for contribution against one person liable his share is to be
reallocated among the other persons liable in proportion to their responsi-
bility.
TITLE VI. Remedies

Chapter 10. Damages
Section 1. Damages in General
Art. 10:101. Nature and Purpose of Damages
Damages are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say, to
restore him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been in if
the wrong complained of had not been committed. Damages also serve
the aim of preventing harm.
Art. 10:102. Lump Sum or Periodical Payments
Damages are awarded in a lump sum or as periodical payments as appro-
priate with particular regard to the interests of the victim.
Art. 10:103. Benefits Gained Through the Damaging Event
When determining the amount of damages benefits which the injured party
gains through the damaging event are to be taken into account unless this
cannot be reconciled with the purpose of the benefit.
Art. 10:104. Restoration in Kind
Instead of damages, restoration in kind can be claimed by the injured party
as far as it is possible and not too burdensome to the other party.
8
Section 2. Pecuniary Damage

Art. 10:201. Nature and Determination of Pecuniary Damage
Recoverable pecuniary damage is a diminution of the victim's patrimony
caused by the damaging event. Such damage is generally determined as
concretely as possible but it may be determined abstractly when appropri-
ate, for example by reference to a market value.
Art. 10:202. Personal Injury and Death
(1) In the case of personal injury, which includes injury to bodily health and
to mental health amounting to a recognised illness, pecuniary damage
includes loss of income, impairment of earning capacity (even if unaccom-
panied by any loss of income) and reasonable expenses, such as the cost
of medical care.
(2) In the case of death, persons such as family members whom the
deceased maintained or would have maintained if death had not occurred
are treated as having suffered recoverable damage to the extent of loss of
that support.
Art. 10:203. Loss, Destruction and Damage of Things
(1) Where a thing is lost, destroyed or damaged, the basic measure of
damages is the value of the thing or the diminution in its value and for
this purpose it is irrelevant whether the victim intends to replace or repair
the thing. However, if the victim has replaced or repaired it (or will do
so), he may recover the higher expenditure thereby incurred if it is reason-
able to do so.
(2) Damages may also be awarded for loss of use of the thing, including
consequential losses such as loss of business.
Section 3. Non-Pecuniary Damage
Art. 10:301. Non-Pecuniary Damage
(1) Considering the scope of its protection (Article 2:102), the violation of
an interest may justify compensation of non-pecuniary damage. This is the
case in particular where the victim has suffered personal injury; or injury
to human dignity, liberty, or other personality rights. Non-pecuniary
damage can also be the subject of compensation for persons having a close
relationship with a victim suffering a fatal or very serious non-fatal injury.
(2) In general, in the assessment of such damages, all circumstances of the
case, including the gravity, duration and consequences of the grievance,
have to be taken into account. The degree of the tortfeasor's fault is to be
taken into account only where it significantly contributes to the grievance
of the victim.
(3) In cases of personal injury, non-pecuniary damage corresponds to the
suffering of the victim and the impairment of his bodily or mental health.
In assessing damages (including damages for persons having a close rela-
9
tionship to deceased or seriously injured victims) similar sums should be

awarded for objectively similar losses.
Section 4. Reduction of Damages
Art. 10:401. Reduction of Damages
In an exceptional case, if in light of the financial situation of the parties full
compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant, damages
may be reduced. In deciding whether to do so, the basis of liability (Article
1:101), the scope of protection of the interest (Article 2:102) and the magni-
tude of the damage have to be taken into account in particular.
10
Commentaries
General Introduction
The Principles of European Tort Law

of the European Group on Tort Law
1. Introduction
1 Since 1992 a group of scholars in the area of tort law has met on a regular
basis in order to discuss fundamental issues of tort law as well as recent
developments and future directions of the law of torts. Years ago this group
(the Tilburg Group), now known as the European Group on Tort Law,
chose to embark on the European Principles of Tort Law.
2 Our group primarily is a European Group, i.e. a group of experts from
mainly EU countries. Yet, we are happy to have among us leading experts
from other important jurisdictions, notably the leading Swiss expert, chair-
man of the Swiss Reform Commission. Moreover, we benefit from the
input and expertise of a South African colleague and a colleague from
Israel. South African private law after all is a mixture of Roman Dutch
law and English law; Israeli private law is also a kind of a mixture. As a
European tort law has to borrow from the English and the continental
European legal systems, which are not so easy to tie together, it is
extremely useful to have information about a legal system which actually
operates on such a basis.
3 Developments in the US increasingly influence European tort law. They
must be taken into account, irrespective of the question whether or not
one likes those developments. We are proud to say that leading American
experts have also joined our group, inter alios the present and the former
reporter for the Restatement on Torts, who already were confronted with
many challenges and difficulties we have to face as well. Their experience
and well-considered views have been of considerable benefit for our work.
4 The present members of the group are: Prof. Francesco Busnelli (Pisa,
Italy), Prof. Giovanni ComandeÂ (Pisa, Italy) Prof. Herman Cousy (Leuven,
Belgium), Prof. Dan Dobbs (Tucson, USA), Prof. Bill Dufwa (Stockholm,
Sweden), Prof. Michael Faure (Maastricht, the Netherlands), Prof. Israel
Gilead (Jerusalem, Israel), Prof. Michael Green (Wake Forest University,
USA), Prof. Konstantinos Kerameus (Athens, Greece), Prof. Helmut
Koziol (Vienna and Graz, Austria), Prof. Bernhard A. Koch (Innsbruck,
Austria), Prof. Ulrich Magnus (Hamburg, Germany), Prof. Miquel Martin
12 Spier
Casals (Girona, Spain), Prof. Olivier MoreÂteau (Lyon, France), Prof.

Johann Neethling (Pretoria, South Africa), Prof. Horton Rogers (Leeds,
England), Prof. Jorge Sinde Monteiro (Coimbra, Portugal), Prof. Jaap
Spier (the Hague and Maastricht, the Netherlands), Prof. Lubos Tichy
(Prague, Czech Republic) and Prof. Pierre Widmer (Lausanne, Switzer-
land).
We are most grateful for the extremely valuable contributions of our for- 5
mer members, the late Prof. Gary Schwartz (Los Angeles, USA), Prof.
Michael Will (formerly Geneva, Switzerland, presently WuÈrzburg, Ger-
many), Prof. GenevieÁve Viney and Dr Suzanne Galand-Carval (Paris,
France), Prof. Christian von Bar (OsnabruÈck, Germany) and Dr. Olav
Haazen (New York, USA). We are also indebted to Prof. Miroslav Nester-
owicz (Torun, Poland) and Prof. Edgar du Perron (Amsterdam, the Neth-
erlands). Finally, we express particular thanks to our regular guests Dr.
Ewa Baginska (Torun, Poland) and Prof. BeÂneÂdict Winiger (Geneva, Swit-
zerland), and many collaborators of our members.
We are equally grateful for the support of Prof. Reiner Schulze (MuÈnster, 6
Germany) and Prof. Bernd Schilcher (Graz, Austria), inter alia, for hosting
one of our meetings.
We owe special thanks to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for their gen- 7
erous financial support of many meetings and to the staff of ECTIL (the
European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law in Vienna) for its invaluable
support in organising meetings and assisting in the publication of our series.
The members of our group have rather different backgrounds. All of them 8
are or have been law professors. However, in their previous lives several
members worked at the Ministry of Justice, have been ± or still are ± mem-
bers of the judiciary or the Council of State, attorneys or company lawyers.
Not only are their backgrounds different, their views are even more. Sev- 9
eral members are involved in important national and EU projects concern-
ing the law of torts and damages. Others are also experts in the field of
insurance. Quite a few members are involved in legislative projects.
Some are inclined to attach quite some importance to doctrine and to sys- 10
tematic arguments, tend to be positivists, whereas others tend to be more
pragmatic or consequentialists. Examples of the former are Art. 3:102 et
seq. and 4:202; the ad hoc mitigation is an example of the latter. Some of
us are very concerned about opening the floodgates, others considerably
less.
There is quite some difference between the common law and the civil law. 11
The former is largely based on case law and precedents, whereas legislation
plays a more important role in the civil law countries, which do not attach
similar importance to precedents. Yet, and perhaps surprisingly, the out-
come of many cases is rather similar in both legal systems. Arguably one
or more national legal systems show many more differences, also in rela-
Spier 13
tion to the outcome. This seems true for the Austrian, German and perhaps
the Dutch tort law.
12 The respective systems diverge in particular as to the doctrinal approach of
the basic norm. We have discussed several possibilities, borrowed from
many legal systems. After long lasting discussions, we have opted for the
protected interests approach; see Art. 2:102 and the commentary thereon.
13 Our draft clearly is a compromise of the different views and solutions in the
respective countries. It aims to bridge differences and to find a reasonable
and coherent way to tackle the topics dealt with.
2. Working Method 1
14 When embarking on a new topic, one member was invited to serve as
reporter and draft a questionnaire consisting of two parts: general issues
and concrete cases, often borrowed from case law in various countries.
This questionnaire was discussed in a meeting. After revision, the members
were invited to draft a national report on the basis of the questionnaire.
Subsequently the member(s) in charge drafted a comparative report based
on the national drafts submitted. In the next general meeting the topic
was discussed at length, with the primary aim to reach consensus on the
important issues. On that basis the reporter tried to draft provisional princi-
ples. This draft was discussed in the next meeting. Meetings were held in
Graz, Hamburg*, Lausanne*, Lyon, Munich*, MuÈnster, Pisa, Tossa de
Mar, Vienna* and WuÈrzburg (* means several times).
15 On this basis, we have dealt with wrongfulness, causation, damages, fault,
strict liability, liability for others, multiple tortfeasors and contributory
negligence. The questionnaires, country reports and the comparative
reports of all these topics have been published or will be published shortly
in the Group's series ªPrinciples of European Tort Lawº 2.
16 As our group is very closely related to ECTIL, we could borrow from the
important and in-depth research executed by it too.
17 In 2002 it was decided to start drafting a full set of principles on the basis of
the work done so far. The drafting was prepared by a Drafting Committee
consisting of Prof. Busnelli, Prof. Koch, Prof. Koziol, Prof. Magnus, Prof.
Martin Casals, Prof. MoreÂteau, Prof. Rogers, Prof. Spier and Prof. Widmer.
The basis for its discussions were the provisional draft and the subsequent
discussions. The Drafting Committee met several times in Vienna and
Munich.
18 After the final substantive meeting of the group in Vienna (spring 2004),
the Drafting Committee was assigned the task to complete and adapt the
final text of the Principles and the commentary thereto. The committee
met twice in the course of 2004; once in Girona and once in Vienna. Its
1
See, also for further references, H. Koziol, Die ªPrinciples of European Tort Lawº der ªEur-
opean Group on Tort Lawº, [2004] Zeitschrift fuÈr EuropaÈisches Privatrecht (ZEuP), 234 et seq.
2
See infra p. 282.
14 Spier
proposals were distributed among the members, whose observations were

taken care of.
The draft Principles have been discussed with various groups of interested 19
lawyers in meetings organised by the Academy of European Law in Trier
(a joint meeting with representatives of the Working Team on Extra-
Contractual Obligations (see infra no. 40), the University of Santiago de
Compostela (Prof. Maria Paz GarcõÂa Rubio), ECTIL in Vienna, the Swiss
Institute of Comparative Law in Lausanne and the University of Lyon.
We are much indebted to the organisers of those meetings and in particular
also to the many lawyers whose observations have been extremely useful
for the end result.
In our exercises we did not endeavour to postulate merely a possible com- 20
mon core. In each case, we posed the question whether such a common
core would be the best solution for Europe. If the question was answered
in the negative, we tried to find a better one.
We are proud to present the result of our work: a full set of principles on 21
the major part of tort law and the law of damages. Although we realise
that some issues still need to be addressed, we take the view that these
Principles cover the most important ones.
When we embarked on the present drafting exercise, years ago, the 22
method and style were discussed. In those days we embraced the ªflexible
systemº, with which ± admittedly ± many of us were rather unfamiliar.
The idea is to mention a series of relevant factors to be taken into account
if a hard and fast rule is not an option. This methodology has greatly influ-
enced the Principles.
We realize, of course, that this approach gives rise to criticism. A multi-fac- 23
tor approach may create a rather high level of uncertainty and has, by the
same token, an obvious disadvantage for practitioners. After all, the out-
come of court cases cannot be predicted with great precision.
Nonetheless, it seems open to debate whether such a criticism is entirely 24
justified. It presupposes that more hard and fast rules would have been
possible without running the risk of undesirable or unexpected negative
consequences. Moreover, this approach has been particularly adopted in
those parts of our Principles where the law in most jurisdictions is either
(to some extent) uncertain and unpredictable or the rules are detailed to
such an extent that they can hardly serve as a basis for Europe. Admittedly,
the former is not necessarily true. In such areas, national case law often has
developed a set of ªsub rulesº which greatly add to legal certainty. More-
over, experienced lawyers develop judgement about how open rules are
to be interpreted. The same will certainly happen on a European level,
but it may take quite some time.
To overcome this inevitable difficulty, regard must be had to the fact that 25
the Principles do not stand by themselves. They are accompanied by a
detailed commentary. That explains, inter alia, how the weighing of the var-
Spier 15
ious factors is meant by our group. The commentary often refers to cases
borrowed from the questionnaires and other cases addressed in the many
meetings on the relevant topic. Thus, we hope to show how they are to be
applied to real life cases. The previous volumes published by the Group
also serve as a source of additional information.
26 Although the very greater part of the (old) EU countries had members in
the Group, we realise that not every country was represented. To some
extent this shortcoming was remedied by extensive knowledge of several
members of the legal systems of the non-represented countries. Further-
more, during the course of our work it became clear that many new coun-
tries would join the EU. At that stage it was practically impossible to start
from scratch again. Yet, for the purpose of further developing European
private law, their views must be taken into account, of course.
27 We have tried to reach consensus which has proven possible in relation to
the vast majority of our Principles. Yet, it could not be reached in every
single case.
28 In case of ± rare ± fundamental disagreement, we refrained from a mechan-
ical way of voting, but we did account of the relative size and influences of
the countries represented. Differing opinions are mentioned throughout
the commentary.
29 It speaks for itself that not every member is particularly happy with the
entire set of Principles and every single Principle. In a very few cases
some members have explicitly expressed dissenting opinions. This only
happened in those instances where they had very considerable hesitations
as to the text that has been agreed by our group.
3. A First Step Towards a Truly European Tort Law

30 The goal of our Principles is to serve as a basis for the enhancement and
harmonisation of the law of torts in Europe. They can hopefully serve as a
kind of framework for the further development of a truly harmonised
European tort law. In this respect they are similar to e.g. the Lando
Principles, the structure and numbering of which are followed.
31 The Principles are not a restatement of the law of torts in Europe. After all
and despite many similarities, there are too many differences among the
respective national legal systems. So there is not yet a solid basis for ªre-
statementº.
32 It is obvious that a European tort law cannot be put together merely by a
group of academics. Leaving aside the issue of legitimacy, one has to bear in
mind that important issues require decision making. For the purpose of non-
binding principles such groups may ± and inevitably have to ± make them.
This is so where there is an identifiable common core which is acceptable, or
if the traditional view is considered less desirable or no longer consistent with
the needs of a modern society. We can only propose what we or the majority
of us deem best. However, when European tort law is going to be based on a
set of binding rules, the decisions must be taken on a political level.
16 Spier
National legal systems are related to legal culture, tradition and issues such 33
as the scope of social and first party insurance.
Probably more than in most other areas of private law, tort law must make 34
rather political choices.
Moreover, it is often hard, if not impossible, to reconcile the different inter- 35
ests or even to weigh them properly. After all, to a large extent one has to
operate in the dark as to important questions such as the potential effects
(the floodgate-argument; do specific choices encourage litigation and, if
so, to what extent in terms of money and the number of claims; the extent
to which tort law deters socially inappropriate conduct and insurability).
In this respect, it should be borne in mind that it is very much open to
debate whether the scene will be the same all over Europe.
Discussions on the law of torts, in particular in relation to personal injury, 36
often tend towards opening the floodgates instead of shutting them. If it
comes down to decisions as to specific topics, many are more often than
not inclined to harp on the defendant's tune, whereas they may be more
liberal when talking about specific cases.
We have had many discussions of this kind in our group too. In several 37
instances we have decided not to venture too far; e.g. Art. 5:101. In other
areas we break new ground, at least seen from the perspective of some
European legal systems. Art. 3:103, 3:104, 3:105, 4:102, 7:101, 10:301 para.
1 third sentence and 10:401. The latter may serve as a tool to avoid too
harsh consequences of full liability, which may have a tremendous and ±
as the majority of the group believes ± not per se justified impact on the
life of a tortfeasor.
Moreover, our Principles generally are rather open. They often provide 38
quite a lot of manúuvring room to adapt them to the changing needs and
requirements of the future; see e.g. Art. 5:102 para 2.
Furthermore, the practical picture cannot be confined to the private law of 39
torts: nowadays due regard must be had to human rights, directives, case
law of supra-national courts and constitutional requirements. The Princi-
ples are to be read and interpreted in their spirit.
Other groups also focus on tort law. That is in particular true for the Work- 40
ing Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations of the Study Group on a Eur-
opean Civil Code under the direction of Christian von Bar (OsnabruÈck).
Apart from a rather different drafting style, there are many similarities
between their and our Principles. There are considerable substantive differ-
ences too. It does not seem necessary to address them here in any detail, all
the less so as their text has not yet reached its final stage; it is still subject to
change 3.
3
The current draft (as of June 2004) can be downloaded at http://www.sgecc.net/media/down-
load/04_06tort.pdf.
Spier 17
41 The Working Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations tackles several issues

which we did not address, such as contractual exclusion and limitation of
liability as well as liability to insured parties. Moreover their draft is more
specific on strict liabilities. Finally, it introduces a de minimis-rule.
42 In our view most of the former two issues do not belong to the very core of
tort law, so we did not address them. The need and desirability of a de
minimis-rule, though practical, is not immediately obvious. After all, it
needs justification why very small claims are banned altogether, whereas
it does not speak for itself that they can only be lodged in other areas.
43 The Working Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations mentions a series of
legally relevant losses. We have been more reluctant to do so explicitly.
The practical differences between both drafts is probably rather remote in
this area.
44 We do not even dream that our Principles are the ideal, final model for
Europe. A lot of work still has to be done. No doubt similar projects, still
in progress, by other groups may also contribute to a more uniform tort
law in Europe. We sincerely hope that our Principles will stimulate and
intensify the debate on the future of this tremendously important field of
the law in Europe.
18 Spier
Title I. Basic Norm
Chapter 1. Basic Norm
Art. 1:101 . Basic Norm
(1) A person to whom damage to another is legally attributable is liable to
compensate that damage.
(2) Damage may be attributed in particular to the person
a) whose conduct constituting fault has caused it; or
b) whose abnormally dangerous activity has caused it; or
c) whose auxiliary has caused it within the scope of his functions.
Comments
1. Overview
The basic norm should only indicate some fundamental ideas and give a 1
rough overview of the main reasons of liability. As to the first aim, Art.
1:101 shows that a person has to compensate another person's harm only
if certain requirements for liability are met. In other words, a person's obli-
gation to render compensation is only established if the damage is legally
attributable to him. The basic norm thereby implicitly makes clear that
ªcasum sentit dominusº. The starting point is therefore that every person
has to bear his loss himself, which is only departed from if there is a legal
basis for shifting it to another.
Furthermore, Art. 1:101 provides that damage has to be compensated. The 2
basic norm thereby stresses firstly one of the general conditions for liability,
namely that another person suffered harm; secondly, that tort law strives
for compensation of that harm. Therefore, the Principles of tort law are
no basis for punitive damages or other payments which are not in corre-
spondence with harm suffered by the victim 1. This is underlined once
more by Art. 10.101 which says that damages are payments to restore the
victim, and points out that damages serve primarily the aim of compensa-
tion but also of prevention. However, compensable harm is not confined
to loss of money or property or financial expenditure.
1
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in: U. Magnus (ed.), Unifica-
tion of Tort Law: Damages (2001) 185.
Koziol 19
Art. 1:101 Title I. Basic Norm
3 Paragraph 2 also provides that damage may be attributed only to the per-
son who caused it; thus it refers to the provisions on causation in Chapter
3 Section 1. Causing the damage is decisive as it is the second general con-
dition of liability, but paragraph 2 also emphasizes that causation on its
own is not sufficient for establishing liability; on the contrary, liability
requires further reasons for shifting the loss, the core reasons being fault,
dangerous activity (the idea of ªriskº) and what is commonly called vicar-
ious liability. For this purpose, the basic norm is a ªsignpostº to the more
detailed principles in Title III.
4 Three further points should be made in relation to the basic norm.
5 First, the bases of liability enumerated in para. 2 are not intended to be in
some descending hierarchy: conceptually they are equal and alternative.
That means that liability based on fault is not seen as the fundamental cate-
gory of liability and all other liabilities as exceptions but rather as different
areas of liability based on different reasons which exist side by side 2.
6 Secondly, Art. 1:101 by listing the three main causes of liability does not
intend to express the idea that the three areas of liability are wholly inde-
pendent of one another and strictly separated by clear borderlines. On the
contrary, the members of the European Group were conscious of the exis-
tence of ªgrey zonesº, i.e. areas in between fault-based and strict liability 3.
7 Thirdly, the norm is a ªbasicº one and does not purport to provide for all
instances of ªtortº liability in all circumstances.
2. Terminology
a) Person
8 ªPersonº of course includes legal as well as natural persons.
b) Damage
9 Art 1:101 refers to ªdamageº as such, but Art. 2:101 shows that only com-
pensable damage is of relevance and defines such damage.
c) Compensate
10 The meaning of compensation is explained in Art. 10.101: The liable per-
son has to restore the victim.
d) Conduct
11 ªConductº has to be understood in a broad sense; the word comprises acts
as well as omissions.
2
But see Art. 4:101 no. 6.
3
Cf., e.g., the answers to the first question in Part I. A. 1. of the questionnaire on strict liability:
ªStrict liability versus fault liability ± alternatives or grey areas in between?º. See B.A. Koch/
H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002), and below the comments to
Chapter 5.
20 Koziol
Chapter 1. Basic Norm Art. 1:101
e) Fault
ªFaultº is defined in Art. 4:101. 12
f) Causation
Chapter 3 deals with ªCausationº and Art. 3:101 defines the cause of 13
damage.
g) Abnormally dangerous
This term is explained by Art. 5:101 4. 14
h) Auxiliary
As to this expression cf. Art. 6:102 5. 15
3. History of the Provision

The Drafting Committee decided already in its first session 6 to begin the 16
principles with a basic norm and to take the ªfundamental rule of imputa-
tionº (Art. 41) of the ªDraft Revision of Swiss Tort Lawº as an example.
Under discussion was especially the reference to the area of liability for
others. Some members wanted a phrase with a more general meaning, so
as to include, e.g., vicarious liability for minors. But the search for a word-
ing according to which damage can be imputed to persons who make use
of others in their own interest or who are burdened with supervisory duties
was not successful: The reasons for attributing the loss differ to a great
extent and there is no common basis for establishing liability for damage
caused by others. Therefore, the basic norm just mentions the most impor-
tant liability for auxiliaries, but the wording ªin particularº makes suffi-
ciently clear that this is only an example. 7
In the discussion at the general meeting of the European Group on Tort 17
Law 8 some members were reluctant to accept the concept of equal footing
of the three causes of liability. Furthermore, the Israeli and Italian mem-
bers proposed to differentiate only between fault and no-fault/strict liability
(either for other persons or for risks). But other members pointed out that
vicarious liability can be either fault or strict liability; further, that vicarious
4
See Art. 5:101 no. 7.
5
See Art. 6:102 no. 6.
6
7 April 2001 in Vienna.
7
The wording of the first draft was:
ª(1) A person is liable for the compensation of the damage caused to another insofar as the
law permits to impute such damage to her.
(2) Damage can be imputed in particular
a) to the person whose behaviour has caused it and who is at fault;
yb) to the person who makes use of an agent, if the damage has been caused by such agent in
the course of an activity for which such agent has been engaged, or
c) to the person who is in a lasting position to control a source of high danger, if the damage
results from the realisation of the characteristic risk inherent thereto.º
8
30 May 2002 in Pisa.
Koziol 21
Art. 1:101 Title I. Basic Norm
liability should not be considered a strict liability in the narrow sense as

some form of misbehaviour on the part of the auxiliary is required. There-
fore, the majority agreed with the three-part listing. The proposal to
shorten the wording in order to show the more general notions behind the
varieties met with unanimous approval.
4. Overview of Existing Liability Systems

18 Some of the existing legal systems have a general clause on fault-based lia-
bility (cf. Art. 1382 of the French and § 1295 of the Austrian civil code) but
none has a basic norm which refers in a general way to fault-based as well
as strict liability and liability for others. One of the reasons may be that
the existing legal systems tend not even to have general provisions on strict
liability 9. As mentioned before, in regard of a basic norm the Swiss draft is
a pioneer and thus the example for the Principles' Art 1:101. The draft of a
new Austrian law of liability also takes the Swiss draft as an example.
9
See infra Introduction to Chapter 5, no. 10.
22 Koziol
Title II. General Conditions of Liability
Introduction
1. Overview
Title II deals with damage and causation, which are necessary conditions 1
for liability: As already mentioned in the commentary to the basic norm,
according to these Principles tort law aims at compensation of harm, and
therefore, no claim can be established without legally cognisable damage.
Further, causation is recognised by all legal systems as a requirement of
tortious liability 1 . Therefore, attribution of damage to one person requires
in any case that this person herself or another person or a thing in her
sphere has caused the damage; otherwise there is no connection between
this person and the damage suffered by the victim which calls upon that
person to make recompense.
It must be emphasized that this Title sets out general requirements for lia- 2
bility which must be fulfilled in all cases but these requirements are not suf-
ficient: in addition there must be one of the reasons for attributing the loss
found in Title III.
2. History of the Title

Originally, Chapters 2 ± 6 were part of a single Title called ªConditions of 3
Liabilityº. This Title consisted of articles of equal rank, among others on
damage, causation, strict liability, fault-based liability and liability for
others. On the request of the Swiss member 2 the Group agreed to split
this Title, thereby demonstrating the difference between the general condi-
tions of liability (now Title II) and the grounds for attributing the damage
(now Title III).
1
See J. Spier/O.A. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, in: J. Spier (ed.), Unifica-
tion of Tort Law: Causation (2000) 127.
2
Meeting in Lausanne, 2 and 3 May 2003.
Koziol 23
Introduction Title II. General Conditions of Liability
Chapter 2. Damage
Introduction
1. Overview
1 Although the title of the chapter refers to ªdamageº in general, Art. 2:101
only mentions ªcompensable damageº. Therefore it is clear that not every
harm suffered by another person can be recovered under tort law: Estab-
lishing an obligation to compensate the damage requires an interference
with a legally protected interest. Which interests are legally protected has
to be ascertained on the basis of the whole legal system. But Art 2:102
sets out the relevant factors in determining the scope of protection.
2 The idea behind placing the emphasis on ªlegally protected interestsº is of
importance for the understanding of the fundamental concept of the Princi-
ples. Underlying the notion of interference with protected interests is one
aspect of the concept which the European Group on Tort law in its discus-
sions has called ªwrongfulnessº 1. We believe that it is possible to trace in
most of the systems we have considered some underlying idea of wrongful-
ness (though by no means necessarily under that name) which can be
regarded as a foundation of tort liability. Unfortunately, there is no unifor-
mity in the use of the expression. In the context of fault liability, in some
systems the stress is upon the interest protected and thus the unwanted
result ± the Erfolgsunrechtslehre, or the result-oriented theory. In other sys-
tems, even though it is accepted that not all interests are uniformly pro-
tected, wrongfulness goes to the behaviour of the tortfeasor (Verhaltensun-
rechtslehre). In yet others wrongfulness is a matter of the combination of
infringement of a protected interest and faulty behaviour, giving the
impression that wrongfulness is not much more than shorthand for ªliabi-
lity in tortº. Some systems (of which the most prominent is France) simply
do not recognize the concept under that or any other name, which does
not mean that the concept is denied altogether. Even in these systems,
wrongfulness may be described as a distinct component of faulty behaviour,
an implied reference to the protected interests and the required standard of
conduct. Things are further complicated by the fact that in some systems
there is a strong subjective element to fault (and not merely in special cases
where the actor lacks full legal capacity). In these cases one may speak of
the conduct being wrongful in the abstract quite apart from the issue of
interference with a protected interest (in German one might say that the
behaviour is tatbestandsmaÈûig) even though the actor may escape liability
because he is not at fault; on the other hand, in a system which takes a
firmly objective position on fault that distinction would be practically
meaningless.
1
Cf. H. Koziol, Conclusions, in: H. Koziol (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness (1998,
hereafter cited as PETL Wrongfulness) 129 et seq.; H. Koziol, The Concept of Wrongfulness
under the Principles of European Tort Law, in: H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European
Tort Law 2002 (2003) 552 et seq.
24 Koziol
Chapter 2. Damage Introduction
We believe that it would be impossible to produce a draft that could recon- 3

cile all these differences (or nuances). 2 The key issue is whether explicit
recognition should be given to the idea of the importance of the protected
interest in determining whether liability may arise and, if so, what is its
scope. After much discussion we have concluded that we should do so. It
seems to us that to a certain extent those systems which do not overtly
recognize this do in fact take account of it in more covert ways, for example
by manipulation of the concept of direct causation. We would also like to
point out that in Art. 2:102 we do not attempt to prescribe a closed or defi-
nitive list of interests for this purpose: we merely indicate the factors that
need to be taken into account in determining the scope of legal protection.
In our view, the law should adopt a three stage approach in this area 4
(though the third stage may be regarded as a subsidiary of the second).
The first step is to ask whether a legally protected interest has been
infringed. If the answer is no, that is the end of the case. If, on the other
hand, the answer is in the affirmative, the second step is to ask whether
the case satisfies one of the further conditions of liability prescribed by Title
III. In the case of liability based on fault the question is whether the actor
violated the standard of reasonable conduct prescribed by Art. 4:102. This
corresponds to the Verhaltensunrechtslehre in some systems or to the
ªbreach of dutyº issue in the common law. It is of course not relevant in
cases of strict liability under Art. 5:101, though the first stage is ± indeed, it
may well be that under a particular legislation the protective scope of strict
liability is narrower than that of fault liability. At present it seems that it is
only Swiss law which clearly recognizes wrongfulness as an element in cases
of strict liability. 3 That is not surprising in view of the way in which wrong-
fulness is mixed with fault in many systems; however, it seems to us that in
the more restricted context of protected interests the issue is as relevant to
strict liability as it is to fault. The second step is relevant but in a rather
more indirect way when it is sought to make a person liable for damage
done by his auxiliary (Art. 6:102) since in such a case it is necessary that
the auxiliary should have violated the required standard of conduct. The
third step will be relevant in only a minority of cases. Although we have
adopted a generally objective standard of due care we have concluded that
some allowance should be made for the inability of certain persons (e.g.
children and mentally disabled persons) to conform with the general stan-
dard (Art. 4:102 para. 2). In such cases it will therefore be necessary to con-
sider whether and how far the objective standard has to be adjusted.
2. History of the Chapter

On the basis of the country reports, the members of the Group at the time 4 5
stated the already above mentioned varying notions of wrongfulness and
agreed after long discussions to distinguish between
2
In any event, in a number of systems the matter is controversial and one cannot state a firm rule.
3
Cf. P. Widmer, Switzerland, in PETL Wrongfulness, 115.
4
Meeting in Vienna, 26±28 September 1996.
Koziol 25
Introduction Title II. General Conditions of Liability
(a) interference with protected rights and interests

(b) violation of the objective, general standard of care described by law
(c) subjective fault
6 With regard to a) and b) there was a common feeling that the English doc-
trine of duty of care and the civil law approach with regard to wrongfulness
(in countries like Austria and also to some extent Germany and the Neth-
erlands) are compatible in the sense that a violation of the standard of
care (under English law the negligence issue, under Belgian law the reason-
able foreseeability and preventability of harm) is essentially the same as
under the German or Austrian concept of Verhaltensunrecht.
7 In later discussions 5 there was agreement that, on the one hand, reference
to the protected interests is inevitable in defining damage 6, on the other
hand, that the concept of protected interests is also decisive for liabilities
other than fault-based liability, in particular for strict liability. Therefore,
after some changes of the wording, the present chapter on ªDamageº has
been accepted by the Group 7.

8 As to the varying meanings of wrongfulness under the different legal sys-
tems, it can be pointed out ± as to some extent already has been done ±
that in some countries wrongfulness is only of importance in the area of lia-
bility based on fault, but in Switzerland also in the field of strict liability 8.
However, even in the area of liability based on fault, the meaning of
wrongfulness differs greatly: Whereas under some systems the result is
qualified as wrongful (Erfolgsunrechtslehre), other systems require the
behaviour of the tortfeasor to be wrongful (Verhaltensunrechtslehre) 9.
For example, the first is true under Swiss law 10 and, according to the preva-
lent opinion 11 , also in Germany as far as unmittelbare Eingriffe (direct
interferences) with absolute rights are at stake. But some German scholars
emphasize that even if the result is decisive, the behaviour has to be
judged 12. Dutch law 13 explicitly relates to the act. Likewise, it is the general
5
Meeting of the Drafting Committee in Vienna, 7 April 2001.
6
Cf. U. Magnus, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in: U. Magnus (ed.), Unification
of Tort Law: Damages (2001, hereafter cited as PETL Damages) 185 (no. 37 et seq.).
7
Meeting in Pisa, 30 and 31 May 2002.
8
Cf. P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Wrongfulness, 115.
9
Cf. the reports on case 13, PETL Wrongfulness.
10
Cf. again P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Wrongfulness, 120 et seq.; further Art. 41 para. 2 of
the Draft Revision of Swiss Tort Law.
11
E. von Caemmerer, Wandlungen des Deliktsrechts, in Festschrift zum 100jaÈhrigen Bestehen
des deutschen Juristentages II (1960) 75 et seq.; H. Stoll, Unrechtstypen bei Verletzung absolu-
ter Rechte, [1963] Archiv fuÈr die civilistische Praxis (AcP) 162, 203; E. Deutsch, FahrlaÈssigkeit
und erforderliche Sorgfalt (2nd edn. 1995) 229 et seq., 282.
12
Cf. W. MuÈnzberg, Verhalten und Erfolg als Grundlagen der Rechtswidrigkeit und Haftung
(1966); G. BruÈggemeier, Deliktsrecht (1986) no. 95; H. KoÈtz/G. Wagner, Deliktsrecht (9th
edn. 2001) no. 98 et seq. See also K. Larenz/C.±W. Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts II/2:
Besonderer Teil (13th edn., 1994) § 75 II 3.
26 Koziol
Chapter 2. Damage Art. 2:101
opinion as well under Austrian law 14 as under Greek 15 and South African 16
law that the behaviour has to be qualified, and this theory also corresponds
to the breach of standard of care under English law 17. As French lawyers
do not strictly keep fault and wrongfulness apart 18, one has to assume that
they also qualify the behaviour and not the result; the same seems to be
true under Belgian law 19. To some extent Italian law tries to synthesize
both ways of establishing wrongfulness by the introduction of the flexible
rule of danno ingiusto following the Roman tradition of iniuria (understood
both as non iure and contra ius) 20.
Art. 2:101 . Recoverable Damage

Damage requires material or immaterial harm to a legally protected inter-
est.
Comments
1. Introduction
The meaning of damage is defined in rather broad terms1. The provision 1
has the effect that recoverable damage involves a negative variation in the
injured party's protected sphere; the notion of damage is thus not a ªnat-
uralº but a ªlegalº one 2. Furthermore, it makes clear at the outset that any
kind of grievance is potentially covered by the notion of damage; therefore,
immaterial as well as material harm can constitute compensable damage.
However, as has been explained above, the Principles apply only to com-
pensable damage, that is to say, damage to a legally protected interest.
Other harm, even if it might be regarded as damage in the ordinary use of
language, is not compensable. Thus a person may not claim compensation
for having been deprived of the fruits of an illegal activity (see Art. 2:103).
2. Definitions
a) Damage/Harm
Linguistically, it might be said that in the context of this Article ªdamageº 2
is a legal concept and ªharmº a natural one. However, the shift is really
13
Cf. Art 6:162 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW); further J. Spier, The Netherlands, PETL Wrongful-
ness, 87 et seq.
14
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Wrongfulness, 13 et seq.
15
See the report by K.D. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Wrongfulness, 66.
16
Cf J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Wrongfulness, 101 et seq.
17
See the W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Wrongfulness, 39 et seq.
18
G. Viney, France, PETL Wrongfulness, 57 et seq.
19
H.A. Cousy, Belgium, PETL Wrongfulness, 31 et seq.
20
Cf. F.D. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Wrongfulness, 69 et seq.
1
Cf. to the reasons U. Magnus, Germany, in U. Magnus (ed.), Unification of Tort Law:
Damages (2001, hereafter cited as PETL Damages) 89 (no. 36 et seq.).
2
See U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 34.
Koziol 27
Art. 2:101 Title II. General Conditions of Liability
made for reasons of euphony ± harm to a legally protected interest is

damage and the words are effectively synonymous. In our view damage or
harm in ordinary usage implies a comparison between the two states of
affairs, i.e., between the hypothetical situation and the real às it is' situa-
tion after the event complained of has occurred 3 ± what is known in the ter-
minology of German law as the ªDifferenzmethode.º 4 This is reinforced by
Art. 10:101: The victim has to be restored to the position he would have
been in if the wrong complained of had not been committed, so far as
monetary damages are capable of being restoration.
b) Material Harm
3 The expression ªmaterial harmº is explained by Art. 10:201: It denotes a
diminution of the victim's patrimony (pecuniary damage). Thus, material
harm includes not only damage to property but also lost earnings or profits
and expenses incurred.
c) Immaterial Harm
4 In contrast, Art. 10:301 does not define ªimmaterial harmº, but as every
damage has to be either material or immaterial, one can conclude that
damage is immaterial if it does not lead to a diminution of patrimony
(non-pecuniary damage). Accordingly, immaterial damage can be defined
as ªloss which is not damage to a person's assets, wealth or income and
which is therefore incapable of being quantified in any objective financial
manner by reference to a marketº 5.
3. Relation to Other Provisions

5 According to Art. 2:101, material as well as immaterial harm is covered by
the notion of damage; thus there is in general no difference in treatment
with regard to these two types of damage, in particular no exclusion from
compensation. Nevertheless, Art. 10:301 reveals that compensation of non-
pecuniary damage may be more restricted than that of pecuniary damage;
the reasons and details are discussed in the comments to that article.
4. Regime in Existing Liability Systems

6 With the exception of Austria, no statutory definition of the term
ªdamageº can be found in European legal systems 6. § 1293 General Aus-
trian Civil Code (Allgemeines BuÈrgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB) reads:
ªDamage is every detriment which was inflicted on someone's property,
rights or personº 7.
3
This was the outcome of the Drafting Committee's meeting on 19 May 2000.
4
5
W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report, in: W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary
Loss in a Comparative Perspective (2001) 246 (no. 2). Cf. also U. Magnus, Germany, PETL
Damages, no. 40.
6
7
Cf. H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, 10 (no. 16 et seq.).
28 Koziol
Illustrations
With regard to losses relating to illegitimate activities or sources, an illus- 7
tration is given in the commentary on Art. 2:103 8.
Another problem recently under discussion and connected with the notion 8
of damage, is compensation for ªwrongful lifeº 9. The question is whether
a handicapped child can base its claim for damages on the ground that it
would not have existed had the doctor acted carefully whilst examining
the mother during pregnancy, because she would have had an abortion
had she known of her child's handicap already then. This is a complex
and highly emotive issue, which admits of different answers, but according
to the prevailing opinion the child has no such claim because it is held
that legal systems do not protect the interest of a person not to live and
that no one has a right to be killed before or after birth 10.
Art. 2:102 . Protected Interests

(1) The scope of protection of an interest depends on its nature; the higher
its value, the precision of its definition and its obviousness, the more exten-
sive is its protection.
(2) Life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and liberty enjoy the
most extensive protection.
(3) Extensive protection is granted to property rights, including those in
intangible property.
(4) Protection of pure economic interests or contractual relationships
may be more limited in scope. In such cases, due regard must be had
especially to the proximity between the actor and the endangered person,
or to the fact that the actor is aware of the fact that he will cause damage
even though his interests are necessarily valued lower than those of the
victim.
(5) The scope of protection may also be affected by the nature of liability,
so that an interest may receive more extensive protection against inten-
tional harm than in other cases.
(6) In determining the scope of protection, the interests of the actor, espe-
cially in liberty of action and in exercising his rights, as well as public inter-
ests also have to be taken into consideration.
8
Infra Art. 2:103 no. 9.
9
See the comments in the country reports on Case 1 in: U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages,
further idem, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, PETL Damages, 185 (no. 98).
10
Cf. U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 98; further O. Massot, France, in: H. Koziol/B.
Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2001 (2002) 191 (no. 22 et seq.); Ph. Brun, France, in:
H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 179 (no. 17 et seq.).
Koziol 29
Comments
1. Introduction
1 A legal system can specify areas of protection in two ways 1: On the one
hand, it can forbid or demand a more or less predetermined behaviour;
from this, one may conclude that the law intends to protect certain interests
which would otherwise be endangered. On the other hand, a legal system
can describe the protected rights or interests and demand in a rather gen-
eral way that they should not be interfered with except as far as is reason-
able. These two methods are usually combined.
2 The question of how extensive the protection of a person's interest is and
which behaviour is therefore required from all others can be answered
rather easily if there is a particular imperative rule (Schutzgesetz) which
forbids endangering an interest by some conduct fairly precisely described.
The issue becomes more complex if the law only provides that others must
not act contra bonos mores. Establishing the level of protection is also more
difficult if the legal system merely describes the rights or interests to be pro-
tected as far as is reasonable. It is then left to practice to determine the
scope of protection and the behaviour demanded from others. Specific leg-
islation may of course precisely define the scope of protection. Thus the EC
Directive on Product Liability allows a claim to be made in respect of per-
sonal injury and damage to other property in private use, but not, for
example, in respect of damage to the property of a company.
3 Art. 2:102 does not mention imperative rules. But it seems a matter of
course that rules which rather precisely prescribe or forbid a certain beha-
viour reveal that the legal system aims at the protection of the otherwise
endangered interests, at least against violation by such behaviour. There-
fore, it seems possible to refrain from expressly mentioning this way of pre-
scribing the scope of protection.
4 As to boni mores, these are also not mentioned by Art. 2:102. Quite apart
from the fact that the concept would have little or no meaning in some sys-
tems, the reason is that referring to bonos mores in itself does not give any
indication of the solution, not even a clue to which factors are relevant.
Therefore, in establishing whether a behaviour is contra bonos mores one
has to weigh all the interests of the parties involved. Thus, there is no dif-
ference to the general way of establishing the scope of protection, and
therefore, no need for a special provision.
5 As we have mentioned above, there are very considerable variations in the
approach of European systems to the issue of protected interests. Thus this
idea is the more or less explicit underpinning of German law. We believe
that something of the same nature is to be found in the common law via
the terminology of the duty of care, since a primary function of duty is to
1
See H. Koziol, The Concept of Wrongfulness under the Principles of European Tort Law, in:
H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 552 et seq.
30 Koziol
identify the types of losses in respect of which liability is to be allowed or

denied or restricted. On the other hand, French law does not overtly recog-
nize ªprotected interestsº at all. However, we stress that we have not
sought to set out either a closed list of interests nor to set them in any abso-
lute hierarchy. We specifically mention matters like bodily integrity, human
dignity, liberty and property because it must be the case that every devel-
oped legal system regards those as the subject of protection by tort law; in
contrast we do not mention privacy, not because we suggest that it should
not be the subject of protection but because the extent and manner of its
protection is at present a good deal more varied than in the other cases.
We also believe that most people would share our view that bodily integrity
and liberty stand higher in terms of requiring the law's protection than
expectancies from contracts. But we are not saying that bodily injury is
always compensable where the defendant has caused it; nor are we saying
that pure economic loss is never compensable. Rather, this Article provides
for a flexible system based on a number of inter-connected factors. These
are signposts to provide at least a starting point of guidance and to provide
at least broad consistency in decision-making. When we say that the factors
are inter-connected this may be illustrated by a simple example. One factor
which has made some legal systems take a more restricted approach to
pure economic loss than to damage to property is the fact that they per-
ceive a risk of an unreasonable burden of liability since a very large num-
ber of people may be affected, the details of whose affairs are unknown to
the actor. However, the position is (and should be) different where a per-
son sets out to cause financial loss to another (for example by fraud or by
persuading third parties not to perform their contracts). In such a case the
fact that the other person is the intended target generally removes the risk
of a wide-ranging liability, and the wilful nature of the actor's behaviour
makes it less likely that he can assert to have acted legitimately for his
own purposes (paragraphs 4 and 5).
2. Definitions
a) Obviousness
Interests are obvious when third persons have reason to be aware of 6
their existence and range 2. The rights to life and also of property are
rather obvious, pure economic and immaterial interests are by no means
obvious. The importance of this factor has been worked out especially
under German law.
b) Precision of Definition
The idea is that some rights have a comparatively clear-cut borderline as, 7
e.g., the right to life or property, whereas others have a broad grey zone,
e.g., the right to privacy or, more so, pure economic interests.
2
H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Wrongfulness, 15 with further references.
Koziol 31
c) Proximity
8 By proximity we mean the closeness of the relationship between the par-
ties. We do not mean it to have the technical (if somewhat obscure) mean-
ing it has acquired in the common law. Plainly, there is likely to be proxi-
mity between parties to or negotiating for a contract (assuming the legal
system allows the concurrence of contract and tort). It is less likely that
there will be proximity between an author and ªconsumersº of generally
published information. On the other hand, even where there is no contact
the nature of the activity may suggest that it is reasonable to regard one
as placing reliance on the other. So there would likely be proximity
between a person issuing a prospectus and those to whom the information
is addressed; and while it is unlikely that a court would impose liability for
advice in a generally published business manual the same might not be
true if, say, the book was a manual for consumers on electrical wiring or
on identifying edible fungi.
d) Pure Economic Loss
9 Pure economic loss is a financial loss which does not result from physical
injury to the plaintiff's own person or property 3.
e) Value
10 Value refers on the one hand to the ranking of an interest. The right to
human life, for example, has a higher ranking than ownership of a book
or the interest to gain some profit. This is shown by many constitutions
and conventions, e.g., the Convention on Human Rights. On the other
hand, value relates also to the size of the interest: The ownership of a
low-priced book which is broadly available in any bookshop is of less value
than the ownership of one of Rembrandt's paintings.
3. Reasons
11 In laying down the scope of protection one has to consider that opposing
interests are involved 4: In protecting one person's interests and rights, the
legal system demands that all others should respect those areas: If the legal
system recognizes protected positions of a person, then it requires that all
others respect those rights and interests to a reasonable extent. The owner
of the protected right or interest does not have to tolerate interference
without justification; he may have the right to apply for an injunction and
the right to self-defence. As a result, every recognition of protected spheres
leads to restriction of freedom of all others. Therefore, establishing the
3
Cf. W. van Boom, Pure Economic Loss: A Comparative Perspective, in: W. van Boom/
H. Koziol/Ch. Witting (eds.), Pure Economic Loss (2004) 2 et seq.; I. Gilead, The Limits of
Tort Liability in Negligence and Pure Economic Loss, in: H. Hausmaninger et al. (eds.),
Developments in Austrian and Israeli Private Law (1999) 203; J. Neethling, South Africa,
PETL Wrongfulness, 106.
4
Cf. R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (1992) 120.
32 Koziol
scope of protection requires the weighing of the opposing interests: On the

one hand, the interest to enjoy far-reaching protection, on the other, the
interest to enjoy the greatest possible freedom.
In discussing the outcome of the country reports, the European Group 12
attempted to work out the factors which are relevant for determining the
level of protection. Relevant factors are: the value of the protected interest,
the precision of its definition and its obviousness; the nature of the defen-
dant's liability (e.g. intention or negligence); the interests of the actor, espe-
cially in liberty of action and in exercising his rights; as well as public inter-
ests.
As to the value of the interests, para. 2 points out that life, bodily integrity 13
and liberty are ranking highest and that property rights are on the next
level (para. 3). The ranking of pure economic interests (para. 4) is even
less, furthermore they are neither obvious nor do they have clear contours;
therefore, their protection is more limited 5. Para. 5 stresses that the scope
of protection also depends on the weight of the grounds of liability; there-
fore, interests are protected to a greater extent in case of wilful endanger-
ing. Para. 6 reminds us that in addition the interests of the actor or the pub-
lic have to be considered in establishing the scope of protection.
It has to be pointed out that the extent of protection of interests depends 14
on whether one or more of a number of factors are given, also on the
weight of these factors and their combination with other factors. As the
scope of protection depends on the total weight of the factors, it may,
therefore, even be that a high-ranking interest enjoys no protection if
opposite interests prevail, e.g., if, on the one hand, the endangering of
health is only very slight and, on the other hand, the actor would suffer
severe damage to his property if he had to respect the right to physical
well-being.

As mentioned above, Art. 2:101 and 2:102 only express that interests may 15
be legally protected and list factors which are relevant for establishing the
scope of protection. Thus these articles also delimitate the extent to which
other persons should not endanger such interests. From this one can con-
clude that interfering with such interests is a misbehaviour in the abstract.
However, which standard of conduct is required in a concrete situation is
not determined by this article but by Art. 4:101 et seq.

The current codified legal systems do not expressly mention the relevant 16
factors in establishing the scope of protection. Nevertheless, there are dis-
5
Cf. in more detail E.K. Banakas (ed.), Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss (1996); W. van
Boom/H. Koziol/Ch. Witting (eds.), Pure Economic Loss (2004); M. Bussani/V.V. Palmer
(eds.), Pure Economic Loss in Europe (2003).
Koziol 33
tinct clues that the legislators as well as the courts under some legal systems
take certain factors into consideration. Art. 2:102 is the compromise synth-
esis of some of the country reports written by members of the European
Group 6.
Illustrations
17 As to the rights of personality which do not have such clear contours as the
fundamental rights to life, bodily or mental integrity and liberty, the inter-
ests of all others in the freedom of action have to be considered. As a
result, the right to honour or reputation is protected against true statements
or expressions of opinion only to a small extent 7. Even if a comment is
untrue, for example, the right of others to free statement of opinion and
the interest in full information have to be considered 8. Regarding contrac-
tual rights, it carries weight that the interests are of lower ranking, and
that they have various contents which are not obvious 9. This is even more
so the case for pure economic interests 10. Therefore, the competing inter-
ests of others have to be valued as being of equal rank. As a consequence,
pure economic interests, e.g., the chance to net a profit, enjoy protection
only to a limited extent 11. Even more restricted is the protection of pure
immaterial interests, e.g., not to be worried or frightened by someone's
behaviour 12.
Art. 2:103 . Legitimacy of Damage
Losses relating to activities or sources which are regarded as illegitimate

cannot be recovered.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 The provision addresses a specific subproblem of the law of damage. It
makes clear that compensation of damage requires that the loss must not
only result from the violation of a legally protected interest as provided
by Art. 2:102 but also that the loss flowing from such violation ± for
instance loss of income ± must be recognised by law as well. When an activ-
6
Cf. the conclusions by H. Koziol, PETL Wrongfulness, 131 et seq.
7
See the reports on case 6 in PETL Wrongfulness.
8
9
10
See the reports on case 1, 3 and 4 in PETL Wrongfulness.
11
See the reports on case 1 in PETL Wrongfulness; cf. further the outlook in W. van Boom/
H. Koziol/Ch. Witting (eds.), Pure Economic Loss (2004) 191 et seq.
12
Cf. infra the comments on Art. 10:301 et seq.; further W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report, in
W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (2001)
no. 31.
34 Koziol/Magnus
ity or source of gain or profit is illegal or disapproved of by the law then its
loss does not constitute recoverable damage. Illegitimate losses do not
deserve the protection of the law and therefore may not be recovered.
The provision is thus a specific expression and extension of the general 2
concept of Art. 2:102 to consequential losses: consequential losses must
relate to positions or expected gains which are protected by the law. On
the other hand the Article implicitly confirms that legitimate losses ± be
they direct or indirect consequences of an infringement of a legally pro-
tected interest ± are in principle recoverable.
2. Definition
Illegitimate
A loss ± for instance of income ± is regarded as illegitimate if the injured 3
person loses income which is not lawfully earned. This is certainly the case
where the injured person pursues some illegal ± e.g., criminal ± activity for-
bidden by law and would have had proceeds from it had the injury not
occurred. Such lost proceeds cannot be recovered. Even where the activity
is disapproved of but nonetheless tolerated (as, e.g., in case of prostitutes)
the gain from it may be regarded as illegitimate not deserving the full pro-
tection of the law. 1 The decision on whether an activity or source is illegiti-
mate depends on what the law prescribes and on what social values and
common judgment allow and disallow. As the case of the prostitutes shows
this judgment may vary from time to time.
However, the Article limits recovery only in cases where the source of the 4
lost proceeds is illegitimate. It does not exclude compensation for bodily
harm or non-pecuniary loss arising from it when for instance a criminal is
injured while driving to the place of commission of the crime.
3. Reasons
Art. 2:103 is based on the argument that the legal order as a whole requires 5
respect and that therefore losses which are connected with some illegal or
at least illegitimate activity or source do not deserve to be protected by
the law. The protective scope of tort law does not cover the loss of a benefit
which the legal order bans. 2 An injured person can therefore only claim
such lost gains or profits which when made would have been in conformity
with the legal order.
1
In Europe the opinion is split whether in this case either full or limited or no compensation for
lost earnings should be granted. While Belgian law denies any compensation the other coun-
tries agree that at least some restricted and basic compensation for lost earnings or lost earn-
ing capacity should be granted; even full compensation of the lost earnings is allowed by Aus-
tria and probably also by England, Greece and the Netherlands; see U. Magnus, Comparative
Report, PETL Damages, no. 12 and the references there.
2
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 54.
Magnus 35
4. Scope of This Article

6 The Article has a limited scope of application. It requires the specific situa-
tion that the loss of the victim must relate to potential illegal or at least ille-
gitimate gains. If the lost gain or profit is illegal because a rule of law expli-
citly so provides no recovery at all is owed. If the gain or profit is illegiti-
mate due to rules of good morals or the like a certain discretion might be
accepted to grant at least a basic compensation. 3
5. Relation to Other Articles

7 The Article is a useful addition and clarification of the general principle
that only legally protected interests enjoy the (full) protection of the law
because the Article extends this principle also to consequential losses. The
Article is therefore related to Art. 2:102. As far as Art. 2:103 excludes com-
pensation it is also linked to the Chapter on damages (Ch. 10).

8 The different European legal systems exclude compensation for losses of
illegal gains or profits and at least restrict recovery where the lost gain or
profit resulted from an illegitimate source of income. 4
Illustration
9 P is earning his living by burglary. He is severely injured in a traffic accident
for which D is liable. Due to the accident P is incapacitated for some time
and claims damages for lost income for that time.
Since P's income is to be regarded as illegitimate he is therefore precluded
under Art. 2:103 from claiming the level of income he would have earned
by burglary. But he is still entitled to compensation for costs of healing or
non-pecuniary loss. Most European laws would also grant him compensa-
tion for the pure (abstract) loss of earning capacity irrespective of whether
or not he exploited it in an illegitimate way. 5
3
See fn. 2.
4
See, e.g., for Austria: OGH [1985] Entscheidungen des oÈsterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes
in Zivil- und Justizverwaltungssachen (SZ) 58/101; [1990] SZ 63/106; [1999] Recht der
Wirtschaft (RdW), 400; for Belgium: H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages,
27 (no. 42, 118); for England: Burns v. Edman [1970] 2 QB 541; for France: S. Galand-Carval,
France, PETL Damages, 77 (no. 26, 79); for Germany: Entscheidungen des (deutschen)
Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 75, 368; for Greece: K. Kerameus, Greece,
PETL Damages 113 (no. 15); for Italy: Cass. civ., sez. III, [1987, I] Foro it. 493; for the Nether-
lands: M. H. Wissink/W.H. von Boom, Netherlands, PETL Damages, 151 (no. 89). Also non-
European countries follow the same rule; see, e.g., for South-Africa: Dhlamini v. Protea
Assurance Co. Ltd., (1974) 4 The South African Law Reports (S.A.) 906 (A); Shield Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Booysen, (1979) 3 S.A. 953 (A); for the USA: G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages,
no. 14. Compare also fn. 2.
5
See U. Magnus, Comparative report, PETL Damages, no. 68.
36 Magnus
Art. 2:104 . Preventive Expenses

Expenses incurred to prevent threatened damage amount to recoverable
damage in so far as reasonably incurred.
Comments
1. Introduction
The provision addresses the problem whether and when expenses which 1
were made to prevent impending damage constitute recoverable damage.
It is often doubtful if at all or to what extent such expenses are caused
when damage is merely threatening. Nonetheless under certain conditions
it appears reasonable that such expenses can be recovered also in order to
strengthen the preventive function which tort law can exercise. Art. 2:104
defines those conditions: It is necessary that damage is ± immediately and
realistically ± threatening and it is necessary that the expenses are reason-
able to prevent this damage. To the extent that these conditions are met
preventive expenses are to be recompensed.
2. Definitions
a) Expenses
The term ªexpensesº means costs or other expenditure ± for instance 2
labour ± spent for the purpose of preventing damage.
b) To Prevent Threatened Damage
Preventive expenses qualify as recoverable damage only if they are 3
intended to ªprevent a threatened damageº. Damage is threatened if there
is the real danger that damage could immediately occur if no preventive
measures are taken. The risk of damage must thus be imminent and real
from an objective point of view. An unfounded fear not supported by suffi-
cient facts that damage will happen does not invoke the provision. More-
over, expenses are only recoverable if they are spent for the prevention of
specific damage and not for other unrelated purposes. However, even
where the damage cannot be wholly avoided measures aimed to reduce its
amount would fall within this Article.
c) Reasonably Incurred
Costs of preventive measures are ªreasonably incurredº when it was rea- 4
sonable to spend them in order to prevent threatening damage. Expenses
for measures which under an objective view at the time when taken are,
for example, unable or unnecessary to prevent the impending damage are
thus unreasonable.
d) Recoverable Damage
The term ªrecoverable damageº is used to clarify that not every kind of 5
expense constitutes a damage that can be recovered but only such expenses
which meet certain qualifying conditions.
Magnus 37
3. Reasons
6 Tort law and in particular the law of damages aims not only at compensa-
tion but also at prevention of damage. This basic idea is expressly men-
tioned in Art. 10:101 sent. 2. It is in line with this aim that costs of preven-
tive measures are recoverable to the extent that they have or could have
reasonably prevented the occurrence of damage.

7 The Article covers a subcategory of recoverable damage. It deals with
expenses spent before a damage has occurred. The Article even applies to
preventive expenses if no damage occurred at all either because the pre-
cautions prevented the occurrence of the threatened damage or because
the risk did not materialise. For all of these cases Art. 2:104 provides that
if the measures financed by the expenses were reasonably apt to prevent
the threatened damage such expenses are recoverable. Whether the pre-
cautions and the respective expenses were reasonably apt must be assessed
from an objective point of view of a reasonable and careful person who has
to weigh the risks in advance. Therefore preventive expenses can be recov-
ered even if the risk of damage did not materialise and hindsight revealed
that the precautions taken were unnecessary. And equally where the threa-
tened damage finally occurs despite reasonable precautions the preventive
expenses still remain recoverable. However, in these two cases it must be
particularly thoroughly adjudicated ± from an ex-ante point of view ±
whether the taken precautions and expenses conformed to the standard of
reasonableness.

8 Art. 2:104 is part of the Chapter on damage and has to be read and under-
stood in conjunction with the other provisions of this Chapter of which it is
an addition for a specific kind of damage. The provision is also linked to
the Chapter on damages though the extent of damages for preventive
expenses already follows from Art. 2:104. It is the expense that was reason-
ably necessary to prevent the threatening damage.

9 The European legal systems accept that reasonable preventive costs can be
claimed as damage. 1
Illustrations
10 1. On the Rhine, D has negligently damaged P's tankship. There is a certain
danger that the transported oil will leak out. In order to prevent pollution of
the Rhine P requests firm X to lighter the tankship and store the transported
oil for few days.
1
Cf. infra fn. 3.
38 Magnus
P is entitled to claim the costs for lighterage and storage from D.

2. P, a department store, employs a detective who catches D, a thief. P claims 11
part of the salary from D.
In this case the common opinion of the European legal systems (though the
matter is frequently uncertain) denies P's claim mainly because of lack of
causation. 2
The department store would have employed and paid the detective irre-
spective whether or not D had stolen something and had been caught by
the detective. Therefore D's behaviour had not been a conditio sine qua
non of the expenditure of the department store 3.
Art. 2:105 . Proof of Damage
Damage must be proved according to normal procedural standards. The

court may estimate the extent of damage where proof of the exact amount
would be too difficult or too costly.
2
See for Austria: H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages; no. 108, R. Welser, Zur Ersetzbarkeit
von Detektivkosten beim Warenhausdiebstahl, [1977] O È JZ, 646; for Belgium: Cass. 15
November 1995, [1995] Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie 1016; for England: W.V.H. Rogers,
England, PETL Damages, no. 38; for France: S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages,
no. 89; for Germany: BGHZ 75, 230 (but a nominal sum of ¨ 25 can be claimed); for Greece:
K.D. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 39 (with slight doubts); for Italy: F.D. Busnelli/
G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no.114; in the Netherlands: M.H. Wissink/W.H. van
Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 133. The same solution is also followed by,
e.g., South Africa: J. Neetling, South Africa, PETL Damages; no. 52; USA: G. Schwartz,
USA, PETL Damages, no. 39.
3
Jurisdictions are split when it comes to determining whether the cost of a reserve vehicle
maintained by a transportation company are recoverable: In such a case, someone who
damages one of the vehicles did not set a conditio sine qua non for the cost of buying and
maintaining the reserve vehicle, as in the example in the main text. On the other hand, the
transportation company could claim the cost of renting a reserve vehicle on the market for
the time during which the damaged vehicle is in repair. Such rental costs may be higher, and
one may argue that maintaining a reserve vehicle from the outset is more cost-effective.
Some legal systems rather compensate such costs as a negotiorum gestio or on other grounds
than tort law.
See for Austria (negotiorum gestio) OGH [1973] JBl 476 with commentary by H. Koziol;
OGH [1986] SZ 59/95; OGH [1987] SZ 60/65; for Belgium: L. Schuermans/A. van Oevelen/
C. Perseyn/P. Ernst/J.L. Schuermans, Onrechtmatige daad. Schade en schadeloosstelling
(1983±1992), [1994] Tijdschrift voor Privatrecht 1007; for England (though decided for ships
and busses only): The Mediana [1900] A.C. 113; Admiralty Comrs. v. SS Susquehanna [1926]
A.C. 655; Birmingham Corp. v. Sowsberry (1969) 113 SJ 877; for France: S. Galand-Carval,
France, PETL Damages, no. 88; for Germany: BGHZ 32, 284; BGHZ 70, 201; for Greece:
K.D. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, 109 (no. 38); for Italy: F.D. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ,
Italy, in J. Spier (ed.): Unification of Tort Law: Causation (2000) 86; in the Netherlands: HR
4 October 1957, NJ 1958, 12; HR 31 October 1959, NJ 1959, 29. The same solution is also
followed by, e.g., South Africa: J. Neetling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 52 while for
instance US law denies a claim for (part of) the ongoing maintenance costs, see G. Schwartz,
Magnus 39
Comments
1. Introduction
1 Although the Principles are generally concerned with substantive law rules
only so that a unification of procedural law is clearly outside their scope,
nonetheless the specific procedural aspect of proof of damage has been
included as well. The reason for this is the importance of this matter on
the one hand and the existence of at least one uniform rule in this field on
the other. Firstly, therefore Art. 2:105 starts with the rather self-evident
rule that the normal ± national ± procedural standards apply. But, secondly,
where it would be too difficult or too costly to prove the exact amount of
the damage there the court is allowed to estimate the amount.
2. Definitions
a) Damage
2 The notion ªdamageº is used here as throughout the Principles and com-
prises immaterial as well as material harm 4.
b) Normal Procedural Standards
3 These are the standards which the national courts apply when assessing the
precise amount of damage. These standards vary considerably, at least in
formal terms. In some systems they require the judge to be fully convinced
(ªnext to certaintyº) that damage of a particular extent has occurred; 5 in
others probability or even overweighing probability (ªmore likely than
notº) suffices 6 .
c) Proof Too Difficult or Too Costly
4 Proof of the exact damage may be too difficult if even extended expert evi-
dence could not clarify the precise extent of the damage with reasonable
certainty. Proof is too costly if the costs of expert or other evidence are
out of proportion to the damage itself, namely almost as high as the
damage or even higher.
3. Reasons
5 The reason for this rule is twofold: it is its first purpose to clarify that the
matter of proof and evidence as a whole is outside the scope of the Princi-
ples. This part of the law is generally governed by the lex fori unless unified
by other instruments. Its second purpose is to formulate a uniform rule for
4
See also the Commentary to Art. 2:101, in particular no. 2±4.
5
For instance under Belgium law: see L. Schuermans/A. van Oevelen/C. Perseyn/P. Ernst/J.L.
Schuermans, Onrechtmatige daad. Schade en schadeloosstelling (1983±1992), [1994] Tijd-
schrift voor Privaatrecht, 977; also under German law: BGHZ 53, 245; BGHZ 61, 169; BGH
[1993] NJW 935.
6
This is the prevailing view for instance in England: see, e.g., Hotson v. E. Berkshire H.A.
[1987] A.C. 750 and in the USA: see G. Schwartz, PETL Damages, no. 17.
40 Magnus
one specific aspect which is dealt with uniformly in most countries: where
the strict proof of the extent of the damage is too difficult or too costly
though it is certain that some damage has been suffered there the court is
entitled to estimate the extent of that damage.

The rule concerns only the proof of the damage. Whether damage as such 6
has been caused has to be determined according to the national procedural
standard of proof just as any other condition of liability has to be proven
(Art. 2:105 sent. 1). A uniform principle applies, however, to the proof of
the extent of damage (Art. 2:105 sent. 2). Here it is required that the appli-
cation of the normal standard of proof would not enable satisfactory results
either because that method could nonetheless not convincingly identify the
exact amount of damage or because the costs of proof of an exact quantifi-
cation would be too high. Then an estimate of the extent of the damage is
allowed. It is self-evident that the estimate must be reasonable.

The provision applies both to pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage (see 7
Art. 10:201 et seq. and Art. 10:301). For the latter kind of damage regularly
the amount is estimated as there is no benchmark for determining the
amount.

In Austria 7 and Germany 8 the Codes of Civil Procedure expressly order 8
that the amount of damages can be estimated and need not be exactly pro-
ven in certain situations. In these countries the prevailing view reads into
the respective provisions that an estimate requires the existence of damage
but the uncertainty of, and unreasonable difficulties to assess, the exact
extent. But also Belgium, 9 England, 10 France, 11 Greece, 12 Italy, 13 the Neth-
erlands, 14 South Africa 15 and US States 16 allow estimates either where the
extent of the damage is uncertain or where an exact determination is not
feasible as particularly in cases of lost income or loss of earning capacity.
Illustration
P, a 20 year old student of chemistry suffers severe brain injury in an acci- 9
dent for which D is liable. Due to the injury P is unable to finish his studies
7
See § 273 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure.
8
See § 287 German Code of Civil Procedure.
9
H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 67.
10
W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 52.
11
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 56.
12
K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 6.
13
F.D. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 30.
14
M.H. Wissink/W.H. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 99.
15
J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 27.
16
G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 18.
Magnus 41
and is reduced in the future to temporary inferior jobs. Besides compensation

for non-pecuniary loss, P claims compensation of his damage due to lost
income.
It can only be estimated what P would have earned as a chemist in his pro-
spective working life starting after the hypothetical end of his studies. Even
after retirement age P would have had probably higher pension rights than
he will have as a partially employed worker. The difference to his probable
real income from inferior temporary jobs has to be estimated and constitu-
tes the recoverable damages.
42 Magnus
Chapter 3. Causation Art. 3:101
Chapter 3. Causation
Introduction
1. History of the Title

The principles on causation are based on the questionnaire, reports and 1
discussions mentioned in the Group's volume on causation. 1 They have
been subsequently discussed at length in our meetings in Pisa (May 2002),
Hamburg (November 2002) and Lausanne (2003). They have been tackled
by the Drafting Committee in several meetings. The commentary was dis-
cussed at length during meetings in Lyon (2003) and Vienna (2004). It
was completed by the Drafting Committee in Girona and Vienna (2004).
2. Overview
The chapter is divided into two sections: 1) the conditio sine qua non 2
(csqn) 2 and qualifications and 2) the scope of liability. Many intensive dis-
cussions lie behind this approach.
Section 1: Conditio sine qua non and Qualifications

Art. 3:101 . Conditio sine qua non
An activity or conduct (hereafter: activity) is a cause of the victim's damage
if, in the absence of the activity, the damage would not have occurred.
Comments
Only in Belgium is csqn probably the sole causal criterion, but the outcome 1
of cases does not seem significantly different compared with other legal sys-
tems. According to some doctrine and case law, the same holds true for
France.
In Austria causation is considered to be merely csqn. The scope of the liabi- 2
lity is treated as a totally unrelated issue. 3 Mixing them up is regarded as
rather confusing and doctrinally wrong. In most other legal systems the
scope of liability is treated as a part of causation. The United States has,
however, vacillated in its approach to this question.
For practical purposes the difference between the approaches seems of 3
very limited importance.
The Group has sought a compromise between the contrasting views, in that 4
each issue is dealt with in a separate section, but the sections are contained
1
J. Spier (ed.) Unification of Tort Law: Causation (2000, hereafter cited as PETL Causation).
See also Ch. von. Bar, The Common European Law of Torts II (2000) no. 411 et seq.
2
Also called: cause in fact, but-for test, equivalence theory.
3
This view is shared by several other members.
Spier 43
in the same chapter. By doing so, we stress first that csqn is, with a few
exceptions discussed below, a prerequisite for liability. If this test is not
met, that is the end of the story.
5 If, on the other hand, an activity is a csqn of a loss (as defined in Art. 3:101)
the important question arises: what is the extent of liability. Or, in other
words, which losses are to be attributed to the activity and, by the same
token, borne by the liable person. In most cases the latter question can be
answered quite easily, as there is (are) only one or a very few utterly ªnor-
malº consequences, e.g., damage to a car after a collision. In those day-to-
day cases, all such losses will have to be compensated, at least as a general
rule. So for practical purposes the attribution rule serves as a tool to limit
the scope of liability.
6 Art. 3:101 is in line with the general rule on causation of the Working
Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations 4. Yet, the latter is going to intro-
duce a specific rule on ªcollaborationº. 5 Participation, instigation or mate-
rial assistance in causing legally relevant damage is regarded as a cause of
the loss.
7 No doubt this rule can be very useful, e.g. in case of participation in violent
demonstrations. Yet, it is not so easy to draw the borderline of cases where
liability should be established and where not. Besides, Art. 9:101 (a) tackles
the issue, seen from the angle of solidary liability. Our Art. 3:101 is open
enough to enable the court to establish liability if the participation, instiga-
tion or assistance fall within the scope of Art. 1:101 para. 2. In those cases,
it is by no means a giant step to regard them as a cause in the sense of Art.
3:101.
Art. 3:102 . Concurrent Causes
In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused
the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the vic-
tim's damage.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 This Article is about activities the result of which is the occurrence of
damage at one, single time. In those cases one could argue that neither of
the activities is the csqn or that all of them are. This seems a rather seman-
tic discussion. Art. 3:102 tries to avoid it in saying that ªeach activity is
regarded as a cause of the victim's damage.º
4
See General Introduction, no. 40.
5
Art. 4:102 in their latest version (June 2004).
44 Spier
If each activity would have caused the entire loss, even in the absence of the 2
others, it seems rather obvious that the persons liable for the respective
activities are liable in full. That is the meaning of Art. 3:102. This is entirely
in line with the common core.
It should be stressed that it is unimportant whether or not the activities 3
took place at the same time; what is decisive is that they caused the damage
at the same time. This can be shown by a somewhat far-fetched example.
D1 launches a long distance missile, and D2 a short distance one. Both mis-
siles hit P's premises at the same time. The launching did not take place at
the same time, whereas the missiles hit the target exactly at the same
time. The latter is decisive.
It follows from the above that there is some overlap between this Article 4
and Art. 9:101 para. 1 (b). Unlike Art. 9:101 (b), which has a broader
scope, Art. 3:102 requires ªdamage at the same timeº. The latter is consis-
tent with the reasoning behind a different approach in Art. 3:102 6 on the
one side and the Art. 3:103 ± 3:106 on the other side 7.
It will not always be clear whether or not the conditions of Art. 3:102 are 5
met. At the end of the day, it is a matter of evidence. This gives manúuvr-
ing room for the court either to solve such cases by means of procedural
law (i.e. one party has the burden of proof), or to take it that the time dif-
ference, if any, is so small that it is assumed that the activities caused the
loss at ªthe same timeº.
Whether or not every single activity would have caused ªthe damageº, is 6
another way of saying that the damage must be ªthe sameº. So reference
is made to the commentary on Art. 9:101 para. 3 (no. 4) for its meaning.
Apart from obvious cases (D1 and D2 set fire to a house at the same
time; D1 and D2 collide at the same time with P, and D1's and D2's speed
was such that each collision would have caused a total loss), it is, unfortu-
nately, impossible to be more specific in this field. 8 In the commentary of
Art. 9:101 several examples illustrate the kind of cases we have in mind.
We trust that on the basis of text and commentary, a coherent system can
be developed.
In case of subsequent activities as defined in Art. 3:104, more often than 7
not the damage was already done by the first activity. If D1 collides with
his forerunner P, whose car is a complete loss, the damage is done. If P's
car is subsequently hit by D2, there is no additional damage 9. If, on the
other hand, D1 and D2 hit P's car at the same time, and P's car would
have suffered a total loss by each single accident, P's damage is, for the pur-
pose of this Article, ªthe sameº if we look at D1 and D2.
6
As the previous footnote.
7
See infra no. 8 et seq.
8
Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 1) no. 415 apparently faced the same problem.
9
Cf. infra Art. 3:104 no. 3.
Spier 45
2. Proportional Liability
8 The idea behind Art. 3:103, 3:105, 3:106 and to some extent Art. 3:104 is
that a liable person has to compensate the loss he may have caused. That
is to say: he should not be liable for a loss that partially is or may be caused
by other activities, irrespective whether these are caused by others, the vic-
tim or natural events.
9 This approach is rather innovative, as it is not (entirely) in line with the
common core. So it requires justification. All the more so as, seen from a
certain angle, it obviously is detrimental for the victim. 10 But arguably, the
latter argument is just rhetoric. After all, it seems to presuppose that the
victim's interests should prevail. In the Group's view such an approach
would be insufficiently balanced. Each solution is inevitably harsh for
either the liable person, the victim or sometimes even for both.
10 One could argue that there are hardly compelling reasons to make a choice
either way whose interests should prevail. In this reasoning, the idea of fair-
ness should depend on the merits of every single case and to some extent
also tradition. More specifically, one might say that it is far from obvious
that the different heads of damages, or of liability ± in particular strict,
vicarious 11, mere fault or grave fault ± are to be treated similarly. One
could also imagine that the magnitude of the harm, the number of tortfea-
sors or of victims might play a role.
11 To the best of our knowledge no legal system has drawn up specific and
detailed rules to cope with just mentioned factors in this context. Doing so
would be a Herculean task. And more importantly, it is very much open
to debate whether such a system would be sufficiently practical. It would
probably give rise to a tremendous amount of litigation.
12 So we felt that we could hardly escape from making a clear choice, irre-
spective of factors such as those mentioned above. As a starting point, we
have adopted proportional liability. With a few, though important, excep-
tions discussed below, it does not appeal to the Group that a tortfeasor
has to compensate a loss not caused by him; i.e. an activity that is not
even a csqn of the loss.
13 In this context, regard is to be had to the following. The borderline
between liability and non-liability is in many instances and cases rather a
grey zone. That is true for the Principles, for legislation and case law alike.
In that grey area, which probably covers a large number of day to day
cases, the justification for establishing liability is almost as convincing as
the opposite would have been. Moreover, coincidence (or bad luck), either
on the side of the victim or of the tortfeasor, often play a considerable role.
10
It should be borne in mind that Art. 3:103 para. 2 is quite a step for the common law. If the
likelihood is over 50% the victim is worse off; instead, he ªgainsº if it is below 50%. See this
article and Art. 3:106.
11
In the sense of Chapter 6.
46 Spier
Seen from this angle, and depending on the merits of the case at hand, it
might be counter-productive for the victim to opt for solidary liability.
After all, if the court would take the view that solidary liability would be
unfair in that specific case, it might feel reluctant to establish liability, as
that would be the only feasible way to avoid the harshness of undesirable
solidarity in that case.
It has been argued that proportional liability should in principle, and, sub- 14
ject to exceptions, apply as well to individual losses caused by two or
more activities which are insufficient causes. After all, so was the argument,
an insufficient cause is only a cause in part. The prevailing view, however,
was that proportional liability should not apply to such cases, but only in
exceptional cases.
3. Relationship Between Multiple Tortfeasors and Causation

It follows from the above that a clear distinction is made between the fol- 15
lowing cases: 1) two or more events are conditiones sine quibus non for
the loss and 2) two or more causes may or may not have caused a loss. In
the latter case it is uncertain whether or not the respective events do fulfil
the csqn-requirement. In the first case the Group opts for solidary liability,
whereas proportional liability is considered a better solution in relation to
the second set of cases.
Solidary liability gives rise to questions of recourse. They are dealt with in 16
Art. 9:102.
Art. 9:101 para. 1 establishes solidary liability in a series of cases. It particu- 17
larly mentions knowing participation, instigation or encouragement of
others in causing damage to a victim and liability for auxiliaries (a and c).
This is entirely in line with the common core.
Solidary liability follows from Art. 3:101 if a person's independent beha- 18
viour or activity causes damage to the victim, whereas the same damage
(as defined in Art. 9:103) is also attributable to another person (Art. 9:101
b). So there was no need to mention it in Chapter 3, first section.
Art. 3:103. Alternative Causes
(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have
been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in
fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent correspond-
ing to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim's damage.
(2) If, in case of multiple victims, it remains uncertain whether a particular

victim's damage has been caused by an activity, while it is likely that it did
not cause the damage of all victims, the activity is regarded as a cause of
the damage suffered by all victims in proportion to the likelihood that it
may have caused the damage of a particular victim.
Spier 47
Comments
1. Introduction
1 Art. 3:103 deals with alternative causation. It is based on the concept of
proportional liability. For the justification see above 12. Prima facie, this
may seem rather in conflict with the solution adopted in Art. 3:102. We
do not believe it is.
2 The obvious difference between Art. 3:102 on the one hand and Art. 3:103
on the other hand is the following. Application of Art. 3:102 requires that
each activity has caused the loss, or at least would have caused it, if one dis-
regards the other activity or activities that took place at the same time. Art.
3:103 is about uncertainty which of several activities has caused the victim's
loss in full. In other words: there is a csqn, but it is unknown which one it is.
3 We see no compelling reason to justify why someone should pay for the
whole of a loss which he possibly (and in case of Art. 3:103 para. 2 most
probably) did not bring about. On the other hand, it would be harsh to
leave the victim empty-handed.
4 The Group realises, of course, that in rare cases proportional liability may
give rise to a tremendous amount of litigation. Apart from the fact that
this may be an incentive for the defendant to settle the case(s) or for the
plaintiffs to sue in only one case, thus saving money, this is not an issue of
substantive law. If it is considered to be (too) problematic, procedural law
should provide adequate means to cope with this issue.
2. Paragraph 1
5 The first paragraph presupposes:
. multiple activities, and
. each of the activities would have been sufficient to cause the damage
(i.e. the entire damage); but
. it remains unknown (i.e. it cannot be proven to the required legal stan-
dard) which activity actually caused the damage.
6 Under those circumstances each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent
corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the damage. This
means that the person liable for the respective activities has to pay that cor-
responding share.
7 D1, D2 and D3 go hunting in a wood frequently visited by walkers. Inde-
pendently from each other, they negligently try to bring down a bird and
consequently shoot in the same direction. Instead one shot hits P; the other
shots just miss P. It is unknown whether the fatal shot was fired by D1, D2
12
Supra Art. 3:102 no. 8 et seq.
48 Spier
or D3; they did not act in concert. 13 In this case the activity of each hunter
fulfils the requirements mentioned above. So each of them is liable for
one third of the loss. 14
A mountain climber is hurt by a falling rock. At the same time a second 8
rock nearly hits him. One falling rock is caused by D1's negligence; the
other by D2's negligence. Both D1 and D2 are liable to the extent corre-
sponding to the likelihood that ªtheir stoneº may have caused the victim's
damage. In this particular case this likelihood is 50%, so D1 and D2 are
each liable for that percentage.
In particular in cases of mass torts, but also in other cases (e.g. if the precise 9
number of hunters 15 is unknown; e.g. because one or more may have disap-
peared from the scene) it may be impossible to prove the likelihood. Again,
this primarily is a matter of procedural law. Yet, as a general rule, the bur-
den of proof on the victim's shoulders should not be too heavy. If the
defendant(s) cannot identify the other missing persons (potentially) liable,
the court may well ignore those others and apportion the loss between the
known defendants in accordance with the likelihood that the damage might
have been caused by each of them.
3. Paragraph 2
The main focus of the second paragraph is on the situation where it is clear 10
that from a ªglobalº point of view there is a causal link between the
damage suffered by a number of victims and the activities of a number of
potential defendants, but it is impossible that the entire damage of all vic-
tims has been caused by each single tortfeasor.
Twenty manufacturers (D1 ± D20) negligently manufacture a drug. 16 D1 11
has a market share of 51%; D2 of 15% and the remaining (D3 ± D20)
have small market shares. The drug causes serious injury and affects
25.000 consumers. It is not possible to identify the source of the drugs
used by individual consumers. It is extremely unlikely that the drug
manufactured by one of the manufacturers caused the injury of all vic-
tims. According to para. 2, D1 is liable for 51%, D2 for 15% and the
rest for their respective market shares of the victim's damage. 17 It is
assumed here that the likelihood corresponds with the market share. If
that is not the case, a similar yardstick has to be found to attribute the
loss.
13
See for the latter Art. 9:101 para. 1 (a).
14
This case is solved in a different way in various jurisdictions; see J. Spier/O. Haazen, Com-
parative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 150 et seq.
15
In our view it is no requirement that their names are known.
16
We leave aside that negligence will rarely be a requirement in this type of cases in view of the
rules on product liability.
17
If there is no adequate basis to establish the marketshare(s) of several of the remaining man-
ufacturers, their part is presumed to be equal; see Art. 3:105.
Spier 49
12 In our view it would be unfair to oblige one or more manufacturers to pay

the entire damage in a case as just mentioned. After all, it is impossible
that each victim's loss has been caused by anyone of them.
13 The Group realises that this may urge the victim to start litigation against
many defendants. Although that is obviously an unattractive scenario, it is
insufficient justification to hold someone liable for a loss he cannot have
caused. All the more as it would shift the litigation burden to such a ±
rather haphazardly chosen 18 ± defendant. Besides, we reckon that in real
life it will not be necessary to litigate with every single manufacturer.
Even if that were the case, this seems more a matter to be solved by proce-
dural law.
14 Moreover, in several legal systems ± particularly in the common law ± the
plaintiff would not get any compensation if the more likely than not-test
(the balance of probabilities) is not met. Seen from this perspective, plain-
tiffs may be better off. However, they get less if the more likely than not-
test is met. In such a scenario, the victim would be entitled to full compen-
sation under English, American 19 and South African law. 20 For the reasons
mentioned above, the Group has not adopted just mentioned doctrine. The
issue is discussed in more detail below under Art. 3:106.
Art. 3:104 . Potential Causes

(1) If an activity has definitely and irreversibly led the victim to suffer
damage, a subsequent activity which alone would have caused the same
damage is to be disregarded.
(2) A subsequent activity is nevertheless taken into consideration if it has
led to additional or aggravated damage.
(3) If the first activity has caused continuing damage and the subsequent
activity later on also would have caused it, both activities are regarded as
a cause of that continuing damage from that time on.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 Art. 3:104 makes a distinction between two situations: 1) where damage
has materialised as a result of the activity in question, even though it would
in any event have occurred later as a result of some other activity and 2) on
the other hand where the later activity causes additional, aggravated, or
18
In case of solidary liability the plaintiffs will undoubtedly sue the manufacturer whose sol-
vency is best. This does not need to be a manufacturer with a considerable market share.
19
Though it is not universally applied in the United States: Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts
(2000) 430 et seq.
20
See J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 150 et seq.;
and W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (2002) no. 6.11 and 6.12.
50 Spier
continuing damage. Entirely in line with the above, we take the view that it
would be inappropriate to oblige someone to compensate damage he did
not cause. If and to the extent an activity already led to a definite and irre-
versible loss, and a subsequent activity does not increase the loss, the latter
is not a csqn for the loss. So why should their ªactorº be responsible?
2. Paragraph 1
According to the first paragraph, a subsequent activity which alone would 2
have caused the same damage, if one ignores the already existing loss, has
to be disregarded. However, this rule only applies to cases of already exist-
ing definite and irreversible losses.
D1 collides with P's car. After the accident the car is a total loss. A few 3
minutes later D2 crashes into the remains of the car. The second accident
would equally have caused a total loss, were it not that the car already
lost its value. D1 has to compensate the full loss, whereas D2 does not
have to pay compensation. In this particular case P's damage was definite
and irreversible after the first accident.
D1 poisons a horse in a stable with a slowly working poison (say the horse 4
would die within 24 hours). Before the poor animal actually dies, D2 sets
the stable afire. The horse perishes in the flames. Since Roman times 21,
this case has been disputed. 22 One could argue that D1 is the csqn of the
loss; it could equally be argued that D2 is, whereas some even take the
view that both D1 and D2 are. It could even be argued that neither D1,
nor D2 have set a csqn. Art. 3:104 para. 1 provides some manoeuvring
room for the court. One might say that D1's act definitively and irreversibly
ªcausedº the loss. After all, no further activity was needed to cause the
horse's death. So, as a general rule we may take it that, in financial terms,
the horse lost its value. On the other hand, D2 has shortened the life of
the horse, but in the example this has no financial impact.
D is the architect of P's house. Due to miscalculations, the house collapses. 5
Three months later, the area is struck by an earthquake. It would have
destroyed the house, if it would still have been there. The earthquake, if
relevant, is an event within P's sphere (Art. 3:106). As a general rule D
will be liable in full. The earthquake does not have any impact on his liabi-
lity. However, depending on the merits of the case and the compelling
demands of justice, it could be argued that D is only liable in part. After
all, at least with the benefit of hindsight, the value of the house, at the
very moment of its collapse, was only limited, i.e. it still had only three
months to go. We believe that such a reasoning, though perfectly sensible
as such, may stimulate litigation. Moreover, it would be beneficial to the
tortfeasor to delay settling hoping that some future cause may reduce his
liability. Finally, in the architect case ± and in so many others ± it is hardly
appealing if D could escape from full liability.
21
D. 9.2.51.pr. 2.
22
See J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 128 et seq.
Spier 51
6 These hypotheticals should be distinguished from the following case. D

kills a 30 year old man. If one would only look at the age of the deceased,
his life expectancy would be 40 years. Yet, a post mortem shows that the
deceased was certainly suffering from a terminal disease which would
have carried him off within a year. The life expectancy is to be based on
the latter information. Yet, that has nothing to do with Art. 3:104 para 1.
After all, there is no second event which occurs. It is merely a matter of
the determination of the loss, governed by Art. 10:201.
7 The examples illustrate that it may depend on the peculiarities of each par-
ticular case whether or not a loss is ªdefinite and irreversibleº. Yet, in most
cases it will be clear whether or not damage is ªdefinite and irreversibleº.
3. Paragraph 2
8 A subsequent activity is taken into account if it has led to additional or
aggravated damage. This rather speaks for itself. After all, this activity is a
csqn for that loss.
9 D1 poisons a horse in a stable with a slowly working poison. After the poi-
soning, the horse still has a certain value, e.g. because it could still partici-
pate in a race and the owner would at least get a starting fee. D2 then sets
the stable on fire, which kills the horse. In such a case D2 would be liable
for the latter fee. 23
10 This leaves unaffected that the first activity will often be a csqn for the loss
too. Whether or not its ªauthorº will also be liable for the additional or
aggravated loss, depends on Art. 3:201 (the scope of liability).
11 D1 collides with P's car. The loss amounts to 100, whereas the value of the
car is 200. Subsequently D2 hits P's car. The second accident caused a
further loss of 50. D2 is liable for 50. D1 for 100 and perhaps ± depending
on Art. 3:201 ± for 150. P cannot recover more than 150 in total, of course.
12 Art. 3:104 para. 2 does not apply in the following type of cases. X dies as a
consequence of a motor-accident for which D is liable. After the fatal acci-
dent X's house is blown up by a terrorist. Without the accident, X would
have been at home at the time of the explosion, which would equally have
killed him. The terrorist is not liable for the loss suffered by the family
members as mentioned in Art. 10:202 para. 2, which follows from Art.
3:104 (1). After all, this is not a case of continuing damage. Only the motor
accident caused X's death. One cannot kill someone who is already dead.
4. Paragraph 3
13 The Group opts for a similar solution in case of continuous damage,
although the second and further tortfeasors are only liable for the damage
which occurs from the time of their activity.
23
According to Art. 3:201 D1 will probably be liable for this fee too, in that the owner can only
get compensation once. See Art. 9:102 for the recourse between D1 and D2.
52 Spier
In our view, continuing damage (e.g. loss of profit or loss of income due to 14
disability, harm caused by continuing noise) occurs, as it were, from day to
day. So it has to be distinguished from definite and irreversible damage,
mentioned in para. 1, as for example injury to the value of property. Seen
from this perspective, each tortfeasor involved is a conditio sine qua non
for the loss as from the very moment that his activity impaired the pro-
tected interest. This presupposes that each activity would have caused that
damage, if the other activity or activities are disregarded. This approach is
in line with the reasoning behind Art. 3:102; see above. 24
P is seriously injured by a car accident caused by D1. It would take him a 15
year to recover. After one week in hospital, he becomes the victim of me-
dical malpractice by D2. It would take (a) 26 or (b) 104 weeks to recover
from this malpractice. 25 P's loss of income is ± in the Group's view ± a con-
tinuous loss. In the example mentioned supra (a) D1 is liable for 52 weeks.
As a general rule, and depending on Art. 3:201, in the example mentioned
supra (b) D1 is liable for 105 (104 + 1) weeks. D2 is liable for 26 or 104
weeks. However, it is obvious that P's loss has to be compensated only
once. For the recourse action by the tortfeasor who paid the entire loss
against the other tortfeasor 26, see Art. 9:102.
Due to an activity for which D1 is liable, P becomes disabled for the rest of 16
his life. According to Art. 10:102, P could opt for a lump sum payment
instead of periodic payments. 27 Assume P did so before D2 appeared on
the scene; D2's activity ± which occurred five years later ± would equally
end up in life time disability, if one would ignore the already existing dis-
ability caused by D1. Does P's settlement with D1 change D2's position?
We tend to answer the question in the negative. For practical purposes, in
most cases, it is of no importance for P. After all, P has already got com-
pensation. 28 Yet, it is important for D1's possible recourse on D2. Accord-
ing to Art. 9:102 para. 1 recourse ± obviously ± requires solidary liability.
To achieve this result, one would have to argue that the mere fact that a
loss has been settled, does not necessarily mean that is has become ªdefi-
nite and irreversibleº in the sense of para. 1.
24
Admittedly, it could be argued that loss of income is not continuing damage but loss of earn-
ing capacity, thus being a loss suffered at once. For the reasons set out under 13, we prefer
to perceive it from a different angle. All the more so as it will often be unclear for quite
some time whether and when the victim will be able to start working again, which may make
it difficult to apply the concept of loss of earning capacity. Moreover, it is very unusual that
this type of cases is settled soon. It rarely happens that the loss before the settlement is calcu-
lated on the basis of loss of earning capacity. After all, why should it, as it can easily be calcu-
lated very accurately. Finally, in several legal systems victims are entitled to a rent; see U.
Magnus, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in U. Magnus (ed.), Unification of
Tort Law: Damages (2001) 185 (no. 89).
25
In other words: P will be in good health again after 52 or 105 weeks as from the first accident.
26
In this particular case, D2's liability is based on contract, but that does not change the scene.
27
The court is not obliged to award them.
28
That is not necessarily true; it would be important for P if, e.g., D1 goes bankrupt after the set-
tlement but before payment.
Spier 53
17 Arguing the other way around would mean that D2 could escape from
recourse by D1 due to D1's settlement with P. This would obviously be dif-
ficult to justify.
18 It might well turn out at the time of D2's activity that the settlement with P
is insufficient, e.g. because inflation is much higher than anticipated or due
to a detrimental change of social security benefits; it is equally possible that
D1 is unable to pay the amount of the settlement. If D2 could disappear
altogether, all the odds would be against P. We see no ± let alone compel-
ling ± justification why D2 should not be liable for the difference between
P's loss, calculated at the time of D2's activity, and the settlement. Such
questions cannot be answered, except by reference to national procedural
laws.
19 It follows from the observation above under no. 12 that para. 3 does not
apply if an earlier activity already caused the victim's death.
20 Art. 3:104 leaves some discretion to the courts to reach ± what they per-
ceive 29 ± equitable and reasonable results by applying the concept of
damages (Chapter 10). This can be illustrated by the following case. P
needs two legs to execute his work. Due to an accident, caused by D1, he
loses one leg. So P becomes unfit for his work. Yet, he can be retrained
for another job. His loss of income is the difference between his former
and his new income. 30 After the accident, P's remaining leg is lost in a sec-
ond accident for which D2 is liable. D2 is obviously liable for the loss of
income caused by the unfitness to execute P's new job. 31 According to
Art. 3:201 the same may hold true for D1.
21 The meaning of ªcontinuing damageº is explained under 13 above. The dis-
cussions on causation where based on the questionnaire which can be
found in the Group's volume on Causation. 32 It follows from the compara-
tive report 33 that the (majority of the) Group was in favour of a rule as
put forward by Art. 3:104. So, its text was actually based on those discus-
sions. In the forelast meeting of the Drafting Committee, a few members
argued to narrow down its meaning, i.e. by restricting it to cases such as
continuing noise by two or more separate factories, which obviously is a
combination of continuing damage and a continuing tort.
Art. 3:105 . Uncertain Partial Causation

In the case of multiple activities, when it is certain that none of them has
caused the entire damage or any determinable part thereof, those that are
29
After all, as opinions are (slightly) divided on this point, the same holds probably true for the
question what is equitable in this type of cases.
30
On top of that P might have a claim for the increased chance that he might become disabled
by a future accident which affects his remaining leg; see Art. 10:202.
31
At least to the extent not yet compensated; see previous footnote.
32
PETL Causation, 3 et seq.
33
J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 141 et seq.
54 Spier
likely to have [minimally] contributed to the damage are presumed to have

caused equal shares thereof.
Comments
Cases of multiple activities which together cause one or more losses often 1
give rise to difficulties. The most difficult questions probably arise in the
area of causation. More often than not, the contribution of every single
activity will be unclear. Art. 3:105 tries to cope with this problem.
It only comes into play ± of course ± if the contributions are unclear. If it is 2
likely that two or more activities have contributed to the loss, whereas each
of their contributions is ªminimalº, it is presumed that their contribution is
equal. So, if A and B have contributed to a loss, and 1) it is clear that
neither of their contributions have caused the entire loss, nor 2) a deter-
minable part thereof, they will be liable for 50% each.
Suppose a loss is caused by D1, D2, D3 and D4. D1's contribution is at 3
least 60%. The remaining loss is caused by D2, D3 and D4. Yet, the
amount of their respective and D1's ªremainingº contributions cannot be
determined for 40% (after all, D1 has caused at least 60%, so he is liable
for that part anyway; this means that 40% remains). In this example, D1,
D2, D3 and D4 are liable for 10% (1/4 of 40%). So, ultimately, the loss
has to be borne by D1 for 70% (60 + 10), and for 10% by each D2, D3
and D4. Thus the majority of the Group.
In the view of some members this Article should only be applied if the con- 4
tributions of all members are small and unclear at the same time. In this
view, it only comes into play in the following type of cases. 100 manufac-
turers have put a ± as it turns out defective ± drug on the market. They all
have similarly small market shares. 20,000 persons fall ill due to this drug.
It is extremely unlikely that the drug of anyone of them has caused the ill-
ness of all victims. In such a case, each manufacturer is liable for 1% of
the loss of each victim.
Yet, the majority of the Group would also apply this Article in the follow- 5
ing type of cases. D 1 ± D 100 have put a defective pharmaceutical product
on the market. The market shares of D 1, 2 and 3 are more or less known;
they are 25, 15 and 10 %. The remaining market share (50%) is distributed
among D 4 ± 100 34 but at the time of the occurrence of the loss, it is not
possible to estimate the individual shares. It is only known, that they were
rather small manufacturers. In such a case, the contributions of D 4 ± 100
will be presumed to be equal. That means that each will be liable for 50/
97%.
The example discussed above under no. 4 and 5 is very similar compared 6
with the one discussed in relation to Art. 3:103. According to Art. 3:103
34
The market share may be the decisive factor in this field; see Art. 3:103 para. 2 and the com-
ment above.
Spier 55
the loss has to be compensated by the tortfeasors in proportion to the

likelihood that their activity may have caused the damage of a particular
victim. Yet, it does not provide a solution in the type of cases mentioned
in Art. 3:105. The latter Article provides a yardstick to determine ªthe
likelihoodº under those circumstances.
7 Neither Art. 3:105 nor any other provision of Chapter 3 provides a solution
for cases if 1) the contributions are not determinable at all, whereas 2) they
are probably unequal. In our view, such questions have to be solved by
procedural law. We do not believe that appropriate hard and fast rules
can be given in this field.
Art. 3:106 . Uncertain Causes in the Victim's Sphere

The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood
that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other circum-
stance within his own sphere.
Comments
1 Art. 3:106 is about a loss that may have been caused by one or more liable
third parties 35 or may lie in the sphere of the victim. In such a case, the vic-
tim has to bear the loss to the extent that the cause may lie in his own
sphere. It should be borne in mind that the cause in the victim's sphere, in
the sense of this Article, should be a csqn of the loss, in case it would
have materialised.
2 A cause lies in the first place in the victim's sphere, if it is caused by his
activity. Such cases can often be tackled by Art. 8:101 too. But, as we will
demonstrate below, this Article may be applicable in those instances as
well.
3 In line with Art. 8:101 para. 3, a cause lies also in the victim's sphere if it is
attributable to his auxiliary.
4 Thirdly, and unlike Art. 8:101, natural events, such as earthquakes, storms,
heart attacks or other diseases, unrelated to activities by third parties, may
qualify as such.
5 If one of these activities, occurrences (including natural events) or circum-
stances may have caused the damage, the victim has to bear his loss to the
extent that such a cause may lie within his own sphere. 36 This does not fol-
low from Art. 8:101; this kind of issues is dealt with by this chapter. Art.
3:106 is the complement of Art. 3:103.
35
Caused by one more liable third parties means that those parties can be held responsible
according to Art. 1:101, or ± as the case may be ± one or more on that basis and one or
more others on another basis, be it of a contractual nature or not.
36
Here we face again the issue discussed above supra Art. 3:104 para. 2.
56 Spier
A mountain climber is hurt by a falling rock. At the same time a second 6

rock nearly hits him. One falling rock is caused by D's negligence; the other
by a wild chamois. It is unclear which rock hit the climber. The Group
thinks it fit to apply Art. 3:106 in this type of cases, despite the fact most
legal systems seem to deny causation in such a case. 37 Art. 3:106 does not
distinguish between causes for which someone is liable and causes ªwithin
the sphere of the victimº, notably causes for which nobody can be blamed
and which do not, in accordance with these principles or other applicable
rules, fall within someone else's sphere. So, D has to compensate half the
loss.
As Art. 3:106 deals with potential causes within the victim's sphere 7
(ªmayº), it is partly based on the concept of the loss of a chance (perte
d'une chance). As already mentioned above, to some extent our Principles
are based on proportional liability, which the Group does not deem an
ideal solution, but the best available for certain types of case. Yet, we
take the view that it is not practicable to take into account every possibility
of causal linkage.
Progress in scientific research may enable one more and more frequently to 8
establish a possible csqn relation between certain losses and activities,
which often took place long ago (the so called ªnew risksº). We express
no view on the question whether or not Art. 3:106 (more specifically the
loss of a chance doctrine) could be applied in those cases. However, most
of us are in favour of, at least, some caution in this field. As a general
rule, we would be even more reluctant to apply Art. 3:106, as long as the
opinions of the scientific experts diverge. If a part of science takes the
view that a causal link can be established, whereas many other experts
challenge this view, it seems at least open to debate whether it could be
argued that the loss may have been caused by an activity for which a third
party is liable. All the more so in relation to activities which took place
long ago. A few members, however, are in favour of a more lenient
approach, in that they stress the importance of the precautionary principle,
also in this field.
As already mentioned supra Art. 3:103, the Group realises that the 9
approach of Art. 3:106 might be quite a step for the common law, based
as it often is on the well established doctrine of the balance of probabil-
ities. 38
Quite apart from the difficulties of the balance of probabilities-doctrine in 10
borderline cases, most of us prefer a different approach. After all, in our
view, it is quite harsh to leave the victim empty-handed if ± e.g. ± the
chance is ªonlyº 49%, whereas it does not appeal to most of us that a tort-
feasor would have to pay 100%, if it is at least greatly uncertain whether or
not he actually caused the entire loss. Seen from a European angle, there is
37
J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation 153.
38
See e.g. W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2002) 218 et seq.
Spier 57
hardly a common core to support the balance of probabilities-doctrine. 39

Besides, there seems to be some dispute about it in the common law-world
as well. 40 Finally, adopting this doctrine would create serious difficulties for
most ± non-common law ± European countries which are unfamiliar with it.
In this respect one has to bear in mind that the common law doctrine is
canvassed in its procedural law/law of evidence. Yet, the latter is rather dif-
ferent in most European jurisdictions, which makes a transplant all the
more difficult.
11 One per cent of the residents (P 1 ± 100) of a small town with 10.000 inha-
bitants fall ill due to a very dangerous illness. This percentage is extremely
high, as 0.05 per cent would be normal (i.e. 5 persons). This considerable
increase of ill persons may be caused by negligent emissions from D, a
neighbouring factory. It may also be mere coincidence. If ± a matter of evi-
dence ± the court is sufficiently convinced that the high percentage is not a
matter of coincidence, it could apply this Article. Seen from each victim's
angle, it can never be proven whether or not his illness is caused by D.
After all, there is a (in the example a rather small, i.e. 5% 41) statistical
chance that he would have fallen ill in the absence of the factory anyway.
In accordance with Art. 3:106, the latter risk has to be borne by the victim
himself. So theoretically P 1 ± 100 could recover 95% of their ªlossº each.
12 Yet, Art. 3:106 must be applied cautiously. Not each and every excess of a
statistical likelihood should give rise to liability. If, for instance, in our
example the percentage would have been 0.06 (or perhaps even 0.09)
instead of 0.05, it may well be the case (on the basis of scientific evidence)
that such a percentage is a result of random variation rather than a causal
relationship. Suppose for example if the normal cancer rate is two persons
per one thousand. Instead of this normal figure, three persons fall ill. This
may be due to D's negligent emissions, but also to a ªnormal deviationº
of statistics. Appreciation that there is not necessarily a causal relationship
is important. As a general rule, a merely speculative ± i.e. very small ±
chance will not be enough. So, a cautious application of this Article is
entirely in line with the state of the law in a number of European legal sys-
tems. 42
13 A further example is a medical malpractice case. 43 The patient falls ser-
iously ill. Yet, the illness may well have a ªnaturalº cause. The doctor is
liable to the extent his malpractice may have caused the illness.
14 An example, unrelated to the loss of a chance, was already mentioned
above supra Art. 3:104 para. 1 (earthquake 44). A further example: P who
39
See also W. van Gerven et al., Tort Law (2000) 459 et seq.
40
W.V.H. Rogers (supra fn. 4) 219±220.
41
I.e. 5% in relation to the number of victims.
42
See for details J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation,
153 et seq.
43
We leave aside that this is probably governed by contract law in most countries. After all, that
does not affect the example.
44
Art. 3:104 no. 5.
58 Spier
was seriously injured by a car accident caused by D. P would never suffi-

ciently recover to take up his work again. In hospital he has a heart attack,
which is totally unrelated to the car accident or any other cause for which
someone else is liable. Had it not been for the accident, P would have
become unable to work for the rest of his life. In relation to P's claim for
loss of income, Art. 3:106 applies in view of Art. 3:104 para. 2 (b). His claim
for loss of income as from the heart attack will probably be reduced to 50%
due to the occurrence in his own sphere, i.e. the heart attack.
It is open to debate whether Art. 3:106 should be applied in cases where 15
the possible contribution is either very small (close to nil) or very substan-
tial (close to 100%). If, e.g., in the case discussed above under no. 13, the
chance to fall ill due to a natural cause is, say, 98%, the court may well
ignore the small chance that it may also have been caused by malpractice.
And if, conversely, the chance that the illness is due to a natural cause is,
say 2%, the doctor may well be held liable in full.
Section 2: Scope of Liability

Art. 3:201 . Scope of Liability
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section 1 of this Chap-
ter, whether and to what extent damage may be attributed to a person
depends on factors such as
a) the foreseeability of the damage to a reasonable person at the time of
the activity, taking into account in particular the closeness in time and
space between the damaging activity and its consequences, or the magni-
tude of the damage in relation to the normal consequences of such an
activity;
b) the nature and the value of the protected interests (Article 2:102);
c) the basis of liability (Article 1:101);
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been violated.
Comments
1. Introduction
For practical purposes, every (European) legal system (under review) 1
accepts that the mere fact that a conditio sine qua non-relation between a
loss and an activity is established, does not mean that every and all
subsequent losses have to be compensated by the liable person. As already
mentioned above, this seems true even for Belgium and France 45. After all,
the outcome of court cases in both countries is not significantly different,
compared with that of other countries under review.
45
Art. 3:101 no. 1.
Spier 59
2 The real difference between the various legal systems seems to be that
some perceive the issue dealt with in Art. 3:201 as part of causation,
whereas others perceive it as an unrelated legal vehicle. Yet, (theoretically
speaking) with the just mentioned exceptions, every legal system recognises
± of course ± that the sky cannot be the limit. So, for practical purposes the
differences are very limited.
3 We have sought to avoid discussions of this kind by distinguishing between
conditio sine qua non (Section 1) and the scope of liability (Section 2),
which are put together in Chapter 3 (causation).
2. The Scope of Liability May Depend on a Series of Relevant Factors

4 Art. 3:201 only comes into play if the requirement of Section 1 is fulfilled.
This means that a potential, concurrent or alternative cause may be enough
(see Art. 3:102 ± 3:104).
5 According to Art. 3:201 the scope of liability depends on a series of rele-
vant factors. This is by no means revolutionary, as it is nicely and convin-
cingly put in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey Inc. v. Philip Morris
Inc. 46:
ª`Proximate cause' [is] an amorphous concept even under common law.
See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 536±37, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
ª(T)he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually impossi-
ble to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every
case. Instead, previously decided cases identify factors that circumscribe
and guide the exercise of judgement in deciding whether the law affords
a remedy in specific circumstancesº.
6 The factors mentioned in Art. 3:201 a ± e are borrowed from a series of
cases, borrowed on their turn from or inspired by national case law. 47 This
list is not an exhaustive one. For that reason we speak of: ªfactors such asº.
7 In most cases various factors will play a role: (a), (b) and (e) are prob-
ably the most important ones. As a rule of thumb, liability will not easily
be established if the damage was not reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the activity, whereas a cautious attribution is required if the criterion
mentioned under (e) is not met. Yet, exceptions may apply, e.g. in case
of intent. Moreover, in particular in cases of (serious) personal injuries
a liberal attribution may well be required to meet the demands of jus-
tice.
46
178 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y.2001).
47
See J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 134 et seq.
This is not to say that every single factor plays a role in every jurisdiction. E.g., (b) is of no
importance in Belgium. See also the reports by H. Koziol in J. Spier (ed.), The Limits of
Expanding Liability (1998) 25 et seq., W.V.H. Rogers, 37 et seq. and J. Sinde Monteiro, 51
et seq.
60 Spier
The latter can be illustrated by the well known egg shell-cases. This type of 8
case is relatively rare and by the same token not really foreseeable. Yet,
such a loss will be attributed to the liable person. 48
The relevant factors may well point in different directions. For example, 9
personal injury deserves a high protection (Art. 2:102 para. 2). Strict liabi-
lity (Art. 5:101) may be a reason for some reluctance in establishing a
very broad scope of liability. If personal injury is caused by an activity as
mentioned in Art. 5:101, this may be therefore a reason for cautious and
liberal attribution at the same time. In those ± and many other ± cases,
the relevant factors have to be weighed against each other. The observa-
tions under no. 7 and 8 above may serve as a guideline.
Art. 3:201 gives considerable discretion to the courts. 10
3. Intervening Intentional or Grossly Negligent Activities of Third Parties

The Group has discussed, at some length, whether or not intervening inten- 11
tional or grossly negligent activities of third parties should limit the scope
of another's liability. Several members would be in favour of such a rule.
Others are much more reluctant to tie the courts in this way. In their
view, it greatly depends on the circumstances of a particular case whether
or not the acceptable scope of liability is exceeded, if such a rule were to
be applied at all.
Art. 3:106 might serve as a basis to tackle the issue discussed in the pre- 12
vious paragraph. If such an activity lies within the victim's sphere, he has
to bear the corresponding loss. So, if the activity lies within his sphere to a
considerable extent, he can only recover a small part of his loss from the
liable person. Notably, only the part which does not lie in his sphere.
4. The Relevant Factors

a) Foreseeability
Foreseeability probably is the most important and most applied factor. It is 13
acknowledged in many legal systems that unforeseeable losses cannot be
attributed more or less automatically. The yardstick is an objective one
(unforeseeable instead of unforeseen).
As a general rule, the magnitude of the harm as such is insufficient reason 14
to refrain from attributing the loss to the liable person. An explosion of
an oil refinery, for instance, may well cause a very large loss. Art. 10:401
may provide a tool to tackle those cases if need would be. Yet, the magni-
tude may considerably exceed the loss normally caused by the activity.
That may be a reason for a somewhat reluctant attribution. E.g., a collision
of cars will normally end up in damage to the car and personal injury of
48
See PETL Causation 17, 28, 45, 58, 70, 85, 98 and 124; slightly different p. 114. The Draft Arti-
cles of the Working Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations (see supra General Introduction,
no. 40) explicitly address this issue in the sense mentioned in the text.
Spier 61
one or more passengers; with some bad luck the loss may amount to, say, a
couple of million euros. Suppose D collides with a taxi. It carries three cap-
tains of industry, who each earn ¨ 25 million on a yearly basis. Due to the
accident, they become unfit for their work for many years. This loss seems
rather out of proportion with the normal consequences of a collision. 49 So,
depending on other relevant factors too, it arguably could not be entirely
attributed to D.
15 If a (new) loss is caused long after the event, this may urge for a somewhat
cautious attribution. E.g., P loses his leg as a consequence of a traffic acci-
dent. Many years later, he is unable to leave his house quickly enough dur-
ing a fire. 50 The national legal systems obviously struggle with this type of
case. One could imagine that different approaches were to be adopted,
whereas the outcome will also depend on the nature of the loss and the
basis of liability.
b) The Nature and the Value of the Protected Interests
16 The nature and the value of the protected interest refers to Art. 2:102. In
that Article, we have given a kind of hierarchy of ªinterestsº. It rather
speaks for itself that the more value is attached to an interest, the wider
the scope of attribution will generally be. The thin skull-rule may serve as
an example, acknowledged as it is in (almost) all legal systems. 51
c) The Basis of Liability
17 The basis of liability may also play a role, in that wide attribution seems
more appropriate if liability is based on fault compared with strict liability.
As already indicated before, all relevant factors were to be taken into
account.
18 If a liability, either based on fault or on Art. 5:101 (strict liability) aims to
protect specific interests, as a general rule we may take it that those losses
will have to be compensated.
d) The Ordinary Risks of Life
19 The ordinary risks of life is a somewhat amorphous concept. It may come
into play if, say, P is involved in a car accident for which D is liable. P
only suffers slight injury. After a couple of days, he decides to consult his
physician. On the way to this physician he is again hit by a car. The latter
accident may well be considered as a consequence of the ordinary risks of
life, in that everyone runs the risk to become involved in an accident. The
second accident seems to be totally unrelated to the first one in any sense
which should be relevant to the imposition of liability. If, on the other
hand, the first accident has increased the chance of becoming involved in
the second accident (e.g. the injury is quite serious; the victim has to trans-
49
See PETL Causation case 1.
50
See case 6 in: J. Spier (ed.), The Limits of Expanding Liability; and PETL Causation case 15.
51
See PETL Causation in relation to case 2.
62 Spier
ported to a hospital straight away at high speed; on the way to the hospital
the ambulance is hit by a car) the latter can no longer be considered as a
normal risk of life.
There obviously is some overlap between the ªordinary risk of lifeº and 20
Art. 3:106. If, in just mentioned example, the second accident is perceived
as a cause within the sphere of the victim, Art. 3:201 (d) does not come
into play any longer.
e) The Protective Purpose of the Rule
It follows from what has been said above supra (c) that the protective pur- 21
pose of the rule plays a rather important role in relation to the scope of
attribution. If a rule clearly aims to protect against a specific loss, that loss
will only exceptionally not fall within the scope of Art. 3:201. If a rule expli-
citly aims to protect only specific interests, other losses will not fall under
the scope of Art. 3:201. However, in the latter type of cases, Art. 3:201
will often not come into play as liability will probably not be established
at all.
Spier 63
Title III. Bases of Liability
Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault
Introduction
1. Overview and Comparison with Existing Liability Systems

1 This chapter deals with liability based on the most traditional, most wide-
spread and ± apparently ± most important criterion of imputation or foun-
dation of responsibility: the blame addressed to the author of a damaging
event for not having observed due care in order to avoid damage, com-
monly called ªfaultº. According to several national reports (A/IL/USA/S)
fault is considered ªthe cornerstoneº, ªthe primary criterionº or ªthe basic
conditionº of tort liability 1; the English report even states that ª[s]ome
would go so far as to say that fault is always necessaryº 2.
If we say that fault is ªapparentlyº the most important ground of liability,
this has a twofold meaning: On the one hand, ªfaultº ± in particular under
its most frequent form of ªnegligenceº ± has become a kind of a ªmaid of
all workº, because, in modern times with their more and more important
technological developments, it had to serve as a justification for compensa-
tion in cases where the traditional idea of ªmoral failureº appeared less and
less consistent. Paradoxically, the idea that there should be ªno responsibil-
ity without faultº was a typical product of the liberalistic and entrepreneur-
ial philosophy of the 19th century and was erected as a dogma at a time
when this very idea was already being overruled by reality. The French
report considers that historically ªfault played a predominant role in the
law of tortsº 3 which seems to indicate that this is no longer the case.
On the other hand, at least in some legal systems, liability based on fault
has been considerably marginalized by the emergence of a number of sta-
tutes introducing so called ªrisk-based liabilityº, i.e. strict liability, whereby
the ªoperatorsº of activities, ªholdersº or owners of goods and materials
1
All appearing in P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (forthcoming 2005, hereafter
quoted as PETL Fault); in particular: H. Koziol, Austria, no. 1; I. Gilead, Israel, no. 1;
G. Schwartz/M. Green, USA, no. 1; M. Martin-Casals/J. SoleÂ, Spain, no. 1.
2
W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Fault, no. 1.
3
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Fault, no. 1: ªFault was more than a ground for tortious lia-
bility: it constituted its very foundationº).
64 Widmer
Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault Introduction
presenting a qualified danger for people and property are made liable inde-
pendently from any blame of having been negligent or violated a duty of
care 4. In particular in those national systems which have enacted such
forms of liability in the transport sector and first of all for motor vehicles,
it can be said without any hesitation that the great majority of cases where
damage occurs and (extra-contractual) liability is at stake, are dealt with
on a basis where fault plays a marginal role, if any.
Nevertheless, fault remains an essential criterion of imputation, certainly 2
under theoretical aspects, but also for all those more or less important daily
events, where damage is caused by and to individual persons in the frame-
work of their normal activities. This explains why even in more recent codi-
fications or in drafts on national and international level 5, liability based on
fault is still put at the very entrance of tort law. The question is then only
if other criteria of imputation (such as technical or organisational risk,
respectively the idea of balancing profit and risk) are accepted as equiva-
lent or still considered as secondary and exceptional 6.
The Principles follow a concept of fault which corresponds to the largely 3
prevailing opinion in most European systems 7, namely an objective or
ªobjectivatedº notion of fault which takes as a yardstick an objective stan-
dard of conduct to which everybody has to conform, independently of his
individual capacities and which, therefore ± it may be argued ± has nothing
to do anymore with blameworthiness 8. Any deviation from this standard is
normally considered as fault; this is at least the theoretical approach, even
if ± of course ± a certain blameworthiness can be found in the great major-
4
B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of
Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability) 395, and infra the
commentary to Chapter 5. Another explanation for fault-independent liability, by inverting
the perspective from the author of the damage to the person who suffers it, was offered by
some French authors, such as Starck, with the idea of ªguaranteeº (theÂorie de la garantie; see
G. Viney, Introduction aÁ la responsabiliteÂ civile, in: J. Ghestin (ed.), TraiteÂ de droit civil (2nd
edn. 1995) § 54.
5
See e.g. the Dutch Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek Art. 6:162/1+3; the new Civil Code of Quebec,
Art. 1457; the Swiss Reform Project 2000, Art. 41 and Art. 48 et seq. COS; the Austrian
Reform Project 2004, §§ 1292 and 1295 et seq. ABGB.
6
Infra Art. 4:101 no. 6; see also C. Canaris, Die GefaÈhrdungshaftung im Lichte der neueren
Rechtsentwicklung, [1995] Juristische BlaÈtter (JBl), 2 (16); this author considers liability based
on fault as being ªeine rechtsethische SelbstverstaÈndlichkeitº (selfunderstanding under the
aspect of legal ethics)º, therefore having ªeine gewisse rechtsethische U È berlegenheit (a higher
dignity from the viewpoint of legal ethics)º.
7
P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 43 et seq.; see also H. Koziol, Liability
based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick? in [1998] Maastricht Journal V/2, 111 et
seq.; Ch. von. Bar, The Common European Law of Torts II (2000) no. 226 et seq.
8
Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 235. As a matter of fact, some members of the Group would
have preferred to return to a more subjective concept of fault and a clearer distinction
between fault-based and strict liability. They consider that it is contradictory to adopt, on the
one hand, a very severe ± objective ± notion of fault, which is almost identical with that of
wrongfulness, and to be so extremely restrictive, on the other hand, in accepting forms of
(truly) objective liability, as is the case in Art. 5:101 of the Principles.
Widmer 65
Introduction Title III. Bases of Liability
ity of cases. The model for this approach is the definition of ªFahrlaÈssig-
keitº (more or less corresponding to the idea of negligence) in § 276,
para.1, 2nd sent. of the German BGB. As will be explained later on, Art.
4:102 para. 2 shows, however, that the Group ± albeit on an exceptional
basis ± has accepted the idea that there are cases where it would be unjust
and contrary to equity to apply always and under all circumstances an
immutable ªstrictlyº objective standard (see infra Art. 4:102 no. 14 et seq.).
2. Terminology & Scope

4 The expression ªfaultº (faute, colpa, culpa, schuld, Verschulden), even if it
may not have an unequivocal meaning, did never meet with fundamental
criticism within the Group, which adopted it as the generally accepted
term designating the basis of liability for personal misconduct.
Usually, it is divided in two sub-categories, namely deliberate wrongdoing
(dolus, intent) on the one hand, and non-intentional, ªnegligentº behaviour
causing (unintended) damage, on the other 9. In criminal law, further dis-
tinctions and nuances are made between unconscious and conscious negli-
gence, the latter of which may develop into dolus eventualis (quasi-intent).
But in private law, too, one may admit different degrees of fault, in a
decreasing order: intent, grave or gross fault or negligence, medium and
finally slight fault or negligence (corresponding to the Romanistic culpa
lata on the one side and culpa levis or even levissima on the other side).
In the framework of a purely objective concept of fault, such degrees 10 are
in principle not relevant as far as the justification of liability as such is con-
cerned; yet, they can influence the assessment of damages, be it on the
basis of the general rule of Art. 3:201 11 or in the more exceptional context
of Art. 10:401 (reduction clause) 12.
5 According to the systematic order adopted for the Principles, Chapter 4
includes a second section titled ªReversal of the burden of proving faultº.
This section contains a first provision (Art. 4:201) establishing the general con-
ditions under which the judge may reverse the burden of proof relating to
fault. A second provision (Art. 4:202) introduces the concept of ªEnterprise
Liabilityº which is also based on a reversal of the burden of proving fault, in
the sense that the (potentially) liable entrepreneur can exonerate himself by
proving that he has ªconformed to the required standard of conduct ª.
Whether this type of liability can still be considered as a variety of liability
based on fault may appear questionable, even if the connecting factor is
9
This division is even stronger in the common law where intent (trespass) and negligence are
considered as separate categories rather than as two forms of a general concept of fault. See
Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562: ªThe liability for negligence, whether
you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of culpa . . .º.
10
See on this topic also Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 237 et seq. (ªDegrees of Blameworthi-
nessº), in particular no. 242±243.
11
Supra Art. 3:201 no. 17.
12
66 Widmer
Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault Introduction
still ªmisconductº. Experiences with similar provisions 13 show that there is

a tendency in jurisprudence to transform them progressively into forms of
ªquasi-strict liabilitiesº by admitting (with express reference to the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine or not) that the occurrence of the damage shows precisely
that the care required to prevent it has not been observed. That this ten-
dency is also present in the Principles, is corroborated by the fact that
Art. 4:201 is also a kind of pre-stage to strict liability for cases of ªhigherº
but not yet ªabnormalº danger 14.
3. History & Background

During the 19th century, which was the period of the great European 6
codifications, the concept of fault which, in the ªiniuriaº of Roman law,
had originally been a largely objective one before becoming refined by
the development of subjective criteria 15, took a new and more subjective
significance as it was understood as the counterbalance of the liberalistic
idea of entrepreneurship. Responsibility was considered as ªpendantº of
liberty, and ± in order not to restrict excessively such liberty ± liability
should only be imposed where the person responsible could be blamed for
not having avoided a damage he would have been positively able to pre-
vent. Already in the second half of the 19th century, however (and as was
mentioned above in no. 1 of the Introduction), industrial and technological
development involving accrued risks for workers and third persons showed
that a truly subjective concept of fault did lead to results which socially and
under an aspect of material justice were no longer acceptable.
The reaction to this situation followed a double track 16: On the one hand, 7
and especially on the continent, new categories of liability were ªinventedº,
which were no longer based on an individual and blameworthy act or omis-
sion, which could be qualified as fault, but took as a connecting factor the
increased and not completely controllable danger of certain activities, the
damaging effects of which were attributed to the person who economically
is in control of such activity and is deemed to take advantage of it. That
was the evolution which led to different forms of so-called strict liability,
the foundation of which was seen in the compensation of a privilege,
conceded to the operator to legally exercise a socially useful activity which
otherwise (because of its statistically unavoidable risks) should have been
forbidden.
13
Swiss law is particularly rich in such experience; see P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Fault,
no. 8 et seq.; idem, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2, 3, 6 et seq.
14
See infra Art. 4:201 no. 2, 7; further the introduction to Chapter 5.
15
B. Winiger, La responsabiliteÂ aquilienne romaine ± Damnum iniuria datum (1997) 95 et seq.,
187: ªInitialement, . . . la LA [Lex Aquilia] formule avec le DID [Damnum Iniuria Datum]
une responsabiliteÂ objective pure.º; idem, La responsabiliteÂ aquilienne en droit commun ±
Damnum culpa datum (2002) 76 et seq., 220 et seq.
16
For a description of this evolution, P. Widmer, Fonction et evolution de la responsabiliteÂ pour
risque, 76 [1977] Zeitschrift fuÈr Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR) I, 417 et seq.; idem, Le visage
actuel de la responsabiliteÂ civile en droit suisse, in: DeÂveloppements reÂcents du droit de la
responsabiliteÂ civile (1991) 7 et seq.; see also: Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 313.
Widmer 67
Art. 4:101 Title III. Bases of Liability
The other kind of reaction ± which happened in a parallel way with the
upcoming of strict liabilities was the ªobjectivationº of fault. The less the
personal conditions and capacities of a person who had caused a damage
were taken into account and the higher the standard of the bonus pater
familias or ªreasonable manº was raised, the greater was the possibility to
establish his responsibility for not having observed all proper care to avoid
the damage. Pushed to the extreme 17, such objectivisation led to a notion of
fault which merged with the concept of ªwrongfulnessº or ªunlawfulnessº.
Under such a concept, capacity of discernment was no longer a prerequi-
site, and fault became equivalent with the purely objective finding of a
deviation of a person's conduct from that of an abstract model (the proper
conduct being established retrospectively by the judge who ± knowing the
whole causal development ± can easily define the measures that should
and could have been taken to prevent the injury).
8 From the very beginning of its discussions, the majority of the Group has
favoured an objective concept of ªfaultº which corresponds to the common
law approach as well as to the French or Dutch notion of ªfaultº, without
going so far as to declare capacity of discernment of no relevance for the
ascertainment of fault (Art. 489-2 Code civil; Art. 6:165 para.1 NBW) 18.
Only at a later stage of debates, it was accepted ± upon a proposition of
the minority, which had advocated a more subjective approach ± to intro-
duce a provision that would allow to take into account certain individual
conditions and characteristics of the wrongdoer, at least under exceptional
circumstances (Art. 4:102 para. 2).
Section 1. Conditions of Liability Based on Fault

Art. 4:101 . Fault
A person is liable on the basis of fault for intentional or negligent violation
of the required standard of conduct.
Comments
1. Introduction and Comparison with Existing Legal Systems

1 This provision states the principle that a person will be liable, provided that
the other conditions of liability are fulfilled, if his conduct is not in confor-
mity with what could reasonably be expected from him. It establishes
therefore a general clause for liability based on fault, comparable to the
general provisions existing in several important continental codes, like
17
In this sense, the Superior Court of Appeal of Munich (MuÈnchener Oberappellationsgericht)
held in 1861 that: ªoperating a railway with locomotives constitutes necessarily and inevitably
a culpable behaviourº; see 14 [1861] Seuffert's Archiv, no. 208, p. 354 et seq.
18
P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 31 et seq.; Ch. von Bar, The Common
European Law of Torts I (1998) no. 61 et seq., in particular 66 et seq.
68 Widmer
Chapter 4. Liability Based on Fault Art. 4:101
Art. 1382 of the French Civil code, Art. 6:162 para.3 of the Dutch NBW,
§ 1295 of the Austrian ABGB, Art. 2043 of the Italian, Art. 1.902 of the
Spanish Civil codes or Art. 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations 1. In a
broader perspective, the German BGB (§ 823 combined with the already
mentioned § 276), notwithstanding its different structure, pursues the
same goal as well as the common law does (if one subsumes intent and neg-
ligence under a general concept of fault 2).
Liability for fault takes its denomination from the criterion of imputation, 2
from the specific basis of this liability, whereas, if one looks at its key ele-
ment (ªAnknuÈpfungstatbestandº), it would have to be called ªliability for
(human) behaviour or conductº. The contrary happens in the field of strict
liability, at least when it is named liability for (or based on) risk: risk or
danger (ªGefaÈhrdungº) is the key element of a form of liability which has
as its basis or justification the idea of compensation of risk and profit
(ªcuius commoda, eius incommodaº) or ± in slightly different words ± the
idea that responsibility has to be assumed as a counterpart of the privilege
to create (and maintain) a situation of increased risk 3.
Fault is the criterion of imputation which applies when damage has been 3
caused by a person's own conduct. This element distinguishes it again
from strict liability where it is not an individual behaviour which is rele-
vant 4, but the risk inherent to a certain activity as such, even if, of course,
the risk is the emanation of an activity exercised by human beings 5. The
link between the risk and the person liable is not established, however, on
the basis of the immediate (damaging) conduct of this person, but in
consideration of the economic and organisational control he has over the
activity involving the risk. The realisation of such risk may also have been
provoked by the behaviour of a person other than the operator or holder
himself, in particular by one of his auxiliaries; in some cases of extreme
risk (like nuclear risk) even by an extraneous third person (so-called ªcana-
lizationº of liability).
2. Terminology
ªFaultº is used as a comprehensive term, embracing intent as well as negli- 4
gence 6. It is understood in a purely objective way as deviation from or
violation of ªthe required standard of conductº, whether wilfully (inten-
1
Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 18), no. 11.
2
Supra Introduction fn. 9.
3
See infra Art. 5:101 no. 28; B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Lia-
bility, no. 48 et seq., in particular no. 71±74.
4
The elementary distinction between liability ªwith and without personal misconductº is also
an essential systematic criterion in Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 18), 5 et seq., idem (supra fn. 7),
no. 179±305, 306±410. B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability,
no. 157.
5
This is also the reason why the Principles establish a strict liability for dangerous activities,
and not just for things, vehicles, energies etc.; see infra Art. 5:101 no. 18.
6
Supra Introduction to Chapter 4, no. 4.
Widmer 69
tional violation of such standard) or by omitting to act with the necessary

care and circumspection as it can ªreasonablyº be expected (negligent
violation of the standard).
5 It is not possible to give a clear-cut legal definition of the ªrequired
standard of conductº. Therefore, Art. 4:102 para. 1 attempts to explain dif-
ferent elements which have to be taken into account in determining this
standard.
3. Relations with Other Provisions

6 Except with the other provisions in Chapter 4, Art. 4:101 is related to a
number of different rules in the whole set of Principles. This is the case,
firstly and in a fundamental way, with the ªBasic Normº of Art. 1:101,
where fault is expressly and primarily (para. 2, lit. a) mentioned as one of
the main criteria of legal imputation or ªattributionº of damage, together
with risk-based attribution (lit. b) and liability for others (lit. c). The place
of fault in the first rank of these three main criteria is not incidental; it
shows that ± at least systematically (and this is also strongly corroborated
by the very restrictive scope of application of Chapter 5) ± fault is still con-
sidered, also in the Principles, as a pre-eminent basis of liability, compared
to which the other two justifications effectively have a more or less second-
ary or exceptional character. This predominance of fault appears notwith-
standing the fact that Art. 1:101 para. 2 treats all three criteria on an appar-
ently equal level 7; it is symptomatic, in this regard, that Art. 9:102 para. 2,
as well as Art. 8:101 para. 1, mention expressly the ªrespective degrees of
faultº of multiple tortfeasors as a factor to be taken into consideration for
the determination of their respective portion of liability in the internal
repartition of the damages, while ªriskº and ªliability for othersº are only
implicitly referred to as ªother mattersº of apparently secondary impor-
tance.
7 A ± more or less hidden ± reference to the criterion of fault appears in
Art. 2:102 which deals, under the heading ªDamageº, with the problem of
ªProtected interestsº. Para. 4 of this provision indicates that the so-called
ªpure economic interestsº ± which are deemed to be of lower value in
comparison with human life, personal integrity, dignity and liberty and
also as against property rights ± may nevertheless enjoy a larger protection
where their infringement is due to an actor which causes the damage with
intent (or at least dolus eventualis) and being conscious that his interests
are of less value than those of the victim.
Para. 5 of the same provision makes clear in a more general way that the
scope of protection depends on the nature (i.e. the basis) of liability, so
that the protection ªagainst intentional harmº will in general be stronger
than in other cases, where fault is of less gravity or completely absent.
7
70 Widmer
In Chapter 3, dealing with causation, Art. 3:106 establishes a rule for cases 8
where uncertain circumstances belonging to the own sphere of the victim
may have contributed to the damage. This provision can also apply to cases
of ªuncertainº contributory conduct of the victim (Chapter 8, Art. 8.101);
and, if such conduct can be considered as ªfaultyº, this element will have
its significance for the assessment of the part of the loss the victim has to
bear itself.
Still in the frame of Chapter 3, fault as a basis of liability is taken into 9
consideration for the determination of the scope of liability according to
Art. 3:201. The element of ªforeseeabilityº mentioned in lit. a of Art.
3:201 is also one of the essential factors in evaluating the ªrequired stan-
dard of conductº as provided in Art. 4:102, para. 1. It is sometimes argued,
that such foreseeability has to be conceived in a more objective way under
the aspect of ªadequacyº related to the requirement of causation 8 than for
the question of fault. However, where the concept of fault is already
ªobjectivatedº itself to a large extent ± as is the case in the Principles ±
this difference becomes extremely theoretical.
It is evident that the scope of liability, i.e. the question whether ªmechani- 10
calº causation in the sense of the conditio sine qua non doctrine should
entail liability and to what extent, is influenced by the basis of liability
(Art. 3:201 lit. c), i.e. the rules relating to fault. And it is also widely
accepted that fault, especially intent and gross negligence should be a fac-
tor which has an important weight for this decision and evaluation 9.
Another, not directly visible, relation to the rules on fault exists in Art. 11
5:101, which precisely establishes a different basis of liability, independent
from any wrongful conduct and fault, namely that connected to an (abnor-
mally) dangerous activity. In trying to define ªabnormal dangerousnessº,
para. 2 lit. a of this provision refers to a risk which remains high and out
of control ªeven when all due care is exercisedº. This shows what one
could call the ªdialectic relationshipº between fault-based liability and
strict liability 10. The latter begins and is justified only from the point at
which the former is unable to grant a socially and economically adequate
compensation of (inevitable) damage 11.
The ªrequired standard of conduct (in supervision)º also plays a role in the 12
context of Art. 6:101, according to which persons charged with the supervi-
sion of minors or mentally disabled persons are exonerated if they show
that they have done everything reasonably possible to prevent damage.
Systematically, this type of liability could therefore have been incorporated
8
On the strange concept of ªobjective retrospective prognosisº, see P. Widmer, Switzerland, in
J. Spier (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Causation (2000, hereafter quoted as PETL Causation)
108.
9
P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Causation, 112.
10
On the interaction between fault and risk-based liabilities; Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 329
et seq.
11
See infra Art. 5:101 no. 14±15.
Widmer 71
just as well in Chapter 4, Section 2 under the heading ªReversal of the

burden of proving faultº. The Group preferred however to form a special
category of ªLiabilities for othersº 12.
13 The violation of the ªrequired standard of conductº on the part of the
auxiliary is a prerequisite for the vicarious liability of his employer or
principal (Art. 6:102). While, for the principal, such liability is based on
the simple fact that he uses auxiliaries for his purposes, and is therefore
ªstrictº in the sense of independence from fault, the conduct of the auxili-
ary which has immediately caused the damage has to be ªwrongfulº and
therefore faulty 13.
14 In Chapter 10 on ªDamagesº, Art. 10:101 mentions as a (secondary/ancil-
lary) purpose of awarding damages ± in addition to the main goal of com-
pensation or restoration ± ªthe aim of preventing harmº. This is of course
particularly true in the context of fault-based liability. The ascertainment
that somebody has committed a ªfaultyº act or has behaved in an incorrect
manner includes at the same time an admonishment to refrain from such
conduct in the future and not to repeat it. This is also the reason why the
ªEconomic Analysisº insists so much on the role of ªfaultº and the element
of blameworthiness in it 14.
15 Fault also plays a role in the context of non-pecuniary damage (Chapter 10,
Section 3) and its compensation. However, and in contrast with what some
national systems provided until recent times 15, the leading idea in the
Principles is that fault ± or even a particularly severe fault ± (on the side
of the tortfeasor) ought not to be a prerequisite for the compensation of
immaterial damage and that, as far as the assessment of the corresponding
damages is concerned, the degree of the tortfeasor's fault should be taken
into consideration ªonly where it significantly contributes to the grievance
of the victimº. That means that the essential factor is the seriousness of
the infringement with the personality rights of the victim, and that the
wrongdoer's fault plays a role only insofar as it makes the situation of the
victim worse. But, it means also that, at least in this respect, aggravating
subjective aspects can be of a certain importance 16.
16 Finally, a link of the rules dealing with fault as a basis of liability exists with
the provision on ªReduction of Damagesº (Art. 10:401) insofar as the basis
12
See also Art. 1384 of the French Civil Code where not only different types of liabilities for
others, but also liability for damage caused by things are treated together in the same provi-
sion.
13
See infra Chapter 6 no. 19.
14
M. Faure, Enonomic Analysis, PETL Fault, no. 40 et seq.
15
In particular Germany and Austria; see W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary
Loss in a Comparative Perspective (2001): E. Karner/H. Koziol, Austria, no. 1 et seq.; U.
Magnus/J. Fedtke, Germany, no. 1 et seq. On the reform in Germany: H.-G. Bollweg/M. Hell-
mann, Das neue Schadensersatzrecht (2003) 22 and 55 et seq., 195 et seq.; on the Austrian
reform project: Verhandlungen des 15. O È sterreichischen Juristentages, BuÈrgerliches Recht
(2004, http://www.juristentag.at/files/juristentag_2003/zivilrecht_15.pdf).
16
See infra the commentary to Art. 10:301 no. 9.
72 Widmer
of liability is certainly ± apart from the financial situation of the parties and
the possible ruin of the defendant ± one of the most important factors to be
taken into account for the decision whether and to which extent a reduc-
tion of the damages (assessed in conformity with the preceding norms of
this chapter) should take place. Here again, the gravity of the fault may
have a certain importance. A reduction will probably not be conceded to
a person who has acted with intent or with gross negligence. If, on the other
hand, the victim has contributed to the damage by behaving in a careless
way, a reduction of the damages owed to him will be envisaged not on the
grounds of Art. 10:401, but as a question of ªadequacyº in virtue of Art.
3:201 and Art. 8:101 17.
4. Illustrations
Pedestrian D1, lost in his thoughts, dashes suddenly on to the street where 17
cyclist D2, trying to make way for him, crashes into another cyclist, P, who
falls from his bicycle and breaks his collarbone. P sues D1 and D2.
On the basis of Art. 4:101 and 4:102, Pedestrian D1 will most probably be
found to have committed a fault by rushing on the street in an unreason-
able and unforeseeable way. D2 should normally be exonerated because
his behaviour was a mere reaction to D1's mistake und because it could
even be qualified as ªcorrect misconductº insofar as it was aimed at pre-
venting the collision with D1.
Without realizing it, D, looking for the key in his bag, drops a banana peel at 18
the entrance of his office; a quarter of an hour later, P, D's superior, who
wants to discuss a paper prepared by D, slips on the peel and is severely
injured.
Even if D can hardly be blamed for this unconscious act, he will probably
be declared liable for fault according to Art. 4:101 and 4:102 because his
behaviour is objectively not in conformity to that of a reasonable person.
Reasonable persons do not drop banana peels on the floor and, in any
case, they make always sure that nothing has fallen from their bag when
they take out their key.
Mrs D, a naturo- and magnetopath, runs a clinic of good reputation in the 19
mountains. Mr P goes to this clinic to cure his renal calculi. After two ses-
sions with Mrs D, who did nothing else but staring hypnotically into his
eyes, P suffers violent colics and has to be brought to the hospital where it
is established that the treatment of Mrs D was absolutely inappropriate in
the specific case; P can be saved only by an extremely expensive transplanta-
tion of new kidneys.
This case can be looked at as a typical example of ªU È bernahmeverschul-
denº 18, i.e. the fault which consists in the fact to engage in an activity of
17
See in this sense also infra the comments ad Art. 10:401.
18
Widmer 73
which the actor should know that he lacks the competence and skills
to carry it out properly. The main problem, in the present case, may be
one of causation, because it could be difficult to prove that Mrs D's
hypnotherapy has had any (positive or negative) effect whatsoever.
20 D sues P for unjust enrichment although he must have known that he had no
claim. The court dismisses the action, qualifying it as abusive. P sues D in
return for his entire loss caused by the time-consuming lawsuit, including
loss of profit and damage to reputation.
To the extent to which P, who has won his case, does not get compensation
on the basis of procedural rules, he can try to sue D in tort on the basis of
Art. 4:101 and 4:102, arguing that D has introduced his action with the
(sole) intent to cause damage or that, at least, it was absolutely obvious
that the case was a hopeless one. Simple negligence will normally not be
sufficient. As a matter of fact, one should be very cautious in restricting
the right to bring an action before court; actually, P would probably have
no case in the ambit of the common law.
21 D, fifteen years old, participates in a ski-camp organised by his college. One
morning, he runs downhill, following his teacher and the other pupils, on a
rather steep slope. At a certain moment, on a hard frozen spot, he loses
control over his skis and crashes into P who stands on a little hill on the
edge of the track. The collision is violent, P is severely injured and one of
his legs permanently affected in its mobility.
It seems likely that, also according to the Principles, D will be held liable
for fault, even if the accident was not really evitable for him and notwith-
standing the fact that skiing is in itself an activity involving a certain risk.
The court will probably argue that D, knowing that in the morning the
snow could be hard and slippery, should have reduced his speed in order
to avoid collisions with other users of the course. 19
22 P, deputy director of an art museum in a medium-size town, is accused of
sexual harassment by two female employees. Different newspapers have
reported on the case. After an administrative inquiry which shows that the
accusations by the two ladies were unfounded, P is rehabilitated, but in the
meantime he has left the town and has been unable to find a new job. He
sues the two ladies for compensation of his lost income.
On the basis of Art. 4:101 and 4:102, the two ladies could be held liable if it
can be proven that their false accusation was intentional (a kind of ªmob-
19
In a similar case (DFC [Decision of the Swiss Federal Court] 82 [1956] II 25 et seq.), the Swiss
Federal Court has held that ª[i]t is true that even an experienced skier takes the risk of falling.
As long as he does not endanger anybody else, no blame can be addressed to him. However,
where he ought to realize that his way of running may cause harm to somebody else, he has to
take all due care in order to prevent this eventuality.º In other words: If a skier constitutes a
danger for somebody else, his conduct is to blame and he is at fault. This conclusion is not
very far away from the German decision of 1861 which considered the use of locomotives by a
railway company to be ªa necessarily and inevitably faulty conductº (supra Introduction, fn. 17).
74 Widmer
bingº); a certain (perhaps partial) liability could also be envisaged, if their

accusation was a grossly exaggerated reaction to a harmless occurrence
and if they should have foreseen that such public denigration could cause
serious injury to P.
Art. 4:102 . Required Standard of Conduct

(1) The required standard of conduct is that of the reasonable person in the
circumstances, and depends, in particular, on the nature and value of the
protected interest involved, the dangerousness of the activity, the expertise
to be expected of a person carrying it on, the foreseeability of the damage,
the relationship of proximity or special reliance between those involved, as
well as the availability and the costs of precautionary or alternative meth-
ods.
(2) The above standard may be adjusted when due to age, mental or physi-
cal disability or due to extraordinary circumstances the person cannot be
expected to conform to it.
(3) Rules which prescribe or forbid certain conduct have to be considered
when establishing the required standard of conduct.
Comments
1. Overview
In its first paragraph, this provision undertakes to enumerate and to 1
describe different factors which have to be taken into account when
defining the required proper standard of conduct, by reference to which
the conduct of the person (potentially) liable has to be measured.
The second paragraph contains a correction of the purely objective stan- 2
dard defined in para. 1. It introduces some subjective elements which ± in
exceptional cases and under particular circumstances ± can mitigate the
appreciation of a person's conduct.
Para. 3 adds a special element to those already mentioned in para. 1. It 3
underlines that statutory duties or interdictions have also to be taken in
consideration for the ascertainment of the proper conduct according to
para. 1 and 2.
2. Terminology and Scope

a) The General Principle (Para. 1)
What is required in a concrete situation and under concrete circumstances 4
is sometimes prescribed more or less precisely by specific rules as men-
tioned in para. 3 20; classical examples are the regulations on road traffic or
20
Infra no. 19 et seq.
Widmer 75
construction law. Otherwise, it is the judge who tries to establish what

would have been the conduct of a ªreasonable manº.
This reasonable man or woman should not be seen as a totally abstract
ªaverage citizenº or a statistically construed representative of the ªsilent
majorityº. It is the modern type of the Roman bonus pater familias, i.e.
somebody who does not pursue his own goals without looking to the right
or left, but who takes also into consideration the (possibly infringed)
interests of other people. Furthermore, the behaviour which serves as
standard has to be determined according to the specific circumstances of
the case 21.
5 This figure of the ªreasonable personº may vary and can be adapted, not to
the individual personality of the person liable, but to the category he repre-
sents. Thus, the standard can be different for a ªreasonableº specialist in
aesthetic surgery than it would be for a ªreasonableº medical generalist; it
can be more severe for an architect and engineer than it would be for a
layman executing some repairs on his own house 22; it will be ªstricterº for
a mountain guide than it would perhaps have been for a simple tourist
(see however infra no. 9: ªUÈ bernahmeverschuldenº).
6 The Group has spent considerable endeavour to indicate as precisely and
as completely as possible all the relevant factors which have to be taken
into account in the process of defining the requirements of proper care
according to given circumstances. The basic starting point for such process
is the acknowledgement of the fact that liability law ± as private law in
general ± has to seek and to find the proper balance between conflicting
individual interests 23, which represent the two faces of liberty: On the one
side, we have the ªactivity interestº which corresponds to the liberty of
developing one's personality and displaying economic, sportive or artistic
activities; on the other hand the ªintegrity interestº, corresponding to the
liberty to enjoy one's own physical and psychic capacities and one's
property without being disturbed.
7 Accordingly, the first factor mentioned as being relevant for the valuation
of a (potentially liable) person's conduct under the aspect of fault is ªthe
nature and the value of the protected interest involvedº. This obviously refers
back to Art. 2:102 and to the hierarchy of interests established therein. It
means that the higher the endangered or threatened interest has to be
valued, the greater the efforts of a person whose behaviour could interfere
with those interests have to be in order to prevent any damage. It means on
the other hand also that a very valuable or even preponderant interest of
21
See H. Koziol, Liability based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick? in [1998] Maas-
tricht Journal V/2, 118.
22
See PETL Fault, Questionnaire, Part II, case no. 7.
23
See on this topic: W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th ed. 2002) Chapter I:
Nature and Functions of the Law of Torts; P. Widmer, Privatrechtliche Haftung, in: P.
MuÈnch/Th. Geiser (eds.), Schaden-Haftung-Versicherung, HandbuÈcher fuÈr die Anwaltspraxis
vol. V (1999) no. 2.2 ± 2.5.
76 Widmer
the person who causes the damage may to a certain degree justify his
conduct 24 and, accordingly, contribute to lower the standard of care applic-
able to such person. Or, in other words: the higher appears the value of the
ªactivity interestº, the more one should be sparing in restricting its exercise
in favour of the ªintegrity interestº of third persons ± subject, of course, to
the nearly absolute priority conferred to physical or psychic integrity and
other personality rights enjoying similar protection.
The second element ± closely linked with the first one relating to the 8
protected interests ± is the ªdangerousness of the activityº. It is a general
principle of common sense that one has to adapt his diligence to the nature
of the activity he exercises and that one should refrain from undertakings
for which he is not sufficiently prepared and formed. ªDangerousnessº is
therefore to be understood in a broad sense, so as to cover every element
of an activity which requires more than everybody's normal abilities,
namely a certain ªexpertiseº.
The precept, according to which the standard of care increases with the
ªdangerousnessº of the activity concerned has, in some legal systems,
been (over-) dogmatised under the denomination of the ªrule of danger
(Gefahrensatz)º and is expressed approximately as follows: ªWhoever
creates or maintains a situation of danger for others has to take all proper
measures to avoid that such danger materialises in form of damageº 25.
Such overdogmatisation begins at the point where this rule is not used
only to ascertain and to measure the fault of a person who could and
should have realised that his conduct created (unnecessary) risks for other
people, but where it is turned into an aspect of causation and a general
principle of unlawfulness. On this basis, the judge could then retrospec-
tively take it as granted that all proper measures to prevent the damage ±
and therefore the required conduct ± have not been adopted because, if
this had been the case, the damage would not have occurred. This reflec-
tion is, of course, logically irrebuttable, but it corrupts the judgement on
fault and, simultaneously, it blurs dangerously the borderline and distorts
the dialectic relationship 26 between fault-based and strict liability.
In some legal systems 27, the liability of specialists is regulated in a particular 9
way, and it can be discussed whether this is an even more severe applica-
tion of an objective yardstick or, on the contrary, the expression of a sub-
jective valuation which ± at least above the ordinary level of the reasonable
every- or nobody ± takes into account the special capacities of the indivi-
dual wrongdoer.
24
See infra Art. 7:101 and the comments thereto.
25
See e.g. for Swiss law: K. Oftinger/E. Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, Allgemeiner Teil,
(5th ed. 1996) § 3 no. 54 et seq.; P. Widmer, Gefahren des Gefahrensatzes, in 106 [1970] ZBJV
(Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins), 289 et seq., 307 et seq.; in the opposite sense
recently: M. Jaun, Gefahrensatz ± Gefahr oder Chance, [2003] ZBJV 139, 141 et seq.
26
See supra Art. 4:101 no. 11.
27
See in particular Austria, § 1299 ABGB.
Widmer 77
On the other hand, someone who purports to carry out a ªdangerousº

activity, knowing that he does not have the necessary abilities, commits a
fault in embarking on such activity disregarding his insufficient ªexpertiseº
and leading others to believe (falsely) that he is able to accomplish his task.
That is a case of liability for disappointed (abused) confidence in the exper-
tise of a person, based on the so-called ªU È bernahmeverschuldenº.
10 A further element, which does not appear expressly in Art. 4:102, but can
be taken from Art. 2:102 para. 1, is the obviousness of the interests or rights
of third parties. The better such rights and positions are recognizable, iden-
tifiable and clearly delimited, the easier it is for others to respect them and
to use proper care in order to safeguard them. The standard of care has to
be judged in accordance with this aspect, too.
11 A classic factor to be taken into consideration in establishing the standard
of conduct is the foreseeability of the damage. A person cannot be held
liable for a consequence of her behaviour if, notwithstanding all due
caution, she was not able to foresee it. In this context, foreseeability
certainly has to be considered ex ante 28; however, the question can still be
discussed if the yardstick is that of a more or less objectivated, abstract
foreseeability or if, on the contrary, the damageable consequences must
have been reasonably foreseeable for the specific person whose liability is
at stake. The Principles adopt an objective approach; a certain correction
can eventually (ªin extraordinary circumstancesº) be based upon the
escape-clause of Art. 4:102 para. 2 29.
12 Foreseeability can also be influenced, among others, by the relationship
between the persons involved. On the other hand, such relationship is a
general element which has to be taken into account for the determination
of the standard of care. The closer the proximity between the actors, the
more they can be expected to pay attention to their respective interests.
Proximity may also generate a certain reliance which has to be met. This
aspect is of particular relevance in the field of liability for services where
damages are mostly of ªpurely economicº nature 30, especially in the wide-
spread consulting business. Where a person has special knowledge in a par-
ticular field (banking, arts etc.), or creates or lets develop the appearance
of such knowledge, she has to assume the corresponding responsibility
towards people who (obviously) rely on it 31.
13 Art. 4:102 para. 1 mentions as the last element to be taken into considera-
tion in defining the standard of conduct and the duty of care the question
of the availability and the costs of precautionary or alternative methods. It
seems evident that, where an interest can be pursued and the intended
result reached by different means and methods, the actor who is or should
28
See supra Art. 4:101 no. 9 and fn. 8.
29
Infra no. 14 et seq.
30
See supra Art. 2:102 para. 4 and the comments thereto.
31
Supra no. 9.
78 Widmer
be aware of the dangers which his activity involves for third persons, should
choose, as far as possible and reasonable, the less dangerous way. This is an
application of the general principles of good faith (ªschonende Rechtsaus-
uÈbungº) and of proportionality.
Somewhat less evident is the other factor, namely that of the (excessive)
costs of such measures and methods. The question is if, and to which
extent, one can invoke as a defence the fact that appropriate precautions
would have been too expensive and that he therefore was not obliged to
adopt them. There is a tendency, under the influence of the ªEconomic
Analysisº (but already induced by the Learned Hand formula) 32, to admit
that costs of precautionary measures become ªunreasonableº from the
moment in which they exceed the expenses which would be caused either
by the direct compensation of damage or by paying insurance premiums
for a corresponding coverage. It seems doubtful, however, that, at a practi-
cal level, a pure cost-benefit analysis can be of great help to courts in reach-
ing their decisions: apart from anything else, it may be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to determine what are the costs on each side of the equa-
tion. It may also be, on the other side, that the legislature decides in a par-
ticular area that an activity should bear all of its inevitable accident costs
via a regime of strict liability.
b) Adaptation of the Ordinary Standard to Extraordinary Circumstances
(Para. 2)
As already indicated 33, the Principles reserve the possibility, in para. 2 of 14
Art. 4:102, though only for a particular type of wrongdoers and for ªextra-
ordinary circumstancesº, that the objectivated notion of fault ± based on
the objective standard of conduct ± may be tempered in order to avoid an
excessive ªhardshipº in the evaluation of a person's effective possibilities
to behave as the standard would have required. In other words: extra-
ordinary circumstances can be admitted, where sticking to the objective
standard would turn fault-based liability into strict liability.
In the first place, the provision mentions expressly the age of the tortfeasor 15
and the fact that he suffers from some mental or physical disability. This is
a defence which is so to say implied in the notion of fault and does there-
fore not appear as a separate and autonomous concept in the frame of the
chapter on ªDefencesº 34.
In this respect, it is important to note that the Principles ± contrary to cer-
tain legal systems 35 ± do not fix a determined (or presumed) limit of age,
32
M. Faure, Economic Analysis, PETL Fault, no. 11 et seq.
33
Supra no. 11 and Introduction no. 3 and 8.
34
Infra Chapter 7, Art. 7:101 et seq.
35
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands; see P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 29;
see also Art. 3:103 para. 2 of the Draft Articles on Tort Law of the Working Team on Extra-
Contractual Obligations of the Study Group on a European Civil Code (see supra General
Introduction no. 40).
Widmer 79
below which a person cannot be held liable. This means that ± in this
respect, too ± we adopt a flexible system, and that the question whether
or not a person had sufficient insight and control of his or her behaviour,
has to be answered from case to case, according to the concrete mental
development of that person. There are situations ± like e.g. playing with
matches or fireworks or other dangerous toys (such as ªsoftgunsº or even
handmade bows and arrows) or the manner in which one has to behave
on streets and places open to the traffic ± where even relatively young
children are normally aware of the risk and able to act in consequence of
such insight.
Avoiding a fixed limit of age also has the advantage that the exception-
clause can be applied in the reverse case to persons whose competences
and capacities are diminished as a consequence of high age. This is consis-
tent with the fact that the provision mentions mental and/or physical dis-
abilities as other possible factors to be taken into account, independently
from the age.
16 It is not possible to indicate in an exhaustive way the circumstances which
may be considered in the frame of Art. 4:102 para. 2. That is the reason
why the Principles adopt, here again, a flexible concept, speaking generally
of ªextraordinary circumstancesº. Lacking a specific rule on capacity (of
discernment) and in conformity with the flexible approach chosen, one
can imagine certain (exceptional) cases, where it would even be justified
to take into account individualised personal circumstances. One example
which was discussed (in a controversial way) within the Group under this
perspective is the case of a young assistant doctor who, after having been
forced to work at the hospital during more than sixty hours without any
serious interruption, coming across a traffic accident on his way home,
provides first aid to the victims and, because of his state of overfatigue,
makes a mistake which causes additional harm to the persons assisted 36. It
seems arguable, in such a case, that this additional accident is due to a
kind of fate which belongs to the own sphere of risk of the injured person
and should not be attributed and imputed to the doctor ± even if, in a radi-
cally objective perspective, an ªU È bernahmeverschuldenº 37 could perhaps
be established against him .38
17 Among the more subjective factors which may play a role in ªextraordinary
casesº, one can also think of those elements which are sometimes described
as ªgrounds of justificationº and, in the Principles, are mentioned in Art.
7:101 para. 1 under the heading ªDefencesº. In those legal systems which
distinguish between wrongfulness and fault, these grounds would be taken
36
See infra the illustration in no. 25.
37
Supra no. 9.
38
The question could seriously be posed, however, if one could not admit the responsibility of
the hospital (according to Art. 4:202 ªEnterprise Liabilityº) which was not organized in a
proper way, so as to prevent its personnel from prolonging their work over the prescribed lim-
its. Cf. Art. 4:202 no. 5.
80 Widmer
into account under the former aspect, and the establishment of liability
would consequently stop at that stage already. According to the approach
chosen by the Principles, which leads to merge wrongfulness with fault 39,
such justification grounds automatically become also reasons for ªexculpa-
tionº 40.
Of course, all the elements which can play a role for the valuation of a 18
person's (damaging) conduct are to be weighed according to the general
rule of Art. 3:201 (ªwhether and to which extent damage may be attributed
to a person depends . . .º). This means that the fault of a person in respect
of a certain damaging event cannot simply be retained or not, and that it
is not only black or white, but that a whole range of nuances are possible.
Insofar, the so-called ªdegrees of faultº can still be of a certain impor-
tance 41.
c) Statutory Duties as Indication for Fault (Para. 3)
A separate paragraph expressly states that, in establishing the ªrequired 19
standard of conductº, attention has to be paid to norms containing a speci-
fic injunction or interdiction, prescribing or forbidding a certain conduct,
such as e.g. the provisions on road traffic, those applying to construction
activities or contained in regulations on the prevention of (work-) acci-
dents.
At first glance, this seems self-evident 42. However, the apparently plain
principle has to be shaded in different respects. First of all, one has to
examine if the prescription or interdiction in question has the character of
a protective statute (ªSchutzgesetzº) in the sense that it is effectively ±
exclusively or alternatively ± aimed at protecting the right that was inter-
fered with by the person whose fault is at stake 43. In systems which distin-
guish between wrongfulness and fault, this question is normally addressed
under the aspect of the ªconnection of unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeitszu-
sammenhang)º, i.e. the relation between the damage and the norm trans-
gressed. Where, however, fault and wrongfulness form one indistinct
requirement, as is the case in the Principles, the same question has to be
posed related to fault: one has to examine the ªconnection of fault
(Verschuldenszusammenhang)º.
The question whether the protective aim of the norm restricts its scope of
application under the aspect of the standard of conduct and of the fault
committed by its non-fulfilment is controversial 44. According to some sys-
tems and the proper jurisprudence, the transgression of a norm which was
39
See also P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 18.
40
See also supra no. 7 and Art. 2:102 para. 4.
41
Introduction no. 4; see also Art. 4:101 no. 16.
42
Supra no. 4.
43
P. Widmer, Switzerland, in H. Koziol (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness (1998,
hereafter cited as PETL Wrongfulness) 122 et seq.
44
See PETL Fault, Responses to case no. 1 in the Questionnaire.
Widmer 81
not aimed at protecting the infringed right or position cannot constitute a

fault. In other systems, the infringement of a norm during the causal
process which led to the damaging event is considered to form a sufficient
basis for admitting fault. The problem does, evidently, also appear under
the aspect of causation and ªadequacyº 45; liability based on fault would be
considered ªadequateº, according to the former opinion, only if and to
the extent in which this fault is connected to the violation of a duty (of
care) which existed at the charge of the (potentially) responsible person
and towards the injured person 46.
The rule as it is formulated in the Principles does not give a clear-cut
answer to this controversy. It simply says that specific rules ªhave to be
consideredº. It is likely, however, that a differentiating view would be in
conformity with the general provision in Art. 3:201.
20 The rules which have to be taken into consideration are not only and not
necessarily norms that have been enacted by public authorities in a formal
procedure. They may also have been issued by semi-public or private
bodies, in particular technical and/or professional organisations and
corporations in the form of directives or deontological principles 47.
21 The violation of a positive injunction or of an interdiction is certainly a
strong indication for the existence of fault. But ± even apart from the
problem of the aim of protection just discussed in no. 19 ± it is not a
definite proof. There are situations in which it may even be advisable to
contravene to a determined rule; one can e.g. imagine that the transgres-
sion of the prescription to drive on the right or the left side of the street
can be a proper reaction in order to prevent a collision with an oncoming
vehicle. On the same line, there is consensus that the fact not to show opti-
mal reactions in a situation of emergency does not necessarily constitute a
fault 48.
On the other hand, it is important to stress that the observance of specific
rules of conduct or interdictions does not per se lead to the conclusion
that no fault has been committed. The same is true in respect of official
authorisation and permits, licenses or approvals after an inspection. It is
generally admitted that a concrete situation may require efforts and mea-
sures that go beyond those prescribed in special regulations or individual
authorisations ± which may also be or have become obsolete by reason of
technical progress 49.
3. Relations with Other Provisions

22 There is of course a close relation with the following Art. 4:103 in that this
provision takes the creation and control of a dangerous situation as a basis
45
J. Spier/O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 132 et seq.
46
See infra Illustrations no. 24.
47
P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Wrongfulness 122 et seq.
48
PETL Fault, Comparative Report, no. 45.
49
PETL Fault, Comparative Report, no. 47.
82 Widmer
for the admission of a duty to protect others from damage. Because of the
similarity of the key elements with those envisaged in Art. 5:101 and
5:102, it can be questionable whether it is possible to distinguish in a suffi-
ciently clear way these cases of wrongful behaviour from those to be ruled
by strict ± and that means: no-fault ± liability (see Introduction no. 3 and
fn. 8) 50.
Another link exists with Art. 4:201, because ± here again ± there is a certain 23
overlapping of the key elements. According to this provision, a danger of a
certain gravity authorizes the judge to operate a reversal of the burden of
proof relating to fault. If misunderstood, this could lead to the conclusion
that in every case where a duty to protect other people from damage has
arisen out of the creation or control of a dangerous situation (keeping in
mind that every damage shows that there must have existed a dangerous
situation before), the burden of proof will automatically be shifted to the
disadvantage of the defendant. Such is certainly not the intention of the
Principles; the ªdangerº contemplated in Art. 4:201 is a danger of greater
seriousness compared to the ªnormalº danger of situations ruled by normal
fault-liability but which, on the other side, does not attain the level of extra-
harzardousness required for strict liability according to Art. 5:101 51.
Illustrations
On a sunny day, D drives on a road as straight as an arrow. As there are no 24
other road users in view, no houses nearby and no roads crossing for some
kilometers. D exceeds the speed limit considerably and hits a drunken tramp
who emerges from the roadside ditch. The injured tramp sues D 52.
The question will be whether there is a causal link between D's faulty
excess of speed and the injury suffered by the tramp, respectively if there
is a sufficient ªVerschuldenszusammenhangº 53 between the wrongful beha-
viour of D and the damage caused to the drunken tramp. The answers in
the various jurisdictions are divergent, depending on the position one takes
on the question whether the infringement of a positive rule is an absolute
criterion for fault or not. Art. 4:102, para. 3 does not clearly resolve the
question; however, its formulation points rather towards a differentiating
solution which would also better fit with Art. 2:102 and 3:201. In the
present case, liability could also be denied for other reasons: either ± in
terms of wrongfulness ± because a lawful conduct of D (respect of the
speed limit) would not have prevented the damage (ªrechtmaÈssiges
Alternativverhaltenº), or because the contributory conduct of the drunken
victim appears as the primary cause of the accident.
D is a young assistant doctor who is on his way home by bicycle after having 25
worked 60 hours without interruption in the emergency ward of a hospital
50
See Introduction no. 3 and fn. 8.
51
Infra Chapter 5, no. 16 and 19.
52
PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 1.
53
Supra no. 19.
Widmer 83
(because the colleague who should have relieved him fell ill). Shortly before
reaching his home, he comes across a traffic accident and, while administer-
ing first aid to one of the injured persons, he omits to apply a very common
hemostatic measure because of his state of extreme fatigue. Can he be made
liable for malpractice? 54
This case illustrates very clearly the problem of the objective or subjective
concept of fault. On a purely objective basis, one will not be in a position
to exonerate D. The question then is whether the present case can be con-
sidered as falling under para. 2 of Art. 4:102, i.e. as fulfilling the require-
ment of ªextraordinary circumstancesº. If one admits an exoneration under
this provision, one may still envisage a responsibility of the hospital which
employs D (or the public community running it), for not having organised
D's relief in a proper way.
26 D, a housewife who suffers of manic-depressive states, in a stage of deep
depression opens the gas-tap of the stove. Under the influence of the escaped
gas, she loses conscience and dies after a short time. A few minutes later, a
violent explosion causes considerable damage to the building in which D
lived with her family. P, the insurance company which insures (on a manda-
tory basis) the partly destroyed building of X, the landlord of D's family,
introduces a recourse action against the husband and the heirs of D 55.
The solution depends on whether or not one admits that D was in a state of
mental disability when she opened the gas-tap. If the answer is in the
affirmative, some legal systems still offer an (exceptional) possibility to
hold liable even an incapable person, in particular if she is very wealthy
and the victim indigent. Where the plaintiff is an insurance company, it
seems at least doubtful that such an exceptional provision could apply.
The complementary application of national law as such is certainly not
prevented by the Principles.
27 D1, D2 and D3, aged six, nine and fourteen, play with matches and set fire to
a barn 56. Can they be held liable notwithstanding their low age?
Since the Principles do not deal expressly with the question of capacity and
do not fix a specific limit of age, the question has to be examined individu-
ally for each one of the children involved, according to their respective
mental ability. Generally speaking, and in the absence of special disabil-
ities, one can normally assume that a child of fourteen, and even one of
nine years, is capable to realise the danger of playing with matches, while
a six years old child is not. In most legal systems, there will be a primary
or cumulative responsibility of the parents or of the person having the
guardianship over the child.
54
PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 10.
55
DFC 103 (1977) II 330 et seq.
56
PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 2; see also DFC 100 (1974) 332 et seq.; DFC 104 (1978)
II 184 et seq.
84 Widmer
Before going to bed, D wants to drink a bottle of fine wine. But after having 28
drunk the bottle, a friend calls him and asks him to join a party. D decides
not to go to bed and drives by car to the party of his friend. Because of his
drunkenness he causes a bad accident and injures P severely 57.
If D ± after having emptied the bottle ± is still capable of discernment, his
decision to drive by car to the party of his friend is an evident case of gross
negligence, because he knows or ought to have known that he would not be
able to drive safely. If, on the other side, D was drunk after having
absorbed a whole bottle of wine, the question to ask is whether he should
have foreseen that in such a state of drunkenness he could get into a dan-
gerous situation (whether driving a car or otherwise). If so, one could admit
negligence (or even dolus eventualis) in form of a so-called actio libera in
causa. This poses however the difficult problem to decide whether it can
generally be said that it is an irresponsible conduct ± in the sense of a
legally relevant ªfaultº to get drunk at all. It could very well be that, in
particular in countries with an old and strong wine tradition, courts would
hesitate to go thus far.
It should however be kept in mind that, at least in most continental
systems, the fault of the driver of a motor-vehicle (hence his capacity) is
of no relevance in founding (his or the car holder's) liability, because their
liability is a strict one based on the specific risk of such vehicles.
X had been employed by D in his enterprise first as an accountant, later on 29
as a deputy director, responsible for administrative and financial matters. In
this quality, X had defrauded a considerable sum. He was dismissed, but
since X had consented to repay the misappropriated money, D issued a
favourable letter of reference in which he praised X's capacities in financial
management. After some time, X was reengaged by company P which
entrusted him again with the finances of the company, without even control-
ling his work. After 10 months in his new job, X became recidivous and con-
verted some 100,000 francs out of company P's assets to his own use.
The case, decided by the Swiss Federal Court in 1975 58, fits into a category
which has recently become rather frequent and which one could name
ªliability for false information or misrepresentationº. Even more recently,
in Germany and Switzerland, doctrine and jurisprudence have invented a
new type of responsibility, called ªliability based on confidenceº, which
encompasses the misrepresentation cases (infra Art. 4:103 no. 1 at fn. 65).
It seems likely that, under the Principles and more specifically by applica-
tion of Art. 4:101, 4:102 and perhaps 4:103, the first employer D could
also be held liable for the (purely economic) loss of the second employer
P. This would mean to admit a duty of D vis-aÁ-vis P (or any other person
who could be induced in error by the letter of reference) to provide correct
information. Such duty ± apart from flowing from the prescription in crim-
57
PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 4a.
58
DFC 101 (1975) II 101 69 et seq.
Widmer 85
inal law which punishes the issue of documents containing false statements ±
may also be deduced from the general principle of good faith. It is contro-
versial, however, if this principle constitutes per se a sufficient reason for
liability; some authors think that it should only come into play where there
was a (pre-existing) ªspecial relationshipº between the parties (as is also
required in Art. 4:103).
Art. 4:103 . Duty to Protect Others from Damage

A duty to act positively to protect others from damage may exist if law so
provides, or if the actor creates or controls a dangerous situation, or when
there is a special relationship between parties or when the seriousness of
the harm on the one side and the ease of avoiding the damage on the other
side point towards such a duty.
Comments
1. Introduction and Comparison with Existing Legal Systems

1 This provision deals expressly with the question whether one can admit a
legal ± i.e. not only moral ± duty to intervene actively in a causal process,
in order to protect another person from suffering damage. Apart from cer-
tain statutes 59 or private codes which establish such duties for particular
professions or situations ± as e.g. for medical professionals 60, mountain-
guides or between mountaineers or skiers 61 ± it is quite unusual to find a
general norm on this subject. The general rule, which normally is not laid
down expressly, is on the contrary that such a duty does not exist 62. As a
rule, one need not care about the security and the well-being of other
people, with or towards whom one has no special relationship or super-
visory function. In other words: an omission (apart from not being able ±
in physical terms ± to initiate a causal process 63) can be considered as
wrongful and faulty only if there is a norm which states a duty to act and
to take care.
In modern law, however, one can observe a certain tendency to widen the
field of duties to act and to protect the interests of others. A manifest
expression of this tendency is the recent (judicial) development, particu-
59
Mainly in the field of criminal law, see e.g. Art. 450 of the Dutch Criminal Code; Art. 128 of
the Swiss Penal Code.
60
The Hippocratic Oath (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_modern.html) and, as an
example, Art. 7 of the Italian Codice di Deontologia Medica (http://www.fnomceo.it/
art07G.htm).
61
See e.g. Rule 9 of the Rules for Conduct of the International Ski Federation (FIS): http://
www.fis-ski.com/uk/rulesandpublications/fisgeneralrules/10fisrules.html.
62
One may recall the answer of CaõÈn when asked about his brother Abel's fate: ªAm I my
brother's keeper?º (Gen. 4/9). On the question in general, see Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7),
no. 194 et seq.
63
Which means ± strictly speaking ± that it cannot be a conditio sine qua non.
86 Widmer
larly in Germany and Switzerland, of a so called ªLiability based on confi-

denceº (Vertrauenshaftung) 64. The idea behind it ± and which is connected
with the concept of ªimplied dutiesº in contract law (ªNebenpflichtenº/
ºSchutzpflichtenº) and even more with that of ªculpa in contrahendoº ±
is, that it is a violation of the principle of good faith and therefore a wrong-
ful and faulty conduct for somebody who has sufficient knowledge not to
warn or to inform another person who is obviously relying on a false per-
ception or misrepresentation of the relevant facts or problems 65. Even
where there is no specific term for such an enlarged liability, there seems
to exist a certain convergence in the European legal systems towards an
improved compensation of ªpure economic lossº, which is very often a
consequence of a breach of confidence, in particular in the field of liability
for incorrect or omitted information 66.
2. History
The considerable differences between the legal systems concerning the 2
question of a positive duty to act in the interests of others were also dis-
cussed by the Group; in general, the prevailing opinion was that no general
duty in this sense was admitted, even where this would have been possible
without any risk and inconvenience for the helper himself 67.
However, the Group deemed it suitable to extend the duty to act, or rather:
to prepare the ground for such an extension. It was felt that an appropriate
ponderation of interests, which is a core element of the Principles (Art.
2:102 and 4:102 para. 1) ± could very well serve as starting point for an
opening in this direction.
3. Terminology and Scope

The duty to act arises, apart from a corresponding statute, in particular if 3
somebody creates or controls a ªdangerous situationº. As explained
above 68, each damage can be explained as being the realisation of a certain
danger that must have existed before. A duty to neutralize such danger can
therefore only arise at the charge of a person who has created it or
permitted its development, although he should have been aware of the
risk and/or would have been able to control it. The term ªdangerº as used
in the context of Art. 4:103 is not necessarily a qualified one in the sense
of Art. 4:201, and even less one that could justify the application of Art.
5:101.
64
65
C.W. Canaris, Die Vertrauenshaftung im deutschen Privatrecht (1971); P. Chappuis/B. Winiger
(eds.), La responsabiliteÂ fondeÂe sur la confiance (2001).
66
See Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 44/45 and Art. 2:207 of the Draft Articles on Tort Law
(supra fn. 35).
67
Responses to case 10 of the Questionnaire PETL Fault; e.g. W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL
Fault, 52: ªNegligent acts . . . are generally regarded as legal wrongs; omissions are generally
not.º and the opinion of Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v. Wise quoted there.
68
Widmer 87
4 The duty to act, respectively the wrongfulness and faulty character of the
ªomissionº to take appropriate safety measures arises as a consequence of
the creation or the maintenance of an (unnecessary) dangerous situation.
It may sometimes be quite difficult to distinguish between the (initial) act
and the (subsequent) omission 69. Normally, the creation of a dangerous
situation is in itself not yet a wrongful act; the delict is only accomplished
if the foreseeable realisation of the risk is not prevented with appropriate
means.
An important element in this context is the ªease of avoiding the damageº,
which constitutes also for itself a factor apt to create a duty to act 70. If the
person who has created a certain risk had the possibility to control it easily
in a way apt to avoid damage to third persons, and if she neglected to do
so, she can effectively be blamed, and the risk then appears as an ªunneces-
saryº one. This ªlack of necessityº adds an essential aspect to the mere
deviation from an objective standard of conduct, in that it gives a strong
indication that the person's behaviour was from the very beginning ªun-
reasonableº and therefore faulty.
5 Another situation in which a duty to act can arise is the existence of a
ªspecial relationshipº between the persons involved. This is self-evident in
the contractual relationship which encompasses a number of implied duties
(relating to the security and the correct information of the partner) result-
ing from the principle of good faith. A ªspecial relationshipº is also widely
recognized between parties who are negotiating a contract. According to
the principle of good faith, they can be held liable for a culpa in contra-
hendo consisting in the omission to disclose certain circumstances or to
inform the partner who is manifestly basing his decision on an erroneous
representation of facts.
According to the Principles, it is however possible to admit a special rela-
tionship even on the mere ground of a factual or social relationship, as it
may exist between people who meet incidentally, but in a situation where
they have good reasons or are even forced to rely on the other. This is
e.g. the case of a hiker in the mountains who asks a local resident to indi-
cate the safe way; or where an information of essential importance and/or
value is requested from a (presumptive) specialist, even without any con-
tractual basis.
6 Finally, a duty to protect others may simply arise from a situation where
somebody is conscious of a danger of certain gravity and where it is easy
for him to take steps in order to prevent others from running such risk.
This can be the case e.g. where a person realizes that another person is
not aware of an imminent danger and where it would be sufficient to shout
or to draw by any other means the second person's attention to the risk, in
order to warn her and prevent her from being injured. The same is true in a
69
See Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 195 et seq.
70
Infra no. 6.
88 Widmer
situation where somebody is already in difficulties and where it is easy for

the passer-by to seek help, e.g. by informing the police or calling an ambu-
lance 71.
Illustrations
D1 lawfully digs a hole in the public road before his house and fences it 7
securely. After a while, he is informed that vandals have removed the fence;
but he does not react. P falls into the hole.
The case shows the classic picture of the principle according to which who-
ever creates or maintains a dangerous situation (e.g. a hole in the public
road) has a duty to take the necessary measures to prevent the risk from
materializing by causing injury to a third person. Such duty exists of course
not only at the moment where the danger is created, but lasts for the whole
time during which it subsists. The liability of a person who omits to take
such measures and to make sure that they remain effective after a lapse of
time (the more when she is informed about troubles) would already follow
from the basic principle of Art. 4:101 and 4:102. Art. 4:103 only makes
explicit this deduction.
After P has fallen into the hole, D2 passes and hears P's moaning. But 8
because he is late for an appointment, he does not stop and P dies. It can be
established that, if D2 had sent for aid, P would have survived.
This situation differs from the preceding one insofar as D2 is not the person
who has created the dangerous situation or is under a specific duty to keep
the correspondent preventive measures effective, but a simple passer-by. In
this respect, Art. 4:102 brings about a certain novelty in comparison with
those systems which stick to the principle that one is not obliged to inter-
vene in order to safeguard the interests of others 72. The reason for which
such a duty arises here is rather the fact that the situation itself creates a
kind of ªspecial relationshipº between the persons involved and that it is
very easy for the passer-by to offer his help to the injured person or at least
to call for such help.
P is walking alone along the street and sees a blind person approaching an 9
unfenced hole. He abstains from any warning or assistance to the blind per-
son.
The case is very similar to the preceding one.
P, a tourist on a trip in the Alps, asks farmer D, who abominates all these 10
tourists stumbling over his land, for the way to the summit. The grumpy
farmer does not answer, but he realizes that the tourist takes the wrong trail
which leads to a dangerous steep. After a short while, the tourist falls over a
rocky precipice and is seriously injured. Can the farmer D be held liable for
his fatal silence?
71
See infra no. 8 and 9.
72
Supra no. 1 and 2 as well as fn. 62 and 67.
Widmer 89
The question is again whether one sticks to the principle that ªI am not my
brothers keeperº or, on the contrary, admits a more or less generalised
duty to prevent others from damage where this is possible without special
efforts. The Principles opt for a stronger commitment in the second sense.
It seems therefore quite obvious that the behaviour of the farmer, which
is essentially motivated by his bad humour, constitutes a breach of this
duty of easy assistance.
Section 2. Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault
Art. 4:201 . Reversal of the Burden of Proving Fault in General
(1) The burden of proving fault may be reversed in light of the gravity of
the danger presented by the activity.
(2) The gravity of the danger is determined according to the seriousness of

possible damage in such cases as well as the likelihood that such damage
might actually occur.
Comments
1. Overview & History

1 The general problems of proof are not yet dealt with in the present version
of the Principles; this aspect may be taken up by further work in this area.
For the moment, the general assumption is that each party has to prove
the facts on which he bases his claim. That means for tort law that the per-
son claiming compensation has to prove the facts that are relevant for
establishing the conditions of liability 1. If, on the contrary, the defendant
has to prove that he is not at fault, it is up to him to show facts from which
it follows that he has behaved in conformity with the required standard of
conduct.
2 In addition to Art. 2:105, where the Principles give some precision as to the
proof of damage, the Group felt it useful and necessary to also clarify the
impact of the proof-issue for the system of attribution (imputation). The
leading idea is that this system is a flexible one and that there is no clearly
determined and pre-determinable borderline between fault-based liability
and strict liability 2. On the other side, the Group has opted for a very
restrictive regime of strict liability, as a consequence of which there remains
a kind of loophole between the normal liability for personal misconduct
(Art. 4:101/4:102) and the liability connected to an (abnormally) dangerous
activity (Art. 5:101). This means that, as long as national systems do not use
1
See supra Title II.
2
See B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 154 et seq.;
H. KoÈtz/G. Wagner, Deliktsrecht (10th ed. 2004), no. 260 et seq.; see also infra Introduction
to Chapter 5, no. 2.
90 Widmer
the latitude opened to them by Art. 5:102 3 by introducing (or keeping)

specific (strict) liability regimes for activities which are not dangerous
enough to be subsumed under Art. 5:101, the judge can still tighten the
liability for such activities by operating a reversal of the burden of proof
relating to fault ± or in more adequate words: relating to the facts which
may justify a judgement that (dis-) qualifies the conduct of the responsible
person as ªfaultyº 4.
2. Definitions
Gravity of Danger
As explained above 5, the dangerousness contemplated here is one of inter- 3
mediate intensity, between the ªnormalº risk which is inherent to any
human activity and the extraordinary or ªabnormallyº high risk which
triggers strict liability; the idea cannot be that a reversal of the burden of
proof should be admitted in all cases for the simple reason that, immedi-
ately before the damage occurred, there has necessarily always been a
pre-existing danger.
Para. 2 specifies that the situation can be dangerous (enough to justify a 4
reversal of the burden of proof) either if it is apt to lead to rather frequent
harm or if the damage which may occur ± even if this happens not very
often ± can be of quite serious dimensions 6; it goes without saying that a
sufficient gravity of danger is all the more attained if the quantitative and
the qualitative conditions are cumulatively fulfilled.
3. Relation with Other Provisions

The provision on the reversal of the burden of proof has of course to be 5
seen in relation with the fundamental norms about liability based on fault
(Art. 4:101 and 4:102), as well as with the general principle according to
which each party has to prove its allegations (supra no. 1). The ªdangerous-
ness of the activityº is a factor which can lead to a tightening of the
required standard of conduct in the frame of Art. 4:102, without a modifica-
tion of the burden of proof. The reversal of such burden also aims at
improving the position of the plaintiff, affording him a substantial benefit
in situations where the application of the general rule would put him into
unreasonable difficulties due to the technical or organizational complexity
of the defendant's activity.
There is a further link between Art. 4:201 and 4:202: The former provision 6
represents the general norm for situations of increased (but not extraordin-
3
See infra comments to Art. 5:102.
4
Strictly speaking, it is not correct to speak about (reversal of the burden of) ªproving faultº.
The (dis-)qualification ªfaultº is a judgment of value, pronounced by the judge on the basis
of his valuation of (proven) facts or conduct, and can therefore not be proven as such (the
same is true, by the way, for the ascertainment of ªunlawfulnessº).
5
Supra Art. 4:102 no. 8 (see also 4:103 no. 3).
6
See the explanations for the parallel notion of ªabnormal dangerº infra Art. 5:101, no. 19.
Widmer 91
ary) danger, while the so-called ªEnterprise Liabilityº is based on the idea
of the ªlengthened armº meaning that, by using auxiliaries and machinery,
the entrepreneur extends his sphere of influence and of risk; it is the corre-
spondent (abstract) ªorganizational riskº which justifies an equation of loss
and profit. But, at the same time, this form of liability remains connected to
a ªdefectº (creating a concrete risk) and therefore to an (extremely objecti-
vated but nevertheless personal) misconduct of the entrepreneur who is
responsible.
7 Similarly, Art. 4:201 builds a bridge between the traditional liability in tort
(Chapter 4) on the one side and the more recent category of strict liability
(Chapter 5) on the other, where fault or any other form of wrongful indivi-
dual behaviour is no longer a prerequisite for responsibility. It is thus a
clear expression of the already mentioned ªunbroken chainº between
both extremities of subjective and objective liability 7.
4. Illustrations by Comparison with Existing Systems

8 Apart from Czech law, which seems to establish a presumption of fault as
the general rule in case of negligence 8 and Spanish law, where ªcourts
have established systematically in their decisions . . . a system of fault
liability with reversal of the burden of proofº 9, many legal systems contain
provisions which positively state a reversal of the burden of proving
those elements which lead to a judgement of (objective) misconduct in
situations of specific and increased risk, such as those created by animals,
children or other incapable persons 10, defective goods, vehicles, buildings
and ruins etc 11.
9 One of the most significant examples is Art. 2050 of the Italian Civil code,
which so to say ªdrawsº strict liability back into the field of liability for
presumed personal misconduct allowing the operator to prove that he has
ªadopted all appropriate measures to avoid the damageº 12. This example
7
B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 156.
8
L. Tichy, Czech Republic, PETL Fault, no. 36 et seq.
9
M. Martin-Casals/J. Ribot/J. SoleÂ, Spain, PETL Strict Liability, no. 9 et seq.; in the same sense
M. Martin-Casals/J. SoleÂ, Spain, PETL Fault, no. 8 et seq.
10
See also infra: Art. 6:101 and the comments thereon.
11
H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Fault, no. 7; H. Cousy/D. Droshout, Belgium, PETL Fault, no. 1
and 43±44; P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 64±65; B.A. Koch/H. Koziol,
Austria, PETL Strict Liability, no. 6; H. Cousy/D. Droshout, Belgium, PETL Strict Liability,
no. 9; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2; J. Fedtke/U. Magnus, Germany,
PETL Strict Liability, no. 7; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Strict Liability, no. 1 et seq.; I.
Gilead, Israel, PETL Strict Liability, no. 8; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Strict Liabi-
lity, no. 16 et seq. and 83 et seq.; E. du Perron/W. van Boom, Netherlands, PETL Strict Liabi-
lity, no. 5 et seq.; P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2, 3, 6 et seq.; M. Faure,
Economic Analysis, PETL Strict Liability, no. 10 et seq.; B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative
Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2 and 154 et seq.
12
In its practical application, however, this provision is used more like an authentic strict liability
than a liability based on fault with reversed burden of proof; see F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ,
Italy, PETL Strict Liability, no. 46 and 85; F. SchluÈchter, Haftung fuÈr gefaÈhrliche TaÈtigkeit
(1990) 4.4.1.2, 116 et seq., 4.4.1.8.6, 164.
92 Widmer
is also interesting in confrontation with French law, where ± on the con-

trary ± the tendency, in particular in the framework of Art. 1384 Code civil,
has rather been to directly transform the originally fault-based liability for
things and dependents into strict liability without using the trick of the
reversal of the burden of proof 13.
Art. 4:202 . Enterprise Liability

(1) A person pursuing a lasting enterprise for economic or professional
purposes who uses auxiliaries or technical equipment is liable for any
harm caused by a defect of such enterprise or of its output unless he proves
that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct.
(2) ªDefectº is any deviation from standards that are reasonably to be
expected from the enterprise or from its products or services.
Comments
1. Overview
Enterprise liability under these Principles is not strict liability. This seems 1
to be the most important message in light of the red rag effect that the
Article's heading tends to have, particularly for representatives of industry.
Instead, the Group proposes a fault regime, though with a reversal of the
burden of proving fault 1.
The issue has nevertheless been tackled within the framework of the 2
Group's project on strict liability, where the questionnaire had expressly
asked for special liability regimes for enterprises in the various jurisdic-
tions 2. The first draft principles produced on the basis of this project there-
fore also included rules on enterprise liability, though these were already
then placed into the grey zone between fault and strict liability. As
explained elsewhere 3, the initial proposal for strict liability had been more
flexible, intending to bridge the fault concept on the one side with the no-
fault regime on the other, so that also mixed concepts were covered. The
13
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Fault, no. 23; idem, France, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2.
1
The Group thereby seems to be in line with the current debate in the United States, where the
ªbattleº between strict liability and negligence in the field of enterprise liability is currently
shifting towards the fault side again: See, e.g., the leading articles by G. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 [1985] Journal of Legal Studies, 461; G. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible
End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 [1992] Georgia Law Review, 601. See
also the more recent discussion of the Third Restatement, where the fault principle is reaf-
firmed, e.g. G. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability,
54 [2001] Vanderbilt Law Review, 1285; J. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50
[2002] UCLA Law Review, 377.
2
See the questionnaire in B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability
(2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability), 3.
3
See infra Chapter 5 no. 2±3; 5±6.
Widmer/Koch 93
solution ultimately adopted by the Group for strict liability (infra Chapter
5) is, however, more narrowly focussed on abnormally dangerous activities,
so that the rules on enterprise liability were ultimately moved to their
proper core context, i.e. fault-based liability and deviations therefrom
(Chapter 4).
3 At the occasion of discussing enterprise and strict liability, the Group
briefly considered adding a specific rule on product liability, but we all
held this to be unnecessary in light of the existing harmonization in this
field as intended (and at least in part achieved) by EC Directive 85/374.
Its regime is certainly not without flaws ± one only needs to look at recent
ECJ case law 4 or some of the statements in the second report on the appli-
cation of this directive 5. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that considerable
efforts have already been put into this field on the European legislative
level, so that it is highly unlikely that any deviation therefrom might be
appealing on the harmonization floors. Art. 4:202 is therefore not meant
to supersede or to deviate from the regime established under the Products
Liability Directive; to the extent it is applicable, it will govern. The solution
proposed here will, however, at least in part fill the gap left open by the
(deserved) failure of the planned Services Directive 6. However, the regime
of these Principles differs considerably from the approach so far taken by
the European legislator, not only because our (narrower) concept is based
on the notion of fault.
4 The major motivation underlying Art. 4:202 is the concern that victims may
not be able to identify the proper cause of their losses although it can be
traced to an enterprise that takes advantage both of human auxiliaries
and/or technical equipment. While an enterprise is of course liable for the
misbehaviour of its auxiliaries under Art. 6:102 and can equally be strictly
liable for abnormally dangerous activities falling under Art. 5:101 or other
dangerous activities covered by Art. 5:102, it may not be easy for a victim
who can prove that the origin of his loss lies within this enterprise to iden-
tify whether it was a human or a technical helper thereof that caused the
harm. In such cases, victims run the risk of pursuing their case on the wrong
track (either via Art. 6:102 or under Chapter 5 of these Principles). Art.
4:202 relieves them of this difficulty at least to some extent: They only
(but as a minimum!) need to prove that the cause lies within the sphere of
the enterprise by showing that it was a defect of such enterprise or of its
output. If they thereby succeed, the ball is in the field of the enterprise,
which then needs to rebut the presumption that this defect established by
the claimant came about because the enterprise failed to exercise all proper
4
Cf. B.A. Koch, European Union, in H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2001
(2002) 473 (no. 31 et seq.); idem, European Union, in H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.),
European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 432 (no. 55 et seq.).
5
COM(2000) 893 final, where the Commission e.g. admits that even after 15 years, there is
ªstill limited experienceº with the Directive (p. 28).
6
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Liability of Suppliers of Services, COM(1990) 482
final, Official Journal (OJ) C 12, 18.1.1991, 8.
94 Koch
care to prevent the loss, thereby violating the higher standard of conduct
required from such professionals.
Furthermore, Art. 4:202 tackles the problem of flaws in the organization 5
and quality control management: Whereas liability for auxiliaries under
Art. 6:102 starts from a misbehaviour of the auxiliary that is attributed to
his employer, Art. 4:202 does not necessarily presuppose that the auxiliary
has done something wrong: It may well be that harm has been caused by
an auxiliary without any violation of the required standard of care on his
side; nevertheless the enterprise can be held liable under Art. 4:202 if
proper organization could have avoided the negative consequences of
such occurrences 7. While under Art. 6:102 a hospital would not have to
answer for the harm caused by a surgeon who suffers a heart attack while
performing a delicate operation 8, the hospital may still have to indemnify
the patient for its deficiencies in staff administration, for example if the
work schedules excessively and unreasonably overburdened the surgeon,
which presented a health risk to him that ultimately culminated in his heart
attack. If that is the case, the hospital may be liable on the basis of fault;
Art. 4:202 makes the victim's case easier by shifting the burden of proving
such fault to the hospital. However, it is still up to the victim to prove
such defects in the hospital's work schedules, and that these ultimately
were the cause of his loss.
Moreover, this Article emphasizes that enterprises employing machinery 6
and other technical equipment will have to pay specific attention to their
proper functioning and to make sure that all reasonable efforts are made
to prevent such equipment from causing harm. Failure to do so may result
in liability, but for misconduct (and therefore fault) only, not for the mere
risk triggered by the use of the machinery. However, it will ± again ± be
the enterprise's task to prove that such failure was no violation of the
required standard of conduct.
The scope of this Article is therefore narrower than it might appear at first 7
sight: In most cases, liability of an enterprise (if any) will be based on
Art. 4:101 or Art. 6:102, since people running businesses and pursuing
professions for profit as well as their staff will typically have to come up
to an elevated standard of conduct, if only for the expertise to be expected
of a person carrying on such activities (cf. Art. 4:102 para. 1). In a few
cases, if an enterprise pursues an abnormally dangerous activity such as
storing explosives in a residential neighbourhood, liability may also be
directly based on Art. 5:101.
Nevertheless, there may still be cases of the kind described earlier: If a 8
patient, for example, manages to prove that the deterioration of his condi-
tion was not caused by some risk within his own sphere (such as his own
pre-condition), but by something that happened in the sphere of the hospi-
7
Cf. Art. 4:102 no. 25.
8
See infra Art. 6:102 no. 18.
Koch 95
tal during the operation, though he cannot identify whether it was one of
the hospital's staff members who did something wrong, or whether the
computers or other operating theatre equipment malfunctioned, he may
still recover damages from the hospital if the latter should fail to prove (a)
that none of its staff violated the required standard of conduct, which is
the highest (but still reasonable) standard of the time (ªall proper careº),
(b) that the organization of the hospital came up to all reasonable expecta-
tions, and (c) that there was no lack of safety with respect to the computers
or the equipment.
9 The novelty brought about by Art. 4:202 is therefore this reversal of the
burden of proving fault under the circumstances of the business pursued
by the enterprise. This may already have happened on the basis of Art.
4:201, if the business activity was so dangerous that the requirements of
Art. 4:201 para. 2 were met. If not, the consequences of Art. 4:201 are
extended to enterprise settings by Art. 4:202 which are not per se as dan-
gerous as required under the former Article. As the standard of conduct
required from enterprises is rather high (e.g. in light of the ªexpertise to
be expectedº from them, Art. 4:102 para. 1), the exculpation required
under Art. 4:202 may be very difficult, so that effectively chances for the
victim to recover may be quite good 9, if only for internal documentation
of the enterprise or other potential evidence that got lost in the course of
time. But again: The minimum requirement for such consequence is that
the victim proves a defect within the sphere of the enterprise that caused
his loss. Uncertainties about such causation have to be solved beforehand
according to the proper rules applicable thereto (Chapter 3), and as to
that point, standard rules of evidence apply.
10 The novelty aforementioned is only one within the framework of these
Principles and therefore necessary to complement them: It is by no means
new to most of the legal systems covered by the Group's research, which
recognize instances of professional behaviour where it is the professional
who has to prove that he conformed to the required standard of conduct,
or which do so indirectly by setting the standard so high that a plaintiff
can easily succeed on this point, leaving the defendant with almost no effec-
tive chance of a rebuttal 10. It is also the case, of course, that even where
there is no formal reversal of the burden of proof, the court may infer fault
from circumstantial evidence such as the nature and circumstances of the
accident. That is not in any real sense a formal principle of tort law and
this Article in no way restricts it.
11 Inspiration for this Article came from the model of the Swiss draft, Art.
49a, which reads:
9
Cf. M. Faure, Economic Analysis of Strict Liability, PETL Strict Liability, 361 (no. 10 et seq.).
10
See, e.g., M. MartõÂn-Casals/J. SoleÂ Feliu, Spain, in P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law:
Fault (2005, hereafter cited as PETL Fault), no. 8 et seq.; further supra Art. 4:102 no. 9; Art.
4:202 no. 8±9.
96 Koch
ªA person who makes use of one or more agents in operating a com-

mercial or professional enterprise is liable for compensation of damage
caused within the sphere of activities of the enterprise, unless she proves
that the organization of the enterprise was appropriate to prevent such
damage.º 11
However, the majority of the Group deemed it necessary to expand this 12
concept to the use of machinery and equipment. At the same time, how-
ever, the Group's proposal is narrower than the Swiss draft which presup-
poses a defect from the mere fact that harm is caused ªwithin the sphere
of activities of the enterpriseº, whereas Art. 4:202 requires that a defect is
shown by the claimant.
Jaap Spier disagrees with the regime proposed by this Article. He fears that 13
it may go too far as practice might use it to expand enterprise liability
rather than limit it, for example by extending the notion of ªdefectº (infra
no. 19). In his view, the failure of the Services Directive 12 should have
been final in light of the criticism raised against it at the time.
2. Definitions
a) Enterprise
Enterprises obviously include business entities and organizations. How- 14
ever, in addition the state or non-profit organizations can fall under this
term as long as they pursue an economic or professional purpose by their
work (unless it is in pursuance of a governmental or regulatory function).
The same is true for individual professionals who spread the workload for
their profession or other business goal by employing auxiliaries or by using
technical equipment.
The enterprise need not aim to be profitable: What counts is an activity 15
that involves a certain co-ordination of labour or machinery resources,
though not necessarily in a complex way. Nevertheless, gaining profit
from such an activity is a strong indicator towards the enterprise qualifica-
tion.
As the word ªlastingº indicates, the enterprise must be pursued on more 16
than just a temporary basis. This is by and large already expressed by the
reference to the ªeconomic or professional purposeº, which typically
involves more than just a momentary effort. However, this adjective expli-
citly excludes people who undertake a task that seems to be of a business
11
English translation according to the appendix to P. Loser-Krogh, Switzerland, in H. Koziol/B.
Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 405 (426).
The original reads as follows: ªDie Person, die sich zum Betrieb einer Unternehmung mit
wirtschaftlich oder beruflich ausgerichteten TaÈtigkeiten einer oder mehrerer Hilfspersonen
bedient, haftet fuÈr den Schaden, der im Rahmen dieser TaÈtigkeiten verursacht wird, es sei
denn, sie beweise, dass die Organisation der Unternehmung geeignet war, den Schaden zu
verhuÈten.º
12
Supra at fn. 6.
Koch 97
nature, but which they only fulfil under rather extraordinary and excep-
tional circumstances, as is the case with people, for example, who have a
certain ± seemingly professional ± expertise which is unrelated to their
work life but is nevertheless shared with others at singular occasions. It
may well be that some DIY lovers form a construction gang of neighbours
helping each other mutually to build a house on the weekends. If such
organisation amounts to something resembling an enterprise in the above-
mentioned sense (which may already be difficult, e.g. for lack of a system
of subordination), it nevertheless will not fall under this Article, if only
because of the fact that their joint effort is not a lasting enterprise. This
would be different, however, if this singular building project would be
repeated elsewhere on a more regular basis.
b) Auxiliaries
17 Auxiliaries are defined infra under Art. 6:102 13.
c) Technical Equipment
18 Technical equipment can be anything from computers to machinery, from
rather simple tools to complex production lines, though it must be used
for purposes of the enterprise in question, thereby forming part of its orga-
nisation.
d) Defect
19 The starting point for the victim's case under Art. 4:202 is a ªdefect of
the enterprise or of its outputº, which must be proven by himself in addi-
tion to the causal links leading from the defect to the harm in question.
Art. 4:202 para. 2 defines the term ªdefectº by pointing at safety stan-
dards which can objectively be expected from enterprises: While the
standard of conduct under Art. 4:102 focuses on the behaviour of the
tortfeasor, the emphasis here lies upon the enterprise as a whole (also
seen as an organization) and the work product of the enterprise. The
expectations towards an enterprise depend upon the circumstances of
the case such as the size of the enterprise in relation to others on the
market: A smaller county hospital will not be expected to be similarly
equipped as a university clinic centre, as long as the requirements for
going into operation at all were fulfilled: It must at least meet the stan-
dards expected from a comparable hospital offering the kinds of medical
services that it does. Those standards may vary over time ± a hospital will
not be liable for failing to provide treatment that only became available
after the damaging event. An airport will not have to account for failure
to use safety gadgets that were either not developed at the time or that
were unreasonably expensive then according to (objectively) reasonable
managerial evaluation.
13
See Art. 6:102 no. 6.
98 Koch
e) Output of an Enterprise
The reference to the enterprise's output makes it clear that the defect in 20
question does not necessarily need to have manifested itself directly within
the enterprise (or as a visible flaw in its structure or organization), but can
also be brought to light indirectly by its products or services. The latter
may be defective or imperfect per se (due to their lack of quality or their
inadequate design) or substandard due to a singular malfunctioning of an
otherwise proper production process or services standard. Both deviations
from standard quality benchmarks point at problems within the enterprise
(be it in its R&D, production or quality control unit).
3. Reasons for Liability 14

An important motivation for a rule of this kind is the fact that an enterprise 21
as defined in this Article tends to involve activities that are more likely to
harm third parties than activities of private individuals, if only for the
frequency and regularity in which the public is exposed to such entrepre-
neurial endeavours. Furthermore, the entrepreneur is the first-hand
addressee when it comes to taking measures to prevent potential harm
that might result from his business activity, or at least to provide for
adequate insurance cover in case such damage should materialize. It is
also he who derives benefits from the enterprise, from which ensuing losses
should be deducted.

As already explained supra in the overview 15, Art. 4:202 stands between 22
the two major pillars of fault-based liability on the one hand (Chapter 4,
Section 1) and strict liability on the other (Chapter 5). Its concept is purely
based upon fault, but by reversing the burden of proving it, it effectively
moves towards a stricter variety of liability 16.
Illustrations
1. V is shot by a terrorist T on board an airplane. The terrorist boarded the 23
plane at airport X operated by D. While it is proven that the gun came onto
the plane at X, it is unclear whether T carried it along when checking in (in
which case it is equally unsettled whether the staff of D failed to detect it, or
whether the scanners malfunctioned), or whether he managed to hide it on
the plane while it was refuelled.
If V's heirs sue D, they have to show that the airport X failed to perform
their duties properly, but they need not go into details whether the gun
14
See also the citations supra fn. 1. Cf. M. Faure/T. Hartlief, Towards an expanding enterprise
liability in Europe? How to analyze the scope of liability of industrial operations and their
insurers, [1996] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 235.
15
Supra Introduction no. 2.
16
Cf. B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, 395 (no. 154 et
seq.).
Koch 99
was overlooked by D's personnel or by D's scanning and other safety

devices. According to Art. 4:202, D is liable unless it can prove that its
organisation has met all possible safety and security standards objectively
to be expected by an airport of such kind, which seems to be unlikely on
the facts outlined. If a machine gun reaches the cabin, this seems to be a
prima facie case of failure by the airport's security, which can be rebutted,
however, by showing that it was entirely disassembled and technically
altered when passing the security gates so that no state of the art machinery
available for an airport of that kind could possibly have detected it.
24 2. P has to undergo radiotherapy at hospital X operated by D. Due to
overexposure with radiation, he suffers physical harm. It remains unclear
whether something went wrong with the technical equipment of the hospital
or whether a staff member of the hospital failed to act properly under the
circumstances.
If P sues D, he has to establish that the cause of his harm lies within the
sphere of the hospital, which fails, for example, at least in part if there
was some other prevailing cause (in particular the worsening of his own
condition in the natural course of events; see supra Art. 3:106). Insofar,
the case is not different to any other situation where P faces only a sole
general practitioner ± the cause(s) of his loss need to be established
according to the standard rules of Chapter 3. However, Art. 4:202 helps P
inasmuch as he need not prove with respect to the hospital's share that it
was either an auxiliary that did something wrong (opening the path
towards liability for others under Art. 6:102 if viewed separately), or the
hospital's therapeutical equipment (possibly leading to strict liability of
the hospital as its keeper, e.g. under Art. 5:102). It may even have been D
itself who failed to come up with suitable working schedules or to provide
for adequate training of the hospital's staff. All such causal uncertainties
with respect to the hospital's internal organisation in this case therefore
do not affect P's claim as long as he can show possible causes (ªdefectsº)
attributable to the hospital ± it is up to the latter to prove that all such
aspects within its sphere have functioned properly in the instant case and
therefore do not trigger liability.
100 Koch
Chapter 5. Strict Liability Introduction
Chapter 5. Strict Liability

Introduction
1. Overview
This Chapter addresses at least parts of those current forms of liability 1
which are not based on fault, but instead shift the focus to additional or
even entirely different aspects such as objective danger. As a result,
compensation can typically be obtained more easily than on the basis of
ordinary fault liability. In that respect this Chapter is building a bridge to
the previous one on fault liability, in particular to its Section 2.
The reason for this rather broad starting point is the fact that all jurisdic- 2
tions show a more or less wide spectrum of liabilities which ± while still
founded upon the idea of fault ± allow claims for compensation more easily
than under the traditional concept, e.g. by shifting the burden of proof or
by increasing the standards of due care 1. The ensuing problem therefore is
that there is no clear-cut concept of strict liability, not even within a single
jurisdiction. As has been rightly said, ªstrict liability and fault liability are
alternatives in terms of convenient classification and exposition, but closer
examination suggests that in terms of substance there is really a continuum
rather than two categoriesº 2.
In light of this fairly fundamental difficulty, the Group has decided to 3
highlight the most extensive variety of strict liability as one end of this
continuum by focussing first on the most extreme types of risk leading to
no-fault liability in the vast majority of countries. This is attempted by
Art. 5:101, which deals with ªabnormally dangerous activitiesº. Even this
end of the chain is not a single link, however: The defences listed in
Chapter 7, in particular those envisaged by Art. 7:102, also have to be
considered, which themselves depend on several additional factors.
Furthermore, national laws already paint a fairly varied picture of causes
of action which depart from the traditional notion of fault liability to the
extent that they should be counted as ªstrict liabilitiesº within the meaning
of the Principles even though these sometimes rather specific instances of
no-fault liability are not uniformly accepted in all jurisdictions.
2. Scope & Terminology

Since the term ªstrict liabilityº may have a limited meaning in some juris- 4
dictions, the Group had first considered to avoid it, but then decided to
keep it in light of its rather clear core meaning. It is not meant to be limited
to the traditional core areas of no-fault liability for risks involving certain
1
B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of
Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability) 395 (no. 2).
2
W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Strict Liability, 101 (no. 1). See also B.A. Koch/H. Koziol,
Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 156.
Koch 101
animate or inanimate objects, but may also apply in cases involving certain
dangerous human activity. Furthermore, it extends beyond current cases of
so-called ªabsolute liabilityº (where no or hardly any defences apply) to
no-fault liability in general, inasmuch as it refers to compensation for
harm caused by the materialization of a certain risk within the defendant's
sphere. However, this Chapter does not cover all cases where the defen-
dant may be liable despite the fact that he himself was not personally at
fault: While some doctrines may call vicarious liability to be ªstrictº as
well, liability for auxiliaries as addressed by Art. 6:102 is considered to fall
into a separate category for the purpose of these Principles 3.

5 The Group has tackled strict liability as a separate project, which was
extensively discussed at two plenary meetings in WuÈrzburg (June 2000)
and Graz (November 2000). The results of this work have been published
in 2002 4. The Drafting Committee re-considered the topic at several occa-
sions before agreeing upon the solution at hand, which was approved at
the Pisa plenary meeting in May 2002.
6 The Group thereby faced the choice between two alternative ways to tackle
this issue: One proposal aimed at introducing a rather general rule, thereby
trying to come up with a fairly broad clause flexible enough to cover a wide
variety of risks while still allowing for adjustments depending on the weight
of the risk. It thereby intended to provide the legislators with guidelines for
the development of their respective national laws towards an increasingly
harmonized set of rules which in comparison may not cover the same risks,
but are still based on the same overall notion of no-fault liability. The other
proposal suggested to stay rather pragmatic, leaving the decision what risks
strict liability laws should cover to the national legislator, with the excep-
tion of certain extreme risks that should trigger liability in all jurisdictions
(as already foreseen by most countries, at least for the core dangers now
covered by Art. 5:101).
7 The latter view, which finally prevailed, is not at all meant to freeze the
scope of strict liabilities to the state of today's laws: As indicated by Art.
5:102 para. 2, analogy should be allowed in order to develop the law from
the basis of existing rules onwards. Going the other way was feared to be
too broad, thereby introducing quite significant uncertainty as to the scope
of strict liability. While some countries currently take a fairly narrow view
on no-fault liability (such as England), others are already going very far
(and continuously seem to go beyond that, such as France). A general
rule of strict liability for other risks than the ones covered by Art. 5:101
might be interpreted from those substantially diverging viewpoints, thereby
not leading to harmonized rules at all, but (at least for quite some time) to
doubts as to what should be covered by such a rule. The current solution
3
See also the Basic Norm, Art. 1:101 no. 17.
4
See supra fn. 1.
102 Koch
Chapter 5. Strict Liability Introduction
tries to avoid such uncertainties by recording the common grounds and

allowing advancement on the basis of existing rules in all jurisdictions.
While the Group at some point considered to include specific rules for 8
certain commonly recognized sources of abnormal risk (for example
animals), this was ultimately rejected altogether, in particular because of
obvious difficulties in putting together a list of dangers acknowledged by
all jurisdictions.
The Group considered several models on the way to the current Articles, in 9
particular sec. 50 of the Swiss Draft Revision 5 and §§ 519 et seq. of the
American Restatement of Torts Second 6. The present formulation is to a
large extent closer to a successor of the latter, the current tentative draft
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic
Principles) 7.

At present, strict liability in most jurisdictions predominantly seems to be 10
based on singular rules rather than general or at least broader clauses.
This is particularly noteworthy for civil law countries: While Austrian
courts, for example, (cautiously) apply existing strict liability laws analo-
gously (which to some extent reduces problems caused by a tardy legis-
5
Sec. 50 reads:
ª(1) The operator who runs a particularly dangerous activity for risk is liable for compensa-
tion of any damage resulting from the realisation of the characteristic risk inherent to this
activity, even if such activity is tolerated by the legal order.
(2) An activity is deemed to be particularly dangerous if, by its nature or by the nature of
substances, instruments or energies used thereto, it is prone to cause frequent or serious
damage, notwithstanding all care which can be expected from a person specialised in this field;
such assumption is justified, in particular, where another statute already provides a special
liability for a comparable risk.
(3) Special provisions governing the liability for a specific characteristic risk are reserved.º
(Translation by P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, 323, no. 97.)
6
§ 519 reads:
ª(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous.º
7
Citations to the Restatement Third in the following refer to the version current as of Septem-
ber 2004, which ± as far as strict liability is concerned ± stems from the 1st Tentative Draft
published in 2001.
Compare in particular the wording of Art. 5:101 with Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab.
Physical Harm, § 20, which is headed ªAbnormally Dangerous Activitiesº:
ª(a) A defendant who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability
for physical harm resulting from the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when
reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) the activity is not a matter of common usage.º
Note that §§ 21±23 of the Restatement Third include specific rules for animals, which has
been specifically rejected by this Group.
Koch 103
lature), German, Italian and Swiss practice so far deny the possibility of
extending their statutory regimes in this way at all 8. French law, on the
other hand, not only has a clause which (at least in today's understanding)
introduces general liability for ªdeeds of the things within one's keepingº
(the famous Art. 1384 al. 1 Code civil 9), courts furthermore seem to be quite
open for an extensive application of other rules (such as the loi Badinter) 10.
This is not only a difference in legislative style, but obviously also affects the
scope of strict liability altogether: A general clause by its nature tends to
allow no-fault liability in more instances than those addressed by singular
pieces of legislation focussing on very specific kinds of risks.
11 The spectrum of risks for which current legislation or case law provides
strict liability is therefore quite diverse in a comparative overview: English
law is very cautious and allows strict liability claims in only a very limited
number of cases (such as accidents with dangerous animals), whereas road
accidents fall under traditional tort law (in particular the law of negli-
gence). On the continent, however, the latter cases are considered to be
typical examples appropriate for strict liability 11. Yet, this widespread
accord when it comes to introducing strict liability for motor vehicles is
not fully reflected when it comes to tailoring the actual rules, which differ
in quite important aspects (such as the availability of defences and the
like). Furthermore, even those jurisdictions which seem to be more pre-
pared to introduce no-fault liability regimes are not proceeding in a coher-
ent manner: Although there is quite some overlap when looking at the
types of risks covered (e.g. animals, aircraft, mains and pipelines), the list
is certainly not identical in all these legal systems 12.
12 The (admittedly narrow) solution found for this Chapter therefore tries to
encompass the lowest common denominator as a minimum standard (Art.
5:101) while at the same time acknowledging existing regimes that already
go beyond (though not necessarily in the same way or extent).
Art. 5:101 . Abnormally Dangerous Activities

(1) A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly
liable for damage characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and
resulting from it.
8
B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Strict Liability, 9 (no. 25); J. Fedtke/U. Magnus, Ger-
many, PETL Strict Liability, 147 (no. 14 et seq.); F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Strict
Liability, 205 (no. 7); P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, 323 (no. 21±22). But
see the Italian practice of interpreting the wording of Art. 2050 Codice civile (ªdangerous
activitiesº) rather broadly: F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Strict Liability, no. 43 et seq.
9
Cf. the references to the Italian Art. 2050 Cod. civ. in the previous footnote.
10
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Strict Liability, 127 (no. 10).
11
ªThe absence of any strict liability for road accidents is perhaps the most marked difference
between English law and that of most European countries.º W.V.H. Rogers, England,
PETL Strict Liability, 101 (no. 25).
12
Cf. the inventory by B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability,
no. 4±45.
104 Koch
Chapter 5. Strict Liability Art. 5:101
(2) An activity is abnormally dangerous if

a) it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even when
all due care is exercised in its management and
b) it is not a matter of common usage.
(3) A risk of damage may be significant having regard to the seriousness or
the likelihood of the damage.
(4) This Article does not apply to an activity which is specifically subjected
to strict liability by any other provision of these Principles or any other
national law or international convention.
Comments
1. Introduction
This provision is intended to cover situations of extraordinary danger 1
requiring a correspondingly extraordinary allocation of responsibility. It is
therefore one pole of a spectrum of liability, which at the other end covers
intentional wrongful conduct.
Liability for abnormally dangerous activities is not focussing on the actual 2
conduct of the defendant as a cause of the victim's loss. In order to carry
on an activity within the meaning of this Article, it is therefore not neces-
sary to actually show some active or passive behaviour as long as one is in
control of a source of risk whose danger materializes. Liability under this
Article is not based on any sense of fault, no matter how slight it may be.
Even though the defendant may have exercised utmost care under both
objective and subjective standards, he will still be required to compensate
the loss caused by the source of danger within his sphere.
This is even the turning point for bringing the case under this Chapter 3
rather than the previous one: As long as the defendant has violated the
required standard of conduct, he will be liable for fault under Art. 4:101
(which is of course particularly true if the activity is prohibited altogether).
If the defendant engages in some dangerous activity, the level of due care
will be higher according to Art. 4:102, so that it may even be easier for
the plaintiff to succeed on the basis of fault liability.
Strict liability as addressed here steps in if a highly significant risk of harm 4
remains despite all proper precautions taken by the defendant. On the
other hand, failure to exercise reasonable care when pursuing an abnor-
mally dangerous activity within the meaning of this Article may also lead
to an additional basis of liability for the victim under these Principles,
which may even be directed against the same defendant: Not only can the
keeper of a source of abnormal danger be liable under this Article, but
may have to account for his additional fault when dealing with this risk.
An important limit to strict liability is expressed by the second half of the 5
first paragraph of this Article: Only damage ªcharacteristic to the risk pre-
sented by the activity and resulting from itº can be recovered under this
Koch 105
rule, which reduces its scope to those cases where the reason for establish-
ing strict liability, i.e. the abnormal risk, is evidenced by the cause of the
harm: If fireworks stored in a warehouse explode, harm is caused by the
particular risk inherent in the fireworks (the danger of unintended explo-
sions and the possible damage ensuing from such blasts). If an employee
negligently drops a box of fireworks onto a passer-by, that person may be
injured, but not because of the abnormal risk inherent in the explosives,
but because of the sheer weight of the box as such (which is not an abnor-
mal risk falling under this rule) 1.
2. Definitions
a) Activity
6 As indicated before, the term ªactivityº is not meant to limit the scope of
this Article to risky behaviour. The very having of certain things may
create a risk of danger to others no matter how much care is taken. On
the other hand, under a system of responsibility there must be some
connection between the thing and the person liable to make compensation:
it must be, as one might say, ªin his sphereº. The Group has decided to
follow the terminology of the Swiss Draft Revision Art. 50 because we
think ªactivityº carries the required sense 2.
b) Abnormal Danger
7 Apart from the fact that an activity in the afore-mentioned sense must not
be a matter of common usage (see infra), it must create a ªforeseeable
and highly significant risk of harm even when all due care is exercised in
its managementº. As indicated by the following explanation, there are two
factors which are most important in weighing the risk in this respect: the
frequency as well as the gravity of the harm it may bring about. To this
extent, the definition resembles § 20 lit. b of the American Restatement
3rd of Torts 3. While the frequency can be determined by way of the theory
of probabilities, the gravity of the harm is not only assessed in light of the
compensation necessary to restore the harmed interests, but equally the
value of such interests within the legal system. Higher-ranking rights such
as life or bodily integrity are also better protected under this rule as is the
case under all jurisdictions in general.
c) Common Usage
8 ªAn activity is plainly of common usage if it is carried on by a large fraction
of the people in the communityº 4, the community thereby being those at
risk under the circumstances. Even though the actual individual might
1
Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm, § 24 cmt. a.
2
See also the broad use of the word ªactivityº in Art. 3:101 (ªactivityº as encompassing ªactiv-
ity or conductº for the purpose of these Principles).
3
See supra fn. 7.
4
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles), § 20 cmt. j.
106 Koch
have engaged in such activity for his very first time, he can still resort to this
exception as long as his activity is typically carried on by the average
person. This has convincingly been explained by pointing at reciprocity: If
many actors create a significant risk by their activity, such danger is never-
theless ªimposed by the many on each otherº 5.
Therefore, driving a motor car is certainly a matter of common usage and 9
for that reason falls outside the scope of this Article (even though it may
be subject to strict liability under national regimes sustained by Art.
5:102), whereas transporting highly explosive chemicals in a huge tanker
may not be excluded by this provision. Setting off a few pieces of fireworks
on New Year's Eve is a custom practised by a large number of people,
whereas large-scale, long-lasting firework displays with hundreds of rockets
and involving substantial organisation and coordination is not: Only the
prior activity will be a matter of common usage, whereas harm caused in
the course of the latter kind of activity may lead to strict liability. This is
obviously even more so true for companies producing and storing fire-
works. Even though dams are certainly no longer exceptional constructions
per se, most of them will nevertheless be ªabnormally dangerousº
inasmuch as their mere existence constitutes a certain danger which is not
commonly achieved by household water butts.
While an activity pursued by a large number of people will typically be a 10
matter of common usage, the reverse is not necessarily true: Even if only
few people pursue an activity which brings about a highly significant risk
of harm, it may still be of common usage. This is true, for example, for
certain public utilities: Electricity supply is typically provided by only few
companies but will still be considered an everyday activity falling under
Art. 5:101 para. 2 lit. b, apart from the fact that this activity reaches (again)
a large number of people. The comment to § 20 of the American Restate-
ment of Torts, Third, rightly argues that ªthe more common the activity,
the more likely it is that the activity's benefits are distributed widely among
the communityº, and concludes that ªthe appeal of strict liability for an
activity is stronger when its risks are imposed on third parties while its
benefits are concentrated among a few.º 6
The qualification of an activity to be of ªcommon usageº may change over 11
time: A previously exceptional activity may later become popular and
thereby fall out of the scope of Art. 5:101. This was, for example, the case
in the United States with airplanes whose operation previously was con-
sidered to be abnormally dangerous but nowadays no longer falls under
any general strict liability regime in most states 7.
It is important to note that liability under this Article only steps in if both 12
elements constituting ªabnormal dangerº are given. Therefore, even
5
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm, § 20 cmt. j.
6
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm, § 20 cmt. j.
7
Schwartz, USA, PETL Strict Liability, 351 (no. 17).
Koch 107
though an activity may create a foreseeable and highly significant risk of

damage, it still will not lead to strict liability if it has to be considered a
matter of common usage. The reverse is of course equally true.
d) Defendant ± ªKeeperº
13 Identifying the defendant under this provision conforms to existing practice
in the field of strict liability: Existing laws throughout Europe focus on the
ªkeeperº or ªoperatorº of a dangerous thing or activity and thereby
address a person ªexercising actual control or . . . economically controlling
the activityº 8. ªCarrying onº an abnormally dangerous activity does there-
fore not require that the person ultimately liable had been directly and
actively involved in the activity in the sense of ªhands-onº action.
14 At some point during the discussion, a formula along the lines of ªexercis-
ing lasting control and deriving economic benefitsº was considered, but
ultimately dropped as it would have been too narrow: Apart from difficul-
ties of defining the duration required, it was agreed that actually making
profit should not be a decisive factor, at least not for excluding liability,
e.g. for an abnormally dangerous activity exercised by a public entity or
institution for the benefit of the public at large and without net profits.
An employee who is ordered to contribute his labour to an abnormally
dangerous activity will not be personally strictly liable as he will not be
considered to be in control thereof.
15 As is already accepted by most jurisdictions 9, capacity to act is not decisive
in the field of strict liability (cf. Art. 4:102 para. 2 for fault liability), hence,
although it is rather unlikely that incapable persons will be carrying on
activities within the scope of this Article, if they do they will be liable.
3. Reasons for Liability

16 As the comparative survey conducted by the Group has confirmed, there
are several possible justifications both in favour of and against strict liabi-
lity. 10 The range of arguments are not limited on aspects of dangerousness,
but also consider to what extent one side was more in a position (though
not under a duty) to avoid the harm (either altogether or at least in part).
Other reasons brought forward focus on the harm itself (by weighing the
protected interests involved) or on the availability of compensation (includ-
ing deep pocket arguments, which tend to attribute loss to the party who
can best afford it). Another traditional justification frequently cited is
related to the old principle ªcuius commodum, eius et incommodaº and
thereby compares benefits or profits with the distribution of risk.
17 While all these arguments certainly play a role in deciding whether or not
to introduce strict liability for a particular (potential) source of harm, this
8
9
B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 100±102.
10
108 Koch
weighing process is certainly more important for developing current law

further by way of analogy as foreseen by Art. 5:102 (2). As far as Art.
5:101 is concerned, which is a narrow rule only applicable to ultra-hazar-
dous activities, promoting the introduction of strict liability for such
extreme risks will most likely not be a demanding task: As indicated
earlier, this rule is meant to incorporate the lowest common denominator
of all legal systems under survey.

As already indicated, nothing in this rule is intended to exclude liability 18
under any other provision of these Principles. It may therefore well be
that someone (not necessarily the same person) will be held responsible
for his personal acts or omissions that have contributed to the victim's
harm. The keeper of a box of dynamite may not only have to compensate
the victims because he was in control of the risk as such, but maybe also
because he did not take proper measures to prevent any harm resulting
from his dynamite, such as faulty storage. At the same time, a third person
might have to account for the fact that he failed to warn of the danger as he
was obliged to do under the circumstances.
It is also important to note that the liability regime of this Article may be 19
complemented, altered, or superseded by national law or international
conventions, as expressed by Art. 5:102, which the Group found necessary
to state expressly in order to avoid misunderstandings in this respect.
As already mentioned, the extent of compensation to be paid by the defen- 20
dant (if any) may be influenced by defences available to him under Chapter
7 of these Principles. The special strict liability defences listed in Art. 7:102
have to be considered in addition to those covered by Art. 7:101.
Illustrations
Since the scope of this Article was meant to be limited to extreme types of 21
dangers, only few activities will fall under this rule in practice. The vast
majority of situations will be governed in particular by Chapter 4 of these
Principles, as has already been explained above.
A typical example of an ultra-hazardous activity which is not of common 22
usage will be blasting 11, even though the circumstances will certainly play
a decisive role: Whereas the destruction of a building in the middle of a
highly populated area will certainly count as an activity governed by Art.
5:101, explosions performed in a deserted test field may not create the
kind of risks envisaged by para. (2)(a) 12.
11
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm, § 20 cmt. e and the Reporters' Note
thereto.
12
ª[B]lasting in a developed area of the city creates a highly significant risk in a way that blast-
ing on a deserted mountainside does not.º Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical
Harm, § 20 cmt. k.
Koch 109
Art. 5:102 . Other Strict Liabilities

(1) National laws can provide for further categories of strict liability for
dangerous activities even if the activity is not abnormally dangerous.
(2) Unless national law provides otherwise, additional categories of strict
liability can be found by analogy to other sources of comparable risk of
damage.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 As indicated in the introduction to this Chapter, its provisions are meant to
define a minimum standard, but shall by no means prevent the expansion
of the notion of strict liability in individual jurisdictions (as is already the
case). Quite the contrary: A gradual expansion may prove to be desirable,
as long as it neither deviates from internal standards of the respective juris-
diction itself nor from external standards (as compiled here) in a way which
overturns the system as a whole.
2. Strict Liability for Activities Which Are Not Abnormally Dangerous

2 Para. 1 of this Article has a much broader scope as it appears at first sight:
Since the Group has decided to reduce its own formula of strict liability
(Art. 5:101) to a rather narrow concept, thereby encompassing only abnor-
mally dangerous activities, the remaining cases of strict liability already
found in European legal systems 13 had to be addressed elsewhere. This is
achieved by this wording, which shows that these other variants have been
considered, but not included in the concept underlying Art. 5:101.
3 When considering the text of this paragraph, the Group concluded that it
should remain in the Principles despite the fact that it may be read as a
mere truism ± it is obvious that national lawmakers will continue to develop
their own strict liability schemes individually until harmonization will be
imposed by some European legislation at some point in the distant future.
The Group nevertheless thought that it is necessary to state explicitly that
Art. 5:101 is not meant to be the exclusive rule of strict liability, but serves
as a minimum residual standard which coexists with the various other types
of strict liabilities currently in force.
4 This paragraph therefore implicitly addresses all existing road traffic
liability schemes, which in themselves are not in harmony for the time
being. Furthermore, it also includes those rules which already are
harmonized at an international scale (or will be in the future), for example
product liability (as governed by the implementations of the EC Directive)
13
See the inventory by B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability,
no. 4 et seq.
110 Koch
or airline liability (as covered by international agreements and European

legislation).
3. Strict Liability By Analogy

Art. 5:102 (2) is meant to allow the expansion of existing strict liability 5
regimes by way of analogy. As indicated above 14, only few jurisdictions cur-
rently favour such an expansion of cases governed by no-fault regimes. The
Group nevertheless is of the opinion that equal cases should be treated
equally, which strongly speaks in favour of a rule as the one embodied
here. This is also supported by the Swiss Draft, whose Art. 50 para. 2 seems
to be based on the same general idea 15.
14
Supra at fn. 8.
15
Art. 50 para. 2 defines the dangerousness of an activity necessary to trigger strict liability
under para. 1. It concludes by saying that such dangerousness is particularly given in those
cases where special legislation has already introduced strict liability ªfor comparable risks.º
Koch 111
Chapter 6. Liability for Others

Introduction
1. Overview
1 This chapter addresses issues usually covered under the heading of vicar-
ious liability. As explained below, the generic term ªliability for othersº
has been preferred, since this chapter addresses a variety of situations
which may not fall under a single rule. First comes the liability for acts of
a minor or insane person, where in most jurisdictions, the liability of the
person in charge is based on lack of care, with a simple reversal of the bur-
den of proof. There is a growing tendency to make the person in charge
strictly liable, but the Group agreed to keep with a common denominator
position. Then comes the situation of the principal (in the widest possible
sense of the term) liable for damages caused by his agents, which may be
described, under most systems, as a case of strict liability with limited possi-
bilities of exoneration if any. This position is reflected in the Principles, yet
making clear that this would not apply to the case of the independent con-
tractor.
2. Scope and Terminology

2 In common law jurisdictions, the term vicarious liability describes situations
where A is liable for a tort committed by B against C, requiring no fault on
A's part. In such cases, A's vicarious liability may also be termed strict
liability. This may apply to the employers who, in most legal systems, are
strictly liable for damage caused by their employees where the employee
(and not necessarily the employer) has been negligent. In a country like
France, it may also apply to parents who are now strictly liable for damage
caused by their minor children. However, in almost all other jurisdictions,
the liability of parents is based on presumed lack of care of the parents.
This is why the term vicarious liability, albeit convenient, has been aban-
doned for a more neutral one, liability for others, which does not indicate
under which principle it operates 1.
3 During the discussions, the Group agreed that the Principles should focus
on tort law issues, leaving aside specific problems related to family law,
company law, labour law and administrative law, which may be mentioned
in the commentary wherever necessary. Borderline issues with the law of
contract are specifically addressed in the commentary, with a clear
intention to match the analysis of the Lando Commission and avoid any
discrepancy with the Principles of European Contract Law.
1
On the terminology issue, see S. Galand-Carval, Comparative Report on Liability for
Damages Caused by Others, in J. Spier (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage
Caused by Others (2003, hereafter cited as PETL Liability for Others) 289 (no. 1).
112 MoreÂteau
Chapter 6. Liability for Others Art. 6:101
3. History and Background

The Group decided to cover all types of liability for damage caused by 4
others and not to limit the present article to cases of vicarious liability in
the ªstrictº sense 2. It was agreed that a general principle was not appropri-
ate, liability for others being based on strict liability in some cases and fault
in others, with a reversal of the burden of proof. This is why the present
Chapter clearly distinguishes liability for minors or mentally disordered
people, based on fault, and liability for auxiliaries.
This distinction reflects the common core of legal systems and can be justi- 5
fied as follows. Liability for minors or mentally disordered people, on the
one hand, is based on the fact that children are a risk of society as a whole.
Parents are best equipped to supervise children but the burden should not
be too heavy given the fact that children are a benefit for the society at
large. Likewise, those taking care of mentally disabled people perform a
social function wherefrom they seldom derive benefit, which explains the
analogy with children. Liability for auxiliaries, on the other hand, is based
on the risk created by personal or enterprise activity with a view to make
profits. This justifies the liability of those controlling the activity of
auxiliaries and benefiting from it, on a large scale (big enterprise) or much
smaller scale (small enterprise or domestic activity). Most legal systems do
not distinguish among different spheres of activity and it is indeed very
difficult to hold them apart. In addition, the risks caused by auxiliaries or
helpers in domestic life are more often than not covered by insurance.
The case of the independent contractor acting outside the direct control of the 6
one benefiting from his activity was also discussed at length and it was agreed
that he may not be regarded as an auxiliary, due to this lack of control.
Corporate liability and state liability have been discussed. General 7
guidance is to be found in the Principles and the commentary but more
specific incorporation may cause too much interference with company law
and administrative law.
Art. 6:101 . Liability for Minors or Mentally Disabled Persons

A person in charge of another who is a minor or subject to mental disability
is liable for damage caused by the other unless the person in charge shows
that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct in supervision.
Comments
1. Introduction
A comparative review of the national systems 1 reveals the existence of 1
three different models as far as children are concerned. Under a first
2
Cf. supra Introduction to Chapter 5, no. 4.
1
S. Galand-Carval, Comparative Report, PETL Liability for Others, no. 17.
MoreÂteau 113
model, there is no particular rule, and the victim of a damage caused by a

child has to prove the parents' fault and the causal connection with the
harm. Austria and England belong to this Group. Under a second model,
the parental fault is presumed but the parents or those in charge of the
minor may be exonerated when proving that they exerted reasonable care
and diligence in the child's supervision and education. This is true for coun-
tries like Germany or Switzerland. Under a third model, persons in charge
of minors are strictly liable. By way of case law, France moved from the
second model to this third one and Italy comes close, since it is very
difficult, in Italian law, to rebut the presumption of fault.
2 It appears that the majority of legal systems operate under the second
model, even if some countries like France and Italy move to the third one.
The Group therefore agreed, for the reasons explained above, to follow
what may appear as a common denominator. The liability of parents or
persons in charge is presumed and exoneration is possible if the duty of
care to supervise children was adequately performed.
3 It was also agreed that a similar rule may apply regarding those in charge
of mentally disabled persons. The decisive point is indeed whether there is
or not a duty of care to supervise. This duty may be stricter on persons or
institutions taking care of insane people, since the danger may be higher.
This is a point to be decided on a case by case basis on the ground of
exoneration. There is no policy or practical argument for treating differ-
ently persons in charge of minors or mentally disabled people.
2. Definitions
a) Person in Charge
4 The term may cover the parent(s) in the case of a minor, or any person or
institution being in charge. This is not meant to apply to a child looked
after for a short period of time. In most jurisdictions, it seems that the
tendency is to make persons temporarily in charge liable on the basis of
negligence only 2. In the case of an adult subject to mental disability, this
may be an individual person or an institution.
b) Minor
5 The question is determined by the relevant national law, the age of major-
ity being 18 in most jurisdictions.
c) Mental Disability
6 The point needs to be decided on a case by case basis, evidence of mental
disability being easier where the person is looked after by a specialised
institution or placed under legal protection. The Principle does not extend
to persons subject to physical disability, covered by Art. 4:102 (2).
2
114 MoreÂteau
3. Scope of Liability
Liability for damage caused by minors or mentally disabled persons may 7
exist whenever the child or the mentally disabled causes it, even in the
absence of fault or negligence. The liability does not stem from a fault or
negligence on the part of the minor or the mentally disabled person but is
based on the duty to supervise.
For instance, an eight-year old child does not cross the street with the 8
necessary speed and causes an accident. The parents of the child did not
prevent this from happening, although they should have intervened. The
parents may be liable even though the child may not be.
Children above a certain age can themselves be liable if they have infringed 9
the standard of care that the law sets for them. 3 This age may not be set in
a fixed way but it is commonly agreed that this may be possible for certain
behaviour of children over the age of seven, for example when they have
reached twelve years of age. The position of French law ruling that even
an infant such as a four year old may be acting in a faulty way does not
meet the standard of conduct as defined at Art. 4:102 of the Principles.
The Group agrees that parents and children can be liable on a solidary 10
basis. Such cases are likely to occur where children are growing near to
the age of majority, in rare cases where the parents fail to meet the burden
of proof.
Art. 6:102 . Liability for Auxiliaries

(1) A person is liable for damage caused by his auxiliaries acting within the
scope of their functions provided that they violated the required standard
of conduct.
(2) An independent contractor is not regarded as an auxiliary for the pur-
poses of this Article.
Comments
1. Introduction
Everyone reading this article will think about the relationship between 1
employer and employee. This article goes beyond the scope of parties
bound by a contract of employment, however, a point which was vividly
discussed. The use of the term auxiliary reveals that the Principle may
apply not only to the business sphere but also to the domestic one, for the
reasons explained in the introduction to this chapter 4. This means that the
auxiliary may be an employee but also anyone willing to help, acting under
the supervision of the liable party. Comparative studies reveal that a major-
3
See Art. 4:102 para. 2 and no. 14 et seq. thereto.
4
Supra Introduction no. 5.
MoreÂteau 115
ity of systems favour a broad interpretation of ªemploymentº, covering the

case of the occasional helper, acting gratuitously or not, for kindness or
expecting some help in return 5.
2 This liability is not based on fault on the part of the principal. It may be
described as liability without wrongdoing on his part, with very narrow
possibilities of exoneration if any. 6
3 It is commonly agreed that the auxiliary's act must fall within the scope of
his functions, again a very broad concept which could be illustrated by
hundreds of examples. There must be a linkage between the employment
and the action in question, a point to be decided on a case by case basis.
4 At most, a few guidelines may be expressed:
(1) Misuse of a position should not be a reason per se for an activity to fall
outside the scope of employment, although in some cases it may even
be a criminal act.
(2) Even if an activity falls outside the scope of employment, liability may
be triggered by an authorisation on the side of the employer.
5 No rule may give a predictable answer for each and every case. One has to
look for `subordination' but may not disregard àd hoc task relationships'.
2. Definitions
a) Auxiliaries
6 The term covers the employee acting under a contract of employment, in a
business or domestic context. It includes the regular or occasional helper,
whether acting gratuitously or not. The term implies some form of subordi-
nation or integration or a task fulfilled under the supervision or control of
the party held liable. The use of the plural indicates that the individual
employee need not be identified as long as it is established that it was a
staff member of the employer.
b) Scope of Functions
7 As explained above, this loose term is to be understood in the widest
manner, indicating a linkage between the task or functions and the act in
question.
c) Independent Contractor
8 The term indicates a party bound by a contract to the one the victim wants
to make liable (the defendant) and yet acting in an independent manner
without supervision or control 7.
5
S. Galand-Carval, Comparative Report, PETL Liability for Others, no. 41±42.
6
7
See infra no. 9 et seq.
116 MoreÂteau
3. Scope of Liability
a) Independent Contractors
Art. 6:102 (2) addresses the case of the truly independent contractor. The 9
dividing line between dependent and independent work is indeed not easy
to draw, especially in the building trade. In most jurisdictions, the rule is
that there is no vicarious liability in tort for harm caused by an independent
contractor: ªit would seem unfair to impose liability on a defendant who
exercises no control whatsoever on the wrongdoer and the way he
performs his taskº 8.
Where D engages a chauffeur, the latter is an auxiliary and D is liable for 10
the driving of the chauffeur. Where D takes a taxi, the taxi driver is an
independent contractor, who is in a much better position to insure the risk.
There is no room for liability for the independent contractor under this 11
rule. Fault liability on the part of the principal may, however, arise from
negligent choice (culpa in eligendo), improper supervision or non-delegable
duty wherever applicable under national law.
However, any indication that the so-called independent contractor was 12
acting under the subordination or supervision or control of the defendant
may change this person into an auxiliary, the key-word being proximity.
As a rule, the independent contractor is not integrated into the organisa-
tional structure of the enterprise (when acting in a business sphere) or
into the household activity (when acting in a domestic sphere).
b) Borderline with Contract Liability
When an employee damages goods belonging to one of his employer's 13
clients (e.g. a car left for repairs in the employer's garage), is the
employer's liability to be dealt with in tort or in contract 9? Most legal
systems distinguish vicarious liability in tort and liability in contract. More
often than not, the liability may be more stringent when based on contract.
Few systems have a clear rule like the French one discarding tort liability
wherever a contract action is possible 10. However, even where such a rule
does exist, it does not eliminate the borderline problem, in the sense that
the borderline between tort law and contract law is drawn differently from
system to system.
According to the Principles of European Contract Law, Art. 8.107 (ex art. 14
3.107) ± (Performance Entrusted to Another), ª[a] party who entrusts
performance of the contract to another person remains responsible for
performance.º This provision has the effect to extend contract liability to
situations which may otherwise be covered by tort liability. The Group
8
9
This is question E.3. in the questionnaire to PETL Liability for Others, 5.
10
Strangely enough, this rule is not always applied in the field of vicarious liability, where the
courts frequently apply tort rules rather than the contract ones. See S. Galand-Carval, France,
PETL Liability for Others, 97 (no. 42±43).
MoreÂteau 117
does not intend to contradict such a principle. Tort liability for damage
caused by others may sometimes yield to general principles of contract
law, such as those produced by the Lando Commission or, more frequently
than not, to rules pertaining to specific contracts.
15 The following example shows that the borderline is far from being clear. D,
a company, offers cleaning services to commercial customers. X, one of its
employees, is required to clean P's jewellery shop. While on the premises,
X steals 50 Cartier watches 11. D may be sued under the present Principle,
yet with a discussion whether the auxiliary's criminal act was within the
scope of his functions. A claim based on contract would probably be stron-
ger, since there is a clear violation of the cleaning contract.
c) Fault and Liability of the Auxiliary
16 As explained in the introduction to this chapter, liability for damage caused
by others is based on the risk caused by the activity or the benefit derived
from it, risk and profit always falling on the same side.
17 May this justify liability in cases where the auxiliary is not at fault, like in
the case of an employed surgeon suffering a sudden heart attack whilst
performing a delicate operation? The Group agreed that liability for others
may only be justified in situations where the auxiliary should be personally
liable, namely where his conduct is a violation of the required standard of
conduct.
18 This does not mean that the victim will be deprived of any remedy in other
cases. In the surgeon's case, the hospital may be liable in contract or in tort
in a wide array of circumstances, such as situations where there is evidence
that as a consequence of the employer's policy to reduce labour costs, the
employees happen to be unreasonably overworked 12. Any infringement of
labour regulations may indeed corroborate a claim based on negligence.
19 Regarding the auxiliary's personal liability, the Group acknowledged the
existence of the following two options, expressing a preference for the sec-
ond one:
(1) exemption from liability for a damage caused to a third party in case of
slight or medium negligence, which seems to be the view of the major-
ity of legal systems 13;
(2) liability of the auxiliary, making him a potential defendant in a tort suit,
combined with a right of recourse against the employer in case of slight
or medium negligence.
20 However, no specific rule is to be applied to the liability of the auxiliary,
which is fault-based and governed by the default rule under these Princi-
ples.
11
This is case no. 12 in the questionnaire to PETL Liability for Others, 7.
12
See Art. 4:202 no. 5.
13
118 MoreÂteau
d) Liability of Legal Entities

Under most legal systems, legal entities are subject to vicarious liability for 21
tort of their organs or agents. Excuses are not admitted and therefore the
present rule regarding liability for damages caused by auxiliaries can be
applied. The majority of the Group agrees that liability of companies is
justified simply by the fact that they are legal entities, actions by their
organs being imputed directly to the juristic person. Some keep thinking
that this is a case of liability for others. One may indeed distinguish the
case of the company (or other legal entity) liable for the tortfeasor as an
auxiliary from the case where it is liable for the tortfeasor as an organ
(original liability of the company).
e) State Liability for Public Servants
Most countries have developed special rules governing the liability of the 22
State for damage caused by public servants, often with some immunity to
protect the public servants. It may be tempting to develop a system or to
decide to extend the present Principle given the many similarities, yet
explicitly allowing national rules to interfere. However, the Group agreed
that no recommendation should be made as to how national law should
deal with the problem of State liability, this area being strongly influenced
by historical and cultural heritage.
MoreÂteau 119
Title IV. Defences
Introduction
1. Overview
1 Title IV covers quite a diverse set of issues, at least from the perspective of
some legal systems. It collects issues which may be raised by the defendant
to repel, in whole or in part, what would otherwise be a basis of liability
established by the plaintiff. It has been said that ª[i]t is practically impossi-
ble to bring these defences within a conceptual framework, which is valid
for the . . . systems under examinationº 1. We have nevertheless tried to
bring them together, though the label under which we placed them may
seem to have a common law connotation.
2. Terminology
2 As at other occasions, for lack of better alternatives the Group has decided
to use an English term which conveys most of the meaning that it is
intended to cover, but may be misunderstood to express its common law
meaning exclusively. The use of the word ªdefencesº as a heading to this
Title was, however, not meant to list only arguments that lead to full
exoneration of the defendant: Art. 7:101 para. 3 and Art. 7:102 also allow
a mere reduction of liability, although only in very limited cases.
3 Furthermore, Title IV is not the only place for the defendant to go if he
seeks to avoid liability: There are, of course, counter-arguments to be
found throughout the Principles: If the plaintiff fails to establish a basic
requirement of liability (whether because he fails to produce the necessary
factual evidence or because the defendant rebuts that evidence), then the
claim fails and defences do not come into play. This is also true if one of
the requirements involves a weighing process: If one of the factors of Art.
2:102, for example, is so weak in a particular case that the interest involved
deserves no protection under these standards, the claimant's case ends. If
the requirements of factual causation are not met, that is equally the end
of the case. This is also true if the tortfeasor does not meet the required
standard of conduct due to his age or disabilities (Art. 4:102 para. 2).
What these latter points have in common, however, is that they are for
1
W. van Gerven et al., Torts (The Common Law of Europe Casebooks, 2000) 356.
120 Koch
Title IV. Defences Introduction
the plaintiff to prove (though the intricacies of the law of evidence need to
be ignored for the time being). The points collected under this Title come
into play when the ball is already within the defendant's field.

It was rather late in the drafting process that the Group decided to draw 4
together defences from the various places where they had been addressed
before in order to come up with a compact chapter of such contents: Most
of what is now Art. 7:101 stems from the Group's project on wrongfulness,
which is why they had first been placed in Chapter 4. Art. 7:102 was dealt
with in the proper context of strict liability. This is also the project where
those defences have been dealt with. Chapter 8 (which comprises just one
single Art. 8:101) is the only Article of this set which is based on a project
of its own 2.
The Title on Defences until recently had a placeholder for another chapter 5
called ªTime Limitationº. After thorough discussion, the Group has
decided not to embark on such a project for the time being, since we did
not deem it essential for this version, particularly in light of already
completed efforts in this field by other experts, such as the Lando Commis-
sion's proposal of ªPrinciples of European Contract Lawº.
2
U. Magnus/M. MartõÂn-Casals (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence (2004).
Koch 121
Art. 7:101 Title IV. Defences
Chapter 7. Defences in General

Art. 7:101 . Defences Based on Justifications
(1) Liability can be excluded if and to the extent that the actor acted legiti-
mately
a) in defence of his own protected interest against an unlawful attack (self-
defence),
b) under necessity,
c) because the help of the authorities could not be obtained in time (self-
help),
d) with the consent of the victim, or where the latter has assumed the risk
of being harmed, or
e) by virtue of lawful authority, such as a licence.
(2) Whether liability is excluded depends upon the weight of these justifica-
tions on the one hand and the conditions of liability on the other.
(3) In extraordinary cases, liability may instead be reduced.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 As mentioned before, this Article stems from the Group's exercise on
wrongfulness and includes arguments which a German-speaking lawyer
would call ªRechtfertigungsgruÈndeº ± grounds of justification. Seen from
that perspective, they are strongly tied to our concept of the standard of
conduct (cf. Art. 4:102).
2 It is undisputed that in establishing the violation of a legal duty one also
has to consider whether the actor simply defended his object of legal
protection against an unlawful attack (self-defence) or whether he acted
under necessity, or because the help of the authorities could not be
obtained in time (self-help) or with the approval of the injured person, his
acceptance of the risk, or by virtue of some lawful authority. These grounds
of justification are nothing more than the result of weighing the interests in
some typical situations. This can be seen, for example, when self-defence is
at stake: While the unlawfulness of the attack is certainly a very important
factor, it is not the only one to be considered. It is commonly recognised
that the endangered interests of the person attacked and the interests of
the assailant menaced by the self-defence must be taken into account and,
therefore, in defending property of inferior value one is not allowed to kill
or even wound the attacker seriously. By the same token, consent of a
person does not justify killing him.
3 The Group has also discussed whether we should include further issues, in
particular illegality (ex turpi causa non oritur actio), but we found a good
deal of uncertainty on the scope of that defence in existing systems and
we doubt whether we could formulate any principle on this without further
122 Koch
Chapter 7. Defences in General Art. 7:101
work. Upon weighing the pros and cons, we finally decided to leave that
aspect out, at least for the time being.
The wording of para. 2 requires that the validity of the arguments under 4
the first paragraph have to be considered in light of the reasons why the
tortfeasor is considered to be held liable in the first place ± the circum-
stances of the case have to be looked at comprehensively and not one-
sidedly.
The whole set of defences initially was meant to serve in a weighing of 5
involved interests. This flexible approach is rather limited, however, with
regard to the grounds of justification listed here. As the rule reads now,
any such reason leads to the exclusion of liability, whereas a mere reduc-
tion should only be considered in ªextraordinary casesº (para. 3). A similar
policy is at least in part expressed by Swiss Art. 52 OR, where self-defence
and self-help lead to full exoneration, while necessity falls under a more
flexible approach and leaves it for the judge to decide to what extent the
defendant may go free 1, which is also true for the consent of the victim as
regulated by Art. 44 para. 1 OR 2.
The solution that we have adopted was rather controversial, since some of 6
us were of the opinion that all defences (including these justifications)
could generally be used for reducing liability (though up to 100%, when
liability would be excluded at all). One example discussed in that context
concerned the problem of so-called wrongful self-defence ± someone
attacks another because he erroneously thinks that he himself is being
attacked by that person, which does not really allow a clear-cut answer in
the sense of an all-or-nothing liability. Similar examples may concern cases
where someone negligently puts himself into a state of danger and then
takes advantage of someone else's goods in order to rescue himself ± there
are certainly constellations imaginable where the weighing of the various
elements of these facts may lead to a reduction, but not to an exclusion of
liability. We all agreed, therefore, that there are cases possible where a
mere reduction of liability is the better solution as compared to a complete
exoneration, and Art. 7:101 (3) is meant to serve that goal.
2. Definitions
a) Self-Defence 3
As the wording of Art. 7:101 (1)(a) already indicates, a person may defend 7
his protected interests against illegitimate attacks by others even if he
thereby causes harm to the attackers. He may therefore not be liable for
1
This is also the law in Italy (Art. 2045 Codice civile speaks of an ªequo apprezzamento del
giudiceº in cases of necessity).
2
Art. 46a (which now also mentions what we consider as Art. 7:101 (e) ± ªlawful authorityº)
and Art. 59 of the new Swiss draft retain this duality.
3
See the text complementing the casebook on tort law cited supra in fn. 1 of the Introduction
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebook/tort/heading3.2.4.B.pdf.
Koch 123
such damage if his defensive action has to be considered legitimate and

appropriate under the circumstances, which is not the case if the reaction
is excessive in comparison to the attack.
8 As the notion of self-defence is related to the idea of self-help 4, the time
factor also plays a role inasmuch as self-defence may no longer be admissi-
ble if help could have been obtained instead from the authorities. Also, the
very meaning of the word ªdefenceº implies that the action by the person
attacked needs to be an immediate response to the attack.
9 While the core concept of self-defence may be rather straightforward, its
delimitation is not as obvious. Several factors (apart from the already
mentioned time aspect) play a decisive role when evaluating the conse-
quences of self-defence: the scope of protection of the endangered interest
on the one hand and the interest of the attacker which is actually harmed
(Art. 2:102), the nature of the threat (whether it was intentional, negligent,
or entirely without fault on the side of the attacker, for example), as well as
the question to what extent the threat was real: The person defending
himself may have been mistaken as to the quality and nature of the (subse-
quently injured) person's behaviour against him. The critical point in such
cases will be whether the ultimate injurer was reasonable in believing that
the other person was about to attack him, even though this was actually
not the case seen retrospectively. Also, his misapprehension of the situa-
tion itself may constitute fault under certain circumstances.
10 If and to what extent a defendant can effectively raise this defence
ultimately depends upon the circumstances of the individual case: While
someone who legitimately fears for his life will to some extent be justified
in using force against the attacker's physical integrity, he may certainly
not beat someone to a pulp who was merely pushing him aside.
b) Necessity 5
11 Similar arguments will be raised by a defendant who causes harm in an
effort to protect his own interests or the interests of another 6, which ± in
contrast to self-defence ± had not been threatened by the plaintiff before-
hand, but by some other source of immediate danger 7. This defence
4
Infra no. 14±15.
5
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebook/tort/heading3.2.4.C.pdf.
6
The defence of someone else's interests against the attacks of the plaintiff are considered to
be cases of self-defence under many jurisdictions, see, e.g., H. Koziol, OÈ sterreichisches Haft-
pflichtrecht vol. I (3rd ed.1997) no. 4/63.
7
Cf. the wording by Lord Goff in In Re F, [1990] 2 AC 1 (at 74), also cited by the text quoted in
fn. 5:
ªThat there exists in the common law a principle of necessity which may justify action which
would otherwise be unlawful is not in doubt. But historically the principle has been seen to
be restricted to two groups of cases, which have been called cases of public necessity and cases
of private necessity. The former occurred when a man interfered with another man's property
in the public interest ± for example (in the days before we could dial 999 for the fire brigade)
124 Koch
requires an actual threat to the defendant's (or someone else's) interests

which leaves the defendant with no choice but to infringe the interests of
another in order to ward off this danger. This also excludes cases where
help from the authorities could have been obtained in due time instead.
Again, the defendant's behaviour must have been proportionate to the
danger that he thereby responded to.
As in the case of self-defence, the interests involved on either side will have 12
to be weighed (though this time more favourably towards the plaintiff, as
the source of danger was not within her sphere), as well as the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's perception of the facts immediately before his
harmful behaviour.
A hiker who gets lost in the mountains may be justified in breaking into a 13
hut and using some of the food reserves stored there in order to avoid star-
ving, but he will obviously not be able to raise this defence if he attacks and
thereby injures someone else when he forcefully tears off that person's
backpack. Also in the first case, the fact that he may not be (fully) liable
in tort does not prevent the owner of the food to claim compensation on
other grounds such as restitution.
c) Self-Help
As has already been mentioned, the notion of self-help is closely related to 14
the afore-mentioned concepts of self-defence and necessity. In contrast to
these, where the defendant has acted in a defensive way in order to protect
his interests, self-help involves behaviour to restore the defendant's legiti-
mate interests when interference therewith is no longer pending, but has
already happened in the past, so that the defendant's action can no longer
be seen as an immediate response thereto.
As in the two other related cases, the defence of self-help is limited by the 15
general rule that nobody is supposed to take the law in his own hands.
the destruction of another man's house to prevent the spread of a catastrophic fire, as indeed
occurred in the Great Fire of London in 1666. The latter cases occurred when a man inter-
fered with another's property to save his own person or property from imminent danger ±
for example, when he entered upon his neighbour's land without his consent, in order to
prevent the spread of fire onto his own land.
ªThere is, however, a third group of cases, which is also properly described as founded upon
the principle of necessity . . . These cases are concerned with action taken as a matter of
necessity to assist another person without his consent. To give a simple example, a man
who seizes another and forcibly drags him from the path of an oncoming vehicle, thereby
saving him from injury or even death, commits no wrong. But there are many emanations
of this principle, to be found scattered through the books. These are concerned not only
with the preservation of the life or health of the assisted person, but also with the preserva-
tion of his property (sometimes an animal, sometimes an ordinary chattel) and even to
certain conduct on his behalf in the administration of his affairs. Where there is a pre-existing
relationship between the parties, the intervenor is usually said to act as an agent of necessity
on behalf of the principal in whose interests he acts, and his action can often, with not too
much artificiality, be referred to the pre-existing relationship between them. Whether the
intervenor may be entitled either to reimbursement or to remuneration raises separate ques-
tions which are not relevant in the present case.º
Koch 125
Action justified under Art. 7:101 (1)(c) is therefore limited to fact settings
where official help from the authorities is not available in due time, such
as when the owner of stolen goods accidentally discovers his property in
the hands of someone else who is on the move. Self-help may also be
justified in further instances when the law so provides, though this typically
will only concern very narrow scenarios.
d) Consent and Assumption of Risk

16 Art. 7:101 (1)(d) not only sustains the rule ªvolenti non fit iniuriaº, but also
includes related concepts. As a minimum, this defence requires that the
plaintiff was aware of the risk that she was exposed to and nevertheless
voluntarily exposed herself thereto (which requires that she is in a position
to properly form her own will). At the other end of possible variations to
this concept are cases where the plaintiff wanted to get harmed (thereby
consented to the damage as such, for example in a tattoo studio 8). In
between are cases where the plaintiff did not consent to suffer damage,
but nevertheless approved of the (ultimately harmful) behaviour of the
defendant. Obviously, there must be an adequate link between the risk
that the plaintiff had assumed or consented to and the harm that she had
suffered.
e) Lawful Authority 9
17 If someone causes harm when fulfilling a legal duty imposed upon him, or
if he acts within the limits of some authority or permission to act given to
him by law, the victim's claim for damages in tort must fail unless the
defendant exceeded his lawful authority or otherwise acted in violation
thereof. The most obvious example in this context concerns a police offi-
cer's power to arrest. In modern conditions, an activity may require an offi-
cial permit; whether or not such a permit would fall within this defence may
turn on its proper interpretation.
Art. 7:102 . Defences Against Strict Liability
(1) Strict liability can be excluded or reduced if the injury was caused by an
unforeseeable and irresistible
a) force of nature (force majeure), or
b) conduct of a third party.
8
Consent to damage faces public policy limitations ± it is no defence for a killer that his victim
was suicidal and wanted to be killed.
Most jurisdictions would also mention medical treatment in this context, even though some
(particularly doctors) dispute the fact that it is a harmful activity unless justified by the
patient's consent.
9
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebook/tort/heading3.2.4.A.pdf.
126 Koch
(2) Whether strict liability is excluded or reduced, and if so, to what extent,
depends upon the weight of the external influence on the one hand and the
scope of liability (Art. 3:201) on the other.
(3) When reduced according to paragraph (1)(b), strict liability and any
liability of the third party are solidary in accordance with Art. 9:101 (1)(b).
Comments
1. Introduction
The defences listed here basically reflect the common core of most 1
European countries with respect to no-fault liability regimes 10. These
defences only apply to instances of strict liability (supra Chapter 5), but to
all varieties thereof, including those national varieties referred to by Art.
5:102, to the extent they are not limited by law (which is, for example, the
case under some countries' rules governing the impact of nuclear energy 11).
As in the case of the defences falling under Art. 7:101, the ultimate decision 2
whether or not the defences listed here apply depends upon the same kind
of weighing exercise explained earlier 12: The conditions of establishing
strict liability are compared with the type and degree of force majeure or
third-party conduct, so that the higher the risk leading to strict liability,
the less likely such external influence will serve as a defence.
Such external influences can hardly ever supersede the impact of the inher- 3
ent exceptional danger of an object, particularly not in those cases where
the type and extent of the resulting harm were only possible due to innate
features of the object, even though the damage was triggered by some
external source (as is the case with accidents in nuclear power plants 13). It
therefore seems to be highly problematic in such cases to completely ignore
10
Cf. B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unifica-
tion of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability) 395 (no. 109
et seq.).
11
This deviation from the Paris Convention is the law, for example, in Austria, Germany and
South Africa. It also extends to ground damage by aircraft falling under §§ 146 et seq. Aus-
trian Luftfahrtgesetz (Aviation Act, LFG); similarly in Spain. It is further important to note
that the French statute on road accidents excludes such defences altogether.
See also § 522 of the American Restatement of Torts Second, which disallows such defences
altogether:
ªOne carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting
harm although it is caused by the unexpectable
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person, or
(b) action of an animal, or
(c) operation of a force of nature.º
12
13
Many jurisdictions therefore substantially narrow or even exclude the admissibility of
defences against nuclear liability. See B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions,
PETL Strict Liability, no. 109. However, the extent of liability for nuclear power plants is
limited in some jurisdictions: B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict
Liability, no. 139 fn. 268.
Koch 127
the dangerousness of a particular object and to leave the victim with the
damage. The Group thereby intended to follow the motto ªthe higher the
risk, the lower the degree of possible defencesº. Para. 2 of this Article
underlines this concept by referring to the reasons for establishing strict
liability in the particular case at hand (the ªconditionsº of liability thereby
include the general conditions listed in Title II as well as the special
conditions addressed in Chapter 5). The defences listed in this Article will
therefore rarely be admissible in most cases falling under Art. 5:101, e.g. if
damage is caused by blasting 14. Nevertheless, such defences may have to
be considered in cases falling under Art. 5:102.
4 Even though it may be considered a defence procedurally, it goes without
saying that failure to establish strict liability in the first place is not a
ªdefenceº within the meaning of this Article, even though it effectively
bars recovery of damages under these rules. This is particularly true if
harm is caused by an abnormally dangerous object, but not due to its inher-
ent risks (e.g. if harm is caused by the mere weight of a box of a dynamite,
but not due to its inherent risk of an explosion, even though this may lead
to liability for fault) 15.
2. Definitions
a) Force Majeure
5 Probably the most common defence to strict liability is the reference to
some external influence which caused or at least contributed to the harm
with elemental force. The strongest type of such impact is typically referred
to as ªAct of Godº, which commonly relates to natural events, while ªforce
majeureº sometimes seems to be broader and to further include other
substantial external impact. After thorough discussion, also in light of the
various uses in international conventions, we have decided to retain the
term force majeure at least as an explanatory term in brackets, even though
it may be loaded with the kind of information that lawyers in various juris-
dictions attribute to that technical term. While war or terrorism also often
fall under that notion, which is rather conduct of third parties, we reduced
the meaning to natural events of massive impact. It is frequently addressed
in international conventions as an ªexceptional natural phenomenon that is
not avoidable, unpredictable and irresistibleº 16.
6 Force majeure only comes into play as a trigger of the risk attributed to the
defendant, for example if lightning strikes a warehouse storing explosives.
14
Cf. also supra at fn. 11 for nuclear accidents.
15
Cf. Art. 5:101 no. 5.
16
Basel convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their
disposal, Protocol 1999, Art. 4, 5.b; cf. Art. 8.a of the 1993 Convention on civil liability for
damages resulting from activities dangerous to the environment (Lugano Convention,
ªnatural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible characterº), furthermore
Art. III.2.a of the 1969 Brussels Convention internationale sur la responsabiliteÂ civile pour
les dommages dus aÁ la pollution par les hydrocarbures (ªexceptional, unforeseeable and irre-
sistible natural phenomenaº).
128 Koch
If a natural phenomenon causes the victim's loss which has to be con-

sidered part of the latter's sphere anyway (see Art. 3:106), to that extent
liability cannot be established in the first place, so that no defence is
needed on the keeper's side.
b) Third-Party Conduct
An entirely different kind of outward influence which can serve as a 7
defence if it was not under the control of one of the parties is a third
person's influence on the chain of events (which need not necessarily be
wrongful). If that person's impact on causation can be verified, the various
jurisdictions are faced with the problem how to weigh strict liability against
the behaviour of this third person, particularly if he was at fault 17. At least
in cases of intentional behaviour of a third party, this may exclude strict
liability of the person carrying on the ultra-hazardous activity unless the
abnormal risk is so grave that even such external impact should be
disregarded when attributing the loss to that person.
It is important to note, however, that this defence does not affect a possible 8
liability of the third party himself, as expressed by para. (3): While strict
liability in the case just mentioned may not apply due to the intentional
interference of the third party, that person himself will most likely incur
liability for fault. If strict liability is only reduced in light of such third-party
influence, and if such third party should himself be liable under these
Principles, both the keeper as well as the third party will be solidarily liable
to that extent in accordance with Art. 9:101 (1)(b), as the ªoverlapº of their
liabilities only extends to those parts of the loss for which both parties are
(still) liable under the respective regime applicable to them.
This defence is somewhat related to the notion of the scope of the risk, the 9
latter not being a defence, but rather a requirement of establishing strict
liability. If the fact that a third party causes harm by interfering with the
source of harm is beyond the scope of its risk, then strict liability is
excluded altogether: If a tanker containing highly explosive liquids runs
down a fence because of a steering problem caused by a mechanic at the
last inspection, but does not explode, this may be an issue of (statutory)
strict liability for vehicles in general, but it is not a case of strict liability
for the abnormal dangers brought about by the explosive liquids.
17
See W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Analysis, in W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Unification of Tort Law:
Multiple Tortfeasors (2004) no. 39.
Koch 129
Chapter 8. Contributory Conduct or Activity

Art. 8:101 . Contributory Conduct or Activity of the Victim
(1) Liability can be excluded or reduced to such extent as is considered just
having regard to the victim's contributory fault and to any other matters
which would be relevant to establish or reduce liability of the victim if he
were the tortfeasor.
(2) Where damages are claimed with respect to the death of a person, his
conduct or activity excludes or reduces liability according to paragraph (1).
(3) The contributory conduct or activity of an auxiliary of the victim
excludes or reduces the damages recoverable by the latter according to
paragraph (1).
Comments
1. Overview
1 This Article embodies the Principle according to which a victim should not
be entitled to recover damages for those losses that he or she has contribu-
ted to cause and labels it as ªcontributory conduct or activityº. Most coun-
tries regard this as an essential principle not only of tort law, but also of
other areas of law, such as contract law 1, and point out that in practice it
is one of the most widely-used defences.
2 The Article formulates this general principle and two subprinciples:
3 a) The general principle establishes that the exclusion or the reduction of
liability is subject, mutatis mutandi, to the same rules that apply when
establishing liability of the tortfeasor. In this sense, this Article uses the
so-called ªmirror-imageº idea as the most intuitive and all-inclusive way
of formulating the principle.
4 b) The subprinciples (2) and (3) refer to two cases of ªidentificationº, i.e.
cases in which the conduct or the activity of a person other than the person
to whom an award of damages is made is taken into account in order to
exclude or reduce recovery of damages.
2. Terminology
5 The expression ªcontributory conduct or activityº departs from the termi-
nology used in all current legal systems. It aims at overcoming the short-
comings arising not only from a widely diverging terminology (contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, Mitverschulden, concurrencia de
1
See U. Magnus/M. MartõÂn-Casals, Comparative Conclusions, in U. Magnus/M. MartõÂn-Casals
(eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence (2004, hereafter cited as PETL
Contributory Negligence), no. 2±4 and O. Lando/H. Beale (eds.), Principles of European Con-
tract Law, Part I and II (2000), notes to Articles. 9:504 and 9:505.
130 MartõÂn-Casals
Chapter 8. Contributory Conduct or Activity Art. 8:101
culpas, concorso di colpa della vittima, faute de la victime, zavineÏnõÂ posÏko-

zeneÂho, etc.) but also from the misleading idea arising from the traditional
labelling of the conduct of the victim as ªnegligenceº or ªculpaº, since the
conduct of the victim does not properly equate to fault of the tortfeasor,
and the exclusion or reduction also applies to cases in which what is
relevant is not the conduct of the victim but the fact that the victim contri-
buted to the damage by performing an activity whose operational hazards
contribute to the damage or to its aggravation.

The Group discussed the terminology at length on several occasions. 6
Originally it adopted the expression ªcontributory negligenceº to refer to
this exclusion or reduction of the damages recoverable by the victim. The
Group was well aware of the fact that in common law ªcontributory negli-
genceº, in a similar way as the old continental ªculpae compensatioº, was
originally understood as an ªall-or-nothingº rule, in the sense that that
victim's negligence excludes compensation. The United States report
pointed out that currently ªcontributory negligenceº is also understood in
the United States in this sense 2, and that this rule has been progressively
abandoned and substituted by ªcomparative negligenceº. This leads either
to a reduction, in a scale from 0 to 100 % (pure comparative negligence),
or involves a 50% threshold (modified comparative negligence) which leads
to no compensation when the victim's negligence is at least equal to the
fault of the tortfeasor (the so-called equal-to variety of the rule) or only
when it exceeds it (the greater-than variety of the rule).
In the course of the discussion of the Group (Tossa de Mar Meeting, May 7
2001) it was pointed out that all European systems follow the more flexible
approach leading to a reduction going from 0 to 100% which only results in
exclusion ± i.e. no compensation at all ± when the damage has resulted
solely from the conduct or the activity of the victim. Accordingly, it seemed
clear that the Principles had to stick to this common core. However, from a
European perspective the term ªcontributory negligenceº seemed more
appropriate, since this is currently the term used England and Wales, in
spite of the fact that the ªall-or-nothingº rule was already abandoned in
1945 and substituted by the reduction rule in a scale from 0 to 100%.
On the occasion of a Drafting Committee meeting in Vienna (February 8
2002) the Group pointed out that the term ªnegligenceº was misleading,
on the one hand because, as clearly resulted from the country reports, the
conduct of the victim cannot be properly qualified as ªfaultº or ªnegli-
genceº in a strict technical sense, since no one is under a legal duty not to
cause damage to his or her own sphere and, on the other hand, because,
in some cases, the operational risks embedded in the activity carried out
2
See G. Schwartz, United State, PETL Contributory Negligence, no 2 and, in more detail, D.
Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2000) 494 et seq.
MartõÂn-Casals 131
by the victim can also contribute to the damage. Accordingly it was

suggested that the heading of the Chapter be replaced with ªContributory
conduct or activityº and in subsequent meetings of the Drafting Committee
(Munich, October 2002) and of the Group as a whole (Hamburg, Novem-
ber 2002, Lausanne, May 2003) the new terminology took root.
4. The General Principle of Contributory Conduct or Activity

a) Introduction
9 Contributory conduct or activity is a defence that sets out that the victim
who suffers damage as a result of the tortfeasor's activity cannot claim
compensation for that part of the damage for which the victim himself or
herself is responsible. From a theoretical point of view, it can be clearly
differentiated from the victim's failure to mitigate damage. In the former
case the victim has contributed to the creation of the damage. In the latter
he has only failed to take the reasonable steps to minimise the damage
already caused. 3 Following the most common practice in all continental
European legal systems which do not distinguish the two concepts 4 and
taking into account that both can give rise to an apportionment of the
damage, both cases are included under this Principle.
b) Conditions
10 The conditions that must be met for contributory conduct or activity to
apply are:
11 (1) In the case of contributory conduct, the victim must have tortious
capacity (Art. 4:102 para. 2). Most countries follow this rule, which is also
consistent with the idea that the reduction of damages on the grounds of
contributory conduct involves an incentive for the victim to take care, a
goal which cannot be reached if the victim does not understand what
harming others means. Alternatively, in the case of contributory activity,
the victim must exercise actual or economical control of the activity, a rule
which is also consistent with the idea that the reduction of damages on the
grounds of contributory activity involves an incentive for the victim to
reduce specifically dangerous activities.
12 (2) The victim must have failed to exercise reasonable care by way of self-
protection or, alternatively ± in the case of contributory activity ± must
have performed a specifically dangerous activity.
13 ªReasonable careº is to be determined by considering what a reasonable
person would have done; in this case, the victim has not been at fault, since
no one has the duty of care towards oneself. However, he or she has failed
to meet a burden of self-protection which, although it cannot be imposed
3
In this sense, see Principles of European Contract Law (supra fn. 1), Art. 9:504 (Loss Attribu-
table to Aggrieved Party) and Art. 9:505 (Reduction of Loss).
4
See U. Magnus/M. MartõÂn-Casals, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Contributory Negligence,
no. 9 and 45±46.
upon him or her by anybody, gives rise to the consequence that he or she
will have to face the adverse consequences resulting from his or her
conduct. However, in this case, the same standard of care applicable to
establishing fault of the tortfeasor applies. The Principles of Chapter 4
apply here mutatis mutandis.
A ªspecifically dangerous activityº is one that would give rise to strict liabi- 14
lity of the victim if he or she had been the tortfeasor. Since everyone must
bear the adverse consequences of the acts and events that belong to his or
her sphere of risks, the hazards involved in the dangerous activity
performed by the victim may also qualify as contributory activity if they
contribute to causing the damage or to its aggravation and, therefore, they
may also give rise to reduction. In this sense, the Principles of Chapter 5
apply mutatis mutandis.
Illustration 1. P takes his cat to the veterinary surgeon, D, in a country where
strict liability for animals, even if domestic, applies. Due to D's negligence, P
sustains serious scratches while assisting D by holding the cat. P files a claim
against D but D argues that P is the keeper of the animal and this is a risk
that he has to bear. The judge holds D liable, but reduces damages on the
grounds of contributory activity of P.
If the dangerousness of the activity is such that it would not have submitted 15
the victim (had he been the tortfeasor) to a strict liability regime according
to national courts it may, nevertheless, be taken into account when
establishing the standard of care in the conduct of the victim. The more
dangerous the activity is, the greater care will be required from the victim.
In this sense, Art. 4:201 may also apply mutatis mutandis. In the cases of
ªspecifically dangerous activitiesº however, the victim will not be able to
avoid reduction even though he or she acted with the care required by the
circumstances.
(3) The neglect in self-protection (or the specifically dangerous activity) 16
must have been a cause of the damage suffered by the victim, or failed to
mitigate it. In the framework of contributory conduct or activity the Princi-
ples referred to both Sections of Chapter 3 (Causation, Section 1. Conditio
sine qua non and qualifications, and Section 2. Scope of liability), also
apply mutatis mutandis.
Occasionally other factors may be relevant for either establishing contribu- 17
tory conduct or activity, reducing its impact or even excluding it. Examples
of the first case are, for instance, the provocation of the victim which,
according to the circumstances, may qualify as contributory conduct giving
rise to a reduction in compensation. Or the consent to engage in dangerous
sports activities, which may also amount to contributory negligence when
the damage results from the fact that the average risks involved in the
activity have been exceeded without surpassing, however, the limits of
what is deemed reasonably acceptable. The impact of contributory conduct
or activity may be reduced or even excluded in cases in which the tort-
feasor may be specifically required to prevent the victim from damaging
himself or herself, even if the victim acts intentionally (see infra no. 23). In
other cases the protective purpose of the duty violated by the defendant may
indicate the contrary.
Illustration 2. A train, breaching the regulations, passes through a zone
where traffic is not permitted. When the train passes through this zone, V
throws himself on railway tracks and suffers fatal injuries. His dependants
claim full compensation from the railway company (D). D raises the defence
of contributory conduct, arguing that the duty infringed had no bearing on
the safety of persons and that the accident was solely attributable to V. The
judge finds for D and exonerates it from liability.
c) Consequences
18 The contributory conduct or activity of the victim regularly leads to a
reduction of the sum of damages that would be otherwise awarded if the
victim had not contributed to the damage or to its aggravation. Therefore
the normal apportionment procedure is, first, to fix the victim's full damage
and then to reduce it in proportion to the victim's contribution. This
regularly leads to a certain percentage by which the original amount of
damages is reduced, but the apportionment of damages between the victim
and the tortfeasor may also occasionally result in full compensation or in
the exclusion of the compensation. Therefore it is commonly pointed out
that the reduction can take place on a scale from 0 to 100%. In practice,
however, the reduction is in most cases within the range of 25±75% and,
less frequently, within the range of 10±90%. Smaller fractions than steps
of 5 or 10% are very rarely used.
19 The considerations underlying the establishment of the exact percentage of
apportionment are a sort of amalgam of causation ± in the sense of Chapter
3, Section 2 of these Principles ± and attribution ± in the sense of Art. 1:101
and Chapters 4 and 5 of these Principles, both on the side of the victim and
on the side of the tortfeasor, which lead to a very flexible system of
assessing damages which regularly escapes any possible standardization.
20 However, when situations are recurring ± e.g. the failure of a motor biker
to wear a crash helmet ± courts tend to establish standardized percentages
of contributory conduct or activity.
d) The Role of the Intent of the Tortfeasor and of the Victim
21 The intent both of the tortfeasor and of the victim play an important role in
the assessment of contributory conduct or activity and, in particular, when
it is present on one side but not on the other.
22 When the tortfeasor has acted with intent and the victim has not contri-
buted intentionally to his or her damage, it is generally considered that it
would be unfair and inconsistent with public policy to allow the tortfeasor
to make use of this defence. Accordingly, the tortfeasor is considered liable
in full regardless of the contributory conduct or activity of the victim. A
clear exception to this general principle ± irrelevance of contributory negli-
gence of the victim when the tortfeasor acts with intent ± is the case of
provocation by the victim. In spite of the fact that provocation as such is
not a defence and does not cause the conduct of the tortfeasor to lose its
tortious character, it has a direct bearing on his or her conduct; in this
sense, it contributes to the damage and, therefore, it can be taken into
account to reduce compensation.
Illustration 3. P enters a pub where D is celebrating the success of his last
novel. P starts laughing at D and disparaging his literary abilities. D is
unable to bear the situation and, since P does not want to leave the premises,
punches him in the mouth and breaks two of his teeth. P claims full compen-
sation from D, D raises the defence of contributory conduct, and the judge
reduces damages accordingly.
When the one who acts with intent is not the tortfeasor but the victim, it is 23
generally considered, on whatever grounds ± good faith, abuse of rights,
breaking of the causal link, etc. ± that it excludes the liability of the negli-
gent tortfeasor. However, a clear exception to this rule can be commonly
found when the tortfeasor may be specifically required to prevent the vic-
tim from damaging himself or herself. This is the case, for instance, when
a person under arrest in a police station or a person admitted to a hospital
hurts himself or herself or commits suicide.
Illustration 4
Example 1. V is arrested by the police (D) and locked in a cell. During the
night V kills himself. His dependants (P) claim full compensation from D
for V's death. D raises the defence of contributory conduct, arguing that V
acted with intent. Although the judge considers that D had the duty to
prevent V from harming himself, damages may be reduced according to the
conduct of V.
Example 2. V suffers a serious nervous breakdown and is admitted to hospi-
tal D. During the night V jumps out of the window and kills herself. Her
dependants (P) claim full compensation from D for V's death. D raises the
defence of contributory conduct, arguing that V acted with intent. Although
the judge considers that D had the duty to prevent V from harming herself,
damages may be reduced according to the conduct of V.
The police have to ensure the safety of the person under arrest and, like- 24
wise, health care institutions that of the patients admitted to hospital, so
that they are prevented from hurting themselves or committing suicide.
Accordingly, the intentional conduct of the person in this situation does
not exclude the liability of the police or of the hospital but it can reduce
compensation, depending on circumstances such as the scope of the duty
of care of the persons or institutions who have to ensure safety of the victim
or the protective purpose of the rule that imposes this duty. If V has to be
considered mentally disabled within the meaning of Art. 4:102 (2),
however, his own conduct might already be disregarded for that very
reason, as this would be a ªmatter relevant to establishº his liability.
e) The Role of Strict Liability

25 Contributory conduct or activity can also be established when the tort-
feasor is strictly liable. In the case of contributory conduct, the factors to
be weighed are to what extent the seriousness of the neglect of the victim
as regards his or her own interests contributes to causing the harm (or to
aggravating it) in comparison to the operational hazards of the activity of
the tortfeasor. In the case of contributory activity, the respective contribu-
tions of the operational hazards (or hazards inherent to things) involved
in each activity are to be weighed against one another.
Illustration 5
Example 1. D is taking her dog for a walk. P is jogging on the same street
and because she is so entranced listening to music with her walkman, she
steps on the tail of D's dog. As a reaction, the dog bites P. P claims full com-
pensation but D raises the defence of contributory conduct, and the judge
reduces damages accordingly.
Example 2. D is driving a lorry and crashes into P's tank wagon which trans-
ports petrol, which leaks due to the collision and sets the tank in flames. The
damage suffered by the tank wagon is assessed at ¨ 25,000. D raises the
defence of contributory activity, arguing that if it had not been for the
dangerous substance transported by the tank wagon (assuming it is an activ-
ity which attracts strict liability under the relevant legal system) the damage
would have only been ¨ 3,000 and the judge reduces damages accordingly.
26 Moreover, when the contributory conduct or activity of the victim has
contributed to the occurrence of the damage or to its aggravation and the
tortfeasor is strictly liable, fault of the tortfeasor should not be neglected.
The negligent conduct of the already strictly liable tortfeasor (the so-called
ªadditional faultº) should be taken into account in the assessment of the
compensation and, according to the circumstances of the case, diminish or
exclude the reduction to which otherwise the contributory conduct or
activity of the victim would have given rise.
Illustration 6. Let's take Example 1 in Illustration 5 again. The judge had
reduced damages caused by D's dog biting P by, for instance, 30% on the
grounds that P had negligently stepped on D's dog tail. However, P argues
that the dog was left unattended in the street because D had entered a bar
for a few minutes to talk to a friend. On these grounds the judge re-examines
the reduction already carried out and establishes it at 10%.
5. The Specific Cases of Identification

27 Identification occurs whenever the conduct or the activity of a person other
than the victim who is entitled to compensation is taken into account in
order to reduce or exclude the award for damages. This is the case, for
instance, in a minority of countries where the negligent conduct of those
persons who have the duty to supervise children, insane or handicapped
persons is taken into account in order to reduce the amount of compensa-

tion that the tortfeasor has to pay.
Since identification can lead to undesirable effects such as forcing the victim 28
to claim from the tortfeasor and the ªidentifiedº person in two separate
actions and to run the risk of the insolvency of both of them, these Princi-
ples stand for a restrictive criterion according to which no identification is
the rule and identification is accepted only in the two cases set out in Art.
8:101 (2) and (3), namely, identification of secondary victims with primary
fatal victims and identification of the victim with his or her auxiliaries.
a) Identification of the Secondary Victims with the Primary Fatal Victims
According to Art. 8:101 (2), the contributory conduct or activity of the pri- 29
mary fatal victim operates to reduce (or exclude) the compensation that
secondary victims are entitled to obtain. The rationale for this principle is
that the claim of the secondary victim is considered derivative of the claim
of the primary victim and, therefore, the tortfeasor must have the same
defences as he or she would have had against the deceased person.
Illustration 7. P has been killed in an accident caused through D's negligence
and P's own contributory conduct. P's dependants claim full compensation
from D, but D contends that 50% of the damage caused was attributable to
P's contributory conduct, who stepped into the road without taking the
required precautions. However, the judge holds that P's contribution was
only 10% and P's dependants recover 90%.
b) Identification of the Victim with His or Her Auxiliaries
According to Art. 8:101 (3), the contributory conduct or activity of the 30
auxiliaries of the victim, in the sense of Art. 6:102 of these Principles,
operates to reduce (or exclude) the compensation that the principal is
entitled to obtain. The rationale of this principle is that, since the principal
is liable for the damage caused by his or her auxiliaries who, acting within
the scope of their functions, have violated the required standard of care,
the ªmirror imageº requires that the contributory conduct or activity of
his or her auxiliaries is also taken into account in order to reduce (or
exclude) compensation. ªIdentificationº makes sense in this case, since
when, within the scope of their functions, the auxiliaries cause damage or
fail to take the necessary steps to self-protection, they are in both cases act-
ing for their principal.
Illustration 8. X is employed by transport company P to drive its huge truck.
In a road accident the truck is destroyed due to D's negligence. However, X
has also contributed to the accident through his negligent conduct. The trans-
port company P files a claim against D seeking compensation for ¨ 100,000.
Nevertheless, D raises the defence of contributory conduct arguing that X
contributed to causing the damage by 25%. The Court agrees and orders an
award of damages of ¨ 75,000.
Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors
Introduction
Overview
1 This Title deals with the situation where it is contended that more than
one person is responsible in tort for an injury suffered by the victim. It
has two aspects: (a) the position between the victim and the tortfeasors
(the external aspect) and (b) that between the tortfeasors inter se, in par-
ticular contribution (recourse) rights (the internal aspect). The most
obvious situation in practice is that where the independent acts of two
persons combine in their effect to produce a single harm to the victim
(Art. 9:101 para. 1 lit. b). However, the same principles apply in two
cases even where one person responsible has not made any ªphysicalº
contribution to the event but has participated or instigated in wrong-
doing (Art. 9:101 para. 1 lit. a) or is liable for the act of his auxiliary
(Art. 9:101 para. 1 lit. c). The basic rule adopted by this Title is that
each person to whom the damage is attributable is liable to the victim
for the whole of the damage suffered by him (Art. 9:101) ± as against
the victim liability is not apportioned according to the number of tortfea-
sors or their degree if fault; but as between themselves the tortfeasors
may claim to have the liability apportioned according to their relative
responsibility (Art. 9:102), so that, for example, one who has paid more
than his share has the right of recourse against the other for what the
other should have paid. The first point is especially important where
one tortfeasor is insolvent.
Terminology
a) Solidary
2 This word is used to describe the situation where each of a number of
tortfeasors is individually liable for the whole of the damage suffered by
the victim. It is difficult to find a suitable form of words here. It is essen-
tially the same as the common law expression ªjoint and several liabilityº
but we consider that to be very unclear. We consider ªsolidaryº to be
preferable even though it is used as a term of art in some systems and not
in a wholly consistent manner. For our purposes its meaning is exclusively
as set out in Art. 9:101.
138 Rogers
Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors Introduction
b) Several
This is the ªoppositeº of solidary. Liability is several where one can attri- 3
bute only part of the overall damage to an individual tortfeasor and then
he is liable only for that part. 1
c) Contribution
This is the right which one tortfeasor who is under a solidary liability has to 4
ªpass onº to the others the amount in excess of his share of responsibility
which he has paid or may be required to pay. Although it is a term of art
in the common law systems, it seemed to us to be preferable to ªrecourseº
for two reasons. First, ªrecourseº is used in other contexts where the
parties are not multiple tortfeasors. For example, one may speak of a
subrogated loss insurer having ªrecourseº against the tortfeasor who has
caused damage to the property insured. Secondly, ªrecourseº perhaps
implies that the person seeking it has made a payment which he seeks to
recover. However, in practice the apportionment of liability will often
take place as a side issue attached to the main suit brought by the victim.
d) Indemnification
In some cases the just result may be that although both tortfeasors are 5
liable to the victim, between themselves one of them should bear the whole
loss. In this context the English expression is ªindemnityº but some
members thought that to other readers this might have too much of an
insurance flavour.
e) Auxiliary
This has the same meaning as in Chapter 6 2 and excludes independent 6
contractors.
History of the Provision

Title V is based on an inquiry carried out by the European Group on Tort 7
Law in 2001±2002. 3 The proposals contained in the Comparative Report 4
were discussed at Hamburg in November 2002 and Lausanne in May
2003. While there was considerable discussion of the drafting, the great
1
The expression ªproportionate liabilityº is sometimes used.
2
Art. 6:102 no. 6.
3
W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Multiple Tortfeasors (2004, hereafter cited as
PETL Multiple Tortfeasors). Country reports were received from Austria (B.A. Koch/P.
Schwarzenegger), Belgium (H. Cousy/D. Droshout), the Czech Republic (L. Tichy), England
(H. Rogers), Gerrmany (U. Magnus), Israel (I. Gilead), Italy (F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ/E.
Bargelli), the Netherlands (W. van Boom), Poland (M. Nesterowicz/E. Baginska), Portugal
(J. Sinde Monteiro/A. Pereira), South Africa (J. Neethling), Spain (M. Martin-Casals/J.
SoleÂ), Sweden (B. Dufwa), Switzerland (C. Chappuis/G. Petitpierre/B. Winiger) and the Uni-
ted States of America (M. Green).
4
W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report, PETL Multiple Tortfeasors, 271.
Rogers 139
Introduction Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors
majority of the Group readily accepted that the broad structure of solidary
liability which prevails in the systems generally should be continued.
Overview of Existing Liability Systems

8 Looked at broadly, there is considerable similarity in the results reached by
European systems in this area, whether they belong to the civil law or
common law camps. Persons whose acts cause a single, indivisible harm
are generally each called upon to answer to the victim for the whole of
that harm, whether or not they have acted in pursuit of some common
design; and as between themselves they may call for the damage as a whole
to be apportioned according to their relative responsibility. Indeed, among
the systems surveyed only the United States has to a large degree departed
from the basic position of solidary liability. However, the details differ very
considerably, to a large extent because this class of case is sometimes
governed by general provisions on co-debtors and sometimes by special
legislation.
Background Issues
9 At first sight the question of solidary versus several liability does not look
like a central issue in tort law. At present the law in European countries
says that where the acts of D1 and D2 combine to inflict an injury on P
then he can sue either (or of course both) of them for the full amount. If
the law were otherwise and he could only sue each of them for, say, half
his loss (several liability) then he would potentially be put to more trouble
in ªcollectingº all the tortfeasors, whether together or in successive suits;
but if all were solvent and accessible he would still recover his total loss.
If, however, D2 is insolvent or inaccessible then P's position is much worse,
for under a system of several liability the 50 per cent that he recovers from
D1 will be the limit of his recovery, whereas under a system of solidary
liability D1 must pay the full loss and it will be he who bears the risk of
the fact that D2 cannot be sued or is not worth suing. The distinction has
been brought into sharp focus in modern times in some systems by the
development of complex litigation arising out of matters like pollution or
disease where a number of actors may be involved in the causation of the
eventual damage over a period of years. In England it has a particularly
sharp focus because tort law plays a greater role in the compensation of
work injuries than in many European countries. Suppose the victim is
employed over a period of years successively by D1, D2, D3 and D4 in
handling asbestos and criticism can be made of all of them in their obser-
vance of the safety regulations. At the end the victim develops asbestosis
and it may be a reasonable inference that all the employments made a
contribution to this. Leaving aside the complexities which may arise
because of the differing bases upon which liability insurance policies may
be written, it may well be that D4 is the only company still in existence
when the disease comes to light and solidary liability would mean that D4
pays for all the victim's loss, for his undoubted legal right of contribution
140 Rogers
Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors Introduction
against the others will be as worthless as the victim's primary claim against
them; a system of several liability, on the other hand, would require D4 to
pay only his ªshareº, though exactly how that would be worked out might
be a complex matter.
Until recently, solidary liability was regarded as self-evidently correct but it 10
has now come to be questioned. Indeed, in the United States the great
majority of the states have departed from it in the last 20 years, though
rather than going for pure several (or ªproportionateº) liability many of
them have adopted various complex compromise positions. Indeed, the
current Third Restatement of Torts has had to create no less than five
variant ªtrackº systems to accommodate diversity in a legal system which
only a few years ago was almost uniform. 5
5
See M Green, United States, PETL Multiple Tortfeasors, no. 16.
Rogers 141
Art. 9:101±9:102 Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors
Chapter 9. Multiple Tortfeasors

Art. 9:101. Solidary and Several Liability: Relation Between Victim and
Multiple Tortfeasors.
(1) Liability is solidary where the whole or a distinct part of the damage
suffered by the victim is attributable to two or more persons. Liability is
solidary where:
a) a person knowingly participates in or instigates or encourages wrong-
doing by others which causes damage to the victim; or
b) one person's independent behaviour or activity causes damage to the
victim and the same damage is also attributable to another person.
c) a person is responsible for damage caused by an auxiliary in circum-
stances where the auxiliary is also liable.
(2) Where persons are subject to solidary liability, the victim may claim full
compensation from any one or more of them, provided that the victim may
not recover more than the full amount of the damage suffered by him.
(3) Damage is the same damage for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b)
above when there is no reasonable basis for attributing only part of it to
each of a number of persons liable to the victim. For this purpose it is for
the person asserting that the damage is not the same to show that it is not.
Where there is such a basis, liability is several, that is to say, each person
is liable to the victim only for the part of the damage attributable to him.
Art. 9:102 . Relation Between Persons Subject to Solidary Liability

(1) A person subject to solidary liability may recover a contribution from
any other person liable to the victim in respect of the same damage. This
right is without prejudice to any contract between them determining the
allocation of the loss or to any statutory provision or to any right to recover
by reason of subrogation [cessio legis] or on the basis of unjust enrichment.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, the amount of the contribution
shall be what is considered just in the light of the relative responsibility for
the damage of the persons liable, having regard to their respective degrees
of fault and to any other matters which are relevant to establish or reduce
their liability. A contribution may amount to full indemnification. If it is
not possible to determine the relative responsibility of the persons liable
they are to be treated as equally responsible.
(3) Where a person is liable for damage done by an auxiliary under Article
9:101 he is to be treated as bearing the entire share of the responsibility
attributable to the auxiliary for the purposes of contribution between him
and any tortfeasor other than the auxiliary.
(4) The obligation to make contribution is several, that is to say, the person
subject to it is liable only for his apportioned share of responsibility for the
142 Rogers
Chapter 9. Multiple Tortfeasors Art. 9:101±9:102
damage under this Article; but where it is not possible to enforce a judg-
ment for contribution against one person liable his share is to be reallo-
cated among the other persons liable in proportion to their responsibility.
Comments
1. Overview
As has been explained above, Art. 9:101 deals with the ªexternalº aspect, 1
the position as between the tortfeasors and the victim, and Art. 9:102 with
the position as between the tortfeasors. Both provisions preserve the broad
picture of solidary liability as it now prevails in European systems gener-
ally.

a) The External Aspect ± Solidarity
The categories in Art. 9:101 para. 1 lit. a and c are, we believe, compara- 2
tively uncontroversial. As to (a), it seems right that where D1 conspires
with D2 to commit a tort against the victim, or encourages him to do so,
then D1 should bear responsibility for the damage, along with D2, even
though he was not present and played no role in the event and even though
it could not be said that D2 was D1's ªauxiliaryº. A fortiori where he lends
some assistance at the scene, even though he may not have participated
directly in the damaging act. A person does not incur liability under this
paragraph unless he is aware of the purpose of the one who inflicts the
damage. So, for example, a person participating in a demonstration, even
if unlawful, would not be liable merely because a group in the crowd set
fire to a building. As to (c), it will only arise where, under the relevant local
law, the auxiliary acting within the scope of his functions is (theoretically in
most cases) liable along with his employer: in some systems he is, in others
he is not.
The increased significance of the issue dealt with in (b) in modern times has 3
been explained above. It is the case of what German law calls NebentaÈter,
or ªseveral concurrent tortfeasorsº in the common law ± persons who
have no community of design nor vicarious liability but whose independent
acts cause indivisible damage. In considering this matter we were not
convinced by the argument that each tortfeasor has only ªpartially causedº
the damage: if the damage is indivisible it is caused by all of them, though it
is justifiable as a matter of final accounting between the tortfeasors to make
each of them bear only a proportion of the loss. Nor are we convinced by
the argument that since the law in effect ªapportionsº indivisible damage
between the tortfeasor and the victim where the latter is at fault (see Art.
8:101) it should do the same as between a number of tortfeasors in their
relationship with the victim. The victim is not a wrongdoer in the same
way (or indeed at all) and, while justice calls for a reduction of his damages,
the more correct analogy is perhaps with the position between the tort-
Rogers 143
feasors ± the ªinternalº aspect. More important, however, is the fact that
solidary liability is so deeply embedded in the European systems that to
abandon it would amount to a profound shift in the balance of the law.
Nor is it merely a question of whether the victim or the tortfeasors as a
group bear the risk of the insolvency of a member of the group. Even
where everyone is solvent, we believe it is possible seriously to underesti-
mate the practical difficulties of the victim if he had the onus of pursuing
all possible tortfeasors in order to be assured of full recompense for his
loss.
4 We must stress, however, that in proposing the retention of the basic rule
of solidary liability it is assumed that the case is one where indivisible
damage has been caused by the defendants under Chapter 3 (both in the
factual sense under Section 1 and in the sense that the damage may be
attributed to them under Section 2). For example, this Article will not
apply to the situation which we have described under Art. 3:103 (1) as
ªalternative causationº, for then the activity of each defendant is regarded
as a cause of the damage only to the extent corresponding to the likelihood
that it may have caused it ± that is to say, a form of proportionate liability. 1
When damage is indivisible is an issue on which we do not think it is
possible to legislate in detail and must be determined by the courts on a
case to case basis. For example, where a passenger in car D1 is killed in a
collision between it and car D2 it is likely that the damage will be indivisi-
ble because it will be impossible to say that one aspect of it was caused by
D1 and another by D2. However, one aspect of the victim's injury may be
attributable to two tortfeasors and lead to solidary liability, whereas
another aspect of it may be attributable only to one of them. So if D1
inflicts some injury on the victim and because of the consequences of this
the victim suffers some additional injury at the hands of D2, it is possible
(assuming the conditions of Art. 3:201 are fulfilled) that D1 as well as D2
might be liable for the second injury, but only D1 would be liable for the
first. A simple example of where the damage suffered by the victim is
divisible on a causation basis in this way is where D1's vehicle knocks P
off his bicycle on to the road, damages the bicycle but causes no personal
injury to P and then D2's vehicle strikes P while he is recovering himself. 2
The damage to the bicycle is caused only by D1 and he alone is responsible
for that. It is conceivable, however, that both D1 and D2 might be regarded
as being responsible for the personal injury, even though it is directly
inflicted only by D2; if so, as far as P is concerned, the personal injury
would be an indivisible harm falling within Art. 9:101, though there could
be an ultimate apportionment of responsibility between D1 and D2 under
Art. 9:102. Of course there may be cases (for example, successive personal
1
For example, where V contracts mesothelioma (which may be caused by the ingestion of a
single asbestos fibre) after exposure to asbestos in successive periods by the activities of A,
B and C.
2
For this purpose it makes no difference whether the liability is strict or based on fault.
144 Rogers
injuries) where it may be very difficult to separate the consequences of the

two harms in terms of the assessment of damages, but the point of principle
seems clear. On the other hand, we would not wish it to be thought that
because damage is ªindivisibleº from a scientific or medical point of view
it must necessarily be indivisible for this purpose. For example, where P's
land is flooded with ten million litres of water contributed in the
proportions of six million and four million by D1 and D2 it may be (we
express no final opinion) that it is proper to regard D1 and D2 as liable to
P in proportion to their contribution. So also where the victim is rendered
80 per cent deaf by the excessive noise successively produced by the
activities of D1, D2 and D3 over a period of time that may be a case for
similarly ªdividingº the liability. D3, for example, can fairly say that when
he came on the scene the victim's hearing had already been damaged by
what D1 and D2 had done.
b) The Internal Aspect ± Contribution
Given the basic assumption of solidary liability, we do not think it would be 5
possible seriously to challenge the basic assumption of Art. 9:102 that the
tortfeasors inter se may call for the apportionment of final liability among
themselves according to their relative responsibility. That appears to be
the universal rule and those systems which once took the contrary view
departed from it a long time ago. Of course, it can operate in a way which
some may consider harsh, for example where an insured tortfeasor (in
reality his insurer) seeks to recover part of the loss from an uninsured
tortfeasor but this is part of a much wider question about the relationship
between insurance and liability.
There may be a contract between the two tortfeasors which provides for 6
allocation of responsibility in the event of a claim by a third party. It seems
right that the terms of the contract should prevail (subject to legal controls
on unfair contract terms) and Art. 9:102 (1) so provides. It also allows for
the fact that a particular legal system may deal with some of these cases
via subrogation or unjust enrichment.
Under Art. 9:102 (2) the court is given a rather broad power to apportion 7
responsibility on the basis of ªrelative responsibilityº. There is an obvious
similarity with Art. 8:101 (1), dealing with reduction of damages on account
of the victim's conduct. This is a feature which is found in current systems
such as those of England, Germany and the Netherlands (indeed, in
Germany the BGB provisions on ªcontributory negligenceº are applied
by analogy). We do not think the way this ªdiscretionº is operated can be
the subject of detailed or rigid rules. Relative fault will obviously be impor-
tant, particularly in a case where all liabilities are based on negligence but it
seems wrong to make that the only determinant. Where, for example, one
defendant is strictly liable on the basis of risk and another is liable on the
basis of negligence, it should not automatically and in all cases follow that
the former recovers a full indemnity from the latter. Nor should contribu-
tion automatically be ruled out where a defendant is an intentional tort-
Rogers 145
feasor, though that will no doubt weigh heavily in the scales and there will
be cases in which such a claim is denied on the separate ground of ªpublic
policyº (a matter on which we doubt if any code can legislate in detail).
But ªintentional tortsº vary a good deal in their turpitude (apart from the
difficulty of defining ªintentionº) and it would probably be unwise to put
the court in a strait-jacket.
c) Other Matters
8 The remaining provisions of Art. 9:102 deal with subsidiary issues. Para. 3
ªidentifiesº the employer/principal with the responsibility of his auxiliary.
This seems to follow from the proposition that he is liable to the victim
for the act of the auxiliary. Para. 4 provides the basic rule that among the
tortfeasors the liability is proportional, so that if there are three tortfeasors,
D1, D2 and D3, each equally responsible on the basis of one third and D3
is insolvent, D1, who has paid the full award, cannot say that D2 is liable
to him for the whole of D3's share. However, this is substantially modified
by the provision for reallocation. In such a case, the responsibility of D1
and D2 being equal, D1 can call upon D2 for half of the contribution which
D3 should have made.
9 Our inquiry into local laws considered a number of other aspects of
contribution, for example, successive claims, overlapping liabilities in tort,
contract and unjust enrichment, the effect of settlement by or judgment
suffered by one tortfeasor in a suit by the victim and time limits on claims.
However, we are satisfied that these issues are intimately connected with
procedure and with matters which go far beyond tort law and cannot be
dealt with in a statement of general principle.
Illustrations
10 P is a passenger in a car driven by D1. The car collides with another driven
by D2 and P suffers a broken leg. The conditions for liability for D1 and
D2 are met (whether under a statute imposing strict liability or on the basis
of fault).
D1 and D2 are each liable in full for P's loss under Art. 9:101 (1)(b)
because the broken leg and its consequences are attributable to both of
them. The court may apportion liability as between D1 and D2 under Art.
9:102. If P sues D1 alone procedural rules should provide a mechanism
for D2 to be brought into the suit so that the issue of apportionment may
be decided without further proceedings. If both D1 and D2 are at fault or
are not at fault but incur a strict liability the apportionment is likely to be
equal; but the fact that D1 is at fault and D2 is not does not compel the
court to shift the whole burden to D1.
11 A group of ten protesters resolve to destroy P's genetically modified crop.
Nine of them go into the field to cut down the plants and one of them, D1,
remains outside to watch for the police. While the other nine are in the field
one of them knocks down and injures P.
146 Rogers
D1 is liable along with the others for the damage to the crop under Art.
9:101 (1)(a). Whether D1 and the other eight in the field are liable for the
act of the one who knocked down P depends on the scope of their agree-
ment for concerted action. If they agreed to meet resistance with force
they will be.
P is injured by the combined acts of D1 and D2 and the conditions for liabi- 12
lity of both for the whole injury are met. Since D1 cannot be found, P sues
D2 alone and gets judgment for his whole loss However, D2 only has
sufficient assets to satisfy 80 per cent of the judgment. D1 then appears.
Assuming the local law allows successive actions, P may bring further
proceedings against D1 but may only recover 20 per cent of his loss.
If the responsibility of D1 and D2 was equal, D2 would have a claim for
contribution against D1, prima facie for 30 per cent of the overall loss, since
he has paid 80 and ªshouldº have paid 50.
P suffers a broken neck in a collision between the vehicles of D1 and D2. 13
The conditions for liability of both are met. P is taken to a hospital, where
the proper tests for allergic reactions to a drug are not done and as a result
P becomes blind in one eye. The broken neck and the blindness are separate
injuries. D1 and D2 are each liable in full for the broken neck. The hospital
is not liable for the broken neck since it did not cause it.
D1 and D2 have caused the blindness for the purposes of Section 1 of
Chapter 3; however, whether it is attributable to them will turn on Section
2 of Chapter 3 (it is not a decisive objection that the act of the hospital
took place later than that of D1 and D2). If it is, then D1, D2 and the
hospital are each liable for the blindness, subject to the right to seek
contribution. If it is not, then the hospital alone is liable for the blindness.
Company D1 is engaged in an activity (the storage of dangerous material) 14
which potentially attracts liability without fault under Chapter 5. It engages
Company D2 to design and operate safety systems but an employee of
Company D2 fails to carry out his duty properly (even though D2 could
not have done any more to supervise him) and there is an escape of the
substance which pollutes the land of P.
P successfully sues both D1 and D2 (D2 being liable for the employee
under Art. 6:102). For the purposes of contribution between D1 and D2,
D2 is treated under Art. 9:102 para. 3 as having committed the fault of
the employee. In fact, since D2 was engaged to prevent the risk of escape
it is likely that, under the contract between D1 and D2, D1 will be entitled
to be indemnified in full by D2 (Art. 9:102 para. 1).
P suffers damage for which D1, D2 and D3 are all responsible in full. P 15
successfully sues D1 and recovers his full loss. D1 then brings contribution
proceedings against D2 and D3 and the court concludes that the relative
shares of responsibility were 50 per cent to D1 and 25 per cent each to D2
and D3. D3 is insolvent.
Rogers 147
Since D2's liability to make contribution is several, the starting point is that
D2 is liable only to pay D1 25 per cent. However, under Art 9:102 (4) D3's
share is reallocated between D1 and D2 in proportion to their responsibil-
ity. Thus D2 must make an additional payment of 8.3 per cent to D1, being
one third of D3's share. Hence in the final accounting D1 bears two thirds
of the loss and D2 bears one third. 3
3
The result would of course be the same if the contribution issue was decided in the main suit.
148 Rogers
Title VI. Remedies
Chapter 10. Damages
Introduction
Title VI. of the Principles deals with the remedies of a party who has been 1
injured through a tort. The most common remedy is a claim for damages
in terms of money (Art. 10:101) but also restoration in kind may be avail-
able where appropriate (Art. 10:104).
Chapter 10 addresses primarily the remedy of damages, which is intended 2
to provide the injured party with an equivalent in money for his or her
loss. The Chapter comprises three sections, the first one dealing with
general questions concerning damages for all types of losses. But it also
includes the remedy of restoration in kind. The two other sections are
specifically concerned with damages for pecuniary loss on the one hand
and non-pecuniary loss on the other.
Section 1. Damages in General

Introduction
Damages as a means of compensation of a loss is generally a `split subject' 1
where specific rules with respect to the different heads of damage are
needed. Damage to the person as e.g. to the person's bodily integrity,
earning capacity, reputation and damage to property either through
destruction, loss, loss of use or another infringement have not very much
in common when the assessment and compensation of such losses are at
stake. The codifications of the European continental countries therefore
tend to contain either no or at best very few provisions on damages in
general. Nonetheless, all European legal systems know of a limited number
of general rules which apply to all situations where damage has to be made
good by way of damages. The Principles formulate these rules in the fol-
lowing section.
Art. 10:101 . Nature and Purpose of Damages

Damages are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say, to
restore him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been in if
Magnus 149
Art. 10:101 Title VI. Remedies
the wrong complained of had not been committed. Damages also serve the
aim of preventing harm.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 The remedy of damages is the most important tool to compensate an
injured party's loss of what kind so ever. This Article defines the term
damages; it also states the main aims of this part of the law and specifies
in particular what the aim of compensation is intended to mean. In addition
it fixes the yardstick according to which the amount of damages is generally
assessed.
2. Definitions
a) Damages
2 The term ªdamagesº is understood to mean a money payment only. Other
forms of compensation like restoration in kind or similar remedies are not
covered by the term. The term also implies that a sum is to be awarded
which in terms of money equals the loss the injured party has suffered and
which is intended to compensate that loss.
b) Aim of Preventing Harm
3 This notion needs hardly explanation. It means that by the prospect of the
imposition of damages a potential tortfeasor is forced or at least encour-
aged to avoid doing harm to others.
3. Reasons
4 The term ªdamagesº as used in the Principles is familiar to common law
systems but less so to civil law systems. It appears therefore useful to define
the term. It also appears necessary to fix the aims which damages are
intended to serve since there is no full unanimity in this respect among
the different legal systems. By requesting that money, so far as money
can, should restore the victim to his or her non-violated position, the
Article states implicitly that compensation is the primary aim of damages.
On this primary aim all European legal systems agree. 1 Also the aim of
prevention of harm is accepted while a punitive purpose of the law of
damages is implicitly refused by not mentioning it. The borderline between
the aim of prevention and the aim of punishment may be sometimes diffi-
cult to draw. But it is clear that the Principles do not allow punitive
damages which are apparently out of proportion to the actual loss of the
1
See the references in U. Magnus, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in: U.
Magnus (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Damages (2001, hereafter cited as PETL Damages)
no. 1 fn. 1.
150 Magnus
Chapter 10. Damages Art. 10:101
victim and have only the goal to punish the wrongdoer by means of civil
damages 2.

The Article is a general norm which gives some definitions and lays down 5
basic aims and principles of compensation. It covers all situations where a
tort victim is entitled to damages. For the assessment of damages it does
not matter in principle whether the tortfeasor's liability is based on fault
or on strict liability.
First, the Article defines in what form damages are granted, namely that 6
they are awarded as a money payment either in form of a single sum
(lump sum) or of a rent which is periodically paid (see thereto also Art.
10:102). The possibility of restoration in kind is not excluded but is dealt
with in Art. 10:104. It is regarded as a special and less frequent form of
reparation.
Art. 10:101 further specifies what the aim of compensation is and how it has 7
to be achieved. The money amount of damages shall restore the victim to
the position he or she would have been in if the wrong for which the tort-
feasor is liable had not occurred. The aim is therefore to provide the victim
with such amount of money that the damage the tortfeasor has caused can
be made good. This implies the principle of full compensation of the
injured party's loss (restitutio ad integrum): In general the whole damage
has to be compensated. However, it should not be overlooked that there
are also certain limits which control the principle of complete restitution;
for instance the value of damaged property is typically the limit of recov-
ery. But in principle, the victim has to be placed into the position which
would have existed without the tort as far as money can achieve this. On
the other hand, it is only this hypothetical position to which he or she has
to be restored. This implies a certain standard and method of assessment:
the present position of the victim has to be compared with the hypothetical
situation. Events which have or would have affected the victim's position
have to be taken into consideration when assessing the amount of
damages 3. Thus, the difference between the present and the hypothetical
state is generally the yardstick by which the recoverable loss is measured.
It is worth mentioning that the Principles of European Contract Law use
the same standard as general measure of damages. 4
2
See also Art. 24 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council
on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (ªRome IIº), COM(2003) 427 final,
22.7.2003: ªnon-compensatory damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, . . . contrary
to Community public policyº.
3
See also Art. 10:103 and the comments on Causation (Chapter 3).
4
Art. 9:502 sent. 1 PECL: ªThe general measure of damages is such sum as will put the
aggrieved party as nearly as possible into the position in which it would have been if the con-
tract had been duly performed.º
Magnus 151
8 Besides the aim of compensation the Article allows recognition of the aim
of prevention though the provision does not expressly state how this goal
is to be achieved. It is, however, clear that, subject to Art. 2:104 (which
allows the recovery of reasonable expenditure to prevent threatened
damage) no damages award can be based on preventive purposes alone.
But for instance, in assessing damages the prevention argument can be
taken into account in that it should not be cheaper to cause damage than
to avoid it.
9 The Principles are silent on the possibility of gain-stripping as a means of
compensation because this is mainly the province of the law of unjust
enrichment or restitution. Nonetheless, in some systems this possibility
plays a ± limited ± role in certain areas of tort law, too, for instance when
intellectual property rights are infringed. In these cases and within the gen-
eral limits which the aims of compensation and prevention set also the gain
the tortfeasor made can be taken into account when assessing the amount
of damages.

10 The Article is ± as is the whole Chapter 10 ± necessarily related to Chapter
2 where the notion of damage is defined and further specified. Damages
always presuppose that an item of damage had been suffered, and the
extent of the damage governs in principle the amount of damages. The
Article gives also general guidance with respect to the application of the
provisions concerning the compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage (Art. 10:201 et seq. and Art. 10:301)

11 The majority of European laws takes the view that a money payment is the
principal form of compensation 5 while a few others theoretically favour res-
titution in kind as the general principle. 6 In practice, however, a money
award is the rule even in those systems.
12 It is unanimously agreed that compensation is the primary aim of the law of
damages. 7 Moreover, almost all European countries have adopted the prin-
5
Cf. the following country reports in PETL Damages: W.V.H. Rogers, England, no. 9; S.
Galand-Carval, France, no. 12 et seq.; K. Kerameus, Greece, no. 2; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ,
Italy, no.7; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, no. 19; see also J. Neethling, South
Africa, no. 5.
6
H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 9; H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL
Damages, no.13 et seq.; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 9.
7
H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 1; H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL
Damages, no. 1; W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 1; S. Galand-Carval, France,
PETL Damages, no. 1; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 1; F. Busnelli/G.
ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 1; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands,
PETL Damages, no. 7; see also J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 1 et seq.; G.
Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 1.
152 Magnus
ciple of full restitutio ad integrum at least as the starting point8 though there
are exceptions. 9 In particular, international conventions and some national
statutes ± concerning strict liability ± provide for caps on the amount of
compensation. 10 The views differ, however, whether restitution should be
achieved primarily by restoration in kind or by way of money payment.
The majority of legal systems attributes an accompanying preventive aim 13
and function to the law of damages or accepts prevention at least as a desir-
able side effect 11 while for instance Greek, 12 Italian 13 or Dutch law 14 are
reluctant to recognise such a separate function.
Besides compensation as primary and prevention as further goal several 14
legal systems recognise also other aims and functions of the law of
damages. The most prominent example is a punitive function which is
partly accepted in English, 15 French 16 and especially U.S. law. 17 Few legal
systems acknowledge also the idea that nominal damages must be awarded
when a right has been infringed though no actual damage has been
caused. 18 Another concept which can be eventually found are `restitution-
ary' damages according to which the gain the tortfeasor made influences
the amount of damages. 19
Art. 10:102 . Lump Sum or Periodical Payments

Damages are awarded in a lump sum or as periodical payments as appro-
priate with particular regard to the interests of the victim.
Comments
1. Introduction
As provided by Art. 10:101 damages awards have to be in terms of money. 1
Art. 10:102 addresses the concrete form of a damages award which may
8
See H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 11 et seq.; W.V.H. Rogers,
England, PETL Damages, no. 1; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 7; K. Kera-
meus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 1; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 5;
M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 15; see also J. Neethling,
South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 5; G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 1 et seq.
9
An exception can be found in Austria and Switzerland where the extent of compensation
depends on the degree of fault: cf. H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 5.
10
For further details see U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 21 et seq.
11
Compare for details U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 8 et seq.
12
See K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 1 et seq.
13
F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 2.
14
M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 9.
15
W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 3.
16
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 3 et seq.
17
See G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 3.
18
See W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 11; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL
Damages, no. 15.
19
See thereto U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 16.
Magnus 153
take either the form of a lump sum award or a periodical payment award.
The choice between both depends on the fact which form is more appropri-
ate, in particular with respect to the interests of the victim.
2. Definition
Lump sum
2 A lump sum is a single sum of money whose payment is intended to cover
the injured party's whole present and future loss.
3. Reasons
3 There are considerable differences between the European legal systems
whether and when an injured party is entitled to claim a rent from the tort-
feasor. It appears therefore useful that the Principles address this question
and provide a clear answer.

4 The Article gives the court or the person who has to decide a discretion to
award damages either in the form of a lump sum or periodical payments.
The discretion has to take into account whether one or the other form is
appropriate. Whether this is the case depends in particular though not
exclusively on the interests of the victim. Where the damage can be fully
repaired it is regularly appropriate that damages are awarded as lump
sum so that the whole loss is compensated at one time. 20 This ònce and
for all' rule 21 has the advantage of clearly and definitely ending the legal
relationship between victim and tortfeasor. But where the damaging event
caused lasting impairments it is often appropriate and in the interest of
the victim and also of the tortfeasor that periodical payments are awarded
which can be adapted to a worsening or an improvement of the situation
of the victim. In particular, where it is uncertain in which way the conse-
quences of the damage will develop in the future periodical payments
appear appropriate.
5 Though the Article formally applies to all kinds of losses the practical
importance of periodical payments concerns almost exclusively personal
injury damage. There, it is most appropriate to award a rent when loss of
future income or loss of maintenance has to be compensated. Although
the Principles do not attempt to lay down in detail how a system of period-
ical payments should operate, we would observe that it can be adjusted to
the actual development and need not be based on mere guesswork with
respect to future developments as is almost unavoidable when assessing a
20
This seems also to be the general rule in many countries: see for instance W.V.H. Rogers,
England, PETL Damages, no. 53; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 49; F. Bus-
nelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 61; J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages,
no. 19, 28; G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 18.
21
See J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 19, 28.
154 Magnus
lump sum in such cases. 22 Nonetheless, the Article leaves it to discretion

even in the last mentioned cases. Therefore, particular interests of the
victim ± e.g., a specific chance to establish a permanent source of income ±
may even then justify a lump sum award. It can also be imagined that,
though certainly very rarely, periodical payments are granted in order to
compensate the non-pecuniary damage related to lasting pains through
personal injury when the development of these pains is uncertain.
It seems unlikely that in case of property damage anything other than lump 6
sums will be awarded. Nevertheless, also in such cases the possibility of
periodical payments should not entirely be excluded ± for instance in case
of ecological damage with long lasting, unforeseeable consequences.

The Article is a general provision which applies to cases both of pecuniary 7
and non-pecuniary damage (Art. 10:201 et seq. and Art. 10:301). There, it
has always to be determined whether a lump sum or periodical payments
should be granted.

Only a few countries provide codified rules on whether a damages award 8
should grant a single sum or periodical payments. 23 But despite this dearth
of code provisions all countries have adopted a certain practice in this
respect. The general rule and starting point is that damages are awarded
as lump sum. 24 Periodical payments are more or less the exception. 25 In
many countries they can only be claimed where personal injury damage
has led to permanent consequences. 26 Other countries like France 27 and
the Netherlands 28 leave it to the full discretion of the court to award a
lump sum or a rent. 29
Illustrations
D has destroyed P's house. 9
Damages for the loss will be awarded as a lump sum.
22
See thereto in particular H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 63.
23
See, e.g., § 843 German BGB.
24
See the references in fn. 20.
25
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 89 with references.
26
Compare H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 63; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages,
no. 49; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 20; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL
Damages, no. 61.
27
28
M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 99 et seq.
29
W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 53. At the time of our Comparative Report on
Damages periodical payments were only possible in England by agreement between the par-
ties. However, when the Courts Act 2003 comes into force there will be a general discretion
to make a periodical payment award in personal injury cases.
Magnus 155
10 D is liable for P's personal injuries. P is permanently incapacitated and

suffers a loss of income. P lacks the expertise to manage a large fund. Alter-
natively, it is uncertain whether P will fully or partly recover in future years.
In either case, it is appropriate to award periodical payments.
Art. 10:103 . Benefits Gained Through the Damaging Event

When determining the amount of damages benefits which the injured party
gains through the damaging event are to be taken into account unless this
cannot be reconciled with the purpose of the benefit.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 The law of damages aims at full compensation of the injured party. This
implies that the actual loss has to be made good but also that compensation
must not cause an enrichment of the injured party. Therefore, Art. 10:103
states the principle that the determination of the amount of damages has
to take into account, and generally to deduct, benefits which the injured
party gained through the damaging event. Only if this is irreconcilable
with the purpose of the benefit does the injured party's gain not reduce
the amount of damages.
2. Definitions
a) Benefits
2 The term ªbenefitsº includes every kind of property, claim or other
increase of fortune which the injured party received because of the dama-
ging event.
b) Damaging Event
3 The term ªdamaging eventº comprises every damage which gives rise to a
claim for damages and which at the same time has caused the injured par-
ty's gain.
3. Reasons
4 The main reason why advantages which the injured party received through
a wrong should in principle be set off against the amount of damages is sim-
ply the argument that the respective compensation should not enrich this
party. 30 But also the purpose of any collateral benefit has to be considered.
The general principle of compensatio lucri cum damno must not lead to an
unjustified relief of the tortfeasor from liability. 31
30
See in particular F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 59; J. Neethling, South
Africa, PETL Damages, no. 26.
31
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 84.
156 Magnus

The provision states a general rule which is the starting point with respect 5
to collateral benefits. In principle, all collateral benefits have to be
deducted from the amount of damages which would be otherwise due in
order to avoid overcompensation. But this principle is subject to certain
qualifications.
First, the benefit must be causally linked to the damaging event. 32 It does 6
not suffice that the victim receives some benefit or advantage on the
occasion of the damaging event. It is necessary that the event has caused
the benefit or advantage. The victim's gain must not have occurred without,
and independently of, the damaging event.
A second qualification is the fact that the deduction must be reconcilable 7
with the purpose of the benefit. 33 Rather often it is the purpose of the
benefit to provide the victim with financial help but not to relieve the tort-
feasor from liability. This is generally the case with insurance payments
and may also be the case with social security benefits when the victim's
entitlement depends on own prior contributions. In these cases the victim's
claim frequently passes over to the paying agency. In a similar way the
continuing payment of wages does not in many systems have the final effect
and purpose to relieve the tortfeasor. On the contrary, payments by the
tortfeasor's liability insurer must certainly be deducted from the amount
of damages which can be claimed from the tortfeasor while benevolent
payments of third parties regularly have to be ignored for the calculation
of damages. 34
Though Art. 10:103 uses the formulation ªunless . . .º, which normally 8
indicates a certain presumption the provision does not in fact establish the
firm presumption that collateral gains always have to be taken into account
± leading to a deduction ± unless another purpose of the benefit can be
shown. Certainly, it is not the aim of the law of damages to enrich the
victim. Therefore, collateral gains will often reduce the amount of damages.
However, as the above-mentioned examples of social security benefits,
insurance payments or continued payment of wages show, the contrary is
rather the rule. Therefore, it must be decided in each case on its own merits
32
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 61; H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL
Damages, no. 56, 58; W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no 49; U. Magnus, Germany,
PETL Damages, no. 47; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 18; F. Busnelli/G.
PETL Damages, no. 93.
33
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 61; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages,
no. 47; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 18; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL
Damages, no. 59; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 93;
also J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 26.
34
See for instance H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 56, 58; W.V.H.
Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no 49; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands,
PETL Damages, no. 93.
Magnus 157
if it is reconcilable with the purpose of the respective benefit whether or

not to deduct it. The formulation ªunless . . .º is meant in this sense.
9 The provision does not expressly define the term benefit. The most
common case of benefits are money payments by others like social security
agencies, insurers, employers or the like. But the provision does not
exclude other benefits which can be measured in terms of money.

10 The Article is part of, and an addition to, the set of rules concerning the
calculation of the amount of damages. It comes into play only if first a
certain amount of damages is established from which a sum for benefits or
advantages can be deducted.

11 On the one hand, there is considerable agreement that advantages which
are caused by the damaging event should generally be taken into account
because this solution corresponds to the principle that the victim should
not be enriched through the damage. 35 But this rule can only be regarded
as a starting point. On the other hand there is considerable discrepancy
with respect to the solution of concrete problems which pose the question
of compensatio lucri cum damno. Thus, for instance the view is divided
whether the victim can claim the full amount of damages or has to allow a
deduction where new things are substituted for the destroyed or damaged
old ones. 36 The view is likewise divided whether a dependant person can
claim full maintenance if the tortfeasor has killed the breadwinner and the
dependant person has inherited valuable property thereby. 37
Illustrations
12 V is killed in an accident for which D is fully liable. V leaves behind his
widow P and considerable assets.
35
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 84 et seq.
36
In favour of deduction see H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 105 et seq.; H. Cousy/A.
Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 142; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages,
no. 83; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 22 (in Italy the courts order some-
times deductions in these cases); M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL
Damages, no. 129 (though disputed). Against deduction see W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL
Damages, no. 80; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 86; K. Kerameus, Greece,
PETL Damages, no. 37; J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 50; G. Schwartz,
37
In favour of deduction though with differing qualifications see for H. Koziol, Austria, PETL
Damages, no. 109 et seq.; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 87 et seq.; M.H. Wis-
sink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 134; J. Neethling, South Africa,
PETL Damages, no. 54. Against deduction see H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL
Damages, 146, 56 et seq.; W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 84; S. Galand-
Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 90; G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages, no. 40; probably
also K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 40; F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL
Damages, no. 115 et seq.
158 Magnus
It is advocated that P can claim maintenance, which is assessed according to

her fortune.
D has damaged P's car. For repair new tires are necessary which have a life- 13
span of two years while the old ones would have to be substituted after six
months.
It is advocated that the advantage of the longer use of new tires can be
deducted.
P's property is destroyed by the tort of D. P's insurer pays P its value. 14
This does not diminish P's claim against D, which therefore passes by sub-
rogation to P's insurer. 38
Art. 10:104 . Restoration in Kind

Instead of damages, restoration in kind can be claimed by the injured party
as far as it is possible and not too burdensome to the other party.
Comments
1. Introduction
This Article allows the victim to claim restoration in kind instead of 1
damages. But this possibility is subject to the qualification firstly that
restoration in kind is still possible and secondly that it is not too onerous
for the debtor.
2. Definition
Restoration in kind
ªRestoration in kindº means that the liable person is obliged to restore ± as 2
far as possible ± the original state without the damaging event.
3. Reasons
Though it is the general aim of the law of damages to restore the injured 3
person as far as possible to the position he or she would have been in with-
out the tort (see Art. 10:101) money will in most cases be an adequate form
of compensation that helps the victim to care for restoration according to
his or her own discretion. Moreover the tortfeasor will in most cases be
neither able nor suited nor willing to restore the damage in kind, for
instance, to cure the injured person or to repair the damaged thing. But
there remain certain cases where money cannot grant adequate compensa-
tion, e.g. in case of defamation when a correcting notice may better restore
38
Many systems recognise this possibility of subrogation; see as examples Austrian and German
law (§ 67 Insurance Contract Act [Versicherungsvertragsgesetz]); for the position under Eng-
lish law compare W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (2002), no. 26.29.
Magnus 159
the injured person's reputation than money would do. For these cases the
present Article reserves the right to claim restoration in kind.

4 In line with the majority of European laws the Principles provide that the
right to claim restoration in kind is the exception while compensation in
money is the rule (see Art. 10:101). But nonetheless, the injured person
can freely chose between restoration in kind and money compensation
provided that the further requirements of the Article are met.
5 Restoration in kind requires firstly that such restoration is still possible. If
for instance the tortfeasor has erected a building which illegally impairs
the sight from the victim's ground then restoration in kind by demolishing
the building remains possible.
6 Secondly, restoration in kind must be not too burdensome for the tortfea-
sor. In the mentioned example it depends on the circumstances of the case
whether the victim can request that the building be demolished. Among
the decisive factors are the value of the building and the cost of demolish-
ing on the one side, the diminution in value of the impaired estate on the
other.

7 Art. 10:104 is an addition to the provisions on damages in general. It adds a
further and different remedy to the remedy of damages. Like the other
provisions of this Chapter it presupposes that an interest has been infringed
that enjoys protection under Art. 2:102.

8 The majority of European legal systems regards restoration in kind as an
exception to the rule that damage has to be compensated in terms of
money 39 though also some systems favour restoration in kind as the general
principle. 40 In practice compensation in money is the standard remedy in
the overwhelming number of cases everywhere.
Illustrations
9 In a newspaper D has published an article defaming P.
P may claim restoration in kind in the form of a formal correction and/or
excuse in the same newspaper.
39
See W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 9; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL
Damages, no. 12 et seq.; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 2; F. Busnelli/G.
PETL Damages, no. 19; also J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 5.
40
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 9; H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL
Damages, no. 13 et seq.; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Damages, no. 9.
160 Magnus
Section 2. Pecuniary Damage

Art. 10:201 . Nature and Determination of Pecuniary Damage
Recoverable pecuniary damage is a diminution of the victim's patrimony
caused by the damaging event. Such damage is generally determined as
concretely as possible but it may be determined abstractly when appropri-
ate, for example by reference to a market value.
Comments
1. Introduction
The distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage is well- 1
known in all European tort systems. In practice damages for pecuniary
loss play the most important role in this branch of the law. The Principles
also deal first with damages for pecuniary loss (as to damages for non-
pecuniary loss see Art. 10:301). Art. 10:201 firstly defines pecuniary
damage in general terms as a diminution of the victim's patrimony and
secondly gives guidance how damages for this has to be determined,
namely as concretely as possible.
2. Definitions
a) Recoverable Pecuniary Damage
ªRecoverable pecuniary damageº is the key term of this section and the 2
precondition for any following assessment of damages for such loss. A
recoverable pecuniary loss exists when the victim has suffered a loss which
diminishes the victim's patrimony. But even where the victim suffered
bodily injury the cost for medical care etc is pecuniary damage (see also
Art. 10:202). ªRecoverableº means that the victim must be entitled to
recovery of damage in accordance with Art. 2:101 et seq.
b) Diminution
The term ªdiminutionº expresses that the damaging event must result in a 3
reduction of the victim's patrimony.
c) Victim's Patrimony
The wide expression ªvictim's patrimonyº includes not only the actual 4
tangible and intangible property rights which the victim possesses but also
the capacity to earn money (see also Art. 10:202 para. 1) or the right to
use a thing (Art. 10:203 para. 2).
d) Concretely
The adverb ªconcretelyº refers to a certain method or prevailing assess- 5
ment of damages. Here it means that damages have to be determined
with respect to the specific situation of the actual victim. If, for instance, a
repair has been effected at a cost less than the prevailing market rate, the
Magnus 161
actual expenditure and not the normal market cost of such repair is the
concrete measure.
e) Abstractly
6 The adverb ªabstractlyº stands for the contrary to ªconcretelyº.
f) Market Value
7 The term ªmarket valueº designates the most common abstract yardstick
according to which damages can be assessed. It is the price which generally
has to be paid to third persons for a comparable good or service.
3. Reasons
8 The notion of pecuniary damage is a key term in all tort systems. Never-
theless, one does not find statutory provisions which define it though all
European tort systems use the term. The central meaning of the term is
more or less the same in these systems while for a number of borderline
cases like loss of use etc it is disputed whether they have to be regarded
as pecuniary damage. It thus appears useful that the Principles provide a
definition based on the general understanding of the term. The definition
is then further detailed in the following provisions with respect to damage
to the person (Art. 10:202) and damage to things (Art. 10:203).
9 It appears as useful, too, to indicate also the general method how to deter-
mine the damage. The European tort systems regularly require that the
damage has to be identified and then the corresponding amount of
damages has to be fixed. This is rarely seen as a formal two-step operation.
But yet the damage has first to be determined and this can be done in a
more abstract or more concrete way or by a combination of both ways.
The Principles adopt the concrete method of determination of damage as
the starting point but allow in a rather flexible manner also an abstract
determination of damage where appropriate.

10 The Article is the general provision for determining pecuniary damage.
11 The first sentence of the Article requires that the damaging event has
caused a diminution of the victim's patrimony. However, this requirement
must be read in conjunction with Art. 2:102. Only if protected interests in
the sense of this Article have been infringed is the resulting pecuniary loss
recoverable.
12 Art. 10:201 is the most general provision of the Section concerning pecuni-
ary damage. It comes into play only if none of the other, more specific
provisions of the Section prevail. Concerning personal injury and death,
Art. 10:202 is the special provision which defines which economic
consequences of such injury are recoverable. Likewise, Art. 10:203 regu-
lates specifically damages when things are lost, destroyed or damaged and
a tortfeasor is liable for this kind of damage. Art. 10:201 therefore applies
162 Magnus
in situations not covered by the mentioned special provisions, or it applies

to questions not or not fully covered by them. This is in particular the
case where pure economic interests or contractual relationships have been
violated insofar as they enjoy protection according to Art. 2:102 (4). In
these cases it is regularly not doubtful that the victim's patrimony has
been diminished and that a pecuniary damage is present. But it is rather
often doubtful whether such loss is recoverable under Art. 2:102 (4).
The requirement that pecuniary damage presupposes a diminution of the 13
victim's patrimony has a twofold repercussion. On the one hand, it
expresses the rule that no recoverable pecuniary damage exists where the
patrimony of the victim is not diminished. The Principles do not provide
the possibility to award nominal damages where no actual damage has
occurred. 1 On the other hand, the diminution ± in value ± of the victim's
patrimony is the general yardstick according to which the recoverable
pecuniary loss is determined. This yardstick functions as a principal limit
for the amount of compensation when for instance costs of repair consider-
ably exceed the diminution in value of the damaged thing. This Principle of
Art 10:201 applies also to cases covered by Art. 10:203 where this question
is not specifically regulated.
The diminution of the victim's patrimony is generally measured by the rea- 14
sonable expenses which are necessary to make good the damage.
The second sentence of the Article gives, however, priority to a generally 15
concrete method of determination of damage though this priority is not an
absolute one. The concrete method aims at an assessment of damage that
comes as closely as possible to the `real' damage of the actual victim and
serves the object of the law of damages to restore the individual victim to
the position he or she would have been in without the damaging event
(see Art. 10:101). It also intends to exclude compensation for ªfictitiousº
damage which the victim in fact did not suffer as may be the case with a
repair which the victim did not execute. Here the diminution in value
rather than the fictitious cost of repair can be the correct amount of
damages. It is therefore not decisive what the ªnormalº damage of a ªnor-
malº victim in abstracto would have been but what the concrete loss of
this individual victim was. However, for practical reasons rather often an
abstract estimate of the ªusualº damage is necessary or even the only possi-
ble method of assessment. This is in particular the case with future loss of
income when awarded in a lump sum. But even here the concrete prospects
of the individual victim can be ± and according to the Principles should be ±
taken into account as far as possible.

As already indicated Art. 10:201 is the general provision for determining 16
pecuniary damage which steps in where the more specific rules of Art.
1
See also Commentary to Art. 10:101.
Magnus 163
10:202 and 10:203 leave room. The application of Art 10:201 further
depends on the requirement that the conditions of Art. 2:101 et seq., in
particular of Art. 2:102 are met.

17 Though pecuniary damage is a generally accepted notion in all European
legal systems the borderline with non-pecuniary damage is not always
drawn in the same way. This is particularly true for the compensation of
loss of use, pure loss of earning capacity, pure loss of holiday or free time,
of damage to things which remain unrepaired or of frustrated expenses. 2
Also the method of determining the damage varies. Though a concrete-
subjective standard seems generally to be preferred there are important
exceptions. For instance, Austrian law provides that in case of slight
negligence the tortfeasor is only obliged to compensate the actual loss
which is calculated in an abstract-objective way. 3 English law applies a
rather abstract method of calculation in cases of future economic conse-
quences of personal injuries. This is achieved by way of a relatively strict
standardization. 4 In a similar way French law allows to rely on abstract
standards (ªbareÁmesº) for the same purpose 5 and the same is true for
Belgian law. 6 In Germany the immobilisation tables for motor vehicles
represent also an abstract method of calculating the damage. 7
Illustration
18 D has persuaded P's top manager to breach his contract by leaving P's enter-
prise and to enter D's enterprise which competes with P's enterprise. D has
acted with the sole intention to throw P out of the market.
P can claim as damages the diminution in value of his enterprise. The
diminution may be taken from a decrease of profits to the extent other
grounds for such decrease can be excluded.
Art. 10:202 . Personal Injury and Death

(1) In the case of personal injury, which includes injury to bodily health
and to mental health amounting to a recognised illness, pecuniary damage
includes loss of income, impairment of earning capacity (even if unaccom-
panied by any loss of income) and reasonable expenses, such as the cost
of medical care.
2
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report, in U. Magnus (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Damages
(2001, hereafter cited as PETL Damages) no. 64 et seq.
3
H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 40.
4
See in detail W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 31 et seq.
5
S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 33, 36.
6
H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 32.
7
U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 34.
164 Magnus
(2) In the case of death, persons such as family members whom the
deceased maintained or would have maintained if death had not occurred
are treated as having suffered recoverable damage to the extent of loss of
that support.
Comments
1. Introduction
The Article provides specific rules for the compensation of the economic 1
consequences of personal injury and death for which a tortfeasor is liable.
2. Definitions
a) Personal Injury
As in Art. 10:301 8 ªpersonal injuryº does not include death because this 2
case is dealt with separately in para. 2. Personal injury includes also injury
to mental health, but only if this kind of impairment is diagnosed as a
recognised illness according to the standards of medical science. If a victim
survives for some time before dying as a result of the tort he or she may
acquire a right to damages under para. 1, whether or not there is a claim
of dependants under para. 2.
b) Loss of Income
ªLoss of incomeº covers the regular income a victim did earn prior to the 3
damaging event and which the victim could expect to earn in future had
not the damage occurred. But it covers cases as well where the victim had
no prior income (for instance due to young age) but could expect to earn
an income in the future.
c) Impairment of Earning Capacity
ªImpairment of earning capacityº means the loss or reduction ± due to the 4
tort ± of the personal ability to earn an income independently of the fact
whether at present or in future the earning capacity is or will be actually
exploited. This is meant by the explanation ªeven if unaccompanied by
any loss of incomeº.
d) Family Members
The Principles do not restrict compensation to ªfamily membersº under- 5
stood as relatives who are entitled to maintenance by legal provisions. It
also includes, for example, persons who had been in a similar position and
had been in fact or would be maintained by the deceased.
3. Reasons
Tortious damage through personal injury or death constitutes one of the 6
most common situations where damages have to be awarded and where
8
Cf. infra Art. 10:301 no. 2.
Magnus 165
the Principles of assessing such damage have tremendous importance since

with health and life the victim's most valuable interests are involved (see
also Art. 2:102 para. 2). The Principles governing the assessment of this
kind of damage therefore have to be not only fair and just; they should
also be as clear as possible.

7 Art. 10:202 para. 1 deals with the personal damage of the injured person
him- or herself while para. 2 concerns maintenance claims of dependants
of a person for whose death the tortfeasor is liable. Both situations have
to be treated differently because different persons are entitled to different
kinds of compensation: the directly injured victim on the one hand and
certain indirectly affected persons on the other.
8 Art. 10:202 para. 1 requires an injury to bodily or mental health. While the
identification of an injury to bodily health normally poses no problem,
injury to mental health entitles to compensation only if this kind of impair-
ment amounts to a recognised illness according to the standards of medical
science. This means on the contrary that mere emotional disturbance as
such does not amount to damage for the purposes of this Article, though
in certain cases it may amount to non-pecuniary damage under Art.
10:301 para. 1.
9 In the case of personal injury an important element of pecuniary damage
are the expenses which are necessary for medical treatment, rehabilitation
measures and the like to cure as far as possible the bodily consequences
of the injury. In line with all European tort systems the Principles grant
the victim those expenses, however, with the qualification that the expenses
must be reasonable. They must be necessary for the medical treatment and
the treatment must be of a kind that can be expected to be effective with
respect to the injury or illness. These Principles apply also in cases where
the victim's costs of medical treatment are borne by a social security system
or a private insurance because the victim's claim then regularly passes by
way of subrogation or assignment to the paying institution 9.
10 Reasonable expenses include the cost of medical care but they are not
confined to this category. They can also cover other expenses, for instance
the costs for a necessary adaptation of the home of the injured. 10
11 Another significant category of loss through personal injury is loss of
income. According to the principle of concrete calculation of damage (see
Art 10:201) the victim can claim not only any loss of income which has
actually accrued, but also such loss which will occur in the future.
9
In some systems, there are no subrogation rights for the health care provider because there is
no liability for payment in the recipient. However, in such systems, the same result is in prac-
tice reached by a direct statutory right.
10
This is the unanimous view held by the European tort systems; see U. Magnus, Comparative
Report, PETL Damages, no. 101 with references.
166 Magnus
In a number of cases the victim did not and will not earn an income (house- 12
wives, pensioners, unpaid workers etc). The European legal systems differ
on the solution of whether a victim whose economically unexploited earning
capacity has been impaired by a tort should be entitled to compensation for
the mere loss or reduction of his or her earning capacity. 11 The Principles
have adopted the solution that such impairment entitles to compensation
since it can hardly be denied that the capacity as such has some economic
worth and can also easily be measured by the cost of a substitute.
In case of death of the victim, Art. 10:202 para. 2 entitles a certain circle of 13
persons to claim their maintenance as damages from the tortfeasor. The
entitled persons are, of course, the relatives of the deceased whom he was
in law obliged to maintain. But the Article also includes those persons
(for instance a non-marital partner) who were actually maintained or
would have been maintained in the future if death had not occurred. The
recoverable damage corresponds to the extent to which maintenance is
lost.

The Article is linked to Art. 10:201 over which it prevails insofar and to the 14
extent as it is the more specific provision.

The European tort systems differ rather widely when the assessment of 15
damages for personal injuries is compared. 12 This concerns the method of
calculation which in some systems is rather strictly standardized. 13 But it
concerns as well the basis of liability in many disputed cases as for instance
in the wrongful birth cases, 14 the question of compensation for loss of
unexploited earning capacity. 15
Illustrations
P, a 6 year old child, has been injured in an accident for which D is liable. P 16
must stay in hospital some weeks in another town.
P is entitled to compensation of the cost of medical treatment but also to
the costs of regular visits of his parents (e.g. travel expenses) since a
reasonable number of such visits serves a therapeutic purpose.
11
For instance Austrian law accepts such compensation: see H. Koziol, Austria, PETL
Damages, no. 81 et seq. The same is true for the USA: G. Schwartz, USA, PETL Damages,
no. 25. On the contrary England (W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 63), France
(S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Damages, no. 68), Germany (U. Magnus, Germany,
PETL Damages, no. 62), Greece (K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 27), the Nether-
lands (M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no. 110) and South
Africa (J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 35) deny compensation in such cases.
12
See already the references cited supra Art. 10:104 no. 8 and Art. 10:201 no. 17.
13
See in particular W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 31 et seq.; S. Galand-Carval,
France, PETL Damages, no. 33, 36.
14
See U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 90 et seq.
15
Compare the references in fn. 45.
Magnus 167
17 P, a 20 year old student of chemistry, suffers severe brain injuries in an

accident for which D is liable. In future P will be only able to work in
inferior jobs.
P is entitled to the difference between his actual income and the potential
income he would have had if he had worked as a chemist. The compensa-
tion award has to take into account that the potential income would only
run from the time onwards when he would have finished studying and
would have started working. According to Art. 10:102 in such a case a
rent could be the appropriate form of compensation.
Art. 10:203 . Loss, Destruction and Damage to Things

(1) Where a thing is lost, destroyed or damaged, the basic measure of
damages is the value of the thing or the diminution in its value and for
this purpose it is irrelevant whether the victim intends to replace or repair
the thing. However, if the victim has replaced or repaired it (or will do
so), he may recover the higher expenditure thereby incurred if it is reason-
able to do so.
(2) Damages may also be awarded for loss of use of the thing, including
consequential losses such as loss of business.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 The Article concerns compensation for damage of any kind to corporeal
things. It states certain specific rules for these cases. In practice cases invol-
ving tortious liability for damage to things constitute ± besides the personal
injury cases ± another very significant group of cases where problems of the
law of damages play an important role. Para. 1 of the Article states the
basic rule that the diminution in value is the general measure of damages
but that higher costs for replacement or repair may be claimed where
such way of recovery is reasonable. Para. 2 of the Article addresses the spe-
cial problem of loss of use.
2. Definitions
a) Thing
2 The term ªthingº means a corporeal movable or immovable object. It does
not include rights and intangible goods (for their compensation see Art.
10:201).
b) Value of the Thing
3 The ªvalue of the thingº is regularly represented by the market price
which would be paid for this or a comparable thing by independent third
persons.
168 Magnus
3. Reasons
Since damage to things is very frequent and is in fact a mass phenomenon 4
in modern society it is necessary ± not the least also for practical reasons ±
to establish fair and clear rules concerning compensation in these cases.

Art. 10:203 para. 1 states the general rule that the basic measure of 5
damages is the value of the thing. In case of loss or complete destruction
of the thing it is its total value that has to be compensated. In case of
damage which only impairs the substance or usability of the thing but
does not fully destroy it the measure is the diminution in value. In order
to determine the value of a thing the Article follows the basic assumption
on which all European tort systems rely that the value of a thing is gener-
ally represented by its market price which third persons would normally
pay. If the thing is lost or destroyed the value is therefore the price which
this or a comparable thing would cost on the market. In case of mere
damage the diminution in value can be measured either by the cost for
this or a comparable (damaged) thing on the market or by the market
cost of repair. However, Art. 10:203 para. 1 makes it clear that compensa-
tion does not depend on the victim's willingness to go to the market and
in fact to replace or repair the damaged thing. The diminution in value
remains to be a recoverable damage even if the victim uses the damaged
thing in an unrepaired state.
If a thing is merely damaged and can be repaired then the easiest and most 6
common way to assess its diminution in value is to take the cost of repair.
The European legal systems consider these costs as good evidence for the
reduced value. 16 On the other hand, also the costs of replacement ± instead
of repair ± can be taken to represent the diminution in value. Art. 10:203
para. 1 leaves it to the discretion of the victim to choose one or the other
way of recovery. However, not infrequently there is a difference between
the two ways: either the cost of replacement or of repair may be the higher
amount. This is for instance the case if old and almost worthless cars are
repaired at high costs or if rather new cars are not repaired but replaced
at costs which considerably exceed the cost of repair. The problem which
amount can be claimed in such situation is addressed by Art. 10:203 para.
1 sent. 2: the victim is entitled to the higher amount only if it was reason-
able to choose this way of recovery. In general it is reasonable to chose
the less expensive way of compensation (see also the general duty to miti-
gate the damage; Art. 8:101). Therefore specific reasons must support the
more expensive form of restoration. For instance, it can be reasonable to
buy a substitute if even complete repair would leave a certain risk of future
16
See, e.g., H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 40, 95; W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL
Damages, no. 33 et seq.; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL Damages, no.
70.
Magnus 169
damage. On the contrary it is clearly unreasonable if repair is executed at a

much higher price than a fully comparable substitute would cost.
7 The European tort systems differ on the compensation for mere loss of
use and also on the assessment of this kind of damage if it is to be com-
pensated. 17 The Principles address this problem in Art. 10:203 para. 2.
They follow the solution preferred in England (though with some reluc-
tance), 18 France, 19 Germany (with qualifications), 20 Greece 21 or apparently
also Belgium 22 while for instance Austrian 23 and Italian 24 law refuses to
compensate for pure loss of use. The reason for the rule in Art. 10:203
para. 2 is that things evidently have some objective useable value which is
also mirrored by its rental value on the market. On the other hand, the
concrete value for the user depends on the use he makes and has some
subjective element. Art. 10:203 para. 2 therefore allows for compensation
of mere loss of use but gives at the same time a certain discretion (ªmayº)
to award that compensation. Furthermore the loss of use includes any
profit which the use would have enabled.

8 Like the preceding Article Art. 10:203 is a provision which deals with a
specific category of losses (those relating to things). It is linked to the
general provision of Art. 10:201 over which it, however, prevails as far as
its rules apply.

9 The starting point of the European tort systems with respect to the damage
to things is more or less the same that the loss of or diminution in value of
the thing has to be compensated. But the details in determining and
assessing the damage vary considerably. This is true for the just mentioned
compensation of mere loss of use. 25 But the views vary also on the question
whether a victim can claim the cost of repair although he or she neither
intends nor executes a repair. 26 And there is equally no real agreement
17
See the survey by . Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 64 et seq.
18
See W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Damages, no. 40.
19
20
U. Magnus, Comparative Report, PETL Damages, no. 35 et seq.
21
K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Damages, no. 13.
22
H. Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 124 et seq. Also South Africa (J.
Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 21) and the USA (G. Schwartz, USA, PETL
Damages, no. 12) follow the approach to compensate the pure loss of use.
23
See H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 46.
24
F. Busnelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy, PETL Damages, no. 47.
25
Compare the references cited in Art. 10:202 no. 15.
26
Austrian law disallows such kind of fictitious damage (see H. Koziol, Austria, PETL
Damages, no. 50) while the other countries allow it (see the references in U. Magnus, Com-
parative Report, PETL Damages, no. 71 fn. 129 et seq.).
170 Magnus
that the victim must chose the cheaper way of restoration unless there are
reasonable grounds to decide otherwise. 27
Illustrations
P's car has been reparably damaged in an accident for which D is liable. The 10
estimated pre-accident value of the car is ¨ 8,000; its value after the accident
is ¨ 6,000; the cost of repair is ¨ 2,000. A comparable car would cost ¨ 8,000.
P can chose either to buy another car and sell the old one or to have it
repaired. In either case the amount of damages is ¨ 2,000.
If the cost of repair would be ¨ 5,000 instead of ¨ 2,000 then according to
Art. 10:203 para. 1 sent. 2 P could claim only the cost of the cheaper way
of restoration. That means he had to buy another car and could claim
¨ 2,000 from D.
P's house has been damaged due to D's negligence. During repair (6 months) 11
P lives in a caravan.
In addition to the cost of repair of the house P can claim compensation for
the temporarily lost use of the house. The amount of damages can be
oriented at the rental costs of a comparable house.
Section 3. Non-Pecuniary Damage

Art. 10:301 . Non-Pecuniary Damage
(1) Considering the scope of its protection (Article 2:102), the violation of
an interest may justify compensation of non-pecuniary damage. This is the
case in particular where the victim has suffered personal injury; or injury
to human dignity, liberty, or other personality rights. Non-pecuniary
damage can also be the subject of compensation for persons having a close
relationship with a victim suffering a fatal or very serious non-fatal injury.
(2) In general, in the assessment of such damages, all circumstances of the
case, including the gravity, duration and consequences of the grievance,
have to be taken into account. The degree of the tortfeasor's fault is to be
taken into account only where it significantly contributes to the grievance
of the victim.
(3) In cases of personal injury, non-pecuniary damage corresponds to the
suffering of the victim and the impairment of his bodily or mental health.
27
Partly diminution in (market) value is regarded as the upper limit of compensation if costs of
repair exceed this amount: see H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Damages, no. 103; K. Kerameus,
Greece, PETL Damages, no. 36; M.H. Wissink/W. van Boom, The Netherlands, PETL
Damages, no. 126, also J. Neethling, South Africa, PETL Damages, no. 48; G. Schwartz,
USA, PETL Damages, no. 34. Other legal systems do not draw this line strictly: see H.
Cousy/A. Vanderspikken, Belgium, PETL Damages, no. 140; U. Magnus, Germany, PETL
Damages, no. 81 (allowance up to 130 %).
Magnus/Rogers 171
In assessing damages (including damages for persons having a close rela-

tionship to deceased or seriously injured victims) similar sums should be
awarded for objectively similar losses.
Comments
1. Introduction
1 Non-pecuniary damage is damage which does not involve a diminution of
the victim's patrimony (see Art. 10:201). All European tort systems make
provision for compensation of this type of loss, though the scope and
details of the regimes vary considerably.
2. Definitions
a) Personal Injury
2 ªPersonal injuryº in legal terminology often includes death. However, in
the context of this Article it covers only injury (including injury to mental
health amounting to a recognized illness 1) short of death, since specific
provision is made for fatal cases, any claim for damages for non-pecuniary
loss then lying in favour of relatives of the deceased. Of course, where the
victim survives for some time before dying as a result of the tort there
may be separate claims on his behalf and that of relatives.
b) Grievance
3 For practical purposes this is synonymous with ªdamageº or ªharmº. How-
ever, this Article covers a very wide range of liabilities and there is little in
common between, for example, personal injury cases and those where a
ªdignitaryº wrong is in issue. It seemed better to use a more neutral term.

4 It is necessary here to distinguish cases of death and personal injury from
other situations ± and, indeed, to distinguish between death and personal
injury. While the award of damages for non-pecuniary loss in cases of
personal injury has been criticised on the grounds that such awards are
arbitrary in their nature and inhibit the full compensation of supposedly
more important financial losses, our survey of European legal systems
convinced us that they are regarded as fulfilling an important function in
providing solace for the very real hurt suffered by the victim of a tort and
in affirming human dignity and in sanctioning inappropriate behaviour.
We are of course aware that where injury is compensated by the mechan-
ism of social security then non-pecuniary loss is typically not covered (or
only covered to a limited degree). However, we are not engaged in an
exercise of replacing tort with social security and we believe that in a tort
context not only is it politically impossible to contemplate the abolition of
1
See Art. 10:202 no. 2.
172 Rogers
these damages, but it would be wrong to take that course. These are real
losses, even if it is difficult to assess them and to put a figure on the result.
It is significant that Germany has recently removed the former restriction
on recovery of such losses in cases of strict liability. 2 Nor do we agree that
such damages are arbitrary, though we accept that they are inevitably
ªconventionalº since there is no market against which they may be
measured.
The case for awarding damages for non-pecuniary loss to relatives of direct 5
victims is perhaps less clear. 3 The majority of systems allow such damages
in fatal cases; some (for example France and Belgium) do so in non-fatal
cases. It can be argued that awards here are more open to the charge of
arbitrariness than in personal injury cases: a leg may be regarded as having
something akin to an objective value in terms of the ability to carry on a
normal life, but who can assess the grief suffered by a person at the loss
of a loved one? Furthermore, some bereavement is a universal human
experience which does not call for compensation in the same way as an
injury to one's body. On the other hand, the loss of a bereaved spouse or
parent is perhaps as ªrealº as the unhappiness of an accident victim. We
doubt if this can be solved by a purely philosophical approach, one has to
accept that opinions differ. However, here again we have to take account
of political realities. In those majority jurisdictions where the right to such
damages is established it would be extremely difficult to take it away and
it is perhaps significant that in England, where such damages were
admitted to the law for the first time in 1981, even those who oppose
them on principle accept that they are now firmly embedded in the law. 4
The existence of these damages in fatal cases was never seriously
challenged in our discussions. There was more controversy about such
awards to relatives in non-fatal cases, mainly because of the greater
practical difficulties. 5 However, the majority view was that they should be
accepted.
Outside the area of personal injury and death, damages for non-pecuniary 6
loss may be available in a very diverse range of situations ± for example
for interference with liberty, honour, reputation or privacy. Although it is
not possible to formulate any hard and fast rule, there is a certain reluc-
tance in many systems to award them in cases of damage to property or
for breach of contract. 6 Thus the buyer of goods is not likely to have
2
See J. Fedtke, Germany, in H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2001 (2002)
232 et seq.
3
It must be stressed that the award of damages for loss of support from a deceased person is an
entirely separate issue. That is pecuniary loss falling under Art. 10:202 and compensation for
it would be universally seen as a necessity.
4
See Law Commission, Claims for Wrongful Death (1999) § 9.2.
5
See W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report, in W.V.H Rogers (ed), Damages for Non-Pecuni-
ary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (2001, hereafter cited as Rogers, Non-Pecuniary Loss)
262 et seq.
6
Except where the purpose of the contract is the provision of enjoyment ± e.g. a holiday.
Rogers 173
much success in seeking compensation for the frustration and disappoint-

ment he feels when the goods are delivered late. However, the line
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss can be hard to draw here. For
example, the reason for the award of sometimes quite substantial damages
for injury to reputation may be that the victim is quite likely to suffer
some financial loss in the future but may find it virtually impossible to
prove cause and effect; and where, for example, a person is forced to
move into lodgings as a result of damage to his house or a passenger is set
down at the wrong destination in the middle of the night, the ªinconveni-
enceº of which they complain may be hard to regard as pecuniary loss but
nor is it quite the same as the suffering of an accident victim. Without
attempting to prescribe exactly when the power should be exercised, we
are satisfied that courts should be able in principle to award damages for
non-pecuniary loss outside the cases of personal injury and death. This is
particularly clear where fundamental rights like those of liberty and other
aspects of personality are infringed. Commonly there will be no provable
financial loss from a short detention, a libel or an invasion of privacy, and
if damages for non-pecuniary loss were not recoverable sanctions against
the violator of such interests would be significantly reduced. 7 The fact that
the interests in question are not easily valued in monetary terms and that
their infringement may be less catastrophic for the victim than a very
serious personal injury does not mean that they are unimportant, looked
at from the point of view of a decent society. Of course in cases of the
type we are now considering awards of damages for non-pecuniary loss
have to be watched and controlled very carefully lest they become extrava-
gant. Difficult as it may be in practice, there is also a need to maintain
equity between different types of victims and to ensure that comparable
situations are treated similarly.
4. Scope and Extent of Liability

a) Non-Pecuniary Loss and Interests
7 There is a link between Art 10:301 para. 1 and Art 2:102. Just as the latter
is concerned with whether an interest is worthy of protection by the law
(either generally or in the particular circumstances of the case) so here
the nature of the interest determines whether its infringement attracts
damages for non-pecuniary loss. And here, too, the approach is a flexible
one. We do not attempt to lay down a rigid list of qualifying interests. How-
ever, we do specifically refer to personal injury (and the claims of relatives
in fatal cases), to liberty and to personality rights because it is so widely
accepted that these are the prime areas in which awards for non-pecuniary
loss are made. That is not to say that such an award is automatically barred
in any other case. Nor is it to say that such awards will be automatic in the
7
Or at least tort sanctions would be. Of course, in some jurisdictions the criminal law plays a
significant role in relation to the infringement of some of these interest; but in others it plays
little or none.
174 Rogers
cases mentioned: for example, we think that the wording is wide enough to
allow a court to refuse such damages in a case of trivial personal injury with
no ongoing effects. We are aware that ªpersonality rightsº has no univer-
sally accepted meaning (indeed to a common lawyer it might mean nothing
at all) but in the context we believe it is clear enough to indicate in a
general way the scope of the interests concerned ± autonomy, privacy,
dignity, reputation and so on. It is not possible to be more precise because
in this area above all local laws are diverse: for example, some systems
have an express right of privacy and to control the use of one's name and
image; others do not but frequently reach much the same result indirectly
by manipulation of other legal concepts.
b) Persons Related to Accident Victims
The third sentence of Art 10:301 para. 3 specifically deals with this. We do 8
not attempt to provide a fixed list of persons who may claim nor to define
what is a ªvery serious personal injuryº. Neither seems to fit into a state-
ment of general principle. For example, we are satisfied that a de facto
cohabitation comparable to that of husband and wife would nowadays
clearly attract such damages; it may be the same is true of a comparable
same-sex relationship but it is not for us to make definitive statements on
this type of issue. However, we should say that what we have in mind is a
relationship which bears at least some resemblance to a ªfamilyº one.
c) Circumstances and Conduct
We think it is important that there should be a degree of comparability in 9
the treatment of essentially similar cases 8. However, it is plainly impossible
to draw up a rigid tariff of awards, especially in non-personal injury/death
cases. Typically, the gravity, duration and consequences of the grievance
will be the central issues in determining an appropriate sum so we have
specifically drawn attention to these in para. 2. However, in the last resort
all the circumstances of the case must be taken into account. The question
of how far the decision of a trial court may be challenged is a matter for
procedural law, including the question whether there may be an appeal or
only cassation. Some explanation is necessary of the relevance of the tort-
feasor's fault. 9 A few systems allow punitive or exemplary damages; most
do not and they are excluded by Art 10:101. However, even among the
majority group there is a discernible tendency to take account of the
conduct of the tortfeasor in determining what is just ªsatisfactionº by way
of damages for non-pecuniary loss. While that may often be legitimate, it
arguably involves a ªdriftº towards a punitive element. In our view the
way to take conduct into account but remain faithful to the principle of
compensation is to provide that the conduct of the tortfeasor only comes
into the picture when it contributes to the grievance of the victim. For
example, we take the view that the grievance of a person whose privacy
8
See infra no. 11.
9
The contributory conduct or activity of the victim will be governed by Chapter 8.
Rogers 175
has been invaded or whose reputation has been traduced by a tabloid

newspaper behaving offensively and high-handedly can fairly say that his
hurt, his mental suffering, should be regarded as greater 10 than it would
be in a case where there was a mere careless error which was speedily
corrected and that he should receive more by way of compensation. Such
an award would be essentially compensatory in nature. In practice we think
that this principle would be confined to cases of intentional or consciously
reckless behaviour: we do not think that a road accident victim in a system
which allows for strict liability should get more because he could prove
fault 11 and where the liability rested only on fault we believe it would be
undesirable to encourage detailed investigation into precisely what degree
of fault was involved. However, we have not laid down any hard and fast
rule excluding conduct less than intention or recklessness as justifying an
adjustment of damages.
d) Levels of Award
10 First, we have not attempted to set any figures. The level of damages for
non-pecuniary loss in accident cases varies considerably from one system
to another, even if within some (but by no means all) systems awards are
fairly predictable. 12 Whether or not this should be so is debatable (indeed
our opinions differ on this point) but in the present state of things the fact
that there are major differences in the methods of assessment is in itself a
reason why it would be difficult to achieve anything approaching unifor-
mity. In any event, (1) a statement of general principles of tort law is not
the place to set the going rate for loss of an eye or loss of a leg and (2)
once we move outside the area of personal injuries it is difficult to see
how any tariff could be drawn up ± or indeed any statement of principle
going much beyond what is said in Art 10:301 para. 2.
e) Nature of These Damages in Personal Injury Cases
11 We believe that the first sentence of Art 10:301 para. 3 contains an important
point of principle, that is to say that damages for non-pecuniary loss in perso-
nal injury cases involve two elements, even if they are typically lumped
together in a global award: the suffering of the victim and the ªobjectiveº
impairment of his health and ability to live life to the full. The latter is a
proper subject of compensation in its own right and, though the award may
be increased on account of the particular suffering of the victim it is likely
to be the injury itself (or more accurately the disability which it causes)
which represents the major part of the award. The logical consequence of
course is that substantial damages may be awarded under this head to a vic-
tim who is permanently comatose. This is a controversial matter 13 but it is
10
Assuming that it is in fact so. If of course he is so thick-skinned that he does not mind, that is
another case, but that is a matter of proof not of law.
11
Although that was in effect the position in Germany until recently.
12
See generally Rogers, Non-Pecuniary Loss (supra fn. 5).
13
Rogers, Non-Pecuniary Loss (supra fn. 5), at 257 et seq.
176 Rogers
the predominant view in modern European systems. The issue of injury to

health as ªdamage in itselfº is clearly linked to that of comparability (see
the second sentence of Art 10:301 para. 3). European systems vary consider-
ably in the way in which they approach the assessment of damages for non-
pecuniary loss. Even in personal injury cases in some systems it is very much
a matter for the trial court and there is little or no explanation of how awards
are arrived at. In others the approach is much more developed and ªscienti-
ficº and levels of award are fairly predictable. We do not think that it is pos-
sible in this exercise to prescribe how a court should approach the problem
of valuation (for example, the choice between the English system of a flexible
tariff based on precedent and supervised by the appeal process or the French/
Italian approach with system of medically assessed ªpointsº of disability as a
starting point): the question is intimately bound up with procedure and even
the ªstyleº of the legal system. However, we are firmly of the view that justice
requires that like cases should be treated broadly alike, which is something
that a number of systems seem to have achieved already. That of course
requires that information on current practice should be available to courts
and lawyers. We believe that justice requires the same approach to be taken
in principle to non-pecuniary loss cases though we readily admit that achiev-
ing comparability in practice or even articulating the reasons for an award
may be much more difficult: in terms of non-pecuniary loss two simple frac-
tures which heal may be regarded as prima facie comparable in their impact
on the victim's health and happiness, but two invasions of privacy or two
wrongful detentions are likely to differ much more, especially bearing in
mind the likely greater significance of the conduct of the tortfeasor in these
cases. But that is not a reason for dispensing with the requirement that the
result should be arrived at on a rational basis.

The relationship between this Article and Art. 2:101 has been set out 12
above 14. The nature and purpose of damages and the concept of pecuniary
damage are dealt with under Art. 10:101 to 10:203.

The law differs so much in this area that even a summary would take many 13
pages. The European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law, which works
closely with the European Group on Tort Law, undertook a detailed
survey of the law and practice in Austria, Belgium, England, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Accounts of these
systems are available in its report 15.
14
Art. 2:101 no. 4±5.
15
E. Karner/H. Koziol, Austria; H. Cousy/D. Droshout, Belgium; W.V.H. Rogers, England; S.
Galand-Carval, France; U. Magnus/J. Fedtke, Germany; K.D. Kerameus, Greece; F.D. Bus-
nelli/G. ComandeÂ, Italy; M.H. Wissink/W.H. van Boom, The Netherlands; M. Nesterowicz/
E. Baginska, Poland; M. Martin-Casals/J. Ribot/J. SoleÂ, Spain. There is also information on
Israeli (I. Gilead) and Swiss (P. Tercier) law.
Rogers 177
Illustrations
14 1. P suffers personal injury in an accident and the conditions for liability on
the part of D are met.
P is entitled to damages for loss of income and expenses under Art 10:202
para. 1 but whether or not there is any such loss, P is entitled to damages
for impairment of his health and the suffering undergone.
15 2. As in case 1, but P is rendered permanently comatose by the accident.
The fact that P is not conscious of what has happened to him does not
preclude an award of damages for the injury to his health.
16 3. V is killed in an accident and the conditions of liability on the part of D are
met. V leaves X, with whom he has been cohabiting for ten years, and Y and
Z, the children of that union. V is also survived by A, to whom V was still
married but with whom he had had no contact for some years, and B, V's
business partner and close friend.
In addition to damages for loss of support (if any) under Art 10:202 para. 2,
X, Y and Z may receive damages for their bereavement. A is probably not
entitled to damages under this Article because there is no longer a close
relationship. Nor is B entitled: neither a business relationship nor mere
friendship falls within the scope of the Article. Assuming that there was
no appreciable interval between the accident and the death 16 V's estate is
not entitled to damages for non-pecuniary loss.
17 4. A tabloid newspaper reveals, in circumstances which amount to an action-
able wrong, details of P's medical treatment and this causes great anxiety and
embarrassment to P. This is made worse by the way in which the newspaper
refuses any apology and mounts a defence of ªpublic interestº which it
knows is spurious.
If P's anxiety was so acute that it amounted to a recognized illness it would
be ªpersonal injuryº but even if it did not P is entitled to damages for the
distress he has suffered and the conduct of the newspaper may be taken
into account in the assessment of the damages.
18 5. P's car is damaged by D in circumstances in which the conditions for the
liability of D are met. P has some difficulty getting the car repaired promptly
and suffers so much annoyance that it spoils his holiday.
P is entitled to the cost of repairs and expenses under Art 10:203 but he is
not entitled to damages for his annoyance.
16
If there was an appreciable interval between injury and death we envisage that a claim for
non-pecuniary loss during that period would survive for the benefit of the estate, though that
is really a matter of procedural law.
178 Rogers
Section 4. Reduction of Damages

Art. 10:401 . Reduction of Damages
In an exceptional case, if in light of the financial situation of the parties full
compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant, damages
may be reduced. In deciding whether to do so, the basis of liability (Article
1:101), the scope of protection of the interest (Article 2:102) and the magni-
tude of the damage have to be taken into account in particular.
Comments
1. Overview
This article allows the court to mitigate liability in exceptional situations 1
where full compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant,
such as in the case of a 14 year old that burns down a house and may not
have the resources to indemnify the owner thereof. This issue is addressed
in some national legal systems 1 and it appears that in others, judges tend
to mitigate without doing so expressly. The recognition of a reduction
clause invites judges to act carefully and more openly, taking into account
among other things the financial situation of the parties, the basis of liabi-
lity, the scope of protection of the interest and the magnitude of the
damage. The fact that the victim benefits from insurance coverage is
usually taken into account. This reduction clause does not interfere with
insolvency law and may be disregarded wherever insolvency law leads to
a similar solution.
2. Scope and Terminology

Art. 10:401 is to be distinguished from Art. 3:201 which defines the scope of 2
liability and explains to what extent damage may be attributed to a person.
Once the damage is attributed in accordance with Art. 3:201, it may be
equitable, in some exceptional circumstances, to reduce the amount of
damages to be awarded on the basis of Art. 10:401.
The reference to Art. 1:101 (Basic norm), 2:102 (Protected interest) and to 3
criteria mentioned in 3:201 (Scope of liability) is not a repetition but an
indication of the consistency of the Principles which aim at defining similar
guidelines for the judgement as to the existence of the liability and its
extent, which may be limited in exceptional cases.
The reduction clause in Art. 10:401 should not be confused with the reduc- 4
tion based on the contributory conduct or activity of the victim, already
1
E.g. in Denmark (§ 19 Erstatningsanvarsloven), Finland (Chap. 2 § 1 para. 2 Vahingonkor-
vauslaki), the Netherlands (Art. 6:109 Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek), Norway (§ 5-2 Skadeser-
statningsloven), Poland (Art. 440 Kodeks cywilny), Portugal (Art. 494 CoÂdigo civil), Spain
(Art. 1103 CoÂdigo civil), Sweden (Chap. 6 § 2 SkadestdÅndslagen), Switzerland (Art. 43 sec. 1,
Art. 44 Obligationenrecht, see also Art. 52 of the Draft Revision of Swiss Tort Law).
MoreÂteau 179
mentioned in Art. 8:101. It is not based on the victim's contributory fault

but on the oppressive burden a full compensation may cause to the defen-
dant.
3. History and Background

5 The question whether exceptions should be allowed to the principle of full
compensation has been vividly discussed in the Group. Introducing a
possibility of ad hoc mitigation may indeed generate complexity and
uncertainty.
6 Dissenting opinions have been expressed by some members of the Group,
who would contend that tort law already contains many rather open-
textured principles designed to avoid the imposition of excessive liability.
They argue that a reduction clause which is focused on the position of the
individual parties adds a further element of unpredictability to the resolu-
tion of disputes, whether by judicial decision or by settlement. In particular,
they deem it inconsistent with rules such as the prescription in Art 10:301
para. 3 for treating like cases of non-pecuniary losses alike. Secondly, they
can see no reason why tort law should be singled out for special treatment:
ªoppressive burdensº may equally arise from contract liability. Thirdly,
they do not believe that this issue can be looked at except in the wider
context of insolvency law. Some European systems, for example, simply
ªwipe outº debts which have been proved in individual bankruptcy, others
do not: that is an issue which has considerable implications for the
existence and scope of any reduction clause. For these reasons (though
they would differ in the weight they attach to each of them) Francesco
Busnelli, Giovanni ComandeÂ and Horton Rogers are opposed to the reduc-
tion clause.
7 The majority of the Group agrees that mitigation should only be allowed in
exceptional circumstances and that the Principle containing the mitigation
clause should not be too vague, setting clear guidelines to the otherwise
arbitrary judicial discretion. It is indeed to be remembered that in a
significant number of jurisdictions, the assessment of damages is regarded
as a question of fact, left to be appreciated by lower judges without any
other possibility of review than an appeal before an intermediate appellate
court.
8 The reduction clause may appear as a novelty serving a double purpose: it
aims to clarify an obscure and often unidentified judicial practice and this
way it also meets the needs of harmonisation.
9 The reduction clause also makes sense in those systems where the plain-
tiff's purpose in suing the tortfeasor is to make sure that a criminal prosecu-
tion will be taken against him, the victim adding its civil action in damages
to the prosecution. In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor is then bound to
prosecute and may not decide to drop the charge. The purpose of the civil
action may be the official recognition of an infringement rather than full
180 MoreÂteau
compensation, which may be an oppressive burden to the defendant in

some cases.
4. Illustrations
D, the fourteen years old son of an unemployed couple, participates in a ski- 10
camp organised by his college. One morning, he runs downhill, following his
teacher and the other pupils, on a rather steep slope. At a certain moment, on
a hard frozen spot, he loses control over his skis and crashes into multi-
billionaire rock star P who stands on a little hill on the edge of the track.
The collision is violent, P suffers bruises in his face. He will not be able to
perform on a special gala concert that night for which he would have earned
¨ 2 million. 2
In this case, compensating the full loss would truly be an oppressive burden
to D when comparing his own financial situation with that of P, taking into
account the low degree of fault and the direct consequences of his conduct
under the circumstances.
Due to economic growth in the region, air traffic develops and at one point, 11
the local airport happens to exceed the level of noise allowed under existing
regulations, though only momentarily.
Dozens or hundreds of thousands of people may have a claim for this clear,
but singular violation of a norm, which has a protective purpose. If they all
could bring a claim and collect damages compensating the whole loss, the
airport may have to be shut down, which would lead to negative conse-
quences for the airport itself, its staff and the economic situation of the
whole region. Reduced damages may be a reasonable remedy in such a
case.
Likewise, in a major company with thousands of employees, one of them
by slight negligence may cause a trivial loss (yet not personal injury) to a
large number of individuals. The reduction clause may be applied where
the aggregated amount of damages would ruin the company as a whole.
2
This is a modified version of a hypothetical already used supra Art. 4:101 no. 21.
MoreÂteau 181
Translations of the
Please note that only the English version of the Principles of European
Tort Law (p. 3 et seq.) has been authorized by the European Group on
Tort Law.
Catalan Translation
by Miquel MartõÂn-Casals and Albert Ruda GonzaÂlez
Principis de dret europeu de la responsabilitat civil
TIÂTOL I. Norma fonamental (3) S'atorga una aÁmplia proteccioÂ als

drets reals, inclosos els que es refereixen
CapõÂtol 1. Norma fonamental
a les coses incorporals.
Art. 1:101. Norma fonamental (4) La proteccioÂ d'interessos purament
patrimonials o de relacions contractuals
(1) La persona a qui es pugui imputar pot tenir un abast meÂs limitat. En tals
jurõÂdicament el dany sofert per una altra casos ha de tenir-se en compte, de
estaÁ obligada a reparar-lo manera especial, la proximitat entre
(2) En particular, el dany pot imputar-se l'agent i la persona protegida, o el fet
a la persona que l'agent eÂs conscient que causaraÁ un
a) la conducta culposa de la qual l'hagi dany a la võÂctima malgrat que els seus
causat; o interessos siguin necessaÁriament objecte
b) l'activitat anormalment perillosa de d'una valoracioÂ inferior als d'aquesta.
la qual l'hagi causat; o (5) L'abast de la proteccioÂ pot veure's
c) l'auxiliar de la qual l'hagi causat en afectat igualment per la naturalesa de la
l'exercici de les seves funcions. responsabilitat, de tal manera que, en
cas de lesioÂ dolosa, l'intereÁs podraÁ rebre
TIÂTOL II. PressupoÁsits generals de la una proteccioÂ meÂs aÁmplia que en la
responsabilitat resta de casos.
CapõÂtol 2. Dany (6) Per establir l'abast de la proteccioÂ
tambeÂ hauran de tenir-se en compte els
Art. 2:101. Dany rescabalable interessos de l'agent, en especial, en la
seva llibertat d'accioÂ i en l'exercici dels
El dany requereix un perjudici material
seus drets, aixõÂ com els interessos
o immaterial a un intereÁs jurõÂdicament
puÂblics.
protegit.
Art. 2:103. Legitimitat del dany
Art. 2:102. Interessos protegits
Les peÁrdues relacionades amb activitats
(1) L'abast de la proteccioÂ d'un intereÁs o fonts que es consideren il.legõÂtimes no
depeÁn de la seva naturalesa; la seva poden ser rescabalades.
proteccioÂ seraÁ meÂs aÁmplia com major
sigui el seu valor, la precisioÂ de la seva Art. 2:104. Despeses preventives
definicioÂ i la seva obvietat. Les despeses realitzades per evitar un
(2) La vida, la integritat fõÂsica i psõÂquica, dany que amenacËa produir-se
la dignitat humana i la llibertat constitueixen un dany rescabalable en
gaudeixen de la proteccioÂ meÂs aÁmplia. la mesura en queÁ hagin estat raonables.
184 Catalan Translation

Art. 2:105. Prova del dany (2) No obstant, hauraÁ de tenir-se en

El dany s'ha de provar d'acord amb els compte aquesta activitat posterior si
ocasiona un dany addicional o agreujat.
criteris processals ordinaris. El tribunal
podraÁ estimar la quantia del dany quan (3) Si la primera activitat ha causat un
la prova del seu import exacte resulti dany continuat i l'activitat posterior
massa difõÂcil o costosa. tambeÂ l'hagueÂs causat meÂs tard,
ambdues activitats han de ser
CapõÂtol 3. RelacioÂ de causalitat considerades com a causa del dany
SeccioÂ 1. La conditio sine qua non i els continuat a partir del moment en queÁ
seus lõÂmits concorrin.
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non Art. 3:105. Causalitat parcial incerta
Una activitat o conducta (d'ara En el cas d'una pluralitat d'activitats, si
endavant, activitat) eÂs causa del dany de eÂs segur que cap d'elles no ha causat tot
la võÂctima si, d'haver faltat tal activitat, el dany o una part determinable del
el dany no s'hagueÂs produõÈt. mateix, es presumeix que aquelles que
probablement han contribuõÈt
Art. 3:102. Causes concurrents
(mõÂnimament) a causar-lo l'han causat
En cas d'una pluralitat d'activitats, si a parts iguals.
cadascuna d'elles hagueÂs causat el dany
Art. 3:106. Causes incertes en l'esfera de
per si sola al mateix temps, es
la võÂctima
consideraraÁ que cada activitat eÂs
causa del dany de la võÂctima. La võÂctima ha de carregar la peÁrdua
Art. 3:103. Causes alternatives soferta en la mesura corresponent a la
probabilitat que pugui haver estat
(1) En cas d'una pluralitat d'activitats, si causada per una activitat, esdeveniment
cadascuna d'elles ha estat suficient per o qualsevol altra circumstaÁncia
si sola per causar el dany, peroÁ eÂs pertanyent a la seva proÁpia esfera.
dubtoÂs quina d'elles l'ha causat
efectivament, es considera que cada SeccioÂ 2. Abast de la responsabilitat
activitat eÂs causa en la mesura Art. 3:201. Abast de la responsabilitat
corresponent a la probabilitat que pugui
haver causat el dany de la võÂctima. Si una activitat eÂs causa en el sentit de la
(2) Si, en el cas d'una pluralitat de SeccioÂ 1 d'aquest CapõÂtol, la quÈestioÂ de
võÂctimes, eÂs dubtoÂs que una activitat si pot ser imputada a una persona i en
hagi causat el dany d'una võÂctima quina mesura depeÁn de factors com ara
concreta, peroÁ eÂs probable que no hagi els seguÈents:
causat dany a totes les võÂctimes, es a) la previsibilitat del dany per una
considera que l'activitat eÂs causa del persona raonable en el moment de
dany sofert per totes les võÂctimes en produir-se l'activitat tot considerant, en
proporcioÂ a la probabilitat que pugui especial, la proximitat en el temps i en
haver causat el dany a una võÂctima l'espai entre l'activitat danyosa i la seva
concreta. consequÈeÁncia, o la magnitud del dany en
relacioÂ amb les consequÈeÁncies normals
Art. 3:104. Causes potencials de tal activitat;
(1) Si una activitat ha ocasionat un dany b) la naturalesa i valor de l'intereÁs
a la võÂctima de manera irreversible i protegit (article 2:102);
definitiva, tota activitat posterior que c) el fonament de la responsabilitat
per si mateixa hagueÂs causat el mateix (article 1:101);
dany ha de ser ignorada. d) l'abast dels riscos ordinaris de la vida; i
Miquel MartõÂn-Casals/Albert Ruda GonzaÂlez 185

e) el fi de proteccioÂ de la norma que ha d'una banda i la facilitat d'evitar-lo de

estat violada. l'altra indiquen l'existeÁncia de tal deure.
TIÂTOL III. Fonament de la SeccioÂ 2. InversioÂ de la caÁrrega de la
responsabilitat prova de la culpa
CapõÂtol 4. Responsabilitat per culpa Art. 4:201. InversioÂ de la caÁrrega de la
prova de la culpa en general
SeccioÂ 1. Requisits de la responsabilitat
per culpa (1) Es pot invertir la caÁrrega de la prova
de la culpa atesa la gravetat del perill
Art. 4:101. Culpa
que l'activitat en quÈestioÂ comporta.
Una persona respon sobre la base de la (2) La gravetat del perill es determina
culpa per la violacioÂ intencional o d'acord amb la gravetat del dany que en
negligent de l'estaÁndard de conducta aquests casos pugui produir-se i tambeÂ
exigible. amb la probabilitat que el dany arribi a
Art. 4:102. EstaÁndard de conducta succeir efectivament.
exigible Art. 4:202. Responsabilitat de l'empresa
(1) L'estaÁndard de conducta exigible eÂs (1) La persona que es dedica de manera
el d'una persona raonable que es trobi permanent a una activitat empresarial
en les mateixes circumstaÁncies i depeÁn, amb fins econoÁmics o professionals i
en particular, de la naturalesa i el valor que es serveix d'auxiliars o equipament
de l'intereÁs protegit de queÁ es tracti, de teÁcnic eÂs responsable de tot dany causat
la perillositat de l'activitat, de la perõÂcia per un defecte d'aquesta empresa o del
exigible a la persona que la duu a terme, queÁ en ella es produeixi, a no ser que
de la previsibilitat del dany, de la relacioÂ provi que ha complert amb l'estaÁndard
de proximitat o d'especial confiancËa de conducta exigible.
entre les persones implicades, aixõÂ com (2) ªDefecteº eÂs tota desviacioÂ respecte
de la disponibilitat i del cost de les dels estaÁndards que soÂn raonablement
mesures de precaucioÂ i dels meÁtodes exigibles a l'empresa o als seus
alternatius. productes o serveis.
(2) L'estaÁndard anteriorment indicat
pot adaptar-se quan degut a l'edat, a la CapõÂtol 5. Responsabilitat objectiva
discapacitat fõÂsica o psõÂquica o a Art. 5:101. Activitats anormalment
circumstaÁncies extraordinaÁries no sigui perilloses
exigible que la persona de qui es tracti
el compleixi. (1) La persona que duu a terme una
(3) En establir l'estaÁndard de conducta activitat anormalment perillosa respon
exigible han de tenir-se en compte les objectivament pel dany caracterõÂstic del
normes que prescriuen o prohibeixen risc que aquesta activitat comporta i que
una determinada conducta. d'ella en resulta.
(2) Una activitat eÂs anormalment
Art. 4:103. Deure de protegir als altres perillosa si:
de danys a) crea un risc previsible i significatiu de
Pot existir el deure d'actuar dany malgrat que hom empri tota la
positivament per protegir als altres de cura deguda en el seu exercici i
danys si aixõÂ s'estableix legalment, si qui b) no eÂs una activitat que sigui objecte
actua crea i controla una situacioÂ de d'uÂs comuÂ.
perill, si existeix una especial relacioÂ (3) El risc de dany pot ser significatiu en
entre les parts o si la gravetat del dany atencioÂ a la seva gravetat o probabilitat.

(4) Aquest article no s'aplica a una a) en defensa d'un intereÁs protegit propi
activitat subjecta especõÂficament a contra un atac antijurõÂdic (legõÂtima
responsabilitat objectiva per qualsevol defensa),
altra disposicioÂ d'aquests Principis o per b) per estat de necessitat,
qualsevol legislacioÂ nacional o c) perqueÁ no va poder obtenir l'ajuda de
convencioÂ internacional. les autoritats a temps (auto-ajuda),
Art. 5:102. Altres supoÁsits de d) amb el consentiment de la võÂctima, o
responsabilitat objectiva si aquesta va assumir el risc de resultar
danyada, o
(1) Les lleis nacionals poden establir e) en virtut d'una autoritzacioÂ legõÂtima,
altres supoÁsits de responsabilitat com ara la lliceÁncia.
objectiva per la praÁctica d'activitats (2) Que la exoneracioÂ sigui total o no
perilloses, malgrat que aquestes depeÁn, d'una part, de la importaÁncia
activitats no siguin anormalment d'aquestes causes de justificacioÂ i, de
perilloses. l'altra, dels pressupoÁsits de la
(2) Llevat que la llei nacional disposi responsabilitat.
altrament, els supoÁsits addicionals de (3) En casos extraordinaris, la
responsabilitat objectiva poden responsabilitat podraÁ ser simplement
establir-se per analogia amb d'altres que reduõÈda.
originin un risc semblant de dany.
Art. 7:102. Causes d'exoneracioÂ en
CapõÂtol 6. Responsabilitat per altres casos de responsabilitat objectiva
Art. 6:101. Responsabilitat pels menors
(1) La responsabilitat objectiva pot ser
o per discapacitats psõÂquics
objecte d'exoneracioÂ total o parcial si el
La persona que teÂ al seu caÁrrec a una dany va ser causat per una imprevisible i
altra que eÂs menor o pateix discapacitat irresistible
psõÂquica respon pel dany causat per a) forcËa de la natura (forcËa major), o
aquesta altra persona llevat que b) conducta d'un tercer.
demostri que ella mateixa va complir (2) Que l'exoneracioÂ de responsabilitat
amb l'estaÁndard de conducta que li era objectiva sigui total o parcial i, en cas de
exigible a l'hora de supervisar-la. reduccioÂ, la seva extensioÂ, depeÁn, d'una
Art. 6:102. Responsabilitat pels auxiliars banda, de la importaÁncia de la influeÁncia
externa i, de l'altra, de l'abast de la
(1) Una persona respon pel dany causat responsabilitat (article 3:201).
pels seus auxiliars en l'exercici de les (3) En el cas de la reduccioÂ prevista en
seves funcions sempre que hagin violat l'apartat (1)(b), la responsabilitat
l'estaÁndard de conducta exigible. objectiva i qualsevol tipus de
(2) El contractista independent no es responsabilitat del tercer soÂn solidaÁries
considera auxiliar als efectes d'aquest conforme a alloÁ que disposa l'article
article. 9:101 (1)(b).
TIÂTOL IV. CAUSES CapõÂtol 8. Conducta o activitat
D'EXONERACIO Â
concurrent
CapõÂtol 7. Causes d'exoneracioÂ en Art. 8:101. Conducta o activitat
general concurrent de la võÂctima
Art. 7:101. Causes de justificacioÂ
(1) Pot excloure's o reduir-se la
(1) Pot excloure's la responsabilitat de responsabilitat en la mesura en queÁ es
qui ha actuat legõÂtimament en la mesura consideri just atesa la culpa concurrent
en queÁ ho hagi fet: de la võÂctima i qualssevol altres

circumstaÁncies que serien rellevants per responsables davant la võÂctima. A

establir o reduir la responsabilitat de la aquest efecte, la persona que afirma que
võÂctima si fos la causant del dany. el dany no eÂs el mateix suporta la
(2) Si es sol.licita la indemnitzacioÂ en caÁrrega de la prova. Si existeix aquesta
relacioÂ amb la mort d'una persona, la base raonable, la responsabilitat eÂs
seva conducta o activitat exclou o parciaÁria, eÂs a dir, cada persona respon
redueix la responsabilitat d'acord amb davant la võÂctima nomeÂs per la part del
el que disposa l'apartat 1. dany que li eÂs imputable.
(3) La conducta o activitat concurrent Art. 9:102 La relacioÂ entre les persones
d'un auxiliar de la võÂctima exclou o subjectes a responsabilitat solidaÁria
redueix la indemnitzacioÂ que aquesta
pot reclamar d'acord amb el que disposa (1) La persona subjecta a
l'apartat 1. responsabilitat solidaÁria teÂ dret de
retorn enfront de qualsevol altra
TIÂTOL V. PLURALITAT DE
persona que sigui responsable davant la
CAUSANTS DEL DANY
võÂctima pel mateix dany. Aquest dret
CapõÂtol 9. Pluralitat de causants del s'estableix sense perjudici d'alloÁ que
dany disposi sobre la distribucioÂ de la peÁrdua
qualsevol contracte celebrat entre elles
Art 9:101 Solidaritat i parciarietat:
o qualsevol disposicioÂ legal o d'un dret
relacioÂ entre la võÂctima i la pluralitat de
de reembossament en virtut de la
causants del dany
subrogacioÂ [cessio legis] o amb base en
(1) La responsabilitat eÂs solidaÁria si tot l'enriquiment injust.
el dany sofert per la võÂctima o una part (2) D'acord amb alloÁ que disposa
diferenciada eÂs imputable a dues o meÂs l'apartat (3) d'aquest article, la quota
persones. La responsabilitat seraÁ d'aquest dret de retorn seraÁ la que es
solidaÁria si: consideri justa ateses les respectives
a) una persona participa en l'actuacioÂ responsabilitats pel dany, en
il.lõÂcita d'altres sabent que causa dany a consideracioÂ a les seves culpes
la võÂctima, o la instiga o estimula; respectives i a qualsevol altre aspecte
b) el comportament o activitat rellevant per establir o reduir la
independent d'una persona causa dany responsabilitat. L'import del retorn pot
a la võÂctima i el mateix dany eÂs tambeÂ ascendir a l'import total de la
imputable a una altra persona; indemnitzacioÂ. Si no pot determinar-se
c) una persona eÂs responsable pel dany la responsabilitat que correspon a
causat per un auxiliar en circumstaÁncies cadascuna de les persones responsables,
en queÁ tambeÂ l'auxiliar eÂs responsable. es consideraran responsables per igual.
(2) Quan diverses persones es troben (3) Si una persona eÂs responsable pel
subjectes a responsabilitat solidaÁria, la dany causat per un auxiliar d'acord amb
võÂctima pot reclamar tota la alloÁ que disposa l'article 9:101, hom la
indemnitzacioÂ d'una o diverses d'elles, a consideraraÁ responsable per tota la
condicioÂ que no obtingui major quota imputable a l'auxiliar a l'hora de
indemnitzacioÂ que la corresponent a distribuir la responsabilitat entre ell i
l'import total del dany sofert. qualsevol altre causant del dany diferent
(3) Es considera que un dany eÂs el de l'esmentat auxiliar.
mateix dany als efectes de l'apartat (4) L'obligacioÂ de respondre en via de
(1)(b) anterior si no existeix una base retorn per la part respectiva eÂs
raonable per imputar-ne nomeÂs una parciaÁria, eÂs a dir, la persona obligada
part a cadascuna de les persones respon nomeÂs per la quota de

responsabilitat que, segons aquest SeccioÂ 2. Dany patrimonial

article, li correspongui pel dany; peroÁ si Art. 10:201. Naturalesa i determinacioÂ
no pot executar-se la senteÁncia que del dany patrimonial
estableix la condemna de la persona
responsable del dany en via de retorn, la El dany patrimonial rescabalable eÂs la
seva part ha de redistribuir-se entre les disminucioÂ del patrimoni de la võÂctima
altres en proporcioÂ a les seves causada per l'esdeveniment danyoÂs. Per
respectives quotes. regla general, aquest dany es determina
d'una forma tan concreta com sigui
TIÂTOL VI. REMEIS possible, peroÁ pot determinar-se en
abstracte, com ara en relacioÂ al valor de
CapõÂtol 10. IndemnitzacioÂ mercat, quan escaigui.
SeccioÂ 1. IndemnitzacioÂ en general Art. 10:202. Dany corporal i mort
Art. 10:101. Naturalesa i objecte de la (1) En el cas de dany corporal, el qual
indemnitzacioÂ inclou el dany a la salut fõÂsica i a la
La indemnitzacioÂ eÂs un pagament en psõÂquica si comporta una malaltia
diners per compensar la võÂctima, eÂs a reconeguda, el dany patrimonial inclou
dir, per restablir-la, en la mesura en queÁ la peÁrdua d'ingressos, el perjudici de la
els diners puguin fer-ho, en la posicioÂ capacitat d'obtenir-los (fins i tot si no va
que hagueÂs tingut si l'il.lõÂcit pel qual acompanyat d'una peÁrdua d'ingressos) i
reclama no s'hagueÂs produõÈt. La les despeses raonables, com ara el cost
indemnitzacioÂ tambeÂ contribueix a la de l'atencioÂ meÁdica.
finalitat de prevenir el dany. (2) En el cas de mort, hom considera
que les persones que, com ara els
Art. 10:102. Suma global o renda familiars, el difunt havia mantingut o
perioÁdica hauria mantingut si la mort no s'hagueÂs
produõÈt, han sofert un dany rescabalable
La indemnitzacioÂ s'atorga mitjancËant
en la mesura de la seva peÁrdua de
suma global o renda perioÁdica segons
sosteniment.
escaigui tot atenent, de manera especial,
als interessos de la võÂctima. Art. 10:203. PeÁrdua, destruccioÂ i dany
de coses
Art. 10:103. Beneficis obtinguts
(1) Quan una cosa es perd, destrueix o
mitjancËant l'esdeveniment danyoÂs
danya, la mesura baÁsica de la
En determinar la quantia de la indemnitzacioÂ eÂs el seu valor i eÂs
indemnitzacioÂ, han de tenir-se en indiferent que la võÂctima vulgui substituir
compte els beneficis que el danyat ha la cosa o reparar-la. Tanmateix, si la
obtingut mitjancËant l'esdeveniment võÂctima l'ha substituõÈda o reparada (o ho
danyoÂs, llevat que aixoÁ sigui faraÁ) pot recuperar la major despesa si
incompatible amb la finalitat del aquesta actuacioÂ eÂs raonable.
benefici. (2) TambeÂ pot rescabalar-se la peÁrdua
de l'uÂs d'una cosa, incloses les peÁrdues
Art. 10:104. ReparacioÂ en forma que se'n derivin, com ara la peÁrdua de
especõÂfica negoci.
En lloc de la indemnitzacioÂ, el danyat SeccioÂ 3. Dany no patrimonial
pot reclamar la reparacioÂ en forma
especõÂfica en la mesura en queÁ sigui Art. 10:301. Dany no patrimonial
possible i no resulti excessivament (1) En atencioÂ a l'abast de la seva
carregosa per l'altra part. proteccioÂ (article 2:102), la lesioÂ d'un

intereÁs pot justificar la compensacioÂ del (incloses les que corresponguin a les
dany no patrimonial. Aquest eÂs el cas, persones properes a la võÂctima que ha
en especial, si la võÂctima ha sofert un mort o que ha sofert lesions greus)
dany corporal o un dany a la dignitat s'hauran de concedir sumes
humana, a la llibertat o a altres drets de indemnitzatoÁries similars per aquelles
la personalitat. TambeÂ pot rescabalar-se peÁrdues que siguin objectivament
el dany no patrimonial d'aquelles similars.
persones properes a la võÂctima d'un
accident mortal o d'una lesioÂ molt greu. SeccioÂ 4. ReduccioÂ de la indemnitzacioÂ
(2) En general, per quantificar aquests Art. 10:401. ReduccioÂ de la
danys hom tindraÁ en compte totes les indemnitzacioÂ
circumstaÁncies del cas, incloent la
gravetat, durada i consequÈeÁncies del En casos excepcionals, pot reduir-se la
dany. Hom tindraÁ en compte el grau de indemnitzacioÂ si la compensacioÂ õÂntegra
culpa del causant del dany nomeÂs si comporta una caÁrrega opressiva per al
contribueix al dany de la võÂctima de demandat atesa la situacioÂ econoÁmica de
manera significativa. les parts. Per determinar si escau
(3) En els casos de dany corporal, el aquesta reduccioÂ, hom hauraÁ de tenir en
dany no patrimonial correspon al compte, de manera especial, el fonament
sofriment de la võÂctima i al perjudici de de la responsabilitat (article 1:101),
la seva salut fõÂsica o psõÂquica. En la l'abast de la proteccioÂ de l'intereÁs
quantificacioÂ de les indemnitzacions (article 2:102) i la magnitud del dany.

Czech Translation
by JirÏõÂ HraÂdek and LubosÏ TichyÂ
Principy evropskeÂho deliktnõÂho praÂva
DõÂl I. ZaÂkladnõÂ ustanovenõÂ (4) Ochrana majetkovyÂch zaÂjmuÊ nebo

smluvnõÂch vztahuÊ muÊzÏe byÂt co do
Hlava 1. ZaÂkladnõÂ ustanovenõÂ
rozsahu omezena. V takovyÂch
CÏlaÂnek 1:101. ZaÂkladnõÂ ustanovenõÂ prÏõÂpadech musõÂ byÂt zohledneÏn
prÏedevsÏõÂm blõÂzkyÂ vztah mezi jednajõÂcõÂm
(1) KazÏdyÂ, komu lze na zaÂkladeÏ zaÂkona
a ohrozÏenyÂm nebo skutecÏnost, zÏe
prÏipsat sÏkodu zpuÊsobenou jineÂmu, je
jednajõÂcõÂ si je veÏdom, zÏe zpuÊsobõÂ sÏkodu,
povinen tuto sÏkodu nahradit.
acÏkoliv jsou jeho zaÂjmy meÂneÏ hodnotneÂ
(2) SÏkodu lze prÏipsat konkreÂtneÏ tomu,
nezÏ zaÂjmy posÏkozeneÂho.
a) kdo ji zpuÊsobil svyÂm zavineÏnyÂm cho-
(5) Rozsah ochrany muÊzÏe byÂt takeÂ
vaÂnõÂm; nebo
ovlivneÏn druhem odpoveÏdnosti do teÂ
b) jehozÏ abnormaÂlneÏ nebezpecÏnaÂ mõÂry, zÏe urcÏityÂ zaÂjem muÊzÏe pozÏõÂvat vysÏsÏõÂ
cÏinnost zpuÊsobila sÏkodu; nebo ochrany proti uÂmyslneÏ zpuÊsobeneÂ uÂjmeÏ
c) jehozÏ pomocnõÂk zpuÊsobil sÏkodu nezÏ v ostatnõÂch prÏõÂpadech.
v rozsahu sveÂho uÂkolu. (6) PrÏi rozhodovaÂnõÂ o rozsahu ochrany
DõÂl II. ObecneÂ prÏedpoklady musõÂ byÂt zvaÂzÏeny jak zaÂjmy jednajõÂcõÂho,
odpoveÏdnosti prÏedevsÏõÂm co do svobody jednaÂnõÂ a
vyÂkonu jeho praÂv, tak verÏejny zaÂjem.
Hlava 2. SÏkoda
CÏlaÂnek 2:103. SÏkoda, kteraÂ se
CÏlaÂnek 2:101. SÏkoda zpuÊsobilaÂ naÂhrady nenahrazuje
SÏkoda je majetkovou nebo NaÂhradu sÏkody vztahujõÂcõÂ se k aktivitaÂm
nemajetkovou uÂjmou zaÂkonem nebo zdrojuÊm, ktereÂ jsou chaÂpaÂny jako
chraÂneÏneÂho zaÂjmu. nezaÂkonneÂ, nelze uplatnÏovat.
CÏlaÂnek 2:102. ChraÂneÏneÂ zaÂjmy CÏlaÂnek 2:104. VyÂdaje na prevenci
(1) Rozsah ochrany zaÂjmu zaÂvisõÂ na jeho VyÂdaje vznikleÂ z duÊvodu braÂneÏnõÂ hrozõÂcõÂ
povaze; cÏõÂm vysÏsÏõÂ je jeho hodnota, sÏkodeÏ prÏedstavujõÂ nahraditelnou sÏkodu
prÏesneÏjsÏõÂ jeho urcÏenõÂ a jeho ocÏividnost, potud, pokud byly vynalozÏeny duÊvodneÏ.
tõÂm rozsaÂhlejsÏõÂ je jeho ochrana.
(2) ZÏivot, teÏlesnaÂ a dusÏevnõÂ integrita, CÏlaÂnek 2:105. ProkaÂzaÂnõÂ sÏkody
lidskaÂ duÊstojnost a svoboda pozÏõÂvajõÂ SÏkoda musõÂ byÂt prokaÂzaÂna podle
nejvysÏsÏõÂ ochrany. beÏzÏnyÂch procesnõÂch prÏedpisuÊ. Soud
(3) RozsaÂhlaÂ ochrana je zarucÏena muÊzÏe odhadnout rozsah sÏkody
majetkovyÂm praÂvuÊm, vcÏetneÏ praÂv k v prÏõÂpadech, kde by prokaÂzaÂnõÂ prÏesneÂ
nehmotnyÂm statkuÊm. vÂysÏe bylo prÏõÂlisÏ obtõÂzÏneÂ anebo naÂkladneÂ.
196 Czech Translation

Hlava 3. PrÏõÂcÏinnaÂ souvislost (kausalita) obeÏ jednaÂnõÂ od takoveÂho okamzÏiku

povazÏovat za prÏõÂcÏinu teÂto pokracÏujõÂcõÂ
OddõÂl 1. Conditio sine qua non a
sÏkody.
kvalifikace
CÏlaÂnek 3:105. NeurcÏitaÂ dõÂlcÏõÂ kauzalita
CÏlaÂnek 3:101. Conditio sine qua non
V prÏõÂpadeÏ võÂce jednaÂnõÂ, kdy je jisteÂ, zÏe
JednaÂnõÂ nebo opomenutõÂ (daÂle jen zÏaÂdneÂ z jednaÂnõÂ nezpuÊsobilo celou sÏkodu
jednaÂnõÂ) je prÏõÂcÏinnou sÏkody ani jejõÂ urcÏitelnou cÏaÂst, se prÏedpoklaÂdaÂ, zÏe
posÏkozeneÂho, jestlizÏe by prÏi neexistenci ta jednaÂnõÂ, kteraÂ zjevneÏ [minimaÂlneÏ]
takoveÂho jednaÂnõÂ sÏkoda nevznikla. prÏispeÏla ke sÏkodeÏ, ji zpuÊsobila rovnyÂm
CÏlaÂnek 3:102. KonkurencÏnõÂ prÏõÂcÏiny dõÂlem.
V prÏõÂpadeÏ võÂce jednaÂnõÂ, z nichzÏ kazÏdeÂ by CÏlaÂnek 3:106. PrÏõÂcÏina ve sfeÂrÏe
samo zpuÊsobilo sÏkodu v ten samyÂ posÏkozeneÂho
okamzÏik, je povazÏovaÂno kazÏdeÂ jednaÂnõÂ PosÏkozenyÂ musõÂ neÂst svou uÂjmu v
za prÏõÂcÏinu sÏkody posÏkozeneÂho. rozsahu odpovõÂdajõÂcõÂm
CÏlaÂnek 3:103. AlternativnõÂ prÏõÂcÏiny pravdeÏpodobnosti, do jakeÂ mõÂry mohla
byÂt zpuÊsobena jednaÂnõÂm, udaÂlostõÂ nebo
(1) V prÏõÂpadeÏ võÂce jednaÂnõÂ, z nichzÏ jinou okolnostõÂ v jeho sfeÂrÏe.
kazÏdeÂ by bylo samo dostatecÏnou
prÏõÂcÏinou sÏkody, prÏicÏemzÏ vsÏak zuÊstaÂvaÂ OddõÂl 2. Rozsah odpoveÏdnosti
nejistyÂm, ktereÂ jednaÂnõÂ ji ve skutecÏnosti CÏlaÂnek 3:201. Rozsah odpoveÏdnosti
zpuÊsobilo, musõÂ byÂt kazÏdeÂ jednaÂnõÂ
Existuje-li prÏõÂcÏinnaÂ souvislost podle
povazÏovaÂno za prÏõÂcÏinu v rozsahu
OddõÂlu 1 teÂto Hlavy, zda a v jakeÂm
pravdeÏpodobnosti, v jakeÂ mohlo
rozsahu maÂ byÂt sÏkoda prÏipsaÂna zaÂlezÏõÂ na
zpuÊsobit sÏkodu posÏkozeneÂmu.
faktorech jako jsou
(2) Pokud v prÏõÂpadeÏ võÂce posÏkozenyÂch
a) prÏedvõÂdatelnost sÏkody v okamzÏiku
zuÊstane nejistyÂm, zda konkreÂtnõÂ sÏkoda
jejõÂho vzniku rozumnou osobou,
posÏkozeneÂho byla zpuÊsobena urcÏityÂm
prÏicÏemzÏ je zohledneÏn konkreÂtnõÂ cÏasovyÂ
jednaÂnõÂm, prÏicÏemzÏ je zrÏejmeÂ, zÏe toto
a prostorovyÂ vztah mezi sÏkodnyÂm
jednaÂnõÂ nezpuÊsobilo sÏkodu vsÏem
jednaÂnõÂm a jeho naÂsledky, nebo rozsah
posÏkozenyÂm, musõÂ byÂt takoveÂ jednaÂnõÂ
sÏkody ve vztahu k normaÂlnõÂm
povazÏovaÂno za prÏõÂcÏinu sÏkod utrpeÏnyÂch
naÂsledkuÊm takoveÂho jednaÂnõÂ;
vsÏemi posÏkozenyÂmi v rozsahu
b) povaha a hodnota chraÂneÏneÂho zaÂjmu
pravdeÏpodobnosti, v jakeÂ mohlo
(cÏl. 2:102);
zpuÊsobit sÏkodu konkreÂtnõÂmu
c) duÊvod odpoveÏdnosti (cÏl. 1:101);
posÏkozeneÂmu.
d) rozsah beÏzÏnyÂch zÏivotnõÂch rizik; a
CÏlaÂnek 3:104. PotenciaÂlnõÂ prÏõÂcÏiny e) ochrannyÂ uÂcÏel normy, kteraÂ byla
(1) JestlizÏe jednaÂnõÂ vedlo definitivneÏ a porusÏena.
neodvratneÏ ke zpuÊsobenõÂ sÏkody DõÂl III. DuÊvod odpoveÏdnosti
posÏkozeneÂmu, naÂsledneÂ jednaÂnõÂ, ktereÂ
by samo zpuÊsobilo tu samou sÏkodu, Hlava 4. OdpoveÏdnost za zavineÏnõÂ
nebude braÂno v potaz. OddõÂl 1. PodmõÂnky odpoveÏdnosti za
(2) NaÂsledneÂ jednaÂnõÂ musõÂ byÂt i prÏesto zavineÏnõÂ
zohledneÏno, jestlizÏe vedlo k dodatecÏneÂ
nebo teÏzÏsÏõÂ sÏkodeÏ. CÏlaÂnek 4:101. ZavineÏnõÂ
(3) JestlizÏe prvnõÂ jednaÂnõÂ vedlo k KazÏdyÂ je odpoveÏdnyÂ na zaÂkladeÏ
pokracÏovaÂnõÂ sÏkody a naÂsledneÂ pozdeÏjsÏõÂ zavineÏnõÂ za uÂmyslneÂ nebo nedbalostnõÂ
jednaÂnõÂ by ji takeÂ zpuÊsobilo, pak je trÏeba porusÏenõÂ pozÏadovaneÂ uÂrovneÏ chovaÂnõÂ.
JirÏõÂ HraÂdek/LubosÏ TichyÂ 197

CÏlaÂnek 4:102. PozÏadovanaÂ uÂrovenÏ CÏlaÂnek 4:202. OdpoveÏdnost podniku

chovaÂnõÂ (1) Kdo provozuje podnik k
(1) PozÏadovanaÂ uÂrovenÏ chovaÂnõÂ se urcÏõÂ hospodaÂrÏskeÂmu nebo profesionaÂlnõÂmu
jako chovaÂnõÂ rozumneÂ osoby v zaÂvislosti uÂcÏelu a kdo pouzÏõÂvaÂ pomocnõÂky nebo
na okolnostech a zaÂlezÏõÂ konkreÂtneÏ na technickeÂ vybavenõÂ, je odpoveÏdnyÂ za
povaze a hodnoteÏ chraÂneÏneÂho zaÂjmu, kazÏdou uÂjmu zpuÊsobenou poruchou
jehozÏ se tyÂkaÂ, nebezpecÏnosti jednaÂnõÂ, takoveÂho podniku nebo jeho produktu,
zkusÏenostech, ktereÂ jsou ocÏekaÂvaÂny u dokud neprokaÂzÏe, zÏe jednal v souladu s
jednajõÂcõÂ osoby, prÏedpoveÏditelnosti pozÏadovanou uÂrovnõÂ chovaÂnõÂ.
sÏkody, vztahu blõÂzkosti nebo zvlaÂsÏtnõÂho (2) ¹Poruchaª je jakaÂkoliv odchylka od
vztahu mezi teÏmi, jizÏ se to tyÂkaÂ, jakozÏ i standardu, kteryÂ muÊzÏe byÂt rozumneÏ
dosazÏitelnosti a ceny prevencÏnõÂch nebo ocÏekaÂvaÂn od podniku nebo od jeho
alternativnõÂch metod. produktu nebo sluzÏeb.
(2) DanaÂ uÂrovenÏ muÊzÏe byÂt upravena, Hlava 5. OdpoveÏdnost bez zavineÏnõÂ
pokud vzhledem k veÏku, fyzickeÂ a CÏlaÂnek 5:101. AbnormaÂlneÏ nebezpecÏneÂ
dusÏevnõÂ neschopnosti nebo zvlaÂsÏtnõÂm cÏinnosti
okolnostem nemuÊzÏe byÂt ocÏekaÂvaÂno, zÏe jõÂ
osoba dostojõÂ. (1) Kdo vykonaÂvaÂ abnormaÂlneÏ
nebezpecÏnou cÏinnost je objektivneÏ
(3) Normy, ktereÂ prÏedepisujõÂ nebo
odpoveÏdnyÂ za sÏkodu charakteristickou
zakazujõÂ urcÏiteÂ chovaÂnõÂ, musõÂ byÂt
pro nebezpecÏõÂ prÏedstavovaneÂ cÏinnostõÂ a
uvaÂzÏeny, pokud stanovujõÂ pozÏadovanou
vyplyÂvajõÂcõÂ z nõÂ.
uÂrovenÏ chovaÂnõÂ.
(2) CÏinnost je abnormaÂlneÏ nebezpecÏnaÂ,
CÏlaÂnek 4:103. Povinnost chraÂnit ostatnõÂ jestlizÏe
prÏed sÏkodou a) vytvaÂrÏõÂ prÏedpoveÏditelneÂ a vyÂznamneÂ
nebezpecÏõÂ sÏkody, i kdyzÏ prÏi jejõÂm
Povinnost jednat za uÂcÏelem ochrany provozu je dodrzÏena vesÏkeraÂ rÏaÂdnaÂ peÂcÏe
ostatnõÂch prÏed sÏkodou muÊzÏe existovat, a
jestlizÏe tak stanovõÂ zaÂkon nebo jestlizÏe b) nenõÂ prÏedmeÏtem beÏzÏneÂho uzÏõÂvaÂnõÂ.
jednajõÂcõÂ vytvaÂrÏõÂ nebo kontroluje (3) NebezpecÏõÂ sÏkody muÊzÏe byÂt
nebezpecÏnou situaci nebo kdyzÏ existuje vyÂznamneÂ vzhledem k zaÂvazÏnosti nebo
zvlaÂsÏtnõÂ vztah mezi stranami nebo pravdeÏpodobnosti sÏkody.
pokud zaÂvazÏnost uÂjmy na jedneÂ straneÏ a (4) Tento cÏlaÂnek se nepouzÏije na
jednoducheÂ odvraÂcenõÂ sÏkody na druheÂ cÏinnost, kteraÂ podleÂhaÂ odpoveÏdnosti bez
straneÏ vybõÂzõÂ k takoveÂ povinnosti. zavineÏnõÂ na zaÂkladeÏ jinyÂch ustanovenõÂ
teÏchto PrincipuÊ nebo jineÂho naÂrodnõÂho
OddõÂl 2. ObraÂcenõÂ duÊkaznõÂho brÏemene
praÂva cÏi mezinaÂrodnõÂ smlouvy.
o zavineÏnõÂ
CÏlaÂnek 5:102. OstatnõÂ prÏõÂpady
CÏlaÂnek 4:201. ObraÂcenõÂ duÊkaznõÂho
odpoveÏdnosti bez zavineÏnõÂ
brÏemene o zavineÏnõÂ obecneÏ
(1) NaÂrodnõÂ praÂvo muÊzÏe stanovit dalsÏõÂ
(1) DuÊkaznõÂ brÏemeno o zavineÏnõÂ muÊzÏe prÏõÂpady odpoveÏdnosti bez zavineÏnõÂ pro
byÂt obraÂceno vzhledem k zaÂvazÏnosti nebezpecÏneÂ cÏinnosti, i kdyzÏ cÏinnost nenõÂ
nebezpecÏõÂ, ktereÂ jednaÂnõÂ prÏedstavuje. abnormaÂlneÏ nebezpecÏnaÂ.
(2) ZaÂvazÏnost nebezpecÏõÂ je stanovena (2) Dokud nenõÂ naÂrodnõÂm praÂvem
podle zaÂvazÏnosti mozÏneÂ sÏkody v stanoveno neÏco jineÂho, mohou
danyÂch prÏõÂpadech, jakozÏ i dodatecÏneÂ prÏõÂpady odpoveÏdnosti bez
pravdeÏpodobnosti, zÏe takovaÂ sÏkoda zavineÏnõÂ vyplyÂvat z analogie jinyÂch
muÊzÏe skutecÏneÏ vzniknout. zdrojuÊ srovnatelneÂho nebezpecÏõÂ sÏkody.

Hlava 6. OdpoveÏdnost za trÏetõÂ osoby CÏlaÂnek 7:102. ZprosÏteÏnõÂ odpoveÏdnosti

v prÏõÂpadeÏ odpoveÏdnosti bez zavineÏnõÂ
CÏlaÂnek 6:101. OdpoveÏdnost za nezletileÂ
nebo osoby dusÏevneÏ nemocneÂ (1) OdpoveÏdnost bez zavineÏnõÂ muÊzÏe byÂt
vyloucÏena nebo omezena, pokud byla
Kdo pecÏuje o jineÂho, kteryÂ je nezletilyÂ
zpuÊsobena neprÏedvõÂdatelnou a
nebo dusÏevneÏ nemocnyÂ, je odpoveÏdnyÂ za
neodvratitelnou
sÏkodu zpuÊsobenou touto osobou, dokud
neprokaÂzÏe, zÏe jednal v souladu s a) prÏõÂrodnõÂ sõÂlou (vysÏsÏõÂ moc), nebo
pozÏadovanou uÂrovnõÂ chovaÂnõÂ prÏi dohledu. b) chovaÂnõÂm trÏetõÂch osob.
(2) Zda je odpoveÏdnost bez zavineÏnõÂ
CÏlaÂnek 6:102. OdpoveÏdnost za vyloucÏena nebo omezena, a pokud ano,
pomocnõÂky tak v jakeÂm rozsahu, zaÂlezÏõÂ na vyÂznamu
(1) KazÏdyÂ je odpoveÏdnyÂ za sÏkodu vneÏjsÏõÂch vlivuÊ na straneÏ jedneÂ a rozsahu
zpuÊsobenou jeho pomocnõÂky jednajõÂcõÂmi odpoveÏdnosti (cÏlaÂnek 3:201) na straneÏ
v raÂmci jejich uÂkolu za prÏedpokladu, zÏe druheÂ.
porusÏili pozÏadovanou uÂrovenÏ chovaÂnõÂ (3) Dojde-li k omezenõÂ odpoveÏdnosti
(cÏl. 4:102). podle odstavce (1)(b), jsou odpoveÏdnost
(2) NezaÂvislaÂ smluvnõÂ strana nenõÂ bez zavineÏnõÂ a jakaÂkoliv odpoveÏdnost
povazÏovaÂna za pomocnõÂka pro uÂcÏely trÏetõÂch osob solidaÂrnõÂ ve smyslu cÏlaÂnku
tohoto cÏlaÂnku. 9:101 (1)(b).
DõÂl IV. ZprosÏteÏnõÂ odpoveÏdnosti Hlava 8. SpoluzavineÏneÂ chovaÂnõÂ nebo
jednaÂnõÂ
Hlava 7. ZprosÏteÏnõÂ odpoveÏdnosti
obecneÏ CÏlaÂnek 8:101. SpoluzavineÏneÂ chovaÂnõÂ
nebo jednaÂnõÂ posÏkozeneÂho
CÏlaÂnek 7:101. ZprosÏteÏnõÂ odpoveÏdnosti
zalozÏeneÂ na duÊvodech vylucÏujõÂcõÂch (1) OdpoveÏdnost muÊzÏe byÂt omezena
protipraÂvnost nebo vyloucÏena v takoveÂm rozsahu, jak
to vyplyÂvaÂ ze spoluzavineÏnõÂ
(1) OdpoveÏdnost muÊzÏe byÂt vyloucÏena, posÏkozeneÂho a vsÏech ostatnõÂch prÏõÂcÏin,
pokud jednal jednajõÂcõÂ ospravedlnitelneÏ ktereÂ by mohly byÂt relevantnõÂ pro vznik
a v rozsahu ospravedlnitelnosti nebo omezenõÂ odpoveÏdnosti
a) prÏi obraneÏ jeho vlastnõÂho chraÂneÏneÂho posÏkozeneÂho, pokud by byl sÏkuÊdcem.
zaÂjmu proti protipraÂvnõÂmu uÂtoku (2) Pokud je naÂhrada sÏkody pozÏadovaÂna
(sebeobrana), z duÊvodu smrti osoby, muÊzÏe jejõÂ chovaÂnõÂ
b) v krajnõÂ nouzi, nebo jednaÂnõÂ vyloucÏit nebo omezit
c) z toho duÊvodu, zÏe pomoc uÂrÏaduÊ odpoveÏdnost ve smyslu odstavce 1.
nemohla byÂt vyzÏaÂdaÂna vcÏas (sveÂpomoc), (3) SpoluzavineÏneÂ chovaÂnõÂ nebo jednaÂnõÂ
d) se souhlasem posÏkozeneÂho, nebo pomocnõÂka posÏkozeneÂho vylucÏuje nebo
jestlizÏe si posÏkozenyÂ byl veÏdom omezuje sÏkodu vymahatelnou
nebezpecÏõÂ vzniku uÂjmy, nebo posÏkozenyÂm ve smyslu odstavce 1.
e) z duÊvodu zaÂkonneÂho zmocneÏnõÂ, jako
naprÏõÂklad licence. DõÂl V. VõÂce sÏkuÊdcuÊ
(2) Zda je odpoveÏdnost vyloucÏena, Hlava 9. VõÂce sÏkuÊdcuÊ
zaÂlezÏõÂ na vyÂznamu teÏchto duÊvoduÊ
vylucÏujõÂcõÂch protipraÂvnost na straneÏ CÏlaÂnek 9:101. SolidaÂrnõÂ a dõÂlcÏõÂ
odpoveÏdnost: vztah mezi obeÏtõÂ a võÂce
jedneÂ a podmõÂnkaÂch odpoveÏdnosti na
sÏkuÊdci
straneÏ druheÂ.
(3) Ve vyÂjimecÏnyÂch prÏõÂpadech muÊzÏe byÂt (1) OdpoveÏdnost je solidaÂrnõÂ, jestlizÏe
odpoveÏdnost namõÂsto vyloucÏenõÂ pouze celaÂ nebo urcÏitaÂ cÏaÂst sÏkody, kterou
omezena. utrpeÏl posÏkozenyÂ, je prÏipsatelnaÂ dveÏma

nebo võÂce osobaÂm. OdpoveÏdnost je cÏaÂstky odsÏkodneÏnõÂ. Pokud nenõÂ mozÏneÂ

solidaÂrnõÂ, pokud: urcÏit vlastnõÂ odpoveÏdnost odpoveÏdnyÂch
a) se osoba veÏdomeÏ uÂcÏastnila nebo osob, musõÂ s nimi byÂt zachaÂzeno jako
podneÏcovala nebo podporovala sÏkodliveÂ s rovneÏ odpoveÏdnyÂmi.
jednaÂnõÂ ostatnõÂch, kterÏõÂ zpuÊsobili sÏkodu (3) Kdo je odpoveÏdnyÂ za sÏkodu
posÏkozeneÂmu; nebo zpuÊsobenou pomocnõÂkem podle cÏlaÂnku
b) nezaÂvisleÂ chovaÂnõÂ nebo jednaÂnõÂ osoby 9:101, s tõÂm musõÂ byÂt pro uÂcÏely
zpuÊsobilo sÏkodu posÏkozeneÂmu a ta vyporÏaÂdaÂnõÂ mezi nõÂm a jinyÂm sÏkuÊdcem,
samaÂ sÏkoda je takeÂ prÏipsatelnaÂ jineÂ nezÏ je pomocnõÂk, zachaÂzeno, jako by
osobeÏ; nesl celyÂ dõÂl odpoveÏdnosti prÏipisovanyÂ
c) osoba je zodpoveÏdnaÂ za sÏkodu pomocnõÂkovi.
zpuÊsobenou pomocnõÂkem za okolnostõÂ, (4) Povinnost vyporÏaÂdaÂnõÂ je dõÂlcÏõÂ, to
za kteryÂch je pomocnõÂk takeÂ odpoveÏdnyÂ. znamenaÂ, zÏe kazÏdyÂ je odpoveÏdnyÂ pouze
(2) JestlizÏe osoby jsou solidaÂrneÏ za svuÊj danyÂ dõÂl odpoveÏdnosti za sÏkodu
odpoveÏdneÂ, muÊzÏe posÏkozenyÂ zÏaÂdat podle tohoto cÏlaÂnku; nenõÂ-li vsÏak mozÏneÂ
plnou naÂhradu sÏkody od jednoho nebo vymoci rozhodnutõÂ o vyrovnaÂnõÂ proti
võÂce z nich za prÏedpokladu, zÏe nevy- odpoveÏdneÂmu, jeho podõÂl musõÂ byÂt
maÂhaÂ võÂce nezÏ je vyÂsÏe utrpeÏneÂ sÏkody. prÏerozdeÏlen mezi ostatnõÂ odpoveÏdneÂ
v rozsahu jejich odpoveÏdnosti.
(3) Pro uÂcÏely odstavce (1)(b) se za
sÏkodu povazÏuje celaÂ sÏkoda, pokud DõÂl VI. ProstrÏedky naÂpravy
neexistuje rozumnyÂ duÊvod pro prÏipsaÂnõÂ Hlava 10. NaÂhrada sÏkody
pouheÂ cÏaÂsti (dõÂlcÏõÂ) sÏkody kazÏdeÂ z osob
OddõÂl 1. NaÂhrada sÏkody obecneÏ
odpoveÏdnyÂch posÏkozeneÂmu. Kdo tvrdõÂ
opak, musõÂ prokaÂzat, zÏe tomu tak nenõÂ. CÏlaÂnek 10:101. Povaha a uÂcÏel naÂhrady
Je-li tak prokaÂzaÂno, pak odpoveÏdnost je sÏkody
dõÂlcÏõÂ; neboli kazÏdyÂ je odpoveÏdnyÂ NaÂhrada sÏkody je peneÏzÏnõÂ platba, kteraÂ
posÏkozeneÂmu pouze za jemu maÂ nahradit posÏkozeneÂmu sÏkodu, jinak
prÏipsatelnou cÏaÂst sÏkody. rÏecÏeno navraÂtit ho do stavu, pokud to
jen peneÏzi jde, ve ktereÂm by byl, kdyzÏ
CÏlaÂnek 9:102. Vztah mezi subjekty
by sÏkodliveÂ jednaÂnõÂ nebylo spaÂchaÂno.
solidaÂrnõÂ odpoveÏdnosti
NaÂhrada sÏkody slouzÏõÂ takeÂ uÂcÏelu
(1) Kdo je solidaÂrneÏ odpoveÏdnyÂ, muÊzÏe prÏedchaÂzenõÂ sÏkodaÂm.
vymaÂhat podõÂl kazÏdeÂ jineÂ osoby
CÏlaÂnek 10:102. JednoraÂzovaÂ cÏaÂstka
odpoveÏdneÂ posÏkozeneÂmu ve vztahu k teÂ
nebo opakovaneÂ platby
sameÂ sÏkodeÏ. TõÂm nejsou dotcÏeny
dohody mezi odpoveÏdnyÂmi urcÏujõÂcõÂ NaÂhrada sÏkody je poskytovaÂna v
rozdeÏlenõÂ uÂjmy nebo jinaÂ provaÂdeÏcõÂ jednoraÂzoveÂ cÏaÂstce nebo jako renta,
ustanovenõÂ nebo praÂvo vymaÂhat sÏkodu pokud je to vhodneÂ s ohledem na
z duÊvodu prÏevzetõÂ praÂv (cessio legis) konkreÂtnõÂ zaÂjmy posÏkozeneÂho.
nebo z duÊvodu bezduÊvodneÂho CÏlaÂnek 10:103. ProspeÏch zõÂskanyÂ
obohacenõÂ. sÏkodnou udaÂlostõÂ
(2) S vyÂjimkou odstavce (3) tohoto Je-li urcÏovaÂna vyÂsÏe naÂhrady sÏkody, musõÂ
cÏlaÂnku se vyÂsÏe podõÂla rÏõÂdõÂ tõÂm, co se zdaÂ byÂt uvaÂzÏen prospeÏch, ktereÂ posÏkozenyÂ
byÂt spravedliveÂ ve sveÏtle konkreÂtnõÂ zõÂskal sÏkodnou udaÂlostõÂ, ledazÏe je tato
odpoveÏdnost odpoveÏdnyÂch osob za neslucÏitelnaÂ s vyÂhodou.
sÏkodu vzhledem k jejich vlastnõÂmu stupni
zavineÏnõÂ a vsÏem dalsÏõÂm prÏõÂcÏinaÂm, ktereÂ CÏlaÂnek 10:104. NavraÂcenõÂ v prÏedesÏly stav
duÊvodneÏ zaklaÂdajõÂ nebo omezujõÂ jejich NamõÂsto naÂhrady sÏkody muÊzÏe byÂt
odpoveÏdnost. PodõÂl muÊzÏe dosahovat plneÂ posÏkozenyÂm pozÏadovaÂno navraÂcenõÂ v

prÏedesÏlyÂ stav, pokud je to mozÏneÂ a uzÏõÂvat, vcÏetneÏ naÂslednyÂch ztraÂt, jako

neprÏedstavuje prÏõÂlisÏ velkeÂ brÏemeno pro naprÏõÂklad usÏleÂho zisku.
druhou stranu.
OddõÂl 3. NemajetkovaÂ sÏkoda
OddõÂl 2. MajetkovaÂ sÏkoda
CÏlaÂnek 10:301. NemajetkovaÂ sÏkoda
CÏlaÂnek 10:201. Povaha a urcÏenõÂ
(1) UvazÏujeme-li o rozsahu ochrany (cÏl.
majetkoveÂ sÏkody
2:102), muÊzÏe posÏkozenõÂ zaÂjmu ospra-
NahraditelnaÂ majetkovaÂ sÏkoda je vedlnit naÂhradu nemajetkoveÂ sÏkody. Je
zmensÏenõÂ majetku posÏkozeneÂho tomu tak konkreÂtneÏ v prÏõÂpadeÏ, kdyzÏ
zpuÊsobeneÂ sÏkodnou udaÂlostõÂ. Tato posÏkozenyÂ utrpeÏl osobnõÂ uÂjmu nebo
sÏkoda musõÂ byÂt zaÂsadneÏ urcÏena co uÂjmu na sveÂ svobodeÏ, duÊstojnosti nebo
nejkonkreÂtneÏji, ale muÊzÏe byÂt takeÂ sta- jinyÂch osobnostnõÂch praÂvech.
novena abstraktneÏ, pokud je to vhodneÂ, NemajetkovaÂ sÏkoda muÊzÏe byÂt vymaÂhaÂna
naprÏõÂklad odkazem na trzÏnõÂ hodnotu. teÂzÏ osobami majõÂcõÂmi blõÂzkyÂ vztah k
CÏlaÂnek 10:202. OsobnõÂ uÂjma a smrt posÏkozeneÂmu, kteryÂ utrpeÏl smrtelnou
nebo velmi vaÂzÏnou nesmrtelnou uÂjmu.
(1) V prÏõÂpadeÏ osobnõÂ uÂjmy, kteraÂ (2) ObecneÏ musõÂ byÂt prÏi stanovenõÂ
zahrnuje uÂjmu fyzickeÂmu a dusÏevnõÂmu takoveÂ naÂhrady sÏkody zvaÂzÏeny vsÏechny
zdravõÂ dosahujõÂcõÂ mõÂry uznatelneÂ okolnosti prÏõÂpadu, vcÏetneÏ zaÂvazÏnosti,
nemoci, zahrnuje majetkovaÂ sÏkoda trvaÂnõÂ a naÂsledkuÊ uÂjmy. StupenÏ zavineÏnõÂ
ztraÂtu na prÏõÂjmu, zhorsÏenõÂ schopnosti sÏkuÊdce musõÂ byÂt vzat v potaz pouze,
vydeÏlaÂvat (i kdyzÏ nenõÂ spojena s zÏaÂdnou pokud vyÂznamneÏ prÏispeÏl k uÂjmeÏ
ztraÂtou na prÏõÂjmu) a prÏimeÏrÏeneÂ vyÂdaje, posÏkozeneÂho.
jako naprÏ. naÂklady na leÂkarÏskou peÂcÏi.
(3) V prÏõÂpadeÏ osobnõÂ uÂjmy odpovõÂdaÂ
(2) V prÏõÂpadeÏ smrti se osoby, jako jsou
nemajetkovaÂ uÂjma utrpenõÂ posÏkozeneÂho
rodinnõÂ prÏõÂslusÏnõÂci, jimzÏ zemrÏelyÂ
a zhorsÏenõÂ jeho teÏlesneÂho nebo
poskytoval nebo by poskytoval vyÂzÏivu,
dusÏevnõÂho zdravõÂ. PrÏi stanovenõÂ naÂhrady
pokud by nenastala smrt, povazÏujõÂ za
sÏkody (vcÏetneÏ naÂhrady sÏkody osobaÂm s
osoby, ktereÂ utrpeÏly nahraditelnou
blõÂzkyÂm vztahem k zemrÏeleÂmu nebo
sÏkodu v rozsahu ztraÂty teÂto podpory.
k vaÂzÏneÏ zraneÏneÂmu posÏkozeneÂmu) by
CÏlaÂnek 10:203. ZtraÂta, posÏkozenõÂ a meÏly byÂt pro objektivneÏ podobneÂ uÂjmy
sÏkoda na veÏci prÏiznaÂvaÂny srovnatelneÂ cÏaÂstky.
(1) Je-li ztracena, znicÏena nebo OddõÂl 4. OmezenõÂ naÂhrady sÏkody
posÏkozena veÏc, je zaÂkladnõÂm meÏrÏõÂtkem
CÏlaÂnek 10:401. OmezenõÂ naÂhrady sÏkody
pro naÂhradu sÏkody hodnota veÏci nebo
zmensÏenõÂ jejõÂ hodnoty a nehraje roli, zda NaÂhrada sÏkody muÊzÏe byÂt ve
posÏkozenyÂ maÂ v uÂmyslu veÏc vymeÏnit vyjimecÏnyÂch prÏõÂpadech omezena, pokud
nebo opravit. JestlizÏe ale posÏkozenyÂ veÏc by vzhledem k financÏnõÂ situaci stran
vymeÏnil nebo opravil (nebo tak udeÏlaÂ), prÏedstavovala plnaÂ naÂhrada sÏkody
muÊzÏe vymaÂhat vysÏsÏõÂ naÂklady, ktereÂ mu prÏõÂlisÏnou zaÂteÏzÏ pro zÏalovaneÂho. PrÏi
tõÂm vznikly, jestlizÏe bylo rozumneÂ tak rozhodovaÂnõÂ zda naÂhradu sÏkody omezit
ucÏinit. musõÂ byÂt podrobneÏ zvaÂzÏeny duÊvod
(2) NaÂhrada sÏkody muÊzÏe byÂt takeÂ odpoveÏdnosti (cÏl. 1:101), rozsah ochrany
prÏiznaÂna z duÊvodu nemozÏnosti veÏc zaÂjmu (cÏl. 2:102) a rozsah sÏkody.

French Translation
by Olivier MoreÂteau*
Principes de droit europeÂen de la responsabiliteÂ civile
TITRE I. La norme de base (2) La vie, l'inteÂgriteÂ corporelle ou

mentale et la liberteÂ jouissent de la
Art. 1:101. Norme de base
protection la plus eÂtendue.
(1) Toute personne aÁ qui le dommage
(3) Les droits de proprieÂteÂ se voient
subi par autrui est leÂgalement imputable
accorder une protection eÂtendue, y
est tenue de le reÂparer.
compris en matieÁre de droits portant sur
(2) Le preÂjudice peut eÃtre imputeÂ en
des biens incorporels.
particulier aÁ toute personne:
a) dont le comportement fautif a eÂteÂ la (4) La protection des inteÂreÃts
cause du dommage; ou eÂconomiques ou des relations
b) dont les activiteÂs anormalement contractuelles pourra eÃtre d'eÂtendue
dangereuses ont eÂteÂ la cause du plus limiteÂe, en consideÂration
dommage; ou notamment de la proximiteÂ entre
c) dont le preÂposeÂ a causeÂ le dommage l'auteur et la personne menaceÂe ou du
dans l'eÂtendue de ses fonctions. fait que l'auteur avait conscience de
causer un dommage, alors que ses
TITRE II. Les conditions de la inteÂreÃts sont neÂcessairement de valeur
responsabiliteÂ infeÂrieure aÁ ceux de la victime.
Chapitre 2. Le preÂjudice (5) L'eÂtendue de la protection pourra
Art. 2:101. PreÂjudice reÂparable eÂgalement eÃtre affecteÂe par la nature de
la responsabiliteÂ, de telle sorte que
Le preÂjudice consiste en une atteinte
qu'un inteÂreÃt pourra recevoir une
mateÂrielle ou immateÂrielle aÁ un inteÂreÃt
protection plus eÂtendue en cas d'atteinte
juridiquement proteÂgeÂ.
intentionnelle que dans les autres cas.
Art. 2:102. InteÂreÃts proteÂgeÂs
(6) Afin de deÂterminer le champ de la
(1) L'eÂtendue de la protection d'un protection, les inteÂreÃts de l'auteur,
inteÂreÃt deÂpend de sa nature; plus sa notamment dans sa liberteÂ d'action et
valeur est eÂleveÂe, sa deÂfinition preÂcise et dans l'exercice de ses droits, ainsi que
la neÂcessiteÂ de le proteÂger eÂvidente, plus l'inteÂreÃt geÂneÂral, devront eÂgalement eÃtre
sa protection sera eÂtendue. pris en consideÂration.
* Version francËaise reÂaliseÂe sous la direction du Professeur Olivier MoreÂteau par l'eÂquipe de
recherche de l'Institut de droit compareÂ Edouard Lambert (UniversiteÂ Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
en novembre 2003 aÁ l'occasion de la reÂunion aÁ Lyon du European Group on Tort Law (13 au
15 novembre 2003) et reÂviseÂe le 31 deÂcembre 2004.
202 French Translation

Art. 2:103. LeÂgitimiteÂ du preÂjudice proportion de sa contribution probable

au dommage subi par la victime.
Les pertes relatives aux activiteÂs ou aux
sources consideÂreÂes comme illeÂgitimes (2) En cas de victimes multiples, deÁs lors
ne pourront eÃtre recouvreÂes. qu'il n'est pas certain que le dommage
subi par une victime particulieÁre a eÂteÂ
Art. 2:104. DeÂpenses preventives causeÂ par une activiteÂ, alors meÃme qu'il
Les deÂpenses engageÂes pour preÂvenir la est probable qu'elle n'a pas causeÂ le
menace d'un dommage sont preÂjudice de toutes les victimes, cette
consideÂreÂes comme preÂjudice activiteÂ est consideÂreÂe comme une cause
reÂparable, du moment qu'elles sont du dommage subi par toutes les victimes
raisonnablement engageÂes. en proportion de sa contribution
probable au dommage subi par une
Art. 2:105. Preuve du preÂjudice victime particulieÁre.
La preuve du preÂjudice est rapporteÂe Art. 3:104. Causes potentielles
selon les reÁgles normales de
l'administration de la preuve. Le juge (1) Lorsqu'une activiteÂ a conduit la
peut s'en remettre aÁ une simple victime, de manieÁre certaine et
estimation de l'eÂtendue du preÂjudice irreÂversible, aÁ subir un dommage, toute
lorsque la preuve du montant exact se activiteÂ conseÂcutive qui aurait aÁ elle
reÂveÁle trop difficile ou trop couÃteuse aÁ seule pu entraõÃner le meÃme dommage,
eÂtablir. doit eÃtre ignoreÂe.
(2) L'activiteÂ conseÂcutive est neÂanmoins
Chapitre 3. Le lien de causaliteÂ prise en compte lorsqu'elle a conduit aÁ
Section 1. Condition sine qua non et un dommage suppleÂmentaire ou aÁ une
autres conditions aggravation du dommage.
(3) Lorsque la premieÁre activiteÂ a causeÂ
Art. 3:101. Condition sine qua non aÁ un dommage continu que l'activiteÂ
Est consideÂreÂe comme cause du conseÂcutive aurait aussi causeÂ par la
dommage subi par la victime tout suite, les deux activiteÂs sont consideÂreÂes
activiteÂ ou conduite (ci-apreÁs «activiteÂ») aÁ compter de ce moment comme cause
en l'absence de laquelle le dommage ne de ce dommage continu.
serait pas survenu.
Art. 3:105. CausaliteÂ partielle incertaine
Art. 3:102. Causes concurrentes
En cas d'activiteÂs multiples, lorsqu'il est
Dans le cas d'activiteÂs multiples, deÁs lors certain qu'aucune d'entre elles n'a causeÂ
que chacune d'elles prise isoleÂment la totaliteÂ du dommage ou une part
aurait dans le meÃme temps causeÂ le deÂterminable de celui-ci, toutes celles
dommage, chaque activiteÂ est ayant probablement contribueÂ au
consideÂreÂe comme une cause du dommage [meÃme de manieÁre minimale]
dommage subi par la victime. sont preÂsumeÂes eÃtre, aÁ eÂgale portion, la
cause de celui-ci.
Art. 3:103. Causes alternatives
Art. 3:106. Causes incertaines dans la
(1) En cas d'activiteÂs multiples, deÁs lors
spheÁre d'influence de la victime
que chacune d'elles prise isoleÂment
aurait eÂteÂ suffisante pour causer le La victime doit supporter ses pertes
dommage, mais que celle ayant dans la mesure correspondant aÁ
effectivement conduit aÁ sa reÂalisation l'incidence possible d'une activiteÂ, d'un
reste incertaine, chaque activiteÂ est eÂveÂnement ou toute autre circonstance,
consideÂreÂe comme une cause, en incluant des eÂveÂnements naturels, du
Olivier MoreÂteau 203

moment que cette cause se trouve dans eÃtre attendu de la personne engageÂe
sa spheÁre d'influence. dans cette activiteÂ, de la preÂvisibiliteÂ du
dommage, de la relation de proximiteÂ
Section 2. Etendue de la responsabiliteÂ
ou de confiance particulieÁre entre les
Art. 3:201. Etendue de la responsabiliteÂ personnes impliqueÂes, ainsi que de la
Lorsqu'une activiteÂ est une cause au disponibiliteÂ et du couÃt des mesures de
sens de la section 1 du preÂsent chapitre, protection ou meÂthodes alternatives.
la question de savoir si le dommage (2) Le standard preÂciteÂ peut eÃtre ajusteÂ
peut eÃtre imputeÂ aÁ une personne et aÁ lorsqu'en raison de l'aÃge, du handicap
quelle hauteur il peut l'eÃtre deÂpend de mental ou physique ou lorsqu'en raison
facteurs tels que: de circonstances extraordinaires, il n'est
a) la preÂvisibiliteÂ du dommage par une pas possible d'exiger d'une personne
personne raisonnable au moment de qu'elle s'y conforme.
l'activiteÂ, eu eÂgard notamment aÁ la (3) Les reÁgles prescrivant ou prohibant
proximiteÂ dans le temps ou l'espace de certaines conduites doivent eÃtre prises
l'activiteÂ dommageable et de ses en consideÂration afin d'eÂtablir le
conseÂquences, ou de l'importance du standard de conduite requis.
dommage face aux conseÂquences Art. 4:103. Devoir de proteÂger autrui
normales d'une telle activiteÂ; d'un dommage
b) la nature ou la valeurs de l'inteÂreÃt
Un devoir d'agir positivement pour
proteÂgeÂ (Art. 2:102);
proteÂger autrui d'un dommage peut
c) le fondement de la responsabiliteÂ
exister lorsque la loi le preÂvoit ou
(Art. 1:101);
lorsque l'auteur creÂe ou controÃle une
d) l'eÂtendue des risques ordinaires de la
situation dangereuse ou lorsque les
vie; et
parties entretiennent des relations
e) l'objectif de protection assigneÂ aÁ la particulieÁres ou lorsque le caracteÁre
reÁgle qui a eÂteÂ violeÂe. seÂrieux du dommage d'une part et le fait
qu'il eut eÂteÂ aiseÂ de l'eÂviter d'autre part,
TITRE III. Les fondements de la induit une telle obligation.
responsabiliteÂ
Section 2. Renversement de la charge de
Chapitre 4. La responsabiliteÂ pour faute la preuve de la faute
Section 1. Les conditions de la Art. 4:201. Renversement de la charge
responsabiliteÂ pour faute de la preuve de la faute, geÂneÂraliteÂs
Art. 4:101. Faute (1) La charge de rapporter la preuve
Toute personne qui viole intentionelle- d'une faute pourra eÃtre renverseÂe aÁ la
ment ou par negligence, le standard de lumieÁre de la graviteÂ du danger preÂsenteÂ
conduite requis, engage sa par l'activiteÂ.
responsabiliteÂ pour faute. (2) La graviteÂ du danger se deÂtermine
en fonction du seÂrieux d'un dommage
Art. 4:102. Standard de conduite requis
potentiel dans de telles circonstances,
(1) Le standard de conduite requis est ainsi que de la probabiliteÂ qu'un tel
celui qu'aurait adopteÂ une personne dommage ne survienne effectivement.
raisonnable, placeÂe dans les meÃmes
Art. 4:202. ResponsabiliteÂ du fait de
circonstances, et deÂpend, notamment,
l'entreprise
de la nature et de la valeur de l'inteÂreÃt
proteÂgeÂ en question, de la dangerositeÂ (1) Toute personne poursuivant une
de l'activiteÂ, du savoir-faire qui pouvait activiteÂ durable dans un but

eÂconomique ou professionnel et utilisant (2) Sauf disposition contraire du droit

des preÂposeÂs ou un eÂquipement national, des cateÂgories additionnelles
technique, est responsable pour toute de responsabiliteÂ sans faute peuvent
atteinte causeÂe par la deÂfaillance d'une eÃtre induites par analogie avec d'autres
telle entreprise ou de sa production, aÁ sources de risque de dommage
moins qu'elle ne prouve qu'elle a qu'elle comparable.
s'est conformeÂe au standard de conduite
Chapitre 6. La responsabiliteÂ du fait
requis.
d'autrui
(2) La «deÂfaillance» s'entend de toute
deÂviance par rapport aux standards qui Art. 6:101. ResponsabiliteÂ du fait des
peuvent raisonnablement eÃtre attendus mineurs et des handicapeÂs mentaux
de la part d'une entreprise ou de ses
Toutre personne en charge d'un mineur
produits ou services.
ou d'un handicapeÂ mental est
Chapitre 5. La responsabiliteÂ sans faute responsable des dommages causeÂs par
Art. 5:101. ActiviteÂs anormalement ce dernier, aÁ moins qu'elle ne deÂmontre
dangereuse qu'elle s'est conformeÂe au standard de
conduite requis dans sa supervision.
(1) Toute personne pratiquant une
activiteÂ anormalement dangereuse est Art. 6:102. ResponsabiliteÂ du fait des
de plein droit responsable des preÂposeÂs
dommages causeÂs, deÁs lors que ceux-ci (1) Toute personne est responsable du
sont caracteÂristiques du risque preÂsenteÂ dommage causeÂ par ses preÂposeÂs
par l'activiteÂ et qu'ils en reÂsultent. agissant dans l'eÂtendue de leurs
(2) Une activiteÂ est anormalement fonctions, deÁs lors que ces derniers ont
dangereuse si: violeÂ le standard de conduite requis.
a) Elle creÂe un risque preÂvisible et (2) Un entrepreneur indeÂpendant n'est
hautement significatif de dommage, pas consideÂreÂ comme un preÂposeÂ au
encore que cette activiteÂ ait eÂteÂ meneÂe sens du preÂsent article.
avec toute la diligence neÂcessaire et;
b) si elle n'est pas d'une pratique TITRE IV. Les causes limitatives ou
commune. exoneÂratoires de responsabiliteÂ
(3) Le risque de dommage peut eÃtre Chapitre 7. Des causes en geÂneÂral
consideÂreÂ comme significatif eu eÂgard aÁ
la graviteÂ ou aÁ la probabiliteÂ du Art. 7:101. Faits justificatifs
dommage. (1) La responsabiliteÂ peut eÃtre eÂcarteÂe si
(4) Lorsqu'une activiteÂ fait l'objet d'une et dans la mesure ouÁ l'auteur a agit
responsabiliteÂ sans faute par l'effet de leÂgitimement:
toute autre disposition de ces Principes, a) pour la deÂfense de ses inteÂreÃts
d'une loi nationale ou d'une convention proteÂgeÂs contre une agression illicite
internationale, l'application de cet (leÂgitime deÂfense),
article est exclue.
b) en cas de neÂcessiteÂ,
Art. 5:102. Autres cas de responsabiliteÂ c) car l'assistance des autoriteÂs n'a pu
sans faute eÃtre obtenue aÁ temps,
(1) Les droits nationaux peuvent d) avec le consentement de la victime ou
preÂvoir des cateÂgories suppleÂmentaires si cette dernieÁre a accepteÂ le risque du
de responsabiliteÂ sans faute pour dommage, ou
activiteÂs dangereuses meÃme si l'activiteÂ e) en vertu d'un pouvoir leÂgalement
n'est pas anormalement dangereuse. confeÂreÂ tel qu'une autorisation.

(2) Pour exclure la responsabiliteÂ, il est (3) Lorsque le preÂposeÂ de la victime a,

tenu compte du poids de ces faits par sa conduite ou son activiteÂ,
justificatifs d'une part, et des conditions contribueÂ aÁ la reÂalisation du dommage,
de la responsabiliteÂ d'autre part. l'allocation de dommages et inteÂreÃts aÁ la
(3) Dans des cas exceptionnels, la victime peut eÃtre exclue ou reÂduite
responsabiliteÂ sera reÂduite plutoÃt conformeÂment aÁ cet article.
qu'exclue. TITRE V. La pluraliteÂ d'auteurs
Art. 7:102. Causes d'exoneÂration en cas Chapitre 9. La pluraliteÂ d'auteurs
de responsabiliteÂ sans faute Art 9:101. ResponsabiliteÂ solidaire et
(1) La responsabiliteÂ sans faute peut conjointe: relation entre la victime et
eÃtre eÂcarteÂe ou reÂduite si le dommage des auteurs multiples
est du aÁ: (1) La responsabiliteÂ est solidaire
a) un cas de force majeure, ou lorsque la totaliteÂ ou une part distincte
b) au fait d'un tiers, du dommage subi par la victime peut
aÁ condition que ces causes exoneÂratoires eÃtre attribueÂ aÁ deux ou plusieurs
aient eÂteÂ impreÂvisibles et irreÂsistibles. personnes. La responsabiliteÂ est
(2) Pour exclure ou reÂduire la solidaire lorsque:
responsabiliteÂ sans faute et, dans ce a) une personne participe sciemment ou
dernier cas, dans quelle proportion, il suscite ou encourage la mauvaise action
sera tenu compte du poids des d'autres personnes qui cause un
influences exteÂrieures d'une part et de dommage aÁ la victime; ou
l'eÂtendue de la responsabiliteÂ (Article b) une personne, par son comportement
3:201) d'autre part. ou son activiteÂ indeÂpendante, cause un
(3) Lorsque qu'elle est reÂduite en dommage aÁ la victime et que le meÃme
application du paragraphe (1)(b), la dommage est aussi imputable aÁ une
responsabiliteÂ sans faute et la autre personne;
responsabiliteÂ eÂventuelle d'un tiers sont c) une personne est responsable du
solidaires en application de l'Article dommage causeÂ par son preÂposeÂ dans
9:101(1)(b). des circonstances ouÁ la responsabiliteÂ du
preÂposeÂ est aussi engageÂe.
Chapitre 8. La contribution de la (2) En cas de responsabiliteÂ solidaire, la
victime victime peut exiger la pleine
Art. 8:101. ActiviteÂ ou conduite compensation de son preÂjudice aupreÁs de
contributive de la victime n'importe quel coauteur ou de plusieurs
d'entre eux, eÂtant entendu qu'elle ne
(1) La responsabiliteÂ peut eÃtre exclue ou saurait obtenir plus que la reÂparation
reÂduite dans des proportions intreÂgrale du preÂjudice qu'elle a subi.
consideÂreÂes comme justes eu eÂgard aÁ la (3) Le dommage est consideÂreÂ comme le
faute contributive de la victime et tout meÃme dommage aux fins de l'alineÂa
autre eÂleÂment qui permettrait d'eÂtablir (1)(b) ci-dessus lorsque il n'y a aucun
ou reÂduire la responsabiliteÂ de la fondement raisonnable permettant d'en
victime si elle avait eÂteÂ l'auteur du attribuer une portion seulement aÁ
dommage. chacun des individus tenus pour
(2) Lorsque le deÂceÁs d'un individu responsable de celui-ci. A cet effet, c'est
entraõÃne une action en dommages et aÁ la personne preÂtendant que le
inteÂreÃts, la conduite ou l'activiteÂ de la dommage n'est pas le meÃme d'en
victime exclut ou reÂduit la responsabiliteÂ rapporter la preuve. En pareil cas, la
de l'auteur conformeÂment aÁ cet article. responsabiliteÂ est multiple, ce qui

signifie que chaque auteur n'est proportionnellement aÁ la responsabiliteÂ

responsable vis-aÁ-vis de la victime que qui leur incombe.
pour la part du preÂjudice qui peut lui
TITRE VI. La reÂparation du dommage
eÃtre imputeÂe.
Chapitre 10. Les dommages et inteÂreÃts
Art 9:102. Relations entre personnes
Section 1. Des dommages et inteÂreÃts en
solidairement responsables
geÂneÂral
(1) Toute personne tenue solidaire-
Art. 10:101. Nature et objet des
ment responsable peut reÂclamer une
dommages et inteÂreÃts
contribution aÁ n'importe quelle
personne responsable du meÃme Les dommages et inteÂreÃts consistent en
dommage aÁ l'eÂgard de la victime. Ce le paiement d'une somme d'argent
droit s'exerce sans preÂjudice de tout visant aÁ compenser le preÂjudice de la
contrat entre les auteurs quant aÁ la victime, c'est-aÁ-dire, aÁ la replacer, pour
deÂtermination de la reÂpartition de la autant que l'argent y parvienne, dans la
perte, de toute disposition leÂgale ou de position qui aurait eÂteÂ la sienne si
tout droit aÁ recouvrement par l'atteinte dont elle se plaint n'avait pas
subrogation ou sur la base d'un eÂteÂ commise. Les dommages et inteÂreÃts
enrichissement sans cause. ont accessoirement une fonction
(2) Sous reÂserve des dispositions du preÂventive.
paragraphe 3 de cet article, le montant Art. 10:102. Paiement global ou
de la contribution doit eÃtre justement paiements peÂriodiques
eÂvalueÂ en fonction de la responsabiliteÂ Les dommages et inteÂreÃts sont alloueÂs
incombant aÁ chacun des auteurs, eu sous la forme d'une somme globale ou
eÂgard au degreÂ de leur faute respective de paiements peÂriodiques selon ce qui
ou de tout autre eÂleÂment permettant convient, eu eÂgard notamment aux
d'eÂtablir ou de reÂduire leur inteÂreÃts de la victime.
responsabiliteÂ. Cette contribution peut
correspondre au montant total de Art. 10:103. Avantages obtenus par
l'indemnisation. S'il est impossible de l'effet de l'eÂveÂnement dommageable
deÂterminer la part de responsabiliteÂ qui Lors de la deÂtermination du montant des
incombe aÁ chacun des auteurs, tous sont dommages et inteÂreÃts, les avantages
alors reÂputeÂs eÂgalement responsables. percËus par la partie leÂseÂe par l'effet de
(3) Lorsqu'une personne est responsable l'eÂveÂnement dommageable doivent eÃtre
du fait de son preÂposeÂ en vertu de pris en compte, aÁ moins que cela ne soit
l'article 9:101, elle est reÂputeÂe supporter inconciliable avec l'objet de ces
la part entieÁre de responsabiliteÂ avantages.
incombant aÁ son preÂposeÂ lorsqu'il s'agit Art. 10:104. ReÂparation en nature
d'eÂvaluer sa contribution par rapport aÁ La reparation en nature peut eÃtre
celle d'auteurs autres que le preÂposeÂ. demandeÂe par la partie leÂseÂe si tant est
(4) L'obligation de contribuer est que cela soit possible et pas trop lourd
conjointe, ce qui signifie que toute pour l'autre partie.
personne assujettie n'est tenue qu'aÁ
hauteur de sa part de responsabiliteÂ du Section 2. Le preÂjudice mateÂriel
dommage conformeÂment aÁ cet article. Si Art. 10:201. Nature et deÂtermination du
toutefois il est impossible de faire preÂjudice mateÂriel
exeÂcuter une deÂcision imposant aÁ un Le preÂjudice mateÂriel susceptible d'eÃtre
responsable de contribuer aÁ la dette, sa reÂpareÂ consiste en une diminution du
part doit alors eÃtre reÂpartie entre les patrimoine de la victime causeÂe par
autres responsables, l'eÂveÂnement dommageable. Un tel

preÂjudice est en geÂneÂral deÂtermineÂ aussi peut justifier la compensation d'un

concreÁtement que possible mais il peut dommage extra-patrimonial. Il s'agit
aussi eÃtre deÂtermineÂ abstraitement si notamment des cas ouÁ la victime a
neÂcessaire, par exemple par reÂfeÂrence aÁ souffert d'un preÂjudice corporel ou
la valeur marchande. encore d'une atteinte aÁ la digniteÂ
Art. 10:202. PreÂjudice corporel et deÂceÁs humaine, la liberteÂ ou aÁ d'autres droits
de la personnaliteÂ. Un preÂjudice extra-
(1) En cas de preÂjudice corporel, lequel
patrimonial peut eÂgalement ouvrir droit
inclut une atteinte aÁ l'inteÂgriteÂ physique
aÁ compensation aux proches
et aÁ la santeÂ mentale conduisant aÁ une
d'une victime ayant subi une atteinte
maladie reconnue, le preÂjudice mateÂriel
mortelle ou non mortelle mais treÁs
doit inclure la perte de revenu, la
seÂrieuse.
deÂteÂrioration de la capaciteÂ de gagner sa
(2) En geÂneÂral, l'eÂvaluation de tels
vie (meÃme si elle n'est pas accompagneÂe
dommages et inteÂreÃts implique que
d'une perte de revenu) et les deÂpenses
toutes les circonstances de l'affaire,
raisonnables, telles que le couÃt des soins
incluant notamment la graviteÂ, la dureÂe
meÂdicaux.
et les conseÂquences du grief, soient
(2) En cas de deÂceÁs, les personnes telles
prises en consideÂration. Le degreÂ de la
que les membres de la famille qui
faute de l'auteur ne sera pris en compte
eÂtaient entretenues par le deÂfunt ou qui
que s'il a significativement contribueÂ au
l'auraient eÂteÂ si le deÂceÁs n'eÂtait pas
grief de la victime.
survenu, sont traiteÂs comme ayant subi
un preÂjudice reÂparable aÁ hauteur de la (3) En cas d'atteinte physiques, le
perte de ce soutien. preÂjudice extra-patrimonial correspond
aÁ la souffrance de la victime ou aÁ
Art. 10:203. Perte, destruction et la deÂteÂrioration de sa santeÂ physique
dommage causeÂ aux biens ou mentale. Dans l'octroi des dom-
(1) Lorsqu'une chose est perdue, mages et inteÂreÃts (incluant ceux
deÂtruite ou endommageÂe, l'estimation alloueÂs aux personnes entretenant de
de base des dommages et inteÂreÃts proches relations avec le deÂfunt ou la
eÂquivaut aÁ la valeur de la chose ou aÁ la victime seÂrieusement blesseÂe), les
diminution de sa valeur et, aÁ cette fin, pertes objectivement identiques
l'intention de la victime de remplacer ou devront se voir attribuer les meÃmes
reÂparer la chose est sans effet. sommes.
NeÂanmoins, si la victime l'a remplaceÂe
ou reÂpareÂe (ou s'appreÃte aÁ le faire), elle Section 4. ReÂduction de la reÂparation
pourra dans la limite du raisonnable Art. 10:401. ReÂduction de la reÂparation
obtenir le remboursement d'une
deÂpense plus eÂleveÂe ainsi occasionneÂe. Dans un cas exceptionnel, si aÁ la lumieÁre
(2) Des dommages et inteÂreÃts pourront de la situation financieÁre des parties la
eÂgalement eÃtre alloueÂs en cas de perte compensation inteÂgrale constituait une
relative aÁ l'usage de la chose, incluant les charge oppressive pour le deÂfendeur, le
dommages indirects tels que les pertes montant des dommages-inteÂreÃts
relatives aÁ une activiteÂ professionnelle. pourrait eÃtre reÂduit. Pour deÂcider si
cette reÂduction doit avoir lieu, il devra
Section 3. Le preÂjudice extra- notamment eÃtre tenu compte du
patrimonial fondement de la responsabiliteÂ (Art.
Art. 10:301. PreÂjudice extra-patrimonial 1:101), de l'eÂtendue de la protection de
(1) Selon l'eÂtendue de sa protection l'inteÂreÃt (Art. 2:102) et de l'importance
(Art. 2:102), la violation d'un inteÂreÃt du preÂjudice.

German Translation
by Bernhard A. Koch, Helmut Koziol and Ulrich Magnus
GrundsaÈtze eines europaÈischen Deliktsrechts
I. TITEL. Grundnorm (3) Weitgehender Schutz wird den ding-

lichen Rechten, einschlieûlich jenen an
Kapitel 1. Grundnorm
ImmaterialguÈtern, gewaÈhrt.
Art. 1:101. Grundnorm (4) Der Schutz reiner VermoÈgensin-
(1) Eine Person hat den Schaden eines teressen oder schuldrechtlicher Bezie-
anderen zu ersetzen, wenn ihr dieser hungen kann geringer sein. Zu beachten
Schaden auf Grund des Gesetzes sind insbesondere die Nahebeziehung
zuzurechnen ist. zwischen Handelndem und GefaÈhrde-
(2) Ein Schaden ist insbesondere jener tem und das Bewuûtsein des Handeln-
Person zurechenbar den, Schaden zuzufuÈgen, obwohl seine
a) die ihn durch ihr schuldhaftes Interessen jedenfalls geringer zu bewer-
Verhalten verursachte; oder ten sind als jene des GeschaÈdigten.
b) deren aussergewoÈhnlich gefaÈhrliche (5) Das Ausmaû des Schutzes kann
AktivitaÈt ihn verursachte; oder auch von der Art der Haftung abhaÈn-
c) deren Hilfsperson ihn im Rahmen gen. Daher kann einem Interesse ein
ihres Aufgabenbereiches verursachten. weitergehender Schutz gegen vorsaÈtz-
liche SchaÈdigung zukommen als sonst.
II. TITEL. Allgemeine Haftungs- (6) Bei der Festlegung des Ausmaûes
voraussetzungen des Schutzes sind sowohl die Interessen
Kapitel 2. Schaden des Handelnden, insbesondere jene an
Bewegungsfreiheit und AusuÈbung der
Art. 2:101. ErsatzfaÈhiger Schaden
Rechte, als auch die Interessen der All-
Schaden setzt einen vermoÈgenswerten gemeinheit zu beruÈcksichtigen.
oder ideellen Nachteil an einem recht-
Art. 2:103. Rechtlich beachtlicher
lich geschuÈtzten Interesse voraus.
Schaden
Art. 2:102. GeschuÈtzte Interessen
Verluste, die mit gesetzwidrigen TaÈtig-
(1) Das Ausmaû des Schutzes eines keiten oder anderen derartigen Quellen
Interesses bestimmt sich nach dessen zusammenhaÈngen, sind nicht zu erset-
Natur; je hoÈher dessen Wert, Abgrenz- zen.
barkeit und Offenkundigkeit ist, desto
Art. 2:104. Vorbeugende Aufwendun-
weitergehender ist der Schutz.
gen
(2) Leben, koÈrperliche und geistige
Unversehrtheit, MenschenwuÈrde und Aufwendungen, die zur VerhuÈtung dro-
Freiheit genieûen den weitestgehenden hender SchaÈden getaÈtigt wurden, sind zu
Schutz. ersetzen, so weit sie gerechtfertigt waren.
Bernhard A. Koch/Helmut Koziol/Ulrich Magnus 209

Art. 2:105. Beweis des Schadens kehrbar herbeigefuÈhrt hat, wird eine
Der Schaden ist gemaÈû den prozessua- nachfolgende AktivitaÈt, die fuÈr sich
denselben Schaden herbeigefuÈhrt haÈtte,
len Regeln zu beweisen. Das Gericht
nicht beruÈcksichtigt.
darf den Umfang des Schadens schaÈtzen,
wenn der Beweis des genauen Betrages (2) Eine nachfolgende AktivitaÈt wird
zu schwierig oder kostspielig waÈre. allerdings dann beruÈcksichtigt, wenn sie
zu einem zusaÈtzlichen oder einem
Kapitel 3. Verursachung schwereren Schaden fuÈhrte.
Abschnitt 1. Notwendige Bedingung (3) Wenn die erste AktivitaÈt zu einem
und EinschraÈnkungen fortlaufend eintretenden Schaden fuÈhrte
und die nachfolgende AktivitaÈt den
Art. 3:101. Notwendige Bedingung
Schaden zu einem spaÈteren Zeitpunkt
(conditio sine qua non)
ebenso herbeigefuÈhrt haÈtte, werden ab
Ein Geschehen oder Verhalten (im Fol- diesem spaÈteren Zeitpunkt beide Akti-
genden: AktivitaÈt) ist dann Ursache des vitaÈten als Ursache dieses fortlaufend
beim GeschaÈdigten eingetretenen Scha- eintretenden Schadens betrachtet.
dens, wenn ohne diese AktivitaÈt der
Art. 3:105. Unbestimmte anteilige
Schaden nicht eingetreten waÈre.
KausalitaÈt
Art. 3:102. Konkurrierende Ursachen
Ist sicher, dass von mehreren AktivitaÈ-
HaÈtte von mehreren AktivitaÈten jede ten keine den gesamten Schaden oder
allein den Schaden zur selben Zeit her- zumindest einen bestimmbaren Teil
beigefuÈhrt, so wird jede als Ursache davon herbeigefuÈhrt hat, so ist davon
angesehen. auszugehen, dass all jene, die wahr-
Art. 3:103. Alternative Ursachen scheinlich geringfuÈgig zum Schaden bei-
getragen haben, dies zu gleichen Teilen
(1) WaÈre von mehreren AktivitaÈten getan haben.
jede einzelne in der Lage gewesen, den
Schaden herbeizufuÈhren, ist es jedoch Art. 3:106. Unsichere Ursachen in der
ungewiû, welche von ihnen den Schaden SphaÈre des GeschaÈdigten
tatsaÈchlich verursacht hat, so wird jede Der GeschaÈdigte hat seinen Schaden
AktivitaÈt entsprechend der Wahrschein- entsprechend der Wahrscheinlichkeit,
lichkeit ihrer UrsaÈchlichkeit fuÈr den dass der Schaden moÈglicherweise von
Schaden als Ursache angesehen. einer AktivitaÈt, einem Ereignis oder
(2) Wenn es in FaÈllen mehrerer anderen UmstaÈnden in seiner eigenen
GeschaÈdigter ungewiû bleibt, ob der SphaÈre verursacht wurde, selbst zu tra-
Schaden eines bestimmten GeschaÈdig- gen.
ten durch eine AktivitaÈt verursacht
wurde, und es wahrscheinlich ist, dass Abschnitt 2. Haftungsumfang
diese nicht die SchaÈden aller GeschaÈ- Art. 3:201. Haftungsumfang
digten verursachte, dann wird die Akti-
vitaÈt in jenem Ausmaûe als Ursache der Wenn eine AktivitaÈt eine Ursache im
SchaÈden aller GeschaÈdigten angesehen, Sinne des Abschnitts 1 ist, so haÈngt es
das der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verur- von Faktoren wie den folgenden ab, ob
sachung des Schadens eines bestimmten und in welchem Umfang SchaÈden einer
GeschaÈdigten entspricht. Person zugerechnet werden koÈnnen
a) die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens
Art. 3:104. Potentielle Ursachen
fuÈr eine vernuÈnftige Person zum Zeit-
(1) Wenn eine AktivitaÈt den Schaden punkt der AktivitaÈt, wobei insbesondere
des GeschaÈdigten endguÈltig und unum- die zeitliche und raÈumliche NaÈhe
210 German Translation

zwischen der schaÈdigenden AktivitaÈt Art. 4:103. Pflicht zur Schadensvermei-

und deren Folgen sowie die GroÈûe des dung
Schadens im VerhaÈltnis zu den gewoÈhn-
Eine positive Verhaltenspflicht, andere
lichen Folgen einer solchen AktivitaÈt zu
vor Schaden zu bewahren, kann aufgrund
beruÈcksichtigen sind;
besonderer Normen bestehen, oder wenn
b) die Natur und der Wert der
der Handelnde eine gefaÈhrliche Situation
geschuÈtzten Interessen (Art. 2:102);
schafft oder kontrolliert, oder wenn
c) der Haftungsgrund (Art. 1:101); zwischen den Betroffenen eine beson-
d) das Ausmaû des allgemeinen dere Beziehung besteht, oder wenn die
Lebensrisikos; und Schwere des Schadens einerseits und der
e) der Schutzzweck der verletzten Norm geringe Aufwand zur Schadensvermei-
III. TITEL: Grundlagen der Haftung dung andererseits dafuÈr sprechen.
Kapitel 4. Haftung wegen Verschuldens Abschnitt 2. Umkehr der Verschuldens-

beweislast
Abschnitt 1. Voraussetzungen einer
Haftung wegen Verschuldens Art. 4:201. Umkehr der Verschuldens-
beweislast im allgemeinen
Art. 4:101. Verschulden
(1) Die Beweislast fuÈr das Verschulden
Wer vorsaÈtzlich oder fahrlaÈssig den
kann angesichts der GroÈûe der von der
erforderlichen Sorgfaltsmaûstab ver-
AktivitaÈt ausgehenden Gefahr umge-
letzt, haftet wegen Verschuldens.
kehrt werden.
Art. 4:102. Erforderlicher Sorgfalts- (2) Die GroÈûe der Gefahr bestimmt sich
maûstab anhand der Schwere eines moÈglichen
(1) Der erforderliche Sorgfaltsmaûstab Schadens in solchen FaÈllen und nach der
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein solcher
bestimmt sich nach dem Verhalten einer
Schaden tatsaÈchlich auftritt.
vernuÈnftigen Person unter den gegebe-
nen UmstaÈnden und haÈngt insbesondere Art. 4:202. Unternehmenshaftung
ab von der Natur und dem Wert der
(1) Wer in seinem aus wirtschaftlichen
betroffenen geschuÈtzten Interessen, von
oder beruflichen Interessen auf Dauer
der GefaÈhrlichkeit der AktivitaÈt, von
betriebenen Unternehmen Hilfsperso-
der von einer sie durchfuÈhrenden Per-
nen oder technische Hilfsmittel einsetzt,
son zu erwartenden Sachkunde, von der
haftet fuÈr jene SchaÈden, die durch einen
Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, vom
Fehler des Unternehmens oder seiner
NaheverhaÈltnis oder der besonderen
Erzeugnisse verursacht werden, sofern
Beziehung zwischen den Betroffenen,
er nicht nachweist, dass er gemaÈû dem
sowie von der VerfuÈgbarkeit und den
erforderlichen Sorgfaltsmaûstab gehan-
Kosten vorbeugender oder alternativer
delt hat.
Verhaltensweisen.
(2) Ein solcher Fehler ist jede Abwei-
(2) Wenn von jemandem wegen seines
chung von den Standards, die vernuÈnfti-
Alters, seiner geistigen oder koÈrper-
gerweise vom Unternehmen oder seinen
lichen Behinderung oder wegen beson-
derer UmstaÈnden nicht erwartet werden Erzeugnissen erwartet werden koÈnnen.
kann, dass er diesem Standard ent- Kapitel 5. GefaÈhrdungshaftung
spricht, kann dieser entsprechend
Art. 5:101. AuûergewoÈhnlich gefaÈhr-
gemildert werden.
liche AktivitaÈten
(3) Bei der Bestimmung des erforderli-
chen Sorgfaltsmaûstabes sind Verhal- (1) Wer eine auûergewoÈhnlich gefaÈhr-
tensgebote oder ±verbote einzubeziehen. liche AktivitaÈt setzt, haftet ohne Ver-

schulden fuÈr jene SchaÈden, die von der Art. 6:102. Haftung fuÈr Hilfspersonen
AktivitaÈt verursacht werden und fuÈr das
(1) Soweit Hilfspersonen im Rahmen
von ihr ausgehende Risiko charakteris-
ihres Aufgabenbereiches taÈtig werden,
tisch sind.
dabei aber den erforderlichen Sorgfalts-
(2) Eine AktivitaÈt ist auûergewoÈhnlich maûstab (Art. 4:102) verletzen, haftet
gefaÈhrlich wenn ihr GeschaÈftsherr fuÈr den dadurch ver-
(a) sie eine vorhersehbare und hoÈchst ursachten Schaden.
signifikante Schadensgefahr schafft, (2) Ein selbstaÈndiger Unternehmer ist
selbst wenn jedwede gebotene Sorgfalt keine Hilfsperson im Sinne dieses Arti-
bei ihrer AusfuÈhrung gewahrt wird, und kels.
(b) sie nicht allgemein gebraÈuchlich ist. IV. TITEL. Einreden
(3) Eine Schadensgefahr kann unter
Kapitel 7. Einreden im allgemeinen
BeruÈcksichtigung der Schwere und der
Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Schadens sig- Art. 7:101. RechtfertigungsgruÈnde
nifikant sein. (1) Die Haftung kann ausgeschlossen
(4) Dieser Artikel ist nicht auf solche werden, wenn und soweit der Han-
AktivitaÈten anwendbar, die anderweitig delnde rechtmaÈûig
einer verschuldensunabhaÈngigen Haf- a) seine eigenen geschuÈtzten Interessen
tung unterstellt wurden, sei es durch gegen einen rechtswidrigen Angriff ver-
eine andere Bestimmung dieser Grund- teidigte (Notwehr),
saÈtze oder durch nationale oder inter- b) im Notstand handelte,
nationale Rechtsvorschriften. c) behoÈrdliche Hilfe nicht rechtzeitig in
Art. 5:102. Andere GefaÈhrdungs- Anspruch nehmen konnte (Selbsthilfe),
haftungen d) mit der Zustimmung des Opfers han-
delte, oder wenn dieses die Gefahr,
(1) Nationales Recht kann weitere geschaÈdigt zu werden, in Kauf genom-
Kategorien verschuldensunabhaÈngiger men hat, oder
Haftung fuÈr gefaÈhrliche AktivitaÈten e) auf der Grundlage einer gesetzmaÈûi-
vorsehen, selbst wenn diese nicht gen Berechtigung, zum Beispiel einer
auûergewoÈhnlich gefaÈhrlich sind. Bewilligung, handelte.
(2) Soweit nationales Recht dem nicht (2) Ob die Haftung ausgeschlossen wird,
entgegensteht, koÈnnen weitere Kategor- haÈngt vom Gewicht dieser Rechtferti-
ien verschuldensunabhaÈngiger Haftung gungsgruÈnde einerseits und den Vor-
in Analogie zu anderen Quellen einer aussetzungen der Haftung andererseits
vergleichbaren Schadensgefahr geschaf- ab.
fen werden. (3) In auûergewoÈhnlichen FaÈllen kann
die Haftung auch beschraÈnkt werden.
Kapitel 6. Haftung fuÈr andere
Art. 7:102. Einreden gegen GefaÈhr-
Art. 6:101. Haftung fuÈr MinderjaÈhrige dungshaftung
oder geistig Behinderte
(1) Eine GefaÈhrdungshaftung kann aus-
Wer fuÈr einen MinderjaÈhrigen oder geschlossen oder beschraÈnkt werden,
geistig Behinderten verantwortlich ist, wenn der Schaden verursacht wurde
haftet fuÈr den von diesem verursachten durch ein unvorhersehbares und unab-
Schaden, soweit er nicht nachweist, dass wendbares
er bei der Beaufsichtigung gemaÈû dem a) auûergewoÈhnliches Naturereignis
erforderlichen Sorgfaltsmaûstab gehan- (force majeure), oder ein
delt hat. b) Verhalten eines Dritten.

(2) Ob die GefaÈhrdungshaftung ausges- b) das selbstaÈndige Verhalten einer

chlossen oder beschraÈnkt wird und in Person oder ihre AktivitaÈt dem GeschaÈ-
welchem Ausmaûe, haÈngt vom Gewicht digten Schaden zufuÈgt und derselbe
des aÈuûeren Einflusses einerseits und Schaden auch einer anderen Person
dem Haftungsumfang (Art. 3:201) zuzurechnen ist; oder
andererseits ab. c) eine Person fuÈr den Schaden verant-
(3) Wenn die GefaÈhrdungshaftung wortlich ist, den eine Hilfsperson verur-
wegen Absatz (1)(b) beschraÈnkt wird, sacht hat, sofern die Hilfsperson auch
ist sie gemaÈû Art. 9:101 (1)(b) haftbar ist.
gesamtschuldnerisch mit einer allfaÈlli- (2) Wenn mehrere Personen gesamt-
gen Haftung des Dritten. schuldnerisch haften, kann der GeschaÈ-
Kapitel 8. Mitverantwortung digte von jeder von ihnen den Ersatz
des gesamten Schadens, insgesamt aber
Art. 8:101. Mitverantwortung des Opfers nicht mehr als seinen vollen Schaden
(1) Die Haftung kann nach Maûgabe verlangen.
der Billigkeit ausgeschlossen oder be- (3) Ein Schaden ist derselbe Schaden im
schraÈnkt werden, soweit ein Fehlverhal- Sinn des Absatz (1) (b), wenn es keinen
ten des Opfers oder sonstige UmstaÈnde vernuÈnftigen Grund dafuÈr gibt, jeder
den Schaden mitverursacht haben, von mehreren Personen, die dem Ge-
gemaÈû denen seine eigene Haftung schaÈdigten haftbar sind, nur einen Teil
begruÈndet oder beschraÈnkt wuÈrde, wenn des Schadens zuzurechnen. Wer sich
er selbst der SchaÈdiger waÈre. darauf beruft, dass der Schaden nicht
(2) Wird Schadenersatz fuÈr den Tod derselbe ist, hat das zu beweisen. Wenn
einer Person begehrt, so wird deren es einen solchen Grund gibt, besteht nur
Verhalten oder sonstige AktivitaÈt beim eine Teilhaftung: jede Person haftet
Ausschluû oder der BeschraÈnkung der dem GeschaÈdigten nur fuÈr den Teil des
Haftung gemaÈû Absatz 1 beruÈcksichtigt. Schadens, der ihr zuzurechnen ist.
(3) Die Haftung wird auch durch ein Art. 9:102. Beziehung zwischen
Fehlverhalten oder eine sonstige Akti- Gesamtschuldnern
vitaÈt einer Hilfsperson des Opfers nach
Maûgabe von Absatz 1 ausgeschlossen (1) Ein Gesamtschuldner kann von jeder
oder beschraÈnkt. anderen Person, die dem GeschaÈdigten
fuÈr denselben Schaden haftet, einen
V. TITEL: Mehrere SchaÈdiger Ausgleichsbeitrag verlangen. Dieses
Kapitel 9. Mehrere SchaÈdiger Recht beruÈhrt weder eine vertragliche
Regelung, die zwischen ihnen die Ver-
Art. 9:101. Gesamtschuldnerische Haf-
teilung des Schadens festlegt, noch eine
tung: Beziehung zwischen GeschaÈdig-
entsprechende gesetzliche Regelung
tem und mehreren SchaÈdigern
noch einen Ausgleichsanspruch, der auf
(1) Die Haftung ist gesamtschuldnerisch, Grund gesetzlichen ForderungsuÈber-
wenn der gesamte oder ein bestimmter gangs oder nach den Regeln der unge-
Teil des Schadens, den der GeschaÈdigte rechtfertigten Bereicherung besteht.
erlitten hat, einem oder mehreren Per- (2) Vorbehaltlich des Absatzes 3 dieses
sonen zuzurechnen ist. Die Haftung ist Artikels richtet sich die HoÈhe des Aus-
gesamtschuldnerisch, wenn: gleichsbeitrags danach, was in Anbe-
a) eine Person sich wissentlich an der tracht der jeweiligen Verantwortlichkeit
rechtswidrigen Tat anderer, die dem der haftbaren Personen fuÈr den Schaden
GeschaÈdigten Schaden zufuÈgt, beteiligt als gerecht erscheint, wobei der jewei-
oder dazu anstiftet oder ermutigt; oder lige Grad ihres Verschuldens und die

weiteren, fuÈr die BegruÈndung oder Be- je nachdem welche Form unter beson-
schraÈnkung der Haftung bedeutsamen derer BeruÈcksichtigung der Interessen
UmstaÈnde zu beruÈcksichtigen sind. Der des GeschaÈdigten angemessen ist.
Ausgleichsbeitrag kann den Umfang der
Art. 10:103. Durch das Schadensereignis
vollen EntschaÈdigung erreichen. LaÈsst
erlangte Vorteile
sich die jeweilige Verantwortlichkeit der
haftbaren Personen nicht bestimmen, Bei der Bemessung des Ersatzumfangs
dann sind sie als in gleicher Weise ver- sind Vorteile, die die verletzte Partei
antwortlich zu behandeln. durch das schaÈdigende Ereignis erlangt,
(3) Wenn eine Person gemaÈû Art. 9:101 zu beruÈcksichtigen, es sei denn, das ist
fuÈr einen Schaden haftbar ist, den eine mit dem Zweck des Vorteils unverein-
Hilfsperson verursacht hat, dann hat die bar.
Person auch den Verantwortungsteil zu
Art. 10:104. Wiederherstellung in Natur
tragen, der der Hilfsperson zuzurechnen
ist, soweit es um die Ausgleichung An Stelle von Geldersatz kann die ver-
gegenuÈber einem anderen SchaÈdiger als letzte Partei Wiederherstellung in Natur
der Hilfsperson geht. verlangen, soweit dies moÈglich und nicht
(4) Die Verpflichtung, einen Aus- zu belastend fuÈr die andere Partei ist.
gleichsbeitrag zu leisten, ist eine Teil- Abschnitt 2. VermoÈgensschaden
schuld: der Verpflichtete haftet nur fuÈr
seinen Verantwortungsanteil an dem Art. 10:201. Art und Bemessung des
Schaden nach diesem Artikel. Sofern VermoÈgensschadens
sich ein Urteil auf einen Ausgleichsbei- Die durch das schaÈdigende Ereignis
trag gegen einen Haftpflichtigen nicht verursachte Minderung des VermoÈgens
vollstrecken laÈsst, ist sein Anteil unter des GeschaÈdigten stellt den ersatzfaÈhi-
den uÈbrigen Haftpflichtigen entspe- gen VermoÈgensschaden dar. Dieser
chend ihrem jeweiligen Verantwortung- Schaden ist grundsaÈtzlich so konkret wie
steil zu verteilen. moÈglich zu bestimmen; in geeigneten
VI. TITEL. Rechtsbehelfe FaÈllen kann er auch abstrakt bestimmt
werden, z.B. durch RuÈckgriff auf den
Kapitel 10. Schadensersatz Marktwert.
Abschnitt 1. Allgemeine Regeln Art. 10:202. Personenschaden und Tod
Art. 10:101. Art und Zweck des (1) Im Fall eines Personenschadens, der
Schadensersatzes Verletzungen der koÈrperlichen Gesund-
Schadensersatz ist als Geldzahlung an heit und, soweit sie zu einer anerkann-
den GeschaÈdigten zu leisten, um seinen ten Krankheit fuÈhren, der geistigen
Schaden auszugleichen und ihn, soweit Gesundheit umfasst, schlieût der Ver-
das durch die Geldzahlung zu erreichen moÈgensschaden einen Einkommensver-
ist, so zustellen, wie er gestanden haÈtte, lust, die Minderung der ErwerbsfaÈhig-
wenn das schaÈdigende Ereignis nicht keit (auch wenn sie nicht von einem
eingetreten waÈre. Schadensersatz dient Einkommensverlust begleitet wird)
auch dem Ziel, SchaÈdigungen vorzu- sowie angemessene Ausgaben, ein-
beugen. schlieûlich der Kosten fuÈr medizinische
Behandlung ein.
Art. 10:102. Kapitalabfindung oder
(2) Im Fall des Todes einer Person
Geldrente
haben Personen, die wie insbesondere
Schadensersatz ist entweder als Kapital- Familienmitglieder vom GetoÈteten
abfindung oder als Geldrente zu leisten, unterhalten wurden oder ohne seinen

Tod unterhalten worden waÈren, im zu einem GetoÈteten oder sehr schwer

Umfang des entgangenen Unterhalts Verletzten stehen.
Anspruch auf Schadensersatz. (2) Bei der Bemessung des Ersatzum-
Art. 10:203. Verlust, ZerstoÈrung und fangs sind alle UmstaÈnde des Falles,
BeschaÈdigung von Sachen einschlieûlich der Schwere, Dauer und
Folgen der Verletzung zu beruÈcksichti-
(1) Wenn eine Sache entwendet, zer-
gen. Der Grad des Verschuldens des
stoÈrt oder beschaÈdigt worden ist, ist der
SchaÈdigers ist nur zu beruÈcksichtigen,
grundsaÈtzliche Maûstab fuÈr den Ersatz
wenn er erheblich zur Verletzung des
des Schadens der Wert der Sache oder
GeschaÈdigten beigetragen hat.
die Minderung ihres Wertes; fuÈr diesen
Zweck ist es bedeutungslos, ob der (3) Im Fall eines Personenschadens
GeschaÈdigte beabsichtigt, die Sache zu stellen das Leiden des GeschaÈdigten
ersetzen oder zu reparieren. Hat der und die BeeintraÈchtigung seiner koÈrper-
GeschaÈdigte aber die Sache ersetzt oder lichen oder geistigen Gesundheit seinen
repariert (oder wird er das tun), dann NichtvermoÈgensschaden dar. Bei der
kann er Ersatz der dafuÈr noÈtigen hoÈhe- Bemessung des Schadensersatzes (ein-
ren Ausgaben verlangen, wenn es ver- schlieûlich des Schadensersatzanspruchs
nuÈnftig ist, die Sache zu ersetzen oder fuÈr Personen mit einer engen Beziehung
zu reparieren. zum GetoÈteten oder schwer Verletzten)
(2) Schadensersatz steht auch fuÈr den sind aÈhnliche BetraÈge fuÈr objektiv aÈhn-
Verlust der Nutzung einer Sache zu, liche Verletzungen zuzubilligen.
einschlieûlich der Folgeverluste wie
etwa der Verlust von GeschaÈftsumsaÈt- Abschnitt 4. Herabsetzung des Umfangs
zen. des Schadensersatzes
Abschnitt 3. NichtvermoÈgensschaden Art. 10:401. Herabsetzung des Umfangs

Art. 10:301. NichtvermoÈgensschaden des Schadensersatzes
(1) Soweit das Ausmaû seines Schutzes Wenn in einem auûergewoÈhnlichen Fall
das rechtfertigt (Art. 2:102), kann die im Hinblick auf die finanzielle Lage der
Verletzung eines Interesses den Aus- Parteien die volle Ersatzpflicht eine
gleich eines NichtvermoÈgensschadens erdruÈckende Belastung fuÈr den Beklag-
rechtfertigen. Das ist insbesondere der ten bedeuten wuÈrde, kann der Umfang
Fall, wenn der GeschaÈdigte einen Per- der Schadensersatzpflicht herabgesetzt
sonenschaden erlitten hat oder seine werden. Bei der Entscheidung daruÈber
menschliche WuÈrde, Freiheit oder ein sind insbesondere der Grund der Haf-
anderes PersoÈnlichkeitsrecht verletzt tung (Art. 1:101), das Ausmaû des
worden ist. Ausgleich ihres Nichtver- Schutzes des Interesses (Art. 2:102) und
moÈgensschadens koÈnnen auch Personen die GroÈûe des Schadens zu beruÈcksich-
verlangen, die in einer engen Beziehung tigen.

Greek Translation
by Eugenia Dacoronia
Aqveè | sot etqxpaiç jotè dijaiè ot sxm adijopqanixèm
SISKOR I. Barijoè| jamoèma| jai g eketheqiè a apokalbaèmotm sg|

etqtèseqg| pqorsariè a|.
Jeuaèkaio 1. Barijoè | jamoèma|
(3) Etqeiè a pqorsariè a paqeèvesai rsa
èAqh. 1:101. Barijoè| jamoèma| peqiotriajaè dijaixèlasa, rsa opoiè a
(1) So pqoèrxpo rso opoiè o jasakociè fesai rtlpeqikalbaèmomsai jai sa dijaixèlasa
g pqoèjkgrg fgliè a| re aèkkom ethtè mesai rsgm aètçkg peqiotriè a.
pqo| apojasaèrsarg atsgè| sg| fgliè a|. (4) G pqorsariè a sxm alicxè| oijomo-
(2) Fgliè a lpoqeiè ma jasakocirheiè lijxèm rtlueqoèmsxm gè sxm rtlbasijxèm
eidijoèseqa rso pqoèrxpo ejeimo sot rveèrexm lpoqeiè ma eiè mai peqirroèseqo
opoiè ot peqioqirleèmg re eè jsarg. Re seèsoie|
a) g tpaiè sia rtlpeqiuoqaè eè vei peqipsxèrei|, deèotra pqorovgè pqeè pei
pqojakeèreiÍ sg fglia gè idiè x| ma doheiè rsgm ecctè sgsa sg| rveè rg|
b) g artmgèhirsa epijiè mdtmg dqarsg- lesantè sot dqaèrsg jai sot diajim-
qioèsgsa eè vei pqojakeè reiÍ sg fglia gè dtmetè ramso| asoèlot gè rso cecomoè| oèsi o
c) o pqorsgheiè | sgm eè vei pqojakeèrei sg dqaèrsg| eè vei epiè cmxrg sot cecomoèso|
fglia jasaè ejseèkerg sxm jahgjoèmsxm oèsi ha pqojakeè rei fgliè a am jai sa
sot. rtlueèqomsaè sot amacjaiè x| eiè mai
SISKOR II. Cemijeè | pqotçpoheè rei| lijqoèseqg| aniè a| apoè atsaè sot htèlaso|.
ethtè mg| (5) G eèjsarg sg| pqorsariè a| lpoqeiè
epiè rg| ma epgqeaèfesai apoè sg utèrg sg|
Jeuaèkaio 2. Fgliè a ethtèmg|, eè sri xèrse eè ma rtlueèqom lpoqeiè
èAqh. 2:101. Apojasarsaseè a fgliè a ma apokalbaèmei etqtèseqg| pqorsariè a|
re peqiè psxrg ej pqoheèrex| pqorbokxèm
G fgliè a pqotçpoheè sei peqiotriajgè gè lg
ap' oè,si re aèkke| peqipsxèrei|.
peqiotriajgè bkaèbg emoè| emmoèlx|
pqorsasetoèlemot rtlueè qomso|. (6) Cia som jahoqirloè sg| eè jsarg| sg|
pqorsariè a|, sa rtlueèqomsa sot
èAqh. 2:102. Pqorsasetoèlema rtlueè qomsa dqaèrasg, idiè x| jasaè sgm eketheqiè a
(1) G eèjsarg sg| pqorsariè a| emoè| dqaèrg| jai sgm aèrjgrg sxm dijaixlaèsxm
rtlueèqomso| enaqsaèsai apoè sg utè rg sot, oèpx| jai sa dgloèria rtlueè qomsa
sot: oèro lecaktèseqg g aniè a sot, g pqeèpei epiè rg| ma kalbaèmomsai tpoèwg.
ajqiè beia sot jahoqirlotè sot jai so
èAqh. 2:103. So moèlilo sg| fgliè a|
pqoèdgkoè sot soèro etqtè seqg eiè mai jai g
pqorsariè a sot. Fgliè e| rvesifoèleme| le dqarsgqioèsgse|
(2) G fxgè, g rxlasijgè gè pmetlasijgè gè pgceè| pot hexqotè msai paqaèmole| dem
ajeqaioèsgsa, g amhqxèpimg aniopqeè peia lpoqotè m ma apojasarsahotè m.
216 Greek Translation

Aqveè| sot etqxpaiç jotè dijaiè ot sxm adijopqanixèm
èAqh. 2:104. Dapaème| pqo| pqoè kgwg sg| dqarsgqioèsgsa atsgè hexqeiè sai aisiè a sg|
fgliè a| fgliè a| pot eèvotm tporseiè oèka sa htèlasa
amaèkoca le sgm pihamoèsgsa ma eèvei
Dapaème| pqo| pqoèkgwg apeikotèlemg|
pqojakeèrei sg fgliè a emoè|
fgliè a| apojahiè rsamsai rso bahloè pot
eiè mai etèkoce|. rtcjejqileèmot htèlaso|.
èAqh. 2:105. Apoèdeing sg| fgliè a| èAqh. 3:104. Epajokothotè re| aisiè e|
(1) Am lia dqarsgqioèsgsa eèvei oqirsijaè
G fgliè a pqeèpei ma apodeijmtè esai
jai lg amarsqeè wila pqojakeè rei fgliè a
rtèluxma le sot| rtmgèhei| dijomolijotè |
rso htè la, epajokothotèra
jamoème|. So dijarsgèqio lpoqeiè ma
dqarsgqioèsgsa g opoiè a atsosekxè| ha
ejsilgèrei sgm eè jsarg sg| fgliè a| oèsam g
lpoqotè re ma eiè ve pqojakeèrei sgm iè dia
apoèdeing sot ajqibotè| porotè ha gèsam
fgliè a dem kalbaèmesai tpoèwg.
enaiqesija dtè rjokg gè enaiqesija
dapamgqgè. (2) Epajokothotèra dqarsgqioèsgsa
kalbaèmesai tpoèwg loèmo am eè vei
Jeuaèkaio 3. Aisixèdg| rtèmderlo| odgcgèrei re epipqoèrhesg gè episaheiè ra
Emoè sgsa 1. Amacjaiè o| oèqo| (conditio sine fgliè a.
qua non) jai diajqiè rei| (3) Am g pqxèsg dqarsgqioèsgsa
pqojaèkere rtmevifoèlemg fgliè a sgm
èAqh. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non
opoiè a ha eiè ve pqojakeè rei epiè rg| jai g
Lia dqarsgqioèsgsa gè rtlpeqiuoqaè epajokothotè ra dqarsgqioèsgsa, euengè|
(euengè| dqarsgqioèsgsa) eiè mai g aisiè a jai oi dtè o dqarsgqioèsgse| hexqotèmsai
sg| fgliè a| sot htèlaso| am, lg aisiè e| atsgè| sg| rtmevifoèlemg| fgliè a|.
tpaqvotèrg| sg| dqarsgqioèsgsa| atsgè|,
g fgliè a de ha epeqvoèsam. èAqh. 3:105. Abeè baig leqijgè aisioèsgsa
Re peqiè psxrg pkeioèmxm
èAqh. 3:102. Rtmsqeè votre| aisiè e|
dqarsgqiosgèsxm, oèsam eiè mai beèbaio oèsi
Re peqiè psxrg pkeioèmxm jaliè a apoè atseè| dem pqojaèkere
dqarsgqiosgèsxm, apoè si| opoiè e| jaheliè a okoèjkgqg sg fgliè a gè jaèpoio oqirsoè
loèmg sg| ha eiè ve pqojakeèrei sg fgliè a slgèla sg|, atseè| pot eiè mai pihamoèm ma
jasaè som iè dio vqoèmo, jaèhe eèvotm ekaèvirsa rtlbaèkei rsg fgliè a
dqarsgqioèsgsa hexqeiè sai aisiè a sg| sejlaiè qomsai oèsi eèvotm pqojakeè rei iè ra
fgliè a| sot htèlaso|. slgèlasaè sg|.
èAqh. 3:103. Diafetjsijeè | aisiè e| èAqh. 3:106. Abeè baie| aisiè e| emsarroèleme|
(1) Re peqiè psxrg pkeioèmxm rsg ruaiè qa sot htèlaso|
dqarsgqiosgèsxm, apoè si| opoiè e| jaheliè a So htèla pqeè pei ma tpoleiè mei sg fgliè a sot
loèmg sg| ha aqjotè re cia ma pqojakeè rei rso bahloè pot amsapojqiè mesai rsgm
sg fgliè a, akkaè paqaleèmei abeè baio poia pihamoèsgsa ma eè vei pqojkgheiè apoè
pqaèclasi sgm pqojaèkere, jaèhe dqarsgqioèsgsa, rtlbaèm gè aèkkg
dqarsgqioèsgsa hexqeiè sai aisiè a eaèm eiè mai peqiè rsarg pot emsaèrresai rsgm dijgè sot
pihamoè ma eè vei pqojakeè rei sg fgliè a sot ruaiè qa.
htèlaso|.
Emoè sgsa 2. è Ejsarg sg| ethtè mg|
(2) Am, re peqiè psxrg pkeioèmxm htlaèsxm,
paqaleè mei abeèbaio am emoè| èAqh. 3:201. è Ejsarg sg| ethtèmg|
rtcjejqileèmot htèlaso| g fgliè a eèvei è Oam lia dqarsgqioèsgsa aposekeiè aisiè a
pqojkgheiè apoè lia dqarsgqioèsgsa, emxè jasaè sgm eè mmoia sg| emoèsgsa| 1 atsotè sot
eiè mai pihamoè g rtcjejqileèmg jeuakaiè ot, so am jai re poia eèjsarg g
dqarsgqioèsgsa ma lgm eè vei pqojakeè rei fgliè a lpoqeiè ma jasakocirheiè re eè ma
sg fgliè a oèkxm sxm htlaèsxm, g pqoèrxpo enaqsaèsai apoè paqaècomse| oèpx|
Eugenia Dacoronia 217

a) g pqobkewiloèsgsa sg| fgliè a| apoè eè ma (3) Jamoème| oi opoiè oi episaèrrotm gè

kocijoè aèmhqxpo jasaè sg rsiclgè sg| apacoqetèotm oqirleèmg rtlpeqiuoqaè
dqarsgqioèsgsa|, kalbamoleèmxm tpoèwg pqeèpei ma kalbaèmomsai tpoèwg cia som
rtcjejqileèma sg| vqomijgè| gè sopijgè| jahoqirloè sot apaisotè lemot leè sqot
ecctèsgsa| lesantè sg| fgliocoèma| rtlpeqiuoqaè|.
dqarsgqioèsgsa| jai sg| rtmeè peiaè| sg|, gè
èAqh. 4:103. Jahgèjom pqorsariè a| aèkkxm
sot leceèhot| sg| fgliè a| re rveèrg le si|
apoè sg fgliè a
rtmgèhei| rtmeè peie| lia| seèsoia|
dqarsgqioèsgsa|Í Jahgèjom hesijgè| emeèqceia| pqo|
b) g utèrg jai g aniè a sot pqorsariè a aèkkxm apoè sg fgliè a lpoqeiè
pqorsasetoèlemot rtlueè qomso| (aèqhqo ma tpaèqnei am o moèlo| so pqobkeè pei, gè am
2:102)Í o dqaèra| dgliotqceiè gè ekeè cvei lia
c) g baèrg sg| ethtè mg| (aèqhqo 1:101)Í epijiè mdtmg jasaèrsarg, gè oèsam tpaèqvei
d) g eèjsarg sxm rtmgèhxm jimdtèmxm sg| idiaiè seqg rveèrg lesantè sxm leqxèm gè
fxgè|Í jai oèsam g robaqoèsgsa sg| fgliè a| apoè sg
e) o pqorsasetsijoè| rjopoè| sot jamoèma lia pketqaè jai g etveè qeia sg| apoutcgè|
pot eè vei paqabiarheiè . sg| fgliè a| apoè sgm aèkkg tpacoqetèotm
eèma seèsoio jahgèjom.
SISKOR III. Baèrei| ethtè mg|
Jeuaèkaio 4. Ethtè mg barifoèlemg re Emoè sgsa 2. Amarsqougè sot baè qot|
tpaisioèsgsa apoèdeing| sg| tpaisioè sgsa|
Emoè sgsa 1. Pqotçpoheè rei| ethtè mg| barifoè - èAqh. 4:201. Amarsqougè sot baèqot|
lemg| re tpaisioèsgsa apoèdeing| sg| tpaisioè sgsa| cemijaè
èAqh. 4:101. Tpaisioè sgsa (1) So baèqo| apoèdeing| sg| tpaisioèsgsa|
è Ema pqoèrxpo ethtèmesai tpojeilemijaè lpoqeiè ma amarsqaueiè emoèwei sg|
cia sgm ej doèkot gè en alekeiè a| paqaèbarg robaqoèsgsa| sot jimdtèmot pot
sot apaisotèlemot leèsqot rtlpeqiuoqaè|. paqotriaèrsgje apoè sg dqarsgqioèsgsa.
(2) G robaqoèsgsa sot jimdtèmot
èAqh. 4:102. Apaisotè lemo leè sqo pqordioqiè fesai rtèluxma le sgm
rtlpeqiuoqaè| robaqoèsgsa pihamgè| fgliè a| re seèsoie|
(1) So apaisotèlemo leèsqo rtlpeqiuoqaè| peqipsxèrei| oèpx| epiè rg| jai le sgm
eiè mai atsoè sot kocijotè amhqxèpot rsi| pihamoèsgsa pqaclasijgè| epeèketrg|
peqirsaèrei|, jai enaqsaèsai, idiaiè seqa, seèsoia| fgliè a|.
apoè sg utè rg jai sgm aniè a sot rvesijotè
pqorsasetoèlemot rtlueè qomso|, sgm èAqh. 4:202. Ethtèmg epiveiqgèrexm
epijimdtmoèsgsa sg| dqarsgqioèsgsa|, si| (1) Pqoèrxpo pot arjeiè diaqjgè
eidijeè| cmxèrei| pot amaleèmomsai apoè so epiveiqglasijgè dqarsgqioèsgsa cia
pqoèrxpo pot sg diemeqceiè , sgm oijomolijotè| gè epacceklasijotè |
pqobkewiloèsgsa sg| fgliè a|, sg rveèrg rjopotè |, so opoiè o vqgrilopoieiè
sg| ecctèsgsa| gè sg| eidijgè| boghgsijoè pqorxpijoè gè sevmijoè
elpirsortè mg| lesantè sxm enopkirloè ethtèmesai cia jaèhe fgliè a pot
elpkejoleèmxm, oèpx| epiè rg| jai sgm pqojakeiè sai apoè ekaèssxla sg|
diaheriloèsgsa jai so joèrso| dqarsgqioèsgsa| atsgè| gè apoè sgm
pqokgpsijxèm gè emakkajsijxèm lehoèdxm. paqacxcgè sg| ejsoè| am apodeiè nei oèsi
(2) So x| aèmx leèsqo lpoqeiè ma eèvei epideiè nei so apaisotèlemo leè sqo
pqoraqlorheiè oèsam koècx gkijiè a|, rtlpeqiuoqaè|.
pmetlasijgè| gè rxlasijgè| amijamoèsgsa| (2) «Ekaèssxla» eiè mai jaèhe apoèjkirg apoè
gè koècx enaiqesijxèm peqirsaèrexm dem sa pqoèstpa pot etkoècx| amaleè momsai
eiè mai dtmasoèm ma amaleèmesai apoè so apoè sgm epiveiè qgrg gè apoè sa pqoiç oèmsa gè
pqoèrxpo ma amsapojqiheiè re atsoè. si| tpgqeriè e| sg|.

Jeuaèkaio 5. Amsijeilemijgè ethtèmg apoè som aèkko ejsoè| eaèm o epibkeèpxm

apodeiè nei oèsi ajokotè hgre so
èAqh. 5:101. Artmgèhirsa epijiè mdtme|
apaisotè lemo leèsqo rtlpeqiuoqaè| jasaè
dqarsgqioè sgse|
sgm epiè bkewg.
(1) So pqoèrxpo pot dienaècei lia
èAqh. 6:102. Ethtèmg cia sot|
artmgèhirsa epijiè mdtmg dqarsgqioèsgsa
pqorsgheè mse|
ethtèmesai amsijeilemijaè cia sg fgliè a
pot eiè mai vaqajsgqirsijgè sot jimdtèmot (1) è Opoio| vqgrilopoieiè pqorsgheè mse|
pot pqojakeiè sai apoè sg dqarsgqioèsgsa ethtèmesai cia sg fgliè a pot pqojkgèhgje
atsgè jai epeèqvesai x| rtmeè peiaè sg|. apoè atsotè | emeqcxèmsa| rsa pkaiè ria sxm
(2) Lia dqarsgqioèsgsa eiè mai artmgèhirsa jahgjoèmsxm sot|, euoèrom paqabiè aram
epijiè mdtmg am so apaisotè lemo leèsqo rtlpeqiuoqaè|.
a) dgliotqceiè eè mam pqobkeèwilo jai (2) O amenaèqsgso| eqcokaèbo| dem
idiaiseèqx| rglamsijoè jiè mdtmo fgliè a| hexqeiè sai pqorsgheiè | cia sot| rjopotè|
ajoèla jai oèsam jaèhe apaisotèlemg sot paqoèmso| aèqhqot.
epileèkeia jasabaèkkesai jasaè sg SISKOR IV. Altmsijaè leè ra
diaveiè qirgè sg| jai
b) dem aposekeiè fgèsgla joimgè| pqa- Jeuaèkaio 7. Altmsijaè leè ra cemijxè|
jsijgè|vqgèrg|. èAqh. 7:101. Altmsijaè leè ra barifoèlema re
(3) O jiè mdtmo| fgliè a| lpoqeiè ma eiè mai dijaiokoècgrg sg| rtlpeqiuoqaè|
rglamsijoè| amauoqijaè le sg roba-
(1) G ethtèmg lpoqeiè ma apojkeirheiè am
qoèsgsa gè sgm pihamoèsgsa sg| fgliè a|.
jai rso bahloè pot o dqaèrsg| emeè qcgre
(4) Atsoè so aèqhqo dem euaqloèfesai re moèlila
dqarsgqioèsgsa cia sgm opoiè a eidijaè a) pqo| tpeqaèrpirg emoè| dijotè sot
pqobkeè pesai amsijeilemijgè ethtèmg re pqorsasetoèlemot rtlueè qomso| apeèmamsi
opoiadgèpose aèkkg diaèsang atsxèm sxm re lia paqaèmolg epiè herg (aèltma),
Aqvxèm gè re opoiadgèpose aèkkg ehmijgè
b) jaèsx apoè amaècjg,
moloheriè a gè diehmgè rtèlbarg.
c) epeidgè g bogèheia apoè si| aqveè| dem
èAqh. 5:102. èAkke| peqipsxèrei| lpoqotè re ma usaèrei eècjaiqa
amsijeilemijgè| ethtèmg| (atsodijiè a),
d) le sg rtmaiè merg sot htè laso|, gè oèsam
(1) Ehmijoiè moèloi lpoqotèm ma
so seketsaiè o eèvei amakaèbei som jiè mdtmo
pqobkeè potm peqaiseèqx jasgcoqiè e|
ma tporseiè bkaèbg, gè
amsijeilemijgè| ethtèmg| cia epijiè mdtme|
e) dtmaèlei moèlilg| enotriè a|, oèpx|
dqarsgqioèsgse| ajoèla jai am g
aèdeia|.
dqarsgqioèsgsa dem eiè mai artmgèhirsa
(2) So am g ethtèmg ha apojkeirheiè
epijiè mdtmg.
enaqsaèsai apoè so baèqo| atsxèm sxm
(2) Ejsoè| eaèm ehmijoè| moèlo| pqobkeèpei
aisiokocgèrexm apoè sg lia pketqaè jai
so amsiè heso, pqoèrhese| jasgcoqiè e|
apoè si| pqotçpoheè rei| sg| ethtè mg| apoè
amsijeilemijgè| ethtèmg| lpoqotèm ma
sgm aèkkg.
rsoiveiohesghotèm amakocijaè cia aèkke|
(3) Re enaiqesijeè| peqipsxèrei|, g ethtè mg
pgceè | rtcjqiè rilot jimdtèmot fgliè a|.
lpoqeiè emakkajsijaè ma peqioqirseiè .
Jeuaèkaio 6. Ethtè mg cia aèkkot|
èAqh. 7:102. Altmsijaè leè ra jasaè sg|
èAqh. 6:101. Ethtèmg cia amgkiè jot| gè pmet- amsijeilemijgè| ethtèmg|
lasijxè| amiè jama pqoèrxpa
(1) G amsijeilemijgè ethtè mg lpoqeiè ma
è Opoio| arjeiè sgm epopseiè a aèkkot, apojkeirheiè gè ma peqioqirseiè am g fgliè a
amgkiè jot gè pmetlasijxè| amijaèmot, pqojkgèhgje apoè liè a apqoèbkepsg jai
ethtèmesai cia sg fgliè a pot pqojkgèhgje amapoèuetjsg

a) amxseè qa biè a (force majeure), gè pqoèrxpa. G ethtè mg eiè mai ei| okoèjkgqom
b) rtlpeqiuoqaè sqiè sot pqorxèpot. oèsam:
(2) So am g amsijeilemijgè ethtèmg ha a) eè ma pqoèrxpo em cmxèrei sot
apojkeirheiè gè ha peqioqirseiè , jai am mai rtlleseèvei gè tpojimeiè gè paqosqtè mei sgm
re poia eèjsarg, enaqsaèsai apoè so baèqo| seèkerg adijopqaniè a| apoè aèkkot| g
sg| enxseqijgè| epiqqogè| apoè sg lia opoiè a pqojakeiè fgliè a rso htè laÍ gè
pketqaè jai sgm eèjsarg sg| ethtèmg| b) g amenaèqsgsg rtlpeqiuoqaè gè
(aèqhqo 3:201) apoè sgm aèkkg. dqarsgqioèsgsa emoè| pqorxèpot pqojakeiè
(3) Re peqiè psxrg peqioqirlotè rtèluxma fgliè a rso htèla jai g iè dia fgliè a lpoqeiè
le sgm paqaècqauo (1)(b), g epiè rg| ma jasakocirheiè jai re aèkko
amsijeilemijgè ethtèmg jai opoiadgèpose pqoèrxpo.
ethtèmg sot sqiè sot pqorxèpot eiè mai ei| c) eè ma pqoèrxpo ethtèmesai cia sg fgliè a
okoèjkgqom rtè luxma le so aèqhqo 9:101 pot pqojkgèhgje apoè som pqorsgheèmsa
(1)(b). re rtmhgèje| pot jahirsotèm jai som
Jeuakaiè o 8. Rtmsqeè votra dqarsgqioèsgsa pqorsgheèmsa epiè rg| tpetè htmo.
gè rtlpeqiuoqaè (2) è Osam peqirroèseqoi tpeèvotm ethtèmg
ei| okoèjkgqom, so htèla lpoqeiè ma
èAqh. 8:101. Rtmsqeè votra dqarsgqioèsgsa
apaisgèrei pkgèqg apofgliè xrg apoè
gè rtlpeqiuoqaè sot htè laso|
opoiomdgèpose gè opoiotrdgèpose apoè
(1) G ethtèmg lpoqeiè ma apojkeirheiè gè ma atsotè|, tpoè sgm pqotçpoèherg oèsi so htèla
peqioqirseiè rso bahloè pot hexqeiè sai dem lpoqeiè ma kaèbei peqirroèseqa apoè so
diè jaio kalbamoleè mxm tpoèwg sot rtmokijoè poroè sg| fgliè a| pot tpeèrsg.
rtmsqeèvomso| psaiè rlaso| sot htè laso| (3) G fgliè a eiè mai g iè dia fgliè a cia sot|
jai opoixmdgèpose aèkkxm fgsglaèsxm rjopotè| sg| paqacqaèuot (1)(b) amxseè qx
rvesijxèm le sgm jahieèqxrg gè som oèsam dem tpaèqvei kocijgè baèrg pqo|
peqioqirloè sg| ethtèmg| sot htè laso| am jasakocirloè loèmo leèqot| sg| re jaheèma
gèsam atsoè o fglixèra|. apoè sa ethtmoèlema apeè mamsi rso htèla
(2) è Osam anixèmesai apofgliè xrg pqoèrxpa. Cia so rjopoè atsoè so pqoèrxpo
amauoqijaè le so haèmaso pqorxèpot, g pot irvtqiè fesai oèsi g fgliè a dem eiè mai g
rtlpeqiuoqaè gè g dqarsgqioèsgsaè sot iè dia oueiè kei ma apodeiè nei oèsi dem eiè mai.
apojkeiè ei gè peqioqiè fei sgm ethtèmg è Oam tpaèqvei seè soia baèrg, g ethtèmg eiè mai
rtèluxma le sgm paqaècqauo 1. diaiqesgè, dgkadgè jaèhe pqoèrxpo
(3) G rtmsqeèvotra dqarsgqioèsgsa gè ethtèmesai apeè mamsi rso htèla loèmo cia so
rtlpeqiuoqaè sot pqorsgheè mso| sot leèqo| sg| fgliè a| pot jasakociè fesai re
htèlaso| apojkeiè ei gè peqioqiè fei sgm atsoè.
apofgliè xrg sot htèlaso| rtè luxma le
èAqh. 9:102. Rveè rg lesantè sxm pqorxèpxm
sgm paqaècqauo 1.
pot ethtèmomsai ei| okoèjkgqom
SISKOR V. Fgliè a apoè peqirroseè qot|
(1) Pqoèrxpo pot ethtèmesai ei|
Jeuaèkaio 9. Fgliè a apoè peqirroseè qot| okoèjkgqom eèvei dijaiè xla amacxcgè|
eèmamsi opoiotdgèpose aèkkot pqorxèpot
èAqh. 9:101. Ei| okoèjkgqom jai diaiqesgè
pot ethtè mesai apeèmamsi rso htèla
ethtè mg: rveè rg lesantè htè laso| jai
amauoqijaè le sgm iè dia fgliè a. Atsoè so
peqirroè seqxm fglixraèmsxm
dijaiè xla dem epgqeaèfei opoiadgèpose
(1) G ethtèmg eiè mai ei| okoèjkgqom oèsam lesantè sot| rtèlbarg g opoiè a
okoèjkgqg gè eèma diajqisoè leèqo| sg| pqordioqiè fei sgm jasamolgè sg| fgliè a| gè
fgliè a| pot eèvei tporseiè so htèla lpoqeiè opoiadgèpose molohesijgè diaèsang gè
ma jasakocirheiè re dtèo gè peqirroèseqa opoiodgèpose dijaiè xla amacxcgè|

dtmaèlei tpojasaèrsarg| [cessio legis] gè opoiè o sa vqgèlasa lpoqotèm, rsg heèrg

baèrei sot adijaiokoècgsot pkotsirlotè . pot ha bqirjoèsam am g adijopqaniè a dem
(2) Tpoè sgm epiutè kang sg| paqacqaèuot eiè ve sekerseiè . G apofgliè xrg epiè rg|
(3) sot paqoèmso| aèqhqot, so poroè sg| rsovetè ei rsgm pqoèkgwg sg| fgliè a|.
amacxcgè| ha eiè mai oè,si hexqeiè sai diè jaio èAqh. 10:102. Euaèpan poroè gè peqiodijeè |
emoèwei sg| rvesijgè| ethtè mg| cia sg jasabokeè |
fgliè a sxm pqorxèpxm pot ethtèmomsai,
amaèkoca le so bahloè psaiè rlaso| sot G apofgliè xrg epidijaèfesai re euaèpan
jahemoè| jai kalbamoleè mxm tpoèwg jai poroè gè re peqiodijeè | jasabokeè|, oèpx|
opoixmdgèpose aèkkxm fgsglaèsxm aqloèfei kalbamoleè mot idiaiseè qx| tpoèwg
rvesijxèm le sgm jahieèqxrg gè som sot rtlueèqomso| sot htè laso|.
peqioqirloè sg| ethtèmg| sot|. G èAqh. 10:103. Oueè kg pot apojoliè fomsai
amacxcgè lpoqeiè ma odgcgèrei re pkgèqg apoè so fgliocoèmo cecomoè |
ijamopoiè grg. Am dem eiè mai dtmasoèm ma
Jasaè som pqordioqirloè sot porotè sg|
pqordioqirseiè g rvesijgè ethtè mg sxm
apofgliè xrg| oueè kg pot o fglixheiè |
pqorxèpxm pot ethtè momsai, oèkoi
apojoliè fei leèrx sot fgliocoèmot
hexqotèmsai tpetè htmoi jasaè iè ra leèqg.
cecomoèso| kalbaèmomsai tpoèwg ejsoè| eaèm
(3) è Osam eèma pqoèrxpo ethtèmesai cia sg
atsoè dem lpoqeiè ma rtlbibarseiè le so
fgliè a pot pqojkgèhgje apoè som
rjopoè sot oueèkot|.
pqorsgheèmsa jasaè so aèqhqo 9:101,
hexqeiè sai oèsi ueèqei oèko so leèqo| sg| èAqh. 10:104. Apojasaèrsarg re eiè do|
ethtèmg| pot apodiè desai rsom Amsiè cia apofgliè xrg, apojasaèrsarg re
pqorsgheèmsa cia sot| rjopotè| sg| eiè do| lpoqeiè ma fgsgheiè apoè som
amacxcgè| lesantè atsotè jai fglixheè msa rso bahloè someiè mai dtmasgè
opoiotdgèpose fglixèramso| aèkkot apoè jai eaèm dem eiè mai idiaiseèqx| epavhgè| cia
som pqorsgheèmsa. so aèkko leèqo|.
(4) G tpovqeèxrg rtllesovgè| rsgm
apofgliè xrg eiè mai diaiqesgè, dgkadgè so Emoè sgsa 2. Peqiotriajgè fgliè a
pqoèrxpo pot tpoèjeisai re atsgè èAqh. 10:201. Utèrg jai jahoqirloè| sg|
ethtèmesai loèmo cia so leèqo| sg| ethtèmg| peqiotriajgè| fgliè a|
x| pqo| sg fgliè a pot sot amakoceiè
Apojasarsaseèa peqiotriajgè fgliè a
rtèluxma le atsoè so aèqhqoÍ akkaè oèsam
rtmirsaè g leiè xrg sg| peqiotriè a| sot
dem eiè mai dtmasoèm ma ejsekerseiè g
htèlaso| pot pqojkgèhgje apoè so
apoèuarg cia rtllesovgè rsgm
fgliocoèmo cecomoè|. Atsgè g fgliè a cemijaè
apofgliè xrg jasaè emoè| pqorxèpot pot
pqordioqiè fesai oèro so dtmasoèm
ethtèmesai, so leqiè dioè sot epileqiè fesai
peqirroèseqo rtcjejqileè ma, akkaè
lesantè sxm tpoèkoipxm pqorxèpxm pot
dtmasoèm ma pqordioqirseiè augqgleèma
ethtèmomsai amakoècx| sg| ethtè mg| sot|.
oèsam aqloèfei, p. v. le amauoqaè rsgm silgè
SISKOR VI. è Emdija boghgèlasa sg| acoqaè|.
Jeuaèkaio 10. Apofgliè xrg èAqh. 10:202. Rxlasijgè bkaèbg jai
haèmaso|
Emoè sgsa 1. Apofgliè xrg cemijaè
(1) Re peqiè psxrg rxlasijgè| bkaèbg|, g
èAqh. 10:101. Utèrg jai rjopoè| sg|
opoiè a peqikalbaèmei bkaèbg rsg
apofgliè xrg|
rxlasijgè tceiè a jai rsgm pmetlasijgè
G apofgliè xrg eiè mai vqglasijgè tceiè a pot jasakgècei re cmxrsgè
jasabokgè pqo| epamoèqhxrg sg| fgliè a| arheè meia, g peqiotriajgè fgliè a
sot htè laso|, dgkadgè pqo| peqikalbaèmei apxèkeia eirodgèlaso|,
apojasaèrsargè sot, rso bahloè rsom leiè xrg sg| ijamoèsgsa| epiè setng|

jeèqdot| (ajoèla jai am dem rtmodetèesai amhqxèpimg aniopqeè peia, eketheqiè a gè re

apoè apxèkeia eirodgèlaso|) jai etè koce| aèkka dijaixèlasa sg| pqorxpijoèsgsa|.
dapaème|, peqikalbamoleèmxm sxm Lg peqiotriajgè fgliè a lpoqeiè epiè rg| ma
dapamxèm iasqijgè| peqiè hakwg|. eiè mai so amsijeiè lemo sg| apofgliè xrg|
(2) Re peqiè psxrg hamaèsot, pqoèrxpa sxm pqorxèpxm pot eèvotm rsemgè rveèrg
oèpx| sa leèkg sg| oijoceè meia| sa opoiè a o le so htè la hamasguoèqa| gè poktè robaqgè|
apohamxèm dieèsqeue gè ha dieèsqeue am o lg hamasguoèqa| rxlasijgè| bkaèbg|.
haèmaso| dem eiè ve epeè khei, (2) Cemijaè, jasaè sgm aposiè lgrg seèsoia|
amsilesxpiè fomsai x| eè vomsa tporseiè apofgliè xrg|, oèke| oi peqirsaèrei| sg|
apojasarsaseèa fgliè a rsgm eèjsarg sg| tpoèherg|, rtlpeqikalbamoleè mxm sg|
apxèkeia| atsgè| sg| diasqougè|. baqtèsgsa|, sg| vqomijgè| diaèqjeia| jai
èAqh. 10:203. Apxèkeia, jasarsqougè jai rtmepeixèm sg| osemovxèqia|, pqeèpei ma
bkaèbg pqaclaèsxm kalbaèmomsai tpoèwg. O bahloè| sg|
tpaisioèsgsa| sot fglixèramso| pqeè pei ma
(1) è Oam eè ma pqaècla apoèkktsai, kalbaèmesai tpoèwg loèmo oèsam eèvei
jasarsqeèuesai gè bkaèpsesai, so barijoè otrixdxè| rtmsekeèrei rsgm rsemovxèqiae
leèsqo sg| apofgliè xrg| eiè mai g aniè a sot sot htè laso|.
pqaèclaso| gè g leiè xrg sg| aniè a| sot jai (3) Re peqipsxèrei| rxlasijgè| bkaèbg|, g
cia so rjopoè atsoè eiè mai adiaèuoqo am so lg peqiotriajgè fgliè a amsirsoiveiè rsom
htèla rjopetèei ma amsijasarsgèrei gè ma poèmo sot htèlaso| jai rsg bkaèbg sg|
epidioqhxèrei so pqaècla. Paèmsx|, am so rxlasijgè| gè pmetlasijgè| sot tceiè a|.
htèla eèvei amsijasarsgèrei gè eè vei Cia som pqordioqirloè sg| apofgliè xrg|
epidioqhxèrei so pqaècla (gè am ha so (rtlpeqikalbamoleèmg| sg|
amsijasarsgèrei gè ha so epidioqhxèrei), apofgliè xrg| sxm pqorxèpxm pot eè votm
lpoqeiè ma kaèbei sgm twgkoèseqg dapaèmg rsemgè rveèrg le hamoèmse| gè robaqaè
rsgm opoiè a eè vei tpobkgheiè gè ha bkabeè mse|) paqoèloia poraè pqeè pei ma
tpobkgheiè am atsoè eiè mai etèkoco. epidijaèfomsai cia amsijeilemijaè
(2) Apofgliè xrg lpoqeiè epiè rg| ma paqoèloie| apxèkeie|.
epidijarseiè cia sgm apxèkeia sg| vqgèrg|
sot pqaèclaso|, rtlpeqikalbamoleèmxm Emoè sgsa 4. Leiè xrg sg| apofgliè xrg|
jai peqaiseèqx fglixèm oèpx| sg| apxèkeia| èAqh. 10:401. Leiè xrg sg| apofgliè xrg|
eqcariè a|. Re enaiqesijgè peqiè psxrg, am emoèwei sg|
Emoè sgsa 3. Lg peqiotriajgè fgliè a oijomolijgè| jasaèrsarg| sxm leqxèm g
pkgèqg| apofgliè xrg ha aposekotère
èAqh. 10:301. Lg peqiotriajgè fgliè a jasapiersijoè baèqo| cia som emacoèlemo, g
(1) Kalbaèmomsa| tpoèwg sgm eèjsarg sg| apofgliè xrg lpoqeiè ma leixheiè . Cia ma
pqorsariè a| sot (aèqhqo 2:102), g apouarirseiè am g apofgliè xrg ha
pqorbokgè emoè| rtlueè qomso| lpoqeiè ma leixheiè , g baèrg sg| ethtèmg| (aèqhqo
dijaiokoceiè apojasaèrsarg sg| lg 1:101), g eè jsarg sg| pqorsariè a| sot
peqiotriajgè| fgliè a|. Atsoè eidijaè rtlueè qomso| (aèqhqo 2:102) jai so
rtlbaiè mei oèsam so htèla eè vei tporseiè leèceho| sg| fgliè a| pqeè pei ma
rxlasijgè bkaèbgÍ gè pqorbokgè rsgm kalbaèmomsai idiaiseèqx| tpoèwg.

Italian Translation
by Francesco D. Busnelli and Giovanni ComandeÂ
Principi di diritto europeo della responsabilitaÁ civile
TITOLO I. Norma fondamentale (4) La tutela degli interessi puramente

Capo 1. Norma fondamentale economici o dei rapporti contrattuali
puoÁ essere piuÁ limitata in estensione. In
Art. 1:101. Norma fondamentale
tali casi, specifico rilievo deve essere
(1) Il soggetto a cui un danno subito da attribuito specialmente alla prossimitaÁ
altri eÁ a lui giuridicamente imputabile tra il soggetto agente e quello
dal diritto eÁ tenuto a risarcirlo. danneggiato, o alla circonstanza che
(2) Il danno eÁ imputabile in particolare l'autore sia consapevole del fatto che
al soggetto: causeraÁ danno e sappia anche che i
a) la cui condotta colposa o dolosa ha suoi interessi sono necessariamente di
causato il danno; o minor valore rispetto a quelli del
b) la cui attivitaÁ straordinariamente danneggiato.
pericolosa ha causato il danno; o (5) L'ambito della tutela puoÁ essere
c) i cui ausiliari hanno causato il danno influenzato anche dalla natura della
nell'ambito delle proprie attribuzioni. responsabilitaÁ cosõÁ che un interesse puoÁ
TITOLO II. Condizioni generali della trovare tutela põÂu ampia contro lesioni
responsabilitaÁ dolose rispetto ad altre ipotesi.
Capo 2. Danno (6) Nel determinare l'ambito della
tutela devono essere presi in
Art. 2:101. Danno risarcibile
considerazione gli interessi del soggetto
Il danno postula una lesione materiale o agente, specialmente in ordine alla
immateriale ad un interesse libertaÁ di agire e all'esercizio dei propri
giuridicamente protetto. diritti, cosõÁ come gli interessi pubblici.
Art. 2:102. Interessi protetti
Art. 2:103. Danno da attivitaÁ o fonti
(1) L'ambito di tutela di un interesse illecite
dipende dalla sua natura; quanto tanto
põÂu ampia sia il suo valore, la precisione Danni connessi ad attivitaÁ o fonti che
della sua definizione e la sua evidenza, sono considerate illecite non possono
tanto põÂu ampia eÁ la sua tutela. essere risarciti.
(2) La vita, l'integritaÁ psico-fisica, la Art. 2:104. Spese di salvataggio
dignitaÁ umana e la libertaÁ ricevono la
piuÁ ampia tutela. Le spese sostenute per prevenire un
(3) Ampia tutela eÁ garantita ai diritti di danno temuto costituiscono danno
proprietaÁ, compresi i diritti di proprietaÁ risarcibile nei limiti in cui esse siano
su beni immateriali. ragionevolmente sostenute.
Francesco D. Busnelli/Giovanni ComandeÂ 223

Art. 2:105. Prova del danno medesimo danno non deve essere
considerata.
Il danno deve essere provato secondo i
(2) Un'attivitaÁ successiva eÁ presa in
normali standard. La corte puoÁ valutare
considerazione se ha comportato danni
la misura del danno ove la prova del suo
ulteriori o piuÁ gravi.
preciso ammontare sia troppo difficile o
troppo costosa. (3) Se una prima attivitaÁ ha causato un
danno continuato e anche un'attivitaÁ
Capo 3. CausalitaÁ successiva lo avrebbe causato da un
Sezione 1. Conditio sine qua non e momento successivo, da quel momento
limitazioni in poi entrambe sono considerate come
causa di quel danno continuato.
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non
Art. 3:105. CausalitaÁ incerta parziale
Un'attivitaÁ o condotta (da ora in avanti:
In caso di attivitaÁ molteplici, quando eÁ
attivitaÁ) eÁ causa del danno subito dalla
certo che nessuna di esse ha causato
vittima se, in assenza di tale attivitaÁ, il
l'intero danno o alcuna parte
danno non si sarebbe realizzato.
determinabile dello stesso, tutte quelle
Art. 3:102. Cause concorrenti che probabilmente hanno contribuito
[anche in modo minimo] a causare il
In caso di molteplici attivitaÁ, ove
danno si presume lo abbiano causato in
ciascuna di esse da sola avrebbe causato
ugual misura.
il danno nello stesso tempo, ciascuna
attivitaÁ eÁ considerata causa del danno Art. 3:106. Cause incerte nella sfera di
subito dalla vittima. influenza del danneggiato
Art. 3:103. Cause alternative La vittima deve sopportare il danno
nella misura corrispondente alla
(1) In caso di molteplici attivitaÁ, ove
possibile incidenza di un'attivitaÁ, evento
ciascuna sarebbe stata sufficiente a
o altre circostanze riferibili alla propria
causare il danno, ma rimane incerto
sfera di influenza.
quale di esse lo abbia in realtaÁ causato,
ciascuna attivitaÁ eÁ considerata causa del Sezione 2. Ambito della responsabilitaÁ
danno in proporzione al suo contributo
Art. 3:201. Ambito della responsabilitaÁ
probabile al verificarsi del danno subito
dalla vittima. Quando una attivitaÁ eÁ causa del danno
(2) In caso di molteplici vittime, qualora ai sensi della sezione 1 di questo capo,
rimanga incerto se il danno di una se e entro che limiti il danno possa
particolare vittima sia stato causato da essere attribuito ad una persona
una specifica attivitaÁ, mentre eÁ dipende da fattori quali:
probabile che essa non abbia causato il a) la prevedibilitaÁ del danno da parte di
danno di tutte le vittime, questa eÁ persona ragionevole al momento dello
considerata causa del danno sofferto da svolgimento dell'attivitaÁ, tenendo in
tutte le vittime in proporzione al suo considerazione in particolare la
contributo probabile al verificarsi del contiguitaÁ nel tempo o nello spazio tra
danno subito da quella vittima. l'attivitaÁ dannosa e le sue conseguenze,
ovvero l'entitaÁ del danno in relazione
Art. 3:104. Cause potenziali alle normali conseguenze di tale attivitaÁ.
(1) Se un'attivitaÁ ha comportato che una b) la natura e il valore dell'interesse
vittima subisca un danno in modo certo protetto (Articolo 2:102);
e irreversibile, una successiva attivitaÁ c) la fonte della responsabilitaÁ (Articolo
che da sola avrebbe potuto causare il 1:101);
224 Italian Translation

d) i limiti dei rischi ordinari della vita; e o quando la serietaÁ della lesione da un
e) lo scopo di protezione della norma lato e la facilitaÁ di evitare il danno,
violata. dall'altro, implicano un tale dovere.
TITOLO III. Fonte della responsabilitaÁ Sezione 2. Inversione dell'onere di
provare la colpa
Capo 4. ResponsabilitaÁ fondata sulla
colpa Art. 4:201. Inversione dell'onere di
Sezione 1. Presupposti della provare la colpa in generale
responsabilitaÁ fondata sulla colpa (1) L'onere di provare la colpa puoÁ
Art. 4:101. Colpa essere invertito alla luce della gravitaÁ
del pericolo presentato dall'attivitaÁ.
Un soggetto che dolosamente o per
(2) La gravitaÁ del pericolo eÁ
negligenza viola lo standard di condotta
determinata in base alla serietaÁ di un
richiesto eÁ responsabile per colpa.
possibile danno in simili casi cosõÁ come
Art. 4:102. Standard di condotta in ragione della probabilitaÁ che tale
richiesto danno possa effettivamente verificarsi
(1) Lo standard di condotta richiesto eÁ Art. 4:202. ResponsabilitaÁ di impresa
quello di una persona ragionevole nelle
(1) Una persona che esercita in modo
circostanze del caso concreto e dipende,
durevole una impresa per scopi di lucro
in particolare, dalla natura e valore
o professionali avvalendosi di ausiliari o
dell'interesse protetto, dalla pericolositaÁ
di apparecchiature tecniche eÁ responsa-
dell'attivitaÁ, dalla perizia che ci si
bile per ogni danno causato da un
aspetta da una persona che la esercita,
difetto di tale impresa o della sua
dalla prevedibilitaÁ del danno, dalla
produzione salvo che provi di avere
relazione di prossimitaÁ o di specifico
adottato lo standard di condotta
affidamento tra i soggetti coinvolti, cosõÁ
richiesto
come dalla disponibilitaÁ e dal costo delle
(2) ¹Difettoª eÁ ogni deviazione dagli
misure di prevenzione o dei metodi
standard che possono ragionevolmente
alternativi.
pretendersi dall'impresa o dai suoi
(2) Il suddetto standard puoÁ essere
prodotti o servizi.
corretto ove richiesto quando in ragione
della etaÁ, della disabilitaÁ fisica o psichica Capo 5. ResponsabilitaÁ oggettiva
o in relazione a circostanze straordinarie Art. 5:101. AttivitaÁ straordinariamente
non eÁ esigibile una condotta ad esso pericolose
conforme.
(3) Regole che prescrivono o (1) Chiunque eserciti un'attivitaÁ
proibiscono determinate condotte straordinariamente pericolosa eÁ
devono essere prese in considerazione oggettivamente responsabile per il
nello stabilire lo standard di condotta danno caratteristico del rischio
richiesto. presentato dall'attivitaÁ e risultante dal
medesimo.
Art. 4:103. Dovere di proteggere altri da (2) Un'attivitaÁ eÁ straordinariamente
un danno pericolosa se
Un dovere di agire positivamente per a) crea un rischio particolarmente
proteggere altri da un danno puoÁ significativo e prevedibile di danno
sussistere se previsto dalla legge, o se il anche quando sono esercitate tutte le
soggetto agente crea o controlla una attenzioni nel suo esercizio e
situazione pericolosa o quando tra le b) non corrisponda a pratiche di uso
parti intercorra una specifica relazione, comune.

(3) Un rischio di danno puoÁ essere a) in difesa dei propri interessi protetti
significativo con riferimento alla serietaÁ contro una aggressione ingiustificata
o alla probabilitaÁ dello stesso. (legittima difesa)
(4) Questo articolo non si applica ad b) in stato di necessitaÁ
un'attivitaÁ se eÁ specificamente c) percheÂ l'intervento delle autoritaÁ non
sottoposta a responsabilitaÁ oggettiva da poteva essere ottenuto in tempo (auto-
altre previsioni di questi Principi ovvero tutela)
da una legge nazionale o da una d) con il consenso del danneggiato, o nel
convenzione internazionale. caso in cui quest'ultimo abbia assunto il
Art. 5:102. Altre fattispecie di rischio di essere danneggiato, o
responsabilitaÁ oggettiva e) in virtuÁ di un provvedimento
legittimo, come in caso di una
(1) Il diritto nazionale puoÁ prevedere
autorizzazione.
altre ipotesi di responsabilitaÁ oggettiva
(2) L'esclusione della responsabilitaÁ
per attivitaÁ pericolose anche se l'attivitaÁ
dipende dal peso di queste
non eÁ straordinariamente pericolosa.
giustificazioni, da un lato e, dall'altro,
(2) Salvo che il diritto nazionale non
dalle condizioni della responsabilitaÁ.
preveda diversamente, ipotesi ulteriori
(3) In casi straordinari, la responsabilitaÁ
di responsabilitaÁ oggettiva possono
puoÁ essere anche soltanto ridotta.
essere individuate in analogia con altre
fonti di rischio di danno comparabili. Art. 7:102. Cause di esonero dalla
responsabilitaÁ oggettiva
Capo 6. ResponsabilitaÁ per fatto altrui
Art. 6:101. ResponsabilitaÁ per minori o (1) La responsabilitaÁ oggettiva puoÁ
incapaci psichici essere esclusa o ridotta se la lesione eÁ
stata causata da una irresistibile e
Chiunque sia tenuto alla sorveglianza di
imprevedibile
un minore o di un soggetto affetto da dis-
a) causa di forza maggiore, o
abilitaÁ psichica eÁ responsabile per il danno
b) condotta di un terzo.
causato da questi, salvo che non provi di
(2) L'esclusione o la riduzione, ed in tal
avere osservato lo standard di condotta
caso anche il limite della riduzione della
richiesto nella sorveglianza.
responsabilitaÁ oggettiva dipendono dal
Art. 6:102. ResponsabilitaÁ per fatto peso dell'influenza esterna, da un lato,
degli ausiliari e, dall'altro, dall'ambito della
(1) Chiunque eÁ responsabile per il responsabilitaÁ (Articolo 3:201).
danno causato dai propri ausiliari, che (3) Se ridotta in base al paragrafo
agiscono nell'ambito delle proprie (1)(b), la responsabilitaÁ oggettiva e ogni
funzioni, in violazione dello standard di responsabilitaÁ del terzo sono solidali a
condotta richiesto. norma dell'articolo Articolo 9:101 (1)(b)
(2) Un collaboratore autonomo non eÁ Capo 8. Concorso di condotta o attivitaÁ
considerato ausiliare ai fini del presente
articolo. Art. 8:101. Concorso di condotta o
attivitaÁ del danneggiato
TITOLO IV. Cause di esclusione o
limitazione della responsabilitaÁ (1) La responsabilitaÁ puoÁ essere esclusa
o ridotta nei limiti ritenuti giusti con
Capo 7. Cause generali
riferimento al concorso di colpa del
Art. 7:101. Cause di giustificazione danneggiato e a ogni altro elemento che
(1) La responsabilitaÁ puoÁ essere esclusa sarebbe rilevante nel determinare o
se e nei limiti in cui il soggetto abbia ridurre la responsabilitaÁ del danneggiato
agito legittimamente: se questi fosse il danneggiante.

(2) Nel caso in cui siano chiesti i danni ossia ciascun danneggiante eÁ
con riferimento alla morte di una responsabile solo per la parte del danno
persona, la condotta o attivitaÁ di ad esso imputabile.
quest'ultimo esclude o riduce la
responsabilitaÁ in base al comma 1. Art 9:102 Rapporti tra i soggetti
(3) La condotta o attivitaÁ concorrente di solidalmente responsabili
un ausiliare del danneggiato esclude o
(1) Un soggetto solidalmente
riduce i danni a questi risarcibili in base
responsabile ha diritto di ottenere
al comma 1.
regresso in via di contributo da ogni
TITOLO V. PluralitaÁ di danneggianti altro soggetto responsabile verso la
vittima per il medesimo danno.
Capo 9. PluralitaÁ di danneggianti
Questo diritto non pregiudica alcun
Art 9:101 ResponsabilitaÁ solidale e eventuale contratto tra di essi per
parziaria: rapporti tra il danneggiato e determinare la ripartizione della
una pluralitaÁ di danneggianti perdita neÂ un'eventuale previsione
di legge o un altro diritto di
(1) La responsabilitaÁ eÁ solidale quando
recupero per surrogazione o sulla
l'intero danno sofferto dalla vittima o
base di un'azione per ingiustificato
una parte distinguibile dello stesso sia
arricchimento.
imputabile a due o piuÁ soggetti. La
responsabilitaÁ eÁ solidale quando: (2) Alle condizioni di cui al comma 3 di
a) un soggetto partecipa questo articolo, la quota di contributo eÁ
consapevolmente o istiga o incoraggia quella ritenuta giusta alla luce della
l'illecito di altri che causa danno al relativa responsabilitaÁ per il danno,
danneggiato; o avendo riguardo ai rispettivi concorsi di
colpa e ad ogni altro elemento rilevante
b) il comportamento o l'attivitaÁ
per stabilire o ridurre la responsabilitaÁ
indipendenti di un soggetto causa un
di ciascuno. L'importo del regresso puoÁ
danno alla vittima e il medesimo danno
coincidere con l'intero risarcimento. Se
eÁ imputabile anche ad un altro; o
non eÁ possibile determinare la
c) un soggetto eÁ responsabile per il
responsabilitaÁ relativa di ciascuno le
danno causato da un ausiliare nelle
responsabilitaÁ si presumono uguali.
circostanze in cui anche l'ausiliario eÁ
responsabile. (3) Un soggetto responsabile per il
(2) Qualora piuÁ soggetti siano danno causato da un ausiliare ai sensi
solidalmente responsabili, la vittima puoÁ dell'articolo 9:101 si considera
chiedere l'intero risarcimento a uno o responsabile per l'intera parte
piuÁ di loro, a condizione che il attribuibile all'ausiliare quando vi sia
danneggiato non riceva piuÁ dell'intero responsabilitaÁ solidale tra costui e altri
danno sofferto. responsabili diversi dall'ausiliare.
(3) Il danno eÁ considerato come il (4) L'obbligazione di contribuire eÁ
medesimo danno ai fini del comma parziaria, cioeÁ ciascun soggetto eÁ
(1)(b) quando non vi sia altro responsabile solo per la parte di
ragionevole fondamento per attribuire responsabilitaÁ che gli eÁ attribuita in
solo una parte del danno a ciascuno o ad base al presente articolo; tuttavia ove
alcuni dei soggetti responsabili verso il la condanna di regresso contro un
danneggiato. A tale scopo eÁ onere di chi danneggiante non possa essere
afferma che il danno non sia il eseguita, la sua quota eÁ riallocata tra i
medesimo di darne la prova. Quando responsabili solidali in proporzione
cioÁ avvenga la responsabilitaÁ eÁ parziaria, della loro responsabilitaÁ.

TITOLO VI. Rimedi esempio con riferimento ad un valore di

mercato.
Capo 10. Danni
Sezione 1. Danni in generale Art. 10:202. Danno alla persona e morte
Art. 10:101. Natura e scopo del risarci- (1) In caso di danno alla persona, che
mento dei danni postula la lesione dell'integritaÁ
psicofisica comportante una malattia
Il risarcimento dei danni consiste nel accertata, il danno patrimoniale
pagamento di una somma di denaro per comprende il lucro cessante, il
rimettere il danneggiato nei limiti in cui deterioramento della capacitaÁ di
il denaro possa, nella posizione che guadagno (anche se non accompagnata
avrebbe occupato se l'illecito non fosse da alcuna perdita di guadagno), e le
stato commesso. Il risarcimento dei spese ragionevoli comprensive delle
danni han anche per scopo la spese mediche.
prevenzione del danno. (2) In caso di morte, persone come i
Art. 10:102. Somma capitale o familiari mantenuti o che sarebbero stati
pagamenti periodici mantenuti del defunto se non si fosse
verificata la morte sono considerati
I danni sono liquidati in somma capitale
come aventi diritto al risarcimento del
o con pagamenti periodici quando cioÂ
danno nei limiti della perdita di tale
appaia piuÁ appropriato con particolare
sostegno.
riguardo all'interesse del danneggiato.
Art. 10:203. Perdita, distruzione e
Art. 10:103. Vantaggi derivati
danno a cose
dall'evento dannoso
Nel determinare l'ammontare dei danni (1) Quando una cosa eÁ perduta,
i vantaggi ottenuti dal danneggiato a distrutta o danneggiata il valore base dei
causa dell'evento dannoso devono danni eÁ il valore della cosa o la
essere presi in considerazione salvo che diminuzione nel suo valore e per tale
cioÁ non sia conciliabile con lo scopo dei scopo eÁ irrilevante che la vittima
vantaggi. intenda ripararla o sostituirla. Tuttavia,
se la vittima la ha sostituita o riparata (o
Art. 10:104. Riparazione in forma intende fare cioÁ), puoÁ ottenere il valore
specifica piuÁ alto se eÁ ragionevole fare cioÁ.
La riparazione in forma specifica puoÁ (2) Danni possono essere risarcite anche
essere richiesta dal danneggiato al posto per la perdita dell'uso della cosa,
dei danni nei limiti in cui sia possibile e comprese le perdite conseguenti come la
non eccessivamente onerosa per l'altra perdita di attivitaÁ professionale.
parte. Sezione 3. Danno non patrimoniale
Sezione 2. Danno patrimoniale Art. 10:301. Danno non patrimoniale
Art. 10:201. Natura e quantificazione
(1) La lesione di un interesse puoÁ
del danno patrimoniale
giustificare il risarcimento del danno
Il danno patrimoniale risarcibile eÁ una non patrimoniale in considerazione
diminuzione del patrimonio del dell'ambito della sua tutela (Articolo
danneggiato causato dall'evento 2:102). In particolare questo eÁ il caso in
dannoso. Tale danno eÁ generalmente cui il danneggiato ha sofferto un danno
determinato in modo il piuÁ concreto alla persona, o una lesione della dignitaÁ
possibile ma puoÁ essere determinato in umana, della libertaÁ, o di altri diritti
astratto ove risulti piuÁ appropriato, per della personalitaÁ. Il danno non patrimo-

niale eÁ risarcibile anche a soggetti che relazione di prossimitaÁ con la vittima

hanno una prossimitaÁ di relazioni con la deceduta o gravemente menomata)
vittima che subisca un danno letale o un devono essere assegnate somme simili
danno particolarmente grave. per lesioni oggettivamente simili.
(2) Di norma, nella valutazione di tali
danni devono essere prese in Sezione 4. Riduzione dei danni
considerazione tutte le circostanze del Art. 10:401. Riduzione dei danni
caso, compresa la gravitaÁ, la durata e le
conseguenze del torto. La colpa del In caso eccezionale, se alla luce della
danneggiante deve essere presa in con- situazione economica delle parti risulta
siderazione solo ove contribuisca in chiaro che il risarcimento integrale
modo significativo alla offesa subita sarebbe un peso oppressivo per il
dalla vittima. convenuto, i danni possono essere
(3) In caso di danno alla persona, il ridotti. Nel decidere se fare cioÁ,
danno non patrimoniale corrisponde devono essere in particolare presi in
alla sofferenza del danneggiato e alla considerazione il fondamento della
menomazione della sua integritaÁ responsabilitaÁ (Articolo 1:101),
psicofisica. Nella liquidazione dei danni l'ambito della tutela dell'interesse
(inclusi i danni a coloro che hanno una (Articolo 2:102) e la misura del danno.

Japanese Translation
by Kiyoaki Fukuda
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230 Japanese Translation

240 Korean Translation

Polish Translation
by Ewa BaginÂska
Zasady europejskiego prawa czynoÂw niedozwolonych
TYTUè I. Norma podstawowa (3) Prawom rzeczowym, wøaÎcznie z

prawami na dobrach niematerialnych
Rozdziaø 1. Norma podstawowa
przysøuguje szeroka ochrona.
Art. 1:101. Norma podstawowa (4) Ochrona czystej szkody
ekonomicznej lub praw wypøywajaÎcych
(1) ZobowiaÎzany do naprawienia
ze stosunkoÂw umownych mozÇe bycÂ
szkody jest ten, komu mozÇna prawnie
ograniczona. W tych przypadkach nalezÇy
przypisacÂ szkodeÎ wyrzaÎdzonaÎ drugiemu.
w szczegoÂlnosÂci wziaÎcÂ pod uwageÎ
(2) SzkodeÎ mozÇna przypisacÂ w
bliskosÂcÂ zwiaÎzku mieÎdzy sprawcaÎ szkody
szczegoÂlnosÂci osobie:
a zagrozÇonaÎ osoba, lub okolicznosÂcÂ, zÇe
a) ktoÂra wyrzaÎdziøa szkodeÎ ze swej winy,
sprawca jest sÂwiadomy tego, zÇe wyrzaÎdzi
b) ktoÂrej dziaøalnosÂcÂ niebezpieczna szkodeÎ chociazÇ jego dobra majaÎ
wyrzaÎdziøa szkodeÎ, bezwzgleÎdnie nizÇszaÎ wartosÂcÂ od doÂbr
c) ktoÂrej podwøadny wyrzaÎdziø szkodeÎ w poszkodowanego.
zakresie powierzonych czynnosÂci. (5) Na zakres obowiaÎzku
TYTUè II. OgoÂlne przesøanki odszkodowawczego mozÇe takzÇe
odpowiedzialnosÂci wpøywacÂ podstawa (charakter)
odpowiedzialnosÂci sprawcy; w wypadku
Rozdziaø 2. Szkoda naruszenÂ umysÂlnych mozÇna zapewnicÂ
Art. 2:101. Szkoda podlegajaÎca ochroneÎ wieÎkszaÎ nizÇ w wypadku innych
naprawieniu naruszenÂ.
(6) UstalajaÎc zakres ochrony uwzgleÎdnia
Szkoda obejmuje uszczerbek majaÎtkowy sieÎ ponadto interesy sprawcy, zwøaszcza
lub niemajaÎtkowy w dobrach jego wolnosÂcÂ dziaøania i wykonywania
chronionych prawem. swoich praw, jak roÂwniezÇ interes
Art. 2:102. Dobra prawnie chronione spoøeczny.
(1) Zakres ochrony dobra zalezÇy od Art. 2:103. LegalnosÂcÂ szkody
jego charakteru; ochrona jest tym Straty zwiaÎzane z dziaøalnosÂciaÎ lub
szersza im wyzÇsza jest wartosÂcÂ dobra, zÂroÂdøami, ktoÂre uznaje sieÎ za nielegalne
bardziej precyzyjna jego definicja, i jego nie podlegajaÎ naprawieniu.
oczywistosÂcÂ.
Art. 2:104. Koszty zapobieźenia szkodzie
(2) Dobrom takim jak zÇycie,
integralnosÂcÂ fizyczna i psychiczna, MozÇna zÇaÎdacÂ zwrotu rozsaÎdnych
godnosÂcÂ oraz wolnosÂcÂ przysøuguje wydatkoÂw poniesionych w celu
najszersza ochrona. zapobiezÇenia grozÇaÎcej szkodzie.
244 Polish Translation

Art. 2:105. DowoÂd szkody powstania szkody, to pomija sieÎ kazÇde

Szkoda musi bycÂ udowodniona w mysÂl nasteÎpne dziaøanie, ktoÂre samodzielnie
normalnych reguø posteÎpowania wyrzaÎdziøoby teÎ samaÎ szkodeÎ.
cywilnego. SaÎd mozÇe samodzielnie (2) Jednak kolejne dziaøanie uwzgleÎdnia
ocenicÂ wysokosÂcÂ szkody w sytuacji, gdy sieÎ, jezÇeli spowodowaøo ono dodatkowaÎ
jej dowoÂd pociaÎgaøby za sobaÎ zbytnie szkodeÎ lub zwieÎkszenie szkody juzÇ
trudnosÂci lub koszty. doznanej.
(3) JezÇeli poczaÎtkowe dziaøanie
Rozdziaø 3. ZwiaÎzek przyczynowy
spowodowaøo szkodeÎ ciaÎgøaÎ, a kolejne
Sekcja 1. Conditio sine qua non i inne poÂzÂniejsze dziaøanie wyrzaÎdziøoby teÎ
warunki samaÎ szkodeÎ, oba dziaøania uwazÇa sieÎ za
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non przyczyneÎ tej szkody ciaÎgøej od tego
DziaøalnosÂcÂ lub posteÎpowanie (odtaÎd: poÂzÂniejszego momentu.
dziaøanie) jest przyczynaÎ szkody jezÇeli Art. 3:105. Niepewna czeÎsÂciowa
szkoda nie powstaøaby w braku tego przyczynowosÂcÂ
dziaøania.
JezÇeli w przypadku kilku dziaøanÂ jest
Art. 3:102. PrzyczynowosÂcÂ pewne, zÇe zÇadne z nich nie
konkurencyjna spowodowaøo caøej szkody lub zÇadnej
W przypadku kilku dziaøanÂ, z ktoÂrych mozÇliwej do okresÂlenia jej czeÎsÂci,
kazÇde samodzielnie i jednoczesÂnie domniemywa sieÎ, zÇe te zachowania,
spowodowaøoby szkodeÎ, kazÇde dziaøanie ktoÂre prawdopodobnie przyczyniøy sieÎ
uwazÇa sieÎ za przyczyneÎ szkody. [minimalnie] do powstania szkody,
spowodowaøy jaÎ w roÂwnych czeÎsÂciach.
Art. 3:103. PrzyczynowosÂcÂ alternatywna
(1) W przypadku kilku dziaøanÂ, z Art. 3:106. Niepewne przyczyny po
ktoÂrych kazÇde samodzielnie stronie poszkodowanego
wystarczaøoby do wyrzaÎdzenia szkody, OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ za szkodeÎ jest
lecz nie jest pewne, ktoÂre w wyøaÎczona w zakresie w jakim dziaøanie,
rzeczywistosÂci szkodeÎ wyrzaÎdziøo, kazÇde zdarzenie lub inna okolicznosÂcÂ,
dziaøanie uwazÇa sieÎ za przyczyneÎ szkody pozostajaÎce po stronie
w tym zakresie, jaki odpowiada poszkodowanego, mogøy bycÂ przyczynaÎ
prawdopodobienÂstwu, zÇe szkoda szkody.
poszkodowanego mogøa wyniknaÎcÂ z tej
przyczyny. Sekcja 2. Zakres odpowiedzialnosÂci
(2) JezÇeli w przypadku wielu Art. 3:201. Zakres odpowiedzialnosÂci
poszkodowanych niepewne jest, czy
okresÂlone dziaøanie wyrzaÎdziøo szkodeÎ JezÇeli zwiaÎzek przyczynowy zostaø
konkretnej osobie, przy czym ustalony w mysÂl sekcji 1 niniejszego
prawdopodobne jest, zÇe nie rozdziaøu, przypisanie szkody osobie i
spowodowaøo ono szkoÂd u wszystkich, zakres jej obowiaÎzku
dziaøanie to stanowi przyczyneÎ szkoÂd odszkodowawczego zalezÇy od
doznanych przez wszystkich nasteÎpujaÎcych okolicznosÂci:
poszkodowanych w czeÎsÂci a) czy w momencie wyrzaÎdzenia szkoda
odpowiadajaÎcej prawdopodobienÂstwu mogøa bycÂ przewidziana przez osobeÎ
wyrzaÎdzenia szkody konkretnej osobie. rozsaÎdnaÎ, przy uwzgleÎdnieniu bliskosÂci
czasowej i przestrzennej mieÎdzy
Art. 3:104. PrzyczynowosÂcÂ hipotetyczna dziaøaniem sprawczym a jego skutkiem,
(1) JezÇeli dziaøanie z pewnosÂciaÎ i lub wielkosÂci szkody w stosunku do
nieodwracalnie doprowadziøo do normalnych skutkoÂw takiego dziaøania;
Ewa BaginÂska 245

b) charakteru i wartosÂci chronionego prawem, baÎdzÂ jezÇeli osoba dziaøajaÎca

dobra (Art. 2:102), stwarza lub ma kontroleÎ nad sytuacjaÎ
c) podstawy odpowiedzialnosÂci (art. niebezpiecznaÎ, baÎdzÂ jezÇeli istnieje
1:101), mieÎdzy stronami stosunek szczegoÂlnego
d) zakresu zwyczajnego ryzyka rodzaju, albo gdy znaczny rozmiar
zÇyciowego, szkody z jednej strony i øatwosÂcÂ jej
e) ochronnego celu normy, ktoÂraÎ uniknieÎcia z drugiej strony wskazuje na
naruszono. taki obowiaÎzek.
TYTUè III. Zasady odpowiedzialnosÂci Sekcja 2. OdwroÂcenie cieÎźaru dowodu

Rozdziaø 4. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na winy
zasadzie winy Art. 4:201. OdwroÂcenie cieÎźaru dowodu
winy ± zasada ogoÂlna
Sekcja 1. Przesøanki odpowiedzialnosÂci
na zasadzie winy (1) CieÎzÇar dowodu winy mozÇe bycÂ
odwroÂcony ze wzgleÎdu na stopienÂ
Art. 4:101. Zasada winy
niebezpieczenÂstwa, jakie przedstawia
Kto narusza wymagany wzorzec okresÂlone dziaøanie.
posteÎpowania z winy umysÂlnej lub (2) O wielkosÂci niebezpieczenÂstwa
niedbalstwa ponosi odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ. decyduje rozmiar mozÇliwej szkody oraz
Art. 4:102. Wymagany wzorzec prawdopodobienÂstwo jej wystaÎpienia.
posteÎpowania Art. 4:202. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ za
(1) Wymagany wzorzec posteÎpowania to przedsieÎbiorstwo
posteÎpowanie rozsaÎdnej osoby w danych (1) Osoba prowadzaÎca przedsieÎbiorstwo
okolicznosÂciach, ktoÂry zalezÇy w w celach zarobkowych lub zawodowych,
szczegoÂlnosÂci od charakteru i wagi ktoÂra korzysta z podwøadnych i innych
naruszonego chronionego dobra, osoÂb, a takzÇe z wyposazÇenia
niebezpieczenÂstwa dziaøania, technicznego, odpowiada za szkodeÎ
profesjonalizmu oczekiwanego od wyrzaÎdzonaÎ na skutek wady tego
sprawcy, przewidywalnosÂci powstania przedsieÎbiorstwa lub jego wytworu,
szkody, wzajemnych relacji i chyba zÇe doøozÇyøa wymaganej
szczegoÂlnego stosunku zaufania mieÎdzy starannosÂci w celu zapobiezÇenia
stronami, dosteÎpnosÂci i kosztoÂw metod szkodzie.
zapobiegawczych lub alternatywnych.
(2) WadaÎ jest kazÇde odsteÎpstwo od
(2) PowyzÇszy wzorzec posteÎpowania standardoÂw, ktoÂrych mozÇna rozsaÎdnie
mozÇna zmodyfikowacÂ gdy z powodu oczekiwacÂ od przedsieÎbiorstwa, albo od
wieku, stanu umysøowego lub fizycznego jego wytworoÂw lub usøug.
lub nadzwyczajnych okolicznosÂci nie
mozÇna wymagacÂ od osoby dostosowania Rozdziaø 5. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na
sieÎ do wzorca. zasadzie ryzyka
(3) UstalajaÎc wzorzec nalezÇy wziaÎcÂ pod
Art. 5:101. Nadzwyczajnie niebez-
uwageÎ normy, ktoÂre nakazujaÎ lub
pieczna dziaøalnosÂcÂ
zakazujaÎ okresÂlonego zachowania.
(1) Kto prowadzi nadzwyczaj
Art. 4:103. ObowiaÎzek ochrony innych
niebezpiecznaÎ dziaøalnosÂcÂ, odpowiada
przed szkodaÎ
za wyrzaÎdzone szkody, ktoÂre saÎ
ObowiaÎzek podjeÎcia dziaøania w celu charakterystyczne dla ryzyka
ochrony innych przed szkodaÎ mozÇe stworzonego przez teÎ dziaøalnosÂcÂ i z
powstacÂ w sytuacjach przewidzianych niego wynikøy.

(2) AktywnosÂcÂ uwazÇa sieÎ za nadzwyczaj starannosÂci przy wykonywaniu

niebezpiecznaÎ, gdy powierzonych jej funkcji.
a. stwarza przewidywalne i bardzo (2) Przepisu tego nie stosuje sieÎ do
znaczaÎce ryzyko szkody, nawet gdy niezalezÇnego specjalisty.
zachowano wszelkaÎ starannosÂcÂ w TYTUè IV. Przesøanki wyøaÎczajaÎce lub
zarzaÎdzaniu ryzykiem oraz gdy ograniczajaÎce odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ
b. ryzyko to nie wynika z czynnosÂci
zÇycia codziennego. Rozdziaø 7. Przesøanki wyøaÎczajaÎce lub
(3) Za wysokim stopniem zagrozÇenia ograniczajaÎce ± przepisy ogoÂlne
szkodaÎ mozÇe przemawiacÂ jej rozmiar lub Art. 7:101. Przesøanki oparte na
prawdopodobienÂstwo powstania. dziaøaniu dozwolonym
(4) Przepis nie ma zastosowania w
(1) OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ mozÇe bycÂ
sytuacji, gdy niniejsze Zasady lub
wyøaÎczona w zakresie w jakim sprawca
przepisy prawa krajowego baÎdzÂ
moÂgø legalnie dziaøacÂ
konwencje mieÎdzynarodowe przewidujaÎ
a) w obronie koniecznej przed
odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na zasadzie ryzyka za
bezprawnym zamachem na wøasne
okresÂlonego rodzaju dziaøalnosÂcÂ.
dobro chronione (obrona konieczna);
Art. 5:102. Inne przypadki b) w stanie wyzÇszej koniecznosÂci
odpowiedzialnosÂci na zasadzie ryzyka c) poniewazÇ pomoc ze strony organoÂw
wøadzy nie byøa mozÇliwa w czasie
(1) Prawo krajowe mozÇe przewidywacÂ
wøasÂciwym (samopomoc)
dalsze przypadki odpowiedzialnosÂci na
d) za zgodaÎ poszkodowanego lub gdy
zasadzie ryzyka za niebezpiecznaÎ
poszkodowany dziaøaø na wøasne ryzyko
dziaøalnosÂcÂ nawet gdy dana dziaøalnosÂcÂ
e) w sÂwietle legalnego upowazÇnienia,
nie jest nadzwyczaj niebezpieczna.
takiego jak zezwolenie administracyjne.
(2) Z zastrzezÇeniem odreÎbnego przepisu
(2) O wyøaÎczeniu odpowiedzialnosÂci,
w prawie krajowym, dopuszcza sieÎ
decyduje poroÂwnanie wagi powyzÇszych
dodatkowo zastosowanie zasady ryzyka
okolicznosÂci z przesøankami
przez analogieÎ do innych zÂroÂdeø
odpowiedzialnosÂci.
poroÂwnywalnego ryzyka szkody.
(3) W wyjaÎtkowych sytuacjach
Rozdziaø 6. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ za czyny odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ mozÇna jedynie
cudze ograniczycÂ.
Art. 6:101. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ za Art. 7:102. Przesøanki wyøaÎczajaÎce lub
maøoletnich i osoby uposÂledzono ograniczajaÎce odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na
umysøowo zasadzie ryzyka
Osoba zobowiaÎzana do nadzoru nad (1) OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na zasadzie
maøoletnim i osobaÎ uposÂledzonaÎ ryzyka mozÇna wyøaÎczycÂ lub ograniczycÂ
umysøowo odpowiada za szkodeÎ jezÇeli szkoda powstaøa na skutek
wyrzaÎdzonaÎ przez nadzorowanego, a. siø natury (siøy wyzÇszej) lub
chyba zÇe doøozÇyøa wymaganej b. zachowania osoby trzeciej.
starannosÂci w nadzorze. (2) WyøaÎczenie caøkowite lub zakres
ograniczenia odpowiedzialnosÂci na
Art. 6:102. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ za
zasadzie ryzyka zalezÇy od poroÂwnania
podwøadnych
znaczenia wpøywu okolicznosÂci
(1) Kto powierza wykonanie czynnosÂci zewneÎtrznych z zakresem
drugiemu, jest odpowiedzialny za odpowiedzialnosÂci (Art. 3:201).
szkodeÎ wyrzaÎdzonaÎ przez teÎ osobeÎ na (3) W wypadku ograniczenia
skutek nie zachowania wymaganej odpowiedzialnosÂci w mysÂl ust. 1 (b),
Ewa BaginÂska 247

odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ na zasadzie ryzyka i szkodeÎ poszkodowanemu i ta sama

jakakolwiek odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ osoby szkoda mozÇe bycÂ roÂwniezÇ przypisana
trzeciej jest solidarna zgodnie z art. innej osobie;
9:101 ust. 1 (b). c. osoba odpowiada za szkodeÎ
Rozdziaø 8. Przyczynienie sieÎ wyrzaÎdzonaÎ przez podwøadnego w
poszkodowanego okolicznosÂciach gdy jest on roÂwniezÇ
odpowiedzialny.
Art. 8:101. Przyczynienie w postaci
(2) W sytuacji odpowiedzialnosÂci
zachowania lub dziaøalnosÂci
solidarnej kilku osoÂb, poszkodowany
poszkodowanego
mozÇe zÇaÎdacÂ peønego odszkodowania od
(1) Zawinione zachowanie kazÇdej z osobna lub kilku z nich, przy
poszkodowanego oraz wszelkie czym nie mozÇe on uzyskacÂ sÂwiadczenia
okolicznosÂci, ktoÂre decydowaøyby o przewyzÇszajaÎcego peønaÎ wysokosÂcÂ
powstaniu lub zakresie szkody.
odpowiedzialnosÂci, gdyby byø on (3) Szkoda oznacza teÎ samaÎ szkodaÎ w
sprawcaÎ, skutkujaÎ wyøaÎczeniem baÎdzÂ rozumieniu ust. 1 (b), gdy nie istnieje
ograniczeniem obowiaÎzku zÇadna rozsaÎdna podstawa przypisania
odszkodowawczego w zakresie tylko czeÎsÂci szkody kazÇdej osoÂb
odpowiadajaÎcym wzgleÎdom søusznosÂci. solidarnie odpowiedzialnych. DowoÂd
(2) Przy rozstrzyganiu roszczenÂ spoczywa na osobie, ktoÂra twierdzi, zÇe
odszkodowawczych powstajaÎcych w szkoda nie jest jedna. JezÇeli podstawa
razie sÂmierci poszkodowanego jego przypisania czeÎsÂci szkody istnieje,
przyczynienie sieÎ uwzgleÎdnia sieÎ w mysÂl odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ jest podzielna, co
usteÎpu 1. oznacza, zÇe kazÇdy z zobowiaÎzanych do
(3) W sytuacji, gdy podwøadny naprawienia szkody odpowiedzialny jest
poszkodowanego przyczyniø sieÎ do tylko za teÎ czeÎsÂcÂ, ktoÂraÎ mozÇna mu
powstania szkody swoim zachowaniem przypisacÂ.
lub dziaøalnosÂciaÎ, odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ
wobec poszkodowanego ulega Art. 9:102. Stosunek mieÎdzy osobami
zmniejszeniu, baÎdzÂ wyøaÎczeniu zgodnie z zobowiaÎzanymi solidarnie
ust. 1. (1) KazÇdy z døuzÇnikoÂw ma prawo
TYTUè V. WielosÂcÂ sprawcoÂw regresu do pozostaøych w zakresie
naprawienia tej samej szkody. Nie
Rozdziaø 9. WielosÂcÂ sprawcoÂw
uchyla to praw wynikajaÎcych z umowy
Art. 9:101. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ solidarna i mieÎdzy zobowiaÎzanymi co do zakresu
podzielona: stosunek mieÎdzy ponoszonej odpowiedzialnosÂci,
poszkodowanym i wspoÂøsprawcami. przepisoÂw ustawy oraz praw
(1) OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ jest solidarna, gdy wynikajaÎcych z subrogacji ustawowej
caøosÂcÂ lub wyodreÎbniona czeÎsÂcÂ szkody lub przepisoÂw o bezpodstawnym
doznanej przez poszkodowanego mozÇe wzbogaceniu.
bycÂ przypisana dwoÂm lub wieÎcej (2) Z zastrzezÇeniem ust. 3, wysokosÂcÂ
osobom. OdpowiedzialnosÂcÂ jest regresu powinna bycÂ sprawiedliwa w
solidarna, gdy: sÂwietle stosunkowej odpowiedzialnosÂci
a. osoba sÂwiadomie bierze udziaø, osoÂb zobowiaÎzanych, uwzgleÎdniajaÎc
inicjuje lub zacheÎca innych do stopienÂ ich winy i wszelkie inne
bezprawnego dziaøania, co prowadzi do okolicznosÂci decydujaÎce o powstaniu lub
powstania szkody; zakresie odpowiedzialnosÂci. Roszczenie
b. niezalezÇne posteÎpowanie lub regresowe mozÇe roÂwnacÂ sieÎ peønemu
dziaøalnosÂcÂ jednej osoby wyrzaÎdza odszkodowaniu. JezÇeli nie mozÇna ustalicÂ

stosunkowej odpowiedzialnosÂci osoÂb poszkodowany otrzymaø w zwiaÎzku ze

zobowiaÎzanych, beÎdaÎ oni odpowiadacÂ w zdarzeniem sprawczym, chyba zÇe byøoby
stopniu roÂwnym. to sprzeczne z celem korzysÂci.
(3) Gdy osoba zobowiaÎzana odpowiada
Art. 10:104. PrzywroÂcenie stanu
za podwøadnego w mysÂl art. 9:101,
poprzedniego
ponosi ona cieÎzÇar regresu w czeÎsÂci
obejmujaÎcej odpowiedzialnosÂcÂ Zamiast odszkodowania mozÇna zÇaÎdacÂ
podwøadnego w rozliczeniach z innymi naprawienia szkody przez przywroÂcenie
wspoÂøsprawcami, z wyøaÎczeniem jego stanu poprzedniego, jezÇeli jest to
samego. mozÇliwe i nie powoduje nadmiernych
(4) ZobowiaÎzanie regresowe jest trudnosÂci dla zobowiaÎzanego.
podzielne, co oznacza, zÇe døuzÇnik Sekcja 2. Szkoda majaÎtkowa
zobowiaÎzany z tego tytuøu odpowiada
tylko za czeÎsÂcÂ przypadajaÎcaÎ na niego Art. 10:201. Charakter i ustalenie
wedøug podziaøu w mysÂl tego przepisu; szkody majaÎtkowej
w razie jednak niemozÇliwosÂci egzekucji SzkodeÎ majaÎtkowaÎ podlegajaÎcaÎ
orzeczenia saÎdowego zasaÎdzajaÎcego naprawieniu stanowi roÂzÇnica w majaÎtku
regres przeciwko jednemu z døuzÇnikoÂw poszkodowanego spowodowana przez
solidarnych, przypadajaÎca na niego zdarzenie sprawcze. SzkodeÎ teÎ ustala sieÎ
czeÎsÂcÂ rozkøada sieÎ na pozostaøych w co do zasady tak precyzyjnie jak to
proporcji do ich odpowiedzialnosÂci. mozÇliwe, lecz stosownie do okolicznosÂci
TYTUè VI. Naprawienie szkody mozÇe bycÂ tezÇ ona ustalona w sposoÂb
abstrakcyjny, na przykøad przez
Rozdziaø 10. Odszkodowanie
odwoøanie sieÎ do cen rynkowych.
Sekcja 1. Zasady ogoÂlne naprawienia
szkody Art. 10:202. Szkoda na osobie i sÂmiercÂ
poszkodowanego
Art. 10:101. Charakter i funkcje
odszkodowania (1) W razie szkody na osobie, ktoÂra
obejmuje uszkodzenie ciaøa i rozstroÂj
Odszkodowanie polega na zapøacie
zdrowia psychicznego urastajaÎcy do
sumy pienieÎzÇnej w celu naprawienia
rozpoznawalnej choroby, naprawienie
uszczerbku osoby poszkodowanej, to
szkody majaÎtkowej obejmuje utracony
znaczy w celu przywroÂcenia jej, na tyle
zarobek, zmniejszenie zdolnosÂci
na ile pieniaÎdze potrafiaÎ, do stanu ktoÂry
zarobkowania (nawet gdy nie
by istniaø, gdyby nie zaszøo zdarzenie
towarzyszy temu utrata zarobkoÂw) oraz
sprawcze. Odszkodowanie peøni takzÇe
rozsaÎdne wydatki, takie jak koszty
funkcjeÎ prewencyjnaÎ
opieki medycznej.
Art. 10:102. SÂwiadczenie jednorazowe (2) W razie sÂmierci poszkodowanego,
lub renta osoby takie jak czøonkowie rodziny,
Odszkodowanie zasaÎdza sieÎ ktoÂrym poszkodowany dostarczaø lub
odpowiednio w formie sÂwiadczenia dostarczaøby sÂrodkoÂw utrzymania,
jednorazowego lub renty, stosownie do gdyby zÇyø, uwazÇane saÎ za poszkodowane
potrzeb ze szczegoÂlnym uwzgleÎdnieniem w zakresie utraty tego utrzymania.
interesoÂw poszkodowanego. Art. 10:203. Utrata, zniszczenie lub
Art. 10:103. KorzysÂci otrzymane w uszkodzenie rzeczy
zwiaÎzku z doznaniem szkody (1) Miernikiem odszkodowanie za
UstalajaÎc wysokosÂcÂ odszkodowania, szkodeÎ polegajaÎcaÎ na utracie,
uwzgleÎdnia sieÎ korzysÂci, jakie zniszczeniu lub uszkodzeniu rzeczy jest
Ewa BaginÂska 249

wartosÂcÂ rzeczy, baÎdzÂ obnizÇenie jej (2) Co do zasady, wysokosÂcÂ

wartosÂci, niezalezÇnie od tego, czy zadosÂcÂuczynienia powinna uwzgleÎdniacÂ
poszkodowany zamierza rzecz zastaÎpicÂ wszystkie okolicznosÂci sprawy, w tym
nowaÎ lub naprawicÂ. Jednak jezÇeli rozmiar, trwaøosÂcÂ i skutki krzywdy.
poszkodowany zastaÎpiø rzecz nowaÎ lub StopienÂ winy sprawcy mozÇe wpøywacÂ na
naprawiø rzecz uszkodzonaÎ (lub wysokosÂcÂ odszkodowania jedynie, gdy
zamierza tak uczynicÂ), mozÇe on zÇaÎdacÂ zawinienie przyczyniøo sieÎ znacznie do
sumy wyzÇszej na pokrycie wydatkoÂw, krzywdy poszkodowanego.
pod warunkiem, zÇe byøy one rozsaÎdne. (3) W razie szkody na osobie, krzywda
(2) MozÇna zÇaÎdacÂ odszkodowania za odpowiada rozmiarowi cierpienia osoby
utrateÎ mozÇliwosÂci uzÇywania rzeczy, poszkodowanej i zaburzenÂ jej zdrowia
wøaÎcznie ze szkodami posÂrednimi, fizycznego i psychicznego. Przy
takimi jak straty zwiaÎzane z ustalaniu wysokosÂci zadosÂcÂuczynienia
prowadzeniem przedsieÎbiorstwa. (wøaÎcznie z odszkodowaniem
przysøugujaÎcym osobom pozostajaÎcym w
Sekcja 3. Szkoda niemajaÎtkowa bliskim stosunku ze zmarøym lub cieÎzÇko
poszkodowanym) podobne sumy
Art. 10:301. Szkoda niemajaÎtkowa
powinny bycÂ zasaÎdzane za obiektywnie
(1) Z zastrzezÇeniem zakresu ochrony podobne szkody.
(Art. 2 :102) naruszenie dobra mozÇe Sekcja 4. Obniźenie odszkodowania
uzasadniacÂ przyznanie
Art. 10:401. Obniźenie odszkodowania
zadosÂcÂuczynienia. ZadosÂcÂuczynienia
mozÇna zÇaÎdacÂ w szczegoÂlnosÂci w razie W sytuacjach wyjaÎtkowych,
szkody na osobie, naruszenia godnosÂci, odszkodowanie mozÇe bycÂ obnizÇone,
wolnosÂci lub innych doÂbr osobistych. jezÇeli zasaÎdzenie peønego odszkodowania
Roszczenie o zadosÂcÂuczynienie mozÇe byøoby nadmiernym cieÎzÇarem dla
roÂwniezÇ przysøugiwacÂ osobom, ktoÂre pozwanego. Jest to dopuszczalne gdy
pozostajaÎ w bliskim zwiaÎzku z przemawia za tym w szczegoÂlnosÂci
poszkodowanym, ktoÂry ponioÂsø sÂmiercÂ podstawa odpowiedzialnosÂci (Art.
lub doznaø innego bardzo powazÇnego 1:101), zakres ochrony dobra (Art. 2:102)
uszczerbku. oraz rozmiar szkody.

Portuguese Translation
by Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro and AndreÂ GoncËalo Dias Pereira
PrincõÂpios de Direito Europeu da Responsabilidade Civil
TõÂtulo I ± DisposicËaÄo fundamental (3) Aos direitos reais, incluindo os

direitos sobre coisas incorpoÂreas, eÂ
CapõÂtulo I. DisposicËaÄo fundamental
concedida uma ampla proteccËaÄo.
Art. 1:101. DisposicËaÄo fundamental (4) Os interesses puramente econoÂmicos
ou as relacËoÄes contratuais poderaÄo ter
(1) Aquele a quem for juridicamente
menor proteccËaÄo. Nestes casos, deve
imputaÂvel um dano sofrido por outrem
tomar-se em consideracËaÄo,
fica obrigado aÁ sua reparacËaÄo.
especialmente, a proximidade entre o
(2) Um dano pode ser imputado, em
agente e a pessoa ameacËada, ou o facto
particular, aÁquele:
de o agente estar consciente de que
a. cuja conduta culposa o tenha causado;
causaraÂ danos, apesar de os seus
ou
interesses deverem ser necessariamente
b. cuja actividade anormalmente considerados menos valiosos do que os
perigosa o tenha causado; ou do lesado.
c. cujos auxiliares o tenham causado no (5) A extensaÄo da proteccËaÄo poderaÂ
exercõÂcio das suas funcËoÄes. tambeÂm ser afectada pela natureza da
TõÂtulo II ± Pressupostos gerais da responsabilidade, de forma a que um
responsabilidade interesse possa ser mais extensamente
protegido face a lesoÄes intencionais do
CapõÂtulo 2. Dano que em outros casos.
Art. 2:101. Dano ressarcõÂvel (6) Na determinacËaÄo da extensaÄo da
proteccËaÄo, devem tambeÂm ser tomados
O dano consiste numa lesaÄo material ou em consideracËaÄo os interesses do
imaterial a um interesse juridicamente agente, especialmente na sua liberdade
protegido. de accËaÄo e no exercõÂcio dos seus
Art. 2:102. Interesses protegidos direitos, bem como o interesse puÂblico.
(1) A extensaÄo da proteccËaÄo de um Art. 2:103. Legitimidade do dano
interesse depende da sua natureza; Os danos relacionados com actividades
quanto mais valioso e mais precisa a sua ou que advenham de fontes
definicËaÄo e notoriedade, mais ampla consideradas ilegõÂtimas naÄo saÄo
seraÂ a sua proteccËaÄo. ressarcõÂveis.
(2) A vida, a integridade fõÂsica ou
Art. 2:104. Despesas preventivas
psõÂquica, a dignidade humana e a
liberdade gozam da proteccËaÄo mais As despesas realizadas com vista a
extensa. prevenir uma ameacËa de dano saÄo
Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro/AndreÂ GoncËalo Dias Pereira 251

consideradas dano ressarcõÂvel, desde que uma actividade posterior que, por si soÂ,
a realizacËaÄo dessas despesas se revele poderia ter causado o mesmo dano naÄo
razoaÂvel. deve ser tomada em consideracËaÄo.
Art. 2:105. Prova do dano (2) Uma actividade posterior deve,
contudo, ser tomada em consideracËaÄo se
O dano deve ser provado de acordo provocou um dano adicional ou se
com as regras processuais gerais. O agravou o dano inicial.
tribunal pode calcular o dano por
(3) Se a primeira actividade causou um
estimativa quando a prova exacta se
dano contõÂnuo e a actividade posterior
revele demasiado difõÂcil ou onerosa.
teria causado o mesmo dano, ambas
CapõÂtulo 3. Causalidade seraÄo consideradas como causa do dano
SeccËaÄo 1. Conditio sine qua non e contõÂnuo a partir deste segundo
outros encadeamentos causais momento.
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non Art. 3:105. Causalidade parcial incerta
Uma actividade ou conduta (doravante: No caso de existirem vaÂrias actividades,
àctividade') eÂ causa do dano se, na sendo certo que nenhuma delas causou
auseÃncia dessa actividade, este naÄo o dano por inteiro ou uma parte
tivesse ocorrido. determinaÂvel deste, presume-se uma
Art. 3:102. Causas concorrentes contribuicËaÄo em quotas-partes iguais
daquelas actividades que provavelmente
No caso de existirem vaÂrias actividades contribuõÂram, ainda que de forma
e se cada uma delas, por si soÂ, teria mõÂnima, para a ocorreÃncia do dano.
causado o dano simultaneamente, cada
uma delas seraÂ considerada como causa Art. 3:106. Causas incertas no aÃmbito da
do dano. esfera do lesado
Art. 3:103. Causas alternativas O lesado deveraÂ suportar o prejuõÂzo na

medida correspondente aÁ probabilidade
(1) No caso de existirem vaÂrias de este ter sido causado por uma
actividades, sendo que cada uma delas, actividade, ocorreÃncia ou qualquer
por si soÂ, teria sido suficiente para outra circunstaÃncia que se situe no
produzir o dano, mas em que persiste aÃmbito da sua proÂpria esfera, incluindo
incerteza sobre qual efectivamente o eventos naturais.
causou, cada uma seraÂ considerada
como causa do dano ateÂ ao limite SeccËaÄo 2. ExtensaÄo da responsabilidade
correspondente aÁ probabilidade de o ter Art. 3:201. ExtensaÄo da
causado. responsabilidade
(2) Se, havendo vaÂrios lesados, persistir
a incerteza sobre se o dano de um deles Quando o nexo de causalidade tiver
foi causado por uma actividade e sendo sido estabelecido de acordo com a
provaÂvel que esta naÄo tenha causado SeccËaÄo 1 deste CapõÂtulo, se ou em que
danos a todos, a actividade seraÂ medida o dano deveraÂ ser imputado a
considerada como a causa do dano uma pessoa depende de factores como:
sofrido por todos na proporcËaÄo da a) a previsibilidade do dano para uma
probabilidade de ter causado dano a um pessoa razoaÂvel no momento da
deles. actividade, tomando em consideracËaÄo
especialmente a proximidade temporal
Art. 3:104. Causas potenciais
ou espacial entre a actividade causadora
(1) Se uma actividade causou definitiva do dano e a sua consequeÃncia, ou a
e irreversivelmente um dano ao lesado, dimensaÄo do dano em relacËaÄo com as
252 Portuguese Translation

consequeÃncias normais daquela nos casos previstos na lei, no caso de o

actividade; autor criar ou controlar uma situacËaÄo de
b) a natureza e o valor do interesse perigo, quando haja uma relacËaÄo
protegido (Art. 2:102); especial entre as partes ou quando a
c) o fundamento da responsabilidade desproporcËaÄo entre a gravidade da lesaÄo
(Art. 1:101); e a facilidade de a evitar aponte no
d) os riscos normais da vida; e sentido da sua existeÃncia.
e) o fim de proteccËaÄo da norma violada.
SeccËaÄo 2. InversaÄo do oÂnus da prova da
TõÂtulo III. Fundamentos da culpa
Responsabilidade
CapõÂtulo 4. Responsabilidade por culpa Art. 4:201. Regra geral
SeccËaÄo 1. Requisitos da (1) O oÂnus da prova da culpa pode ser
responsabilidade por culpa invertido em virtude da gravidade do
Art. 4:101. Culpa perigo apresentado por uma dada
A pessoa que, intencionalmente ou por actividade.
negligeÃncia, violar o padraÄo de conduta (2) A gravidade do perigo eÂ
exigõÂvel responde por culpa. determinada em funcËaÄo da severidade
do possõÂvel dano naquelas
Art. 4:102. PadraÄo de conduta exigõÂvel
circunstaÃncias, bem como pela
(1) O padraÄo de conduta exigõÂvel probabilidade de que tal dano possa
corresponde ao de uma pessoa razoaÂvel efectivamente ocorrer.
colocada nas mesmas circunstaÃncias e
depende, especialmente, da natureza e Art. 4:202. Responsabilidade
valor do interesse protegido em empresarial
questaÄo, da periculosidade da
(1) Aquele que exercer uma actividade
actividade, da perõÂcia que eÂ de esperar
econoÂmica ou profissional de caraÂcter
da pessoa que a exerce, da
duradouro e utilizar auxiliares ou
previsibilidade do dano, da relacËaÄo de
equipamento teÂcnico eÂ responsaÂvel
proximidade ou da particular confiancËa
pelos danos causados por um defeito da
entre as partes envolvidas, bem como da
empresa ou do que nela se produza,
disponibilidade e custos de meÂtodos
excepto se provar que agiu de acordo
preventivos ou alternativos.
com o padraÄo de conduta exigõÂvel.
(2) O padraÄo de conduta pode ser
ajustado em funcËaÄo da idade, de (2) ªDefeitoº eÂ qualquer desvio dos
deficieÃncia psõÂquica ou fõÂsica, ou quando, padroÄes que se podem razoavelmente
devido a circunstaÃncias extraordinaÂrias, esperar da empresa ou dos seus
naÄo se possa legitimamente esperar que produtos ou servicËos.
a pessoa em causa actue em CapõÂtulo 5. Responsabilidade objectiva
conformidade com o mesmo.
(3) As disposicËoÄes que prescrevem ou Art. 5:101. Actividades anormalmente
proõÂbem uma determinada conduta perigosas
devem ser tomadas em consideracËaÄo a
(1) Aquele que exercer uma actividade
fim de se estabelecer o padraÄo de
anormalmente perigosa eÂ responsaÂvel,
conduta exigõÂvel.
independentemente de culpa, pelos
Art. 4:103. Dever de prevencËaÄo do danos resultantes do risco tõÂpico dessa
perigo para terceiros actividade.
Um dever de agir positivamente para (2) Uma actividade eÂ considerada
proteger terceiros de danos pode existir anormalmente perigosa quando:

a. cria um risco previsõÂvel e bastante tenham violado o padraÄo de conduta

significativo de dano, mesmo com exigõÂvel.
observaÃncia do cuidado devido, e (2) Aquele que actua com
b. naÄo eÂ objecto de uso comum. independeÃncia naÄo eÂ considerado
(3) O risco de dano pode ser auxiliar para os fins do presente artigo.
considerado significativo tendo em TõÂtulo IV. ExclusaÄo ou LimitacËaÄo da
consideracËaÄo a gravidade ou a Responsabilidade
probabilidade do dano.
CapõÂtulo 7. Das Causas de ExclusaÄo ou
(4) Este artigo naÄo recebe aplicacËaÄo
LimitacËaÄo em Geral
com respeito a uma actividade
especificamente sujeita ao regime da Art. 7:101. Causas de justificacËaÄo
responsabilidade objectiva por uma
(1) A responsabilidade pode ser
outra disposicËaÄo destes PrincõÂpios, da
excluõÂda se e na medida em que o
legislacËaÄo nacional ou de uma
agente actuou legitimamente
ConvencËaÄo Internacional.
a. em defesa do proÂprio interesse
Art. 5:102. Outras fontes de protegido contra um ataque ilõÂcito
responsabilidade objectiva (legõÂtima defesa);
b. em estado de necessidade;
(1) As leis nacionais podem estabelecer
c. devido aÁ impossibilidade de recorrer
outras categorias de responsabilidade
em tempo uÂtil ao auxõÂlio da autoridade
objectiva por actividades perigosas,
(accËaÄo directa);
mesmo que essas actividades naÄo sejam
anormalmente perigosas. d. com o consentimento do lesado, ou se
este assumiu o risco da lesaÄo, ou
(2) Salvo se a lei nacional dispuser em
e. em virtude de um poder legalmente
sentido contraÂrio, as disposicËoÄes que
conferido, por exemplo, uma
estabelecem uma responsabilidade
autorizacËaÄo.
objectiva podem ser aplicadas
analogicamente a situacËoÄes de risco (2) A exclusaÄo da responsabilidade
comparaÂvel. depende da ponderacËaÄo, por um lado,
do peso destas causas de justificacËaÄo e,
CapõÂtulo 6. Responsabilidade por facto por outro lado, dos fundamentos da
de outrem responsabilidade.
(3) Em casos excepcionais, a
Art. 6:101. Responsabilidade por actos
responsabilidade pode, em alternativa,
de menores ou incapazes por anomalia
ser reduzida.
psõÂquica
Art. 7:102. ExclusaÄo ou limitacËaÄo da
As pessoas encarregadas de vigiar um
responsabilidade objectiva
menor ou uma pessoa com anomalia
psõÂquica saÄo responsaÂveis pelos danos (1) A responsabilidade objectiva pode
causados por estes, salvo se mostrarem ser excluõÂda ou reduzida se a lesaÄo foi
que cumpriram o dever de vigilaÃncia de causada por uma imprevisõÂvel e
acordo com o padraÄo de conduta irresistõÂvel
exigõÂvel. a. forcËa da natureza (forcËa maior), ou
b. facto de terceiro.
Art. 6:102. Responsabilidade por actos
(2) A exclusaÄo ou reducËaÄo da
dos auxiliares
responsabilidade objectiva depende da
(1) Uma pessoa eÂ responsaÂvel pelos ponderacËaÄo, por um lado, da influeÃncia
danos causados pelos seus auxiliares no externa e, por outro lado, da extensaÄo
exercõÂcio das funcËoÄes, desde que estes da responsabilidade (Art.3:201).

(3) Quando houver lugar aÁ reducËaÄo, nos c. uma pessoa responde pelo dano
termos do paraÂgrafo (1) (b), a causado por um auxiliar, sendo este
responsabilidade objectiva e a igualmente responsaÂvel.
responsabilidade de terceiro saÄo (2) No caso de responsabilidade
solidaÂrias, nos termos do artigo 9:101 (1) solidaÂria, o lesado pode demandar pela
(b). totalidade qualquer um ou vaÂrios dos
CapõÂtulo 8. Conduta ou actividade responsaÂveis, desde que naÄo receba um
concorrente montante superior ao total dos danos
sofridos.
Art. 8:101. Conduta ou actividade
(3) O dano eÂ ªo mesmoº para efeitos do
concorrente do lesado
(1) (b) deste artigo, quando naÄo haja um
(1) A responsabilidade pode ser fundamento razoaÂvel para imputar
excluõÂda ou reduzida, tomando em somente parte do dano a cada um ou a
consideracËaÄo a culpa do lesado ou alguns dos responsaÂveis; incumbe
quaisquer outras circunstaÃncias que aÁquele que alega que o dano naÄo eÂ ªo
seriam relevantes para estabelecer ou mesmoº a prova desse facto. Quando
reduzir a responsabilidade do lesado na existir um fundamento razoaÂvel, a
producËaÄo do dano se fosse ele o lesante. responsabilidade eÂ conjunta, isto eÂ, cada
(2) No caso de indemnizacËaÄo por morte um responde apenas pela quota-parte
de uma pessoa, a conduta ou actividade do dano que lhe eÂ imputaÂvel.
desta exclui ou reduz a responsabilidade
de acordo com o disposto no paraÂgrafo Art. 9:102. RelacËaÄo entre os devedores
(1). solidaÂrios
(3) A conduta ou actividade (1) O devedor sujeito a
concorrente de um auxiliar do lesado responsabilidade solidaÂria tem direito
exclui ou reduz o montante da de regresso contra qualquer outra
indemnizacËaÄo a que este tem direito de pessoa que responda face ao lesado pelo
acordo com o disposto no paraÂgrafo (1). mesmo dano. Este direito naÄo prejudica
TõÂtulo V. Pluralidade de ResponsaÂveis qualquer contrato entre os
condevedores estabelecendo a
CapõÂtulo 9. Pluralidade de ResponsaÂveis distribuicËaÄo dos prejuõÂzos, uma
disposicËaÄo legal em contraÂrio, ou
Art. 9:101. Responsabilidade SolidaÂria e
qualquer direito de reembolso com
Conjunta: relacËaÄo entre o lesado e os
fundamento em sub-rogacËaÄo (cessio
vaÂrios responsaÂveis
legis) ou no enriquecimento sem causa.
(1) A responsabilidade eÂ solidaÂria (2) Salvo o disposto no paraÂgrafo (3)
quando todo ou uma parte determinada deste artigo, a prestacËaÄo a que os
do dano sofrido pelo lesado eÂ imputaÂvel condevedores estaÄo adstritos deve
a duas ou mais pessoas. Em particular, a corresponder ao que for considerado
responsabilidade eÂ solidaÂria quando: justo em funcËaÄo da contribuicËaÄo de cada
a. uma pessoa participa consciente- um para os danos, tendo em conta a
mente ou instiga ou encoraja gravidade das culpas e outras
comportamentos ilõÂcitos de terceiros que circunstaÃncias que sejam consideradas
causam danos ao lesado; ou relevantes para estabelecer ou reduzir a
b. o comportamento ou actividade sua responsabilidade. Esta prestacËaÄo
independente de uma pessoa causa pode corresponder ao montante total da
dano ao lesado e o mesmo dano eÂ indemnizacËaÄo. Se naÄo for possõÂvel
tambeÂm imputaÂvel a outra pessoa; determinar a responsabilidade relativa

dos condevedores, estes devem ser Art. 10:104. ReconstituicËaÄo natural

considerados responsaÂveis por igual.
Em alternativa a uma indemnizacËaÄo em
(3) A pessoa responsaÂvel pelos danos dinheiro, o lesado pode exigir a
causados por um auxiliar, nos termos do reconstituicËaÄo natural, desde que esta
Artigo 9:101, deve suportar por inteiro a seja possõÂvel e naÄo demasiado onerosa
quota deste para efeitos da concorreÃncia para a outra parte.
entre ele e qualquer outro dos
responsaÂveis, desde que naÄo seja o SeccËaÄo 2. Danos patrimoniais
proÂprio auxiliar. Art. 10:201. Natureza e avaliacËaÄo
(4) A obrigacËaÄo de satisfazer a
prestacËaÄo de regresso eÂ conjunta, isto eÂ, Os danos patrimoniais constituem uma
diminuicËaÄo do patrimoÂnio do lesado
cada responsaÂvel responde apenas pela
causada pelo evento. Estes danos
sua quota-parte, nos termos deste
devem em regra ser avaliados o mais
artigo; mas se um dos condevedores naÄo
concretamente possõÂvel, mas poderaÄo
puder cumprir a prestacËaÄo a que estaÂ
seÃ-lo em abstracto quando tal meÂtodo se
adstrito, eÂ a sua quota-parte repartida
mostrar adequado, por exemplo por
proporcionalmente entre todos os
refereÃncia a um valor de mercado.
demais.
Art. 10:202. Danos pessoais e morte
TõÂtulo VI ± Direitos do Lesado
(1) No caso de danos pessoais,
CapõÂtulo 10. ObrigacËaÄo de indemnizacËaÄo
abrangendo a lesaÄo da sauÂde fõÂsica e
SeccËaÄo 1. Regras gerais psõÂquica se conduzir a uma doencËa
reconhecida, a indemnizacËaÄo deve
Art. 10:101. Natureza e finalidade da
incluir a perda de rendimentos, a
indemnizacËaÄo
deterioracËaÄo da capacidade de ganho
A indemnizacËaÄo consiste numa (mesmo se naÄo acompanhada de
prestacËaÄo pecuniaÂria com vista a qualquer perda de rendimento) e todas
compensar o lesado, isto eÂ, a repor o as despesas razoaÂveis, incluindo o custo
lesado, na medida em o dinheiro o dos tratamentos meÂdicos.
permita, na posicËaÄo em que ele estaria (2) No caso de lesaÄo de que proveio a
se a lesaÄo naÄo tivesse ocorrido. A morte, teÃm direito a ser indemnizadas as
indemnizacËaÄo tem tambeÂm uma funcËaÄo pessoas, como os membros da famõÂlia, a
preventiva. quem o lesado prestava ou podia via a
prestar alimentos se a morte naÄo se
Art. 10:102. Capital ou renda
tivesse verificado, ateÂ ao limite da
A indemnizacËaÄo seraÂ satisfeita numa assisteÃncia que podiam esperar.
uÂnica prestacËaÄo global ou em
Art. 10:203. Perda, destruicËaÄo e
pagamentos perioÂdicos conforme se
danificacËaÄo de coisas
julgue mais apropriado, tendo
especialmente em consideracËaÄo os (1) No caso de perda, destruicËaÄo ou
interesses do lesado. dano causado a coisas, a medida baÂsica
da indemnizacËaÄo eÂ o valor da coisa ou
Art. 10:103. CompensacËaÄo de benefõÂcios
da diminuicËaÄo do seu valor, sendo para
Na fixacËaÄo do montante da este fim irrelevante se o lesado pretende
indemnizacËaÄo seraÄo tomados em conta substituir ou reparar a coisa. Todavia, se
os benefõÂcios que o lesado obteve com o o lesado substituiu ou reparou a coisa
evento danoso, salvo se tal se revelar (ou vai fazeÃ-lo), pode exigir os custos
incompatõÂvel com a finalidade do adicionais, se essa opcËaÄo for
referido benefõÂcio. considerada razoaÂvel.

(2) Pode igualmente ser concedida uma consequeÃncias da ofensa. A gravidade

indemnizacËaÄo pela privacËaÄo do uso da da culpa do autor apenas deve ser tida
coisa, incluindo os danos daõÂ derivados, em conta quando tiver contribuõÂdo
tais como os prejuõÂzos respeitantes a significativamente para a ofensa.
uma actividade profissional. (3) Nos casos de dano pessoal, a
SeccËaÄo 3. Danos naÄo patrimoniais indemnizacËaÄo corresponde ao
sofrimento da võÂtima e aÁ deterioracËaÄo da
Art. 10:301. Danos naÄo patrimoniais sua sauÂde fõÂsica e psõÂquica. Na fixacËaÄo
(1) Tomando em consideracËaÄo o seu das indemnizacËoÄes (incluindo as das
aÃmbito de proteccËaÄo (Art. 2:102), a pessoas com uma relacËaÄo de grande
violacËaÄo de um interesse poderaÂ proximidade com o falecido ou a võÂtima
justificar a atribuicËaÄo de uma de uma lesaÄo muito grave), devem ser
compensacËaÄo por danos naÄo atribuõÂdos montantes similares para
patrimoniais, em especial nos casos de lesoÄes objectivamente similares.
danos pessoais ou de ofensa aÁ dignidade SeccËaÄo 4. LimitacËaÄo da indemnizacËaÄo
humana, aÁ liberdade ou a outros direitos
de personalidade. Nos casos de morte e Art. 10:401. LimitacËaÄo da indemnizacËaÄo
de lesaÄo corporal muito grave, pode Excepcionalmente, se face aÁ situacËaÄo
igualmente ser atribuõÂda uma econoÂmica das partes a reparacËaÄo
compensacËaÄo pelo dano naÄo- integral constituir um encargo opressivo
patrimonial aÁs pessoas que tenham uma para o reÂu, a indemnizacËaÄo pode ser
relacËaÄo de grande proximidade com o reduzida. Para tomar esta decisaÄo, deve
lesado. ter-se em consideracËaÄo, especialmente,
(2) De uma forma geral, devem ser o fundamento da responsabilidade
tomadas em consideracËaÄo no caÂlculo (art.1:101), a extensaÄo da proteccËaÄo do
destes danos todas as circunstaÃncias do interesse (art. 2:102) e a dimensaÄo do
caso, incluindo a gravidade, duracËaÄo e dano.

Russian Translation
by Yuri Yumashev
258 Russian Translation

Yuri Yumashev 259

Yuri Yumashev 261

Yuri Yumashev 263

Yuri Yumashev 265

Spanish Translation
by Miquel MartõÂn-Casals
Principios de derecho europeo de la responsabilidad civil
TIÂTULO I. Norma fundamental (3) Se otorga una amplia proteccioÂn a

los derechos reales, incluidos los que se
CapõÂtulo 1. Norma fundamental
refieren a las cosas incorporales.
Art. 1:101. Norma fundamental (4) La proteccioÂn de intereses
(1) La persona a quien se pueda puramente patrimoniales o de
imputar jurõÂdicamente el danÄo sufrido relaciones contractuales puede tener un
por otra estaÂ obligada a repararlo. alcance maÂs limitado. En tales casos
(2) En particular, el danÄo puede debe tenerse en cuenta, de modo
imputarse a la persona especial, la proximidad entre el agente y
la persona protegida, o el hecho de que
a) cuya conducta culposa lo haya
el agente es consciente de que causaraÂ
causado; o
un danÄo a la võÂctima a pesar de que sus
b) cuya actividad anormalmente intereses sean necesariamente objeto de
peligrosa lo haya causado; o una valoracioÂn inferior a los de eÂsta.
c) cuyo auxiliar lo haya causado en el (5) El alcance de la proteccioÂn puede
ejercicio de sus funciones. verse afectado igualmente por la
TIÂTULO II. Presupuestos generales de naturaleza de la responsabilidad, de tal
la responsabilidad modo que, en caso de lesioÂn dolosa, el
intereÂs podraÂ recibir una proteccioÂn maÂs
CapõÂtulo 2. DanÄo amplia que en los demaÂs casos.
Art. 2:101. DanÄo resarcible (6) Para establecer el alcance de la
proteccioÂn tambieÂn deberaÂn tenerse en
El danÄo requiere un perjuicio material o cuenta los intereses del agente, en
inmaterial a un intereÂs jurõÂdicamente especial, en su libertad de accioÂn y en el
protegido. ejercicio de sus derechos, asõÂ como los
intereses puÂblicos.
Art. 2:102. Intereses protegidos
(1) El alcance de la proteccioÂn de un Art. 2:103. Legitimidad del danÄo
intereÂs depende de su naturaleza; su Las peÂrdidas relacionadas con
proteccioÂn seraÂ maÂs amplia cuanto actividades o fuentes que se consideran
mayor sea su valor, la precisioÂn de su ilegõÂtimas no pueden ser resarcidas.
definicioÂn y su obviedad.
Art. 2:104. Gastos preventivos
(2) La vida, la integridad fõÂsica y
psõÂquica, la dignidad humana y la Los gastos realizados para evitar un
libertad gozan de la proteccioÂn maÂs danÄo que amenaza producirse
amplia. constituyen un danÄo resarcible
Miquel MartõÂn-Casals 267

en la medida en que hayan sido Art. 3:104. Causas potenciales

razonables.
(1) Si una actividad ha acarreado un
Art. 2:105. Prueba del danÄo danÄo a la võÂctima de modo irreversible y
definitivo, toda actividad posterior que
El danÄo debe probarse de acuerdo con por sõÂ misma hubiera causado el mismo
los criterios procesales ordinarios. El danÄo debe ser ignorada.
tribunal podraÂ estimar la cuantõÂa del (2) No obstante, deberaÂ tenerse en
danÄo cuando la prueba de su importe cuenta esa actividad posterior si
exacto resulte demasiado difõÂcil o conlleva un danÄo adicional o agravado.
costosa. (3) Si la primera actividad ha causado
CapõÂtulo 3. RelacioÂn de causalidad un danÄo continuado y la actividad
posterior tambieÂn lo hubiera causado
SeccioÂn 1. La conditio sine qua non y maÂs tarde, ambas actividades deben ser
sus lõÂmites consideradas como causa del danÄo
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non continuado a partir del momento en que
concurran.
Una actividad o conducta (en adelante,
actividad) es causa del danÄo de la Art. 3:105. Causalidad parcial incierta
võÂctima si, de haber faltado tal actividad, En el caso de una pluralidad de
el danÄo no se hubiera producido. actividades, si es seguro que ninguna de
ellas ha causado todo el danÄo o una
Art. 3:102. Causas concurrentes
parte determinable del mismo, se
En caso de una pluralidad de presume que aqueÂllas que
actividades, si cada una de ellas hubiera probablemente han contribuido
causado el danÄo por sõÂ sola al mismo (mõÂnimamente) a causarlo lo han
tiempo, se consideraraÂ que cada causado a partes iguales.
actividad es causa del danÄo de la
Art. 3:106. Causas inciertas en la esfera
võÂctima.
de la võÂctima
Art. 3:103. Causas alternativas La võÂctima tiene que cargar con la
(1) En caso de una pluralidad de peÂrdida sufrida en la medida
actividades, si cada una de ellas ha sido correspondiente a la probabilidad de
suficiente por sõÂ sola para causar el que pueda haber sido causada por una
danÄo, pero es dudoso cuaÂl de ellas actividad, acontecimiento o cualquier
efectivamente lo ha causado, se otra circunstancia perteneciente a su
considera que cada actividad es causa en propia esfera.
la medida correspondiente a la SeccioÂn 2. Alcance de la
probabilidad de que pueda haber responsabilidad
causado el danÄo de la võÂctima.
Art. 3:201. Alcance de la
(2) Si, en el caso de una pluralidad de
responsabilidad
võÂctimas, es dudoso que una actividad
haya causado el danÄo de una võÂctima Si una actividad es causa en el sentido
concreta, pero es probable que no haya de la SeccioÂn 1 de este CapõÂtulo, la
causado danÄo a todas las võÂctimas, se cuestioÂn de si puede ser imputada a una
considera que la actividad es causa del persona y en queÂ medida depende de
danÄo sufrido por todas las võÂctimas en factores como los siguientes:
proporcioÂn a la probabilidad de que a) la previsibilidad del danÄo para una
pueda haber causado el danÄo a una persona razonable en el momento de
võÂctima concreta. producirse la actividad considerando, en
268 Spanish Translation

especial, la cercanõÂa en el tiempo y en el Art. 4:103. Deber de proteger a los

espacio entre la actividad danÄosa y su demaÂs de danÄos
consecuencia, o la magnitud del danÄo en
Puede existir el deber de actuar
relacioÂn con las consecuencias normales
positivamente para proteger a los demaÂs
de tal actividad;
de danÄos si asõÂ se establece legalmente,
b) la naturaleza y valor del intereÂs
si quien actuÂa crea y controla una
protegido (artõÂculo 2:102);
situacioÂn de peligro, si existe una
c) el fundamento de la responsabilidad
especial relacioÂn entre las partes o si la
(artõÂculo 1:101);
gravedad del danÄo para una parte y la
d) el alcance de los riesgos ordinarios de
facilidad de evitarlo para la otra indican
la vida; y
la existencia de tal deber.
e) el fin de proteccioÂn de la norma que
ha sido violada. SeccioÂn 2. InversioÂn de la carga de la
prueba de la culpa
TIÂTULO III. Fundamento de la
responsabilidad Art. 4:201. InversioÂn de la carga de la
CapõÂtulo 4. Responsabilidad por culpa prueba de la culpa en general
SeccioÂn 1. Requisitos de la (1) Puede invertirse la carga de la
responsabilidad por culpa prueba de la culpa a la luz de la
Art. 4:101. Culpa gravedad del peligro que la actividad en
Una persona responde con base en la cuestioÂn comporta.
culpa por la violacioÂn intencional o (2) La gravedad del peligro se
negligente del estaÂndar de conducta determina de acuerdo con la gravedad
exigible. del danÄo que en tales casos pueda
Art. 4:102. EstaÂndar de conducta producirse asõÂ como con la probabilidad
exigible de que tal danÄo llegue a suceder
efectivamente.
(1) El estaÂndar de conducta exigible es
el de una persona razonable que se halle Art. 4:202. Responsabilidad de la
en las mismas circunstancias y depende, empresa
en particular, de la naturaleza y el valor
(1) La persona que se dedica de modo
del intereÂs protegido de que se trate, de
permanente a una actividad empresarial
la peligrosidad de la actividad, de la
con fines econoÂmicos o profesionales y
pericia exigible a la persona que la lleva
que emplea auxiliares o equipamiento
a cabo, de la previsibilidad del danÄo, de
teÂcnico es responsable de todo danÄo
la relacioÂn de proximidad o de especial
causado por un defecto de tal empresa o
confianza entre las personas implicadas,
de lo que en ella se produzca, a no ser
asõÂ como de la disponibilidad y del coste
que pruebe que ha cumplido con el
de las medidas de precaucioÂn y de los
estaÂndar de conducta exigible.
meÂtodos alternativos.
(2) ªDefectoº es toda desviacioÂn con
(2) El estaÂndar anteriormente indicado
respecto a los estaÂndares que son
puede adaptarse cuando debido a la
razonablemente exigibles a la empresa o
edad, a la discapacidad fõÂsica o psõÂquica
a sus productos o servicios.
o a circunstancias extraordinarias no sea
exigible que la persona de que se trate CapõÂtulo 5. Responsabilidad objetiva
lo cumpla.
Art. 5:101. Actividades anormalmente
(3) Al establecer el estaÂndar de
peligrosas
conducta requerido deben tenerse en
cuenta las normas que prescriben o (1) La persona que lleva a cabo una
prohõÂben una determinada conducta. actividad anormalmente peligrosa

responde objetivamente por el danÄo de sus funciones siempre que eÂstos

caracterõÂstico del riesgo que tal hayan violado el estaÂndar de conducta
actividad comporta y que resulta de ella. exigible.
(2) Una actividad es anormalmente (2) El contratista independiente no se
peligrosa si: considera auxiliar a los efectos de este
a) crea un riesgo previsible y artõÂculo.
significativo de danÄo incluso aunque se
TIÂTULO IV. Causas de exoneracioÂn
emplee todo el cuidado debido en su
ejercicio y CapõÂtulo 7. Causas de exoneracioÂn en
b) no es una actividad que sea objeto de general
uso comuÂn.
Art. 7:101. Causas de justificacioÂn
(3) El riesgo de danÄo puede ser
significativo en atencioÂn a la gravedad o (1) Puede excluirse la responsabilidad
a la probabilidad del mismo. de quien ha actuado legõÂtimamente en la
(4) Este artõÂculo no se aplica a una medida en que lo haya hecho:
actividad sujeta especõÂficamente a a) en defensa de un intereÂs protegido
responsabilidad objetiva por cualquier propio contra un ataque antijurõÂdico
otra disposicioÂn de estos Principios o (legõÂtima defensa),
por cualquier legislacioÂn nacional o b) por estado de necesidad,
convencioÂn internacional. c) porque no pudo obtener la ayuda de
Art. 5:102. Otros supuestos de las autoridades a tiempo (auto-ayuda),
responsabilidad objetiva d) con el consentimiento de la võÂctima, o
si eÂsta asumioÂ el riesgo de resultar
(1) Las leyes nacionales pueden danÄada, o
establecer otros supuestos de
e) en virtud de una autorizacioÂn
responsabilidad objetiva por la praÂctica
legõÂtima como, por ejemplo, la licencia.
de actividades peligrosas, incluso
(2) Que la exoneracioÂn sea total o no
aunque dichas actividades no sean
depende, de una parte, de la
anormalmente peligrosas.
importancia de esas causas de
(2) A menos que la ley nacional
justificacioÂn y, de la otra, de los
disponga de otro modo, los supuestos
presupuestos de la responsabilidad.
adicionales de responsabilidad objetiva
(3) En casos extraordinarios, la
pueden establecerse por analogõÂa a otros
responsabilidad podraÂ ser simplemente
que originen un riesgo parecido de danÄo.
reducida.
CapõÂtulo 6. Responsabilidad por otros
Art. 7:102. Causas de exoneracioÂn en
Art. 6:101. Responsabilidad por los casos de responsabilidad objetiva
menores o por discapacitados psõÂquicos
(1) La responsabilidad objetiva puede
La persona que tiene a su cargo otra
ser objeto de exoneracioÂn total o parcial
persona que es menor o sufre
si el danÄo fue causado por una
discapacidad psõÂquica responde por el
imprevisible e irresistible
danÄo causado por esa otra persona a
a) fuerza de la naturaleza (fuerza
menos que demuestre que ella misma
mayor), o
cumplioÂ con el estaÂndar de conducta
que le era exigible en su supervisioÂn. b) conducta de un tercero.
(2) Que la exoneracioÂn de
Art. 6:102. Responsabilidad por los responsabilidad objetiva sea total o
auxiliares parcial y, en caso de reduccioÂn, su
(1) Una persona responde por el danÄo extensioÂn, dependen, de una parte, de la
causado por sus auxiliares en el ejercicio importancia de la influencia externa y,

de otra, del alcance de la b) el comportamiento o actividad

responsabilidad (artõÂculo 3:201). independiente de una persona causa
(3) En el caso de la reduccioÂn prevista danÄo a la võÂctima y el mismo danÄo es
en el apartado (1)(b), la responsabilidad tambieÂn imputable a otra persona;
objetiva y cualquier tipo de c) una persona es responsable por el
responsabilidad del tercero son danÄo causado por un auxiliar en
solidarias conforme a lo dispuesto en el circunstancias tales que tambieÂn el
artõÂculo 9:101 (1)(b). auxiliar es responsable.
(2) Cuando varias personas se hallan
CapõÂtulo 8. Conducta o actividad
sujetas a responsabilidad solidaria, la
concurrente
võÂctima puede reclamar toda la
Art. 8:101. Conducta o actividad indemnizacioÂn de una o varias de ellas,
concurrente de la võÂctima con tal que no obtenga mayor
indemnizacioÂn que la correspondiente al
(1) Puede excluirse o reducirse la importe total del danÄo sufrido.
responsabilidad en la medida en que se
(3) Se considera que un danÄo es el
considere justo en atencioÂn a la culpa
mismo danÄo a los efectos del apartado
concurrente de la võÂctima y a
(1)(b) anterior si no existe una base
cualesquiera otras circunstancias que
razonable para imputar soÂlo una parte
serõÂan relevantes para establecer o
del mismo a cada una de las personas
reducir la responsabilidad de la võÂctima
responsables ante la võÂctima. A tal
si fuera la causante del danÄo.
efecto, la persona que afirma que el
(2) Si se solicita la indemnizacioÂn con danÄo no es el mismo soporta la carga de
relacioÂn a la muerte de una persona, su la prueba. Si tal base razonable existe, la
conducta o actividad excluye o reduce la responsabilidad es parciaria, es decir,
responsabilidad conforme a lo dispuesto cada persona responde ante la võÂctima
en el apartado 1. soÂlo por la parte del danÄo que le es
(3) La conducta o actividad concurrente imputable.
de un auxiliar de la võÂctima excluye o
reduce la indemnizacioÂn que eÂsta puede Art. 9:102 La relacioÂn entre las personas
reclamar a conforme a lo dispuesto en el sujetas a responsabilidad solidaria
apartado 1. (1) La persona sujeta a responsabilidad
TIÂTULO V. Pluralidad de causantes del solidaria tiene derecho de regreso frente
danÄo a cualquier otra persona que sea
responsable ante la võÂctima por el
CapõÂtulo 9. Pluralidad de causantes del mismo danÄo. Este derecho se establece
danÄo sin perjuicio de lo que disponga sobre la
Art. 9:101 Solidaridad y parciariedad: distribucioÂn de la peÂrdida cualquier
relacioÂn entre la võÂctima y la pluralidad contrato celebrado entre ellas o
de causantes del danÄo cualquier disposicioÂn legal o de un
derecho de reembolso en virtud de la
(1) La responsabilidad es solidaria si subrogacioÂn [cessio legis] o con base en
todo el danÄo sufrido por la võÂctima o el enriquecimiento injusto.
una parte diferenciada del mismo es (2) De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el
imputable a dos o maÂs personas. La apartado (3) de este artõÂculo, la cuota de
responsabilidad seraÂ solidaria si: ese derecho de regreso seraÂ la que se
a) una persona participa a sabiendas en considere justa a la luz de las respectivas
la actuacioÂn ilõÂcita de otros que causa responsabilidades por el danÄo, en
danÄo a la võÂctima, o la instiga o estimula; consideracioÂn a sus culpas respectivas y

a cualquier otro aspecto relevante para resulte apropiado en atencioÂn, de modo

establecer o reducir la responsabilidad. especial, a los intereses de la võÂctima.
El importe del regreso puede ascender
al importe total de la indemnizacioÂn. Si Art. 10:103. Beneficios obtenidos
no puede determinarse la mediante el evento danÄoso
responsabilidad que corresponde a cada Al determinar la cuantõÂa de la
una de las personas responsables, se indemnizacioÂn, deben tenerse en cuenta
consideraraÂn responsables por igual. los beneficios que el danÄado ha
(3) Si una persona es responsable por el obtenido mediante el evento danÄoso, a
danÄo causado por un auxiliar de menos que ello sea incompatible con la
acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artõÂculo finalidad del beneficio.
9:101, se consideraraÂ responsable por
toda la cuota imputable al auxiliar a los Art. 10:104. ReparacioÂn en forma
especõÂfica
efectos de distribuir la responsabilidad
entre eÂl y cualquier otro causante del En lugar de la indemnizacioÂn, el danÄado
danÄo distinto de dicho auxiliar. puede reclamar la reparacioÂn en forma
(4) La obligacioÂn de responder en võÂa de especõÂfica en la medida en que eÂsta sea
regreso por la parte respectiva es posible y no excesivamente gravosa
parciaria, es decir, la persona obligada para la otra parte.
responde soÂlo por la cuota de
responsabilidad que, seguÂn este artõÂculo, SeccioÂn 2. DanÄo patrimonial
le corresponda por el danÄo; pero si no Art. 10:201. Naturaleza y determinacioÂn
puede ejecutarse la sentencia que del danÄo patrimonial
establece la condena de la persona
responsable del danÄo en võÂa de regreso, El danÄo patrimonial resarcible es la
su parte debe ser redistribuida entre las disminucioÂn del patrimonio de la
demaÂs en proporcioÂn a sus respectivas võÂctima causada por el evento danÄoso.
cuotas. Por regla general, tal danÄo se determina
de un modo tan concreto como sea
TIÂTULO VI. Remedios posible, pero puede determinarse en
abstracto, como por ejemplo con
CapõÂtulo 10. IndemnizacioÂn
relacioÂn al valor de mercado, cuando
SeccioÂn 1. IndemnizacioÂn en general resulte pertinente.
Art. 10:101. Naturaleza y objeto de la Art. 10:202. DanÄo corporal y muerte
indemnizacioÂn
(1) En el caso de danÄo corporal, lo que
La indemnizacioÂn es un pago en dinero incluye el danÄo a la salud fõÂsica y a la
para compensar a la võÂctima, es decir, psõÂquica si comporta una enfermedad
para reestablecerla, en la medida en que reconocida, el danÄo patrimonial incluye
el dinero pueda hacerlo, en la posicioÂn la peÂrdida de ingresos, el perjuicio de la
que hubiera tenido si el ilõÂcito por el que capacidad de obtenerlos (incluso si no
reclama no se hubiera producido. La va acompanÄado de una peÂrdida de los
indemnizacioÂn tambieÂn contribuye a la mismos) y los gastos razonables, tales
finalidad de prevenir el danÄo. como el coste de la atencioÂn meÂdica.
(2) En el caso de muerte, se considera
Art. 10:102. Suma alzada o renta
que han sufrido un danÄo resarcible, en
perioÂdica
la medida de su peÂrdida de
La indemnizacioÂn se otorga mediante sostenimiento, las personas que, como
suma alzada o renta perioÂdica seguÂn los familiares, el difunto habõÂa

mantenido o habrõÂa mantenido si la gravedad, duracioÂn y consecuencias del

muerte no se hubiera producido. danÄo. El grado de culpa del causante del
Art. 10:203. PeÂrdida, destruccioÂn y danÄo danÄo soÂlo se tendraÂ en cuenta si
de cosas contribuye al danÄo de la võÂctima de
modo significativo.
(1) Cuando una cosa se pierde, destruye
o danÄa, la medida baÂsica de la (3) En los casos de danÄo corporal, el
indemnizacioÂn es su valor y, a estos danÄo no patrimonial corresponde al
efectos, es indiferente que la võÂctima sufrimiento de la võÂctima y al perjuicio
quiera sustituir la cosa o repararla. No de su salud fõÂsica o psõÂquica. En la
obstante, si la võÂctima la ha sustituido o cuantificacioÂn de las indemnizaciones
reparado (o lo va a hacer) puede (incluyendo las que correspondan a las
recuperar el mayor gasto si tal actuacioÂn personas allegadas a la võÂctima fallecida
resulta razonable. o que ha sufrido lesiones graves) se
(2) TambieÂn puede resarcirse la peÂrdida deberaÂn conceder sumas
del uso de una cosa, incluidas las indemnizatorias similares por aquellas
peÂrdidas derivadas de ello, como la peÂrdidas que sean objetivamente
peÂrdida de negocio. similares.
SeccioÂn 3. DanÄo no patrimonial SeccioÂn 4. ReduccioÂn de la

Art. 10:301. DanÄo no patrimonial indemnizacioÂn
(1) En atencioÂn al alcance de su Art. 10:401. ReduccioÂn de la

proteccioÂn (artõÂculo 2:102), la lesioÂn de indemnizacioÂn
un intereÂs puede justificar la
compensacioÂn del danÄo no patrimonial. En casos excepcionales, puede reducirse
Este es el caso, en especial, si la võÂctima la indemnizacioÂn si la compensacioÂn
ha sufrido un danÄo corporal o un danÄo a õÂntegra comporta una carga opresiva
la dignidad humana, a la libertad o a para el demandado a la luz de la
otros derechos de la personalidad. situacioÂn econoÂmica de las partes. Para
TambieÂn puede resarcirse el danÄo no determinar si esta reduccioÂn procede,
patrimonial de aquellas personas deberaÂ tenerse en cuenta, de modo
allegadas a la võÂctima de un accidente especial, el fundamento de la
mortal o una lesioÂn muy grave. responsabilidad (artõÂculo 1:101), el
(2) En general, para cuantificar tales alcance de la proteccioÂn del intereÂs
danÄos se tendraÂn en cuenta todas las (artõÂculo 2:102) y la magnitud del
circunstancias del caso, incluyendo la danÄo.

Index
Numbers in the following refer to the marginal numbers of the respective
parts of the Commentary. If a Title or Chapter is listed, directly followed
by a marginal number, then the introduction to this Title or Chapter is
referred to. If only a Title, Chapter or Article is cited without marginal
numbers, the entire commentary thereupon is dealing with the respective
keyword.
Absolute liability Chapter 5 4 relatives Art. 10:301 5, 8, 16

act of God Art. 7:102 5 suffering Art. 10:301 11
activity Art. 1:101 1 et seq., Art. things Art. 10:203 5, 6, 8
5:101 6 loss of use Art. 10:203 7, 8
abnormally dangerous a. Art. auxiliary
1:101 14, Art. 5:101 definition Title V 6; Chapter 6 5,
contributory a. Art. 8:101 12, 14, 6; Art. 6:102 1; Art. 6:102 6
15
fault of the principal Art. 6:102 2
intervening a. of third parties
independent contractor see inde-
Art. 3:201 11
pendent contractor
multiple a. Art. 3:103 5; Art.
3:105 1 liability of the a. Art. 6:102 17,
subsequent a. Art. 3:104 1±2, 7 19, 20
ad hoc mitigation see reduction of principal Art. 6:102 17
damages legal entities Art. 6:102 21
alternative causes Art. 3:103 scope of functions Art. 6:102 3, 4,
assessment of damage 5, 7
abstract a. Art. 10:201 6, 9, 15, 17 solidarity Art. 9:101±9:102 2, 8
collateral benefits Art. 10:103 state liability Art. 6:102 22
full compensation Art. 10:101 7
concrete a. Art. 10:201 5, 9, 14, 17 Behaviour see conduct
non-pecuniary damage Art. burden of proving fault Art. 4:201;
10:301 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 Art. 4:202
death Art. 10:202 6
earning capacity Art. 10:202 12 Causation Art. 1:101 3, Chapter 3;
equal treatment Art. 10:301 11 Art. 8:101 16
loss of income Art. 10:202 11 adequacy of c. Art. 3:201
personal injury Art. 10:202 6, 15, cause
Art. 10:301 4, 10 alternative c. Art. 3:103
market value Art. 10:201 7 concurrent c. Art. 3:102
275
Index
potential c. Art. 3:104, Art. 3:106 conditions Art. 8:101 11 et seq.

7 consequences of c. Art. 8:101 18
proximate c. Art. 3:201 et seq.
uncertain c. in victim's sphere dangerous activity Art. 8:101 17
Art. 3:106 definition Art. 8:101 1, 5, 9
uncertain partial c. Art. 3:105 protective purpose of duty Art.
collateral benefits 8:101 17
basic rule Art. 10:103 1 identification see identification
causation Art. 10:103 6 intent Art. 8:101 22, 23, 24
definition Art. 10:103 2, 9 mirror-image idea Art. 8:101 3
unjust enrichment Art. 10:103 1, mitigation of damages Art. 8:101
4, 8, 11 9
insurance payments Art. 10:103 7 provocation Art. 8:101 17, 22
qualifications Art. 10:103 5 et strict liability Art. 8:101 25±26
seq. terminology Art. 8:101 5, 6
presumption Art. 10:103 8
contributory negligence see contrib-
purpose Art. 10:103 7
utory conduct
social security Art. 10:103 7
corporate liability Chapter 6 7
comatose victim Art. 10:301 11, 15
common usage Art. 5:101 8 Damage Chapter 2
compensatio lucri cum damno see additional or aggravated d. Art.
collateral benefits 3:104 1, 7, 9
concurrent causes Art. 3:102 continuing d. Art. 3:104 12 et seq.
conditio sine qua non Art. 3:101 definition Art. 1:101 9, Art. 2:101
conduct, standard of Chapter 2 3, 2; Art. 2:105 2
Art. 4:102
fictitious Art. 10:201 15
definition Art. 4:101 5
immaterial d. Art. 2:101 3
intentional c. Art. 4:101 4
indivisible Art. 9:101±9:102 4
negligent c. Art. 4:101 4
legitimacy Art. 2:103
objective Chapter 4 24, 28
consent Art. 7:101 2, 16 material d. Art. 2:101 3
contractual relationship Art. 2:102 non-pecuniary d. see non-pecuni-
5, 8 ary damage
contribution Art. 9:102 pecuniary see pecuniary damage
apportionment Art. 9:101±9:102 proof Art. 2:105
5, 7 recoverable d. Art. 2:101; Art.
basic rule Art. 9:101±9:102 8 2:104 5
contract between tortfeasors Art. damages Chapter 10
9:101±9:102 6 purpose Art. 10:101 3, 4, 7, 8, 9
definition Title V 4, Art. 9:101± assessment Art. 10:101 1, 2, 5, 7,
9:102 5 10, Art. 10:103 1 et seq.
unjust enrichment Art. 9:101± collateral benefits see collateral
9:102 6 benefits
subrogation Art. 9:101±9:102 6 definition Art. 10:101 2
contributory conduct Chapter 8 legitimacy of Art. 2:103 1 et seq.
apportionment Art. 8:101 18, 19, lump sum see Art. 10:102 4 et
20 seq.
276
Index
money payment Chapter 10 1, definition Art. 1:101 12, Art.

Art. 10:101 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, Art. 4:101 4
10:104 1, 3, 4, 8 force majeure Art. 7:102 5
nominal d. Art. 10:101 14, Art. foreseeability Art. 3:201 13 et seq.;
10:201 13 Art. 4:102 11
periodical payments Art. 10:102 4 fundamental rights Art. 10:301 6
et seq.
punitive d. Art. 10:101 4, 14; Art. Grievance Art. 10:301 3
10:301 9
Harm see damage
reduction of d. see reduction of
damages honour Art. 10:301 6
human dignity Art. 2:102 7; Art.
relatives Art. 10:301 5, 8, 16
10:301 7
restoration in kind see restoration
in kind Identification Art. 8:101 27 et seq.
danger basic rule Art. 8:101 28
abnormal d. Art. 5:101 7 definition Art. 8:101 4, 27
gravity Art. 4:201 3±4 secondary victims Art. 8:101 29
rule of d. Art. 4:102 8 auxiliaries Art. 8:101 30
death Art. 10:202 2, 6, 13 illegality Art. 7:101 3
relatives Art. 10:301 5, 8, 16 illegitimate loss Art. 2:103 3
defamation Art. 10:104 3 income Art. 10:202 3, 4, 11±12
defect independent contractor Art. 6:102 8
enterprise liability Art. 4:202 19 et seq.
defences Title IV insurance payments Art. 10:103 7
assumption of risk Art. 7:101 16 intellectual property rights Art.
consent Art. 7:101 2, 16 10:101 9
definition Title IV 2±3 intent Chapter 4 4; Art. 4:101 4
force majeure Art. 7:102 5 interests, protected see protected
illegality Art. 7:101 3 interests
lawful authority Art. 7:101 17
necessity Art. 7:101 11±13 Justification see defences
self-defence see self-defence
self-help Art. 7:101 8, 14, 15 Keeper Art. 5:101 13±15
third-party conduct Art. 7:102 6
Legitimacy of damage Art. 2:103
et seq.
liability for others Chapter 6
Earning capacity Art. 2:103 9; Art. auxiliary see auxiliary
10:202 3, 4, 12 corporate liability Chapter 6 7;
enterprise Art. 4:202 14 et seq. Art. 6:102 21
enterprise liability Art. 4:202 definition Chapter 6 1, 2, 4
expenses, preventive see preventive legal entities Art. 6:102 21
expenses minors or mentally disabled per-
sons Art. 6:101
Family members state liability Chapter 6 7; Art.
definition Art. 10:202 5 6:102 22
fault Art. 1:101 3; Chapter 4 25; liberty Art. 2:102 7; Art. 10:301 6, 7
Art. 4:101 loss see also damage
277
Index
consequential l. Art. 2:103 1±2, 7 general rule Art. 10:201 12

illegitimate l. Art. 2:103 3 loss of income Art. 10:202 3, 11
l. of earning capacity see earning personal injury Art. 10:202
capacity property damage Art. 10:203
pure economic l. see pure eco- pure economic interests Art.
nomic loss 10:201 12
loss of a chance Art. 3:106 7 repair of things Art. 10:203 5, 6, 8
lump sum payment Art. 10:102 loss of use Art. 10:203 7, 8
periodical payments Art. 10:102
Market share liability Art. 3:103 11; person Art. 1:101 8
Art. 3:105 personal injury Art. 2:102 13; Art.
market value Art. 10:201 7; Art. 10:202
10:203 3, 5 comatose Art. 10:301 11, 15
mental health Art. 10:202 8; see also definition Art. 10:202 2, Art.
personal injury 10:301 2
mental disability Art. 4:102 15; Art. death Art. 10:202 2, 13; see also
6:101 death
definition Art. 6:101 6 emotional disturbance Art.
minor Art. 6:101 10:202 8
definition Art. 6:101 5 expenses Art. 10:202 10
multiple tortfeasors Title V health impairment Art. 10:301 11
Necessity Art. 7:101 11±13 loss of income Art. 10:202 11, 12
negligence see fault medical treatment Art. 10:202 9
non-pecuniary damage Art. 10:301 mental health Art. 10:202 8, Art.
assessment Art. 10:301 10 10:301 2
autonomy Art. 10:301 7 non-pecuniary damage Art.
breach of contract Art. 10:301 6 10:301 4, 6, 7, 11
death Art. 10:301 4 periodical payments Art. 10:102 5
definition Art. 10:301 1 pecuniary damage Art. 10:201 2,
honour Art. 10:301 6 Art. 10:202 9
personal injury Art. 10:301 4, 7, relatives Art. 10:301 5, 8, 16
11 social security Art. 10:301 4
liberty Art. 10:301 6, 7 suffering Art. 10:301 11
personality rights Art. 10:301 6, 7 personality rights Art. 10:301 6, 7
privacy Art. 10:301 6, 7 physical disability Art. 4:102 15
property Art. 10:301 6 prevention Art. 2:104 3; Art. 10:101
relatives Art. 10:301 5, 8, 16 3, 4, 8, 13
reputation Art. 10:301 6, 7 preventive expenses Art. 2:104
privacy Art. 2:102 7; Art. 10:301 6, 7
Pecuniary damage product liability Art. 4:202 3
assessment Art. 10:201 1, 5 et property damage Art. 10:203
seq., 15 diminution of value Art. 10:203 6,
contractual relationship Art. 8
10:201 12 repair Art. 10:203 5, 6, 8
definition Art. 10:201 1, 8 replacement Art. 10:203 6
earning capacity Art. 10:202 3, 12 loss of use Art. 10:203 7, 8
278
Index
proportional liability Art. 3:102 8 et conspiracy Art. 9:101±9:102 2

seq., Art. 3:103; Art. 3:106 7 encouragement Art. 9:101±9:102
protected interests Art. 2:102 2
pure economic loss Art. 2:102 5, 6, state liability Chapter 6 7
11, 13; Art. 4:101 7; Art. 10:201 strict liability Chapter 5
12 analogy Art. 5:102 5
definition Art. 2:102 9 contributory conduct or activity
Art. 8:101 25, 26
Recourse see contribution
defences Art. 7:102
reduction of damages Art. 10:401
definition Chapter 5 4
rent Art. 10:102
reputation Art. 10:301 6, 7 Third-party conduct Art. 7:102 6 et
restoration in kind Chapter 10 1, seq.
Art. 10:101 2, 4, 6, 11, Art. 10:104 tortuous capacity Art. 4:102 14 et
Self-defence Art. 7:101 2, 9, 10 seq.; Art. 8:101 11
definition Art. 7:101 7 et seq. Unjust enrichment Art. 9:101±9:102
wrongful s. Art. 7:101 6 6, Art. 10:101 9; Art. 10:103 1, 4,
self-help Art. 7:101 8, 14, 15 8, 11
several liability Title V usage, common Art. 5:101 8
definition Title V 3
solidary liability Title V; Art. 9:101± Vicarious liability see liability for
9:102 2 et seq. others
auxiliary Art. 9:101±9:102 2, 8
definition Title V 2 Wrongfulness Chapter 2 2, 5±8
279
The Principles of European Tort Law Series
Volume 1: The Limits of Liability: Keeping the Floodgates Shut. Edited by
Jaap Spier. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-0169-1.
1996, 162 pp.
Volume 2: The Limits of Expanding Liability. Eight Fundamental Cases in a
Comparative Perspective. Edited by Jaap Spier. Kluwer Law International,
The Hague. ISBN 90-411-0581-6. 1998, 244 pp.
Volume 3: Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness. Edited by Helmut
Koziol. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-1019-4. 1998,
144 pp.
Volume 4: Unification of Tort Law: Causation. Edited by Jaap Spier.
Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-1325-8. 2000, 161 pp.
Volume 5: Unification of Tort Law: Damages. Edited by Ulrich Magnus.
Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-1481-5. 2001, 255 pp.
Volume 6: Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability. Edited by Bernhard A.
Koch and Helmut Koziol. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN
90-411-1705-9. 2002, 444 pp.
Volume 7: Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage Caused by Others
Edited by Jaap Spier. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-
2185-4. 2003, 335 pp.
Volume 8: Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence. Edited by
Ulrich Magnus and Miquel MartõÂn-Casals. Kluwer Law International, The
Hague. ISBN 90-411-2220-6. 2004, 300 pp.
Volume 9: Unification of Tort Law: Multiple Tortfeasors. Edited by W.V.
Horton Rogers. Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-
2319-9. 2004, 313 pp.
Volume 10: Unification of Tort Law: Fault. Edited by Pierre Widmer.
Kluwer Law International, The Hague. ISBN 90-411-2098-X. Forthcoming
2005.
280
The Tort and Insurance Law Series
Volume 1: Cases on Medical Malpractice in a Comparative Perspective. Edi-
ted by Michael Faure and Helmut Koziol. Springer, Vienna/New York.
ISBN 3-211-83595-4. 2001, 331 pp.
Volume 2: Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective.
Edited by W.V. Horton Rogers. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-
83602-0. 2001, 318 pp.
Volume 3: The Impact of Social Security on Tort Law. Edited by Ulrich
Magnus. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-83795-7. 2003, 312 pp.
Volume 4: Compensation for Personal Injury in a Comparative Perspective.
Edited by Bernhard A. Koch and Helmut Koziol. Springer, Vienna/New
York. ISBN 3-211-83791-4. 2003, 501 pp.
Volume 5: Deterrence, Insurability and Compensation in Environmental
Liability. Future Developments in the European Union. Edited by Michael
Faure. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-83863-5. 2003, 405 pp.
Volume 6: Der Ersatz frustrierter Aufwendungen. VermoÈgens- und Nicht-
vermoÈgensschaden im oÈsterreichischen und deutschen Recht. By Thomas
Schobel. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-83877-5. 2003, 342 pp.
Volume 7: Liability for and Insurability of Biomedical Research with
Human Subjects in a Comparative Perspective. Edited by Jos Dute, Michael
G. Faure and Helmut Koziol. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-
20098-3. 2004, 445 pp.
Volume 9: Pure Economic Loss. Edited by Willem H. van Boom, Helmut
Koziol and Christian Witting. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-
00514-5. 2003, 214 pp.
Volume 10: Liber Amicorum Pierre Widmer. Edited by Helmut Koziol and
Jaap Spier. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-00522-6. 2003, 376 pp.
Volume 11: Terrorism, Tort Law and Insurance. A Comparative Survey.
Edited by Bernhard A. Koch. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-
01867-0. 2004, 313 pp.
Volume 12: AbschlusspruÈfer. Haftung und Versicherung. Edited by Helmut
Koziol and Walter Doralt. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-20800-
3. 2004, 180 pp.
281
Volume 13: PersoÈnlichkeitsschutz gegenuÈber Massenmedien / The Protec-
tion of Personality Rights against Invasions by Mass Media. Edited by Hel-
mut Koziol and Alexander Warzilek. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN
3-211-23835-2. 2005. Approx. 700 pp.
Volume 14: Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes. Edited by
Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-
24481-6. 2005. Approx. 400 pp.
Volume 15: Children in Tort Law. Part I: Children as Tortfeasors. Edited by
Miquel MartõÂn-Casals. 3-211-24480-8. 2005. Approx. 600 pp.
Volume 16: Liability in Tort and Liability Insurance. Edited by Gerhard
Wagner. 3-211-24482-4. 2005. Approx. 400 pp.
The Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook Series

2001: European Tort Law 2001. Edited by Helmut Koziol and Barbara C.
Steininger. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-83824-4. 2002, 571 pp.
Steininger. Springer, Vienna/New York. ISBN 3-211-24479-4. 2005, approx.
620 pp.
282

Principles of European Tort Law Text and Commentary by Francesco D. Busnelli, Giovanni Comandé, Herman Cousy, Dan B. Dobbs, Bill W. Dufwa, Michael G. Faure, Israel Gilead, Michael D. Green, Konstantin (Z-lib.org

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Principles of European Tort Law Text and Commentary by Francesco D. Busnelli, Giovanni Comandé, Herman Cousy, Dan B. Dobbs, Bill W. Dufwa, Michael G. Faure, Israel Gilead, Michael D. Green, Konstantin (Z-lib.org

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European Group on Tort Law

Principles of European Tort Law

Text and Commentary

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ISBN-10 3-211-23084-X SpringerWienNewYork

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW ........................................ 1

General Introduction .............................................................................. 11

Title I. Basic Norm ......................................................................... 19

Title II. General Conditions of Liability ........................................... 23

Title III. Bases of Liability .............................................................. 64

Title IV. Defences ............................................................................ 120

Title V. Multiple Tortfeasors .......................................................... 138

Title VI. Remedies ........................................................................... 149

Art. 10:102. Lump Sum or Periodical Payment (Magnus) ....................... 153

TRANSLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES ........................................... 183

Index .................................................................................................... 275

OR Swiss Code of Obligations

TITLE II. General Conditions of Liability

(2) A subsequent activity is nevertheless taken into consideration if it has

TITLE III. Bases of Liability

well as the availability and the costs of precautionary or alternative meth-

Art. 5:102. Other Strict Liabilities

TITLE IV. Defences

TITLE V. Multiple Tortfeasors

right is without prejudice to any contract between them determining

TITLE VI. Remedies

Section 2. Pecuniary Damage

tionship to deceased or seriously injured victims) similar sums should be

The Principles of European Tort Law

Casals (Girona, Spain), Prof. Olivier MoreÂteau (Lyon, France), Prof.

proposals were distributed among the members, whose observations were

3. A First Step Towards a Truly European Tort Law

41 The Working Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations tackles several issues

3. History of the Provision

liability should not be considered a strict liability in the narrow sense as

4. Overview of Existing Liability Systems

2. History of the Title

We believe that it would be impossible to produce a draft that could recon- 3

2. History of the Chapter

(a) interference with protected rights and interests

3. Overview of Existing Liability Systems

Art. 2:101 . Recoverable Damage

made for reasons of euphony ± harm to a legally protected interest is

3. Relation to Other Provisions

4. Regime in Existing Liability Systems

Art. 2:102 . Protected Interests

identify the types of losses in respect of which liability is to be allowed or

scope of protection requires the weighing of the opposing interests: On the

4. Relation to Other Provisions

5. Regime in Existing Liability Systems

Art. 2:103 . Legitimacy of Damage

Losses relating to activities or sources which are regarded as illegitimate

4. Scope of This Article

5. Relation to Other Articles

6. Regime in Existing Liability Systems

Art. 2:104 . Preventive Expenses

4. Scope of This Article

5. Relation to Other Articles

6. Regime in Existing Liability Systems

P is entitled to claim the costs for lighterage and storage from D.

Art. 2:105 . Proof of Damage

Damage must be proved according to normal procedural standards. The