Basic Principles of Interpretation

Under the guidance

Of
Professor Radhika Rodrigues

Submitted By: Kunal Dalvi

Roll no: 213018
Class: T.Y. LL.B
Signature:

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 Index
Sr. no Topic

1. Meaning of Interpretation or Construction

2. Intention of Legislature

3. Rule of Literal Construction

4. The Mischief Rule: Heydon’s Case

5. Rule of Reasonable Construction or Golden Rule

6. Rule of Harmonious Construction

7. Rule of Ejusdem Generis

8. Expressio Units EstExclusioAlterius

9. ContemporaneaExpositioEst Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

10. Noscitur a Sociis

11. Strict and Liberal Construction

12. Interpretation of Special or Particular Statutes

13. Conclusion

14. Bibliography

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 Meaning of Interpretation or Construction

Webster’s New World Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “interpretation” as
the act or result of interpreting; explanation, meaning, translation, exposition etc.”
and that of “construction” as “the act or process of constructing, the way in which
something is constructed; manner or method of building. Lastly, Webster defines
“statutory” as fixed, authorized or established by statue.
Therefore, by statutory interpretation we mean explanation, meaning, translation or
interpretation of statutes or enacted laws. “Interpretation” means action of explaining
the meaning of something. For interpreting a statutory provision, courts are required
to make an insight into the provision and unfold its meaning by means of well-
established canons of interpretation, having regard to object, purpose, historicism of
law and many other well-known factors. Interpretation of a legal provision is always
independent of the facts of a given case. Interpretation is a process by which the
court determine meaning of statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to a
situation before it.
Although the enacted laws are drafted by legal experts and there is hardly any room
for interpretation or construction but very often the courts and lawyers have to unfold
the meaning of ambiguous words, expressions and resolve inconsistencies.
Salmond says that only in the case of an enacted law a process of judicial
interpretation or construction is necessary, it is not necessary in a customary or case
law. “By interpretation or construction is meant the process by which the court seek
to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the meaning of the authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.”
According to some, interpretation and construction are two distinct expressions.
Cooley says, "Interpretation differs from construction in that the former is the art of
finding out the true sense of any form of words, i.e., the sense which their author
intended to convey and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which
the author intended to convey.
Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects
that lie beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known from and given
in the text conclusions which are in the spirit though not within the letter of the law."
But according to Crawford, this distinction has been largely relegated to the realm of
academic discussion. Sutherland defines this distinction as “erroneous”.
But in common usage, these words are taken as synonyms of each other and are
also used synonymously. As White J, observed about them that "in common usage
interpretation and construction are usually understood as having the same
significance."
Dias said that "although there is some distinction between them, they are so hard to
disentangle that they cannot afford a suitable basis for discussion."

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Maxwell’s ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ has defined statute as the will of the
legislature. Usually, it refers to the act that is enacted by the legislature. The term
statute is generally applied to laws and regulations of every sort law which ordains,
permits or prohibits anything which is designated as a statute, without considering
from what source it arises.

Constitution of India has no particular definition for the word statute but it uses the
term “law” for denoting the actions of legislature and its primary power. Statutes are
divided into classes as mentioned below:

1. Codification: It is one when they codify the unwritten law on a particular

subject.
2. Declaration: When there is no change in the existing law but merely
clarification or explanation of what it is.
3. Remedial: This is when they alter the common law or the judge makes a
non-statutory law on a particular subject.
4. Amendment: This is when the judge or the legislature changes or alters
the statute law.
5. Consolidation: This is combining several previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter with or without making changes in the same.
6. Enabling: Removal of restriction or disability.
7. Disabling or Restraining: Restrain on the alienation of property.
8. Penal: When there is imposition of penalty or forfeiture.

The term “statue law” is often used interchangeably with the word “statute”.
However, “statue law” is a wider term for it includes not only statues but also judicial
interpretation and application thereof. In the word of Crawford. “Statute law” may be
defined as the will of the state expressed by the legislature or by the people through
its initiative and expounded by the courts.” Thus, “statute law” includes statutes as
also case-laws.

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Need and Object of Interpretation

Salmond directed that, “Interpretation or construction is the process by which the

Court’s seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of
authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”
Lord Denning commented on the need of interpretation in Seasford Court Estates
Ltd. v. Asher. He said that it is not within an ordinary man’s power to realize what
new facts will arise from a case at hand. Considering the facts, all laws cannot be
free from ambiguity when applied to them. There can be no legislature or judge that
can make a perfect law written in perfect English for ordinary people to understand
and not get criticized. Therefore, interpretation of a law is very important as what one
writes can be converted into various meanings and various judgments. A judge
should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come
across this luck in the texture of it, how would they have straight ended it out? He
must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which
it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.
The main and most important objective of interpretation is to see the intention that
has been merely expressed by the words. The words of the statute are to be
interpreted so as to ascertain the mind of legislature from natural and grammatical
meaning of the words which it has used.
The expression intention of the legislature is a shorthand reference to the meaning of
words used by the legislature objectively determined with guidance furnished by the
accepted principles of interpretation. If a statutory provision is open to more than one
interpretation the Court has to choose that interpretation that represents the true
intention of the legislature in other words the ‘true meaning’ or a ‘legal meaning’.
When the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of
interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived from the
same word or sentence. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the statute to find out
the real intention of the statute. Also to determine the intention of the legislature
conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.

In the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-
statutory.

Statutory Aids may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific
definitions contained in individual Acts.
Non-statutory Aids are illustrated by common law rules of interpretation (including
certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-laws relating to the
interpretation of statutes.
Interpretation of Statutes is required for two basic reasons:-

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Legislative Language – Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and
hence may require interpretation; and
Legislative Intent – The intention of the legislature or Legislative intent assimilates
two aspects:
 The concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means; and
 The concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading
through the statute.

Intention of Legislature
A statute is an established rule, formal regulation or Ordinance, enacted by the
Legislature. A statute is an edict of the legislature, as declared by the Supreme Court
in a case. Interpretation of statutes is the exclusive privilege of the constitutional
courts." Interpretative function of the court is to discover the true legislative intent. It
is the obligation of courts to promote the intention of legislation." Any system of
interpretation can be used for resolving a difficulty. Principles of interpretation are not
principles of law but are only a methodology for explaining the meaning of words
used in a text.

There are some settled principles of interpretation which are given below:
 the court must start with the presumption that the legislature did not make a
mistake
 the court must adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention
of the legislature
 if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the
court would not go beyond its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The
court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not
there, especially when the literal reading produces on intelligible result. Only
when it becomes necessary or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute,
words may be added, altered or modified.

All such rules of interpretation are meant to assist the court in advancing the ends of
justice." Law cannot be as interpreted as would cause oppression or be unjust.
Where the legislative intent is clear, the court should give effect to it." The
conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to know the intention of the
maker of the statute. It has to be construed in the manner similar to "the intent of
them who make it. According to Salmond, the duty of the judicature is to discover
and to act upon the true intention of the legislature, themens orsententia legis. The
essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is significant only as
being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it." The elementary

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principle of interpreting a statute is to gather the mens or sententialegis of the
Legislature.
When more than one interpretation can be made of a statutory provision, the court
has to be very careful in choosing that interpretation which represents the true
intention of the legislature and which can also be referred to as the "legal meaning"
of the statutory provision. The function of the courts is only to expound the law and
not to legislate." Judicial art of interpretation and appraisal is imbued with creativity
as well as realism because interpretation implies a degree of discretion and choice,
regardless of the conventional principle that judges are to expound, not legislate."
Courts are, therefore, held as "finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which
comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing." But there
are certain limits on the court's powers of interpretation; courts cannot re-legislate on
the subject under the guise of interpretation against the will expressed in the
enactment itself."
The intention of the legislature can be said to have two aspects:
(i) “Meaning”- First aspect is that of “meaning” which tells what the words mean
(ii) “Purpose and Object”- Second aspect include concept of “purpose and object”
which means the purpose and object of enacting the statue.

Therefore, it can be said that the process of construction combines both literal and
purposive approaches. In other words, it means that the legislative intention, i.e., the
true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the
words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which
comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed." It is
also a cardinal principle of construction that external aids are brought in by widening
the concept of context as including not only other enacting provisions of the same
statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in parimateria and
the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.
The most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the
intention of the legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are
either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences, or
the spirit and reason of the law. In the court of law what the legislature intended to be
done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen
to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. But
the whole of what is enacted "by necessary implication" can hardly be determined
without keeping in mind the purpose or object of the statute. A bare mechanical
interpretation of the words and application of legislative intent devoid of concept or
purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficent legislation to futility. The
courts, however, are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of
interpretation and they must avoid the danger of determination of the meaning of a
provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or
scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted.

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Blackstone says that most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by
exploring the intention of the legislature through the most natural and probable signs
which are either the words, context, the subject-matter, the effect and consequence,
or the spirit and reason of the law.

Rule of Literal Construction

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation.
According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and
natural meaning, and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be
given to a provision of a statute whatever may be the consequences. Where
wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, rule of literal
construction is to be applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not
required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and
inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning." Where the meaning of a
word or expression is not clear, the literal rule of interpretation is not applicable. Only
when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of
interpretation may be applied. Ordinarily, courts should not depart from literal rule as
that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not
permissible. Literal construction giving rise to anomalous or absurd situations should
be avoided. Where it is the possibility that two parallel proceedings may continue at
the same time and two tribunals may render contradictory decisions on the same
question, it was held that such construction should be avoided. The rule of literal
construction is applicable both to the private law as well as public law. This rule can
be easily understood under the following headings:
(i) Natural and grammatical meaning
(ii) Explanation
(iii) Exact meaning, preferred to loose meaning
(iv) Technical words in technical sense

Natural and Grammatical Meaning

The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense
and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning,
unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in
the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In the absence of any material, a
different meaning cannot be ascribed by tracing history of the legislation and
attributing object and legislative intendment which suits court's own view.
Statutes must be construed according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of
words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any express intention or declared
purpose of the statute, or it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or
inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged
only to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further.

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Where the words are clear, there is no ambiguity, no obscurity and the intention of
the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take
upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation
the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely
for an exhibition of judicial valour. There is a line, though thin, which separates
adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. A
construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided: Courts cannot aid the
legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, add or mend, and by construction make up
deficiencies which are left there. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read
words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so and clear a reason for it
is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.
Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands
is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. While interpreting a provision the court only
interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and
subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or
repeal it, if deemed necessary.
In a case, the Supreme Court held that it is not its task to find out or search for the
wisdom of the legislature. The court is concerned with the interpretation only. For the
same reasons, it cannot be accepted that the word "adjust" should be read to mean
"accommodate". The Supreme Court further observed that it cannot be said that the
literal interpretation in the present case would be illogical, unprincipled and
impracticable.

Explanation of the Rule

When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or
popular sense, it is meant that the words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or
popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to
which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. In the statement
of the rule "the epithets 'natural’, ‘ordinary', 'literal', 'grammatical' and 'popular' are
employed almost interchangeably" to convey the same idea.

In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to be
asked is what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its
context in the statute? But when that natural or ordinary meaning indicates such a
result which cannot be opposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, then
we have to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase which may
then convey the true intention of the Legislature. In the construction of statutes, the
context means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in
parimateria, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to
remedy. Every word apart from having a natural, ordinary or popular meaning, often
has a secondary meaning too which may be for e.g., either technical or scientific.

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This secondary meaning is less common than the ordinary meaning. But once, when
in the process of interpreting a statute, it is accepted that the natural, ordinary or
popular meaning of a word is derived from its context, the distinction drawn between
different meanings loses significance.

Exact Meaning Preferred to loose meaning

The third important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact
meaning is preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament.
Every word has a secondary meaning too. Therefore, in applying the above stated
rule one should be careful not to mix up the secondary meaning with the loose
meaning. Loose meaning should not defeat the secondary meaning of a word.
Wherever the secondary meaning points to that meaning which statute meant,
preference should be given to that secondary meaning.
But preference to secondary meaning does not offend the rule that preference
should not be given to loose meaning. Example can be taken of the word “obtain”.
Obtain in its primary sense requires some request or effort to acquire or get
something but in its secondary meaning it means it means to acquire or get without
qualification and if in a statute the secondary meaning is preferred, it cannot be said
that preference has been given to loose meaning.

Technical words in technical sense

The fourth important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that technical
words are understood in the technical sense only.

Literal Interpretation
In construing Statutes, the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions literally and
grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also
known as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of
interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The
words in an enactment have their own natural effect and the construction of an act
depends on its wording. There should be no additions or substitution of words in the
construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret words
as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when the
meanings of the words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the language is
plain and only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.

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To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include “definitions” sections within a statute,
which explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some
statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a
particular term. The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation
that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word
found within a definition itself.
Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides
in legislative or political issues. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers
do not have extensive access to secondary sources. In probate law the rule is also
favoured because the testator is typically not around to indicate what interpretation of
a will is appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed
to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide for
consistency in interpretation.
One criticism of the rule is that it rests on the erroneous assumption that words have
a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own
prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little else is offered
as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives.

Case Law:
In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus
stand was changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be
moved within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to
section 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30
days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of
the order”. The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and
hence rejected the application as invalid.
Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted
in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in
the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are
used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary
grammatical sense.’

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 The Mischief Rule: Heydon’s Case

In Heydon‟s Case, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the sure
and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and
considered:
1. What was the Common Law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not
provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the Commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?
The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privatocommodo, and to add force and life to
the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the
golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. It can be
argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes
law-making decisions away from the legislature.
There are certain advantages and disadvantages of the rule. The Law Commission
sees it as a rule that is far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as it avoids
unjust or absurd results in sentencing but for some it is considered to be out of date
as it was established in 16th century when conditions were very different from now.
Case Law:
The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, applied the mischief
rule in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to the
state of law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the chaos
and confusion that was brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by
indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different Provincial Legislatures
founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R. Das, stated “It was to
cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of interstate trade
or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the constitution”.
A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it existence. These are designed to approach immortality as nearly as human
institutions can approach it’. Mischief Rule is applicable where language is capable
of more than one meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a
statue which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

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 Rule of Reasonable Construction or Golden Rule

The words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in
many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary
meaning of words, does not meet the ends as a fair and a reasonable construction.
Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily
assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur.
Often enough interpreting the provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the
subject matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.

According to this rule, the words of a statute must be construed ut res magisvaleat
quam pareat, so as to give a sensible meaning to them. A provision of law cannot be
so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense, every word or expression
used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning.

It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule.
Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary
meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the
legislature’s intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of
homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose
the preferred meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but applying this would
lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.

Case Law:
In RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd, the Supreme Court
stated that if a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of
the statute makers provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses,
phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is
looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must
look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clauses each
phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the
entire Act.

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 Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a
statute then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule
follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law
and should be read as a whole. The interpretation consistent of all the provisions of
the statute should be adopted. In the case in which it shall be impossible to
harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the provision shall
prevail.

When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict with each
other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and that
construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be
adopted except in the last resort.
The important aspects of this principle are:
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions
and they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained
in another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to
reconcile their differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory
provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is
given to both the provisions as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision
to a useless number or a dead lumbar, is not harmonious construction.
5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it loose.

Case Law:
In Raj Krishna v. Binod, two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which
were in apparent conflict, were brought forth. Section 33 (2) says that a Government
Servant can nominate or second a person in election but section 123(8) says that a
Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except by casting his
vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was entitled to
nominate or second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This
harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the govt.
servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a candidate and forbidding
him to assist the candidate in any other manner.

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 Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem Generis (pronounced as “eh-youse-dem generous”) is a Latin term

which means “of the same kind.” The term ‘Ejusdem Generis’ in other words means
words of a similar class. The rule is that where particular words have a common
characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow should be construed as
referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be afforded.

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A

particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the Act. The
Ejusdem Generis rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups of
words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.

Normally, general words should be given their natural meaning like all other words
unless the context requires otherwise. But when a general word follows specific
words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a restricted meaning of
the same category. The general expression takes its meaning from the preceding
particular expressions because the legislature by using the particular words of a
distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect.

The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies
a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a
supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental
rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be
accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of one genus, in
which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.

Case Law:

The Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health and others v.

SatchikitsaPrasarak Mandal & Others has examined and explained the meaning
of Ejusdem Generis as a rule of interpretation of statutes in our legal system.

While examining the doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the expression Ejusdem
Generis which means “of the same kind or nature” is a principle of construction,
meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by restricted
words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication
with the meaning of restricted words.

The Supreme Court has further held that the Ejusdem Generis principle is a facet of
the principle of ‘Noscitur a sociis’(A latin term for ‘it is known by the company it
keeps’, it is the concept that the intended meaning of an ambiguous word depends
on the context in which it is used). The Latin maxim Noscitur a Sociis contemplates
that a statutory term is recognized by its associated words. The Latin word ‘sociis’
means ‘society’. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific

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words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their color and their contents are
to be derived from their context. But like all other linguistic canons of construction,
the Ejusdem Generis principle applies only when a contrary intention does not
appear.

Expressio Units EstExclusioAlterius

The maxim is given to gauge the intent of the legislature. If the words of the Statute
are plain and its meaning is clear then there is no scope for applying the rule. The
rule means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.

At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction,
unless there is in the statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning
by reasonable construction; because many things are put into a statute ex
abundanticautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included
is for that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of
construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to make
the “expression” complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the “exclusion” is often
the result of inadvertence or accident because it never struck the draftsman that the
thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention. The maxim ought not to be
applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.

ContemporaneaExpositioEst Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

The maxim means that a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in
law. Where the words used in a statute have undergone alteration in meaning in
course of time, the words will be construed to bear the same meaning as they had
when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim. In simple
words, old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when
they were passed and prior usage and interpretation by those who have an interest
or duty in enforcing the Act, and the legal profession of the time, are presumptive
evidence of their meaning when the meaning is doubtful.

But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong
meaning had been attached to it for many years, will be immaterial and the correct
meaning will be given by the Courts except when title to property may be affected or
when every day transactions have been entered into on such wrong interpretation.

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 Noscitur a Sociis

The “Noscitur a Sociis” i.e. “It is known by its associates”. In other words, meaning of
a word should be known from its accompanying or associating words. It is not a
sound principle in interpretation of statutes, to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted
from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be
read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the
maxim „noscitur a socitis‟ has much relevance in understanding the import of words
in a statutory provision (K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC
2143). The rule states that where two or more words which are susceptible of
analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood in their cognate
sense. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with
words of narrower significance, is doubtful that the present rule of construction can
be usefully applied.

The same words bear the same meaning in the same statute. But this rule will not
apply:
1. When the context excluded that principle.
2. If sufficient reason can be assigned, it is proper to construe a word in one part
of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the
Act.
3. Where it would cause injustice or absurdity.
4. Where different circumstances are being dealt with.
5. Where the words are used in a different context. Many do not distinguish
between this rule and the ejusdem generis doctrine. But there is a subtle
distinction as pointed out in the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha.

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 Strict and Liberal Construction

In Wiberforce on Statute Law, it is said that what is meant by ‘strict construction’ is

that “Acts, are not to be regarded as including anything which is not within their letter
as well as their spirit, which is not clearly and intelligibly described in the very words
of the statute, as well as manifestly intended”, while by “liberal construction” is meant
that “everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done
consistently with any construction of the statute”. Beneficial construction to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy is generally preferred.

A Court invokes the rule which produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in
the case before it. “Although the literal rule is the one most frequently referred to in
express terms, the Courts treat all three (viz., the literal rule, the golden rule and the
mischief rule) as valid and refer to them as occasion demands, but do not assign any
reasons for choosing one rather than another. Sometimes a Court discusses all the
three approaches. Sometimes it expressly rejects the “mischief rule” in favour of the
“literal rule”. Sometimes it prefers, although never expressly, the “mischief rule” to
the “literal rule”.

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 Interpretation of Special or Particular Statutes

Rent Control Legislations

There has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent
control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would
indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an
interpretation which would benefit the tenant. In these cases the courts consistently
held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide
safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue
advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people
looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute
scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later
judgments."

Town planning and Development legislations

While interpreting The Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, it
was held that the power to restrict the use of land by the owners thereof is a drastic
power. The designation or reservation of the land and its use results in severe
abridgement of the right to property. Statutory provisions enabling the State or
authorities to impose restrictions on the right to use one's own land are required to
be construed strictly.

Land Acquisition Statutes

Land acquisition statutes are required to be strictly construed. State acquisition in
exercise of its power of eminent domain is subject to existence of a public purpose
and on payment of reasonable compensation in terms of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. In case of a private company, the public purpose, not being a
requisite criterion, other statutory requirements call for strict compliance, being
imperative in character. Binding effect of rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies)
Rules, 1963 was held to be evident from the nature, language and intent of statutory
provision. As it is an expropriatory legislation, language of rule 4 uses the word
"shall" not once but twice, thus, has been held to be imperative in nature. The
intention behind giving it a mandatory nature is to bring satisfaction of appropriate
Government or statutory regarding private negotiation of company and landowner
and bona fide need for acquisition from the report of the collector.

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Terrorism Laws

Terrorism laws are to be strictly construed. In any case, the applicability of sections
21, 3 and 4 were in question. Presumption under section 21 is attracted only if
accused "knowing facilitates the commission or preparation in respect of terrorist act.
The accused in the case was ignorant about the smuggled arms being put to use of
terrorist, weapons were neither recovered from the accused nor their destination was
known to him. There was no confession, no investigation and no evidence regarding
knowledge or handing over arms to terrorists of Punjab. It was held that the
presumption under section 21 that arms and ammunition would be used for terrorist
activity and heavy onus on the accused to refute the same would be applicable only
if it is proved that the arms and ammunition had been recovered from the accused
and had been used in the manner laid down in section 3.

Interpretation of Constitutional provisions

The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that the interpretation and
construction of the constitutional provisions which conflict with the constitutional goal
to be achieved should be eschewed and the interest of the Nation in such a situation
should be paramount consideration. This principle should equally apply when
interpreting a statutory provision having application at the national level in order to
achieve the avowed object of national integration and larger public interest.

The Supreme Court was interpreting the word "consultation" in Article 124 of the
Constitution. It held that when more than one authority or functionary participate
together in the performance of a function, to ascertain who assumes significance,
keeping in mind various principles and objectives as above to be achieved, who
would be best equipped and likely to be more correct for achieving the purpose and
perform the task satisfactorily in safeguarding the interest of the entire community of
this Great Nation. Accordingly, primacy in one who qualifies to be treated in the know
of things far better than any other, then comparatively greater weight to their opinion
and decision is to be attached.

It was further held that establishment of a strong Centre was a necessity felt by our
Founding Fathers of the Nation to protect the unity of the Nation either from internal
disturbance or any external aggression. In this context, Article 355 of the Constitution
is required to be noted under which the Centre is entrusted with the duty to protect
every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and also to ensure
that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution. However, within the spheres allotted to the States, they are
supreme."

In the context of interpretation in the background of constitutional provisions, it has

been held that where penal statute bears significant relationship to fundamental
constitutional principles of liberty, dignity and autonomy, the court while analyzing
penal provisions should give effect to constitutional principles.

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 Conclusion

Every nation has its own judicial system, the purpose of which to grant justice to all.
The court aims to interpret the law in such a manner that every citizen is ensured
justice to all. To ensure justice to all the concept of canons of interpretation was
expounded. These are the rules which are evolved for determining the real intention
of the legislature.

It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are always clear, explicit and
unambiguous and thus, in such cases it is very essential for courts to determine a
clear and explicit meaning of the words or phrases used by the legislature and at the
same time remove all the doubts if any. Hence, all the rules mentioned in the article
are important for providing justice.

The process of deciphering legislative purpose and textual analysis must be

balanced while interpreting legislation in the Indian setting. To uphold justice, uphold
the rule of law, and guarantee that laws are enforced consistently and equitably,
judges must take into account numerous interpretational concepts. The Indian legal
system guarantees that legislation remains applicable and useful tools for managing
society while adapting to changing conditions by carefully applying these principles.
Statutory interpretation guidelines are essential for ensuring that the law is applied
consistently and effectively.

In short, The Mischief Rule seeks to determine the legislators' intent by filling in the
legal gaps left by prior legislation, whereas the Literal Rule emphasizes the plain
sense of words. The flexibility offered by the Golden Rule allows for deviation from
its exact application in order to prevent ludicrous results. Finally, the Rule of
Harmonious Construction unifies provisions that are in conflict in order to achieve the
overall goal of the legislation. Courts work to promote the ideals of justice, fairness,
and the efficient operation of the legal system by applying these norms.

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 Bibliography

Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, fifth Edition, Dr Avtar Singh Prof (Dr)

Harpreet Kaur
https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/
https://blog.ipleaders.in/
https://taxguru.in/

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