CASE DIGEST

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

NEGROSOCCIDENTAL, GR No. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
Facts:
On November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite alleging that as a natural son of the
latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the life time of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as
such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine
National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961, and two days later it set
the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, for one reason or
another, the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed
an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain. A
duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to
this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof and further questioning petitioner's capacity
and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in
the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds:
(1) that as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal
basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and
(2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said
intestate proceedings, he not being acknowledged as natural son of the decedent.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to
dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion
for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the special proceedings in CFI Negros was proper and
whether CFI Manila has jurisdiction to probate the alleged will.
Held:
The court held that it was proper that the intestate proceeding in Negros CFI
be discontinued because the decedent had left a will. It is well-settled that testacy is
favored over intestacy, and that any intestate proceeding may be terminated at any time
when it is discovered that the deceased had left a will.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance
have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died
testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question,
the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of
first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these
Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city
where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding
No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance
with his alleged will. Hence, the CFI Manila may continue with the probate case, without
prejudice to petitioner's successful action for his compulsory recognition as heir. Petition
for certiorari was denied.
EMILIO ADVINCULA v. JUDGE JOSE TEODORO
GR No. L-9282, May 31, 195

Facts:
On November 22, 1954, Emilio Advincula was appointed as special administrator of the
estate of his deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, in special proceeding No. 3245
of said court. After Advincula had qualified as such, the brothers of the deceased, who
left no issue, submitted to the court, for allowance, a document purporting to be her last
will and testament. Petitioner opposed the probate thereof upon the ground that it did
not bear the signature of the deceased and that the signature thereon, if hers, was
secured through fraud and duress; and that the instrument had not been executed with
the requisite formalities. On May 4, 1955, respondent Enrique Lacson, one of the
brothers of the deceased, filed a motion praying that he be appointed administrator of
said estate, in lieu of petitioner herein, because said respondent is the executor named
in the alleged will. Thereafter, Atty. Jose Y. Torres and Antonio Lozada, as counsel for
Advincula, filed an opposition to said motion. When the latter was called for hearing,
Atty. Lozada was served, in open court, copy of an amended motion, of respondent
Lacson, for change of administrator. It was alleged therein, in addition to the ground
set forth in the first motion that the present administrator is incompetent, incapable, and
unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being foreign to the estate, and without
changing or removing him as such would be disastrous to the estate and to the heirs
named in the will of the decedent. Atty. Lozada asked a postponement of the hearing
upon the ground that Advincula's main counsel, Atty. Torres was in Manila, but his
request was denied. Then, after hearing the argument of opposing counsel, the
court, presided over by respondent, Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., Judge, issued, on
the same date, an order the pertinent parts of which read: The Court, after hearing
the oral arguments of both parties, finds the motion for postponement not well-taken
and hereby denies the same; and finding the motion well-founded and said motion is
hereby granted. Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond, letters of administration
were issued to him, and he tried to take possession of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner instituted the present action for certiorari, against Lacson and Judge
Teodoro, to annul his aforesaid orders as the new Administrator upon the ground that
the same were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Upon the filing of a bond by
Advincula, we issued, as prayed for in his petition, a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondent Lacson and his agents from interfering and harassing the
petitioner in the administration of the estate of the deceased, during the pendency of
this case.
Issue: Whether Judge Teodoro erred in appointing Lacson as administrator of the estate
of the deceased and whether the discovery of the will nullify the letters of administration
already issued

Held: The Court held that Lacson's appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator of
the estate of Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former is
named executor in the alleged will of said deceased. The provision therein to this effect
cannot be enforced, however, until after said document has been allowed to probate.
The court ruled that the discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of a deceased, after the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the
latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died intestate, does not ipso facto nullify
the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation thereof,
until the alleged will has been "proved and allowed by the court." Rule 83, section 1,
of the Rules of Court, is plain and explicit on this point. Hence, the amended motion for
change of administrator endeavored to justify the removal of Advincula by alleging that
he is incompetent, incapable, and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being
foreign to the estate of the deceased is devoid of merit. Also, Advincula has not been
found guilty of any specific act or omission constituting one of the legal grounds,
enumerated in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the removal of an executor
or administrator. Wherefore, the orders of respondent Judge are reversed, and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued in this case hereby made permanent, with costs against
respondent Lacson.
FRANCISCO DE BORJA, Petitioner Vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN
G.R. No. L-6476, November 19, 1955

Facts:
On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for
the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will
was probated on April 2, 1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One
of the heirs who is now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case
to the Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal was granted. All
the records of the case were destroyed or lost during the last Pacific war but were on
January 1, 1946, reconstituted. On March 26 of that year Francisco de Borja qualified
as executor and administrator. Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully
administer the estate he being quite weak and unable to see, on petition of Matilde de
Borja, one of the heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-
administrator, Crisanto qualified as co-administrator.
On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to
anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in
abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja's amended account. Francisco, Matilde
and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja but by
order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge indirectly denied the motion for
reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose,
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of
Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on
the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja. Thereafter, Francisco, Matilde and
Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja as co-
administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later, they filed
the corresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27, 1952, respondent Judge
Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on
the ground that the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory
in nature and so was not appealable. Hence, this petition for mandamus, as already
stated, to compel respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and to give due
course to the appeal.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory
in nature and not appealable.
Held: No, the Court held that, though an order appointing a regular administrator is
appealable, On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1(e) an order appointing
a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator
is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake
those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal.
The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81,
section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or
disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is
authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay
are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87, section
8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator
has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have
the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator.
In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a
specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his
appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said
temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions
and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not
alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances
obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated
administrator, is and has for several years been one only in name due to his physical
and mental disability which grounds for removal of Administrator under Rule 82, section
2 of Rules of Court, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the
sole administrator, there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the
appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same
effect as a sole regular or general administrator.
BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO
SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-23419

Facts:
Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the
appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919,
begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores
Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children named
Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano. On June 17,1960
Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified petition for the
settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed as
administratrix. Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of
Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children. In a supplemental
opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the remedy of Benjamina
Sebial was an action to rescind the partition. After hearing, Benjamina Sebial as
administratrix. It found that the alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and
ineffective. Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial on January 19,
1961. On the same date, a notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the
reconsideration but the same was denied. The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a
motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the grounds that the decedent's
estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had already been
partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding. On
April 27,1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate
allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land. On May 6, 1961, the
administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the
spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the four parcels of land.
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action on the pending
incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. It ordered the parties to
prepare a complete list of the properties belonging to the decedent, with a segregation
of the properties belonging to each marriage. On November 11, 1961, the oppositors
submitted their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia
Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land. They alleged that the conjugal estate of
Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel of land allegedly
purchased with money coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia
Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land was sold by the children
of the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado. The oppositors claimed that the two
parcels of land acquired during the first marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1)
Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial as the representative of the
estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of the six
children of the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They clarified that under
that partition the three children of the first marriage received a three-fourths share while
the six children of second marriage received a one-fourth share. They also alleged that
Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the
third persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of Gelacio
Sebial. To the inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an
opposition. In an order dated November 11,1961 the lower court inexplicably required
the administratrix to submit another inventory. In compliance, she reproduced her
inventory dated April 17,1961 and added two other items, namely, two houses allegedly
valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received
by the children of the first marriage. The oppositors interposed an opposition to the said
inventory. The lower court approved the second inventory dated November 7, 1961,
because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of
land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order,
it allowed the delivery to the administratrix of certain parcels of land, and it directed that
the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of said parcels of land to deliver
those properties to her and to not disturb her in her possession and administration of
the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to approve the inventory made by the
administratrix despite the fact that it was filed 3 months from the date of her
appointment?
Ruling:
Yes, the court held that the three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First
Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains that jurisdiction until
the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-month
period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an
administrator's unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal
as stated under Sec. 2, Rule 82 of Rules of Court which provides that If an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules,
or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resign, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone
to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be
to any suitable person.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996

Facts:
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his
only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to
his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the
cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unknown reasons, Edmond, the
named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes
who filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition
on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. On November 2, 1992,
one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde
IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On January 19, 1993, the
probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental
deposit and payments totaling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle
Verde property. In compliance, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and
maintenance expenses on the estate. On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993,
admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond. On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz
as executor, filed a motion for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
motion for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine,
and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions
of the holographic will. On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion
for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of
opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to, and possession of the
properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

Issue:
Whether the probate court erred in granting an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren?

Ruling:
The Court ruled that, on the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the clear provision of the law governing the said case.
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as provided by law. In this
case, the law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. Be that as it may, grandchildren
are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law
clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.