SYMPOSIUM

Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics

Wayne Cameron
Victorian Auditor-General

This article tests a wide range of government activities against requirements for public
accountability. The article explores the incentives for ethical behaviour by public officials;
the need for more outcome focused performance indicators, tensions between parliamentary
and managerial accountability; the standards of accountability applied to public providers
of services can be applied to private providers; the utility of spelling out service
requirements in advance; the impacts on accountability of the convergence of the public
and private sectors; the need, where responsibility for programs is collaborative, for a
clear governance framework, tensions between representative and participative
democracy, and trends towards more participative and collaborative leadership.

Public accountability — what is it?
Accountability is an important element of good
governance. It involves being answerable for
decisions or actions, often to prevent the misuse of
power and other forms of inappropriate behaviour.
The notion of accountability can be divided
into a number of components, namely:
• giving an explanation to stakeholders;
• providing further information where required;
• reviewing, and if necessary revising, systems or
practices to meet the expectations of stake-
holders; and
• granting redress or imposing sanctions (Barberis
1998).
Access to information is an essential characteristic
of accountability — virtually all accountability relies
on the availability of relevant and timely information.
However, information is of little value unless it can
lead ultimately to the rectification of any issues
highlighted, or improved performance. It also can,
and does, fulfil an important stewardship function.
The question about accountability is funda-
mentally about who is accountable to whom, for
what. In the public sector, the public accountability
process is largely determined by legislation and the
parliamentary system.
Parliament (the legislature) provides the
authority for the acquisition and use of resources
for the public sector. In most cases this is done
Australian Journal of Public Administration • 63(4):59–67, December 2004
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2004. Published by Blackwell Publishing Limited
through the collection of taxes and the appropri-
ation of those taxes to executive government
through the budgetary process. Thus executive
government is accountable to parliament for the
management and use of resources provided to it
by parliament. Parliament, through its representa-
tive members, is responsible to the public, who
judge the performance of the government and are
able to exercise their influence via voting rights.
Public servants serve the government, and are
accountable to ministers. In a broader sense they
also have an obligation of accountability to
parliament and the public for their actions.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the public
sector accountability process (International
Federation of Accountants).
Public accountability is an important charac-
teristic of modern democratic government. Our
system of government, the ‘Westminster’ system,
requires that ministers act in the ‘public interest’.
This requirement demands a heightened level of
public accountability, transparency and probity.
Public accountability requires openness of
account giving, whereby those in power are held
accountable in public for their acts and omissions,
decisions, policies and expenditures. In this manner,
it is the complement of sound public management.
Departments and officials are potentially
accountable to the public for all aspects of their
performance, including not only their final actions
and decisions but also the processes by which
these actions and decisions were made. This
60
LEGISLATURE
y Co
Independent, bilit
si
objective
pon ting
information s di re
d re por
e ep o
ferre dit r
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Co A
LEGISLATIVE
AUDITOR
Figure 1 Public sector accountability process
accountability is implemented through a range
of different institutional mechanisms (Mulgan
2002).
For ministers and departmental officials, the
key channel of accountability remains the chain
of responsibility, upwards through the depart-
mental hierarchy to the secretary and the minister
and, via the minister, to parliament and the public.
This central channel is supplemented by a number
of other accountability mechanisms, including
the accountability of public servants to respond
to inquiries by parliamentary committees, to those
agencies which through their statutory roles
reinforce public accountability such as the
Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, tribunals and
the courts, as well as freedom of information
legislation.
These institutions, along with the power of
public debate in parliament, questions asked by
members of parliament and the role of the media,
reinforce the accountability processes in our
parliamentary system of democracy. Although
many of these bodies do not have the power to
impose remedies or sanctions, they can require
ministers and officials to provide all required
information and explanations, the results of
which , in most cases, unless on rare occasions
the public interest would be placed at risk, are
made public.
Statutory authorities and their individual
members are subject to a similar range of account-
ability mechanisms.
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2004
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nf
e Transparency
Au rred
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Audit EXECUTIVE
One much debated matter touches on the
balance between the personal accountability of
a minister and that of the agency official. If some-
thing goes horribly wrong, as it did in New
Zealand on 28 April 1995 in what became known
as the ‘Cave Creek disaster’ where some 14
students fell to their death from a deficient
viewing platform, is the constructor of the
platform primarily accountable, his supervisor,
the departmental CEO or the portfolio minister?
The numerous inquiries that followed that
particular tragedy failed to clear the matter up
adequately in the public eye. Perhaps each were
responsible in their own way.
But who was accountable? Who should
have picked up the tab when all the facts were
laid bare? The Regional Conservator resigned
immediately. The departmental CEO resigned,
but only after he was satisfied the system of
checks and balances to guard against a repeat of
that tragic event was satisfactorily concluded and
the member resigned later in May 1996.
Ethics and public accountability
Cabinet ministers delegate most of their powers
to the departmental head who, in turn, delegates
certain powers to staff. As public servants are
entrusted with significant power and resources, this
brings with it responsibility to perform duties in
accordance with accepted standards of conduct.
Community expectations about public sector
Public Accountability: Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics
performance and conduct are very high. In many
ways, more stringent standards are applied to the
public sector than elsewhere in society. The reasons
for this are simply that the resources at the disposal
of the executive and/or public servants have been
acquired compulsorily. The grantor of the resources
has had no choice in the matter. The most they can
demand in return is adequate and clear accounta-
bility for the use of the resources so acquired.
Ethical behaviour is one of the principal means
by which accountability is maintained in the public
sector (O’Faircheallaigh et al. 1999:225).
The ethical framework flows from public service
values, obligations and standards, which are in turn
derived from legislation, policy and accepted public
service conventions. Parliament has imposed a
statutory responsibility on public servants to act
ethically. There are codes of conduct for members of
parliament and for public servants — certainly for
those in government departments. (The further away
from the oversight of central agencies — for example
fully autonomous statutory corporations — the less
clear the strength of influence of the central agency
to require codes of conduct covering members of
governing bodies or their staff becomes. This is
largely due to their relative autonomy as expressed
in enabling legislation, the expectation that the
governing board will require these aspects of good
governance to be in place and the uncertainty of the
authority of central agencies to mandate particular
requirements.)
The accountability of every officer of the public
service must not only be clear, it must be well under-
stood. For individuals, the type of organisation in
which they work, as well as the position occupied,
will determine the applicable legislative and policy
regime.
According to that regime, the duties, respon-
sibilities and powers of individual officers must be
clearly spelt out, for example in a position statement
or performance contract. Each officer will need to
understand the legislation, delegations and
performance standards relevant to his or her duties.
Influences on public accountability
While the legal and ethical framework of govern-
ment has remained essentially the same over the
last decade there have been significant changes to
the way government is conducted and services are
provided. These changes include privatisation,
corporatisation, outsourcing, budgetary and
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2004
61
financial reform and devolution of authority from
central agencies.
It can be said that the biggest influence on public
accountability is the changing environment in which
government operates, resulting in an ongoing need
to ensure that the accountability relationships
between parliament, the government, the public
service and the electorate are defined in a credible
manner that is acceptable to all parties.
The clearest accountability imperative is
adherence to the rule of law (including delegated
authorities). Conversely, the greatest uncertain-
ties and conflicts are created by the administrative
environment and its demands that are not clearly
related to the legal framework applying to the
public services, including any guidelines derived
from particular statutes (Barrett 2001).
Some of the key factors and emerging issues
impacting on public accountability today are
outlined below.
Performance reporting and management
Public reporting is one of the main means of
discharging public accountability obligations.
For many, transparency is the essence of account-
ability. Well-documented and reported perform-
ance information is fundamental to public agency
accountability and effective management. It is a
primary vehicle by which assurance is provided
to parliament and the public that a government’s
objectives are being met. Hopefully the reader
can also gauge whether those objectives are being
achieved efficiently and effectively.
In Victoria, the Performance Management
and Reporting Framework and associated per-
formance indicators seek to link government
policy outcomes with public sector outputs and
the budget process. The framework is made up of
three components: outputs, objectives and
government outcomes. Outcome information in
particular is one of the principal means of achiev-
ing program accountability, yet it is also the area
in which the greatest gap in performance infor-
mation still exists.
It is generally agreed that performance indi-
cators need to become more outcome focused.
This not only includes information on what has
been achieved but the oncost effectiveness of these
achievements (Barrett 1996).
My recent report to parliament on perform-
ance management and reporting in Victoria
(Victorian Auditor-General 2003:19) found that
62
although the key government measures set out in
the government’s Growing Victoria Together
provide a strong sense of priority and purpose:
• they do not cover the full scope of agency
objectives or outputs;
• they do not adequately link departmental
objectives and outputs to government’s
policy outcomes; and
• they have tended to focus at the key
government indicator level and don’t allow
‘connected’ drill down to the agency level.
The Victorian Performance Management and
Reporting Framework currently includes only
government departments and not the full range
of public sector entities that make contributions
to the achievement of all government’s desired
outcomes. There is a range of mechanisms by
which government agencies are held account-
able; however, this abundance of mechanisms has
not led to a greater public understanding of the
benefits received from the activities of government
and its agencies (Victorian Auditor-General
2003:7–8).
A number of issues associated with reporting
non-financial performance have been identified.
These include:
• there being few incentives for agencies to
report more than they are legally required to.
This is due to factors such as aversion to
generating reactions to bad news, uncertainty
over whether the additional information is
appropriate and uncertainty about the use to
be made of the additional information;
• tension between parliamentary and mana-
gerial accountability in that accountabilities
for managerial control by government differ
from the accountabilities for oversight by
parliament;
• difficulties in translating overall mission/
vision statements into identifiable outcomes
and in turn linkage to the service provision
(level and funding) decisions;
• the absence of bridges between the preparers
and users of the information, whereby the
users do not always have a good grasp of
how to assess performance and there is often
a sense of having overwhelmed the general
reader with too much information (Neale and
Anderson 2000).
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Non-financial performance reporting has a long
way to go yet in Australia to be both useful and
meaningful. We have yet to get the rewards and
sanctions right. Because of the lack of symmetry
between the different needs of users — ranging
from managers to policy analysts, to government,
to parliament and the public — insufficient
attention has been given to recognising each of
these quite different needs with the resulting
outcome of KPIs being largely driven through
the budgetary process (linked to resource allo-
cation rather than achievement of goals and
objectives — hence their orientation to efficiency
rather than effectiveness), and departmental
annual reports largely linked to KPIs associated
with managing the services (outputs) of the
agency.
So as things currently stand, we are seeing
many KPIs reported by agencies more as a compli-
ance exercise rather than a genuine attempt to
report on the effectiveness of programs. Part of
the problem is also due to the inherent constraints
of the annual reporting cycle. Effective reporting
against a number of government programs may
require a more periodic and comprehensive
solution as instanced in my recent report on the
effectiveness of school literacy programs in
Victoria.
Triple bottom line reporting
There is also a growing public interest in an
organisation’s performance beyond its economic
result, to its social and environmental performance.
This has led to demands for greater transparency and
disclosure in these areas, with an emphasis on
sustainable development and ethical behaviour.
In March 2000, the state government summit
Growing Victoria Together recommended a triple
bottom line direction to policy development that
integrated economic, social and environmental
goals.
The Victorian state government also ap-
proved the implementation of an Environmental
Management System requiring departments to
include in their annual reports, from 2003–04,
information about their performance in relation
to energy use, waste production, paper waste,
water consumption, transportation and pur-
chasing activities and how those facets of their
activity are environmentally responsible.
Public Accountability: Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics
Conformance (process) vs
performance (results)
The community has a right to be assured that the
programs to which funding is applied have a clear
and relevant purpose, that programs are being run
efficiently and effectively (are providing value
for money) and that the highest standard of ethics
are being maintained.
Agencies thus become accountable in two
broad areas: the quality of outcomes and the qual-
ity of process (how well an agency conforms to
the ‘rules’). The challenge is to strike an appropri-
ate balance between conformance and perform-
ance, determined by leadership decisions, values,
and identified preferences (Barrett 2003a,b,c).
Of necessity there are trade-offs between
conformance and performance. In the past, the
public sector has tended to focus on ensuring
conformance with legal and procedural
requirements rather than striving for exceptional
performance. Indeed, as auditors, our audit work
frequently focuses on procedural fairness and
compliance with authority. This has encouraged
a risk-adverse attitude among public servants,
with attention focused more on process than on
achieving government objectives.
There therefore needs to be a cultural change in
the public sector if public servants are to focus more
on achieving results and on being accountable for
their performance, including effective management,
rather than avoidance of risks.
That is not to say that risks should be over-
looked and not managed. Clearly they should be. In
fact good risk management practices will provide
the necessary balance between conformance and
performance risk.
Outsourcing/private sector involvement
in service provision
The employment of private persons or institutions
for public purposes is not new. In Europe in the
18th century and before, private provision of
publicly funded services was almost the norm.
What we are seeing now is a return to an earlier
era, partly as a result of a search for greater
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public
funds, and partly out of a preference for reducing
the public sector and enlarging and enriching the
private sector (Mulgan 2002).
The involvement of the private sector in the
provision of public services raises a number of
important accountability questions. Can the same
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standards of accountability applied to government
providers of public service also be applied to non-
government providers? Are private contractors to
government as accountable as departmental officers
providing the same service? Or does outsourcing
reduce accountability?
The Victorian Public Accounts and Estimates
Committee has noted differing views about whether
outsourcing lessens the accountability of
government for the provision of public services
(Victorian Public Accounts and Estimates Committee
2000:105).
In general, two factors have a significant
impact on accountability practices (Mulgan
2002). These are:
1. Inclusion of private sector organisations with
significantly different accountability practices.
While non-government organisations may
adjust their accountability practices to fit more
closely with the standards expected of the
public sector, there are limits to their
adaptability; and
2. Replacement of internal, organisational
relationships with new contractual relation-
ships between purchaser and provider.
Compared to the public sector, the private sector
tends to be more accountable for results because
commercial companies have a comparatively clear
‘bottom line’ (public sector agency objectives can
be imprecise and may contain conflicting economic
and social objectives) however, it falls short in terms
of process transparency and accountability (Mulgan
2002).
The overall reduction in accountability is most
obvious when mistakes occur and members of the
public seek remedies from the government. In the
case of public service provision of services, the
minister concerned will be able to conduct immediate
inquiries and where possible impose immediate
remedies. In the case of provision of services by a
private contractor, the minister may at times be
powerless to act (South Australian Auditor-General
1998) — particularly if appropriate safeguards were
not included in the contractual arrangements.
While contracting out services involves some
diminution of ministerial and therefore
parliamentary accountability, it does have poten-
tial to increase accountability in other respects.
For example, the need to spell out service require-
ments in advance may force governments to
64
clarify both the objectives sought through a
particular service and the criteria by which the
performance of providers is to be assessed.
This was my experience in outsourcing
financial statement audits. Before the policy to
outsource could be implemented some consider-
able effort was undertaken to codify precisely
what a ‘legislative audit’ was to ensure that the
activities formerly undertaken by staff were
repeated by the private provider.
Commercial confidentiality concerns
The involvement of private providers in service
provision raises the question of to whom are
outsourced contractors and their staff accountable.
In practice, outsourcing tends to reduce the range of
accountability mechanisms through which providers
must answer.
Victoria’s Public Accounts and Estimates
Committee observed that it was important that
accountability in the delivery of government services
be evidenced in fact by the capacity of the public to
gain an awareness of the key features of contractual
arrangements entered into and contribute to the
decision-making process (Victorian Public Accounts
and Estimates Committee 2000:xxxi).
Greater participation of the private sector in
the provision of public services has allowed some
governments to establish a new regime to limit
the publication of material, based on the view
that the details of government dealings with the
private sector need to be protected from public
scrutiny because the commercial value embedded
in the contracts with the private sector would be
diminished if those contracts were released.
In some jurisdictions parliament and the
Auditor-General have no direct access to contractors
and freedom of information legislation does not
apply. Only recently has Victorian audit legislation
been amended to allow the Auditor-General to
disclose publicly information contained in
commercial in-confidence contracts. The jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman is not normally extended to
private contractors when they provide public services.
One of the most notable effects of out-
sourcing has been the removal of certain account-
ability requirements for transparency and fairness
expected in the public sector. For example, how
much is paid for the service? Once a service is
outsourced, the amounts of money paid to
individual members of the outsourcing contract
becomes commercially confidential and beyond
the range of public inquiry. Matters of employ-
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ment conditions, particularly the appointment to
positions based on merit, are also no longer an
issue for public concern (Mulgan 2002).
With the increased involvement of the private
sector in provision of public services, the demon-
stration of accountability concepts (such as
transparency, equity of treatment and probity of
public resources, including application of public
sector values and codes of conduct) has the
potential to become clouded unless governments
take a proactive and consistent stance to the
scrutiny of contracts involving public funds
(Barrett 2002:10).
The convergence of the public and private
sectors raises issues about the nature of account-
ability. Private sector providers are clearly under
pressure from the openness and transparency
required by public sector accountability to
parliament and the community. There should be
some movement towards striking a balance
between the appropriate nature and level of
accountability and the need to achieve cost-
effective outcomes by: emphasising project and
contract management skills in public sector
managers basing commercial relationships on
sound tendering and administrative procedures
and an enforceable contract; and ensuring that
public accountability is not eroded through a
reduction in external scrutiny by parliament and
the Auditor-General (Barrett 2003a).
Compliance with public sector
values and conduct
It is important that non-public servants are made
aware of the expected standards of conduct of
public sector employees. When establishing
agreements and contracts, agencies will need to
consider factors such as the extent to which the
private sector provider and its employees will be
expected to comply with public sector values and
code of conduct, any additional conduct require-
ments that reflect the agency’s business, and the
action that may be taken if standards are not met.
Agencies must ensure that contractors are
aware that public sector employees are bound by
values and a code of conduct and do not place
public servants in a position where their impar-
tiality or professionalism may be compromised.
Private financing of government activities
In the current budgetary environment, public
sector entities in many countries have found it
difficult (without borrowing) to provide
Public Accountability: Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics
dedicated funding for large projects out of annual
budgets. The encouragement of private sector
investment in public infrastructure by governments
is one response to these budgetary pressures. It has
also given rise to additional challenges and demands
for public accountability and transparency because
the parameters of risk are far different from those in
traditional approaches to funding public infra-
structure (Barrett 2001).
Private financing arrangements have been
used extensively in the UK and by Australian
state governments, particularly in relation to
infrastructure projects such as the construction of
roads and buildings.
Public accountability issues are centred
around whether the financing arrangement is in
the public interest and offers better value for
money, or net benefit, when compared with the
best public sector delivery model. They also centre
on the adequate transfer of risk and operational
control to the private sector entity while reserving
the capacity to protect the public interest and
achieve government policy objectives.
There have been concerns expressed about
public accountability for privately financed
projects, stemming from the reduction in the flow
of performance information available and
difficulties experienced by parliamentarians in
gaining access to contract documents (Barrett
2003b).
In view of the growing interest in and use of
private financing initiatives and the important
financial, risk transfer and accountability issues
raised, agencies increasingly will need to focus
their attention on examining the broader public
accountability issue. This will be important in
meeting parliament’s and the public’s need for
assurance about the processes adopted and
outcomes achieved.
Collaborative government/partnership
arrangements
As governments continually reassess their role in
society, they are being required to develop new
approaches to policy-making and service delivery
arrangements. These are increasingly likely to
involve the establishment of partnership arrange-
ments. Public sector reform is also resulting in
government objectives requiring the collabora-
tive efforts of two or more agencies/parties/levels
of government — joined-up government.
Unfocused and uncoordinated programs
waste resources, confuse and frustrate customers
and limit the overall program effectiveness. As a
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65
consequence, accountability arrangements will
need increasingly to cross organisational
boundaries to align activities better and reduce
barriers to effective cooperation and coordination.
Accountability in the areas of community
service obligations, equity in service delivery and a
high standard of ethics within a legislative-based
values system are particularly critical to public sector
agencies working in partnership to deliver joined-
up services effectively (Barrett 2003c:28).
Working in partnership undoubtedly adds
to the complexity of accountability arrangements
(Lord Sharman 2001). Therefore, in any
arrangement where there is joint responsibility
for overseeing and implementing programs across
a number of bodies, a clear governance framework
including accountability and reporting
arrangements — which clearly define roles and
responsibilities of the various participants — is
essential.
Agencies cannot continue to represent only
their immediate areas of responsibility. They must
also act in accordance with their cross-portfolio
or inter-agency responsibilities. Any uncertainty
experienced by private and/or public participants
about their responsibilities can create confusion
both as to who is accountable for what and the
requirements of the various relationships with
stakeholders.
The Canadian Auditor-General, in a study
of collaborative partnerships involving govern-
ment and non-government sectors in delivering
services and policy-making, suggested that while
the minister is clearly accountable to parliament
for the involvement of a federal department or
agency, in collaborative arrangements partners
could be held accountable for the achievement
of results (Canadian Auditor-General 1999:Ch5).
Joined-up government inevitably involves
at least dual accountability of participants both
for their individual organisations and for the
joined-up arrangements. However, where the
private sector is involved, the government and
parliament may need to re-examine the more
traditional notions of accountability and the
extension of them to private sector participants
(Barrett 2003a).
Community consultation/participatory
governance
Governments are increasingly outsourcing ser-
vices and partnering with other agencies, sectors
and the community at large in delivering out-
66
comes. The mood is clearly moving towards the
private and community sectors wanting greater
involvement in public policy-making based on the
knowledge they have accumulated in service
delivery.
Important accountability issues arise as more
non-government players are involved in the policy
development process (Edwards 2003). In those
circumstances can the principles of individual
collective ministerial responsibility and accounta-
bility to parliament hold when the boundaries
between the public and community sectors are
blurred?
Developing an accountability framework that
fits collaborative arrangements better may assist
effective participatory governance. The participation
and accountability of any independent parties
involved in the development of government policies
or the achievement of policy objectives need to be
made explicit and clear.
Determining how much participation is re-
quired on any particular issue for any stage in the
policy cycle should lead to greater efficiency and
use of resources compared to the more traditional
approach to consultation.
While close relationships with stakeholders
should inform decision-making better, public ser-
vice employees need to be clear about their obliga-
tions to be impartial, accountable and responsible
to government. The closer and the more formal
the relationship, the more important it is to clarify
expectations and obligations, including the
handling of confidential information to prevent
unauthorised disclosure, and transmission of
advice. Conflicts of interest may arise where
stakeholders become involved in decision-
making or have access to confidential information.
This also needs to be appropriately managed.
Another important issue in relation to
increased community participation in policy-
making is the impact on the legitimacy of the
current model of representative democracy (where
citizens elect representatives to make policy
decisions for them). Such participation has the
potential to create tension between representative
democracy and participatory democracy (where
citizens are directly involved in policy decision-
making). Processes will be needed that address
this tension when it arises.
Changes in society
We now live in a society that is infinitely more
literate and informed and thus far more discrim-
inatory than a few decades ago. Citizens are
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increasingly highly educated, more responsible
and more critical. They have the knowledge and
skills to lobby and influence decision-makers and
the media, and thus mobilise public opinion and
public confidence.
The ability of today’s community to scruti-
nise the activities of public sector entities has
also increased due to the universal availability of
information in the public arena including agency
websites and printed material together with
freedom of information and administrative investi-
gations. These all serve to ensure continued
application of the spotlight on the operations of
the public sector and its public accountability.
Impact of information technology
Information technology is revolutionising the
way the public sector operates. It has improved
the ability of public sector organisations to
communicate, share critical information and
organise processes in a more efficient way.
It has the potential to expand the scope of
public accountability by facilitating information
sharing and delivery of information to the
community. However, the effect in practice can
be uneven (Heeks 1998).
Recipients must have access to the tech-
nology and must have skills and confidence to
access and interpret the information provided.
There is the potential for inequality in public
accountability as a result of accessibility barriers
created for a minority of public citizens by compu-
terised information systems.
As dependence on information technology
grows and new and high-risk areas emerge, public
sector agencies need to adopt modern practices
to correct any underlying managerial problems
that impede effective system development and
operations. Unless appropriately controlled,
computerised operations can offer numerous
opportunities for committing fraud, unauthorised
tampering with data or disrupting vital operations
(Barrett 2003a,b,c).
In moving to online service delivery in the
public service, the complexities of the public
sector environment, in particular the social,
regulatory and legal issues faced as a result of the
changing of service delivery models need to be
considered and addressed.
Conclusion
The settings for the effective discharge of
accountability obligations continue to change as
Public Accountability: Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics
governments seek new ways to deliver community
programs more efficiently and effectively. Some of
these changes, such as those associated with multi-
party delivery, require new ways of thinking about
how best to inform stakeholders about achievements.
The traditional model does not envisage a sharing of
responsibility — yet in increasingly more
circumstances accountability is shared.
It is beyond question that leadership is required
in seeking out appropriate ways to adapt to these
influences of change. Perhaps the form of leadership
needs to be more participative and collaborative than
the practice that served us well in the past where
central agencies determined the course for others to
follow. Managers of tomorrow will need increasingly
to factor into their reform agenda time and
opportunity for buy in and joint problem-solving.
There will be times when leaders will continue to
need to take the initiative and establish broad
direction, but the mode, nature and pace of progress,
because it effects others, will require consultation
and negotiation if solutions are to endure. Our
challenge is to ensure all stakeholders are sufficiently
well informed about progress made in achieving
governmental goals.
References
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