MOHD ARSHAAN AFAQ

ROLL NO. 17BLW033

BA.LL.B (HONS)
VI SEM - REGULAR
SUB – INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Q.1. “The rules of interpretation are like the tools of carpenter and sculptor”. Explain the
above mentioned statement while discussing the meaning and purposes of interpretation the
statute.

The term has been derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to explain,
expound, understand, or to translate. Interpretation is the process of explaining, expounding
and translating any text or anything in written form. This basically involves an act of
discovering the true meaning of the language which has been used in the statute. Various
sources used are only limited to explore the written text and clarify what exactly has been
indicated by the words used in the written text or the statutes.
Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding of the law. This process is commonly
adopted by the courts for determining the exact intention of the legislature. Because the
objective of the court is not only merely to read the law but is also to apply it in a meaningful
manner to suit from case to case. It is also used for ascertaining the actual connotation of any
Act or document with the actual intention of the legislature.
There can be mischief in the statute which is required to be cured, and this can be done by
applying various norms and theories of interpretation which might go against the literal
meaning at times. The purpose behind interpretation is to clarify the meaning of the words
used in the statutes which might not be that clear.
According to Salmond, “Interpretation”  is the process by which the court seeks to
ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it
is expressed.
Construction meaning
In simple words, construction is the process of drawing conclusions of the subjects which are
beyond the direct expression of the text. The courts draw findings after analysing the
meaning of the words used in the text or the statutes. This process is known as legal
exposition. There are a certain set of facts pending before the court and construction is the
application of the conclusion of these facts.
The objective is to assist the judicial body in determining the real intention of the legislature.
Its aim is also to ascertain the legal effect of the legal text.

It is necessary for all law students, lawyers, judges and anyone who belongs to the legal
fraternity to know how to interpret the statute whenever a legislative house comes up with the
new statute or an amendment because they will be dealing with these legislations on day to
day basis. The main intention of analyzing is to know the new changes which are being
brought due to the legislation and the impacts of that legislation in society.
Usually, the interpretation of the statute is done by the judges, it is the primary function of the
judge as a judicial head. As we all know that our government is divided into three important
wings which are: Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Here legislature lays down the law
and intends people to act according to the legislature and the judiciary that is judges will
come up with the proper meaning of the law and puts the law into operation. This helps in
maintaining checks and balances between the wings.

The Need to Interpret Statutes:

 Legislative Language – Legislative language may be complicated for a layman, and

hence may require interpretation; and
 Legislative Intent – The intention of the legislature or Legislative intent assimilates
two aspects;
a.) The Concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word means;
b.) The concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ petvading through
the statute
 The ambiguity of the words used in the statute: Sometimes there will be words that
have more than one meaning. And it may not be clear which meaning has to be used.
There could be multiple interpretations made out of it.
 Change in the environment: We all know that society changes from time to time and
there may be new developments happening in a society that is not taken into
consideration, this lacks the predictability of the future event.
  Complexities of the statutes: usually statutes are complex and huge, it contains
complicated words, jargon and some technical terms which are not easy to understand
and this complexity may lead to confusion.
 When legislation doesn’t cover a specific area: Every time when legislations are out it
doesn’t cover all the area it leaves some grey areas and interpretation helps in
bridging the gaps between.
 Drafting error: The draft may be made without sufficient knowledge of the subject. It
may also happen due to the lack of necessary words and correct grammar. This makes
the draft unclear and creates ambiguity in the legislature.
 Incomplete rules: There are few implied rules and regulations and some implied
powers and privileges which are not mentioned in the statute and when these are not
defined properly in the statute this leads to ambiguity.

In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerela, it was held that a word gets its ‘colour’ in the
context in which it is used. The word gathers its meaning not only in the context that it has
been used but from the words used in similar conditions.
In the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory.
Statutory aids may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions
contained in individuals Acts wheres non-statutory aids are illustrated by common law rules
of interpretation (including certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-
laws relating to the interpretation of statutes.
According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the process by which the courts seek
to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.”It has been said that there is a distinction between the two expressions.
As explained by Cooley: “Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former
is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author
intended to convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting
the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. This distinction has been widely
criticized.
Interpretation of statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a
statute. When the language of the statute is clear, there is no need for the rules of
interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be derived from the same
word or sentence. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the statute to find out the real
intention of the statute.
The Supreme Court in R.S Nayak v. A.R Antualay held that If the words of the Statute are
clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural
meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the
event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of words used in the Statute would be self-
defeating.
Again the Supreme court in Grasim Industries Ltd. V. The Collector of Customs,
Bombay held that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no
ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court
to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.
The purpose of Interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature – not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge
may deem reasonable or expedient.
According to Blackstone the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by
exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which
are ‘either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the
spirit and reason of the law.

UNIT- II

Q.2. “The words of the statute have to be given grammatical and ordinary meaning
irrespective of possible consequences resulting from it”. Discuss it while bringing out the
differences between Literal and Golden rules of interpretation.

Ans.) The above mentioned point in question can be found to closely adhere to the
Maxwellian view on interpretation. According to him if there is nothing to modify or qualify
then the language must be given its ordinary meaning without contemplating the possible
consequences of the done act and if there are more than one meaning of the given statute then
the ordinary meaning should be given to it unless adequate grounds are available for
departure from the ordinary meaning. Bases on this definition can be said to appear a divide
in protocols of the two rules of interpretation i.e., a.) The literal rule and; b.) The Golden rule
for whom the differences in their approach are mentioned below:
Literal Rule of Interpretation: It is the first rule of interpretation. According to this rule, the
words used in this text are to be given or interpreted in their natural or ordinary meaning.
After the interpretation, if the meaning is completely clear and unambiguous then the effect
shall be given to a provision of a statute regardless of what may be the consequences.
The basic rule is that whatever the intention legislature had while making any provision it has
been expressed through words and thus, are to be interpreted according to the rules of
grammar. It is the safest rule of interpretation of statutes because the intention of the
legislature is deduced from the words and the language used.

According to this rule, the only duty of the court is to give effect if the language of the statute
is plain and has no business to look into the consequences which might arise. The only
obligation of the court is to expound the law as it is and if any harsh consequences arise then
the remedy for it shall be sought and looked out by the legislature.
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, In this case, the appellant, a citizen of India after
arriving at the airport did not declare that he was carrying gold with him. During his search
was carried on, gold was found in his possession as it was against the notification of the
government and was confiscated under section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act.
Later on, he was also charged under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act,
1947. The appellant challenged this trial to be violative under Article 20(2) of the Indian
Constitution. According to this article, no person shall be punished or prosecuted more than
once for the same offence. This is considered as double jeopardy.
It was held by the court that the Seas Act neither a court nor any judicial tribunal. Thus,
accordingly, he was not prosecuted earlier. Hence, his trial was held to be valid.
Manmohan Das versus Bishan Das, AIR 1967 SC 643, The issue in the case was regarding
the interpretation of section 3(1)(c) of U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. In this
case, a tenant was liable for evidence if he has made addition and alternate in the building
without proper authority and unauthorized perception as materially altered the
accommodation or is likely to diminish its value. The appellant stated that only the
constitution can be covered, which diminishes the value of the property and the word ‘or’
should be read as land.
It was held that as per the rule of literal interpretation, the word ‘or’ should be given the
meaning that a prudent man understands the grounds of the event are alternative and not
combined.
State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others, 1987 AIR 33 SCR(1) 317, in this case a
person was caught along with the counterfeit currency “dollars” and he was charged under
section 120B, 498A, 498C and 420 read with section 511 and 34 of Indian Penal Code for
possessing counterfeit currency. The accused contended before the court that a charge under
section 498A and 498B of Indian Penal Code can only be levied in the case of counterfeiting
of Indian currency notes and not in the case of counterfeiting of foreign currency notes. The
court held that the word currency notes or bank note cannot be prefixed. The person was held
liable to be charge-sheeted.
Golden Rule of Interpretation: It is known as the golden rule because it solves all the
problems of interpretation. The rule says that to start with we shall go by the literal rule,
however, if the interpretation given through the literal rule leads to some or any kind of
ambiguity, injustice, inconvenience, hardship, inequity, then in all such events the literal
meaning shall be discarded and interpretation shall be done in such a manner that the purpose
of the legislation is fulfilled.
The literal rule follows the concept of interpreting the natural meaning of the words used in
the statute. But if interpreting natural meaning leads to any sought of repugnance, absurdity
or hardship, then the court must modify the meaning to the extent of injustice or absurdity
caused and no further to prevent the consequence.
This rule suggests that the consequences and effects of interpretation deserve a lot more
important because they are the clues of the true meaning of the words used by the legislature
and its intention. At times, while applying this rule, the interpretation done may entirely be
opposite of the literal rule, but it shall be justified because of the golden rule. The
presumption here is that the legislature does not intend certain objects. Thus, any such
interpretation which leads to unintended objects shall be rejected.

Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 850, In this case, there was an issue with
regard to issuing of the notice under section 99 of Representation of People’s Act, 1951, with
regard to corrupt practices involved in the election.
According to the rule, the notice shall be issued to all those persons who are a party to the
election petition and at the same time to those who are not a party to it. Tirath Singh
contended that no such notice was issued to him under the said provision. The notices were
only issued to those who were non-parties to the election petition. This was challenged to be
invalid on this particular ground.
The court held that what is contemplated is giving of the information and the information
even if it is given twice remains the same. The party to the petition is already having the
notice regarding the petition, therefore, section 99 shall be so interpreted by applying the
golden rule that notice is required against non-parties only.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company, AIR 1967 SC 276, A
transporting company was carrying a parcel of apples was challenged and charge-sheeted.
The truck of the transporting company was impounded as the parcel contained opium along
with the apples. At the same time, the invoice shown for the transport consisted of apples
only.

Section 11 of the opium act 1878, all the vehicles which transport the contraband articles
shall be impounded and articles shall be confiscated. It was confiscated by the transport
company that they were unaware of the fact that opium was loaded along with the apples in
the truck.
The court held that although the words contained in section 11 of the said act provided that
the vehicle shall be confiscated but by applying the literal rule of interpretation for this
provision it is leading to injustice and inequity and therefore, this interpretation shall be
avoided. The words ‘shall be confiscated’ should be interpreted as ‘may be confiscated’.

State of Punjab v. Quiser Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, a period of limitation was
prescribed for, under section 18 of land acquisition act, 1844, that an appeal shall be filed for
the announcement of the award within 6 months of the announcement of the compensation.
Award was passed in the name of Quiser Jehan. It was intimated to her after the period of six
months about this by her counsel. The appeal was filed beyond the period of six months. The
appeal was rejected by the lower courts.
It was held by the court that the period of six months shall be counted from the time when
Quiser Jehan had the knowledge because the interpretation was leading to absurdity. The
court by applying the golden rule allowed the appeal.

UNIT –III
Q.3. Examine the role played by parliamentary history and dictionaries in the interpretation
of statutes.
Ans.) Role of Parliamentary History: The Supreme Court has used the aid of
Parliamentary history in resolving questions of construction but it can be said that the
Supreme Court generally has enunciated the said rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in
the way it was traditionally enunciated by English Courts.
But in a few cases, it has been held that the legislative history within circumspect limits may
not be consulted by the Courts in resolving ambiguities. Legislative history and precedent
English statutes may be taken into consideration in giving a beneficent interpretation to a
provision in an act. In determining legislative intent, even a minister’s budget speech was
taken into consideration.
(i) BILL
As the speeches made by the members of the Constitution Assembly in the course of debates
on the draft Constitution cannot be admitted as an external aid to the Constitution, in the
same way, the debates on a Bill in Parliament are not admissible for construction of the Act
which is ultimately enacted.
In State of Travancore v Bombay Co Ltd, it was held that a speech made in the course of
the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it
could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried
the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.
In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhary v Union of India, Fazal Ali, J, admitted Parliamentary history
including the speech of the Minister introducing the Bill as evidence of the circumstances
which necessitated the passing of the Act, a course apparently approved in later decisions.
In Union of India v Harbhajan Singh, extensive references were made to speeches in the
Constituent Assembly to support the construction that wealth-tax on net-wealth including the
capital value of agricultural lands fell within the residuary power of the Parliament.
(ii) STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The statement of objects and reasons accompanying a legislative bill cannot be used to
ascertain the true meaning and effects of the substantive provisions of the legislation, but it
can certainly be pressed into service for the limited purpose of understanding the background,
the antecedent state of affairs and the object that the legislation seeks to achieve. If the
meaning of the provision of a statute is clear and explicit, it is not necessary to advert to the
objects and reasons thereof.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction but that by itself
cannot be termed to be and by itself as an aid to the construction of a statute. It is a useful
guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have to be gathered from the entirety of the
statute. In Ashwini Kumar’s case, the statement of Objects and Reasons was ruled out as an
aid to the construction of a statute.
When the validity of a particular statute is brought into question, a limited reference may be
made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons but it may not be relied on. It may be
employed for the purposes of comprehending the factual background, the prior state of legal
affairs, the surrounding circumstances in respect of the statute and the evil which the statute
has sought to remedy. It cannot be the exclusive footing upon which a statute is made a
nullity through the decision of a court of law.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons can be referred only for understanding the
background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the
state of affairs, and the evil which the statute has sought to remedy. It can be referred to only
to ascertain conditions prevailing at the time which prompted the introduction of Bill but
where the language of the statute is clear and plain it is not required to be referred to.
In Babu Ram v State of U.P, it was held that the statement of Objects and Reasons can be
referred to ascertain mischief sought to be remedied by the statute.
However, the Statement of Objects and Reasons have never been held admissible for
determining whether a certain provision of the Act, which was ultra vires was or was not
severable from the other provisions of the Act. A provision inserted by subsequent
amendment cannot be construed on the basis of the statement of objects and reasons of the
original statute.
(iii) COMMISSION/ INQUIRY COMMITTEE
Reports of Commissions or Inquiry Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill have also
been referred to as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief
or evil intended to be remedied and at times for interpreting the act. In the Transfer of
Property Act, Section 53 A was inserted on the basis of recommendations of the Special
Committee set up by the Government of India.
Examples can also be taken from Sodra Devi’s Case in which Income Tax Enquiry Report
was referred, in Express Newpaper’s Case where the Press Commissions Report was referred
and in Madanlal’s Case where the report by Committee appointed to bring changes in
Company law was referred.
(iv) PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
Parliamentary debates at the time of introduction of bill may be used as an external aid in
interpretation. It is a settled position that there can only be limited use of Parliamentary
Debates. The court should not normally critically analyze the proceedings of Parliament. In
Milton v DPP, in interpreting the term ‘prosecution’ under the Income Tax Act, a minister’s
speech at the time of introduction of Bill has been taken into consideration.
(v) LETTERS
The letter written by Law Minister cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute
is very clear, whatever statement made by the Law Minister on the floor of the House cannot
change the words and intendment borne out from the words. It was held that such a letter
cannot be read to interpret the provisions of Section 100A CPC. The intention of the
Legislature is more than clear in the words and the same has to be given its natural meaning
and cannot be subject to any statement made by the Law Minister in any communication. The
words speak for themselves. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement
made in any manner.

Role of Dictionaries: Dictionaries can be consulted by the courts whenever the need arises to
know the ordinary sense of a word. However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of
a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that “the
meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in
which they appear”.
The court must be careful because it is not necessary the dictionary meaning of a word may
be the true meaning in a particular context. It is for the court to interpret the statute as best as
it may.
In so doing the court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any
literary held they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and
reference to well known and authoritative dictionaries.
In Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax officer, the question before the court was whether betel
leaves are vegetables and, therefore, exempt from imposition of sales tax under the central
Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948. The dictionary
meaning of ‘vegetable’ was sought to be relied on wherein it has been defined as pertaining
to, comprised or consisting of or derived or obtained from plants or their parts.
It was held that the dictionary meaning could not be said to reflect the true intention of the
framers of the sales tax law and betel leaves should be understood in the same sense in which
they are commonly understood. Therefore, sales tax could be levied on the sale of betel
leaves. In Motipur Zaminday Company private Limited v. State of Bihar, the question
was whether sales tax could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1947 on the sale of
sugarcane. The applicant argued that sugarcane being green vegetable was exempt from
imposition of tax.
The dictionary meaning of vegetable was quoted in Support of the argument. The Supreme
Court rejected the contention and held that in the context of the Act vegetables mean only
such vegetables as can be grown in a kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner as
articles of food. This was the common parlance meaning of the term and the legislature
intended the word to be under stood only in such sense and consequently, the dictionary
meaning was not of much consequence under the circumstances of the case.

In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, the appellants beat up the officers of the
respondents while the latter were pounding up stray cattle. The appellants were charged under
section 332, Indian Penal Code but they pleaded the right of private defense of property. The
question was whether the cattle being pounded up were abandoned within the meaning of
section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
The appellants emphasized on the dictionary meaning of the term which means ‘Complete
leaving of a thing as a final rejection of one’s responsibilities so that it becomes ownerless’.
Observing that the acceptance of dictionary meaning would destroy the primary purpose of
the Act itself which could never is the intention of the legislature; the court held that
abandoned means Unattended or let loose, in the present context of the statute.

In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, the supreme court remarked that where the object
of the Parliament was to stop not only trade in imported elephant ivory but ivory of every
description under the wildlife protection Act, 1972 as amended by Act 44-of 1991 vide
Section 49-C, the word ivory will include ivory of every description imbedding mammoth
ivory as is clear from the dictionary meaning of the word Ivory.

UNIT- IV
Q.4. “The rule which requires that penal statutes should be construed strictly, has lost much
of its force in recent times”. Do you agree with the above statement? Substantiate your
answer and refer to decided cases.
Ans. The principle that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is to be strictly
construed is not of universal application which must necessarily be observed in every case. It
is now only of limited application and it serves in the selection of one when two or more
constructions are reasonably open. The rule was originally evolved to mitigate the rigour of
monstrous sentences for trivial offences and although that necessity and that strictness has
now almost vanished, the difference in approach made to a penal statute as against any other
statute still persists.
According to Lord Esher, MR, the settled rule of construction of penal sections is that ‘if
there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we
must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more
lenient one.’
Interpretation of penal provisions must be in consonance with the principles underlying
fundamental rights. Any provision which visits an accused with adverse consequences
without affording him any remedy to disprove an item of evidence which stands against his
innocence, is inconsistent with the philosophy enshrined in Art 21. It was held by the
Supreme Court that they should so interpret such a provision as to dilute it to make it
amenable to Art 21 of the Constitution.
When words employed in a penal statute are not clear the principle ‘against double
penalisation’ would be applied. Failure to comply with a statute may attract penalty. But only
because a statute attracts penalty for failure to comply with the statutory provisions, the same
in all situations would not call for a strict construction. An interpretation which strikes a
balance between enforcement of law and protection of valuable human right of accused (right
of privacy) must be resorted to. Sec 105 of the Evidence Act 1872 says that the burden to
prove that the case of the accused falls within an exception to a statutory offence lies on him.
But the question whether the defence set up by an accused is really a defence of an exception
or a defence setting up non-existence of a fact which is an ingredient of the offence to be
proved by the prosecution depends upon the construction of the particular statute.
In applying and interpreting a penal statute, public policy is also taken into consideration. In a
recent case, the House of Lords held that consensual sadomasochistic homosexual encounters
which occasioned actual bodily harm to the victim were assaults occasioning actual bodily
harm, contrary to Sec 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and unlawful wounding
contrary to Sec 20 of the Act, notwithstanding the victim’s consent to the acts inflicted on
him. The following are some of the propositions important in relation to strict construction of
penal statutes:
(a) if the scope of prohibitory words cover only some class of persons or some well defined
activity, their scope cannot be extended to cover more on consideration of policy or object if
the statute.
(b) prohibitory words can be widely construed only if indicated in the statute. On the other
hand if after full consideration no indication is found the benefit of construction will be given
to the subject.
(c) if the prohibitory words in their own signification bear wider meaning which also fits in
with the object or policy of the statute.

 JK (Bombay) Ltd v. Bharti Matha Mishra

In this case, it was held that the expression ‘officer or employee of a company’ applies not
only to the existing officer or employee but also includes past officers or employees where
such an officer or employee either

 wrongfully obtains possession of any property, or

 wrongfully withholds the same after the termination of his employment.

The expression would also include the ‘legal heirs or representatives.’ It was held by the
court that the penal statutes should not be so liberally construed with the aid of presumptions,
assumptions and implications as to rope in for the purposes of prosecution such persons
against whom the prosecution is not intended by the statute and initiation of prosecution
would be violative of Art 21 of the Constitution and against public policy.

 In Swedish Match AB v. SEBI

It was observed that penal statute is required to be strictly construed. Failure to comply with a
103 PENAL STATUTE TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED Para 5.3 statute may attract
penalty, but only because a statute attracts penalty for failure to comply with statutory
provisions, the same in all situations would not all for a strict construction. In this case, as per
strict interpretation, penalty was called for. However, there were differences in interpretation
of SEBI regulations. Hence, SC exercised its jurisdiction under Article 142 and asked SEBI
not to proceed with adjudication in the matter.\

 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tondon

In this case, the definition of ‘sale’ in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 was
construed in the sense having regard to the mischief intended to be remedied. It was held that
the ‘sale’ in the Act would include all commercial transactions where under an adulterated
article of food was supplied for consumption by one person to another person. Therefore,
supply or offer of food to hotelier to a customer when consolidated charge was made for
residence and other amenities including food fell within the definition.

 Tolaram v. State of Bombay

In this case, Sec 18 of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act
1947 was construed. This section provided that ‘if any landlord receives any fine, premium or
other like sum or deposit or any consideration other than the standard rent in respect of the
grant, renewal or continuance of a lease of any premise, such landlord shall be punished.’ It
was held by the Supreme Court that the section did not prohibit the taking of money by
owner of an incomplete building in consideration.

UNIT - V
Q.5. What do you understand by the Presumption against retrospective operation of statutes?
Also discuss its scope and limitations.
Ans. Retrospective operation of law implies to the application of law to facts or actions
which existed prior to the enactment of the said law. Such laws change or alter the legal
consequences of acts which took place prior to its enactment. A retrospective law takes away
or impairs an existing right by creating or imposing a new liability for an act committed
before the enactment of a law. However retrospective operation of law does not apply to
penal provisions. A retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle of prospective
operation of law which regulates future acts without changing the character of past
transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. Article 20 (1) of the
Constitution of India provides protection against retrospective operation of law commonly
known as ex post facto law which changes the legal consequences of actions committed
before the enactment of the law. The question which is faced during the applicability of
retrospectively is whether a statue or law should be given a retrospective effect which takes
away or impairs an existing right or impose a new liability.
Retrospective generally means to take a look back at events that already have taken
place. The term is used in situations where the law (statutory, civil, or regulatory) is changed,
altered or reinterpreted, affecting acts committed before the alteration. When such changes
make a previously committed lawful act unlawful in a retroactive manner, and are known as
an ex post facto law or retroactive law.
Retrospective operation of law therefore means application of law to facts or actions which
exist even prior to the date the said law is promulgated. It takes into its ambit activities
existing prior to the date of the new law and thus operates from a date earlier than the date
they come into effect.
APPLICATION OF RETROSPECTIVETY
In most legal systems, retrospective laws which punish the accused for acts, that were lawful
when committed, are rare and not permissible. More commonly, changes retroactively
worsen the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships
that existed, by bringing it into a more severe category than it was in when it was committed;
by changing the punishment or recompense prescribed, as by adding new penalties, extending
sentences, or increasing fines and damages payable; or it may alter the rules of evidence in
order to make exoneration more difficult than it would have been. On the other hand,
retrospective laws which deal with amnesty may decriminalize certain acts and grant pardon
by reducing punishments or change possible consequences for unlawful acts retroactively by
repealing previous laws and making it no longer applicable to situations to which it
previously was, even if such situations arose before the law was repealed.
A Law does not become retrospective, only because a part of the requisite for its action is
drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. In some cases where a new offence is created or
a penalty is increased, the legislature is not prevented from enacting an ex post facto law, but
if any such law takes or impairs any vested right acquired under an existing law or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to the transactions
on considerations already past, such laws must in express terms state that it is to be
applicable retrospectively and the necessary implication of such retrospectively shall be
borne out from the language employed by the Legislature.
EX-POST FACTO LAW
The term Ex-Post Facto, retroactive and retrospective are synonyms in judicial use and such
terms makes the law look backs on acts which have already taken place. It changes the legal
consequences of past events as if the law had been different when the event took place
and imposes retrospectively upon acts already done or increase penalties. In relation to
criminal law, it may criminalize actions that were legal when committed or it may aggravate
the crime by bringing it into a more severe category than it was before or it may increase the
punishment of a crime by adding new penalties or extending the terms or it may alter the
rules of evidence in order to make conviction for a crime more likely than it would have been
at the time of the action for which a defendant is prosecuted.
A law may have an ex post facto effect without being technically ex post facto. For example,
when a law repeals a previous law, the repealed legislation no longer applies to the situations
it once did, even if such situations arose before the law was repealed. Ex post facto laws are
seen as a violation of the rule of law as it applies in a free and democratic society. Most
jurisdiction do not permit retrospective legislation to come into force, though some have
suggested that judge -made law is retrospective as a new precedent applies to events that
occurred prior to the judicial decision. The principle of prohibiting the continued application
of these kinds of laws is also known as nullumcrimen, nullapoena sine praevialegepoenali,
which means that there exists no crime and no punishment without a pre -existing penal law.
In some nations that follow the Westminster system of government, such as the United
Kingdom, ex post facto laws are technically possible as the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy allows parliament to pass any law it wishes. However, in a nation with an
entrenched bill of rights or a written constitution, ex post facto legislation may be prohibited.
CRIMINAL APPLICABILTY
Mostly applicability of Ex-post facto laws to criminal liability is frowned upon. A canon of
interpretation of penal provisions does not permit penal provisions to have retrospective
effect of law. A penal character in certain offences makes certain offences punishable as
offences for the first time, usually no case is maintainable under such a circumstance as
respect to acts done before the commencement of such an act. To punish a person for his act
which was not an offence at the time of committing the act, a subsequent legislation which
came into operation after the commission of the act will per se be unconscionable besides
amounting to negation of fair play and justice.
The Apex Court in Vijay vs. State of Maharashtra held that penal statues which creates new
offences are always prospective, but penal statues which create new disabilities, though
ordinarily prospectively are interpreted to be retrospective in nature where there is a clear
intendment that they are to be applied to past events.
VALIDITY OF RETROSPECTIVE LAW
The Constitution of India does not permit retrospective operation of an act or law, unless
there is a necessary implication in law stating that the law is retrospective in nature. A law
which is held retrospective but it is not specifically implied in the act would be held to be
invalid or unconstitutional. Article 20 (1) of the Indian Constitution provides for protection
against retrospective operation of law commonly known as ex post facto law which changes
the legal consequences of actions committed before the enactment of the law. The Supreme
Court has pronounced many judgment in respect of retrospective operation of laws.
In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra, the Court laid down the ambit and
scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation The Court held that a statue which
affects substantive right is presumed to be prospective in operation unless expressly made
retrospective. A procedural law should not be allowed to operate retrospectively and a statute
which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be
construed to be prospective in operation unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by
necessary implication.
A Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Income Tax Commissioner vs.
Vatika Township Private Ltd. held that a legislation cannot be presumed to be intended to
have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern
current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do
something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow‘s
backward adjustment of it. The Constitutional Bench set out the general principles
concerning retrospectively and concluded that of the various rules guiding how a legislation
has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a
legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The Court held
that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and
should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known
as lexprospicit non respicit i.e. law looks forward not backward. A retrospective legislation is
contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be
regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. The obvious
basis of the principle against retrospectively is the principle of fairness‘, which must be the
basis of every legal rule. Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose
obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective
unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect unless the
legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to
explain a former legislation. The Hon‘ble Court held that the rule against a retrospective
construction is different. If a legislation
confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some
other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have
been the legislators object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a
purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. The doctrine of
fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context
of it to be given a retrospective operation. The presumption against retrospective operation is
not applicable to declaratory statutes which remove doubts existing as to the common law, or
the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. It is well
settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective
operation is generally intended.
CONCLUSION
It is now settled that unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require
it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an
existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards
matters of procedure. The general rule is that all statutes other than those which are merely
declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie
prospectively and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter
or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be
avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is
expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed
as prospective only. To sum up, it is now settled and confirmed by a Constitution Bench of
the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, that unless the language of the statute expressly so provides it
can only be construed to be prospective in its operation, the only exceptions being in case of
declaratory or clarificatory amendments or statutes.