POLITICAL

Pre-week
LAW
Notes (Part
II)
Atty. Alexis F. Medina

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 THE BILL OF RIGHTS

THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT

The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against actions of private individuals

The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals. It cannot be invoked
against the actions of private individuals. Thus, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of a private entity for its own and private purposes, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked. (Dela
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

Exclusionary rule applies only applies as a restraint against the State; cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals

The exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution only applies as a
restraint against the State and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals,
save for instances where such individuals are shown to have acted under the color of a state-
related function. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Atillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-018, September
29, 2021)

Examples when evidence was admissible because there was

no State intervention

Photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were obtained
and used as evidence against petitioner cannot be considered as fruit of the poisonous
tree, if not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State

The photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were
obtained and used as evidence against petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the
poisonous tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent
of the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule
governing the admissibility of evidence under Article III of the
Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its
agents. (Cadajas v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021)

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 Where the State is not involved in the retrieval of photos from a Facebook account, the
exclusionary rule does not apply.

Judge Atillo, Jr. claims that the pictures are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule. The contention is without merit. The exclusionary rule under
Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution only applies as a restraint against the State
and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals, save for instances
where such individuals are shown to have acted under the color of a state-related
function. The exclusionary rule finds no application in the case because the State was
in no way involved in the retrieval of the subject pictures from Judge Atillo, Jr.'s
Facebook account. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Atillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-018,
September 29, 2021)

When private individuals are considered State agents, and thus, the
exclusionary rule applies

Barangay tanods are deemed law enforcers and bantay bayan has the color of a state-
related function for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. (Dela Cruz v. People,
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016) Bantay Bayan or civilian volunteers for the preservation
of peace and order in their respective areas have the color of a staterelated function and are
deemed law enforcers for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. Consequently,
evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to
the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017)

Domestic port security personnel authorized to oversee the security of persons and vehicles
within its ports are not necessarily law enforcers, but they should be considered agents of
government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during
routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. (Dela Cruz v. People,
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

DUE PROCESS

Rights protected: Life, Liberty, Property

The Right to Liberty

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 Indefinite period of detention for legislative contempt violates the right to liberty of
persons appearing in legislative inquiries

The Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation,

must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. An indefinite and
unspecified period of detention for being cited for contempt will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty. (Balag v. Senate of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Imprisonment for contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry, which is 1) Upon approval/disapproval of
Committee Report; and 2) upon expiration of one Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC is not a license to detain a person indefinitely

Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC does not vest the DOJ, BJMP, PNP unbridled right to
indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices
of the reviewing prosecutor. Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC is not a license to detain
a person indefinitely. A detainee must be promptly released to avoid violation of the
constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or
the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659) for the conduct of the
preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the
investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of
Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017)

Component of the Due Process Clause: Substantive and Procedural

Substantive and Procedural Due Process

Due process is comprised of two (2) components – substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty,
or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. (Palacios v. People, G.R. No. 240676.
March 18, 2019)

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Substantive Due Process:
The Test to Determine the Validity of the Exercise of Police Power

The validity of the exercise of police power must be judged on the basis of the due process
clause, particularly substantive due process, which requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject or purpose and a lawful means or method. There is a lawful purpose when the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power. On the other hand, the means are said to be lawful when the
methods employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Only when these two requisites concur may the
State be considered to have properly exercised police power. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021)

Substantive due process requires an inquiry on the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his property. The law must have a valid governmental
objective, i.e., the interest of the public as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the intervention of the State. This objective must be pursued in a lawful manner, or
in other words, the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive.

Hence, two things must concur: (1) the interest of the public, in general, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, requires the intervention of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive on individuals.
(Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education,
G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018)

The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of lawful subject and
lawful means. The interests of the public generally require its exercise, and the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, while not being
unduly oppressive. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019; Southern Luzon

Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017; Fernando
v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

Rational relationship test: A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846, January 20, 2009)

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Example of VALID exercise of police power

Mandatory discounts for senior citizens and PWDS

The laws on mandatory discounts for senior citizens and PWDs meet the requirements
for a valid exercise of police power - lawful subject and lawful means. The welfare
of senior citizens and PWDs is a recognized public duty of the State and a lawful
subject. The means employed -- imposing discounts on the medical services and
purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction
rather than tax credit – is fair and reasonable. The law mandating senior citizens’
discounts is a valid exercise of police power affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services. It is a valid police power
regulation, as the state may impose burdens on private entities, even if it may affect
their profits. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R.
No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Examples of INVALID Exercise of Police Power

(Violations of Substantive Due Process)

Requiring property owners to 1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a
fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said
fence five meters back

The ordinance -- which requires property owners to (1) demolish their existing
concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% seethru,
and (3) build the said fence five meters back is invalid. The purpose of the ordinance
was supposedly to discourage burglars, robbers and lawless elements. Limiting the
height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in excess of
one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of
ensuring public safety and security. Such exposed premises could even entice and
tempt would-be criminals to the property. The ordinance is thus an invalid exercise of
police power. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

Ban on wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day by
motels

The prohibitions on 1) wash rate (short-time or less than 12 hours) admissions and 2)
renting out a room more than twice a day are not reasonably necessary or related to
the purpose of minimizing the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is
in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing

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 laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
The Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. The Ordinance is unduly
oppressive as it curtails legitimate sexual behavior and legitimate uses for a wash rate
or renting out of rooms for more than twice a day. It needlessly restrains the operation
of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846, January 20, 2009)

Mandatory requirement to shift from aerial spraying to other modes of pesticide

application within a 3-month period under pain of penalty, despite impossibility
of carrying out a shift within the same period.

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable
and oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication
of the ordinance. The RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to
other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial and civil
works required for the conversion. Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power. (Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

Procedural Due Process

Doctrines on Administrative Due Process

• A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio.

• Procedural due process requires opportunity to be heard; opportunity to be heard
through motion for reconsideration is sufficient compliance with due process.
• Procedural due process in administrative proceedings means opportunity to explain
one's side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
• A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied.
• Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in administrative
investigations: Recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory.
• Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings.
• A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel.
• Any procedural defect in an administrative proceeding is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration.

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 • Procedural due process and NBI investigations: Opportunity to be heard for the
person under investigation is not required because the NBI does not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely recommendatory.
• Due process is a must in military academy disciplinary proceedings: A cadet facing
dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected
private interests (life, liberty, or property). Hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted
within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.
• Due process in student disciplinary cases: Formal trial-type hearing is not required
at all times. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016; Shu v.
Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014; Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296,
February 22, 2017; Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013; Sibayan v. Alda, G.R.
No. 233395, January 17, 2018; Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689,
September 7, 2010; Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No.
187854, November 12, 2013; Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February
22, 2017; Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014; Cudia v. The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

When lack of prior notice and hearing does not violate

due process

Clamping of illegally parked vehicles without prior notice and hearing

The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is necessary

because the transgressors are not around at the time of apprehension and thus notice
and hearing would be superfluous. Moreover, the transgressors have the chance to
reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest, which procedure equally satisfies
the need for a hearing. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)

Ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in VAWC cases does not
violate due process

Because time is of the essence to prevent further violence, and the respondent has an
opportunity to present his case after a TPO is issued. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267,
June 25, 2013)

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 EQUAL PROTECTION

Requirements for Valid Classification/Discrimination

The Equal Protection Clause requires a valid classification

The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to
a valid classification, which must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions;
(2) germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) equally applicable to all members of the class. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause:

Example of Valid Classification

Valid: Socialized housing tax on real property owners

No violation of equal protection clause: Requiring real property owners but not
informal settlers to pay socialized housing tax to provide funds for the housing of
informal settler is not discriminatory. For the purpose of urban development and
housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal
settler as two distinct classes are obvious. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30,
2015)

Violations of the Equal Protection Clause:

Examples of Invalid Classification

Invalid: Banning aerial spraying of pesticide (but not other modes of spraying pesticide)

Banning aerial spraying of pesticide (but not others modes of spraying pesticide) to
prevent pesticide drift violates the equal protection clause because pesticide drift may
result not just from aerial spraying but also from other modes of pesticide application.

A total ban on aerial spraying without any distinction as to the substances being
sprayed (whether pesticides or vitamins) violates the equal protection clause, because
the ban is "overinclusive," affecting groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose of preventing pesticide drift. There should
be reasonable distinctions in terms of the effects of liquid substances

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 to the public health, livelihood and the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

Invalid: Imposing different garbage fees based on whether the payee occupies a lot,
condominium, or socialized housing unit

Imposing garbage fees based on whether the payee occupies a lot, condominium or
socialized housing unit violates the equal protection clause, because there is no
substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant
of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other
hand, because most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is
uniform. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)

FREE SPEECH

The Basic Prohibitions under the Free Speech Guarantee

• Prior restraint
• Subsequent punishment of protected speech
• Vague and overbroad laws

The Prohibition Against Prior Restraint

Prior restraint defined:

Means government censorship. It refers to official governmental restrictions on the

press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
(Chavez v. Gonzales, February 15, 2008 G.R. No. 168338)

Kinds of Prior Restraints: Content-based & Content-neutral

Content-based restraint refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of speech,

aimed at the message or idea

Content-neutral regulation refers to restrictions/regulations on time, place, or manner

of the speech

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Content-Based Prior Restraint:
What it restricts: Subject matter, message or idea.

Presumption: Content-based prior restraints are presumed invalid

Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

Any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008)

When content-based prior restraints are valid:

Clear and Present Danger Test

A content-based prior restraint on free speech is presumed invalid, unless it passes

the clear and present danger test

The clear and present danger test

Clear and present danger rule: Speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
The evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338,
February 15, 2008)

The government has the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

(Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)

Content-Neutral Prior Restraint What it regulates: Time, Place and Manner of Speech

Merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the
time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards. (Chavez v. Gonzales, 15
February 2008 G.R. No. 168338)

When a content-neutral prior restraint is valid: A content-neutral prior restraint is valid

if it passes the intermediate test or O’Brien test

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 A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified

• if it is within the constitutional power of the Government,

• if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
• if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
• if the incident restriction on freedom of speech is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August
14, 2019)

Examples of INVALID Content-Based Prior Restraints

Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on private property

by non-candidates during elections

The tarpaulins are political advocacy of private individuals and not election
propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of freedom of expression by a non-candidate.

The prohibition is a content-based prior restraint that is presumed invalid and there
is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin.

The prohibition is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property.

(Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during election period in Public

Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and public transport terminals

The prohibition constitutes a content-based prior restraint on the right to free

expression which is presumed invalid.

Assuming the prohibition is a content-neutral regulation, it is still not valid because

first, it is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second,
there is no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners

of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

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 Example of Invalid Content-Neutral Prior Restraints

The ban on partisan political activity (the act of campaigning for or against any candidate)
abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period

The ban on partisan political activity (the act of campaigning for or against any
candidate) abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period is a sweeping prohibition
against all forms of expression considered as partisan political activities, without any
qualification. It is an invalid content-neutral regulation because the prohibition is
more than what is essential to the furtherance of the contemplated governmental
interest.

The risk of compromising the integrity and order of our elections may occur only
within premises where voting is conducted, i.e., in embassies, consulates, and other
foreign service establishments. There is, therefore, no reason to impose a limitation on
the protected right to participate in partisan political activities beyond said places.

By banning partisan political activities or campaigning even during the campaign period
within embassies, consulates, and other foreign service establishments, it goes beyond
the objective of maintaining order during the voting period and ensuring a credible
election. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)

The Prohibition Against Subsequent Punishment

for Protected Speech

Freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an “unbridled license that gives immunity
for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom.” (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)

Unprotected Speech in General

Some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution. Restrictions on

unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech
clause. (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)

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Example of Unprotected Speech: Libel or Defamation

Libel is unprotected speech and may be penalized

The government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation.

The cybercrime law penalizing the author of a libelous online statement or article is
valid. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

The Element of Malice in Libel

General Rule: Presumption of malice, if writing is defamatory

Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious.

Exceptions: Privileged communications (not presumed malicious.)

If the writing is considered privileged communications, malice is not

presumed.

Privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of

malice or malice in law and requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of
malice in fact. (Co v. Munoz, G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013)

Privileged Communications under the

Constitutional Right to Free Speech:
(When malice is not presumed and actual malice must be proved for libel)

a) Statements against Public Figures (Public Figure Doctrine)

If the defamatory statement is against a public official or public figure, actual

malice must be proved to be liable for libel

The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or

public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466 January
14, 1999)

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 Remarks directed against a public figure are privileged. In order to justify a
conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must
establish that the libelous statements were made or published with actual
malice or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. (Co v. Munoz, G.R. No.
181986, December 4, 2013)

No liability can attach if the statement relates to official conduct, unless the
public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual
malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was true or not. (Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959
September 30, 2005)

Actual Malice must be proved -- if offended party is a public figure Malice is

presumed – if the offended party is not a public figure

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact when the offender makes the
defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. The prosecution bears the burden of
proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when
the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a
public official or a public figure.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need
not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence
(malice in law) from the defamatory
character of the assailed statement. (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, 1February 11, 2014 )

Meaning of “public figure”: A celebrity

(Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988; Philippine
Journalists Inc. v. Theonen, G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005)

Criticisms against the “lousy performance” of a public official are not presumed
malicious

Criticisms against the “lousy performance” of a public official are qualifiedly

privileged communications and thus would require proof actual malice to

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 hold the critic liable for libel. (Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July
5, 2017)

b) Fair comments on matters of public interest (Fair Comment Doctrine)

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that in
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably
be inferred from the facts. (Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017)

Even assuming that the contents of the articles were false, mere error, inaccuracy or
even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. (Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No.

170341, July 5, 2017)

The Prohibition Against Vague and Overbroad Laws

Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

A law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
(Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)

Overbreadth Doctrine

A proper governmental purpose may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily

sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. An
overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even constitutionally-protected rights.
(Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)

Facial challenges on the ground of vagueness or overbreadth:

Allowed to counter the chilling effect on protected speech

A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a

statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where
it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech
that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether

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 his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or
vague law thus chills him into silence. (Disini v. Secretary of

Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the
ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. The allowance
of a review of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech. (Nicolas-Lewis v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)

Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, as facial challenges, apply only to free speech
cases, not for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred.

(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552,

October 5, 2010)

Examples of void laws for being vague or overbroad

The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is void for
being vague and overbroad

The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement,
"Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?"
The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect
on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting"
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

16
The ban on “partisan political activity abroad” during the 30-day overseas voting period

is void for being overbroad

Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as it does
not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application,
which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and expression, and
ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected freedoms.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court declares Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as
amended by R.A. No. 10590, unconstitutional for violating Section 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019)

Why Article 133 of the RPC (Offending the religious feelings) cannot be struck down on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine

Article 133 of the RPC (Offending the religious feelings) does not encroach on the
freedom of expression as it does not regulate free speech. Moreover, the terms
"notoriously offensive" and "religious feelings" are not utterly vague as they are
composed of words commonly used.

A facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be allowed when

the subject penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech.

Evidently, such is not the case here. Article 133 of the RPC (Offending the religious
feelings) does not encroach on the freedom of expression as it does not regulate free
speech. The gravamen of the penal statute is the disruption of a religious ceremony
and/or worship by committing acts that are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful inside a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a
religious ceremony. There is nothing in the provision that imposes criminal liability
on anyone who wishes to express dissent on another religious group. It does not seek
to prevent or restrict any person from expressing his political opinions or criticisms
against the Catholic church, or any religion.

Jurisprudence further provides that the void-for-vagueness doctrine can only be

invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. As such, a
statute is not vague if it defines the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can

The said terms ("notoriously offensive" and "religious feelings") are not utterly vague
as they are composed of words commonly used. (Celdran y Pamintuan v. People, G.R.
No. 22012, November 21, 2018])

17
 RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

Right to form associations and registration requirements

The requirement of registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, but
merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality and the possession
of the rights and privileges granted by law.

The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to give official status to every
single association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to form themselves
as a collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to be formally recognized by
the state and given all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. The
requirement of registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which
may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua
non for the acquisition of legal personality and the possession of the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate organizations. (Quezon City PTCA Federation v. Department of
Education, February 23, 2016, G.R. No. 188720

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:

the Establishment Clause and

the Free Exercise Clause. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Non-Establishment Clause

The State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another. It calls for government neutrality in religious matters.

(In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-
19-SC, March 7, 2017)

The State cannot sponsor any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It
mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, 8 April 2014)

The Comelec cannot invoke the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of a party from
registration. The government must act for secular purposes. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

18
Free exercise clause

The basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

The guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe and
the freedom to act on one's belief; the first part is absolute; the second part is limited and
subject to regulation where the external acts affect the public welfare. In case of conflict, the
court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

In case of conflict between freedom of religion and government regulation: Doctrine of

Benevolent Neutrality allows accommodation of religion, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

In case of conflict between freedom of religion and government regulation: Strict scrutiny
and compelling state interest test apply: Laws burdening the free exercise of religion should
be subject to strict scrutiny. Only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

204819, 8 April 2014)

Benevolent Neutrality allows for exemption from government regulation:

To compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction
would be violate "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to free exercise
of religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

A 2010 CHED Memorandum has imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic
activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations. Thus, HEI
officials are duty bound to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires
the exemption of students who are Seventh-Day Adventists from academic
responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of their Saturday worship. That a
student is being made by a state university to choose between honoring his religious
obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious
freedoms. (Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)

When the government can compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction:

Compelling state interest, such as to save the life of the mother or a child: If it is
necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may

19
 be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Why the holding of religious rituals such as Catholic masses at the basement of a
government hall of justice may be allowed:

The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their religion.
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church
and State.

There is no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious

freedom in the halls of justice. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must
be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery
of public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their
official functions.

Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is
not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. Benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's religion. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at
the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

RIGHT AGAINST TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE

WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION

Requisites for a valid taking in the exercise of eminent domain

The following are the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain:

(1) the property taken must be private property;

(2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private
property;
(3) the taking must be for public use;
(4) there must be payment of just compensation; and
(5) (5) the taking must comply with due process of law. (Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 110478, October 15, 2007)

20
Requirement No. 1 - “Taking”

Meaning of “taking”: “Taking” in eminent domain includes deprivation of the ordinary

use of property

"Taking" of property takes place when:

(1) the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;

(2) there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his
property;
(3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of the property, or
(4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8
September 2015)

Taking therefore occurs when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the
proprietor of his or her property. So too, when there is "an intrusion so immediate and
direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his
exploitation of it," the said property is deemed taken. (Republic v. Juan Maria Posadas,
G.R. No. 214310, February 24, 2020)

The right-of-way easement is “taking”

The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights

over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within
the ambit of the term “expropriation.” (National Power Corporation v.

Aguirre-Paderanga, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 481; National Power Corporation v. San Pedro,
September 26, 2006)

Easement of right-of-way on the land is equivalent to the taking of property.

(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September
2015)

The presence of transmission lines restricts a landowner’s use of his property.

Petitioner is liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property. (National
Power Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009)

Requirement No. 2 - Genuine necessity

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and that necessity must be of a public character.

21
 The right to take private property for public purposes originates from “the necessity”
and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. (Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. NO. 136349, January 23, 2006)

There is no “necessity” for the taking of a private property to establish a sports and
recreational center if there exists an alternative facility for sports development and
community recreation in the area residents, including those who were the intended
users of the planned sports center. (Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. NO. 136349, January
23, 2006)

Requirement No. 3 - Public use

“Public use” in eminent domain means “public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and
public convenience. It is no longer confined to “use by the public.”
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation v. 15 April 2005)
“Public use” in eminent domain does not depend on number of people served or size of the
property. (Barangay Sindalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007)

“Public use” now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage,
including in particular, urban land reform and housing. (Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110478, October 15, 2007)

"Socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". (Manapat v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007)

Requirement No. 4 - Just compensation

Just compensation: Full and fair equivalent of the property taken:

Fair market value as standard

Just compensation means the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The standard value is the "fair market value" of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of
the taking of property, whichever is earlier. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892,
209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)

No requirement of full payment of just compensation prior to government takeover of

property. (Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, September
8, 2015)

Reckoning point for determination of just compensation: Value of the property at the time
of taking or the filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is earlier. (Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

22
The reckoning point for determination of just compensation is the value of the property
at the time of taking, even if the valuation is outdated

Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just
compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just
compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just
compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking,
that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears outdated. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

Just compensation should be equivalent to principal sum plus interest

The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the
unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed. (Republic v.
Macabagdal, G.R. No. 227215, January 10, 2018)

Interest shall commence from the date of the taking

Interest must be paid in case of delay, to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Legislative enactments, as

well as executive issuances, fixing or providing fix the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are mere guidelines in ascertaining the
amount of just compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Zabala, G.R. No. 173520, January
30, 2013)

Actions for just compensation are not barred by prescription

An action for payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is
taken by the Government for public use without expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson,
G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

Actions for just compensation are not barred by laches

An action for payment of just compensation is not barred by laches. Laches as a

doctrine of equity does not apply because law and equity dictate payment of just

23
 compensation. Thus, even after the lapse of more than 50 years, a property owner may
still file a claim to demand just compensation for the taking of his property without
the benefit of expropriations proceedings. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

Requirement No. 5 - Due process

Expropriation cases are divided into two stages: 1) the first is concerned with the propriety
of condemning the property; while 2) the second involves the determination of just
compensation

Expropriation cases are divided into two stages. The first is concerned with the
propriety of condemning the property, while the second involves the determination
of just compensation. The first phase begins with the filing of the complaint before the
trial court, which is then tasked to ascertain the purpose of the taking. If it finds that
the property is being taken for a public purpose, it shall issue an order condemning
the property, otherwise it must dismiss the case. If the court issues an order of
condemnation, it must then proceed to the second phase - the determination of just
compensation. (Republic v. Juan Maria Posadas, G.R. No. 214310, February 24, 2020)

Police Power v. Eminent Domain (Compensable Taking)

In police power, property is rights are not appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the
public. In eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public
purpose. (Equitable Bank v. South Rich Acres, G.R. No. 202384, May 04, 2021)

Examples of Compensable “Taking” of Property

An ordinance declaring a private road network as a public road

City Ordinance No. 343-97, Series of 1997 (City Ordinance No. 343-97) declared
Marcos Alvarez Avenue as a public road. SRA is the legal owner of the seven parcels
of land (subject lots) which formed part of a private road network, collectively referred
to as Marcos Alvarez Avenue. The declaration of the entirety of Marcos Alvarez
Avenue as a public road despite the fact that the subject lots are owned by SRA is an
act of unlawful taking of SRA's property. The taking of SRA's property without just
compensation amounts to confiscation which is beyond the ambit of police power.
(Equitable Bank v. South Rich Acres, G.R. No. 202384, May 04, 2021)

Road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government
should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be

24
 utilized as a public road." Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the
owner-developer." (Equitable Bank v. South Rich Acres, G.R. No. 202384, May 04, 2021)

Mandatory five-meter setback of fences of private property to provide for public parking
space amounts to a deprivation of the beneficial use of private property, and thus, is a
compensable taking

A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to
provide for parking space for the general public is tantamount to a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The implementation of the
ordinance requiring a five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area for
the public would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107,
March 12, 2013)

Examples of No Taking of Private Property

Mandatory discounts on price of goods

The law mandating senior citizens’ discounts does not amount to a compensable
taking of private property because there is no private property invaded or
appropriated, as what is supposedly taken is not earned profits but merely an
expectation of profits. There can be no taking of a contingency or of a mere
possibility. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R.
No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

The law mandating senior citizens’ discount is not a taking of private property
without just compensation, as the regulation affects only the seller's right to profit,
not earned profits. The right to profit is not a vested right, but an inchoate right, a
mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence. (Southern Luzon Drug
v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

25
Requirements for Eminent Domain by LGUs

Requirements under A 7160 (Local Government Code)

(1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property;

(2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;

(3) there is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and

(4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. (City of
Manila v. Prieto, July 8, 2019, G.R. No. 221366)

Requirements under RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)

There must be a showing that 1) an attempt was made to first acquire the lands that
are higher in priority before proceeding to expropriate respondents' private lands;
private lands are last in the order of priority of acquisition for socialized housing 2)
the areas are the proper subjects of on-site development (dilapidated, obsolete, and
unsanitary); 3) prospective beneficiaries of the expropriation are the "underprivileged
and homeless" 4) the other modes of acquisition (such as negotiated sale) were first
exhausted over the filing of an expropriation suit. (City of Manila v. Prieto, G.R. No.
221366, July 8, 2019)

TRAVEL

Constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations on the right to travel:

Under the Constitution, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they:

(1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and

(2) are provided by law. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)

As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

26
DOJ Secretary has no authority to curtain the right to travel

There is no law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. In the conduct of a
preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not necessary, and thus, the DOJ
cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement on the ground that it is necessary to
ensure attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints. The DOJ cannot keep
an individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal
prosecution. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)

PRIVACY

Meaning of the right to privacy

The right to be let alone. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Three strands of the right to privacy

Locational, Informational, and Decisional privacy. The right to informational privacy is

usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. (Vivares
v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

When the right to privacy can be asserted:

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test

The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)

whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013)

Privacy with respect to Facebook posts and computer data

To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep
posts private through the use of privacy tools. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666,
September 29, 2014)

A Facebook user cannot invoke his right to privacy with respect to his Facebook post, unless
he manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the use of Facebook's privacy
tools. The utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the
user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. (Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C.
No. 11394, December 01, 2016)

27
 Where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with
coworkers and kept his computer locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
computer files. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Privacy in one’s residence

Surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013)

An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is
a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the right to privacy.
(People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014; Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017, G.R. No. 200370)

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Reasonable and Unreasonable Seizures: Arrests

Valid Warrantless Arrests

Valid warrantless arrests:
In Flagrante Delicto, Hot Pursuit, and Escaped Prisoner Arrests
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances wherein a
peace officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant: A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

28
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a
warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (l) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (People v. Comprado, G.R.
No. 213225, April 4, 2018; Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019; Veridiano v. People,
G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. (People v. Comprado,
G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018; Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019; Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

In flagrante delicto arrest

Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014;
Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: Reliable information alone is

not enough to justify a warrantless in flagrante delicto arrest. There must be an overt
act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed,
was being committed, or is about to be committed. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529,
August 3, 2010)

Examples of lack of overt act requirement for an in flagrante delicto arrest

Arrest of a jeepney passenger at a checkpoint on the basis of an informant’s tip cannot

be justified as a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, absent any overt act from the person
to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed,
or is about to be committed. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

29
The mere acts of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler and boarding a tricycle
are not sufficient for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. Such acts cannot be considered
criminal. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act
that justifies an in flagrante delicto arrest. (Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018)

The mere act of carrying a bag while riding a bus is not an overt physical act that could
have raised suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that the person to be
arrested had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime to
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. (People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)

The acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one's hands
cannot considered criminal acts to justify a warrantless arrest. (Dominguez v. People,
G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)

Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when no crime has
been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. There was no
overt act that person had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting
to commit a crime to justify a warrantless arrest. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July
7, 2014)

Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest without an

overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Thus, the warrantless arrest, based on an
informant’s tip, of a person who had just alighted from a bus and was waiting for a
tricycle ride is invalid. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)

The police officers could not have identified items like clear sachets with miniscule
amounts of white powder while peering from a slightly opened door ten meters away.
(People v. Rangaig, G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021)

Holding ball pens, papelitos, and money and not being small town lottery employees
do not, by themselves, constitute an illegal gambling activity. Considering that the
arresting officers were about five (5) meters away from the supposed criminal
transaction, it would be highly implausible for them to ascertain with reasonable
accuracy that the aforesaid items were being used as gambling paraphernalia. There
was no other overt act that could be properly attributed to petitioners so as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that the former had just committed,
were committing, or were about to commit a crime. (Cruz v. People, July 1, 2019, G.R.
No. 238141)

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Hot pursuit arrest

Hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a
crime, but must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that
the person sought to be arrested committed it. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07
June 2017)

Probable cause in hot pursuit arrest: Police present during the commission of the
offense is not required, but probable cause is required: Police presence during the
commission of the offense is not required for a hot pursuit arrest. It is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has
probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances,
that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso,
G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

Personal knowledge as basis for probable cause in a hot pursuit arrest: Probable
cause must be based on the arresting officer’s personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. (Pestilos
v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

Example of lack of probable cause for a hot pursuit arrest

The police officers proceeded to, and entered, the house of the accused based solely
on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house.
Thus, they had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead
them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. (People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)

When police officers chased the tricycle to arrest the accused, they had no personal
knowledge to believe that they accused bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer
and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. (Sanchez v.
People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless hot pursuit arrest, because the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that the accused had just committed a crime. (Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06,
2018)

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 Requirement of immediacy in hot pursuit arrest

The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy
in point of time." -- The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It
connotes "immediacy in point of time." An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to
the point of arrest. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element
of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise,
the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search
incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary
rule of the 1987 Constitution. (People v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016)

Examples of lack of immediacy for a hot pursuit arrest

The arrest of a robbery suspect at a checkpoint one day after the robbery and after
investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted by the police.
(People v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016)

Arrest of suspects 3 days after commission of the crime.

Arrest of a person one day after the commission of the crime.

Arrest of a person six days after the commission of the crime.

(Pestilos v. Generoso and People, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

Reasonable and Unreasonable Searches

The Meaning of “Search”

There is a “search” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if there is an

intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (Saluday v. People, April
3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)

The reasonable expectation of privacy test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. "The reasonableness of a person’s expectation
of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has

32
 exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Examples of a “search”

Collection by the government of bulk traffic data (electronic communication’s origin,

destination, route, time, date)

Section 12 of the Cybercrime empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due

cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in realtime.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities. The
Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and
"adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since
Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a
general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the
Constitution prohibits. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

Mandatory drug testing

(Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

Restricting and blocking access to private computer data

Sec. 19 of RA 10175, empowers the DOJ to order to restrict or block access to such computer
data. Computer data are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether
while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in
one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute
for judicial search warrant. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11,
2014)

Accessing and copying contents of a computer hard drive

(see Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

33
 Disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination of computer data

The Supreme Court already issued the Rules of Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No.1711-03-
SC dated 03 July 2018) covering the procedure for the application and grant of warrants
and related orders involving the preservation, disclosure, interception, search,
seizure, and/or examination, as well as the custody, and destruction of computer data,
as provided under Republic Act No. (RA) 10175, otherwise known as the "Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012."

Use of surveillance cameras to cover places where there is reasonable expectation of

privacy

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere
for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however,
should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013)

The State Action Requirement

The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against searches by private individuals. If the search
is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No.
209387, January 11, 2016)

When private individuals are considered agents of the state

Security personnel of the Cebu Port Authority should be considered agents of the
government under the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function and thus they are
deemed agents of government. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

A search by agents of persons in authority, such as barangay tanods, is covered by the

Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)

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 Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen are also considered law enforcers or agents
of the government for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. (Dela Cruz v.
People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016) Bantay Bayan or civilian volunteers are
deemed law enforcers for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. (Miguel v.
People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017)

Unreasonable: Searches and Seizures

Unreasonable: Searches WITHOUT a Warrant

A search and seizure must be carried through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure become “unreasonable.” (People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16,
2020) The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any
evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

(Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019)

A search and seizure carried out without a judicial warrant becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitution. (Sindac v. People, G.R. No. 220732, September
06, 2016; People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)

Cybercrime warrants: The disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or

examination, of computer data related to a cybercrime must be authorized by the
courts through the issuance of a cybercrime warrant. (Rules of Cybercrime Warrants,
A.M. No.17-11-03-SC dated 03 July 2018)

Unreasonable: Searches under an INVALID Warrant

A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its
issuance; otherwise, it is void, and the search conducted on its authority is likewise
null and void. (Ogayon v. People, G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015)

Constitutional requisites for a valid search warrant: 1) probable cause; 2) to be

determined personally by the judge; 3) judge must examine under oath or
affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and 4) the warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (People v. Gabiosa, G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020;
Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)

Additional requirements for the validity of a warrant under the Rules of Court:
Warrant must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge, before

35
 issuing the warrant, must personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them. (Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure; People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)

Requirement: Probable cause: Probable cause for a search warrant means the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched. (People v. Pastrana, G.R.
No. 196045, February 21, 2018; World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106,
January 13, 2014)

Requirement: Determination by the judge of probable cause: The judge must

personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them. (Ogayon v. People, G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015)

There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered
by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. In the absence of records
indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant
and his witnesses, the search warrant is a nullity. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)

Requirement: One specific offense: A search warrant must be issued in relation to

one specific offense (Dimal v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)

Reason for the one specific offense requirement in search warrants: To ensure that the
warrant is issued only on the basis of probable cause. Otherwise, it would be
impossible for the judges to find the existence of probable cause. The purpose is to
outlaw general warrants. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)

A search warrant for violation of the Securities Regulation Code and Estafa is invalid.
(People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)

REASONABLE SEARCHES:

1. Valid Warrantless Searches

Search as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime

2. Administrative Searches
Search conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme or for an administrative purpose

36
Valid Warrantless Searches
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a judge before
a search can be validly effected. The rule requiring warrants is, however, not absolute.
Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when warrantless searches and seizures are
considered permissible:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019;
Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019)

Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything

which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense

without a search warrant. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything

which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without
a search warrant. (Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; People
v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592, March 21, 2000)

The requirement of lawful arrest prior to the search: For a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest, the lawful arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
There must be a valid arrest before there can be a valid search incident to a lawful
arrest. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)

In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding the
search, the process cannot be reversed. (Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2,
2015)

Limitations to a search incidental to a lawful arrest

Limitation as to Area: Immediate Control Test: A valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the

37
 area of his immediate control. The “area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. (People
v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)

Limitation: There must be a prior lawful arrest (See discussion on Valid Warrantless
Arrests)

Search of a Moving Vehicle

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se

are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of
individuals and ensure their safety or where the government's survival is in danger.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

Visual Search of Vehicles

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks is not violative of the right against unreasonable searches. (Veridiano v. People,
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

Examples of valid visual searches: For the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be

non-violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, the search must
be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) where the officer simply
looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the
car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e)
where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;
and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. (People v. Sapla, G.R. No.
244045, June 16, 2020)

Extensive Search of Vehicles

Valid when probable cause is present. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7,
2017)

An extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is probable

cause. (Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018)

A more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the
vehicle necessitates probable cause. (People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)

38
 An extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law
enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a
crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense. (Veridiano v. People, G.R.
No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

Examples of lack of probable cause for an extensive

search of a motor vehicle

Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.
A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

An extensive search of a passenger of a jeepney -- based only on a tip from a concerned

citizen and absent any peculiar activity from that passenger that may either arouse
their suspicion -- is invalid for lack of probable cause. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017)

Warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information can be valid if

there are other circumstances that justify a warrantless search. (Veridiano v.

People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

The police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle.
He noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police officers was the
sole basis for their belief of the alleged transportation of marijuana. Searches at
checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause, should be limited only to a visual
search. The arresting officers' search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the
two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be
admitted in evidence. (People v. Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019)

For there to be a properly exceptional search of a moving vehicle, law enforcers

should not have proceeded from a preconceived notion of any specific individual's
liability. The police cannot just wait for the target person to ride a motor vehicle,
setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle
when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person. (Evardo v. People,
G.R. No. 234317, May 10, 2021)

Customs Search

Requirements for a valid warrantless customs search: (1) the persons conducting the
search were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the
enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a

39
 dwelling place or house. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

Plain View Doctrine

Under the plain view doctrine, during the conduct of the search, objects falling in plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Plain view doctrine requirements: a) prior justification for intrusion; b) inadvertent
discovery; and c) contraband is immediately apparent.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
(Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020; Dominguez v. People, G.R. No.
235898, March 13, 2019; Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)

The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.

(Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019

Prior justification for intrusion: Law enforcer must be in a lawful position when he
discovered contraband. -- The first requisite of the plain view doctrine assumes that
the law enforcement officer has "a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area[.]" This means that the officer who made the
warrantless seizure must have been in a lawful position when he discovered the target
contraband or evidence in plain view. (Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020)

The requirement of valid intrusion under plain view doctrine: Law enforcers must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which they can
particularly view the area. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)

Examples of invalid seizure due to lack of valid intrusion

Without a search warrant, the police officers intentionally peeped first

through the window of the house before they saw and ascertained the
activities of accused inside the room. The objects were not validly seized

in plain view. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)

A municipal mayor has no authority to conduct warrantless search or

ocular inspection on a mining site. -- Mayor Pilapil and his team of police
officers and barangay officials were able to view the subject explosives
during the course of their ocular inspection on the mining site operated by

40
 BCMC and Prime Rock. Mayor Pilapil and his team entered and conducted
an ocular inspection on the mining site of BCMC and Prime Rock without
any judicial warrant. The Local Government Code does not authorize a
municipal mayor to conduct warrantless inspections of mining sites. The
Mining Act and its RIRR do not confer any authority upon a municipal
mayor to conduct any kind of inspection on any mining area or site.

The illegality of the aforesaid ocular inspection means that Mayor Pilapil and
his team were not in a lawful position when they were able to view the
subject explosives. Accordingly, Mayor Pilapil and his team's subsequent
warrantless seizure of the subject explosives is not reasonable and runs
against the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020)

Immediately apparent test: Items not inherently unlawful cannot be seized under
the plain view doctrine. Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Example of evidence not immediately apparent: There can be no valid plain
view seizure if at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily
apparent to the police that the very small plastic sachet contained anything,
much less shabu. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)

The requirement of “inadvertence”: The plain view doctrine is applied where a police
officer is not searching for the evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. (People v. Calantiao, G.R. No.
203984, June 18, 2014; Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)

The "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching"
for evidence against the accused. The discovery was not inadvertent. (People
v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019)

Invalid seizure because the evidence was not inadvertently discovered:

When the police went to arrest the accused on a complaint for mauling and
proceeded to seize the marijuana plants near his home, after obtaining prior
knowledge that he had planted marijuana near his home. The discovery is not
inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be
contraband in the area. (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019)

Consented Search
When a person himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal

right which may be waived. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. (Acosta

41
v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019) The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. (People
v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)

The consent must be voluntary, unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,

uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent must be voluntary in order
to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence,
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019)

Consent to a search must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given. Signing

of the pro-forma Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection of firearm at one’s
residence cannot be considered a valid waiver of the right against unreasonable
searches. The applicant cannot intelligently consent to the warrantless inspection at
his residence under RA 10591 because of the lack of parameters on how the inspection
shall be conducted by the police. (Acosta v.

Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019)

Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress. The

constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary
such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)

If a police officer, without coercion or intimidation, asks for permission to open a bag
and the bag owner says, “yes, just open it,” there is consent to the search of the
contents of the bag. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)

Silence or lack of resistance to search is not necessarily consent to a search but mere
implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017)

A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as
a waiver. A peaceful submission to a search is not consent but is merely a
demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law. (People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No.
136267, July 10, 2001)

An implied acquiescence to the search may be mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances, and cannot be considered consent. (People
v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

42
 Silence or lack of resistance is not necessarily consent to a warrantless search but
mere implied acquiescence given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)

Stop and Frisk Search (“Terry search”)

A "stop and frisk" search is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. (Veridiano v. People,
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017; Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

When a “stop and frisk” search is permissible: Where a police officer observes
unusual conduct, which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
dangerous. (People v. Binad Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003)

Scope of Stop-and-Frisk Search:

Scope of stop-and-frisk is limited to protective search of outer clothing for

weapons. (People v. Binad Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657, 04 February 2003)

The allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search
of outer clothing for weapons." (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7,
2017)

A “stop and frisk” becomes unlawful the moment the police officers continue
with the search on a person’s body even after that finding this person has no
weapon. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)

Requirement for stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine reason that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous.
(People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance

with his experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R.
No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

Mere suspicion is not enough for a “stop-and-frisk”; there must be “genuine

reason” to believe that the person has a concealed weapon. (People v. Cogaed,
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, People v. Binad Sy Chua, February 4, 2003)

43
 Genuine reason for a “stop and frisk”: The combination of the police asset's
tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under
person's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to
conduct a stop and frisk search. (Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20,
2019)

Stop-and-frisk procedure for the police: Stop a citizen on the street,

interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. (Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

REASONABLE SEARCHES:
Administrative Searches

Administrative search doctrine:

When the search is not based on suspicion and when special needs beyond law
enforcement make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable

The Constitution permits the warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses;

"special needs" cases such as schools, employment, and probation; and "checkpoint"
searches such as airport screenings under the administrative search doctrine. Because
administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting criminal
wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. Where the risk to public safety
is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank
as "reasonable." (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

Searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an

administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible though not supported by probable cause
directed to a particular place or person to be searched. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No.
229071, December 10, 2018)

a) Reasonable: Routine Security Search of Departing Passengers at

Airports

A warrantless search of departing passengers pursuant to airport security procedure

is reasonable given its minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (People
v. Johnston, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 526; People v. Canton, G.R.
No. 148825, 27 December 2002; People v. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003; People
v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

44
Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.
(People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

Airport security searches are lawful administrative searches because (1) these
searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward finding particular
items (weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose grave danger to
airplanes and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-on luggage is no more intrusive
than is necessary to ensure air travel safety); (3) airline passengers have advance notice
that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to these security measures; (4) all
passengers are subject to the same screening procedures; and (5) passengers are aware
that they can avoid the screening process altogether by electing not to board the plane.
(People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

Routine security searches of passengers attempting to board on aircraft are

reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Thus,
illegal drugs discovered on a departing passenger during routine airport frisk
pursuant to airport security procedures may be validly seized. (People v. Johnston, G.R.
No. 138881, December 18, 2018)

Screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a general regulatory

scheme to prevent hijackings. The search cannot be transformed from a limited check
for weapons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime. (People v.
O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

Once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, an airport search

can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale. Where an action
is taken that is simply unrelated to the administrative goal of screening luggage and
passengers for weapons or explosives, the action exceeds the scope of the permissible
search, and the evidence obtained during such a search should be excluded. (People v.
O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

If a potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to fly before
placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt. The right to abandon air
travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening procedures. (People v.

O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the AntiHijacking
program. A search on the person of the passenger or on his personal belongings in a
deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under
the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement. Thus, illegal drugs
discovered after a pat down search by airport security personnel at the final security

45
 checkpoint based only on reliable information, and not during the initial security
check in the course of the routine airport screening – are inadmissible as evidence,
the search being unreasonable.
(People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)

b) Reasonable: Warrantless Search by the Government Agency of the

Office Computer of its Own Employee in connection with an
Administrative Investigation of WorkRelated Misconduct

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures equally applies to a government
workplace. Individuals do not lose this merely because they work for the government
instead of a private employer. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011)

Test to determine the validity of an employer’s intrusion into an employee’s privacy:

1) whether an employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy; and 2) whether the
employer’s intrusion for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, is
reasonable. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Probable cause is not required for a public employer to conduct a legitimate, work-
related non-investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct. Such intrusion should be judged by the standard of reasonableness.
(Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Test for determining the reasonableness of an employer’s intrusion into an employee’s

right to privacy: 1) whether the action was justified at its inception; and 2) whether
the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference. A search of an employee’s office by
a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-
related purpose. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Example of an employee who failed to prove that he had an actual subjective

expectation of privacy in is government office or government-issued computer:
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share
with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to
prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he
submits that he normally would have visitors in his office, whom he even allowed to
use his computer. (Pollo v. Constantino-

46
 David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

A government employee’s subjective expectation of privacy can be negated by a

government policy regulating the use of office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Example of a reasonable search of a government employee’s computer files: A

search by a government employer of an employee’s office undertaken in connection
with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No.
181881, October
18, 2011)

c) Reasonable: Mandatory, Random and Suspicion-less Drug-Testing

for Secondary and Tertiary Level Students to Stamp Out Drug Abuse

The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug

testing of students are constitutional. It is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute;
it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

d) Reasonable: Mandatory, Random and Suspicion-less Drug-Testing for

Employees in the Private and Public Sector, to Stamp out Drug Abuse

Reasonableness of an administrative search is judged by the balancing of the

intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. Given that the drug testing policy for employees--and
students for that matter under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search the
probable cause standard is not required or even practicable. (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

Reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace: The employees' privacy interest in

an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)

47
 Reasonableness of the intrusion of a mandatory, random, suspicionless drug-
testing for employees under RA 9165: The scope of the search or intrusion is narrowly
drawn or narrowly focused. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.
157870, November 3, 2008)

Taking into account the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, the challenged drug test requirement is
reasonable and, constitutional. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws. Civil servants, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. The search is reasonable, and
thus constitutional. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008)

e) Reasonable: Routine Baggage Inspections at Domestic

Seaports by Port Authorities

Searches pursuant to domestic port security measures are not unreasonable per se.
The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to
routine security procedures in airports. The reason behind it is that there is a reduced
reasonable expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel. (Dela
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a
crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to
safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R.
No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

f) Reasonable: Non-Intrusive Public Bus Searches for Public Safety

48
The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in a
public bus. The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others
may be put at risk. A person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or
she enters private premises that are accessible to the public. Thus, a bus inspection at
a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No.
215305, April 3, 2018)

Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches:

Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray
scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked.
In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags
and luggages for inspection, in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object,
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of
information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person
and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon
receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passenger en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine
inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person
boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to
stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to
evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at
designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for
a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggage.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the
bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the
search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar
motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the
purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the

49
 evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against
the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports,

are in that category. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)

The Exclusionary Rule

Effect of unlawful search and seizure: Evidence obtained is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel. x x x (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The above
provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights." (People
v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)

When Miranda Rights are available:

ONLY during Custodial Investigation

The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial
investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and
is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission. (People v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)

Miranda rights apply only during a custodial investigation, when the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)

50
What custodial investigation means: Person is a suspect, under custody and being
questioned by the police: Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which
tend to elicit an admission. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015)

If a person, before he is arrested and placed under custodial investigation, voluntarily

confesses to the police his commission of a crime, such confession, even if done without the
assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right, and is admissible
as evidence. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015)

Confession to the police when the person was not yet a suspect is admissible as evidence
because he was not yet under custodial investigation. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R.
No. 221424)

Miranda rights are not available in administrative investigations. Thus, an employee’s

written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in
connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment is admissible as evidence against the employee. (Manila Water Company v.
Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014)

A person under custodial investigation must be assisted by counsel at all times. If the lawyer
assisted only during the time the accused executed his extrajudicial confession, the
extrajudicial confession is invalid. (People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)

The counsel must be independent and competent

A legal consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor -- whose duty is to provide legal
advice to the Mayor whose duty, in turn, is to execute the laws and ordinances and
maintain peace and order in the municipality -- cannot be considered as an independent
counsel since protecting the rights of the accused as a suspect is in direct conflict with his
duty to the Municipal Mayor and the local government of the Municipality. (People v. Paris,

G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)

He should not merely give a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. (People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)

51
 BAIL
Purpose

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

Who are entitled to bail

Any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

Bail as a matter of right v. as a matter of discretion

Bail is a matter of right -- before conviction, when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua;

Bail becomes a matter of discretion -- if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
(People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019)

Procedure when bail is discretionary: To determine whether evidence of guilt of the

accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings. (People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April
03, 2019)

Bail is neither a matter of right or discretion – when the accused is convicted of a capital offense

When constitutional right to bail ends: After conviction of a capital

offense

Bail should be denied to an accused who was convicted of a capital offense. If an accused
who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court
and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the
accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not
have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient
to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused
during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

In this case, Napoles was charged with Plunder, a capital offense which carries with it the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, applying all the above legal precepts, the presumption
of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail ends. (People v. Revilla, G.R. No.
247611, January 13, 2021)

52
Bail in special and compelling circumstances: Bail regardless of evidence
of guilt

When there is a need for continuing medication to preserve the health of the accused
throughout the criminal proceedings, and guarantee his appearance in court, and continued
incarceration were shown to be injurious to their health, or endanger their life. (People v.
Revilla, G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

When bail may be allowed regardless of the crime charged and independently of the
merits of the charge: When the incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. -- Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
The objective of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

When Mandela Rules apply to those convicted of a capital offense

Revised United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson
Mandela Rules) do not support the release of PDLs pending the appeal of their conviction
of a capital offense. It is only when advance medical treatment is required or prison
hospitals prove to be inadequate will the PDLs be brought to the nearest hospital for
treatment. (People v. Revilla, G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Presumption of innocence: The law than an accused's presence during a hazing is prima
facie evidence of his or her participation, does not violate the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a logical
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When such prima facie
evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the conviction founded on such
evidence will be valid. However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable presumption does not preclude the presentation of
contrary evidence. (Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020)

SPEEDY TRIAL &

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

The right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases: Protection against vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)

53
 The right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions, while the right to
speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018)

Balancing Test: Four factors to consider to determine a violation of the right to a speedy trial:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant." (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018; People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)

Examples of violation of the right

Pre-trial was not held for more than 1 year-after the arrest; the prosecution failed to present
any evidence during the 4 settings with any justifiable reason; the accused was in detention
during the trial; and the accused moved for the dismissal of the case for violation of his right
to a speedy trial. (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)

The more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine
issue (like venue in libel cases) is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. (People v. Macasaet,
G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018)

Effect of violation of the right

Dismissal on the ground of violation of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal.
(People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
The right to speedy trial and right to speedy disposition of cases

The right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions, while the right to
speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)

Reckoning point for determining delay

The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint
shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
(Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against
the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of
whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. For the purpose of
determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the
filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
The ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for determination of
inordinate delay is abandoned. (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018, G.R. No. 206438)

54
 The fact-finding investigation by the Ombudsman conducted before the filing of a formal
complaint, as in investigations relating to anonymous complaints or motu proprio
investigations by the Ombudsman, will not be counted in determining the attendance of
delay. During such fact-finding investigations and prior to the filing of a formal complaint,
the party involved cannot yet invoke the right to speedy disposition of his case since he is
not yet subjected to any adverse proceeding. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019)

Prior to a person’s inclusion as respondent in the preliminary investigation, his right to

speedy disposition of case cannot be invoked as he was not yet subjected to any adverse
proceeding. (Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Requirements for double jeopardy:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the
crime charged;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021)

The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)

Jeopardy will not attach in case of dismissal of a complaint during preliminary investigation.
The preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial, and the dismissal of a case during
preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy. (Jamaca v.
People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)

If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was dismissed upon
the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No.
176830, February 11, 2014)

"Finality-of-acquittal" rule: A judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately executory

upon its promulgation.

The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-
ofacquittal" rule, which, makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately
executory upon its promulgation. The State with all its resources and power should not be

55
 allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty.

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.

(People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021)

Grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.

Once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant amounts to an
acquittal. Any further prosecution for the same offense would violate the accused's
constitutional right against double jeopardy. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 233437, April
26, 2021)

Provisional dismissal is not an acquittal; hence, jeopardy will not attach.

The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal is
made with the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy does not attach.

(Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)

EXCEPTION to the "finality-of-acquittal" rule: When the Court commits grave abuse of
discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due
process. --

The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the Court which
rendered the acquittal did so with— grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever
there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is denied the
opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial,
rendering the judgment of acquittal void. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14,
2021)

CONFRONTATION

The right to confront and cross-examine a witness is not available during preliminary
investigation, which is not part of trial. -- Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. (Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)

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 INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
The statutory requirement on private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bono reproductive health services does not amount to involuntary servitude
but only regulation of profession. The practice of medicine is imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it for the public welfare. The practice
of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. Congress has the power to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014)

CRUEL AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT

A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature
of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.

The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional
and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman. (Fuertes v.
Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020)

Perpetual disqualification from public office is not cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. (Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

BILLS OF ATTAINDER

Bill of attainder: A legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals without a judicial
trial

Bills of attainder are prohibited under A11icle III, Section 22 of the Constitution. A bill of
attainder is generally understood as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. A bill of attainder
encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to
impose the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

Essence of a bill of attainder: Exclusion of courts from determination of guilt

The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the
determination of guilt and imposable penalty. Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either
to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Fuertes v.
Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020)

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 The Anti-Hazing Law is not a bill of attainder. The law does not make a determination or
declaration of guilt. The mere filing of an Information is not a finding of their guilt of the crime
charged. The prosecution must still prove the offense, and the accused's participation in it, beyond
reasonable doubt. (Fuertes v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020)

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Right to information and the State’s duty of full public disclosure. The constitutional
guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure in all transactions
involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These
provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in the Government. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and
Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210)

Requisites for invoking the right to information:

• the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public

interest; and

• it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
(Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210)

Exempt from the right to information: Closed-door cabinet meetings

The constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national
security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and
criminal matters, diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting, executive
sessions of either house of Congress, and internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Close-
door Cabinet meetings are not covered in order to allow the free exchange of ideas among
Government officials. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R.
No. 175210)

Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the

bidding or review committee.

While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or
decisions" on the bids or proposals. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, G.R.
No. 210858, June 29, 2016)

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Deliberative process privilege

Deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations,

and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No.
210858)

Fundamental requirements for the communication to be covered by the deliberative process

privilege: 1) pre-decisional; and 2) deliberative: First, the communication must be pre-
decisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy." Second, the communication
must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes
recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." Records which are
"predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature - part of or related to the deliberative process,
i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations, and similar papers - are protected and cannot be the subject of a
subpoena. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA

International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

THE WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Writ of Kalikasan:
For violation of constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology

A remedy against violation of constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The
violation must involve environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the
issuance of the writ. (Braga v. Abaya, G.R. No. 223076, September 13, 2016)

Requirements:

1) actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful

ecology;
2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017; LNL
Archipelago Minerals v. Agham Party List, April 12, 2016, G.R. No. 209165)

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Precautionary principle

When there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in
resolving the case. This rule applies when the link between the cause, that is the human
activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot
be established with full scientific certainty. (West Tower Condominium Corporation v. First
Philippine Industrial Corporation, .R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015)

Precautionary principle in environmental cases: Where there is lack of full scientific certainty
in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the courts
may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of
preserving and protecting the environment. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)

Precautionary principle requires scientific basis. As much as possible, a complete and

objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted
and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of
action. (Mosequeda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, G.R. No. 189185, August
16, 2016)

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The Writ of Habeas Corpus

A speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, meaning any
restraint that will preclude freedom of action. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)

Applies to illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint

A Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty
is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court because since then, the restraint has
become legal. The element of illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal
restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus.
(Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)

Applies to unlawful restraint, illegal confinement or detention

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which

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 any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance of
the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. (Abellana v. Paredes, G.R.

No. 232006, July 10, 2019)

Applies as a post-conviction remedy

The writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when 1) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as such excess. (Abellana v. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006,
July 10, 2019)

No applicable when persons detained by virtue of a judicial or legal process

The writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to obtain the release of persons
detained by virtue of a judicial process. -- If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Habeas corpus has
been denied on the ground that the persona seeking relief were detained by virtue of a
lawful process. Habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same. Rodolfo is, therefore, not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
(Salas v. Medina, G.R. No. 251693, September 28, 2020)

If a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. -- If a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted of this
jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of the proceedings. (Abellana v. Paredes,
G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019)

THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Nature of the Writ of Amparo

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 For the protection of the right to life, liberty, and security, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Callo v. Commissioner
Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)

Meaning of Enforced Disappearance.

The arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,
with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
(Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)

Characteristics of enforced disappearance

a) deprivation of liberty;

b) by authority, support or acquiescence of the State;

c) refusal to give information as to the whereabouts of the person; and

d) intention to remove the person from protection of the law for a prolonged period. (Callo
v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)

Meaning of extralegal killings:

Killings without due process of law. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324,
September 19, 2017)

The Amparo Rule is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof

The Amparo Rule is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof. If the petitioners admit that their petition does not cover extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, the petition for the writ of amparo should be
dismissed. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

The writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

No determination of criminal, civil or administrative liability

Writ of amparo proceedings do not determine criminal, civil, or administrative liability, but
only whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof has transpired.
(Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)

In the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. (Republic v. Cayanan, G.R.
No. 181796, November 7, 2017)

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 There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and
habeas data proceedings. Courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or
accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

(Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011)

Duty of respondents in amparo proceedings

Show extraordinary diligence in the conduct of investigation. The respondent public

official cannot invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty to evade
responsibility or liability. (Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017)

Extraordinary diligence in investigation: Passive certificates to the effect that the missing
person was not being detained by any of them are severely inadequate and amount to a
general denial, which is not allowed. (Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017)

Extraordinary diligence: Details of the investigation conducted must be given. -- Under

the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations
conducted by the authorities in a manner that would enable the court to judiciously
determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain a missing person’s whereabouts had been
sincere and adequate. (Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017)

The failure of the police to conduct a fair and effect investigation may amount to a
violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person. The right to
security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the
observance of the duty to investigate. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011)

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

Writ of habeas data: Nexus between right to privacy and right to life,
liberty or security must exist

There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty, or security on the other for the writ to be granted. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R.
No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

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 The petitioner must show that the supposed dissemination of a sex video will violate his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right

to life, liberty or security on the other. (Lee v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014)

Remedies under the writ of habeas data: Suppression or destruction of data

The remedies against the violation of the right to privacy can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession
or in control of respondents. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014)

Overriding legitimate state interest vs. the right to privacy: The

right to privacy in life, liberty or security must yield to an
overriding legitimate state interest

The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or overriding state
interest deemed legitimate and compelling. An application for a writ of habeas data
may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty or security must yield to an
overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of private armed groups
(PAGs). (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

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