BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. REYNALD R.

SUAREZ
[G.R. No. 167750, March 15, 2010]

Facts:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current accounts with
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands’ (BPI) from 1988 to 1997.

Sometime in 1997, Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred
not to deal directly with the land owners. Suarez transacted with the owners of the Tagaytay properties, making it appear
that he was the buyer of the lots. As regards the payment of the purchase money, Suarez and his client made an
arrangement such that Suarez’s client would deposit the money in Suarez’s BPI account and then, Suarez would issue
checks to the sellers.

On 16 June 1997, Suarez’s client deposited a RCBC check with a face value of P19,129,100, in BPI Pasong Tamo Branch
to be credited to Suarez’s current account in BPI Ermita Branch. Suarez instructed his secretary, Petronila Garaygay
(Garaygay), to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already credited to his account that same
day of 16 June 1997. According to Garaygay, BPI allegedly confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. Relying
on this confirmation, Suarez issued on the same day five checks of different amounts totaling P19,129,100 for the
purchase of the Tagaytay properties.

While Suarez was in the US for a vacation, Garaygay informed him that the five checks he issued were all dishonored by
BPI due to insufficiency of funds and that his current account had been debited a total of P57,200 as penalty for the
dishonor.

On 19 June 1997, the payees of the five BPI checks that Suarez issued on 16 June 1997 presented the checks again.
Since the RCBC check had already been cleared by that time, rendering Suarez’s available funds sufficient, the checks
were honored by BPI. Subsequently, Suarez sent a letter to BPI demanding an apology and the reversal of the charges
debited from his account. Suarez received a call from the manager who requested a meeting with him to explain BPI’s
side. However, the meeting did not transpire.

Upon Suarez’s request, BPI delivered to him the five checks which he issued on 16 June 1997. Suarez claimed that the
checks were tampered with, specifically the reason for the dishonor. In reply, BPI offered to reverse the penalty charges
which were debited from his account, but denied Suarez’s claim for damages. Suarez rejected BPI’s offer.

Suarez then filed with the RTC a complaint for damages claiming that BPI mishandled his account through negligence.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Suarez.

BPI appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Arguments:
Suarez:
● Insists that BPI was negligent in handling his account when BPI dishonored the checks he issued to various
payees on 16 June 1997, despite the RCBC check deposit covers the total amount of the BPI checks.
● BPI is estopped from dishonoring his checks since BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check
deposit and assured the adequacy of funds in his account.
● That he relied on this confirmation for the issuance of his checks to the owners of the Tagaytay properties. Thus,
BPI made a representation that he had sufficient available funds to cover the total value of his checks

Issues:
1. W/N BPI was negligent in handling the account of Suarez.
2. W/N BPI is liable to pay Suarez moral and exemplary damage fees and costs of litigation.

Ruling:
Petition is partly meritorious.

1. Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do."

The question concerning BPI's negligence, however, depends on whether BPI indeed confirmed the same-day
crediting of the RCBC check’s face value to Suarez’s BPI account.

Based on the records, there is no sufficient evidence to show that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting
of the RCBC check which Suarez’s client deposited late on 16 June 1997. Garaygay failed to (1) identify and name
the alleged BPI employee, and (2) establish that this particular male employee was authorized by BPI either to
disclose any information regarding a depositor’s bank account to a person other than the depositor over the
telephone, or to assure Garaygay that Suarez could issue checks totaling the face value of the RCBC check.
Moreover, a same-day clearing of a P19,129,100 check requires approval of designated bank official or officials, and
not any bank official can grant such approval. Thus, BPI was not estopped from dishonoring the checks for
inadequacy of available funds in Suarez’s account since the RCBC check remained uncleared at that time.
 While BPI had the discretion to undertake the same-day crediting of the RCBC check, and disregard the banking
industry’s 3-day check clearing policy, Suarez failed to convincingly show his entitlement to such privilege as he had
no credit or bill purchase line with BPI which would qualify him to the exceptions to the 3-day check clearing policy

Considering that there was no binding representation on BPI’s part as regards the same-day crediting of the RCBC
check, no negligence can be ascribed to BPI’s dishonor of the checks because BPI was justified in dishonoring the
checks for lack of available funds in Suarez’s account.

0. BPI however mistakenly marked the dishonored checks with "drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF), " instead of
"drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD)." In the case of DAUD, the depositor has, on its face, sufficient funds in his
account, although it is not available yet at the time the check was drawn. On the other hand, in DAIF, the depositor lacks
sufficient funds in his account to pay the check. Moreover, DAUD does not expose the drawer to possible prosecution for
estafa and violation of BP 22, while DAIF subjects the depositor to liability for such offenses. Thus, it is clear therefore that
DAIF differs from DAUD. Does the erroneous marking of DAIF, instead of DAUD, give rise to BPI’s liability for damages?

The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages:
a. There is an injury — whether physical, mental or psychological — clearly sustained by the claimant;
a. The culpable act or omission is factually established;
a. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
a. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the CC.

In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous
marking of DAIF on the checks. Proximate cause has been defined as "any cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would
not have occurred." There is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of
DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he
suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to the Tagaytay properties did not materialize
due to the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only
himself to blame and cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence.

However, while the erroneous marking of DAIF, which BPI belatedly rectified, was not the proximate cause of Suarez’s
claimed injury, the Court reminds BPI that its business is affected with public interest. It must at all times maintain a
high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez
had a right to expect such high level of care and diligence from BPI. Since BPI failed to exercise such diligence,
Suarez is thus entitled to nominal damages to vindicate Suarez’s right to such high degree of care and diligence.
Thus, we award Suarez P75,000.00 nominal damages.

On the award of actual damages, we find the same without any basis. Considering that BPI legally dishonored the
checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit, BPI was justified in debiting the penalty charges against Suarez’s
account, pursuant to the Rules of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (see: Sec. 27. Penalty Charges on
Returned Items)

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition in part. The Court sets aside the 30 November 2004 Decision and 11
April 2005 Resolution of the CA and deletes the award of all damages and fees. The Court awards to respondent
Suarez nominal damages in the sum of P75,000.00.

FILONILA O. CRUZ, petitioner,vs.HON. CELSO D. GANGAN, DIR. MARCELINO HANOPOL, AUDITOR

GLENDA MANLAPAZ, AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACTS:
On Friday afternoon of January 15, 1999, petitioner went to the Regional Office of the Technological Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in Taguig, Metro Manila for consultation with the regional director.3 After the
meeting, petitioner went back to her official station in Caloocan City, where she was the then Camanava district director of
the TESDA, by

The petitioner here boarded the (LR T) on board, her handbag was slashed and its contents stolen by an
unidentified person. Among the items taken from her were her wallet and the government-issued cellular phone, which is
the subject of the instant case. That same day, she reported the incident to police authorities who immediately conducted
an investigation. However, all efforts to locate the thief and to recover the phone proved futile.

Three days after, on January 18, 1999,petitioner reported the theft to the regional director of TESDA. She did
through a Memorandum, in which she requested relief from accountability of the subject property. In a 1st Indorsement,
the regional director, in turn, indorsed the request to the resident auditor.

Under a 2nd Indorsement dated February 26, 1999, the resident auditor denied the request of petitioner on the
ground that the latter lacked the diligence required in the custody of government properties. Thus, petitioner was ordered
to pay the purchase value of the cell phone (P3,988) and that of its case (P250), a total of P4,238. The auditor's action
was sustained by the director of the National Government Audit Office II (NGAO II). The matter was then elevated to the
Commission on Audit.

ISSUE :
1 -whether petitioner was negligent in the care of the government-issued cellular phone
RULING:
NO, petitioner was not negligent because riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a negligent act under the
circumstances in which petitioner was influenced by time and money considerations.

Under Art. 1173 of the Civil Code, provides: The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201 , paragraph2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected
of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case at bar the Rules provide that property for official use shall be
utilized with the diligence of a good father of a family. Extra-ordinary measures are not called for in taking care of a cellular
phone while in transit. Placing it in a bag away from covetous eyes and holding on to that bag, as done by petitioner, is
ordinarily sufficient care of a cellular phone while travelling on board the LRT. The records do not show any specific act of
negligence on her part. It is a settled rule that negligence cannot be presumed, it has to be proven.

34. Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027, April 21, 1999.

FACTS
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal guardian of the minors Rianna
and Reianne. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu
truck-trailer.
Reynaldo Raynera was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa.
The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal
sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red
lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates.5 The asphalt road was not well lighted.
Reynaldo crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the
collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo6 rushed him to the Paraaque Medical
Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre,7 pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on
arrival.
Petitioners : complaint12 for damages against respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck , accident caused by the
negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights.
Respondents: truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion of the road, with
no tail lights, license plate and early warning device.
TC: respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no
license plate and tail lights; (2) there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts18 each, on both sides of the steel plates;
and (3) the truck trailer was improperly parked in a dark area. Respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death, for which they are jointly and severally liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial
court applied the doctrine of contributory negligence19 and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of
the victims own negligence.
CA: Set asude TC decision. Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of
his death,22 and consequently, absolved respondents from liability
ISSUE
(a) whether respondents were negligent and (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Reynaldo Raynera.
RULING
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila.
RATIO
No, respondent was not negligent.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.23
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code
(Republic Act No. 4136)25 respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof. Despite the absence of tail lights and license
plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger
to passing motorists.
No, Reynaldo Rayneras negligence was the proximate cause of his death and not the respondents’
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the
prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Virgilio Santos testimony strengthened respondents defense that it was the victim who was reckless and negligent in
driving his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not much different from the victims
motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.29 The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of
the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into
the rear of the Is

35. Jarco Marketing v CA (1999)

Facts:

Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong,
Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively.
Respondents are the spouses and parents of Zhieneth Aguilar

Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Department Store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip
at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
her. She then beheld her daughter Zhieneth on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the
assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. She was rushed to the
Hospital and was operated on. But the next day Zhieneth lost her speech and later after 14 days after the incident she
died at the age of six.

Criselda demanded reimbursement for hospitalization, medical bills and funeral expenses but Jarco Marketing
refused to pay to which the aggrieved family members filed a complaint against Jarco. Jarco however denied any liability
for the injuries and death as they claimed that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter
allowing her to freely roam the store filled with glassware and appliances. Also Zhieneth was liable for contributory
negligence as she climbed the counter triggering the eventual collapse said counter was made of sturdy wood and strong
support and never fell for the past 15 years of its construction.

Jarco claimed that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control
of its employees and raised due care and diligence in the performance of their duties as a defense. The trial court
dismissed the complaint ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it
and also Criselda’s negligence contributed to the incident. As the said counter was at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a
precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered an attractive nuisance. The counter was higher than Zhieneth it
has existed for 15 year and is safe and well balanced. Zhieneth had no business in climbing and clinging on it.

Respondents appealed to the Court of appeals and raising the defense that an child below 9 years old is incapable of
contributory negligence and even if she did it was impossible of her to propped herself on the counter as she had a small
frame and that a testimony of Gonzales a former store employee who accompanied her to the hospital heard that when
she was asked by the doctor what she did she said nothing and did not come near said counter and it just fell on her to
which said testimony received as res gestae. And that negligence could not be imputed to Criselda as she was paying at
said time and that the cause of death was Jarco Marketing negligence for not having the counter permanently nailed. The
Court of appeals ruled in favor of Criselda. Hence the current case

Issue(s): WON the death of Zhieneth is accidental or attributable to negligence

And if it was negligence WON such is attributable to Jarco Marketing or Criselda and Zhieneth

Held: For the first issue it is negligence; it is important to determine the difference between an accident and negligence.
An Accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens, while Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.

Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. The test in
determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The tragedy that befell Zhieneth was no accident and could only be
attributable to negligence.

The Second issue it is deemed the negligence of Jarco Marketing, as the testimony of Gonzales proved their negligence.

As the court deemed said testimony is valid it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and in
extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter; Zhieneth performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their
negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. Following said testimony Guevarra another former
employee corroborated that Jarco marketing store supervisor was informed of the danger imposed of the unstable
counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation Jarco
Marketing and its supervisors miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

Negligence cannot be contributed to Zhieneth as the court applied the conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence
to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners'
theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the
counter to collapse.

Criselda should be also absolved of negligence as initially Zhieneth held her hand but momentarily released it to
pay. Such letting go of her hand was reasonable and when she was pinned down she was only a foot away from her
mother and the said counter was only 4 meters away from Criselda, Zhieneth did not loiter and was near her mother. It is
deemed that the one liable for the negligence is Jarco Marketing and the store supervisors for failing to properly set up
precautions to the said counter.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
Doctrine: Last Clear Chance - the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by
the exercise of due diligence

Facts:
● May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling
P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC
with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
● They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas
● Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC
● Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated and stamped
by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
● Original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number - retained by the bank
● Duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank
● After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the
account number to RMC's account number
● This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
● Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later on filed in the
RTC
● RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
● CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees

Issue/s: WON applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not exercising the
proper validation procedure

Ruling/Held: Yes, the fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should
not relieve the PBC of responsibility. In addition, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred
by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Court also ruled that RMC has contributory negligence, thus, only 60% of the balance will be paid by PBC

Analysis/Ratio:
● The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the account holder)
should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
● Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lack in selection
and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
● Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the
effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were
validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later
● last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril - where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
 fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
● antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of,
or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
● Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
● If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a
good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty
bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care

37. Leano v. Domingo, G.R. No. 84378, July 4, 1991.

DOCTRINE:

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The Law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability to that. (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363, 372-373 [1988]).

[SEE ONLY NEGLIGENCE ASPECT]

 ●

PEDRO T. LAYUGAN vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS

MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION GR. No. L-73998 November 14, 1988

TOPIC: Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

DOCTRINES:

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur defined:

"Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”

Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control,
and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.

Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the
accident happened provided character accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence
of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management
and control of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 113, 115.

Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.

● The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstance involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.

The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is particular to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.

● The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the employer exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection or supervision of his employees.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Respondent Godofredo Isidro.

On May 15, 1979, Petitioner Layugan and his companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked
along the National Highway in Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, when defendant’s truck, recklessly driven by Daniel
Serrano, bumped Layugan. As a result, he was hospitalized and incurred expenses.

Defendant was declared in default, plaintiff’s evidence was received ex-parte, the decision was set aside to give a chance
to defendant to file his answer, and later on a third party complaint.

Defendant Isisdro admitted ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. He countered that Layugan was merely a
bystander, not a truck helper being the brother-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck being repaired occupied
almost half of the right lane towards Solano, N.V., right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the
failure of the driver of the parked vehicle to install the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car must
answer for the damages sustained by the truck of Isidro in the amount of Php 20,000, that plaintiff being a mere bystander
or hitchhiker must suffer all the damages he incurred. Respondent-Defendant’s counterclaim; attorneys fees, moral
damages.

A third party complaint was filed by Respondent Isidro against his insurer Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation (TMIC):
Without admitting his liability, Isidro claimed that TMIC is liable for contribution, indemnity and damages, by virtue of their
Insurance Policy which covers damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property. Third party defendant
TMIC answered that even if the subject matter is covered by the Insurance Policy, its liability shall in no case exceed the
limit defined in the terms and conditions stated therein, that complaint is premature, that the accident in question was
approximately caused by the carelessness of Layugan.

Layugan declared that he is a married man with one child and that he works as a security guard in Mandaluying City and
on his free time, as a truck helper. Due to the accident, his left leg was amputated and could no longer support his family
sufficiently.

Respondent Isidro testified that his vehicle in the accident was insured with TMIC covering own damage and third party
liability, that after he filed his claim, the insurance company paid him Php 18,000 for the damages sustained by his vehicle
but not for the third party liability.

Respondent’s driver Daniel Serrano declared that he gave his statement to the Bagabag police, that he knew his
responsibility as a driver, that the truck owner instructed him to be careful in driving and that he bumped the truck being
repaired by Layugan while the same was stopped.

From the evidence presented, it had been clearly established that the injuries sustained by Layugan were caused by
Driver Serrano. Police report confirmed that while Layugan was repairing the parked truck, the impact caused the jack to
dislodge and pin down Layugan, causing injury to his left forearm and left leg, which had to be amputated when gangrene
had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work.

The Trial Court held in favour of Layugan, ordering Isidro to pay Php70,000 as actual and compensatory damages, Php
2,000 attorneys fees, Php 5,000 moral damages, plus cost of suit. The lower Court ordered TMIC to indemnify Isidro Php
50,000 for actual and compensatory damages, plus cost of suit.

The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the Lower courts decision and dismissed the complaint and counter claims.
Hence this Petition.
Isidro submits that any immobile object along the highway, like the parked vehicle, poses a serious danger to a moving
vehicle which has the right to be there. He proffers that the burden to prove that care and diligence was observed, (using
and early warning devie) falls on Layugan, as he claims that his vehicle had the right to be there, and not the immobile
vehicle. Isidro concludes that absent of such proof of care and diligence, under the doctrine of res ips loquitur, would
evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked vehicle as well as his helper.

ISSUE:

1. Did Isidro exercise the right amount of care to relieve him from the liability for the negligence of his employee?
NO.
2. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will apply? NO.

RULING:

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Isidro’s contention is untenable because the records disclose that about 3 or 4 meters from the rear of the parked vehicle
was a lighted kerosene lamp, and admission on the part of Serrano that as he was driving, the headlight of the
approaching vehicle blinded him and that he did not notice the parked vehicle being repaired, that as he stepped on the
breaks, it did not work.

Absence or want of care by Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that in
stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by Respondent Isidro of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to escape the liability
for the negligence of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error. (see discussion on res ipsa loquitur
in DOCTRINES portion)

In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already
been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner
used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

Respondents submission is untenable. In the first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because
he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the
brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.

Moveover, the fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to
destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial.

The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his
vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro
failed to prove the-diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would
exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. Even if respondent is able to prove that he had
proved the diligence of a good father in the selection of the driver, he would still have to prove the same for the mechanic.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the respondent court as well as its Resolution
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated
January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto. With costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Sealoader Shipping Corporation v. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 167363, December 15,
2010

FACTS:

Sealoader Shipping Corporation (Sealoader) is corporation engaged in the business of shipping and hauling cargo. Grand
Cement Manufacturing Corporation (Grand Cement) is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling cement. It
maintains its own private wharf in San Fernando, Cebu, Philippines.

Sealoader entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila.
On March 31, 1994, Sealoaders barge, the D/B Toploader, arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by the M/T Viper.
The D/B Toploader, however, was not immediately loaded with its intended cargo as the employees of Grand Cement
were still loading another vessel, the Cargo Lift Tres.

Typhoon Bising struck the Visayas area . The D/B Toploader was, at that time, still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement.
In the afternoon of said date, as the winds blew stronger and the waves grew higher, the M/T Viper tried to tow the D/B
Toploader away from the wharf. The efforts of the tugboat were foiled, however, as the towing line connecting the two
vessels snapped. This occurred as the mooring lines securing the D/B Toploader to the wharf were not cast off. The
following day, the employees of Grand Cement discovered the D/B Toploader situated on top of the wharf, apparently
having rammed the same and causing significant damage thereto.

Grand Cement filed a Complaint for Damages against Sealoader.However, Sealoader insisted that Joyce Launch should
have been sued in its stead, as the latter was the owner and operator of the M/T Viper. Having complete physical control
of the M/T Viper, as well as the towing, docking, mooring and berthing of the D/B Toploader

ISSUE : Who among the parties in this case, should be liable for the damage sustained by the wharf of Grand Cement

RULING :
The Court holds that Sealoader had the responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather conditions in the areas
where its vessel was set to sail. Sealoader cannot merely rely on other vessels for weather updates and warnings on
approaching storms, as what apparently happened in this case. Common sense and reason dictates this. To do so would
be to gamble with the safety of its own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running
the risk of causing damage to the property of third parties for which it would necessarily be liable.

Sealoader was negligent for the lack of a radio or any navigational communication facility aboard the D/B Toploader.
There is also a manifest laxity of the crew of the D/B Toploader in monitoring the weather.

The records of the instant case reveal that Grand Cement timely informed the D/B Toploader of the impending typhoon.

The Court finds that the evidence proffered by Sealoader to prove the negligence of Grand Cement was marred by
contradictions and are, thus, weak at best. We therefore conclude that the contributory negligence of Grand Cement was
not established in this case.

40. Philippine National Railways v. CA, G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007.
FACTS:

Winifredo Tupang, husband of respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of petitioner at Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines
Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam
Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the
alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado,
called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of
Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held
the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.

On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence
required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay
the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is negligent and is liable as a common carrier.

HELD:

The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so
over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of
the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was
under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen
off the train at lyam Bridge.

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in
doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the
performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner
failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears that the deceased was
chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he
should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from
the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the
deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set
aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant
of exemplary damages should be discarded.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by eliminating therefrom the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No costs.

41. G.R. No. L-7567 November 12, 1912 THE

UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Segundo Barias was a driver for Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company.
On November 2, 1911, he was driving his vehicle along Rizal Avenue and stopped to take on passengers. He
looked back to check if all the passengers were on board and then started his vehicle forward when Fermina Jose
walked in front of the vehicle and was knocked down and dragged a little distance underneath the vehicle. Without
knowing what happened, Barias went on and only found out about the incident until his return.
The trial court in its decision said that it was sufficient that Barias did not diligently checked the track immediately in
front of his car to see if it was already clear before he proceeded which caused the incident. The court found him
guilty of imprudencia temeraria (reckless negligence) and was sentenced one year and one month imprisonment
and to pay the cause of action.

ISSUE:
WoN there was negligence on the part of Barias.

RULING:
Yes, there was negligence on the part of Barias.

In an earlier decision, the Court defined negligence as the failure to observe for protection on the part of the
defendant as to amount to reckless negligence (imprudencia temeraria) and is preceded by (1) failure to take such
precautions or advance measures in the performance of an act as the most prudence would suggest (2) whereby
injury is caused to persons or property.

In this case, evidence showed that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely
populated section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets
begin to move about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high
degree of diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any negligence on
his part in observing the track over which he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to
assume that the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp
lookout, and to do everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy
street cars on public thoroughfares in populous sections of the city.

The court further held that the reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their
employees the duty of exercising the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with
equal force to the duty of avoiding the infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public streets and
thoroughfares over which these companies are authorized to run their carsPrudence is that cardinal virtue which
teaches us to discern and distinguish the good from bad, in order to adopt or flee from it. It also means good
judgment, temperance, and moderation in one's actions.

Adzuara v. CA, G.R. No. 125134, January 22, 1999.

Doctrine: NEGLIGENCE – the want of care required by the circumstances, it is a relative or comparative, not an absolute,
term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstance reasonably require. (ex: keeping a watchful eye on the road, observe traffic rules on speed, right of way)

Facts:

• On Dec 17, 1990, 1:30 am, Xerxes Adzuara, then a law student, and his friends Rene Gonzalo and Richard Jose were
cruising along Quezon Ave from EDSA towards Delta circle in a Colt Galant sedan at approx 40 kph.
• Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West St their car collided w/ a 1975 Toyota Corolla owned and driven by Gregorio
Martinez.
• Martinez was w/ his daughter Sahlee and was coming from the eastern portion of Quezon Ave near Delta Circle and
executing a U-turn at 5kph.
• The collision flung the Corolla 20 meters southward from the point of impact and landed on top of the center island of
Q.Ave.
• Sahlee Martinez sustained injuries because of the accident and caused her to miss classes.
• On July 12 1991, petitioner Adzuara was charged before QC RTC w/ reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property w/ less physical injuries.
• On Dec 11, 1991, before the presentation of evidence, Martinez manifested is intention to institute a separate civil action
for damages.
• RTC convicted Adzuara, CA affirmed but deleted the fine of P50K

Issue/s: WON N Adzuara was guilty of negligence

Ruling/Held: Yes, it was satisfactorily proved that the accident occurred because of Adzuara’s reckless imprudence
consisting of his paying no heed to the red light and proceeding fast as it was approaching an intersection.

Analysis/Ratio:
It was satisfactorily proved that the accident occurred because of Adzuara’s reckless imprudence consisting of his paying
no heed to the red light and proceeding fast as it was approaching an intersection.
Gregorio testified that when the traffic light turned green, he turned left at the speed of 5kph, this was corroborated by the
testimony of Sahlee.
Adzuara testified that he was driving at the speed of 40kph but this was belied by the fact that the vehicle of Martinez was
thrown off 20 meters away from the point of impact.
The appreciation of Adzuara’s post-collision behavior serves only as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence
which is readily established by the admission of Adzuara and his friend that they saw the car of MArtines making a U-turn
but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes
NEGLIGENCE – the want of care required by the circumstances, it is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and
its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstance
reasonably require. (ex: keeping a watchful eye on the road, observe traffic rules on speed, right of way)
The speed at which Adzuara drove appears to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid collision.
It is a rule that motorists crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn. But if the
person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already
visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former.
Adzuara should have stopped when he saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn.
Adzuara claims that Martinez was guilty of contributory negligence but his has not been satisfactorily shown.
 CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA
TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA CUASO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160795 June 27, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and 2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is
managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank
and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.

Before the Cuasos constructed their house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty the surveyor as per recommendation of
the petitioner association. Later on, Corinthian Gardens Association approved the plans made by the builder CB Paras
Construction.

Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to
the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC). Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence of the
Cuasos’ encroached upon Tanjancos’ lot.

The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to
Engr. De
Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also
faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making
representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised
diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the
Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such
construction.

ISSUE: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, other such negligence contributed to the
injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

RULING: Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with negligence. Petitioner is found negligent. The
MRRC provides that no new constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner association. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of
periodic inspections of on- going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in ensuring compliance with
the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls
Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on the lot owned by the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as
duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance with the evidence on record. A Corinthian’s failure to prevent the
encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjancos’ property-despite the inspection conducted-constituted
negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos in having been deprived of the use
of that portion of their lot encroached upon.

A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable
risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the
Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very
least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

NOTE: as for the damages

The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from
1989 up to the time they vacate the property considering the location and category of the same.

They were, likewise, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P150,000.00 as attorney's fees. The CA also imposed six percent (6%) interest per annum on all the
awards. The Cuasos' appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the
third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective
duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment
sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision, also with interest of six percent (6%) per
annum.

RATIO of the damages awarded:

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property. However,
petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own
appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable
amount of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.

In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry
case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial
notice, but by supporting evidence:

x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence, there
can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence.

Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value. But
contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because
they were deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based
on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of
rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case.

Capili v. Spouses Cardaña, G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006.

FACTS:

Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.Her parents Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa filed a case for
damages against the school principal Joaquinita Capili knowing that the tree was dead and rotting did not dispose of it

Respondents alleged that as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby.

Petitioner's Arguments
(THE PRINCIPAL) Capili said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree, and she presented witnesses who
attested that she brought up Lerios' offer during a meeting, and had assigned Remedios Palana to negotiate the sale.

She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. Claiming that despite her physical inspection Of the school
grounds, She did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did anv of her 15 teachers inform her that
the tree was already rotten

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for the death.

RULING:
The probability that the branches Of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is Clearly a danger that is
foreseeable- AS the school principal, petitioner was tasked to See to the maintenance Of the school grounds and safety
Of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch
had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position.

46. Sicam v. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007.

ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in
Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside
the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the
pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry
for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the
loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents
appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value
of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not
liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)

HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

YES

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must
be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss.

Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that
when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of
safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault
inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of
robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts
petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event.

Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may
have been occasioned. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility
of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.

Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery committed based on the
report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that
petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that
petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other establishments which are engaged in
making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily,
the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing
pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a
prudent person would as to his own property.

In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required.

We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.

A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their
pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by petitioners in the
operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was
one, that he had sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged security guard
exercised all that was necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were
allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is quite impossible that
he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the
employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not
one of petitioners’ employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in court.

Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners’
failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they were negligent in not exercising the precautions
justly demanded of a pawnshop.

NOTES:
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves
against loss of the pawned jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13,
1973, and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns
pledged must be insured, to wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must
be insured against fire and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance company accredited by the
Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns – The office building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured
against fire. (emphasis supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted. Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible
to require insurance of pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-quoted amendment, there is no statutory duty
imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error for the CA to consider it as a factor in
concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to exercise the diligence required of them
under the Civil Code.

47. Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

Facts:

When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor
and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.

Issue: W/N the compulsory pilot/master is liable for the damage caused

Held: YES.
Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master
observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to permit the
pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly.
Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which
the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that
she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an
opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should have acted accordingly.
The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel,
and to third parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligence of
a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is
actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held
accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be anything which concurred with the
fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners are liable.
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated from the usual and ordinary course followed by navigators in passing through
the strait in question, without a substantial reason, was guilty of negligence, and that negligence having been the
proximate cause of the damages, he is liable for such damages as usually and naturally flow therefrom.
As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to
the person injured.

48. Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005.

Doctrine: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

Facts:
1. Dacara Jr.’s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon
City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr., his son who was
likewise on board the car, sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when
it hit the pile of earth
2. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir
Tiamzon before RTC. He prayed for damages.
3. LGU: contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs and the driver is
overspeeding
4. TC: LGU is liable
5. CA: Affirmed - petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent

Issue/s: WON Quezon City Government is liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.

Ruling/Held: Yes, Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same

Analysis/Ratio: Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was
buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how
then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was
found at the scene of the accident.

Negligence of QC is the proximate cause of the incident.

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined
from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending
circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required
to be observed. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of
the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subjectarticle is tantamount to negligence per se which
renders the City government liable.
 [G.R. NO. 160283 October 14, 2005]

JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Petitioner, v. Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc., Respondent.

FACTS:

The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and
bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent.

The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the
services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by
petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality.

They entered into a Memorandum of Agreement which stipulated that any damage within and outside the property of the
first party (Chan) incurred during the digging hall be borne by the second party (Yoro).

Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that the
digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected
as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.

On 18 April 1995, a Complaint5 against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioner's engineer, was filed by the
respondent before the RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as Civil Case No. A-1646. Petitioner and Oller filed an
Answer with Third-Party Complaint6 impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.

Issue: WoN the case is a case of quasi-delict

Held: Yes.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 2176. 'Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;

(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; andcralawlibrary

(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the
respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel.
The excavation on respondent's premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.

For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.28

The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.

As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.29

Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they
would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner's property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating
petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.

Coming now to the matter on damages, the respondent questions the drastic reduction of the exemplary damages
awarded to it. It may be recalled that the trial court awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000,000.00 but
same was reduced by the Court of Appeals to P50,000.00.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.31 In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.32 By gross negligence is meant such
entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences
of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others.33

Surreptitiously digging under the respondent's chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby endangering the
lives and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the damage that
may be caused to the structure itself. The respondent may indeed be awarded exemplary damages.
For such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is
inadequate. The exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.

BENGUED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 12736

Doctrine: Gross Negligence

FACTS:

Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat market.

On 14 January 1985 at around 7:50 in the morning, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their stalls to meet
a jeepney loaded with slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very first to
reach the parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars of the vehicle Jose suddenly stiffened and trembled as though
suffering from an epileptic seizure. In no time the other vendors rushed to Jose and they discovered that the antenna of
the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with an open electric wire. Jose was rushed to hospital but suddenly
died thereafter.

Caridad O. Bernardo, widow of Jose and their minor children filed a complaint against BENECO before the RTC of Baguio
City for a sum of money and damages arising from the electrocution of Jose Bernardo. BENECO filed a third-party
complaint against Guillermo Canave, Jr., the jeepney owner.

RTC ruled in favor of the Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay them damages. BENECO questions the award of
damages and alleges that the death of Jose Bernardo were directly attributable to the fault and negligence of jeepney
owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BENECO was solely liable for negligence in the electrocution and death of Bernardo? YES.

HELD:

Yes. BENECO was grossly negligent.

There was a violation of the Philippine Electrical Code which requires a minimum vertical clearance of 14 feet from the
level of the ground since the wiring crosses a public street. Another violation was that the main line connected to the
service line was not of rigid conduit wiring but totally exposed without any safety protection. It failed to detect, much less
to repair, for an inexcusably long period of 7 years the uninsulated connection which caused the death of Jose Bernardo.
Canave was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that any municipal law or
ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act.

The amount corresponding to the loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors: (a) the number of years on the
basis of which the damages shall be computed; and, (b) the rate at which the losses sustained by the widow and her
children should be fixed.

The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be predetermined.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,
exemplary damages are awarded when the act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross negligence.

Gross negligence is that negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference
to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.
52. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 8110, June 30,
1956.
FACTS
August 23, 1951 6:00 am: In Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron
Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven by its employee Procopio Macunat and on its way to the mine camp at Talantunan,
while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of
Mamador and injury to the others
In a criminal case, Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
but has paid nothing
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner
confirming the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death
Petitioner maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law which states
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by
any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from
his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what he paid:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Provided, That in case the employer recovers from
such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured
employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the
proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or
his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”
Since mamador’s widow was awarded indemnity for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive
Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution in the criminal action, and
that there was an amicable settlement between the said heirs and macunat, the compensation sought from the employer
can no longer be held.
Petitoner also maintains that the deceased was negligent for he violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding
the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer’s “notorious negligence” which, under the law,
precludes recovery.
ISSUE: W/N Mamador having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks was notorious
negligence thereby precluding recovery
RULING
There being no other material point raised in the petition for review, the award of compensation is hereby affirmed, with
costs against Petitioner.
RATIO
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board.
And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it
declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is
believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious” negligence, which we have interpreted to
mean the same thing as “gross” negligence 3 — implying “conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course of
conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter disregard of consequences.” (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting
or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no
danger or risk was apparent.”

Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., G.R. No. 33836, March 16, 1987.
Doctrine: Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted

Facts: Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the intention of
crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold
classes.

She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and
looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear
to cross the same, but when she was almost at the center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving People's
Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car,
thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body, suffering more particularly brain concussion which
subjected her to several physical examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car was damaged to the extent of
P2,451.27.

Petitioner: She is almost completely losing her voice, that she has a terrible headache when her head is pressed, that she
has lost her sense of taste, that she is nervous and temperamental and that she has lapses of memory, however, are
belied by the deposition of Dr. Aramil that the patient's EEG was already normal

CFI: Jose Leyson guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of
the accident in question. On the other hand, defendant Alliance Transport System, Inc. failed to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good father of the family in the selection, supervision and
control of its employees including defendant Leyson. Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and severally liable
for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her car, in addition
to the other consequential damages prayed for.

In favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees

CA: Affirmed with modification - reducing the amount of moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees but granting actual damages of P2,451.27.

Issue/s: WON the CA is justified in modifying or changing the grant of damages by the trial court

Ruling/Held: No, the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to pass
the test of reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.

Analysis/Ratio: While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by
the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly produce the effects
complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some, serious handicaps
or predispose the patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 52-54). Being a doctor by profession, her fears can
be more real and intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral
damages which are proportionate to her suffering.

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The award of moral damages must be proportionate to
the suffering inflicted
A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as
serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer
scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a logical
conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be established, actually took place, not to mention the
fact that such were not supported by the medical findings presented.

The Court of Appeals conforms with aforesaid findings of the trial court but is not prepared to accept that there was gross
negligence on the part of the driver to justify the imposition of exemplary damages.
However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to
life and limb of other people cannot be said to be acting in anything less than gross negligence. The frequent
incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures.

SC: MODIFIED insofar as the award of damages is concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay
the petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of
P15,000.00 as moral damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

June 17, 1997

Petition for review under certiorari of CA decision
Ponente: Davide Jr., J.

FACTS

- A Philtranco bus was being jumpstarted along Magsaysay Blvd., turning into Gomez Street of Calbayog City. The bus
was being driven by Rogasiones Manilhig.
- Ramon A. Acuesta was riding an easyrider bicycle along Gomez Street. When the bus’s engine started from the
jumpstart, Acuesta was directly in front of the bus. The bus hit and ran over Acuesta.
- P/Sgt. Yabao was jogging in the area and witnessed the incident. He also forced Manilhig to stop and proceed directly to
the police station.
- Philtranco offered a defense of “good father of the family” diligence in selecting Manilhig and that Manilhig had a spotless
record. They alleged that Acuesta had suddenly overtaken two tricycles into the bus’ lane and that Manilhig was unable to
avoid hitting Acuesta. Manilhig feared that he would be mobbed and was to report directly to the police, and surrendered
when Yabao introduced himself as a police officer.
- Atty. Jose Buban, Philtranco’s lawyer, was not present on either hearing dates set by the court. The Court found
Philtranco to have waived their right to present evidence due to the absence of their counsel, and ruled in favor of the
heirs of Acuesta.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision. The CA applied Art. 2180 and 2194, saying that
Philtranco cannot use “good father of the family” diligence as a defense, and that Philtranco is solidarily liable with Malihig
for damages.

ISSUES

1. WON Philtranco had waived their right to present evidence (YES; not torts-related)
2. WON the CA correctly applied Art. 2180 and 2194 in ruling that Philtranco is solidarily liable (YES, main torts issue)
3. WON CA correctly assessed death indemnity (NO, should have been only P50k based on jurisprudence; not
torts-related)

RATIO

If a respondent fails to prove good father of the family diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, then
their liability to those who suffered injury or damage shall be solidary with their negligent employee.

- Defense of “good father of the family diligence” must be proved. In this case, due to the failure of counsel of the
respondents to appear during the hearings, their right to present evidence was deemed to have been waived. No
evidence of good father of the family diligence meant that the defense could not be asserted fully.
- Art. 2194 was properly applied, since Art. 2180 itself provides that the liability of an employer over the negligence of their
employees is primary and direct.
- Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it
is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based
on quasi-delict, as provided in Art. 2181.

DISPOSITION: CA decision AFFIRMED, modifications in amounts of damages awarded

Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918)

Facts:
Picart was riding his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union (75 m x 4.8m). However, he was on the wrong side. Before
he had gotten half way across, the Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about 10-12 MPH. As Smith approached the bridge, he blew his horn when he saw Picart. Observing that Picart was not
observing the rules of the road, Smith gave 2 more successive blasts. Perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or
rapidity of the approach, Picart moved his horse closer to the railing instead of going to the correct side of the road (which
is the left side). Picart did this as he thought he had no more time to reach the left side. Smith also guided his car toward
the same side where Picart‘s horse was. At this point, Smith and Picart are in a direct collision course. In so doing, Smith
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.

However, since the pony had not exhibited fright and the fact that Picart made no motion to stop, instead of veering away,
Smith continued to approach directly towards Picart without diminution of speed. As he got closer, the possibility of the
horse moving to the other side also grew slim. As a result, Smith guided his car to the right to avoid hitting the horse.
However, as the car passed, the pony became frightened and turned its body. Consequently, the car struck the left hind
leg of the horse. As the horse fell, the rider was thrown off. The horse died as a result and Picart suffered some
contusions and temporary unconsciousness. It was seen that the space between the horse and the car at the time of the
incident was less than 1.5 meters.

Issue:
Whether or not Smith (driver) is guilty of negligence. YES.

Held:
While Smith had the right to assume that Picart would pass over the proper side of the bridge, when this eventuality had
become an impossibility, it became Smith‘s duty to either bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing there were no other
people on the bridge, take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horseman. Instead, Smith ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse. He did not take into consideration the fact that there was an appreciable risk with
regard to the fact that the pony might get excited and/or frightened.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, he is
guilty of negligence.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are
not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when
there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is
said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

In the present case, having recognized that the course he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would,
therefore, have foreseen harm to Picart as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under said circumstances, the
imposed on Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

While Picart was also not free from fault for being on the wrong side of the road, the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the Smith succeeded the negligence of the Picart by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.

DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. vs. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC.G.R. No.
161803February 4, 2008Reyes, R. T., J.:

FACTS:
Romeo Catamora(Catamora), was driving a Nissan van ownedby petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc.(Teban Trading) along the National Highway in Butuan City, going to Surigao
City. A Joana Paula(Paula) passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the
van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent LibertyForest, Inc.The night before, the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire
blowout.
The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga (Limbaga), parked the prime mover askew
occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He
parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the
cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway.

The prime mover was not equipped with early warning device required under Letter of
Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front
and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that
Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.To avoid
hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to
the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring
headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover.

The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor
injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of the incident. Petitioner
filed a complaint for damages against private respondents. The trial court ruled that the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the
prime mover on the national highway without an early warning device on the vehicle.The CA
reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.
ISSUE:
Whether the negligence of Limbaga was the proximate cause of the collision.

Ruling:
YES, Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would nothave occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that
cause acting first and producing the injury,either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under

such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom
Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the
damage or injury.That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury mustbe a natural and probable result of the act or omission
Here, the Court agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural
and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. The skewed
parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to
prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the primemover triggered the series of
events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passengerbus and the Nissan
van
60. Añonuevo v. CA, G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004.
Doctrine: There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as
1912, in U.S. v. Juanillo, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater than that of
ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads, putting to
great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads.

Facts: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,traversing the opposite lane was driving
a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of
making a leftturn towards Libertad Street when the collision
occurred.

Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC.

He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter
was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.

Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets.
He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent
if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

Issue/s:
1. WON Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non- motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively
negligent.
2. WON Añonuevo was negligent.
3. WON Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence

Ruling/Held:
1. No, There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles.
2. Yes, he was speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good
distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have
had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident
3. No, it is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been
equipped with safety equipment.

Analysis/Ratio:
1. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of greater speeds and
acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting
greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to
the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to
the use of fuel. There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. As far
back as 1912, in U.S. v. Juanillo, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater
than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country
roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such
lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make
the left turn.
2. In the same case, the Court emphasized: A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use
a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction,
and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can
and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to
accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let
the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is
 adopted and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An
automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have
exercised under the circumstances.
3. American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the
cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists. While he
duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons
growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully discharge
the duty than from the latter.
4. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence

G.R. No. 172200 : July 6, 2010

THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO and ELPIDIO ABIAD, Petitioner

vs. SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: At around 1:45 in the afternoon of August 27, 1997, a Toyota Corolla Taxi with a Plate No. of PYD-128, being
driven by Redentor Completo, owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad and a bicycle rode by the herein
respondent, Amando Albayda Jr., figured in a mishap along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, Villamor Air Base
leaving a deep indentation on the rear right of the taxicab and causing serious physical injuries on the part of the
respondent. Albayda was brought to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was
immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City,
because there was a fracture on his left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH. From August 21,
1997 until February 11, 1998, he was confined therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23, 1998 until
March 22, 1998.

The respondent filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On the other hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through
reckless imprudence against Albayda which was later dismissed. The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 45, where Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against
petitioners Completo and Abiad. After Submission of the parties’ respective pleadings, a pre-trial conference was held. On
December 8, 1998, RTC issued a pre-trial order. Whereby both parties alleged their defenses.

On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the judgment if which favoured the herein plaintiff [Albayda] and
against the defendants [Completo and Abiad].

ISSUES: (1) WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision.

(2) WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family.

(3) WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees to Albayda had no basis.

RULING:

1. No. As stated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of
the motorist’s negligence is a question of fact. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed
to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because due to overspeeding. Such negligence was the
sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
2. Yes. Under article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees, but the employer’s responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
3. No. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in qausi-delicts causing physical injuries. The permanent
deformity and the scar left by the wounds suffered by Albayda will forever be a reminder of the pain and suffering
that he had endured and continues to endure because of petitioner’s negligence.

Pacis vs. Morales

Facts:

Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year college student, died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he
sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store.

The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Morales.

With Alfred Pacis (father of Dennis) at the time of the shooting were Matibag and Herbolario. They were sales agents
of the defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.

The bullet which killed Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.

The gun was left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.

Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun store
was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store
while he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in
the gun store which included the key to the drawer where the fatal gun was kept.

It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table.
Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Dennis Pacis to return
the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Dennis in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag, however, he was acquitted because of the exempting
circumstance of "accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced
and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.

TC - The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. Ordered defendant (Morales) to pay damages.

The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code

Also, it held that respondent failed to observe the required diligence when he left the key to the drawer containing the
loaded defective gun without instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.

CA - The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employer-employee
relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not under the control of
respondent with respect to the means and methods in the performance of his work. There can be no
employer-employee relationship where the element of control is absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not
apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.

Furthermore, it held that respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can be attributed to him.

Issue:

WON respondent Morales, as a gun store owner, exercised the required diligence. Thus, he cannont be held liable for
the death of Dennis Pacis.

Held:

No. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners
opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer.
Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the
"Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License
to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person
in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to
prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the
duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use.With more reason, guns accepted by
the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should
have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it
was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another
person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.
For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in
this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
 Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him
from liability in this case.

Petition GRANTED.

0. Taylor v. The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, G.R. No. 4977, March 22, 1910

FACTS:

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and
an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end
of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila .The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.

On September 1905, the plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel,about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting an employee of the defendant, impelled by curiosity, the boys, spent some time
wandering about the company's premises where they later found and took home several brass fulminating caps scattered
on the ground, which are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite.

Soonafter, the boys went home along with Jessie Adriano, who was only 9 years old at that time and they made a series
of experiments with the caps, which led to an explosion causing more or less serious injuries to all three. The evidence
does not definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they
had been there when the boys found them. Furthermore, no measures seem to have been adopted by the defendant
company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended,
when they felt disposed so to do.

ISSUES:
Whether respondent corporation is liable for the injuries sustained by the victims

RULING
NO

While we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have relieved Manila
Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to his
negligence,

The negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received. Cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred

It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries

The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt
to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he
knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous.

64. Ylarde v. Aquino, G.R. No. 33722, July 29, 1988.

Facts:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
therein. The school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II.
Aquino decided to help clear the area. So after the classes, he gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10-11, and ordered
them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. The following day he called
4 of the 18 students, including Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left the children to level the loose
soil while he went to see another teacher for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. Before leaving,
he told the children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, 3 of the children playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining one jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall which led to his death 3 days after. The parents of Ylarde filed a suit
for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
Issues:
Can Aquino and Soriano be held liable for damages?
Held:
Soriano (principal) not liable, Aquino (teacher in charge) liable. The subject school in this case was an academic
school not a school for arts and trade.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students while in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who
can be held liable. It was held in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the
word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable
for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly
admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take
the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.

Private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of
adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had
finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so
apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on
the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play
around. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino.
Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent
Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

66. U.S. v. Pineda, G.R. No. 12858, January 22, 1918.

Doctrine: The Court has pointed out that the profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill.69 Thus,
pharmacists are expected to be experts in dispensing the correct medicine. In fact, jurisprudence places a high standard
of diligence for pharmacists. In one case, the Court said that the responsibility of the druggist to use care has been
qualified "care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men."

Facts:
● Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and
which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago
Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist)
● Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of 6 papers
marked Botica Pineda
● Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the
packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses.
● Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given
the preparation, died shortly afterwards.
● Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and
Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate.
● At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium
chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison;
potassium chlorate is not.)
● Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning

Issue/s: WON Pineda should be liable for negligence

Ruling/Held: Yes, every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he
may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer
any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate
any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale.

Analysis/Ratio: The Court has pointed out that the profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill.69 Thus,
pharmacists are expected to be experts in dispensing the correct medicine. In fact, jurisprudence places a high standard
of diligence for pharmacists. In one case, the Court said that the responsibility of the druggist to use care has been
qualified "care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men."

As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided
that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent"
which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?

If we were to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable
degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it
was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the
intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the
purchased thereby suffered injury.

Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of
negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead of
caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.
CRUZ VS CA (GR NO. 122445 NOVEMBER 18, 1997)
Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual
Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at
around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
“Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept
in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to
Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant for a rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not
proceed with the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed through after the
petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner,
Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by another
instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested
to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an
oxygen tank, gasping for breathe. Apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an
oxygen. Later, without the knowledge of Lydia’s relatives, she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to San Pablo
District Hospital where she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia Umali. YES.
Held: Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science.
In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a
doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He
therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use
to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s
conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries
involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that
expert testimony is usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.
In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought
must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural reference of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
have occurred.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;

2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood
vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a
cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a clotting defect known as DIC.
This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by
an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was
caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the
family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.

0. Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008.

FACTS:
On July 28, 1994, respondent 3 months pregnant Editha Ramolete was brought to Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San
Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding upon advise of petitioner related via telephone, Editha was admitted to the
LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. The
following day, Editha repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement
was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised her to undergo a D&C
procedure. She was discharged the following day. On September 16, 1994, Editha was once gain brought at the LMC, as
she was suffering from vomiting ans severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Drs. Dela Cruz, Mayo and Komiya.
Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latter’s womb, after Editha went laparectomy, she
was found to have massive intra abdominal hemorrhage and ruptured uterus. Thus, she had to go hysterectomy and as a
result no more chance to bear a child.

ISSUES :
Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical malpractice.

RULING:
NO.

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his
practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that
the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have
done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

From the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is evident that the D&C procedure was not the
proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus. Further in the testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was
conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the
petitioner dealt with Editha

It is also undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioners advise. Editha
omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for
a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could
have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Editha’s health condition and applied the
corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been
conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause of
her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part.
70. Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No.178763, April 21, 2009.
FACTS
Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted respondent, Dr. Tuaño, on a complaint of soreness and redness on his right
eye. The respondent, after a series of examinations, found that the former was suffering from conjunctivitis or “sore eyes”
and prescribed the use of the Spersacet-C. However, after the petitioner’s condition seemed to have worsened, he
sought for the respondent’s second finding wherein the latter said that his condition had progressed to Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent then prescribed the use of Maxitrol, a steroid-based eye drop. The
petitioner’s condition worsened overtime, yet he obediently complied with all the prescriptions and orders of the
respondent.
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from significant swelling of his right eyeball, headaches, nausea and
blindness on this right eye, he sought for the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found that the petitioner
had been suffering from glaucoma and needed to undergo laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness.
After reading the literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners herein and Peter Lucas’
wife, read that one of the adverse effects of prolonged use of steroid-based eye drops could possibly be glaucoma. Peter,
Fatima, and their two children instituted a civil case for damages against herein respondent for medical malpractice.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr. Tuaño failed to exercise diligence in the performance of his duty as
petitioner Peter Lucas’ physician.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 27
September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.
RATIO
No. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the circumstances, the Court has no
yardstick upon which to evaluate the attendant facts of the case at hand to be able to state with confidence that the acts
complained of, indeed, constituted negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between
the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2)
breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must
co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
As the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as that of any other reasonably competent physician
would use in the treatment of his patient, said standard level of care, skill and diligence must likewise be proven by expert
medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge
of experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of the average layperson.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician
when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of
duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient. Rather, the negligence of the physician must be the proximate
cause of the injury.

72. Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, September 5, 1997.

Doctrine: In malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony
and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff; have been applied in actions against anesthesiologists
to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anesthesia. Essentially, it
requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the
particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in
his treatment.

Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital
for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while
Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications
of "unknown cause.

"Petitioner requested the NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's
death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anesthesia. The NBI recommended that Dr.
Antonio and Dr. Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor

Issue/s: WON there is medical negligence.

Ruling/Held: Yes, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on the
part of the attending physicians in administering the anesthesia

The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Analysis/Ratio:
In malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony and the
availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff; have been applied in actions against anesthesiologists to hold
the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anesthesia. Essentially, it requires
two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind
of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.

Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether the doctor's actions
in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause of the patient's injury. Indeed here, a
causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim's death after the negligent act of the anesthesiologist in
administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be
sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not
conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim
could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia.