Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bird Strike Committee USA
Bird Strike Committee USA
Principal Compiler
Ed Cleary
Federal Aviation Administration
Staff Wildlife Biologist
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Contents
1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 1
2. BSC-USA Best Management Practices................................................................ 2
2.1 Airport Wildlife Hazard Management............................................................. 2
2.1.1 Background............................................................................................ 2
2.1.2 Identifying attractions............................................................................. 3
2.2 Active Wildlife Control on the Airport............................................................. 4
2.2.1 Background............................................................................................ 4
2.2.2 Aircraft flight schedule modification........................................................ 4
2.2.3 Habitat management.............................................................................. 4
2.2.4 Wildlife dispersal.................................................................................... 5
2.2.5 Wildlife removal...................................................................................... 5
2.3 Organization.................................................................................................. 6
2.3.1 Background............................................................................................ 6
2.3.2 Collaboration and coordination between organizations on the airport....6
2.4 Equipment..................................................................................................... 7
2.4.1 Background............................................................................................ 7
2.4.2 Portable equipment................................................................................ 7
2.4.3 Static devices......................................................................................... 8
2.4.4 Trained predators (raptors and dogs)..................................................... 8
2.5 Logging Wildlife Management Activities........................................................ 8
2.5.1 Background............................................................................................ 8
2.6 Wildlife Strike Reporting................................................................................ 9
2.6.1 Background............................................................................................ 9
2.6.2 Definition of a wildlife strike.................................................................... 9
2.6.3 Analysis of wildlife strike data............................................................... 11
2.6.4 Wildlife remains identification............................................................... 11
2.6.5 Data required in a wildlife strike report................................................. 11
2.6.6 Submission to ICAO............................................................................. 11
2.7 Risk Assessment......................................................................................... 12
2.8 Conclusions................................................................................................. 12
3. References......................................................................................................... 13
4. Summary of BSC-USA Best Management Practices for Airport Wildlife Control 15
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1. Introduction
Several excellent handbooks exist that describe techniques used to manage the
wildlife strike risk on airports (for example, CAA 1998, Transport Canada 2001, ACI
2005, Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). However, there has been little effort to quantify the
investment in time, personnel, equipment, and training needed to manage wildlife
hazards effectively. This contrasts sharply with other airport safety requirements.
For example, U.S. Federal regulations specify the required number and size of
aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment and the quantity of firefighting agents (Title
14 Code of Federal Regulations, part 139.317) (14 CFR, part 139.317) as well as the
operational requirements (14 CFR, part 139.319). This inconsistency has arisen in
part because the habitat types, the wildlife species present, and the levels of risk
caused by wildlife vary widely among airports. The precise techniques that are
successful at one site might not work at another. The situation is further aggravated
by the differences in resources available at each airport and the attitudes of airport
managers and air carriers.
1[1]
Warsaw, Poland, May 2003.
2[2]
Athens, Greece, May 2005.
3[3]
St. Louis, Missouri, USA, August 2006.
provide the technical detail needed to set up a wildlife control program. It does not,
however, describe the levels of effort needed to conduct an efficient and successful
program.
This document identifies universally applicable practices. It suggests levels of airport
habitat management, wildlife control equipment, personnel, and other resource that
BSC-USA believes an airport needs to manage the wildlife aircraft strike risk
effectively. The best management practices will give airport managers, state and
national regulators, the insurance industry, lawyers, and other interested people
information about what BSC-USA believes should be the minimum investment in
wildlife control at an airport.
BSC-USA believes these standards should apply to any airport certificated under 14
CFR, part 139 to serve scheduled and unscheduled air carrier operations. Airports
with unusually high wildlife strike risks should invest more resources in strike
prevention than the minimum described below. BSC-USA recognizes that many
reliever and general aviation airports are too small to justify the expense of wildlife
control at the levels described in this document; nonetheless, these airports need to
be aware of wildlife hazards and have management plans in place.
This document distills the collective experience of wildlife and aviation experts into a
set of basic management practices the aviation industry can use. No attempt is made
to provide a detailed scientific underpinning for the best management practices.
Those wishing to explore the science involved should review the scientific literature
and the proceedings of organizations such as IBSC (www.int-birdstrike.com), Bird
Strike Committee USA (www.birdstrike.org), Bird Strike Committee Canada
(www.birdstrikecanada.com), and the German Birdstrike Committee (www.davvl.de).
2.1.1 Background
Controlling an airport’s attractiveness to wildlife is fundamental to good wildlife
control. It is more important than wildlife population management for controlling the
overall risk. If an airport provides easily accessible resources to wildlife—food, water,
shelter, or breeding sites—the wildlife will continue trying to return despite any
strategies used to discourage them. The control program will fail unless the airport is
made as unattractive to wildlife as possible.
Habitat management to deter wildlife involves two steps: (1) identifying the attractive
features and (2) imposing changes to either remove the attraction or to deny wildlife
access to it. Habitat management, such as improving drainage, installing fences, and
changing vegetation cover, is often expensive. It can also be difficult to get
resources for programs such as vegetation management that may take years to carry
out, especially when the immediate benefits are not always clear. Long-term
commitment from senior management is essential. A named member of the airport’s
senior management staff should have responsibility for ensuring implementation of all
parts of the wildlife hazard management program. A Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) approved Wildlife Hazard Management Plan must identify airport personnel
with responsibility for carrying out various parts of the plan (14 CFR 139.337(f) (1)).
Best management practice 1 – Airport Managers:
Assign a senior airport management staff member responsibility for
carrying out all parts of the wildlife control program.
Do not limit wildlife hazard assessments and wildlife management programs to the
airport property. ICAO recognizes the need to control hazardous wildlife attractants
near airports, as well. In 2003, ICAO published new standards on airport wildlife
control4[4]. The new standards state the following:
In the United States, wildlife hazard assessments must identify and quantify
hazardous wildlife attractants on and within 5 miles of the airport. The FAA
recommends minimum separation distances between an airport’s air operation area
(AOA) and any known hazardous wildlife attractant. For airports serving mainly
piston-powered aircraft, the FAA recommends a 5,000-foot separation distance; for
airports serving turbine-powered aircraft, the FAA recommends a 10,000-foot
separation distance. A 5-mile separation distance is recommended if the attractant
may cause hazardous wildlife to move through the airport’s approach/departure
airspace. Airports that have received Federal grant-in aid assistance must use these
standards (see the most recent version of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-33,
Hazardous wildlife attractants on or near airports).
4[4]
Amendment 5 to Annex 14, Volume 1, Chapter 9, § 9.4 Bird Hazard Reduction.
Best management practice 3 – Airport Managers:
Conduct a wildlife hazard assessment to identify land use practices and
geographic features on and near the airport attractive to hazardous wildlife.
Get support from a qualified wildlife damage management biologist as
needed (see the most recent version of FAA AC 150/5200-36,
Qualifications for wildlife biologist conducting wildlife hazard
assessments and training curriculums for airport personnel involved in
controlling wildlife hazards on airports).
Identify the precise nature of the attractants (such as food, water, or
cover).
2.2.1 Background
Four basic control strategies are available to solve wildlife problems on airports:
1. Aircraft flight schedule modification;
2. Habitat modification and exclusion;
3. Repellent and harassment techniques; and
4. Wildlife removal.
Integrate all four control strategies into the airport’s wildlife hazard management plan,
as appropriate.
5[5]
The FAA recommends a 5,000-foot separation distance between known hazardous wildlife
attractants and any aircraft movement area for airports that serve primarily piston powered aircraft; a
10,000-foot separation distance is recommended between known hazardous wildlife attractants and
any aircraft movement area for airports that serve turban powered aircraft. A 5-mile separation
distance is recommended if the hazardous wildlife attractant may cause hazardous wildlife to move
across the airport. (see the most recent version of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-33,
Hazardous wildlife attractants on or near airports)
and develop a habitat management plan to reduce these attractions to the extent
practicable.
On their own, air traffic control (ATC), airport operations, or maintenance personnel
cannot effectively detect all hazardous wildlife. Relying on ATC, airport operations,
or maintenance personnel to notify the wildlife control staff could result in missing
some hazardous wildlife. It will also result in a delayed response when wildlife is
detected. It will take time for the wildlife control specialists to reach the particular
location. Efficient detection requires a mobile patrol using personnel trained and
equipped to disperse wildlife as soon as it is detected. Diverting the wildlife control
staff to other duties will reduce their efficiency.
Bird control at night is more problematic because it is often difficult to detect birds
and to determine where birds dispersed from the airport are going. Control of
nocturnal mammals may only be possible at night when they are active.
2.3.1 Background
Airports may adopt various organizational structures for their wildlife control program.
These vary from having wildlife control as a secondary duty of aircraft rescue and
firefighting, maintenance, or operational personnel to employing wildlife management
specialists or full-time wildlife control units. Wildlife control staffed from larger units
has the advantage of more personnel on call and greater flexibility in coping with
sudden increases in wildlife numbers. However, personnel employed mainly in other
roles may regard wildlife control as a secondary or low-status duty that, if only carried
out on rare occasions, is not their personal responsibility. Small, specialized units
staffed by people who have a real interest and training in wildlife and wildlife control
will clearly recognize that responsibility for airport wildlife lies with them. This
ownership of the wildlife problem can be a powerful motivation to improve standards
of wildlife control. Such units may find it difficult to cope with staff illness or sudden
increases in wildlife numbers that require assignment of added personnel.
Regardless of organizational system used, it should deliver the standards described
elsewhere in this document.
2.4 Equipment
2.4.1 Background
Certain basic equipment, such as pyrotechnics, distress calls, and sometimes
firearms, is required to adequately control hazardous wildlife on or near an airport.
The equipment needed will depend on the species involved, the size of the airport,
and the number of personnel used.
Wildlife deterrent devices can be broadly divided into visual, acoustic, and lethal
categories. These can be further subdivided into portable and static systems. The
levels of sophistication, and therefore cost, are variable and include the simple
scarecrow (static visual), complex radio-controlled sound generators (static acoustic),
pyrotechnics and vehicle-mounted distress call apparatuses (mobile acoustic),
handheld lasers (mobile visual), traps (static lethal), and guns (mobile lethal). The
choice of system or systems to be used will depend on cost, legal and logistical
constraints, and the species being controlled.
Some of the wildlife control devices available to airports have not undergone a
rigorous scientific evaluation of their effectiveness. It is not possible, therefore, to
recommend particular devices for wildlife control at every airport.
There is some debate about the need for lethal control in airport wildlife
management. However, most experts agree, to maintain their effectiveness,
nonlethal pyrotechnics and other devices must occasionally be reinforced with lethal
control. The occasional use of lethal control reduces wildlife habituation to nonlethal
control devices and allows selective removal of any wildlife failing to respond to
nonlethal dispersal techniques.
2.5.1 Background
Many air carriers and their insurance companies are taking legal action against
airport managers and regulators to recover the costs of wildlife strike damage. It is
important that airport wildlife control specialists record all wildlife control actions
taken. These records can help prove a satisfactory wildlife control program was in
place if an incident occurs and the program was functioning properly. Data gathered
as part of a wildlife control program is also important in assessing the effectiveness
of control actions taken. There are several different methods for recording data;
everything from simple paper records to sophisticated devices based on pocket PC
technology. The latter save time and effort, especially when entering the data onto a
computer for further analysis. Regardless of the recording methods used, keep a
detailed and comprehensive record of all wildlife control activities. Summarize these
records at least every 12 consecutive months. This will help prove the airport is
following its own policies and procedures.
2.6.1 Background
All wildlife management programs must be monitored to see if they are working
effectively and whether they need to be adjusted, extended, or improved. The only
effective way to do this is by collating wildlife strike data for the airport concerned.
Other measures, such as counting the wildlife on the airport, provide useful added
information, but are not a direct measure of the strike risk at the airport.
Report all strikes, whether they cause damage to the aircraft and regardless of the
wildlife species involved. Unless the species struck on the airport are known,
management efforts cannot be directed correctly. Do not penalize airport or air
carrier personnel for reporting wildlife strikes. Even though strikes to large airliners
from small species such as swallows or sparrow-sized birds are unlikely to cause
damage, encourage airport or air carrier personnel to report them.
Never use the total number of strikes at an airport as a measure of strike risk or
the performance of the wildlife control specialists. The number of reported
strikes should increase when a hazardous wildlife control program is started and
airport personnel become aware of the situation and the need to report strikes. The
increase in reported strikes is an artifact of education and effort, not the result of an
increase in the number of strikes. The main risk arises from strikes with larger
species and smaller species that form large flocks (for example, European starlings).
Use a risk assessment that combines strike frequency with likely severity to assess
the risk (see below). Remember, a risk assessment cannot work effectively unless
all strikes are reported.
Many countries also record near misses in their wildlife strike databases; the FAA
does not. Defining a near miss is more problematic as it involves the pilot’s
interpretation of how close the wildlife was to the airplane and whether this posed a
threat to safety. Also, at airports located in areas with high bird populations, it might
be difficult for an observant pilot to land or take off without seeing birds at some
distance from the aircraft. Every movement might be regarded as a near miss.
Collecting near miss information could prove valuable, but, as with unconfirmed
strikes, do not include near misses in the airport’s strike statistical analysis. Set up
databases to separate unconfirmed strikes and near misses from other wildlife strikes
when evaluating the dataset.
Anyone with direct knowledge of a strike should report it. Consistent with the
organizational structure in a particular country or at an individual airport, send all
strike reports to a central location where duplicate strikes can be merged and more
information gathered. Reporting wildlife strikes is the responsibility of all personnel
with direct knowledge of material facts; this includes air carrier personnel, airport
operations, air traffic control, and pilots. It is important the airport has a system for
ensuring that it is aware, as much as is possible, of all strikes that happen on or near
its property.
6[6]
For the purpose of wildlife strike reporting, the FAA defines “on or near the airport” to mean strikes
occurring within 5 miles of the airport and under 4,000 ft AGL.
possible. Some data items may not be available (such as the altitude of strike). Give
due consideration to missing data during later analyses.
2.8 Conclusions
These best management practices present a consensus from leading experts in
wildlife aircraft strike prevention. They provide a foundation for effective airport
hazardous wildlife control programs. In the future, BSC-USA will develop and publish
more Best Management Practices papers dealing with other aspects of the problem.
These best management practices are provided in good faith, and every effort has
been made to ensure the contents are accurate. BSC-USA, the author, and the
BSC-USA membership accept no responsibility for any loss or damage arising from
the use or implementation of these guidelines.
3. References
Allan, J. 2001. The use of risk assessment in airport bird control. Pages 232-241 in
Bird Strike 2001, Proceedings of the Bird Strike Committee USA/Canada meeting.
Transport Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
CAA. 1998. CAP 680 Wildlife Control on Aerodromes. Civil Aviation Authority,
London, UK. (http://www.caa.co.uk/).
BSC-USA believes these best management practices should apply to all airports
certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, part 139 to serve scheduled
and unscheduled air carrier operations.
Ensure that all airports have personnel properly trained and equipped in
wildlife control.
Wildlife management on airports is a complex undertaking with an array of legal, technical
and social aspects. Most large airports need a full-time biologist to carry out the complex
duties of managing wildlife in and around the facility. Smaller airports need the services of
professional biologists for consultation and to train operations personnel in the latest
techniques of wildlife management.
Zero tolerance for deer and other large mammals on airport property.
Aircraft strikes from large animals are an increasing threat that has the potential to cause
injury and death to aircraft occupants.
Zero tolerance for feeding birds and other wildlife on airport property.
The presence of food tends to attract more wildlife to the area. Enforcing a ban of feeding
wildlife on airport property is well within the authority of airport operators and is not in
violation of federal laws and international treaties protecting some species of birds and
animals.
Zero tolerance for uncovered trash and garbage receptacles at the airport.
Garbage and trash containers that are not properly secured can provide food and in some cases
shelter for birds and other wildlife.
Promote the reporting of bird and other wildlife strikes to the appropriate
national authority.
Bird strike reports provide critical data for biologists, aeronautical engineers, and land-use
planners to justify and develop effective programs to reduce damaging bird strikes. Flight
crews, ground crews, maintenance workers, and airfield support staff should all be
encouraged to report the details of any strike or suspected strike.
21-24 June 2010
Bird Strike Committee USA/Canada
Meeting
Salt Lake City, Utah
Agenda
(subject to change)
MONDAY, JUNE 21
9 a.m.-7:30 p.m. Registration
9:30-11:45 a.m. BSC-USA Steering Committee Meeting
9:30-11:45 a.m. Annual General Meeting of the Bird Strike Association of Canada
1-5 p.m. Early Bird Hands-On Training
6-7:30 p.m. Opening Host Reception with Exhibitors
Hosted by Salt Lake City International Airport
TUESDAY, JUNE 22
7 a.m.-5 p.m. Registration
7-8 a.m. Continental Breakfast
8-10 a.m. Plenary Session
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, through an interagency agreement with the Federal
Aviation Administration, compiles a database of all reported bird/wildlife strikes to U.S. civil
aircraft and to foreign carriers experiencing strikes in the USA. Over 87,000 strike reports
from over 1,650 airports have been compiled, 1990-2008 (over 7,500 strikes in 2008). The
FAA estimates that this represents only about 20% of the strikes that have occurred. The
following historical examples of strikes from 1905-1989 and examples from the database
from 1990-2008 are presented to show the serious impact that strikes by birds or other
wildlife can have on aircraft. These examples demonstrate the widespread and diverse nature
of the problem and are not intended to criticize individual airports. Many of the strike
examples reported here occurred off airport property during descent, approach or climb.
15 July 1996; Belgian Air Force Lockheed C-130; Eindhoven, Netherlands: The aircraft
struck a large flock of starlings during approach and crashed short of the runway. All four
crew members and 30 of the 37 passengers were killed.
14 July 1996; NATO E-3 AWACS; Aktion, Greece: The aircraft struck a flock of birds
during takeoff. The crew aborted the takeoff and the aircraft overran the runway. The aircraft
was not repaired, but none of the crew was seriously injured.
22 September 1995; U.S. Air Force E-3 AWACS; Elmendorf AFB, Alaska: During
takeoff as the aircraft was passing rotation speed, the aircraft struck about three dozen Canada
geese, ingesting at least three into engine two and at least one into engine one. The aircraft
was unable to maintain controlled flight and crashed in a forest about 1 mile (1.6 km) beyond
the runway. All 24 occupants were killed.
September 1987; U.S. Air Force B1-B; Colorado, USA: Aircraft lost control and crashed
after a large bird (American white pelican) struck the wing root area and damage a hydraulic
system. The aircraft was on a low level, high speed training mission. Only three of the six
occupants were able to successfully bail out. .
1980; Royal Air Force Nimrod; Kinloss Scotland: Aircraft lost control and crashed after
ingesting a number of birds into multiple engines.
Bird strikes are a significant threat to flight safety, and have caused a number of
accidents with human casualties.[3] Major accidents involving civil aircraft are quite
low and it has been estimated that there is only about 1 accident resulting in human
death in one billion (109) flying hours.[4] The majority of bird strikes (65%) cause
little damage to the aircraft;[5] however, the collision is usually fatal to the bird.
Most accidents occur when the bird hits the windscreen or flies into the engines.
These cause annual damages that have been estimated at $400 million [3] within the
United States of America alone and up to $1.2 billion to commercial aircraft
worldwide.[6]
Event description
The point of impact is usually any forward-facing edge of the vehicle such as a wing
leading edge, nose cone, jet engine cowling or engine inlet. [citation needed]
The force of the impact on an aircraft depends on the weight of the animal and the
speed difference and direction at the impact. The energy of the impact increases with
the square of the speed difference. Hence a low-speed impact of a small bird on a
car windshield causes relatively little damage. High speed impacts, as with jet
aircraft, can cause considerable damage and even catastrophic failure to the vehicle.
The energy of a 5 kg (11 lb) bird moving at a relative velocity of 275 km/h
(171 mph) approximately equals the energy of a 100 kg (220 lb) weight dropped
from a height of 15 metres (49 ft).[9] However, according to the FAA only 15% of
strikes (ICAO 11%) actually result in damage to the aircraft. [citation needed]
Inside of a jet engine after a bird strike
Bird strikes can damage vehicle components, or injure passengers. Flocks of birds
are especially dangerous, and can lead to multiple strikes, and damage. Depending
on the damage, aircraft at low altitudes or during take off and landing often cannot
recover in time, and thus crash.[citation needed]
Remains of the bird, termed snarge,[10] are sent to identification centers where
forensic techniques may be used to identify the species involved. These samples
need to be taken carefully by trained personnel to ensure proper analysis [11] and
reduce the risks of zoonoses.[12]
The Israeli Air Force has a larger than usual birdstrike risk as Israel is
on a major spring and autumn long-distance bird migration route.[citation needed]
Sacramento International Airport has had more bird strikes (1,300 collisions between
birds and jets between 1990 and 2007, causing an estimated $1.6 million in
damage) than any other California airport. Sacramento International Airport has the
most bird strikes of any airport in the west and sixth among airports in the US,
according to the FAA, as it is located along the Pacific Flyway, a major bird migration
path.[13][14]
Species
The animals most frequently involved in bird strikes are large birds with big
populations, particularly geese and gulls in the United States. In parts of the US,
Canada Geese and migratory Snow Geese populations have risen significantly while
feral Canada Geese and Greylag Geese have increased in parts of Europe increasing
the risk of these large birds to aircraft.[15] In other parts of the world, large birds of
prey such as Gyps vultures and Milvus kites are often involved.[4] In the US reported
strikes are divided between waterfowl (32%), gulls (28%), and raptors (17%) (Data
from the BSC USA).[citation needed] The Smithsonian Institution's Feather Identification
Laboratory has identified turkey vultures as the most damaging birds, followed by
Canada geese and white pelicans,[16] all very large birds. In terms of frequency, the
laboratory most commonly finds Mourning Doves and Horned Larks involved in the
strike.[16]
The largest numbers of strikes happen during the spring and fall migrations. Bird
strikes above 500 feet altitude are about 7 times more common at night than during
the day during the bird migration season.[17]
Large land-bound animals, such as deer, can also be a problem to aircraft during
take off and landing, and over 650 civil aircraft collisions with deer were reported in
the U.S. between 1990 and 2004.
An animal hazard reported from London Stansted Airport in England is rabbits: they
get run over by ground vehicles and planes, and they pass large amounts of
droppings, which attract mice, which attract owls, which become another birdstrike
hazard.[18]
Countermeasures
There are three approaches to reduce the effect of bird strikes. The vehicles can be
designed to be more bird resistant, the birds can be moved out of the way of the
vehicle, or the vehicle can be moved out of the way of the birds.
Vehicle design
A ICE 3 high speed train after hitting a bird
Most large commercial jet engines include design features that ensure they can shut-
down after "ingesting" a bird weighing up to 1.8 kg (4 lb). The engine does not have
to survive the ingestion, just be safely shut down. This is a 'stand alone'
requirement, i.e., the engine, not the aircraft, must pass the test. Multiple strikes
(from hitting a bird flock) on twin engine jet aircraft are very serious events because
they can disable multiple aircraft systems, requiring emergency action to land the
aircraft, as in the January 15, 2009, forced ditching of US Airways Flight 1549.
Modern jet aircraft structures must be able to withstand one 1.8 kg (4 lb) collision;
the empennage (tail) must withstand one 3.6 kg (8 lb) bird collision. Cockpit
windows on jet aircraft must be able to withstand one 1.8 kg (4 lb) bird collision
without yielding or spalling.
At first, bird strike testing by manufacturers involved firing a bird carcass from a gas
cannon and sabot system into the tested unit. The carcass was soon replaced with
suitable density blocks, often gelatin, to ease testing. Currently testing is mainly
conducted with computer simulation, although final testing usually involves some
physical experiments (see birdstrike simulator).
Aircraft Forward Lighting can play an important role in enhancing the detectability of
birds to aircraft. Vision is the primary sensory pathway serving the animal in
detection of approaching objects (e.g., trees, buildings, other birds, and predators)
and adjustment of flight path relative to an object's approach. In a very basic sense,
once a threat is identified, the animal can utilize its high aerodynamic capabilities to
avoid collision. Recent experimental findings suggest that birds will use similar
[19]
strategies in response to aircraft approach
Bird management
A bird control vehicle belonging to Copenhagen Airport Kastrup, equipped with
various tools.
A UH-60 Black Hawk after a collision with a Common Crane, and resulting failure of
the windshield.
Other approaches try to scare away the birds using frightening devices, for example
sounds, lights, pyrotechnics, radio-controlled airplanes, decoy animals/corpses,
lasers, dogs etc.[22] Firearms are also occasionally employed. A successful approach
has been the utilization of dogs, particularly Border collies, to scare away birds and
wildlife.[23] Another alternative is bird capture and relocation. Falcons are sometimes
used to harass the bird population, as for example on John F. Kennedy International
Airport.[16] At Manchester Airport in England the usual type of falcon used for this is a
peregrine falcon/lanner falcon hybrid, as its flight range covers the airport. An airport
in New Zealand uses electrified mats to reduce the number of worms that attracted
large numbers of sea gulls.[16]
Flight path
A UH-60 after collision with a crane (bird), and subsequent failure of the windshield,
as seen from the inside.
Pilots have very little training in wildlife avoidance nor is training required by any
regulatory agency. However, they should not takeoff or land in the presence of
wildlife, avoid migratory routes,[24] wildlife reserves, estuaries and other sites where
birds may congregate. When operating in the presence of bird flocks, pilots should
seek to climb above 3,000 feet as rapidly as possible as most birdstrikes occur below
3,000 feet. Additionally pilots should slow their aircraft when confronted with birds.
The energy that must be dissipated in the collision is approximately the relative
kinetic energy (Ek) of the bird, defined by the equation where m is the
mass and v is the relative velocity (the sum of the velocities of the bird and the
plane). Therefore the speed of the aircraft is much more important than the size of
the bird when it comes to reducing energy transfer in a collision. The same can be
said for jet engines: the slower the rotation of the engine, the less energy which will
be imparted onto the engine at collision.
The body density of the bird is also a parameter that influences the amount of
damage caused.[25]
The US Military Aviation Hazard Advisory System uses a Bird Avoidance Model [26]
based on data from the Smithsonian Institution, historical patterns of bird strikes and
radar tracking of bird activity.[16] This model has been extremely successful. Prior to
flight USAF pilots check for bird activity on their proposed low level route or bombing
range. If bird activity is forecast to be high, the route is changed to one of lower
threat. In the first year this BAM model was required as a preflight tool, the USAF Air
Combat Command experienced a 70% drop in birdstrikes to its mission aircraft.
TNO, a Dutch R&D Institute, has developed the successful ROBIN (Radar Observation
of Bird Intensity) for the Royal Netherlands Airforce. ROBIN is a near real-time
monitoring system for flight movements of birds. ROBIN identifies flocks of birds
within the signals of large radar systems. This information is used to give Air Force
pilots warning during landing and take-off. Years of observation of bird migration
with ROBIN have also provided a better insight into bird migration behaviour, which
has had an influence on averting collisions with birds, and therefore on flight safety.
Since the implementation of the ROBIN system at the Royal Netherlands Airforce the
number of collisions between birds and aircraft in the vicinity of military airbases has
decreased by more than 50%.
There are no civil aviation counterparts to the above military strategies. Some
experimentation with small portable radar units has taken place at some airports.
However, no standard has been adopted for radar warning nor has any governmental
policy regarding warnings been implemented.
Incidents
The Federal Aviation Administration estimates the problem costs US aviation 600
million dollars annually and has resulted in over 200 worldwide deaths since 1988. [27]
In the United Kingdom, the Central Science Laboratory estimates [6] that, worldwide,
the cost of birdstrikes to airlines is around US$1.2 billion annually. This cost includes
direct repair cost and lost revenue opportunities while the damaged aircraft is out of
service. Estimating that 80% of bird strikes are unreported, there were 4,300 bird
strikes listed by the United States Air Force and 5,900 by US civil aircraft in 2003.
The first reported bird strike was by Orville Wright in 1905, and according to the
Wright Brothers' diaries Orville … flew 4,751 meters in 4 minutes 45 seconds, four
complete circles. Twice passed over fence into Beard's cornfield. Chased flock of
birds for two rounds and killed one which fell on top of the upper surface and after a
time fell off when swinging a sharp curve.[4]
French pilot Eugene Gilbert in 1911 encountered an angry mother eagle over the
Pyrenees Mountains enroute from Paris to Madrid during the great aviation race held
that year between those two cities. The bird feared for the safety of her young which
were perched high in a nest in the mountains and as Gilbert flew past she thought he
was a predator. Gilbert flying a Bleriot XI open cockpit was able to ward off the large
bird by firing pistol shots at her but not killing her.[28]
The first recorded bird strike fatality was reported in 1912 when aero-pioneer Cal
Rodgers collided with a gull which became jammed in his aircraft control cables. He
crashed at Long Beach, California, was pinned under the wreckage and drowned.[3][29]
The greatest loss of life directly linked to a bird strike was on October 4, 1960, when
Eastern Air Lines Flight 375, a Lockheed L-188 Electra flying from Boston, flew
through a flock of common starlings during take off, damaging all four engines. The
plane crashed shortly after take-off into Boston harbor, with 62 fatalities out of 72
passengers. Subsequently, minimum bird ingestion standards for jet engines were
developed by the FAA.
On September 22, 1995, a U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft (Callsign Yukla
27, serial number 77-0354), crashed shortly after take off from Elmendorf AFB, AK.
The plane lost power to both port side engines after these engines ingested several
Canada Geese during takeoff. The aircraft went down in a heavily wooded area about
two miles northeast of the runway, killing all 24 crew members on board. [30]
The Space Shuttle Discovery also hit a bird (a vulture) during the take-off of STS-
114 on July 26, 2005, although the collision occurred early during take off and at low
speeds, with no obvious damage to the shuttle.[31]
NASA also lost an astronaut, Theodore Freeman, to a bird strike. He was killed when
a goose shattered the plexiglass cockpit of his T-38 Talon, resulting in shards being
ingested by the engines, leading to a fatal crash.[citation needed]
Aircraft continue to be lost on a routine basis to birdstrikes. In the fall of 2006, the
USAF lost a twin engine T-38 trainer to a bird strike (ducks) and in October 2007,
the US Navy lost a T-45 jet trainer in a collision with a bird.
In the summer of 2007, Delta Air Lines suffered an incident in Rome, Italy, as one of
its Boeing 767 aircraft, on takeoff, ingested yellow legged gulls into both engines.
Although the aircraft returned to Rome safely, both engines were damaged and had
to be changed. United Air Lines suffered a twin engine bird ingestion by a Boeing 767
on departure from Chicago's O'Hare Field in the spring of 2007. One engine caught
fire and bird remains were found in the other engine.
On November 10, 2008, Ryanair Flight 4102 from Frankfurt to Rome made an
emergency landing at Ciampino Airport after multiple bird strikes put both engines
out of commission. After touchdown, the left main landing gear collapsed, and the
aircraft briefly veered off the runway before the crew regained control. Passengers
and crew were evacuated through the starboard emergency exits. Three passengers
and two crew members were injured, none seriously. [34]
On January 4, 2009, a bird strike is suspected in the crash of a PHI S-76 helicopter
in Louisiana. While the final report has not been published, early reports point to a
bird impacting the windscreen and retarding the throttles, leading to the death of 7
of the 8 persons on board.[35]
On September 18, 2009, American Eagle Airlines Flight 5183 from Dallas Texas to
Lawton Oklahoma, collided with over 100 pigeons during takeoff on runway 31L. The
takeoff was aborted and the aircraft sustained minor damage. 34 whole birds were
recovered, hundreds of body parts were also recovered. The aircraft returned safely
to the gate with no injuries.[citation needed]
Bug strike
Flying insect strikes, like bird strikes, have been encountered by pilots since aircraft
were invented. In 1911 future Air Force general Henry "Hap" Arnold as a young
aviator flying a mile high and not wearing goggles nearly lost control of his Wright
Model B after a bug flew in his eye causing distraction. Large numbers of bugs such
as a locust swarm can infiltrate an aircraft engine and bring down a plane. [citation needed]