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Investigations and prevention of derailment accidents in Japan

Conference Paper · September 2012

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 Investigations and preventions of derailment accidents in Japan
Akira Matsumoto1 2
1
member of Japan Transport safety Board (JTSB), matsumoto-a2jk@mlit.go.jp
2
emeritus researcher of National Traffic Safety & Environment Laboratory (NTSEL)
7-42-27 Jindaiji-higashimachi, Chofu, Tokyo 182-0012 Japan

ABSTRACT

The safety level of Japanese railways is very high, as 0.6 accidents happen per 106 km train-run
and nearly zero on-board passengers are killed in a normal year. But we had not a few serious
accidents in the past. In this paper the author introduces the outline of accident occurrences, and safety
progress in last 50 years in Japan at the beginning, and reports on the cause analyses of derailment
accidents and countermeasures, concerning ‘flange climbs’, ‘overturns due to excessive-speed curving
and side blast’. Railway damages due to great earthquakes are discussed in the final part of the paper.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statistics of Railway Accidents in Japan [1][3][4]

The occurrences of railway accident have been reduced in last 50 years. Fig. 1 shows the change of
the occurrence of railway accidents in Japan after 1975. The occurrence of accidents had been
reduced clearly before 2000, but after that time it has been staying about 0.6 per one million km train-
run. The number of accidents shown in the fugure includes “level crossing accidents”, which are
caused by automobile drivers, etc., and “human damage accidents”, where passengers on platform are
hit by a train, or citizens crossing railway track are hit by a train. Fig. 3 shows the percentage of
numbers of accidents classified by accident types. From the figure the number of train accidents, i.e.
“train derailment”, “train collision”
and “train fire”, is very few, and
most of railway accidents are due to
“level crossing accidents” and
“human damage accidents”. The
number of these accidents has been
decreasing gradually in recent years,
but not remarkably. The introduction
of “platform door” may reduce the
number of “human damage
accidents”.
Fig. 2 shows the change of
casualties in railway accidents after
1975. The number of casualties is on
a declining trend year after year like
the number of accidents, but it
increased at the year when serious
accidents happened unfortunately. Fig.1 Decrease of number of railway accidents
The peak at 1991 is caused by “Shigaraki Railway accident” whose casualties were over 650
passengers, and the peak at 2005 is caused by “Fukuchiyama Line accident” whose casualties were
also over 650 passengers. Except serious accidents the casualties had been reduced before 2000, and
after the year stay about 700 in recent years. But most of them are those of “level crossing accidents”
including automobile drivers and those of “human damage accidents”. The casualties of “train
accidents” are small, as nearly zero passengers are killed in a normal year.

(Zoomed to 1990–2008)

Fig.2 Decrease of number of casualties in railway accidents

Fig.3 Classification of number of accidents Fig.4 Classification of number of casualties

(2011) (2011)

1.2 Accidents Investigation Organization in Japan [2][4]

“Aircraft Accidents Investigation Commission (AAIC)”, the first permanent organization for
transport accidents investigation in Japan, was established in 1974. At that time the governmental
permanent organization had been required after many serious aircraft accidents in Japan. After 27
years activities the AAIC was reorganized to “Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation
Commission (ARAIC)” in 2001.
Before the establishment of the ARAIC, there was no permanent governmental organization for
railway accidents investigation in Japan. For “Shigaraki Accident” in 1991, the cause of the accident
was investigated mainly by police, where the author was engaged in for a specialist for judgment, and
for “Hibiya L. Accident” in 2000 the cause was investigated by both of the Police and the Ministry,
and the author was engaged in the investigation of both groups. Before the accident, in 1999 the
Ministry established a semi-formal investigation committee of railway. Although the “Hibiya L.
Accident” was the first experience, the committee successfully concluded the causes. This committee
acted as a pilot to the establishment of the ARAIC.
In 2008 the ARAIC was reorganized to “Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB)”, which investigates
marine accidents as well as aircraft and railway. The objective of the JTSB is to prevent recurrences
and to mitigate damages caused by accidents. The JTSB conducts investigations to determine the
causes of aircraft, marine and railway accidents, serious incidents and damage caused by the accidents.
The causes of accidents/incidents are investigated through objective/scientific processes. Based on the
findings of the investigations, the JTSB provides recommendations or opinions to relevant ministers or
parties involved, concerning the measures to be taken to prevent accidents/incidents and to mitigate
damage caused by accidents. The JTSB consists of a chairperson, 12 board members and secretariat.
Aircraft, railway and marine accident investigators belong to secretariat.
Railway accidents and incidents are investigated usually by railway subcommittee and railway
accident investigators. The objects of investigation are “train derailment accidents”, “train collision
accidents”, “train fire accidents”, “accidents with 5 or more casualties”, “accidents with passenger
death”, “accidents with peculiar characteristics” and “serious incidents”. The number of
accidents/incidents investigated is around 20 to 30 in normal year and investigation reports will be
opened at the end of every month.

2. FLANGE-CLIMB DERAILMENTS IN SHARP CURVES

2.1 Subway Hibiya Line Accident in 2000 [5]

In 2000 a train of Hibiya line of Tokyo Subway derailed on the transient curve section of 160m
radius curve, and crashed against the opposite-direction train, and 5 passengers were killed (see Fig.
5). This accident was investigated by the committee organized by the Ministry of Transport, including
5-nights train running tests at the site. The committee concluded that it was a flange climb derailment
at low speed caused by multiple factors, as follows;
1) Unbalanced L/R static wheel loads of an axle
>to decrease of outside wheel load
2) Track structural twist in an exit-side transient curve (see Fig.6)
>within the regulation, but to lead decrease of outside wheel load
3) Sharp curve
>within the regulation, but to increase lateral forces
4) Friction coefficient (see Fig.7)
>high friction ciefficient at the rush hour to increase lateral forces
5) Over super-elevation due to slow speed operation
>within the regulation, due to the limited speed signal at the rush hour
6) Undesirable influence by levelling control of air springs
>not bad, but to decrease outside wheel load on transition curves
7) Characteristics of vertical stiffness (bogie)
>rather high, to decrease outside wheel load due to vertical stiffness of primary suspension
8) Characteristics of lateral stiffness (bogie)
>rather high, to increase of lateral forces due to the stiffness of air suspension
9) Rail profile with grinding and wheel profile
>to increase of lateral forces due to the interaction between rail ground profile and wheel profile
 Fig.5 Accident site of subway Hibiya line derailment

Fig.6 Mechanism of wheel-load reduction in transient curve section

0.8 45
Rail Temperature

40
Friction Coef.

0.6 35
30
0.4
25
0.2 20
Derail Accident
15
0 10
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00
Time Train peak hour
10
Trains in 20min

8
6
4
2
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00
Time
Fig.7 Change of friction coefficient of wheel/rail interface from first
train to the rush hour
2.2 Countermeasures against Flange Climb Derailments

After the accident, the ministry obliged to set up “guard rails” for prevention of derailments at
sharp curves according to the estimated formula concerning the safety factor on derailment coefficient
“Q/P”, which is equal to “Y/Q” in western countries, as shown in Fig.8.
The estimated safety factor f can be calculated by the following formula;
f = (Q/P)cri / (Q/P)0
where;
-the critical derailment coefficient “(Q/P)cri” is calculated by Nadal’s formula considering creep
characteristics and attack angle,
-the estimated derailment coefficient “(Q/P)0” is calculate by estimated lateral force “(Q0)”,
considering κ (=inside Q/P), centrifugal, air-sus twist, track irregularity, and the estimated wheel load
“(P0)”, considering centrifugal force, track twist, air-sus. twist
If the estimated safety factor f<1.2, “guards rail” are necessary. Now “guard rails” or “anti-
derailment guards” are set up through most of the curves of R≦ 200m in Japanese railway lines.

Fig.8 Derailment coefficient Q/P, equal to L/V or Y/Q in western countries

Fig.9 Undesirable forces acting in a sharply curving bogie

2.3 Continuous “Q/P” Monitoring on In-Service Trains for Prevention of Flange Climb
Derailments

After the accident various researches for prevention of flange climbs have been carried out in
Japan. As shown in Fig.7 the friction coefficient µ is changing time by time, and high µ is very
harmful in curving through sharp curves as shown Fig. 9. So “monitoring of wheel/rail contact forces
and friction coefficients [7]” and “lubrication and friction modification of wheels and/or rails [6]” are
very important.
“Continuous measurement of derailment coefficient and observation system on in-service trains”,
which is called “Q/P monitoring system”, is one of the new technologies for derailment prevention
[7][8]. This system can observe contact forces without strain gauges and slip rings, so durability is
very high, and it is possible to measure Q/P and friction coefficients of all curves through whole line
every day. The lateral contact force is measured by non-contact gap sensors directly, and the
mechanism and outlook of the system are shown in another paper in this conference[9]. Now 3
observation trains have been running on 3 lines of Tokyo Metro.

Fig.10 Sample of measured derailment coefficients in a sharp curve

by service trains during 5 days [9]

2.4 Flange Climb Derailments in Sharp Turnouts

For the effect of countermeasures after the derailment on Subway Hibiya line in 2000, flange
climb accidents in sharp curves have been remarkably reduced. But some similar accidents have
happened at turnouts with sharp curves, especially caused by newly trued wheel treads.
Table 1 shows derailment accidents in turnouts in recent years. Many cases were concerned with
turnout with sharply curved lead rail and/or straight-type tongue rail toe. Moreover in 4 cases, flange
climbs occurred just after wheel truing and some of them concerning very short distance shuttle run
passing through the same turnout. In such cases careful operation and appropriate lubrication to wheel
flange may be necessary.
Detailed information of the causes were described in the official investigation reports by ARAIC
or JTSB on each accident [2]; but only Japanese version now.
The mechanism of climb up of newly truing wheels is researched by some groupes, sych as
RTRI and JR East.

Table1. Flange climb derailments in sharp turnouts

Derailed Wheel tread

Date Railway Turnout type Radius Direction Wheel tread Coments
point truing
37kg/ No.8/ Tongue Conical just after
2006.1 Private 107m Trailing
simple (T-type) (toe) (57.2deg) (95km run)

same as same as same as just after

2006.2 107m Facing Lead rail
above above above (35km run)

Private; Conical
2007.9 37kg/ simple 46m Trailing Tongue No
LRT (65deg)

50N/ after 6 times -

JR-type arc 2day after
2008.2 JR No.8(siding- 103m Facing Lead rail short distance
(65deg) (394km run)
type)/ simple shuttle; 5km

Conical
Private; Tongue
2008.7 37kg/ simple 165m Facing (60deg, No worn rail
local (toe)
worn)

after 16times -
short distance
Private; 50N/curved in 86m Conical 2day after
2008.9 Facing Tongue shuttle; 2km;
urban same direction c=60mm (68deg) (574km run)
over super
elevation

Private; 50N/curved in 184m Conical

2011.12 Facing Tongue No
urban same direction c=54mm (70deg)

Exit-side
Private; Conical Incorrect setting
2009.8. none 200m none transient No
local (60deg) of guard rail
curve

3. OVERTURNING DUE TO EXCESSIVE-SPEED CURVING AND HEAVY CROSSWIND

3.1 Overturn Derailment on Fukuchiyama Line in 2005

In the spring of 2005 a commuter train was derailed on Fukuchiyama line near Osaka. The train
crashed against a residential building, and 107 persons were killed and 562 passengers were injured.
ARAIC investigated the causes, including numerical simulation, and concluded that the main cause of
the accident was extraordinary excess of the
speed limit through the curve [10]. The train
entered at about 115km/h into 304m radius
curve, where the speed limit is 70km/h. The
critical speed against overturning may be a
little under 110km/h, which was calculated
by numerical simulations and Kunieda’s
formula, a traditional simplified formula for
overturn limit in Japan.
The human factors and organizational
safety problems in the railway company may
be concerned with this accident. The train
driver failed to apply brake in timely manner,
probably because; He was distracted by the
contents of the radio communication
between the conductor of the train and the
train-operation controller, because he asked Fig.11 Overturn limit speed
the conductor to make false reports and “Kunieda’s formula”
concerning his over-run driving at the previous station. He was worrying about the excuses to avoid
“Nikkin kyoiku (the punitive training)”.
It is very shocking situation for Japanese railway circles that a professional train driver violate
speed limit more than 45km/h in curving. After the accident the ministry immediately obliged to set up
speed-check type ATS or ATC on sharp curves according to the safety recommendation of ARAIC.
The curves, where the approaching speed can be higher than the overturn limit, should be attached
such devices. The limit speeds are calculated on the base of Kunieda’s formula.

3.2 Overturn Derailment by Side Blast, such as Tornados

In the winter of 2005, an express train was overturned and derailed on the main line of Japan Sea
side in Tohoku area. The train was fallen down from the embankment and 5 passengers were killed
and 33 persons were injured. ARAIC investigated the causes, including model tests in a wind tunnel
and numerical simulations, and conclude that the accident was caused by sudden heavy crosswinds,
probably produced by a tornado [11]. According to the following studies, the climates in that area is
unstable in winter and tornados or down bursts are not so rare.
As shown in Fig. 13, the radar of the Meteorological Agency caught the coming of gust front,
probably tornados, at the time of the train passing through accident site.
In next year, another express train was overturned and derailed in south Kyushu. ARAIC carried
out the investigation and conclude that the accident was caused obviously by a tornado [12].
After these accidents, further researches and countermeasures have been carried out concerning
“observation and forecast methods of abnormal weather [14]”, “Vehicle dynamics affected by
crosswinds [15]”, “windbreak fences”, “operation guidance under heavy winds”, etc.

(a) Express “Inaho” in Tohoku (2005) (b) Express “Nichirin” in Kyushu (2006)

Fig.12 Overturned trains by sudden blast

Fig.13 Rader echo strength

distribution by the
Meteorological Agency
; the train accident happened
at 19:14
4. DERAILMENT DUE TO EARTHQUAKES

4.1 Jo-etsu Shinkansen Derailment

22 wheelsets of 8cars, in a shinkansen train (40 wheelsets, 10cars) derailed by the Chuetsu
earthquake near Niigata in October 2004, but nobody was injured. The epicenter was very near the
derailed point. The accident was investigated by ARAIC and numerical simulations of vehicle /
infrastructure were carried out by RTRI [13]. According to the report the train was derailed by the
shake of infrastructure, and the derailed wheels broke many fasteners of rails, therefore the track was
broken and many wheelsets derailed. In spite of these circumstances the parts around the leading
wheelset played as guidance, and consequently the train did not deviated from the track.
For the countermeasures “anti-derailment guards from track-side”, “anti-deviation devices from
on-board and/or track-side” have been developed, and have already set up partly. The reinforcements
of infrastructure for earthquake-proof were almost effective, but not perfect. So reinforcement
constructions have been forced after the earthquake. The researches on “early earthquake detection
system [16]” and “Vehicle dynamic behavior against earthquake and its countermeasures [17]” have
been also carried out.

(b) The first wheelset of the train derailed,

but some device chanced to guide the train
(a) Tail of derailed train
Fig.14 Derailment accident of Josetsu Shin-kansen train in 2004

(a) anti-deviation devices from on-board (b) anti-derailment guards from track-side

Fig.15 Anti-derailment/deviation guards from on-board or track side

4.2 Great Earthquake on March 11 2011

The strong earth shakes and

heavy tsunamis attacked Tohoku
area by “2011 Tohoku district - off
the Pacific Ocean Earthquake [18]".
2 trains, including Shinkansen
off-service train, derailed by the
shake, and several rolling stocks
were swept away by the tsunamis,
but there are no casualties in
railway passengers and drivers.
All passenger-service trains of
Shinkansen, whose speed 270km/h
max., resulted in stopping safely by
“Earthquake Detection and Alarm
System”. 2 wheelsets in an off-service Fig.16 Earthquake and Shinkansen trains’ position
Shinkansen train derailed near Sendai
station, and JTSB has been investigating
the cause. The earthquake-proof
reinforcements of infrastructures have
been more advanced after the Joetsu-
Shinkansen accident and effective in this
earthquake.
Beside this case, only 1 wheelset of a
freight train derailed near Sendai. So the
derailed wheelsets by the earthquake
were only these 3, except that several
rolling stocks were swept away by
tsunamis (see Fig. 17).

Fig.17 Damage of railway vehicles by earthquake

5. CONCLUSIONS and tsunami

The number of accidents in Japanese railways have been reduced, and especially the number of
derailment accidents have been small in recent years. It is the effect of coutermeasures, such as “anti-
derialment guard”, which have been implemented in sharp curves according to the estimated value of
derailment coefficient after the Hibiya Line accedent. Researches and developments of prevention
technologies also have carried out on “friction control” and “condition monitoring” of wheel/rail
interface.
On the other hand some derailment accidents occur in turnouts with sharply curved rails. Newly
trued wheel treads also need to be cautious. As derailments may cause serious damage, further R&D of
prevention technologies of derailment are desired on “wheel/rail problems”.
 For prevention of overturn derailment, R&D and implementation are necessary in various
technology field, such as signalling system for over-speed prevention, forcast system of tornads for
side blast avoidance.
For countermeasure against earthquakes, advanced researches on reinforcement of infrastructures,
early detection system of quake, train anti-deviation divices, etc. are studied in various circles in case
of coming earthqiakes.

REFERENCES

[1] Railway bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Japan (2012) “Information on
safety of railway and tramway transportation (FY2011)”, (in Japanese)
[2] Web of JTSB, http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/english.html
[3] Matsumoto A. (2010), “Progress of Safety in Japanese Railways -Accidents Investigation,
Countermeasures and R&D of Safety Technologies-“, Journal of Mechanical Systems for
Transportation and Logistics, Vol. 3(1), 2-11
[4] Matsumoto A. (2012), “Derailment accidents and prevention technologies in Japan”, International
Rail Safety & Incident Investigation Seminar RSII2012, Orlando
[5] Accident investigation committee of Ministry of Transport (2000), “Investigation report on the
train derailment/collision accident in Nakameguro sta. of Hibiya line of Teito rapid transportation
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