2020 Georgia Code

Title 51 - Torts

Chapter 2 - Imputable Negligence

§ 51-2-7. Liability of Owner or Keeper of Vicious or Dangerous Animal for Injuries Caused by Animal

Universal Citation: GA Code § 51-2-7 (2020)

A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless
management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not
provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious
propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an
ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the
occurrence not at heel or on a leash. The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated fowl
including roosters with spurs. The foregoing sentence shall not apply to domesticated livestock.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2907; Code 1868, § 2913; Code 1873, § 2964; Code 1882, § 2964; Civil Code 1895, §
3821; Civil Code 1910, § 4417; Code 1933, § 105-110; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1033, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Vicious dogs, T. 4, C. 8, Art. 3.

Care and confinement of wild animals, T. 27, C. 5.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey article on tort law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (2000). For survey article on law of
torts, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2007). For annual survey on law of torts, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 335
(2009). For annual survey of tort law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 279 (2016). For note, "Is There (and Should
There Be) Any 'Bite' Left in Georgia's 'First Bite' Rule?," see 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1343 (2000).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Knowledge
Violation of Ordinances

Domesticated Livestock

Procedure

General Consideration

This section is but a restatement of common law. Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 585
(1974).

The 1985 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7,, substituting "may" for "shall" in the first sentence, brought
the amount of statutory liability more in line with the liability imposed by the common law since the
amendment did not purport to change the "first bite" rule, but rather supported the limited protection
of the rule for pet owners by removing an inflexible strict liability standard. Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga.
App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Steagald v. Eason, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 169
(Ga. 2017).

Due process not violated.

- Second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 regarding liability of an owner for a vicious or dangerous animal
did not violate procedural due process because the owner could still produce evidence that the owner
did not have knowledge of the animal's vicious nature or that the owner did not know that the animal
was unrestrained at the time of the injury, and the plaintiff still had to prove the other elements of a
claim under that statute, which satisfied the due process right of an opportunity to be heard; and the
defendants had constructive notice of the presumption regarding an animal's viciousness as the second
sentence of that Code section was enacted in 1985. S&S Towing & Recovery v. Charnota, Ga. , 844 S.E.2d
730 (2020).

To the extent that the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 regarding liability of an owner for a vicious
or dangerous animal could be considered a rebuttable presumption, procedural due process was not
violated as a rational basis existed to allow local jurisdictions to determine based on the local conditions
whether certain animals needed to be restrained and for the General Assembly to modify the common
law and define a vicious animal as one that was not restrained according to the will of the local
governmental body. S&S Towing & Recovery v. Charnota, Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 730 (2020).

Reasonable measures required in control of animals.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 merely recognizes a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management and restraint
of a vicious or dangerous animal for the protection of the public; ordinary care to restrain an animal
requires the taking of reasonable measures to keep the animal restrained, and that, in turn, necessarily
requires personal deliberation and judgment. What should be done always will depend to some extent
on the circumstances and, for purposes of official immunity, that means that the duty cannot - when
applied to a public officer - be characterized properly as a ministerial one; thus, the public officer is
entitled to official immunity. Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015), overruled on other
grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 248 (Ga. 2016).

Section is not an exclusive basis for recovery when injury is caused by domestic animal. Callaway v.
Miller, 118 Ga. App. 309, 163 S.E.2d 336 (1968).

Cause of action for attack by animal.

- The owner of a vicious or dangerous animal, who allows the animal to go at liberty, is liable to one who
sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event that the
owner knows of the animal's vicious or dangerous character. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162
S.E.2d 818 (1968); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

Under this section, which is but a restatement of the common law, to support an action for damages for
injuries sustained by being bitten by a dog, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious, and that the
owner had knowledge of this fact. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944); McCree v.
Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973).

An owner of a domestic animal who allows it to go at liberty is liable under this section to one who
sustains injury as a result of the vicious or dangerous tendency of the animal only in the event the owner
knows of vicious or dangerous character. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

In order for a party to recover, it must appear that the animal had a propensity to do the act which
caused the injury and that the defendant knew of it. McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491
(1973); Pearce v. Shanks, 153 Ga. App. 693, 266 S.E.2d 353 (1980).

Cat and dog bite cases treated same.

- There is no authority for the assertion that cat bite cases should be treated differently than dog bite
cases. Fellers v. Carson, 182 Ga. App. 658, 356 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 182 Ga. App. 910, 356 S.E.2d 658
(1987).

No application to out-of-possession landlord.

- In an action by a woman seriously injured in a pit bull attack, the landlord of the dogs' owners was
entitled to summary judgment despite the landowner's failure to fix a broken gate latch, O.C.G.A. § 44-
7-14, because there was no evidence that the landlord was aware of the dogs' vicious propensities. The
Court of Appeals erred in applying O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 to the landlord and to presume such awareness
because the statute applied only to owners and keepers of dangerous animals. Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso,
305 Ga. 480, 826 S.E.2d 100 (2019).

Assumption of risk properly determined on summary judgment.

- In a suit involving two dogs fighting, the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on the defendant's counterclaims because the defendant assumed the risk of harm as a
matter of law by intervening in the dog fight with the defendant's bare hands. Saulsbury v. Wilson, 348
Ga. App. 557, 823 S.E.2d 867 (2019).

Although issues of negligence, lack of care in avoiding negligence of others, lack of care for one's own
safety, and assumption of the risk are ordinarily not susceptible to summary adjudication, either for or
against the complainant, when the evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably
draw but one conclusion the issue of assumption of risk may be determined on summary judgment.
Saulsbury v. Wilson, 348 Ga. App. 557, 823 S.E.2d 867 (2019).

Official immunity following bite by police dog.

- When a police dog attacked the plaintiff's son, the officer's motion for summary judgment on the
ground of official immunity was improperly denied because the officer, who was a dog handler for the
police department, did not act with malice or an intent to injure anyone when the officer failed to
secure the police dog outside the officer's home; and the duties that the officer was alleged to have
violated were not ministerial ones, for which the officer would not have been entitled to immunity,
because, although the duties reflected in O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 and a county ordinance might be definite,
they required an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what was reasonable regarding
the restraint of the police dog. Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015), overruled on other
grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 248 (Ga. 2016).

Cited in Phillips v. Cleveland, 31 Ga. App. 206, 120 S.E. 639 (1923); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797,
30 S.E.2d 398 (1944); Rutherford v. Underwood, 84 Ga. App. 624, 66 S.E.2d 768 (1951); Thomas v.
Richardson, 129 Ga. App. 834, 201 S.E.2d 653 (1973); Gordon v. Dawson, 146 Ga. App. 784, 247 S.E.2d
596 (1978); Rines v. Harris, 18 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Culver, 172 Ga. App. 183, 322
S.E.2d 294 (1984); McBride v. Wasik, 179 Ga. App. 244, 345 S.E.2d 921 (1986); Goodman v. Kahn, 182
Ga. App. 724, 356 S.E.2d 757 (1987); Gilbert v. Hudspeth, 182 Ga. App. 898, 357 S.E.2d 601 (1987);
Pickard v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 595, 478 S.E.2d 432 (1996); Bakhtiarnejad v. Cox Enters., 247 Ga. App. 205,
541 S.E.2d 33 (2000).

Knowledge
Owner's knowledge of dog's vicious propensity not immaterial when dog running at large.

- Supreme Court disapproved any court of appeals cases to the extent they held that the owner's
knowledge of the animal's vicious propensity was immaterial when the animal was running at large in
violation of a local ordinance, including Cowan v. Carillo, 331 Ga. App. 387 (2015); Stennette v. Miller,
316 Ga. App. 425 (2012); Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761 (2009); Johnston v. Warendh, 252 Ga. App. 674
(2001); and Oertel v. Chi Psi Fraternity, 239 Ga. App. 147 (1999). S&S Towing & Recovery v. Charnota,
Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 730 (2020).

Dog's dangerous character and owner's knowledge thereof.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, the dog's dangerous character is at issue totally apart from the issue of the
owner's knowledge of the dog's dangerous character; therefore, while the expert's report concluding
that the dog was dangerous or potentially dangerous could not be relevant to the issue of knowledge
because it was issued after the attack on the plaintiff, the fact that the dog was declared dangerous or
potentially dangerous three weeks after the attack were relevant to whether the dog had dangerous
propensities at the time of the attack. Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 432 S.E.2d 658 (1993).

Lack of knowledge of vicious and dangerous character.

- If owner does not know of vicious and dangerous character of the owner's animal, the owner will not
be liable for injury which is not usual and natural consequence to be anticipated from allowing an
ordinary animal of that kind to go at large. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968).

In a wrongful death action based on the death of an infant caused by a dog, the dog owner was entitled
to summary judgment on the parent's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 because there was no evidence
that the animal had ever attacked or bitten a human; the owner's rule that the dog stay outside unless
accompanied by a person was a result of the dog's destruction of property, not due to any threat the
dog posed to animals or humans. Harper v. Robinson, 263 Ga. App. 727, 589 S.E.2d 295 (2003).

In a personal injury suit brought by a visitor seeking damages for injuries incurred after being kicked by a
horse, the owner of the real property was properly granted summary judgment since there was no
evidence whatsoever that the owner was aware of any vicious propensity on the part of the horse; the
owner filed an affidavit, stating that the owner boarded the horses for many years and never observed
the horse who injured the visitor exhibit the propensity to run directly at any person or exhibit any
violent, vicious, or dangerous behavior. Burns v. Leap, 285 Ga. App. 307, 645 S.E.2d 751 (2007).
Dog-bite victim sued the dog's owners, alleging the owners failed to warn the victim of the dog's vicious
tendencies. As there was no evidence the dog had ever previously bitten or attacked anyone, and an
owner's alleged statement that children would not "have to worry about getting bit" if the children
stayed away from the owner's truck, where the dog was chained in the truck bed, was insufficient to
establish the owners' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity; thus, the owners were properly
granted a directed verdict on this claim. Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (2009).

Unforeseen and unforeseeable acts of dog.

- Owner of dog may not be found liable for unforeseen and unforeseeable act of dog simply because dog
was not under owner's direct control at the time the act took place. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App.
555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

Proof of scienter required.

- Under this section, it is still necessary, as at common law, to show not only that the animal is vicious or
dangerous, but also that the owner or keeper knows of this fact. Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384, 49
S.E. 281 (1904).

Scienter is a necessary and a material fact which must be shown before there can be any finding of
liability under this section. Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 167 S.E.2d 697 (1969); McCree v. Burks,
129 Ga. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 491 (1973); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

When a plaintiff showed that a local ordinance required an animal to be restrained and the animal was
not restrained at the time of the incident, a plaintiff seeking to recover had to prove scienter and could
do so in two ways: by showing that the owner had knowledge of the animal's vicious propensity as
defined by the common law or by showing that the owner knew that the animal was unrestrained at the
time of the injury; and a plaintiff had to also show that the owner carelessly managed or allowed the
animal to go at liberty; the animal caused the injury; and the injured party did not provoke the injury by
plaintiff's own act. S&S Towing & Recovery v. Charnota, Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 730 (2020).

Proof of scienter is essential to a suit under this section. Johnson v. Hurt, 120 Ga. App. 761, 172 S.E.2d
201 (1969).

Proof that the owner of a dog either knew or should have known of the dog's propensity to do the
particular act which caused injury to the complaining party is indispensable to recovery against the
owner. Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980); Stanger v. Cato, 182 Ga. App. 498,
356 S.E.2d 97 (1987).
The size of a dog, its breed, and the fact that its owner keeps it restrained, does not establish any
inference that the owner knows the dog to be dangerous. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830, 363 S.E.2d
48 (1987).

Scienter requirement is not satisfied by dog owner's use of a restraining chain, or posting of "beware of
dog" sign. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Chain restraint may not be sufficient.

- The simple fact that a dog is restrained on a chain may not be sufficient to establish the owner is free
from liability for "careless management" under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7. Freeman v. Farr, 184 Ga. App. 830,
363 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

Owner is not responsible for acts of dog if there is lack of scienter. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251
S.E.2d 88 (1978).

In a typical dog bite case, regardless of whether the cause of action is based on the premises liability
statute of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, or the dangerous animal liability statute of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, a plaintiff
must produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to show that the owner of the
premises had superior knowledge of the danger. Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 667 S.E.2d 135
(2008).

When there is a lack of scienter, even the breach of a leash law is not sufficient to hold the owner
responsible for the acts of the dog. Turner v. Irvin, 146 Ga. App. 218, 246 S.E.2d 127 (1978); Fitzpatrick v.
Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555, 269 S.E.2d 60 (1980).

Dog owners entitled to summary judgment when no propensity to bite.

- In a parent's personal injury action seeking to hold the dog owners liable for injury to the parent's son,
the dog owners were entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that the dog ever
displayed vicious behavior or evinced a propensity to bite anyone prior to biting the child as required for
such an action. Swanson v. Tackling, 335 Ga. App. 810, 783 S.E.2d 167 (2016).

Knowledge of propensity to particular harm required.

- It is not enough for liability under this section that the possessor of the animal know of a propensity to
do harm in one or more specific ways; it is necessary that the possessor have reason to know of its
propensity to do harm of the type which it inflicts, Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275
(1972); Penick v. Grimsley, 130 Ga. App. 722, 204 S.E.2d 510 (1974); Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254,
251 S.E.2d 88 (1978); Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597, 466 S.E.2d 37 (1995); Clark v. Joiner, 242 Ga.
App. 421, 530 S.E.2d 45 (2000).

Knowledge may be actual or constructive.

- To support a recovery a plaintiff must show either actual or constructive knowledge by the defendant
of the animal's danger to others. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Starling v.
Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214 (1970).

Knowledge presumed in certain dangerous animals cases.

- While this section does not set out how knowledge of the vicious nature of the animal may be
acquired, under the common law this knowledge is presumed to exist when the animal involved belongs
to a certain class of animals ferae naturae, such as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, baboons, apes, and
monkeys. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).

When a person is injured by an attack of an animal ferae naturae, the negligence of the owner or keeper
thereof is presumed because of the dangerous and ferocious propensities of a wild beast, such as a lion,
tiger, leopard, bear, ape, baboon, and such wild beasts, and the law recognizes that safety lies only in
keeping such animals perfectly secure. Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).

Knowledge of instinct to bite of dogs.

- A propensity on the part of a dog to bite people is not one of the instincts common to the species of
which every owner must be presumed to have notice. Starling v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 428, 174 S.E.2d 214
(1970).

What constitutes knowledge of animal's dangerous nature.

- In order to constitute notice to an owner or keeper of an animal's vicious or dangerous nature, there
should be an incident or incidents which would put a prudent man on notice to anticipate the event
which occurred. A single incident may not adequately place a person on notice. The test should be
whether the one incident was of such nature as to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that
the animal was sufficiently dangerous as to be likely to cause an injury at a later time. Sutton v. Sutton,
145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).
If a dog has "friendly" intentions but has habits which because of its size or other characteristics make
the dog dangerous, then it seems that such behavior should be controlled. However, it is necessary that
the owner, as previously pointed out, have knowledge of the pattern of the animal's dangerous behavior
before the owner can be held for failure to control the animal. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162
S.E.2d 818 (1968).

Sufficient evidence of dog's vicious propensity.

- By presenting evidence that the defendant's animal was required to be on a leash by an ordinance of
the applicable governmental body and that the animal was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence,
the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove the vicious propensity of the defendant's dog under
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 section. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in the defendant's favor
based upon uncontroverted evidence that the defendant had no knowledge of the dog's vicious
propensity. Fields v. Thompson, 190 Ga. App. 177, 378 S.E.2d 390 (1989).

Defendant pet-owner's statement to another, about three months before the defendant's dog bit the
plaintiff, asking that person "to do whatever was necessary . . . to keep the dogs from attacking. . ."
raises genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant's prior knowledge of the dogs' tendency to
attack humans. Supan v. Griffin, 238 Ga. App. 404, 519 S.E.2d 22 (1999).

Insufficient knowledge of dog's vicious propensities.

- When the worker who was knocked down, allegedly by the dog owners' dog, was unable to show that
the dog had any dangerous propensities or that the dog owner knew about such propensities, the
worker could not recover either under the dangerous animal liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, or the
premises liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; however, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the dog owners as a genuine issue of material fact still existed regarding whether the one
dog owner voluntarily undertook a duty to restrain the dogs on the owner's premises and, if so, whether
that voluntary undertaking was negligently performed. Osowski v. Smith, 262 Ga. App. 538, 586 S.E.2d
71 (2003).

Trial court did not err in granting a dog owner summary judgment in a nurse's action under the
dangerous animal liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, to recover for injuries the nurse sustained when
the dog bit the nurse while the nurse was at the owner's home because there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the dog was required to be at heel or on a leash or that the owner had knowledge that
the dog had the propensity to bite a human; section 10-11(a)(1) of the Cobb County, Ga., animal control
ordinance did not require the dog to be at heel or on a leash at the time of the incident. Stennette v.
Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 729 S.E.2d 559 (2012).
Knowledge or notice that dog will behave ferociously toward other animals is not necessarily notice that
it will attack human beings. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972); Banks v. Adair, 148
Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Knowledge of attacks on other animals, combined with the confinement by the defendant of the
defendant's dog, is not sufficient to show the defendant's knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies and
therefore to create liability. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

Dog's menacing behavior alone is sufficient to apprise owner of animal's vicious propensities. Banks v.
Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

Menacing behavior does not establish vicious propensity.

- A dog's barking and growling amount, at most, to menacing behavior, and menacing behavior does not
establish vicious propensity under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7.. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d
877 (1998).

Knowledge of frolicsome affection directed solely to owners.

- An owner's knowledge of a dog's frolicsome affection which is directed solely towards the owners is
not such knowledge of a pattern of dangerous behavior as to put a reasonably prudent person on notice
that the animal may cause injury by displaying such behavior towards another at a later date. Marshall v.
Person, 176 Ga. App. 542, 336 S.E.2d 380 (1985).

Fact that dog owner invited or allowed neighbor to pet the owner's dog did not make the owner liable
for the neighbor's subsequent dog bite injuries, since the owner had no prior knowledge, either actual
or constructive, that the dog would bite the neighbor. Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E.2d
877 (1998).

Adequacy of owner's management and control.

- A new trial was authorized when material fact issues existed as to the adequacy of an owner's
management and control of the owner's dog. Evans-Watson v. Reese, 188 Ga. App. 292, 372 S.E.2d 675
(1988).

Even if the defendant's dog were vicious or dangerous, genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the defendant was careless in the defendant's management of the dog and whether the
plaintiff exercised reasonable care for the plaintiff's own safety since the dog was chained in an area
accessible only by stepping over a 28" high guardrail and which was not an area where people would
normally pass. Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 191 Ga. App. 442, 382 S.E.2d 180 (1989).

After the plaintiff was bitten by a dog, summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the
plaintiff as an issue of fact existed as to whether the dog was carelessly managed by the dog's owner at
the time of the incident because the evidence that the dog was on a two-foot leash showed that the
owner was in full compliance with the county ordinance's leash requirement; and, given that the owner
was six feet tall and weighed 165 pounds, that the owner testified that the owner was physically capable
of restraining the dog, and that there was no evidence that the dog had a history or propensity for
vicious behavior, it was for a jury to decide whether the owner carelessly managed the dog at the time
the dog bit the plaintiff. Myers v. Ogden, 343 Ga. App. 771, 807 S.E.2d 926 (2017), cert. denied, No.
S18C0515, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2018).

Guard dogs.

- The scienter requirement applies in the case of a dog specifically purchased and used for guarding
commercial property. Wade v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000).

Victim's knowledge of dog's aggressive tendencies.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to dog owners in dog bite case in light of the evidence
of the victim's equal or superior knowledge of the dog's aggressive tendencies and assumption of the
risk in petting the dog. Durham v. Mason, 256 Ga. App. 467, 568 S.E.2d 530 (2002).

Trial court did not err in granting a dog owner summary judgment in a roommate's action under the
vicious animal statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, and the premises liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, to recover
damages for injuries the roommate sustained when the owner's dog attacked the roommate inside the
owner's townhouse because the roommate had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity equal to that
of the owner's; the roommate's own testimony was that the roommate was aware of the dog's previous
unprovoked attack and was nervous when around the dog, presumably because the roommate was
afraid that the dog could attack again. Stolte v. Hammack, 311 Ga. App. 710, 716 S.E.2d 796 (2011).

Violation of Ordinances

Violation of municipal ordinance not necessarily scienter.

- The fact that a mad dog is at large in violation of the municipal ordinance imposing a penalty upon its
owner does not alter the rule that scienter must be shown. Langford v. Eskedor, 30 Ga. App. 799, 119
S.E. 431 (1923).

Violation of local ordinance.

- By presenting evidence that the defendant's dog was required by ordinance to be on a leash and that
the dog was not on a leash at the time of the occurrence, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to
prove the vicious propensity of the dog under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7. Oertel v. Chi Psi Fraternity, 239 Ga.
App. 147, 521 S.E.2d 71 (1999).

Violation of leash law was irrelevant under former provisions.

- In the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling
incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to
the victim even though the dog's presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation
of the county leash law. Brown v. Pierce, 176 Ga. App. 787, 338 S.E.2d 39 (1985).

Dog not confined as required by ordinance.

- Defendants' dog was not "confined within the property limits of his owner or custodian," as required
by a county ordinance, since, although the animal may have been physically within the boundaries of
the defendants' property at the time the dog bit the plaintiffs' son, it had broken loose from its chain.
Tutak v. Fairley, 198 Ga. App. 307, 401 S.E.2d 73 (1991).

When a dog's owner allowed the dog to run free inside the owner's house, including having access to
doors leading outside the house, a genuine fact issue was present as to whether the dog was allowed to
roam free in violation of a local ordinance. Johnston v. Warendh, 252 Ga. App. 674, 556 S.E.2d 867
(2001).

No evidence that ordinance was violated.

- Dog-bite victim sued the dog's owners, asserting a claim of negligence per se. As the dog had not been
running at large, and the applicable ordinance did not protect people such as the victim who
approached a dog that was restrained in the bed of a truck, the victim's motion for a directed verdict on
this claim was properly denied. Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (2009).

Trial court erred in denying an animal care clinic's motion for summary judgment in a guest's action to
recover damages for injuries the guest sustained when a dog bit the guest because the guest could not
establish a vicious propensity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 through a violation of the county animal
ordinances; the dog was not running at large in violation of Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance Sec. 10-
29(a) at the time of the guest's injury. Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193, 728 S.E.2d
822 (2012).

Domesticated Livestock

Bulls, stallions, and rams.

- The law does not regard bulls, stallions, and rams as being abnormally dangerous animals, but rather as
animals routinely kept for stud purposes, so that the particular danger involved in their dangerous
tendencies has become a normal incident of civilized life. Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499, 433 S.E.2d 667
(1993).

Roosters.

- Sitter failed to present any evidence supporting the sitter's claim that the pet owners violated O.C.G.A.
§ 51-2-7 as there was no evidence that the owners engaged in careless management of the rooster by
asking a professional pet sitter to take care of the rooster, which was kept in a coop, and warning the
sitter that the rooster "will attack!" and that a garbage can lid could be useful in dealing with the
rooster. Gilreath v. Smith, 340 Ga. App. 265, 797 S.E.2d 177 (2017).

Injuries by runaway horse.

- The owner of a runaway horse is generally liable for injuries caused by the horse. Phillips v. Dewald, 79
Ga. 732, 7 S.E. 151, 11 Am. St. R. 458 (1887).

Knowledge that horse has thrown rider does not show propensity to kick. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App.
557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

Procedure

Sufficiency of pleadings.
- It is not sufficient to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that the defendant's dog
was vicious, but facts showing knowledge, either actual or constructive, must be alleged. Hays v.
Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

When the plaintiff did not allege that the dog had ever made an attack on anyone prior to the time the
dog injured the plaintiff, or had ever given the defendant cause to suspect that the dog might be vicious,
except that the dog belonged to the breed of dogs known as German police dogs, and did not allege that
the defendant was the owner of the dog, or that the defendant ever had the dog under the defendant's
personal supervision or control, the petition did not set out a cause of action for damages sustained by
the plaintiff when bitten by the dog. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

Petition alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was bitten by
the dog on entering the premises, and that the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff with a safe place
to work, in that keeping the dog endangered the plaintiff's life and safety while the plaintiff was in the
performance of duties incident to the plaintiff's employment. When no facts were alleged to show that
the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to
work in the house with the dog present, the petition failed to set out a cause of action because of failure
to allege facts showing the defendant knew, or should have known of the danger. Hays v. Anchors, 71
Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

When in an action for damages it is alleged that the plaintiff was bitten and injured by a dog kept by the
defendant, that the dog was vicious and accustomed to bite which was known to the defendant, the
allegations are sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga.
App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

When a petition alleges that the defendant wrongfully and injuriously did keep a certain dog which the
defendant knew was used and accustomed to attack and bite, and that the defendant negligently and
carelessly managed the dog in that the defendant permitted the dog to go at liberty knowing the
character of the dog and that the dog was vicious and that the defendant knew that the dog was vicious,
the ferocious character of the dog and knowledge of the owner were sufficiently alleged as against a
demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Greene v. Orr, 75 Ga. App. 673, 44 S.E.2d 273 (1947).

Knowledge can defeat summary judgment.

- Affidavit by the parent of a dog-bite victim that the dog's owner told the parent that "she knew
something like this would happen" was admissible, and was evidence sufficient to preclude summary
judgment for the defendants. Johnson v. Kvasny, 230 Ga. App. 162, 495 S.E.2d 651 (1998).
Summary judgment in favor of homeowner proper because dog belonged to homeowner's visiting child.

- Homeowner was not the owner or keeper of a dog who attacked a home health care provider in the
homeowner's driveway; the provider admitted in the complaint and in a deposition that the dog was
owned by the homeowner's child, who was visiting from another city. Therefore, the homeowner was
not liable to the provider for the dog's attack under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7. Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App.
699, 722 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

Summary judgment on issue of negligence was improper.

- Trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to an injured pedestrian as to negligence
because, even if the dog owners violated the local ordinance, there was still a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the owners were careless in the management of the owners' dog under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, so it
could not be said that the owners were negligent as a matter of law. Askew v. Rogers, 326 Ga. App. 24,
755 S.E.2d 836 (2014).

After the plaintiffs' children were bitten by the defendants' dog, the trial court erred by removing the
question of whether the defendants carelessly managed their dog from the jury's consideration as the
trial court's order granting partial summary judgment found only that the dog was not properly
restrained and made no ruling as to whether the dog was carelessly managed; and the trial court's
instruction that the defendants were negligent based solely on the fact that the defendants did not
properly restrain the dog was a misstatement of the law, which could not be considered harmless as the
jury did not have an opportunity to consider the primary issue of whether the defendants carelessly
managed the defendants' dog. Cowan v. Carillo, 331 Ga. App. 387, 771 S.E.2d 86 (2015).

Jury instructions.

- When there was proof going to show that the plaintiff, at the time the plaintiff was injured by reason of
the horse running over the plaintiff, was standing upon a sidewalk in a city, and one of the acts of
negligence charged by the petition was the alleged driving of the horse upon the sidewalk, in violation of
a city ordinance, and such ordinance was admitted in evidence without objection, it was not error for
the court to charge upon the validity and legal effect of the ordinance, even though the evidence
indicated that the driving of the horse on the sidewalk was unintentional on the part of the driver, since
the court expressly instructed the jury that, if such act was unintentional, it would constitute no
violation of the ordinance. Clackum v. Bagwell, 40 Ga. App. 831, 151 S.E. 689 (1930).

Jury question.

- In an action for injuries to the plaintiff by a bull of the defendant, the questions of the viciousness of
the bull, and the negligence of the defendant are questions for the jury. Van Harlengen v. Bearse, 26 Ga.
App. 473, 106 S.E. 306 (1921).
When a private zoo owner opens a private zoo for viewing without any charge to the public, it is a
question for the jury whether the act of the defendant's employee in removing a chimpanzee from the
chimpanzee's cage complied with that degree of care required by this section. Palmer Chem. & Equip.
Co. v. Gantt, 123 Ga. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 492 (1971).

While a previous attack would not necessarily be required to say there is a jury issue on the question of
knowledge that a dog had a propensity to attack human beings, at least some form of menacing
behavior would be. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

Evidence that the dog's owner knew that the dog had tried to attack another person and had scolded
the dog for this behavior was behavior evidence such that the jury should have been allowed to
determine whether the owner should have anticipated the subsequent successful attack on the plaintiff.
Thurmond v. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687, 520 S.E.2d 43 (1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Scope of section.

- This section relates to a civil action for damages for injury caused by a vicious or dangerous animal kept
by its owner when the owner with knowledge of the viciousness of the animal negligently allows the
animal to go at liberty. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

Basis of liability.

- If injury occurs to another by reason of the exercise of the vicious propensity of an animal, the owner
will be held liable therefor, if the owner knew of the vicious character and negligently allowed such an
animal to run at large. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

Presumption of negligence.

- When a person is injured by an attack of an animal which by nature is vicious, the negligence of the
owner is presumed because the law recognizes that safety lies only in keeping such animals perfectly
secure. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 652.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.

- 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 62 et seq.

Plaintiff's Negligence, Provocation, or Assumption of Risk as Defense in Dogbite Cases, 39 POF3d 133.

1D Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Animals, § 98.

C.J.S.
- 3B C.J.S., Animals, § 319 et seq., 340 et seq., 365 et seq.

ALR.
- Duty and liability of master to servant injured by horse belonging to master, 26 A.L.R. 871; 42 A.L.R.
226; 60 A.L.R. 468.

Character and extent of claims for which lien on animal damage feasant attaches, 26 A.L.R. 1047.

Constitutionality of "dog laws", 49 A.L.R. 847.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to person thereon by dog not owned or harbored by
former, 92 A.L.R. 732.

Liability of owner of male animal who furnishes its service for breeding purposes, for damage inflicted
during such services, 106 A.L.R. 1418.

Owner or keeper of trespassing dog as subject to injunction or damages, 107 A.L.R. 1323.

Owner's liability, under legislation forbidding domestic animals to run at large on highways, as
dependent on negligence, 34 A.L.R.2d 1285.

Statutory liability for physical injuries inflicted by animal as surviving defendant's death, 40 A.L.R.2d 543.

Liability for injury to property inflicted by wild animal, 57 A.L.R.2d 242.

Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or intentional provocation as defense to action for injury by
dog, 66 A.L.R.2d 916.

Liability of landlord to tenant or member of tenant's family, for injury by animal or insect, 67 A.L.R.2d
1005.

Law as to cats, 73 A.L.R.2d 1032; 8 A.L.R.4th 1287.

Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 80 A.L.R.2d 886.

Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like,
85 A.L.R.2d 1161.
Liability for injury or damage caused by bees, 86 A.L.R.2d 791.

Master's liability to agricultural worker injured other than by farm machinery, 9 A.L.R.3d 1061.

Liability for injury or death of child social guest, 20 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Owner's or keeper's liability for personal injury or death inflicted by wild animal, 21 A.L.R.3d 603; 92
A.L.R.3d 832; 66 A.L.R. Fed. 305.

Liability of owner of dog known by him to be vicious for injuries to trespasser, 64 A.L.R.3d 1039.

Animals as attractive nuisance, 64 A.L.R.3d 1069.

Keeping bees as nuisance, 88 A.L.R.3d 992.

Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 A.L.R.3d 832.

Personal injuries inflicted by animal as within homeowner's or personal liability policy, 96 A.L.R.3d 891.

Liability of owner of dog for dog's biting veterinarian or veterinarian's employee, 4 A.L.R.4th 349.

Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injuries by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 A.L.R.4th 358.

Measure, elements, and amount of damages for killing or injuring cat, 8 A.L.R.4th 1287.

Liability of person, other than owner of animal or owner or operator of motor vehicle, for damage to
motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in
street or highway, 21 A.L.R.4th 132.

Liability of owner or operator of vehicle for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein
resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 21 A.L.R.4th 159.

Liability of owner of animal for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from
collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 29 A.L.R.4th 431.

Liability to adult social guest injured otherwise than by condition of premises, 38 A.L.R.4th 200.

Liability for personal injury or death caused by trespassing or intruding livestock, 49 A.L.R.4th 710.

Modern status of rule of absolute or strict liability for dogbite, 51 A.L.R.4th 446.

Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080.

Who "harbors" or "keeps" dog under animal liability statute, 64 A.L.R.4th 963.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injury to patron by dog or cat, 67 A.L.R.4th 976.
Liability for injuries caused by cat, 68 A.L.R.4th 823.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or
vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or
vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 A.L.R.4th 374.

Intentional provocation, contributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of risk as defense to

action for injury by dog, 11 A.L.R.5th 127.

Liability for injury inflicted by horse, dog, or other domestic animal exhibited at show, 68 A.L.R.5th 599.

Liability of United States, under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS secs. 1346, 2671 et seq.), for death or
injury sustained by visitor to national park or national forest, 66 A.L.R. Fed. 305.

CHAPTER 3 LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND Article 1 General Provisions.

51-3-1. Duty of owner or occupier of land to invitee.

51-3-2. Duty of owner of premises to licensee.

51-3-3. Lawful possessor of land owes no duty of care to trespasser.

Article 2 Owners of Property Used for Recreational Purposes. Article 3

51-3-20. Purpose of article.

51-3-21. Definitions.

51-3-22. Duty of owner of land to those using same for recreation generally.

51-3-23. Effect of invitation or permission to use land for recreation.

51-3-24. Applicability of Code Sections 51-3-22 and 51-3-23 to owner of land leased to state or
subdivision for recreation.

51-3-25. Certain liability not limited.

51-3-26. Construction of article.

Owners of Property Used for Other Purposes. Article 4

51-3-30. Liability of landowner or hunter for injury caused by wildlife crossing public roadway.

51-3-31. Agritourism defined; immunity for civil liability; warnings.

Liability of Space Flight Entities. Law reviews. -For annual survey article discussing local government law,
see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (1999). For annual survey on commercial transportation: a two-year survey,
see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 39 (2019).

51-3-41. Definitions.
51-3-42. Civil or criminal liability for injuries during space flight.

51-3-43. Required warning and agreement for space flight; requirements for enforceability.

51-3-44. Governing law.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Tort liability for window washer's injury or death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Secs. 6-45—6-63. - Reserved.

ARTICLE III. - DANGEROUS DOG CONTROL[2]

Footnotes:

--- (2) ---

State Law reference— Responsible Dog Ownership Law, O.C.G.A. § 4-8-20 et seq.

Sec. 6-64. - Definitions.

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in this article, shall have the meanings ascribed to
them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

Animal control board means a board that was created by the governing authority of a local government
to hold hearings provided for in section 6-66.

Classified dog means any dog that has been classified as either a dangerous dog or vicious dog pursuant
to this article.

Dangerous dog means any dog that, according to the records of an appropriate authority:

(1)Causes a substantial puncture of a person's skin by teeth without causing serious injury; provided,
however, that a nip, scratch, or abrasion shall not be sufficient to classify a dog as dangerous under this
subsection;(2)Aggressively attacks in a manner that causes a person to reasonably believe that the dog
posed an imminent threat of serious injury to such person or another person although no such injury
occurs; provided, however, that the acts of barking, growling, or showing of teeth by a dog shall not be
sufficient to classify a dog as dangerous under this subsection; or(3)While off the owner's property, kills
a pet animal; provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply where the death of such pet animal
is caused by a dog that is working or training as a hunting dog, herding dog, or predator control dog.

Dog control officer means an individual selected by a local government pursuant to the provisions of
section 6-65 to aid in the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this article.
Owner means any natural person or any legal entity, including, but not limited to, a corporation,
partnership, firm, or trust owning, possessing, harboring, keeping, or having custody or control of a
dangerous dog or potentially dangerous dog.

Potentially dangerous dog means any dog that without provocation bites a human being on public or
private property at any time.

Proper enclosure means an enclosure for keeping a dangerous dog or potentially dangerous dog while
on the owner's property securely confined indoors or in a securely enclosed and locked pen, fence, or
structure suitable to prevent the entry of young children and designed to prevent the dog from
escaping. Any such pen or structure shall have secure sides and a secure top, and, if the dog is enclosed
within a fence, shall be of sufficient height and the bottom of the fence shall be constructed or secured
in such a manner as to prevent the dog's escape either from over or from under the fence. Any such
enclosure shall also provide protection from the elements for the dog.

Serious injury means any physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death; results in death, broken
or dislocated bones, lacerations requiring multiple sutures, or disfiguring avulsions; requires plastic
surgery or admission to a hospital; or results in protracted impairment of health, including transmission
of an infection or contagious disease, or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

Severe injury means any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring
multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery or a physical injury that results in death.

(1)A dog that inflicts an injury upon a person when the dog is being used by a law enforcement officer to
carry out the law enforcement officer's duties shall not be a dangerous dog or potentially dangerous dog
within the meaning of this article.(2)A dog shall not be a dangerous dog or a potentially dangerous dog
within the meaning of this article if the injury inflicted by the dog was sustained by a person who, at the
time, was committing a willful trespass or other tort or was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog or
had in the past been observed or reported to have tormented, abused, or assaulted the dog or was
committing or attempting to commit a crime.

Vicious dog means a dog that inflicts serious injury on a person or causes serious injury to a person
resulting from reasonable attempts to escape from the dog's attack. No dog shall be classified as a
dangerous dog or vicious dog for actions that occur while the dog is being used by a law enforcement or
military officer to carry out the law enforcement or military officer's official duties. No dog shall be
classified as a dangerous dog or a vicious dog if the person injured by such dog was a person who, at the
time, was committing a trespass, was abusing the dog, or was committing or attempting to commit an
offense under O.C.G.A. Title 16, Chapter 5 (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 et seq.) (Crimes Against the Person).
(Code 1987, § 4.5-40; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-65. - Dog control officer.

The animal control director shall be designated, with the approval of the board of commissioners, as the
dog control officer of the county. Upon receiving a report of a dangerous dog or potentially dangerous
dog within the unincorporated areas of the county from a law enforcement agency, animal control
agency, rabies control officer, or county board of health, the dog control officer shall make such
investigations and inquiries with regard to such report as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-41; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

State Law reference— Dog control officer, O.C.G.A. § 4-8-22.

Sec. 6-66. - Classifying dangerous dogs and potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)Procedure for classification. When a dog control officer classifies a dog as a dangerous dog, a vicious
dog, or reclassifies a potentially dangerous dog as a dangerous dog or a vicious dog, the dog control
officer shall notify the dog's owner in writing by certified mail to the owner's last known address of such
classification or reclassification. Such notice shall be complete upon its mailing.(b)Notice. When a
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog is classified as such, the dog control officer
shall notify the dog's owner of such classification. The notice to the owner shall meet the following
requirements:(1)The notice shall be in writing and mailed by certified mail to the owner's last known
address within 72 hours of the determination.(2)The notice shall include a summary of the dog control
officer's findings that formed the basis for the dog's classification as a dangerous, a vicious, or
potentially dangerous dog.(3)The notice shall be dated and shall state that the owner, within 15 days
after the date shown on the notice, has a right to request a hearing on the dog control officer's
determination that the dog is a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog.(4)The
notice shall state that the hearing, if requested, shall be before the county animal control board or such
board so designated by the county board of commissioners.(5)The notice shall state that if a hearing is
not requested, the dog control officer's determination that the dog is a dangerous dog or a vicious dog
will become effective for all purposes under the law on a date specified in the notice, which shall be
after the last day on which the owner has a right to request a hearing.(6)The notice shall include a form
to request a hearing before the animal control board and shall provide specific instructions on mailing or
delivering such request to the animal control board.(c)Hearing.(1)When the animal control board
receives a request for a hearing as provided in this section, it shall schedule such hearing within 30 days
after receiving the request. The animal control board shall notify the dog owner in writing by certified
mail of the date, time, and place of the hearing; and such notice shall be mailed to the dog owner at
least ten days prior to the date of the hearing. At the hearing, the owner of the dog shall be given the
opportunity to testify and present evidence; and in addition thereto, the animal control board shall
receive such other evidence and hear such other testimony as it may find reasonably necessary to make
a determination either to sustain, modify, or overrule the dog control officer's classification of the dog.
(2)Within ten days after the date of the hearing, the animal control board shall notify the dog owner in
writing by certified mail of its determination on the matter. If such determination is that the dog is a
dangerous dog or a vicious dog, the notice shall specify the date upon which that determination is
effective. If the determination is that the dog is to be euthanized pursuant to this chapter and O.C.G.A. §
4-8-26, the notice shall specify the date by which the euthanasia shall occur.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-42; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-67. - Registration of dangerous dogs or potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)It is unlawful and a violation of this chapter for an owner to have or possess within the
unincorporated areas of the county a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog
without a certificate of registration issued by the dog control officer.(b)Unless doing so would violate
another provision of this chapter, the dog control officer shall issue a nontransferable certificate of
registration to the owner of a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog if the owner
presents to the dog control officer or the dog control officer otherwise finds sufficient evidence of:(1)A
proper enclosure designed to confine securely the dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially
dangerous dog on the owner's property, indoors, in a securely locked and enclosed pen, fence or
structure to prevent the dog from leaving the property.(2)The posting of the premises where the
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog is located with a clearly visible sign warning
that there is a dangerous dog on the property. Said sign shall be maintained continuously on the
premises.a.The dangerous dog warning sign shall conform to design provided by the state department
of natural resources, and shall be furnished by the county to the owner or possessor of a dangerous dog
or potentially dangerous dog, with the initial cost of such sign to be included in the registration fee as
required herein.b.Should the original dangerous dog warning sign issued to the owner or possessor of a
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog be lost, stolen, destroyed, or damaged, said
owner or possessor shall report same immediately to the dog control officer and shall secure a
replacement sign from the animal control department. The owner or possessor shall be required to pay
the then-current full cost for such replacement sign.(3)A microchip containing an identification number,
capable of being scanned has been injected under the skin between the shoulder blades of the dog.
(4)Proof of general or specific liability insurance in the amount of at least $50,000.00 issued by an
insurer authorized to transact business in this state insuring the owner of the vicious dog against liability
for any bodily injury or property damage caused by the dog; or(5)A surety bond in the amount of
$15,000.00 or more issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this state payable to
any person or persons injured by the dangerous dog.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-43; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-68. - Additional requirements.

(a)A certificate of registration may only be issued to an individual 18 years of age or older.(b)The owner
of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog shall notify the dog control officer within
24 hours if the dog is on the loose, is unconfined, has attacked a human or has died.(c)The owner of a
dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog shall notify the dog control officer if the owner
is moving from the unincorporated areas of the county. The owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or
potentially dangerous dog who is a new resident of the unincorporated areas of the county shall register
the dog as required herein within 30 calendar days after becoming a resident. The owner of a
dangerous, vicious, or potentially dangerous dog who moves from one address to another within the
unincorporated areas of the county shall notify the dog control officer of the new address within ten
calendar days after moving to the new address.(d)Issuance of a certificate of registration or the renewal
of a certificate of registration by the dog control officer does not warrant or guarantee that the
requirements for obtaining a certificate of registration, as specified in this section, are maintained by the
owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog on a continuous basis following the
date of the issuance of the initial certificate of registration or following the date of any annual renewal
of such certificate.(e)The dog control officer is authorized to make whatever inquiry is deemed
necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of this article.(f)Only one certificate of registration is
permitted per household.(g)No person shall be the owner of more than one vicious dog.(h)No certificate
of registration for a vicious dog shall be issued to any person who has been convicted of the following
crimes; from the time of conviction until two years after completion of his sentence, nor to any person
residing with such person:(1)A serious violent felony as defined in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1;(2)The felony of
dog fighting as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-37, or the felony of aggravated cruelty to animals as
provided for in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4; or(3)A felony involving trafficking in cocaine, illegal drugs, marijuana,
methamphetamine, or ecstasy as provided for in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-31 and 16-13-31.1.(i)A vicious dog
shall not be transferred, sold, or donated to any other person unless it is relinquished to a governmental
facility or veterinarian to be euthanized.(j)Under no circumstances shall an employee or official of the
county be held liable for any damages to any person who suffers an injury inflicted by a dog as a result
of a failure to enforce the provisions of this article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-44; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-69. - Registration fee.

(a)In addition to regular licensing and tag fees, an annual fee as may from time to time be prescribed by
the board of commissioners, payable at the time of registration and on or before April 1 of each
succeeding year, shall be paid by the owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous
dog.(b)Certificates of registration shall be renewed on an annual basis, not later than April 1 of each
year. At the time of the annual renewal of a certificate of registration, the dog control officer shall
require evidence from the owner or make such investigation as may be necessary to verify that the dog
owner is continuing to comply with the provisions of this article. Failure to renew a certificate of
registration within ten days of the renewal date or initial classification shall constitute a violation of this
article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-45; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-70. - Confinement of dangerous dogs and potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)It is unlawful and a violation of this article for an owner of a dangerous dog or vicious dog to permit
the dog to be outside of the owner's property unless:(1)The dog is muzzled and restrained by a chain or
leash not to exceed six feet in length and is under the physical restraint of a responsible person capable
of preventing the dog from engaging any other human or animal. The muzzle shall be made in a manner
that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or respiration but will prevent it from
biting any person;(2)The dog is contained in a closed and locked cage or crate; or(3)The dog is working
or training as a hunting dog, herding dog, or predator control dog.(b)It shall be unlawful for an owner of
a vicious dog to permit the dog to be outside an enclosure designed to securely confine the vicious dog
while on the owner's property unless:(1)The dog is muzzled and restrained by a chain or leash not to
exceed six feet in length and is under the physical restraint of a responsible person capable of
preventing the dog from engaging any other human or animal. The muzzle shall be made in a manner
that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or respiration but will prevent it from
biting any person; or(2)The dog is contained in a closed and locked cage or crate.(c)It shall be unlawful
for an owner of a vicious dog to permit the dog to be unattended with minors.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-46; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-71. - Confiscation of dangerous dogs or potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)Confiscation. A dangerous dog or vicious dog shall be immediately confiscated by the dog control
officer or by a law enforcement officer or by another person authorized by the dog control officer if the:
(1)Owner of the dog does not secure the liability insurance or bond required herein;(2)Dog is not validly
registered as required herein;(3)Dog is not maintained in a proper enclosure;(4)Dog is outside a proper
enclosure in violation of this section; or(5)The officer believes that the dog poses a threat to public
safety.(b)Grounds. A potentially dangerous dog shall be confiscated in the same manner as a dangerous
dog if the dog is:(1)Not validly registered as required herein;(2)Not maintained in a proper enclosure;
or(3)Outside a proper enclosure in violation of this article.(c)Disposition of confiscated dogs. Any
dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog that has been confiscated under the provisions
of this article shall be returned to its owner upon the owner's compliance with the provisions of this
article and upon the payment of reclaim and boarding fees as set out in this article. In the event the
owner has not complied with the provisions of this section within 20 days of the date the dog was
confiscated, said dog shall be destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.(d)Refusal to surrender.
A refusal to surrender a dog subject to confiscation shall be a violation of this article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-47; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-66. - Classifying dangerous dogs and potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)Procedure for classification. When a dog control officer classifies a dog as a dangerous dog, a vicious
dog, or reclassifies a potentially dangerous dog as a dangerous dog or a vicious dog, the dog control
officer shall notify the dog's owner in writing by certified mail to the owner's last known address of such
classification or reclassification. Such notice shall be complete upon its mailing.(b)Notice. When a
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog is classified as such, the dog control officer
shall notify the dog's owner of such classification. The notice to the owner shall meet the following
requirements:(1)The notice shall be in writing and mailed by certified mail to the owner's last known
address within 72 hours of the determination.(2)The notice shall include a summary of the dog control
officer's findings that formed the basis for the dog's classification as a dangerous, a vicious, or
potentially dangerous dog.(3)The notice shall be dated and shall state that the owner, within 15 days
after the date shown on the notice, has a right to request a hearing on the dog control officer's
determination that the dog is a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog.(4)The
notice shall state that the hearing, if requested, shall be before the county animal control board or such
board so designated by the county board of commissioners.(5)The notice shall state that if a hearing is
not requested, the dog control officer's determination that the dog is a dangerous dog or a vicious dog
will become effective for all purposes under the law on a date specified in the notice, which shall be
after the last day on which the owner has a right to request a hearing.(6)The notice shall include a form
to request a hearing before the animal control board and shall provide specific instructions on mailing or
delivering such request to the animal control board.(c)Hearing.(1)When the animal control board
receives a request for a hearing as provided in this section, it shall schedule such hearing within 30 days
after receiving the request. The animal control board shall notify the dog owner in writing by certified
mail of the date, time, and place of the hearing; and such notice shall be mailed to the dog owner at
least ten days prior to the date of the hearing. At the hearing, the owner of the dog shall be given the
opportunity to testify and present evidence; and in addition thereto, the animal control board shall
receive such other evidence and hear such other testimony as it may find reasonably necessary to make
a determination either to sustain, modify, or overrule the dog control officer's classification of the dog.
(2)Within ten days after the date of the hearing, the animal control board shall notify the dog owner in
writing by certified mail of its determination on the matter. If such determination is that the dog is a
dangerous dog or a vicious dog, the notice shall specify the date upon which that determination is
effective. If the determination is that the dog is to be euthanized pursuant to this chapter and O.C.G.A. §
4-8-26, the notice shall specify the date by which the euthanasia shall occur.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-42; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-67. - Registration of dangerous dogs or potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)It is unlawful and a violation of this chapter for an owner to have or possess within the
unincorporated areas of the county a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog
without a certificate of registration issued by the dog control officer.(b)Unless doing so would violate
another provision of this chapter, the dog control officer shall issue a nontransferable certificate of
registration to the owner of a dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous dog if the owner
presents to the dog control officer or the dog control officer otherwise finds sufficient evidence of:(1)A
proper enclosure designed to confine securely the dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially
dangerous dog on the owner's property, indoors, in a securely locked and enclosed pen, fence or
structure to prevent the dog from leaving the property.(2)The posting of the premises where the
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog is located with a clearly visible sign warning
that there is a dangerous dog on the property. Said sign shall be maintained continuously on the
premises.a.The dangerous dog warning sign shall conform to design provided by the state department
of natural resources, and shall be furnished by the county to the owner or possessor of a dangerous dog
or potentially dangerous dog, with the initial cost of such sign to be included in the registration fee as
required herein.b.Should the original dangerous dog warning sign issued to the owner or possessor of a
dangerous dog, a vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog be lost, stolen, destroyed, or damaged, said
owner or possessor shall report same immediately to the dog control officer and shall secure a
replacement sign from the animal control department. The owner or possessor shall be required to pay
the then-current full cost for such replacement sign.(3)A microchip containing an identification number,
capable of being scanned has been injected under the skin between the shoulder blades of the dog.
(4)Proof of general or specific liability insurance in the amount of at least $50,000.00 issued by an
insurer authorized to transact business in this state insuring the owner of the vicious dog against liability
for any bodily injury or property damage caused by the dog; or(5)A surety bond in the amount of
$15,000.00 or more issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this state payable to
any person or persons injured by the dangerous dog.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-43; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-68. - Additional requirements.

(a)A certificate of registration may only be issued to an individual 18 years of age or older.(b)The owner
of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog shall notify the dog control officer within
24 hours if the dog is on the loose, is unconfined, has attacked a human or has died.(c)The owner of a
dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog shall notify the dog control officer if the owner
is moving from the unincorporated areas of the county. The owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or
potentially dangerous dog who is a new resident of the unincorporated areas of the county shall register
the dog as required herein within 30 calendar days after becoming a resident. The owner of a
dangerous, vicious, or potentially dangerous dog who moves from one address to another within the
unincorporated areas of the county shall notify the dog control officer of the new address within ten
calendar days after moving to the new address.(d)Issuance of a certificate of registration or the renewal
of a certificate of registration by the dog control officer does not warrant or guarantee that the
requirements for obtaining a certificate of registration, as specified in this section, are maintained by the
owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog on a continuous basis following the
date of the issuance of the initial certificate of registration or following the date of any annual renewal
of such certificate.(e)The dog control officer is authorized to make whatever inquiry is deemed
necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of this article.(f)Only one certificate of registration is
permitted per household.(g)No person shall be the owner of more than one vicious dog.(h)No certificate
of registration for a vicious dog shall be issued to any person who has been convicted of the following
crimes; from the time of conviction until two years after completion of his sentence, nor to any person
residing with such person:(1)A serious violent felony as defined in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1;(2)The felony of
dog fighting as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-37, or the felony of aggravated cruelty to animals as
provided for in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4; or(3)A felony involving trafficking in cocaine, illegal drugs, marijuana,
methamphetamine, or ecstasy as provided for in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-31 and 16-13-31.1.(i)A vicious dog
shall not be transferred, sold, or donated to any other person unless it is relinquished to a governmental
facility or veterinarian to be euthanized.(j)Under no circumstances shall an employee or official of the
county be held liable for any damages to any person who suffers an injury inflicted by a dog as a result
of a failure to enforce the provisions of this article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-44; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-69. - Registration fee.

(a)In addition to regular licensing and tag fees, an annual fee as may from time to time be prescribed by
the board of commissioners, payable at the time of registration and on or before April 1 of each
succeeding year, shall be paid by the owner of a dangerous dog, vicious dog, or a potentially dangerous
dog.(b)Certificates of registration shall be renewed on an annual basis, not later than April 1 of each
year. At the time of the annual renewal of a certificate of registration, the dog control officer shall
require evidence from the owner or make such investigation as may be necessary to verify that the dog
owner is continuing to comply with the provisions of this article. Failure to renew a certificate of
registration within ten days of the renewal date or initial classification shall constitute a violation of this
article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-45; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-70. - Confinement of dangerous dogs and potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)It is unlawful and a violation of this article for an owner of a dangerous dog or vicious dog to permit
the dog to be outside of the owner's property unless:(1)The dog is muzzled and restrained by a chain or
leash not to exceed six feet in length and is under the physical restraint of a responsible person capable
of preventing the dog from engaging any other human or animal. The muzzle shall be made in a manner
that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or respiration but will prevent it from
biting any person;(2)The dog is contained in a closed and locked cage or crate; or(3)The dog is working
or training as a hunting dog, herding dog, or predator control dog.(b)It shall be unlawful for an owner of
a vicious dog to permit the dog to be outside an enclosure designed to securely confine the vicious dog
while on the owner's property unless:(1)The dog is muzzled and restrained by a chain or leash not to
exceed six feet in length and is under the physical restraint of a responsible person capable of
preventing the dog from engaging any other human or animal. The muzzle shall be made in a manner
that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or respiration but will prevent it from
biting any person; or(2)The dog is contained in a closed and locked cage or crate.(c)It shall be unlawful
for an owner of a vicious dog to permit the dog to be unattended with minors.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-46; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)

Sec. 6-71. - Confiscation of dangerous dogs or potentially dangerous dogs.

(a)Confiscation. A dangerous dog or vicious dog shall be immediately confiscated by the dog control
officer or by a law enforcement officer or by another person authorized by the dog control officer if the:
(1)Owner of the dog does not secure the liability insurance or bond required herein;(2)Dog is not validly
registered as required herein;(3)Dog is not maintained in a proper enclosure;(4)Dog is outside a proper
enclosure in violation of this section; or(5)The officer believes that the dog poses a threat to public
safety.(b)Grounds. A potentially dangerous dog shall be confiscated in the same manner as a dangerous
dog if the dog is:(1)Not validly registered as required herein;(2)Not maintained in a proper enclosure;
or(3)Outside a proper enclosure in violation of this article.(c)Disposition of confiscated dogs. Any
dangerous dog, vicious dog, or potentially dangerous dog that has been confiscated under the provisions
of this article shall be returned to its owner upon the owner's compliance with the provisions of this
article and upon the payment of reclaim and boarding fees as set out in this article. In the event the
owner has not complied with the provisions of this section within 20 days of the date the dog was
confiscated, said dog shall be destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.(d)Refusal to surrender.
A refusal to surrender a dog subject to confiscation shall be a violation of this article.

(Code 1987, § 4.5-47; Ord. No. 2013-006, 4-2-2013)