POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

COLLEGE OF LAW

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

FIRST SEMESTER AY 2023 - 2024

NAME: CRUZ, Reynald C.

SECTION: JD 1-2

CASE DIGEST

TITLE OF THE CASE: De Las Alas vs. Court of Appeals

GR # L-3800061
DATE: May 16, 1978
PONENTE: Chief Justice Felix V. Makasiar

CASE DOCTRINE Computation of Periods

FACTS It appears that the respondent lower court judge rendered a decision on August 7,
1972 in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2117; that copy of the said decision was
received by petitioners’ counsel on September 9, 1972; that on September 28, 1972,
petitioners’ counsel filed an urgent motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from
October 9, 1972—the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration and/or
perfecting the appeal—within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision of August 7, 1972; that this motion for extension was
granted as prayed for; that on October 7, 1972, petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration; that on November 9, 1972, the respondent lower court judge denied
the motion for reconsideration and a copy of the order of denial was furnished
petitioners’ counsel on November 16, 1972; that on November 20, 1972, petitioners
sent by registered mail their notice of appeal and an appeal bond, serving a copy
thereof upon private respondents’ counsel also by registered mail; that on the same
day, November 20, 1972, petitioners filed a motion for extension of twenty (20) days
within which to file their record on appeal, which motion for extension was granted;
that under this extension the record on appeal was due for filing on December 25,
1972; that on December 8, 1972, petitioners filed their record on appeal; that on
December 9, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and to
disprove the record on appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal, the appeal
bond and the record on appeal were filed out of time; that on December 20, 1972,
herein petitioners filed their opposition to said motion to dismiss appeal and to
disapprove record on appeal; that on January 26, 1973, the respondent lower court
judge granted the said motion to dismiss and petitioners received a copy of the said
order on February 9, 1973; that on March 9, 1973, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of fifteen (15) days from March 11, 1973, within which to submit a motion
for reconsideration; that on the same date, March 11, 1973, private respondents filed a
mo tion for the execution of the decision of the respondent lower court judge dated
August 7, 1972; and that on March 21, 1973, petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration of the order of the respondent lower court judge dated January 26,
1973, which motion for reconsideration was denied on June 18, 1973.
On November 7, 1973, the private respondents filed their opposition to the motion for
reconsideration which was then replied by the said petitioners on November 20, 1973.
On December 13 of the same year, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution
denying the petitioners’ motion.
Hence, on January 17, 1974, petitioners filed the instant petition.
ISSUE/S: First, Whether the petitioners have still had 3 more days left of the period of appeal as
of the day they filed their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972.

Second; Whether or not the private respondents are correct to say that when
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972, was beyond the
reglementary period based on the rule of the last paragraph of Article 13 of the New
Civil Code.

RULING: Firstly, YES, based on Lloren vs. De Vera 4 SCRA 637.

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that they have up to October 9, 1972
within which to perfect their appeal (Lloren vs. De Vera 4 SCRA 637). Their MOR was
filed on October 7, 1972, and in this date of filing must be added to the remainder of
the period of the appeal, petitioners, clearly had 3 more days left of their period of
appeal October 7,8, and 9 1972. Therefore, if the petitioners received the order
denying their MOR on November 16, 1972 which day should also be excluded from
the period of appeal in him the Lloren Doctrine their period of appeal extended up to
November 19, 1972, since Nov 19, 1972 is a Sunday, there period to perfect their
appeal was extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following after,
i.e. November 20, 1972. Since the petitioners filed their notice of appeal and appeal
bond on November 20, 1972 and their record on appeal within the period extended
by respondent lower court judge, it follows that the petitioners perfected their appeal
within the legal period.

As per SC’s logic the MOR has been pending since October 7, 1972, the date of its
filing and remained so until November 16, 1972, when the petitioners received the
order of denial of their MOR. Consequently, making the MOR pending for a period of
41 days – 25 days for October and 16 days for November. Deducting 41 days from 61
days this will result to 27 days, therefore the petitioners still have 3 days more within
which to perfect their appeal.

Secondly, No, based on the same logic of the aforementioned case.

Regardless, however, of the findings and even assuming that the respondent’s
position was correct. The SC contends “we find that one-day delay does not justify
the dismissal of the appeal under the circumstances obtaining in this case. The
provision of section 1, Rule 50 of the Rule of Court which provides specific grounds
for dismissal of appeal manifestly confers a power and does not impose a duty, what
is more it is directory and not mandatory. Hence, it should be exercised with a great
deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances.

Wherefore, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, promulgated on

September 12, 1972, and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, dated
December 13, 1973, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent trial
court is hereby directed to approve petitioners bond and record on appeal and to
certify the said appeal to respondent court of appeals, for the resolution of the case on
its merits. No costs.