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CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. (People v. Chavez, G.R.
No. 207950, Sept. 22, 2014)
Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to “include the
practice of issuing an „invitation‟ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the „inviting‟ officer for
any violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police
officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial
setting exist in this scenario. (People v. Bitancor, GR. No. 207950; Sept. 22, 2014)
The Miranda doctrine requires that:
1. Any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain Silent;
2. Anything he says can and will be used Against him in a court of law;
3. He has the right to talk to an Attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and
4. If he cannot Afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
(People v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)
1.RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
This is the aspect related to the right against self-incrimination. One’s silence will not be taken
against him, unlike in Rules of Evidence where there is such a thing as admission by silence can
convict the accused aside from the statement, the statement is immaterial; i.e. whether the statement
is admitted or not, the accused is convicted anyway.
If there is no other evidence to convict the accused aside from the extra-judicial confession, and the
confession is admitted, then the accused will be acquitted.
2.COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Art. III, Sec. 12 - ―custodial interrogation‖ (1973 Consti.) to ―investigation‖ (1987) as such, upon
arrest you have the right to counsel.
Choice of counsel:
a.the suspect has the choice of who will his counsel be.
b.in absence of letter a, it is chosen by police investigator to which suspect expressly agreed or
suspect failed to object (exception to letter b is when such choice of counsel is given by police in
an intimidating circumstance that you cannot object, the supreme court ruled that it does not
tantamount to suspect’s consent to such choice.)
2022 notes: only lawyers are qualified: exception to such is when lawyer are (since they are not
anymore independent and competent): (1) those who prosecute (2) conduct preliminary
investigation (like the ombudsman) (3) city, municipal and provincial attorneys (4) mayors and
barangay captain (5) police officers
2022 notes: with regard 4 & 5, they are still prohibited to be counsel even if it is outside of their
jurisdiction.
2022 notes: judges can assist in a confession.
Counsel of Choice Not Exclusive
The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The
constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is:
1. Engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation; or
2. Appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf. (People v.
Espiritu, G.R. No. 128287, Feb. 2, 1999)
Presence of Counsel:
a.presence of counsel is needed even if in foreign land
b.when you sign a receipt of seized items, you are entitled to lawyer otherwise it would tantamount
to a confession.
c.marked money or in administrative investigation, no need of lawyer
d.even in an interview by police, or invited in police station or in tactical interrogation (in order for
military to have tactical advantage in confrontation), counsel is needed
3.RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
The right under Sec. 12 specifically refers to the right to be informed (the first right) of the right to
remain silent and the right to a counsel. The right to be informed is over and above the other rights.
Information must be relayed in clear and unequivocal terms. The rights must be in the language
understood by the suspect or the person investigated. There is no clear standard for so long as there
is meaningful transmission and reasonable certainty that the person has understood the rights.
BAR: Chief Justice Narvasa was arrested for an offense. Should he be ap- prised of his rights
under the Miranda Warning?Yes. It is not more of the person arrested knowing his rights but rather
to assure him that his rights will be observed.When the person will start to talk, he must be
informed or warned that anything that he will say can and will be used against him in any court of
law.
4.RIGHT TO VISITS FROM RELATIVES ,LAWYER AND DOCTOR IN JAIL
(STATUTORY RIGHT)
WHEN ARE RIGHTS ATTACHED:
This is applicable only in Criminal, as such if its taken in administrative procedure, it can be
admissible even in criminal proceedings however, if it is taken in criminal ,such admission is
inadmissible even if it is used in civil and administrative proceedings.
1.when suspect is in custody which means not only that he is in jail but that he is deprived of
his freedom in a significant way (like while walking, police investigated him immediately) OR
2.under investigation, which means that he is being subjected to questioning by officers having
custody over him in relation to some crime.
Investigation, as defined in the case of Escobedo vs. Illinois Arizona
- that kind of questioning that ceases to be a general inquiry on the fact of the commission of an
offense and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect having been taken into custody, and
the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting incriminating statements.
The right to be informed, to remain silent and to counsel even covers situations where you are
invited by the police for questioning. Therefore, technically now, you can refuse an invitation for
questioning by the police if you have no counsel.
Does Not Apply to Police Lineups
As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up. (People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, Aug. 13, 2012)
WAIVER OF THE RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION:
1.Express
a.writing
b.assistance of counsel
c.after valid waiver (a & c), the confession must be signed in the presence of parent,
brother, sister, spouse, mayor or judge.
(scenario c is still valid even if the lawyer is not there anymore)
RA 7438 does not propose that the persons mentioned above appear in the alternative
or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated
therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must
be met: 1. Counsel of the accused must be absent, and 2. A valid waiver must be
executed. (People v. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
2.Implied
By Failure to object during trial while oral confession was admitted (Oral confession
is absolutely prohibited ,but since accused failed to object then it’s a waiver.)
What may be waived:
 Right to remain silent
 Right to counsel
What cannot be waived:
 Right to be informed of the right to remain silent and right to counsel
 as well as the requirement to be assisted by a counsel during a waiver in writing
WHEN RIGHTS END
The Criminal Process includes:
1. Investigation prior to the filing of charges
2. Preliminary examination and investigation after charges are filed
3. Period of trial
The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights were conceived for the first of these three phases,
that is, when the inquiry is under the control of police officers. It is in this situation that the
psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper
safeguards, is inherently coercive. Outside of this situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies and
Sections 14 and 17 come into play instead. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 2009)
The right to counsel under Section 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal
proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings.
Any proceeding conducted by an administrative body is not part of the criminal investigation or
prosecution. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity
of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a
criminal prosecution. (Gutierrez v COA, G.R. No. 200628, Jan. 13, 2015)

NON-AVAILABILITY
MIRANDA RIGHTS does not apply to administrative or civil cases, because persons
are not arrested and investigated for violations of an administrative law or civil law.
1. The rights are not available before government investigators become involved. Thus, admissions
made in an administrative investigation conducted by officials of the Philippine Airlines do not
come under Section 12. (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989)
2. The rights are not available when the confession or admission is made to a private individual.
(People v. Tawat, G.R. No. L62871, May 25, 1984)
3. The rights do not apply to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer. (Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, July 16, 1994)
4. The rights do not apply to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation. (People v. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
5. The rights do not apply to an admission made to a mayor who is approached not as mayor but as
confidante. (People v. Zuela, G.R. No. 112177, Jan. 28, 2000)
6. The rights do not apply to an interview recorded on video in the presence of newsmen, but the
Supreme Court warned that trial courts should admit similar confessions with extreme caution.
(People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001)
7. The rights do not apply to persons who voluntarily surrender, where no written confession was
sought to be presented in evidence as a result of a formal custodial investigation. (People v.
Taylaran, G.R. No. L49149, Oct. 23, 1981)
8. The rights do not apply to spontaneous statements, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed
the crime. (People v. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002)
9. Person in a police line-up not entitled to counsel. (Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. L56291 June
27, 1988)
10. Administrative proceedings. (Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24,
2015)
11. Signing of arrest reports and booking sheets. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be
the basis of a judgment of conviction. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's
being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. (People v. Bandin, G.R. No.
104494, Sept. 10, 1993)
12, Not applicable to res gestae statements
Res Gestae Statements - (This is a rule in evidence, Rule 140, Sec.2)
Literally, It means ―things done‖
* These are spontaneous statements in connection with a startling
occurrence relating to the fact and in effect forming part thereof (of the
startling occurrence). A startling exclamation.
People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
After he shot somebody, he immediately went to the police and told them
what happened. That is immediately after a startling occurrence. So when he
made a statement admitting liability, that can be taken against him. The
question was, when he gave the statement, there was no Miranda warning
given.SC said that was not required because it was part of res gestae. He
admitted even without being questioned; he admitted as a part of a statrling
occurrence.
SUMMARY OF AVAILABILITY AND NON-AVAILABILITY
2022 Bar MATTER:It does not mean, however, that if the extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible, the accused will be acquitted.
He can only be acquitted if there is no other evidence which will prove his guilt. If the
only proof submitted by the prosecution is the extrajudicial confession, and it so
happen that said confession is inadmissible, the accused will be acquitted. But
regardless whether there is an extrajudicial confession or not, and there are other
evidences to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused will nevertheless be convicted.
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EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:
1. Made in Writing, and in the language known to and understood by the confessant;
2. Made with the Assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. Given Voluntarily and intelligently where the accused realized the legal significance of his act;
4. Express and categorical; and
5. Signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him. (People
v. Olivarez, Jr., G.R. No. 77865, Dec. 4, 1998)
BURDEN OF PROOF: LIES WITH THE PROSECUTION
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection,
the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with
strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed:
1. The accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession; and
2. Knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a
lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. (People v. Jara, G.R. No. L-
61356-57, Sept. 30, 1986)
In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained during the police custodial investigation
relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is
inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the
appellant. (People v. Samontañez, G.R. No. 134530, Dec. 4, 2000)
EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
Nature
According to the exclusionary rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal
act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit
of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should
not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. (People v. Samontañez, G.R. No. 134530, Dec. 4, 2000)
Covers Both Confession & Admission
• Admission – an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact.
• Confession – a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein. (Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No.
147782, June 25, 2008)
Only Covers Confession or Admission Made During Custodial Investigation
Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they
are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
The fact that that accused was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest
proceedings does not in any way affect his culpability. It has already been held that "the infractions
of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation." Here, appellant's conviction was based not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution witness. (People v.
Bio, G.R. No. 195850, Feb. 16, 2015)
Inter Alios Acta Rule
General Rule: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Exception: An admission made by a conspirator under Section 31, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act of declaration. It is admissible against a coaccused when it is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-accused in
the crime.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that:
1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
2. The admission relates to the common object; and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People v.
Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013)
Exclusionary Rule Not Applicable to the Violator of the Right
The constitutional provision makes the confessions and admissions inadmissible ―against him,‖ that
is, against the source of the confession or admission. And it is he alone who can ask for exclusion.
Samples of Exclusionary Rule (Total Prohibition)
1.uncounselled confession
2.obtained through force, intimidation… or other means that vitiate will (like giving a reward or
injecting a truth serum so that he will tell the truth)
3.oral confessions
4.obtained after a valid waiver, but not signed in presence of parents… (those mentioned above in
express waiver)

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate
is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime
with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence (REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 44)
(Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, Jan. 22, 1980)
4BLUE95. Presumption of innocence persists even when there is conviction by lower court
and case is still on appeal. Such presumption is not destroyed until there is proof that
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on evidence. (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)
EQUIPOISE RULE: Where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. (People v.
Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, Nov. 26 2008)
EXEMPTION TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
In case of malversation
Intellectual property
Fisheries Code
2. RIGHT TO BE HEARD PERSONALLY OR BY COUNSEL
Includes the right to be present at the trial from arraignment to promulgation of sentence.
(U.S. Beecham, G.R. No. 5161 & 5162, Oct. 9, 1912)
After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused.
If fake lawyer: then it violates your right to counsel
There are instances however, just like in the Municipal Trial Court, that non-lawyers may be
allowed to appear. In the MTCs in the province, some prosecutors are chiefs of police, not lawyers,
because of lack of prosecutors.
4blue 95:you have no right to an intelligent lawyer, so if bobo ang lawyer mo then you are bound by
his kabubuhan.
What shall be done if the accused appears in court without a counsel?
 According to the case of People vs. Sueldado, it should be that the court will inform him of
his right to counsel. If he can’t afford a counsel, the court should tell the accused that the
court may appoint a counsel for him, a counsel de officio. If the accused would insist that he
wants to get the services of a counsel de parte, the court must allow the accused reasonable
time to admit the services of his own counsel.
 The role of a counsel de officio officially starts upon appointment and continues upon
arraignment before trial, after trial and on appeal. The designation of said counsel does not
stop after the decision of the trial court.
 The choice of the counsel de officio would depend on the competency,
independence and integrity of the lawyer. He must also be a lawyer of good
standing.
 In case of an arraignment, he must be given at least one hour to talk with the
accused.
 In case of a trial, the counsel de officio must be given at least two days to
prepare for trial.
Jimenez vs. Nazareno
On the appointment of a counsel de officio.At the different stages of a proceeding, different
counsels de officio were appointed. Does that violate the right of the accused to be heard by himself
or by counsel?SC said no, so long as the counsels de officio have done their job, i.e., they
participated in the course of the proceedings and they defended the accused to the best of their
abilities.
Delgado vs. CA
The accused was convicted. He appealed to the CA, still convicted. The accused moved for a new
trial on the ground that his lawyer who assisted him in the trial court was not actually an attorney.
The SC granted that because it violates his right to be heard by counsel. He apparently did not
know that his lawyer was not actually a lawyer.
3. RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (Sec. 11)
Duty of Court to Inform Accused of his Right to Counsel
1. Inform accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned;
2. After giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
3. If he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable
time to do so; and
4. If he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign a
counsel de officio to defend him
4BLUE95.A student who finished third year in the law school may engage in law student
practice with the supervision of a lawyer. He can appear, sign pleadings with the
supervision of a lawyer. In certain cases in the MTCCs, non-lawyers are allowed to appear.
This is to provide adequate legal assistance. IBP has its own free legal assistance program.
Some law schools also provide free legal assistance.
4.RIGHT TO HAVE COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE
OF WITNESSES
4 blue 95:documents should be subpoena.
4blue 95:remember the requisites in trial in absentia which is (1) arraigned (2) notify and (3)
failure to appear is unjustified.
2022 notes:however, you cannot be arraigned in absentia.
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5. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
Arraignment
an indispensable process in criminal prosecution; without it, no criminal prosecution nor
judgment will be valid.
It is the reading of the official charge where the information is read to the accused by the
court interpreter and whereby the accused will enter his plea of guilty or not guilty.
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2022 notes: if the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense, the
accused cannot be convicted even if prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial
with respect to such elements.
-- the real nature of the crime charged is determined from recital of facts in the information
and not based on caption, preamble or from specification of the law violated.
6. RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL
4blue 95 says that it is available only to Criminal Cases (unlike in speedy disposition of
cases whereby it applies to criminal, civil and administrative cases)
Speedy Trial v. Speedy Disposition of Cases
The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law
concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any
proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the appropriate right involved is the
right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit.
(Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. et al. v. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E.
Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, Jan. 24, 2012)
Section 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial ,quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
2022 notes:while right of accused applies only to the trial phase of criminal cases, the right
to a speedy disposition of cases covers all phases of JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL or
ADMINISTRATIVE proceedings.
4blue 95 says that this right covers the period before,during and after trial.
Effect of dismissal based on the ground of violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial:
if dismissal is valid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used s basis to obtain double
jeopardy. This would be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the consent of the
accused.
Remedy if the Right to Speedy Trial was violated:
1. He can move for the dismissal of the case
2. If he is detained, he can file a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)
7. RIGHT TO PUBLIC TRIAL
Public trial is that the attendance of the trial is open to all irrespective of their relationship to
the accused. However, if the evidence to be adduced is offensive to decency ,the public may
be excluded.
Right of the accused to public trial is not violated if the hearing are conducted on Saturdays,
either with the consent of the accused or it failed to object thereto.
The right of accused in fair trial is superior to that of right of people to be informed and
right of media to cover the trial, therefore ,if the accused or the witness wants that his case is
to be private with no media ,then it may be granted by the court.
8. RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Impartial trial means that the accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
It is an element of due process,so dapat judge must not be biased.
With regard too much media coverage, the lawyer of defense cannot just invoke that the
decision of the judge was biased due to media coverage, the lawyer must prove that due to
the media coverage there was actual prejudice on part of the judge.
9.RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE (CONFRONTATION)
If failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due to
the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should be excluded.
When the right to cross examine is demandable,it is demandable only during trials. Thus it
cannot be availed of during preliminary investigation.
Exceptions to right to confrontation are:
1.admissibility of ―dying declaration‖
2.trial in absentia
3.with respect to child testimony
10. RIGHT TO APPEAL
The only difference from the Rules of Court Rule 115, Rights of the Accused, is the right to
appeal after trial in allowable cases, which is provided in the said Rule.

11 . RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Section 17.NO PERSON (NATURAL) shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself
1.In Criminal cases– there exist a Prohibition on Inquiry , which means you cannot
force the accused to take the witness stand
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand
as a witness. An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
–
1. To be exempt from being a witness against himself, and
2. To testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness
he may be crossexamined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal
to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
2.In Civil cases – the person has the option to answer incriminating question,
therefore, the other party may call on such person to witness stand and latter cannot
refuse.
3.Administrative – if criminal, then follow rule (1), if civil follow (2).
4.if it is the Legislative who will case the person, then follow the rules on Civil case
above.
4blue 95:right against self-incrimination covers only TESTIMONIAL which includes the
production of documents, taking dictation and re-enactment of a crime.
However, exception to such is when it is the corporation, the officers cannot invoke self-
incrimination and if it is public record, the public officer cannot invoke self-incrimination.
Available Only When the Incriminatory Question is Asked
The right against self-incrimination is not selfexecuting or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate
time. (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989)
The right against self-incrimination does not apply in the following cases:
1. A woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy.
2. An accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to
have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether
he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim.
3. To expel morphine from the defendant’s mouth.
4. To have the outline of the defendant’s foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints.
5. To be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. (Dela
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
Over the years, the Supreme Court has expressly excluded several kinds of object
evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination.
These include:
1. Photographs, hair, and other bodily substances.
2. Examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her
husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small
for his penis.
3. DNA testing and its results. (Agustin v. CA, G.R. No. 162571, June 15,
2005)
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EXPANDED APPLICATION
1. The right is extended to respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings.
2. The right extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law.
3. The right extends to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.
4. The right extends to legislative investigations.
5. The right extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect,
i.e. medical board investigation.
6. The right extends to investigations conducted by a fact-finding ad hoc board.
KINDS OF IMMUNITY:
USE IMMUNITY- even if you testified, you can still be prosecuted with regard other
crimes and not on crime that you testified.
prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
TRANSACTION IMMUNITY- immunity whereby if you testify you cannot be
prosecuted anymore.
prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
4BLUE95. A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or
the witness would establish a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of
evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the accused or the witness.
4BLUE95.An accused can refuse to take the witness stand by invoking the right
to self incrimination but an ordinary witness cannot refuse to take the stand. He
can only refuse to answer specific questions which would incriminate him in the
commission of an offense.
What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from
the witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist were it not for the actions
compelled from the witness.
The right does not prohibit the examination of the body of the accused or the use of findings
with respect to his body as physical evidence .Hence, fingerprints of an accused would not
violate the right against self incriminations (or undergoing an ultra violet exam). However,
obtaining a sample of the handwriting of the accused would violate this right if he is charged
for falsification.
The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his possession which
might tend to incriminate him. However, a third person in custody of the document may be
compelled to produce it.
It can only be invoked during criminal cases or in administrative proceedings if accused is
liable to a penalty
It can only be invoke by natural persons not juridical persons.\\
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted
Ex post facto law is one where it makes an action done before passing of law and which was
innocent when done ,criminal and punishes such action or which aggravated the crime to
make it greater than when it was committed. Or changes punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than that which law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
2022 notes:it applies only to retrospective penal laws.
Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The
elements are:there must be a law. It must impose a penal burden individually and it is
imposed directly without judicial order.
4blue 95:applicable only to statutes and punishments.
4blue 95: not applicable to executive orders & presidential proclamations.
Gumabon vs. Dir. of Prisons
The petitioner was charged of a complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes.
He was found guilty and made to suffer a penalty for life imprisonment. This was in 1953.
In 1956, the case of Amado V. Hernandez was decided by the SC, it ruled that there is no
such crime as rebellion complexed with murder, the latter being necessarily included in the
crime of rebellion.
Gumabon wanted to avail of that ruling because the penalty is only prision mayor. Can he
avail of that?
The first question was, should judicial decisions be given retroactive effect?YES, because
judicial decisions form part of the law of the land and specially if it is favorable to the
accused. So, it should be applied to the petitioner in this case.
The other question is, should the decision in the prior case of Humabon be changed in that it
should be prision mayor and not life imprisonment?SC said NO, it cannot be changed
because the decision has already been final. What can be done is when the prision mayor
minimum at least has already been served, then the court is ousted of jurisdiction to order
the continued detention of the accused outside of that prision mayor penalty. So, after he
has served the prision mayor, he can file a petition for habeas corpus to question his
continued detention.

12. RIGHT TO BAIL
BAIL: the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, conditioned upon
his appearance before any court as required under the condition.
So, if you don’t want to serve a jail term before you are convicted, that is, pending trial, you
can be released temporarily pending the trial on bail.
GENERAL RULE: ALL PERSONS ACTUALLY DETAINED SHALL, BEFORE
CONVICTION BE ENTITLED TO BAIL. (PHIL. CONST., ART. 3, § 13).
Since bail is constitutionally available to “all persons”, it must be available to one who
is detained even before formal charges are filed.
Exceptions:
(1) Persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and
death, when evidence of guilt is strong
• For the purpose of determining whether an offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, what is determinative is the penalty provided for by law
regardless of the attendant circumstances. To require more than that would
practically entail a full-dress trial thereby defeating the purpose of bail which
is to enable the accused to obtain liberty pending trial.
• Strong evidence means ―proof evident‖ or ―presumption great.‖
(2) Persons who are members of the AFP facing a court martial
GENERAL RULE: BAIL APPLIES ONLY TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
As a general rule, the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. Thus, they do not apply in deportation proceedings, which are
administrative in nature. However, see Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, where
the court applied the general principles of international law found in the
UDHR and ordered released under a bond in a Habeas Corpus petition
Bail in Extradition Cases: Our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee. There is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
EFFECTS OF BAIL
1. The custody of the accused is transferred from the State to the bond.
2. The jurisdiction of the court over the accused remains if he is under bond.
FORMS OF BAIL
1. Cash Bond - bail in an amount, e.g., 80,000 pesos
The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his
posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our
law on the matter. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is
authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it.
And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a
surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.
2. Property Bond - if you don’t have any cash, but you have property, you can make the
property as your guaranty or security for the appearance in court. Normally,
it is required under the rules and by-laws that (1) the property is located in the
province or the place where the court sits, and (2) the value of the property
should at least equal to the value of the bail amount recommended or
approved by the court.
3. Surety Bond - is just like an insurance. You just pay the premium or the bail amount,
in which case, the surety becomes your custodian.
4. Recognizance -
An obligation of record entered into before a court guaranteeing the
appearance of the accused for trial. It is in the nature of a contract between the
surety and the state. The details on how recognizance can be obtained or when
it is applicable is left to legislation. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 2009)
Apart from bail, a person may attain provisional liberty through recognizance,
which is an obligation of record entered into by a third person before a court,
guaranteeing the appearance of the accused for trial. It is in the nature of a
contract between the surety and the state. (People v. Abner, G.R. No. L2508,
Oct. 27, 1950)
allowed for certain offenses, as when the penalty is not more than six months,
in which case, he can be released on recognizance, and the person who will
take custody will be a responsible person or officer of the community. This is
the Laurel Law (he thinks) by which Sen. Laurel introduced the law on
recognizance for minor offenses.
Ex. When the accused don’t have money, he may request the barangay
captain to take him under his custody and the court will designate the latter as
his temporary jailer. He will assumed responsibility in bringing the accused to
court whenever required.
Another instance is when a minor is charged for violation of R.A. 6425, in
which case, the minor may be released on recognizance to a responsible
member of a community: Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Councilor or even not an officer
of the community but at least responsible, who can take custody in the
meantime that the case is pending, but only particular cases.
4BLUE95. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. Bail is not a sick pass for an
ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. (People
v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, Oct. 27, 2006) BUT SEE: The currently fragile state of
Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail. (Juan Ponce Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015)
5
IF CONVICTED by the trial court, bail is only discretionary pending appeal (Magno
v. Abbas, G.R. No. L-19361, Feb.y 26, 1965; Comendador, et al. v. Villa, G.R. No.
93177, Aug. 2, 1991)
When a person who is out on bail is convicted, the bondsman must surrender
him for execution of the final judgement. (ROC, Rule 114, § 2[d])
BEFORE CONVICTION, Bail is Either:
A. A matter of right: When the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. To this extent, the right is absolute.
B. A matter of discretion: When the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, it shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is determined that
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right. (People v. Nitcha,
G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995)
• Discretion refers to the court’s discretion to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong.
• Do not confuse interpretation of Bail under Bill of Rights with the
interpretation of Bail under Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as to:
i. Bail as a Matter of Right (Sec 4),
ii. Bail as a Matter of Discretion (Sec 5),
iii. Non-Bailable offenses (Sec 7).
Since the grant of bail is discretionary and can only be determined by judicial
findings, such discretion can only be exercised after evidence is submitted to
the court, the petitioner has the right of cross examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal. (Santos v. Judge How, A.M. No. RTJ-05- 1946, Jan.
26, 2007)
A person is considered to be “in the custody of law” when:
(1) He is arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest.
(2) He has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.
The Court held that when the person has actually posted a bail bond, which
was accepted by the court, he has effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 115407, Aug. 28, 1995)
Other Rights in Relation to Bail:
A. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended
B. Excessive bail shall not be required (PHIL. CONST., art. 3, § 13).
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN SETTING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL:
1. Financial Ability of the accused to give bail
2. Forfeiture of other bail
3. The accused was a Fugitive from justice when arrested
4. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
5. Penalty for the offense charged
6. Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail
7. Character and reputation of the accused
8. Age and health of the accused
9. Weight of the evidence against the accused
10. Nature and circumstance of the offense
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. (De La Camara v. Enage, G.R. Nos. L32951-2, Sept. 17, 1971)
To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged is to
permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court. (Yap v. CA, G.R. 141529, June 6, 2001)
RIGHT TO A HEARING
In cases where the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong.
The constitutional right to bail necessarily includes the right to a hearing. When bail is
denied without a hearing, a fundamental right is violated. Hence, the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution in private inquiry, in the absence of the detainee, and the
subsequent issuance of an order on the basis of the private inquiry, cannot be allowed. The
hearing, however, need not be separate and distinct from the trial itself. And it need only be
summary. The right to a prompt hearing is waived by agreeing to postponements.
Parallel to the accused’s right to a hearing is the prosecution’s right to present evidence. If
the prosecution is denied such right, the grant of bail is void. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009)
The Court of Appeals/Supreme Court may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant:
1. If appellant escapes from prison or confinement;
2. If appellant jumps bail; or
3. If appellant flees to another country during the pendency of the appeal
 6

13.PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY C. The second element is that the accused must be placed in jeopardy of being punished
for the same offense.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a Situations contemplated:
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
1. identical offense
 Ex. Murder committed on Feb. 1; case dismissed without his consent, or the
2 KINDS: (1) Same Offense and (2) Same Act accused convicted or acquitted; the same case of murder committed on Feb. 1
is refiled

2nd offense is an attempt to commit the first

2. Frustration of the offense charged

 Ex. An earlier case for consummated homicide is filed. It turned out after the
case was dismissed, without the consent of the accused, or the accused was
acquitted or convicted, that the victim did not die after all, so an attempted or
frustrated homicide case is filed. That will be covered under the rule on
double jeopardy.

3. The second offense necessarily includes the first offense

 Some of the elements of the second offense constitute all the elements of the
first offense.
 Ex. First offense is homicide; the second offense is murder. Some of the
elements of murder constitute all of the elements of homicide.

I. SAME OFFENSE 4. The second is necessarily included in the first offense

It involves a statute only, and to know if there is double jeopardy,then look at the statute
itself.
General Elements of Jeopardy under SAME OFFENSE:
A. It is required under the first jeopardy to be attached or considered to have attached
but there must be (Requirements)
1. a court of competent jurisdiction
but if no jurisdiction or wrong venue (like in bigamy whereby he must be charge in place where 2 nd
marriage occurred), then, he can be charge again.
It must be determined which court has jurisdiction over the offense. The MTC now has jurisdiction
over criminal cases punishable up to six years of imprisonment. Example: a case of murder against
an accused filed, tried and decided before the MTC, and later, another case for the same murder is
filed against him before the RTC, the accused cannot claim his right against double jeopardy. The
first jeopardy has not attached because the MTC has no jurisdiction over murder cases.
 (It is the reverse of the preceding number)
 Ex. First offense is less serious physical injuries; the second offense is for
slight physical injuries, still covering the same act. All of the elements of
slight physical injuries constitute some of the elements of less serious
physical injuries. So the second is necessarily included in the first offense.
5. The accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense, if it is valid.
 It is allowed under our rules in criminal procedure that the accused will enter
into a plea bargaining. For a plea bargaining to be valid, the offended party,
as well as the prosecutor, must both agree to the plea bargaining. The plea
bargaining involves the plea of guilt of the accused to a lesser offense.
 Ex. Charged for serious physical injuries. If the complainant and the fiscal
agrees that you plea guilty to a lesser offense of slight physical injuries, the
case for serious physical injuries will be dismissed, you will become guilty
for slight physical injuries, thus, convicted. The private complainant cannot
refile the case for serious physical injuries.
EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL ELEMENT (C) :

2. an information or complaint filed sufficient to convict the accused 1. Supervening fact/event

however, if accused was charged with no offense; or the complaint or information was not signed
by offended party or that it was not filed by proper officer, then , he can be charged again.
The rules on the sufficiency of information or complaint embodied in the Rules of Court must be
observed. Example: when one is charged for rape but the private offended party did not institute
the complaint, that will not be sufficient to convict the accused, because rape is a private offense
and it can be instituted only by the private offended party.
3. an arraignment and plea
If the accused has not been arraigned and has not entered his plea, the case will be dismissed, and
that is without prejudice to refiling. It is different if there is already an arraignment and plea, that
will not constitute as first jeopardy if eventually the first case is dismissed without the expressed
consent of the accused.
4blue 95:however, even if he was arraigned (whereby he plead guilty) but if there is new substantial
evidence (in a sense that it was not discovered while on trial) pointing that he is not guilty, then, he
must be re-arraigned.
If the graver offense develop due to a supervening event/fact.
Melo vs. People:The accused was charged for frustrated homicide. When the accused was
arraigned on Dec. 29, 8:00 A.M., he pleaded not guilty. At 10:00 A.M. on the same day, the victim
died. On Jan.4, a charged for consummated homicide was filed against the same accused. The
accused contended that the consummated homicide charged could not be filed for it violates his
rights against double jeopardy.
SC said that this is a supervening event. When the accused was arraigned , the victim had not yet
died. Therefore is as yet no consummated homicide to talk about. Since there was this supervening
fact which developed after the arraignment of the accused, it will not amount to the validation of the
double jeopardy.
A supervening fact is not yet existing at the time of the arraignment of the accused.
2. The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after
the filing of the former information (NEWLY DISCOVERED FACT).

4. the accused has been acquitted, convicted or otherwise the case is
dismissed without his express consent.
From the terms of the double jeopardy rule, the mere filing of two information for the same offense
will not afford the accused protection from double jeopardy, because there is as yet no jeopardy
which has attached. It is required that the first jeopardy must have attached.
B. first jeopardy was terminated
Termination can be effected by:
1.acquittal
Judgment of acquittal is immediately final, it can never be appealed therefore the records cannot be
forwarded to court of appeals or appellate courts.
No matter the seriousness of an error, you cannot reverse the judgment of acquittal.
However, there exist a reversal of judgment or opening a case on acquittal whenever there exist
grave abuse of discretion or violation of due process.
So even if it is not a supervening fact, but at the time the first information was field, or the accused
had pleaded guilty, these facts were not yet discovered with reasonable diligence, although not
covered by the first exception on supervening fact, but under the second exception, this will now be
considered as an exception.
People vs. Yorac:The accused was prosecuted for frustrated murder for an act which he has been
previously charged for slight physical injuries. The victim, after being mauled by the accused, went
to a medical doctor for examination. The doctor gave a medical certificate stating that the victim
had been confined since Apr. 8 up to the present for head injury. He was charged for slight physical
injuries.
On Apr. 16, the accused was arraigned and pleaded guilty and was penalized accordingly. On Apr.
18, prosecution filed another information, this time, for frustrated murder, because according to the
prosecution the medical certificate shows contusion with lacerated wound and cerebral concussion.
Is this a supervening event.
SC said NO. That fact of the injury was already present when the accused was arraigned on Apr. 16
(only the doctor failed to mention it). It was not a supervening fact. It was the mistake of the
prosecution in not charging the correct offense. And since the accused already pleaded guilty, it is
already covered by the rule on double jeopardy.
3. In cases where the accused enters a plea of guilt to a lesser offense such is not valid,
because the offended party and the prosecutor both had not agreed in writing.

2.conviction (criminal)
No appeal is necessary even if to impose the proper penalty or else there would be jeopardy.
II.SAME ACT

3.dismissal without express consent of accused Similar or same act/circumstance. This situation contemplates an act punishable by a statute
There is NO Express Consent on the following: as well as an ordinance.
a.when accused objects to the dismissal To know if there is jeopardy, look at the act in time and in space. Therefore, the 1 act must be
b.when accused is silent at same time and same space in order to invoke protection against double jeopardy.
c.reinvestigation
Ex: X is driving recklessly and under influence of liquor. So if X is convicted or acquitted in
However, even if there is no consent ,it can still be refilled in the following: reckless driving, can he be charge again for driving under the influence of liquor as violation of a
a.grave abuse (since dismissal was erroneous) city ordinance? NO MORE, since it is the same act which is driving. It doesn’t show that at first 5
b.violation of due process minutes he is driving recklessly and next 5 minutes he is under influence of liquor since both occur
at the same act.
Express consent (so it can be refiled)
There exist express consent on the following: Ex:X was charged for 40 kilos of shabu but due to connections inside, X was able to bribe the
a.dismissal is provisional (1 yr for MTC & 2 yr for RTC) officer in changing the 40 kilos to 40 grams only, and then when X was arraigned he pleaded guilty.
b.without prejudice So he was penalized for imprisonment only for 6 months since it is only 40 grams.
c.on motion of accused However, in a few months time, court found out that the charge was fraudulent, so court wanted to
d.accused agrees to the dismissal charged X for the 40 kilos.
The SC said that he cannot anymore be charged since it is still the same act.
It is required that it is either viva voce or in writing which is considered to be positive, direct and
unequivocal, that the accused wants the case to be dismissed. That should be the tenor of the People vs. Relova. Theft of electricity is both punishable under the Penal Code for Theft, as well as
express consent. by an ordinance in that municipality of Batangas for theft of electricity. he was charged under the
city ordinance. It was dismissed based on the ground of prescription. Another case, this time, was
Instances in that case where, even with the express consent of the accused or upon motion of the filed against him for theft under the penal code. He invoked double jeopardy.
accused, it is considered as an acquittal (cannot be refilled): SC said the contention is valid. Under the constitution, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy in
1. the accused invokes the right to a speedy trial punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
2. the accused moves to dismiss the case based on a demurer to the evidence (which means lack of acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
evidence, so even if new witness in presented in future, it cannot be refilled anymore) 4BLUE 95: The act must be punished by an ordinance and a statute. If punished by two statutes or
3. state witness two ordinances, it will not be covered.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
1. General Rule: The prosecution may not appeal an acquittal, and an acquittal is
immediately final. (ROC, Rule 120, § 7)
Exception: The prosecution may appeal an order of dismissal when:
1. The dismissal is on motion or with the express consent of the accused. (ROC, Rule
117, § 7) a. Exception to the Exception: If motion is based on violation of the right to
a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence. (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 140633,
Feb. 4, 2002)
2. The dismissal does not amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits. (People
v. Salico, G.R. No. L-1567, Oct. 13, 1949)
3. The question to be passed upon is purely legal. (People v. Desalisa, L-15516,
Dec.17, 1966)
4. The dismissal violates the right of due process of the prosecution. (People v.
Sandiganbayan et. al., G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010)
5. The dismissal or acquittal was made with grave abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandiganbayan et. al., G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010)
Although, as a rule, dismissal of a criminal case may be used to abate an administrative case based
on the same facts, the same does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal
of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal case. However, if the two actions
are based on the same facts and evidence, such as in this case, dismissal in administrative case may
be used to negate criminal liability. (People v. Sandiganbayan et. al., G.R. No. 164577, July 5,
2010).
Effect of an accused’s appeal of his conviction
1. Waiver of right to double jeopardy
2. The appellate court may place a penalty higher than that of the original conviction.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. (People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, Sept. 22,
2014)
2. Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings. Res
judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be
availed of in an interlocutory order even if the order is not appealed. Even if the argument is
expanded to contemplate double jeopardy, double jeopardy will not apply because it requires
that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against the accused has been
dismissed or terminated without his express consent. (People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300,
July 26, 2017)
3. Dismissal with Consent of Accused: General Rule: Equivalent to a waiver of the defense of
double jeopardy.
Exception: When motion is based on Provisional Dismissal - A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
(ROC, Rule 117, § 8).
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new
rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of
the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled
even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the
ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
(People v. Panfilo Lacson, G.R. 149453, Oct. 7, 2003)
4.Motion for Reconsideration
At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, upon motion of the
accused or at its own instance, but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration. (ROC, Rule 121, § 1) From the phraseology of the rule, it is evident that a motion
for new trial or a motion for reconsideration applies when the judgment is one of conviction; and it
is the accused, not the prosecution which avails of the same. (Riano, Criminal Procedure, 583,
2014)
Q: On October 21, 1986, 17 year old Virginia Sagrado brought a complaint against Martin Geralde
for consented abduction. With the accused pleading not guilty upon arraignment, trial ensued. After
trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered against Geralde. When the case was appealed to it, the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Trial Court, ratiocinating and ruling as follows:
"This is not to say that the appellant did nothing wrong...she was seduced by the appellant with
promises (of marriage) just to accomplish his lewd designs." Years later, Virginia brought another
complaint for Qualified Seduction. Geralde presented a Motion to Quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, which motion and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied: Question: May
Geralde validly invoke double jeopardy in questioning the institution of the case for Qualified
Seduction? He placed reliance principally on the "same evidence" test to support his stance. He
asserted that the offenses with which he was charged arose from the same set of facts. Furthermore,
he averted that the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and estoppel on the part of
the complainant, she having opted to consider the case as consented abduction. Finally, he argued
that her delay of more than eight (8) years before filing the second case against him constituted
pardon on the part of the offended party. How would you resolve Gerald's contentions? Explain.
(1999 BAR)
A: Geralde’s invocation of double jeopardy is improper. Although the two crimes may have arisen
from the same set of facts, they are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on
double jeopardy. The gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent,
who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the parents
and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. In
cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is
seduced. Moreover, Virginia's filing of a subsequent case against the accused belies his allegation
that she has waived or is estopped from filing the second charge against him. Neither could she be
deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly given (Rule
110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
Moreover the length of time it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she
filed it within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period (Art. 90, RPC; Perez v. CA, G.R. No. L-80838,
November 29, 1988).
Q: Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000. Pre-trial was
dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the
prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal
and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a
professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the
reversal of the trial court's assailed dismissal of the case place the accused in double jeopardy?
(2000 BAR)
A: NO, the reversal of the trial court’s assailed Political Law 82 dismissal of the case would not
place the accused in double jeopardy. While generally, dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense, the same rule is not applicable in
this case considering that the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated by the State.
For this reason, Pablo cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy (People v. Tampal, G.R. No.
102485, May 22, 1995).
7
Q: For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings
at the instance of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution
witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case was pending trial for a period of
seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court
dismissed the case. Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for
homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning. Accused Erning moved for
dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected, submitting the
reason that it was not able to present the said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding
out of fear. Resolve the motion. (2001 BAR)
A: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal of a criminal
case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Q: A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was drunk, sideswiped a pedestrian along
EDSA in Makati City, resulting in physical injuries to the latter. The public prosecutor filed two
separate informations against Cascasero, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of an ordinance of Makati City
prohibiting and penalizing driving under the influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried and
convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With
regard to the second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being arraigned, he filed a
motion to quash the information invoking his right against double jeopardy. He contended that,
under Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act He
argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed from the same act of driving allegedly
under the influence of liquor which caused the accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your
Answer. (2002, 1997 BAR)
A: YES, there was double jeopardy. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged
under a statute. In this case, the same act is involved in the two cases. The reckless imprudence
which resulted in physical injuries arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor.
The fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the
logic of double jeopardy.
Q: Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was prosecuted under a Makati ordinance penalizing such
act. He moved for its dismissal on the ground that the jumper cable was within the territorial
jurisdiction of Mandaluyong and not Makati. The case was dismissed. The City of Mandaluyong
thereafter filed a case against him for theft under the Revised Penal Code (RCP). Is there double
jeopardy? a. No. The first jeopardy was terminated with his express consent; b. Yes. This is double
jeopardy of the second kind – prosecution for the same act under an ordinance and a law; c. Yes. He
is prosecuted for the same offense which has already been dismissed by the City of Makati; d. No.
The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates conviction or
acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy. (2012 Bar)
A: D. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates
conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy. (Zapatos Vs People, 411 SCRA 148)
Q: Amoroso was· charged with treason before a military court martial. He was acquitted. He was
later charged with the same offense before a Regional Trial Court. He asks that the information be
quashed on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objects, contending that for purposes of
double jeopardy, the military court martial cannot be considered as a "competent court." Should the
Regional Trial Court grant Amoroso's motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy? (2018
BAR)
A: YES, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted. A defendant, having been acquitted of a crime by
a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under lawful authority, cannot be subsequently
tried for the same offense in a civil court. It appearing that the offense charged in the Court Martial
and in the Regional Trial Court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case
and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the acquittal by the military court
should be a bar to Amoroso’s further prosecution for the same offense in the Regional Trial Court
(Crisologo v. People, (G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954); Marcos v. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-
4663, May 30, 1951); Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. 198554, July 30, 2012).
Q: An Information for Estafa was filed against the accused, Mr. D. During the course of the trial,
Mr. D filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the case for a reasonable length of time.
Opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that its failure to present its witnesses was due to
circumstances beyond its control. Eventually, the trial court dismissed the case with finality on the
ground that Mr. D’s right to speedy trial was violated. A month after, the same criminal case for
Estafa was refilled against Mr. D, prompting him to file a motion to dismiss invoking his right
against double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that the first criminal case
for Estafa was dismissed with the express consent of the accused as it was, in fact, upon his own
motion. Moreover, it was already able to secure the commitments of its witnesses to appear; hence,
it would be prejudicial for the State if the case were to be dismissed without trial. (a) For double
jeopardy to attach, what requisites must exist? (2019 BAR)
A: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act (Section 21, Article III, CONST.). To raise the defense of
double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first. (b) Rule on Mr. D’s present motion. (2019 BAR)
A: Mr. D’s motion to dismiss should be granted. A dismissal predicated on the right of the accused
to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar
another prosecution of the accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that a
dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused will not be a bar to the
subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. (Salcedo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-
49375, February 28, 1979)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Recent jurisprudence provide that ―As a general rule, the dismissal of
a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. x x x x It must
be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the
private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State.‖ (Tan v. People, G.R. NO.
173637, April 21, 2009). In these cases, the Court focused on discussing why there was no violation
of the right to speedy trial hence there was no first jeopardy to speak of. The facts stipulated in the
question, however, do not provide that there was an issue on the first jeopardy other than it was
secured upon the motion of the accused
 8
SELF-INCRIMANATIONCLAUSE

Q: Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank
(IUB) with the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and
the House of Representatives unanimously approved a Resolution directing the House Committee 14.RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
on Good Government (HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of legislation, in order to
prevent the recurrence of any similar fraudulent activity. The HCGG immediately scheduled a
hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP). On the date set for the airing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared, prompting
Congressman Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum
tocompel the attendance of the invited resource persons. The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit
HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the subpoena, raising the following
argument: Compelling the IUB officials, who are also respondents in the criminal and civil cases in
court, to testify at the inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self- incrimination. Are
the foregoing argument tenable? Reasons. (2009 BAR)
A: The argument is untenable. Since the IUB officials were not being subjected to a criminal
penalty, they Political Law 80 cannot invoke their right against selfincrimination unless a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded (Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee,
541 SCRA 456 [2007]). The right to speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. To determine
whether or not a person's right to speedy disposition of cases is violated, there are four
Foreign laws factors to consider. The four (4) factors — (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the
delay; (3) the respondent's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the respondent — are
Q: Alienmae is a foreign tourist. She was asked certain questions in regard to a complaint that was
filed against her by someone who claimed to have been defrauded by her. Alienmae answered all to be considered together, not in isolation. The interplay of these factors determine whether
the questions asked, except in regard to some matters in which she invoked her right against self- the delay was inordinate. (Baya v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 204978-83, July 6, 2020)
incrimination. When she was pressed to elucidate, she said that the questions being asked might
tend to elicit incriminating answers insofar as her home state is concerned. Could Alienmae invoke In evaluating criminal cases invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases, a case is
the right against self-incrimination if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign law? (2014 deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent
BAR) conduct of the preliminary investigation. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144,
A: NO. Alienmae cannot invoke her right against self-incrimination even if the fear of incrimination Feb. 19, 2020)
is in regard to her foreign law. Under the territoriality principle, the general rule is that a state has
jurisdiction over all persons and property within its territory. The jurisdiction of the nation within its The person must invoke his or her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases in a
own territory is necessary, exclusive, and absolute. However, there are a few exceptions on when a timely manner and failure to do so even when he or she has already suffered or will suffer
state cannot exercise jurisdiction even within its own territory, to wit: 1) foreign states, head of
the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right. (Baya v. Sandiganbayan,
states, diplomatic representatives, and consults to a certain degree; 2) foreign state property; 3) acts
G.R. Nos. 204978-83, July 6, 2020)
of state; 4) foreign merchant vessels exercising rights of innocent passage or arrival under stress; 5)
foreign armies passing through or stationed in its territories with its permission; and 6) such other
persons or property, including organisations like the United Nations, over which it may, by Remedy
agreement, waive jurisdiction. Seeing that the circumstances surrounding Alienmae do not fall
under those exceptions, that she is a foreign tourist who received a complaint for fraud, such The remedy for violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case is dismissal obtained
principle of territoriality can be exercised by the State to get the information it needs to proceed through mandamus. (Lumanlaw v. Hon. Peralta, G.R. No. 164953, Feb. 13, 2006)
with the case.

Application

Q: A man was shot and killed and his killer fled. Moments after the shooting, an eyewitness
described to the police that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had boots and was
about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the description given, was seen nearby. He was taken
into custody and brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were forcibly taken
and he was weighed, measured, photographed, fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his 15.TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
trial, Borja objected to the admission in evidence of the apparel, his height and weight, his
photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results of the paraffin test, asserting that these were This is allowed to speed up disposition of criminal cases.
taken in violation of his right against selfincrimination. Rule on the objection. (2000 BAR)
A: The objection of Borja is not tenable. As held in People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615, the rights
guaranteed by Section 12, Article in of the Constitution applies only against testimonial evidence. WHEN PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS A DUTY
An accused may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his garments may be removed, and 1. Arraignment and Plea
his body may be examined. 2. During Trial, for identification
3. Promulgation of Sentence
Q: A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced disappearance, applied for the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo before a Regional Trial Court in Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and • Exception: Light offense where accused need not personally appear.
production orders addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff to allow entry at Camp Aquino and permit
the copying of relevant documents, including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by
courtdesignated Commission on Human Rights (CHR) lawyers, A took photographs of a suspected
isolation cell where her husband was allegedly seen being held for three days and tortured before he REQUISITES OF TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers requested one Lt. Valdez for a photocopy of the master plan
of Camp Aquino and to confirm in writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt. Valdez 1. The accused has been validly Arraigned and
objected on the ground that it may violate his right against self-incrimination. Decide with reasons. 2. Accused has been duly Notified; and
(2010 BAR) 3. His failure to appear is Unjustifiable. (Parada v. Veneracion, A.M. No.
A: The objection of Lt. Valdez is not valid. The right against self-incrimination refers to testimonial RTJ-96-1353, March 11, 1997)
evidence and does not apply to the production of a photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino,
because it is a public record. He cannot object to the request for him to confirm his custody of the Trial in absentia can also take place when the accused voluntarily waives his
master plan, because he is the public officer who had custody of it (Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA right to be present. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment
286 [1995].) he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the
witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open
court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the
case on trial. Thus, for an accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not
enough that he vaguely agrees to be identified by witnesses in his absence. He
must unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness mentions as name by
Q: Mariano was arrested by the NBI as a suspect in the shopping mall bombings. Advised of his which he is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him.
rights, Mariano asked for the assistance of his relative, Atty. Santos. The NBI noticed that Atty.
Santos was inexperienced, incompetent and inattentive. Deeming him unsuited to protect the rights
of Mariano, the NBI dismissed Atty. Santos. Appointed in his place was Atty. Barroso, a bar
topnotcher who was in the premises visiting a relative. Atty. Barroso ably assisted Mariano when JUDGEMENT IN ABSENTIA
the latter gave a statement. However, Mariano assailed the investigation claiming that he was
deprived of counsel of his choice. Was the NBI correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgment, the absence of
Atty. Barroso in his stead? Is Mariano's statement, made with the assistance of Atty. Barroso,
his counsel during such promulgation does not affect its validity.
admissible in evidence? (2005 BAR)
A: The NBI was not correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty. Barroso in his stead.
Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the Promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid provided that the essential elements are
commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of present:
his own choice". This is meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice 1. That the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and
under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation. The appointment of Atty. 2. That a copy be served upon the accused or counsel. Recording the decision in the criminal
Barroso is questionable because he was visiting a relative working in the NBI and thus his docket of the court satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused of the decision
independence is doubtful. Considering that Mariano was deprived of counsel of his own choice, the wherever he may be.
statement is inadmissible in evidence. (People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The NBI was correct in dismissing Atty. Santos as he was
incompetent. The 1987 Constitution requires counsel to be competent and independent. Atty.
Barroso, being a bar topnotcher ably assisted Mariano and there is no showing that his having a
relative in the NBI affected his independence. Moreover, the accused has the final choice of ounsel
as he may reject the one chosen for him and ask for another. A lawyer provided by the investigators
is deemed engaged by the accused where he raises no objection against the lawyer during the course
of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the truth of his statement before the
swearing officer. Thus, once the prosecution shows there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency which are not present in this case.
Accordingly, the statement is admissible (People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 29, 1998)

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical
liberty
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: A writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ
shall consider in the behalf.
PURPOSE OF THE WRIT
The primary purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. (Agcaoili
v. Hon. Farinas, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)
TO WHAT HABEAS CORPUS EXTENDS
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 1)
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
(In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, April
8, 2015).
WHAT IS SUSPENDED: THE PRIVILEGE, NOT THE WRIT
The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the
privilege of the writ, i.e., once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person
detained is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not inquire
further.
REMEDY BECOMES MOOT WHEN RESTRAINT BECOMES LEGAL
The arrest warrants against the accused were issued by the court that has jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Since the restraint on the accused has become legal, the remedy of habeas corpus
has already become moot and academic
The writ shall not be allowed if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order.
If the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 4)
PROCESS
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before the:
1. Supreme Court or any of its members;
2. Court of Appeals, or any of its members in instances authorized by law; or
3. Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.
The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restraining of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the
court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court
shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus.
Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
4BLUE95. The inmates' allegations of suddenly being transferred from the National Bilibid Prisons
in Muntinlupa City to the National Bureau of Corrections in Manila City for the purpose of
conducting an inspection on their living quarters, if proven, are sufficient to clothe the party with
standing to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus, provided that they invoke a violation of a
fundamental right granted to all citizens, regardless of whether they are incarcerated or not.
However, mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not enough. The violation of
constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. (In the Matter of the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus/Data v. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 215585 & 215768, Sept. 8, 2020).
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The President may suspend the privilege for a period not exceeding 60 days. The grounds for the
suspension of the privilege are:
1. Actual invasion or actual rebellion; and
2. When the public safety requires the suspension
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. During the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released. (PHIL. CONST., art. 7, § 18)
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
1. To question the conditions of confinement
2. Once charges have been filed in court
9
WRIT OF AMPARO
A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. (Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7,
2008)
The Writ of Amparo does not cover threats to property. To be entitled to a Writ of Amparo,
petitioners must prove that their rights to life, liberty, and security are being violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission. The intrusion into their farm was merely a violation of property
rights. (Pador v. Arcayan, G.R. No. 18346, March 12, 2013)
Examples of Property Rights Not Covered:
• Right to be restituted of personal belongings. It is already subsumed under the general rubric of
property rights which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. (Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
189155, Sept. 7, 2010)
• Merely seeking protection of property rights, like land in possession of the petitioners. (Castillo v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, Nov. 25, 2009)
• Violent incidents purely property-related such as acts of terrorism in relation to a disputed land
(Tapuz v. Hon. Judge del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008)
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF GOV‟T PARTICIPATION
The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. (Spouses Martin and Santiago v. Tulfo, G.R.
No. 205039, Oct. 21, 2015)
COVERAGE
The writ shall cover
(1) extralegal killings
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. (Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June
23, 2015)
(2) enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics:
1. An arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government.
2. The refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law. (Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23,
2015)
Elements of an Enforced Disappearance
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. (Section 3(g) R.A. No. 9851;
Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015)
4BLUE95. The remedy of the writ of amparo may be available even to convicted national inmates,
as long as the alleged abduction was made for the purpose of placing the national inmate outside the
protection of the law. However, considering that the Secretary of Justice has the authority to
determine the movement of national inmates between penal facilities, there is no compelling reason
to grant the writ of amparo in situations where there is an urgent need to remove the national
inmates from their place of confinement and to transfer them to another detention facility. (In the
Matter of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus/Data v. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 215585 & 215768,
Sept. 8, 2020)

Q: The police served a warrant of arrest on Ariston who was suspected of raping and killing a
female high school student. While on the way to the police station, one of the police officers who
served the warrant asked Ariston in the local dialect if he really raped and killed the student, and
Ariston nodded and said, "Opo." Upon arriving at the police station, Ariston saw the City Mayor,
whom he approached and asked if they could talk privately. The Mayor led Ariston to his office
and, while there in conversation with the Mayor, Ariston broke down and admitted that he raped
and killed the student. The Mayor thereafter opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness Ariston's confession. In the presence of the Mayor, the police and the media,
and in response to questions asked by some members of the media, Ariston sorrowfully confessed
his guilt and sought forgiveness for his actions. Which of these extrajudicial confessions, if any,
would you consider as admissible in evidence against Ariston? (2018 BAR)
A: Ariston was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted
that the police failed to inform him of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. His confession to the police is therefore inadmissible in evidence. His confession
before the mayor, however, is admissible. While it may be true that a mayor has ―operational
supervision and control‖ over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, Ariston’s
confession to the mayor, as described in the problem, was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not appear as having questioned Ariston at all. No police
authority ordered Ariston to talk to the mayor. It was he himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that he was going to
confess his guilt to him. When he talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to the Mayor did not violate his constitutional rights. His
confession to the media can likewise be properly admitted. The confessions were made in response
to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements
spontaneously made by suspects to news reporters during televised interviews are deemed voluntary
and are admissible in evidence (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997)
Q: The contents of the vault of ABC company consisting of cash and documents were stolen.
Paulyn, the treasurer of ABC, was invited by the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the
amount of cash stolen and the details of the missing documents. Paulyn obliged and volunteered the
information asked. Later, Paulyn was charged with qualified theft together with other suspects.
Paulyn claims her rights under the Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The
police explained that they were just gathering evidence when Paulyn was invited for a conference
and she was not a suspect at that time. Rule on her defense. (2016 BAR)
A: The defense of Paulyn is bereft of merit. It is axiomatic that constitutional rights of a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unresolved crime and the
investigation has stated to focus on a particular person as a suspect., i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating ot exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense. When she was invited for questioning by the Makati City Police Department and
she volunteered information, she was not yet a suspect.
Q: An information for parricide was filed against Danny. After the NBI found an eyewitness to the
commission of the crime, Danny was placed in a police line-up where he was identified as the one
who shot the victim. After the line-up, Danny made a confession to a newspaper reporter who
interviewed him. a. Can Danny claim that his identification by the eyewitness be excluded on the
ground that the line-up was made without benefit of his counsel? (1993, 1997 BAR) b. Can Danny
claim that his confession be excluded on the ground that he was not afforded his "Miranda" rights?
(1994 BAR)
A:
a. NO, the identification of Danny, a private person, by an eyewitness during the line-up
cannot be excluded in evidence. In accordance with the ruling in People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA
1, the accused is not entitled to be assisted by counsel during a police line-up, because it is not
part of custodial investigation since he was not being questioned but was merely being asked
to exhibit his body for identification by a witness.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, in United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert
v. California, 338 U.S. 263 (1967), it was held that on the basis of the Sixth, rather than the
Fifth Amendment (equivalent to Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) rather than Sec. 12(1)), the police line-up
is such a critical stage that it carries "potential substantial prejudice" for which reason the
accused is entitled to the assistance of Counsel.
b. NO. Danny cannot ask that his confession to a newspaper reporter should be excluded in
evidence. As held in People v. Bernardo, 220 SCRA 31, such an admission was not made
during a custodial interrogation but a voluntary statement made to the media.
Q: William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines,
was inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino citizen.
Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police
came, and brought him to the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police
investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an
independent local counsel. William refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be
assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel
assigned by the police stayed for the duration of the investigation. William protested his arrest. He
also claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not given the lawyer of his
choice; that being an American, he should have been informed of his rights in proper English; and
that he should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken into custody, not when he
was already at the police station.
Was William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not?
A: The fact that the police officer gave him the Miranda warning in halting English does not detract
from its validity. Under Section 2(b) of RA 7438, it is sufficient that the language used was known
to and understood by him. William need not be given the Miranda warning before the investigation
started. William was not denied his Miranda rights. It is not practical to require the police officer to
provide a lawyer of his own choice from the United States (Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642)
If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under the "international standard of
justice" and that he comes from a U.S. State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William
be granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons. (2009 BAR)
A: William should not be granted bail as a matter of right. He is subject to Philippine criminal
jurisdiction, therefore, his right to bail must be determined on the basis of Section 13, Article III of
the Constitution.
Q: Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White to a nearby police station. Upon
arriving at the police station, Brown was asked to stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette
vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed them that they were looking for a certain cigarette
vendor who snatched the purse of a passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point at the
vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked from the vendors. a. Brown, afraid
of a "set up" against him, demanded that he be allowed to secure his lawyer and for him to be
present during the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to counsel? Explain. b. Would the answer in (a)
be the same if Brown was specifically invited by White because an eyewitness to the crime
identified him as the perpetrator? Explain. c. Briefly enumerate the so-called "Miranda Rights".
(2012 BAR)
A:
a. Brown is not entitled to counsel during the police line-up. He was not yet being asked to answer
for a criminal offense. (Garaboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642)
b. Brown would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. He was already considered as a suspect
and was therefore entitled to the right under custodial investigation. (People v. Legaspi, 331 SCRA
95.)
c. The Miranda warning means that a person in custody who will be interrogated must be informed
of the following:
1. He has right to remain silent;
2. Anything said can be used as evidence against him;
3. He has the right to have counsel during the investigation; and
4. He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. (Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436)
10
Q: As he was entering a bar, Arnold — who was holding an unlit cigarette in this right hand — was
handed a match box by someone standing near the doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the
matchbox to light his cigarette and as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard
noticed. The guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its contents.
After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he immediately arrested Arnold and called
in the police. At the police station, the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold
in possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guard’s statement; he steadfastly
Political Law 74 remained silent and refused to give any written statement. Later in court, the guard
testified and narrated the statements he gave the police over Arnold’s counsel’s objections. While
Arnold presented his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been set-up,
he himself did not testify. The court convicted Arnold, relying largely on his admission of the
charge by silence at the police investigation and during trial. From the constitutional law
perspective, was the court correct in its ruling? (2013 BAR)
A: The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold during the police investigation
and during the trial. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, he had the right to
remain silent. His silence cannot be taken as a tacit admission; otherwise, his right to remain
silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering that his right against self-incrimination
protects his right to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it (People v. Galvez,
G.R. No. 157221, March 30, 2007, 519 SCRA 521)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The court correctly convicted Arnold. There is no showing that
the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient. When Arnold remained silent, he runs the
risk of an interference of guilt from non-production of evidence in his behalf (People v. Solis
G.R. No. 124127, June 29, 1998, 128 SCRA 217)
Q: The police got a report about a shooting incident during a town fiesta. One person was killed.
The police immediately went to the scene and started asking the people about what they witnessed.
In due time, they were pointed to Edward Gunman, a security guard, as the possible malefactor.
Edward was then having refreshment in one of the eateries when the police approached him. They
asked him if he had a gun to which question he answered yes. Then they asked if he had seen
anybody shot in the vicinity just a few minutes earlier and this time he said he did not know about
it. After a few more questions, one of the policemen asked Edward if he was the shooter. He said
no, but then the policeman who asked him told him that several witnesses pointed to him as the
shooter. Whereupon Edward broke down and started explaining that it was a matter of self-defense.
Edward was eventually charged with murder. During his trial, the statements he made to the police
were introduced as evidence against him. He objected claiming that they were inadmissible since he
was not given his Miranda rights. On the other hand, the prosecution countered that there was no
need for such rights to be given since he was not yet arrested at the time of the questioning. If you
were the judge, how would you rule on the issue? (2014 BAR)
A: If I were the judge, I would rule that the confession is inadmissible. First, the rights under
investigation in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution are applicable to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense. The investigation began when a policeman told
Edward that several witnesses pointed to him as the shooter, because it started to focus on him as a
suspect (People v. Labtan, 320 SCRA 140) Requisites
Q: In his extrajudicial confession executed before the police authorities, Jose Walangtakot admitted
killing his girlfriend in a fit of jealousy. This admission was made after the following A and
question to wit: T - Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng serbisyo ng isang abogado para
makatulong mo sa imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makuha, ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng
libreng abogado, ano ngayon ang iyong masasabi?" "S - Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (point to
Assistant Fiscal Aniceto Malaputo) kaya hindi ko na kinakailanganang abogado." During the trial.
Jose Walangtakot repudiated his confession contending that it was made without the assistance of
counsel and therefore Inadmissible in evidence. Decide. (1993 BAR)
A: The confession of Jose Walangtakot is inadmissible in evidence. The warning given to him is
insufficient in accordance with the ruling in People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379, he should have been
warned also that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him. Besides, under Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution, the counsel assisting a
person being investigated must be independent. Assistant Fiscal Aniceto Malaputo could not assist
Jose Walangtakot. As held in People v. Viduya, 189 SCRA 403, his function is to prosecute
criminal cases. To allow him to act as defense counsel during custodial investigations would render
nugatory the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation. What the
Constitution requires is a counsel who will effectively undertake the defense of his client without
any conflict of interest. The A of Jose Walangtakot indicates that he did not fully understand his
rights. Hence, it cannot be said that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.
Q: Larry was an overnight guest in a motel. After he checked out the following day, the
chambermaid found an attaché case which she surmised was left behind by Larry. She turned it over
to the manager who, to determine the name and address of the owner, opened the attache case and
saw packages which had a peculiar smell and upon squeezing felt like dried leaves. His curiosity
aroused, the manager made an opening on one of the packages and took several grams of the
contents thereof. He took the packages to the NBI, and in the presence of agents, opened the
packages, the contents of which upon laboratory examination, turned out to be marijuana flowering
tops, Larry was subsequently found, brought to the NBI Office where he admitted ownership of the
attaché case and the packages. He was made to sign a receipt for the packages. Larry was charged in
court for possession of prohibited drugs. He was convicted. On appeal, he now poses the following
issues: a. The packages are inadmissible in evidence being the product of an illegal search and
seizure; b. b. Neither is the receipt he signed admissible, his rights under custodial investigation not
having been observed. Decide. (1993 BAR)
A: According to the ruling in People v. Mirantes, 209 SCRA 179, such receipt is in effect an
extrajudicial confession of the commission of an offense. Hence, if it was signed without the
assistance of counsel, in accordance with Section 12(3), Article IV of the Constitution, it is
inadmissible in evidence. (People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100)
Q: A, who was arrested as a suspect in a murder case was not represented by counsel during the
"question and A" stage. However, before he was asked to sign his statements to the police
investigator, the latter provided A with a counsel, who happened to beat the police station. After
conferring with A, the counsel told the police investigator that A was ready to sign the statements.
Can the statements of A be presented in court as his confession? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO, the statements of A cannot be presented in court as his confession. He was not assisted by
counsel during the actual questioning. There is no showing that the lawyer who belatedly conferred
with him fully explained to him the nature and consequences of his confession. In People v. Compil
244 SCRA 135, the Supreme Court held that the accused must be assisted by counsel during the
actual questioning and the belated assistance of counsel before he signed the confession does not
cure the defect.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, the statements of A can be presented in court as his confession.
As held in People v. Rous, 242 SCRA 732, even if the accused was not assisted by counsel during
the questioning, his confession is admissible if he was able to consult a lawyer before he signed.
Q: PO1 Adrian Andal is known to have taken bribes from apprehended motorists who have violated
traffic rules. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an entrapment operation where P01
Adrian was caught redhanded demanding and taking PhP500.00 from a motorist who supposedly
beat a red light. After he was apprehended, PO1 Adrian was required to submit a sample of his
urine. The drug test showed that he was positive for dangerous drugs. Hence, PO1 Adrian was
charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. PO1 Adrian argues against the admissibility of the urine test results and seeks
its exclusion. He claims that the mandatory drug test under R.A. No. 9165 is a violation of the
accused's right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. Are PO1 Adrian's contentions
correct? (2018 BAR)
A: PO1 Adrian is correct that his rights to privacy and against selfincrimination have been violated.
The results of the ―confirmatory‖ urine test should therefore be rejected as evidence against him. It
should be noted that RA 9165 allows the conduct of urine tests only for persons arrested for acts
prohibited under said law, such as, among others, the manufacturing, sale, use or possession of
illegal drugs, and not for any unlawful act, like extortion, for which PO1 Adrian was arrested (De la
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014).

Waiver
Q: On October 1, 1985, Ramos was arrested by a security guard because he appeared to be
"suspicious" and brought to a police precinct where in the course of the investigation he admitted he
was the killer in an unsolved homicide committed a week earlier. The proceedings of his
investigation were put in writing and dated October 1, 1985, and the only participation of counsel
assigned to him was his Political Law 76 mere presence and signature on the statement. The
admissibility of the statement of Ramos was placed in issue but the prosecution claims that the
confession was taken on October 1, 1985 and the 1987 Constitution providing for the right to
counsel of choice and opportunity to retain, took effect only on February 2, 1987 and cannot be
given retroactive effect. Rule on this. (2000 BAR)
A: The confession of Ramos is not admissible, since the counsel assigned to him did not advise him
of his rights. The fact that his confession was taken before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution is
of no moment. Even prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court already
laid down strict rules on waiver of the rights during investigation in the case of People v. Galit, 135
SCRA 465.
Q: Rafael, Carlos and Joseph were accused of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Accused Joseph turned state witness against his co-accused Rafael and Carlos, and was accordingly
discharged from the information. Among the evidence presented by the prosecution was an
extrajudicial confession made by Joseph during the custodial Investigation, implicating Rafael and
Carlos who, he said, together with him (Joseph), committed the crime. The extrajudicial confession
was executed without the assistance of counsel. Accused Rafael and Carlos vehemently objected on
the ground that said extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence against them. Rule on
whether the said extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence or not. (2001 BAR)
A: According to People v. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499, the confession is admissible. Under Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, the confession is inadmissible only against the one who
confessed. Only the one whose rights were violated can raise the objection as his right is personal.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: According to People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516, the confession is
inadmissible. If it is inadmissible against the one who confessed, with more reason it should be
inadmissible against others.
Q: A robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong, and Rollie were invited for
questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor that he saw them come out of the
victim’s house at the time of the robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other
information they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing the crime. Lito initially
resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his participation in the crime. Elated by this break
and desirous of securing a written confession soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to
serve as the trio’s counsel and to advise them about their rights during the investigation. Badong
and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito’s early admission, likewise admitted their participation. The
trio thus signed a joint extrajudicial confession which served as the main evidence against them at
their trial. They were convicted based on their confession. Should the judgment of conviction be
affirmed or reversed on appeal? (2013 BAR)
A: The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on the extra judicial
confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must be independent. City Attorney Juan
Buan is not independent. As City Attorney, he provided legal support to the City Mayor in
performing his duties which include the maintenance of peace and order (People v. Sunga, 399
SCRA 624)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The judgment of conviction should be affirmed if the accused failed to
object when their extrajudicial confession was offered in evidence which was rendered it admissible
(People v. Samus, 389 SCRA 93)
Q: Agnes was allegedly picked up by a group of military men headed by Gen. Altamirano, and was
brought to several military camps where she was interrogated, beaten, mauled, tortured, and
threatened with death if she would not confess her membership in the New People's Army (NPA)
and point to the location of NPA camps. She suffered for several days until she was released after
she signed a document saying that she was a surenderee, and was not abducted or harmed by the
military. After she was released, and alleging that her rights to life, liberty and security had been
violated and continued to be threatened by violation of such rights, she filed with the Supreme
Court (the Court) a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data with prayers for Temporary
Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
case was filed against President Amoyo (who was the President of the Philippines when the
abduction, beating, mauling and life threats were committed), General Altamirano, and several
military men whom Agnes was able to recognize during her ordeal. The Court, after finding the
petition to be in order, issued the writ of amparo and the writ of habeas data and directed the
respondents to file a verified return on the writs, and directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to hear the
petition. The respondents duly filed their return on the writs and produced the documents in their
possession. After hearing, the CA ruled that there was no more need to issue the temporary
protection orders since the writ of amparo had already been issued, and dismissed the petition
against President Amoyo on the ground that he was immune from suit during his incumbency as
President. Agnes appealed the CA ruling to the Court. The appeal was lodged after President
Amoyo's term had ended. Was the CA correct in saying that the writ of amparo rendered
unnecessary the issuance of the temporary protection order? (2018 BAR)
A: YES. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding and requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs to the petitioner. It serves both preventive and
curative reliefs in addressing extrajudicial abduction and torture. Temporary protection orders are
merely intended to assist the Court before it can arrive at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition. A temporary protection order, being an interim relief, can only be granted before final
adjudication on the amparo case is made. The privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, already
entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the writ of amparo was already granted and
issued, there is no more need to issue a temporary protection order (Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
186640, Feb. 11, 2010; Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 & 193160, Nov. 15,
2011)
Q: Mrs. W supplies the Philippine National Police (PNP) with uniforms every year. Last month, he
and two (2) other officers of the PNP conspired to execute a "ghost purchase", covered by five (5)
checks amounting to ₱200,000.00 each, or a total of ₱1,000,000.00. An investigating committee
within the PNP, which was constituted to look into it, invited Mrs. W, among others, for an inquiry
regarding the anomalous transaction. Mrs. W accepted the invitation but during the committee
hearing, she stated that she will not answer any question unless she be provided with the assistance
of a counsel. The PNP officials denied her request; hence, she no longer participated in the
investigation. (2019 BAR)
(a) What is a custodial investigation? Under the 1987 Constitution, what are the rights of a
person during custodial investigation? A: Custodial investigation refers to any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody [People v.
Basay, G.R. No. 86941, March 3, 1993]. The rights of a person under custodial investigation
include the right to remain silent, the right to have competent and independent counsel, and
the right to be informed of these rights. [Art. III, Sec. 12(1)]
(b) Was the PNP’s denial of Mrs. W’s request violative of her right to counsel in the
proceedings conducted before the PNP? Explain. A: NO, PNP’s denial of Mrs W’s request is
not violative of her right to counsel. In administrative proceedings need not be clothed with
the attributes of a judicial proceeding. Thus, while desirable, the right to counsel is not
available in administrative proceedings. Since the proceedings involved in this case is an
investigation being conducted by a PNP committee, which is administrative and not a
custodial investigation, Mrs. W is not entitled to the assistance of counsel. [Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015].
11
Q: Johann learned that the police were looking for him in connection with the rape of an 18-year old
girl, a neighbor. He went to the police station a week later and presented himself to the desk
sergeant. Coincidentally, the rape victim was in the premises executing an extrajudicial statement.
Johann, along with six (6) other suspects, were placed in a police lineup and the girl pointed to him
as the rapist. Johann was arrested and locked up in a cell. Johann was charged with rape in court but
prior to arraignment invoked his right to preliminary investigation. This was denied by the judge,
and thus, trial proceeded. After the prosecution presented several witnesses, Johann through
counsel, invoked the right to bail and filed a motion therefor, which was denied outright by the
Judge. Johann now files a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing that he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right, thus the Judge should not have denied his motion to fix ball
outright. Decide. (1993, 2008 BAR)
A: In accordance with Art. III. sec. 13 of the Constitution, Johann may be denied bail if the
evidence of his guilt is strong considering that the crime with which he is charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. It is thus not a matter of right for him to be released on bail in such case. The
court must first make a determination of the strength of the evidence on the basis of evidence
already presented by the prosecution, unless it desires to present some more, and give the accused
the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. If having done this the court finds the evidence
not to be strong, then it becomes the right of Johann to be admitted to bail. The error of the trial
court lies in outrightly denying the motion for bail of Johann.
Q: State with reason(s) whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion in the following
cases: a. The imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua and the accused is a
minor; b. The imposable penalty for the crime charged is life imprisonment and the accused is a
minor; c. The accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as Political Law 78
maximum. (2005 BAR)
A:
a. A minor charged with a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, in case of conviction the penalty would be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua. This rules out reclusion perpetua. [Bravo v. Borja,134 SCRA
466 (1985)]
b. Bail is a matter of discretion for a minor charged with an offense punishable with life
imprisonment, because Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable and he is not entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance under it. [People v. Lagasca, 148 SCRA 264 (1987)]
c. Bail is a matter of discretion for an accused convicted of homicide on a charge of murder,
because an appeal opens the whole case of review. There is a possibility that he may be convicted of
murder, which is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. His conviction shows the evidence of
his guilt is strong. [Obosa v. CA, 266 SCRA 281 (1997)]
Q: A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by recluion perpetua or death the right to
bail. State whether or not the law is constitutional. Explain briefly. (2006 BAR)
A: A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or death the right
to be bail is unconstitutional, because according to the constitution, ‖[A]all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.‖
Q: JC, a major in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is facing prosecution before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for the murder of his neighbor whom he suspected to have molested his
(JC’s) 15-year old daughter. Is JC entitled to bail? Why or why not? (2008 BAR)
A: As a rule, bail is a matter of right even in capital offense, unless it is determined, after due
hearing, that the evidence of his guilt is strong (Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended). Presumption of innocence
Q: OZ lost five head of cattle which he reported to the police as stolen from his barn. He requested
several neighbors, including RR, for help in looking for the missing animals. After an extensive
search, the police found two head in RR's farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got
hidden in a remote area of his farm. Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told him
he has a right to be presumed innocent under the Bill of Rights. But there is another presumption of
theft arising from his unexplained possession of stolen cattle— under the penal law. Are the two
presumptions capable of reconciliation In this case? If so, how can they be reconciled? If not, which
should prevail? (2004 BAR)
A: The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of innocence stands until the contrary
is proved. It may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon human experience. The
presumption that RR is the one who stole the cattle of OZ is logical, since he was found in
possession of the stolen cattle. RR can prove his innocence by presenting evidence to rebut the
presumption. The burden of evidence is shifted to RR, because how he came into possession of the
cattle is peculiarly within his knowledge (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63). Assistance of
counsel
Q: One day a passenger bus conductor found a man's handbag left in the bus. When the conductor
opened the bag, he found inside a calling card with the owner’s name (Dante Galang) and address, a
few hundred peso bills, and a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. He brought
the powdery substance to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination and it
was determined to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug. Dante Galang
was subsequently traced and found and brought to the NBI Office where he admitted ownership of
the handbag and its contents. In the course of the interrogation by NBI agents, and without the
presence and assistance of counsel, Galang was made to sign a receipt for the plastic bag and its
shabu contents. Galang was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs and was convicted.
On appeal he contends that - The receipt he signed is also inadmissible as his rights under custodial
investigation were not observed. Decide the case with reasons. (2002 BAR)
A: The receipt which Galang signed without the assistance of counsel is not admissible in evidence.
As held in People v. Castro, 274 SCRA 115 (1997), since the receipt is a document admitting the
offense charged, Galang should have been assisted by counsel as required by Article III, Section 11
of the Constitution. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
Q: Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000, pre-trial was
dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8, and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the
prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal
and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a
professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the
grant of the motion for postponement have violated the accused's right to speedy trial? (2000 BAR)
A: The grant of the motion for postponement would not have violated the right of the accused to
speedy trial. As held In People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238, since the motion for postponement was
the first one requested, the need for the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a
valid reason, no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the prosecution should be
afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted.
Q: Select the best answer and explain.
1. An accused’s right against selfincrimination is violated in the following cases: a. When he is
ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to prove he is guilty of murder; b. When he is
compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as evidence against his father charged with plunder;
c. When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence that he is the
author of a letter wherein he agreed to kill the victim; d. When the president of a corporation is
subpoenaed to produce certain documents as proofs he is guilty of illegal recruitment. (2006 BAR)
A: The best answer is (c), ordering the accused to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as
evidence to prove that he is the author of a letter in which he agreed to kill the victim as this will
violate his right against self- incrimination. Writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention. Producing a sample of his handwriting may
identify him as the writer of the letter (Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570, [1929]).