Violence Against Women

Volume 15 Number 3
March 2009 307-320
© 2009 Sage Publications

Women’s Fatalistic Suicide 10.1177/1077801208330434

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A Partial Test of Durkheim in an

Islamic Republic
Akbar Aliverdinia
University of Mazandaran
William Alex Pridemore
Indiana University

Durkheim’s theory of fatalistic suicide, or suicide resulting from overregulation of

behavior, has been neglected empirically. The authors test this hypothesis in Iran by
examining the geographic distribution of female suicide. Employing the province as the
unit of analysis, they examine the association between female suicide rates and multi-
ple measures of social control of women, with rates expected to be higher in areas with
greater social regulation of the lives of women and stronger traditional tribal cultures.
Results show that provinces with lower levels of female education, female labor force
participation, and urbanization have higher female suicide rates. Thus, whereas social
deregulation is often associated with higher suicide rates in the West, the authors’ find-
ings reveal that hyperregulation is associated with higher suicide rates in Iran, at least
for women.

Keywords:   Durkheim; Iran; suicide

O n its surface, suicide seems an intimately individualistic act. Sociologists, how-

ever, often regard variation in suicide rates as a social phenomenon. The initial
ideas and work of Durkheim (1951) have long formed the basis for many sociologi-
cal studies of suicide, and his theories of how social factors influence suicide rates
have received substantial empirical support (Boor, 1979; Chandler & Tsai, 1992;
Danigelis & Pope, 1979; Kushner, 1994; Kushner & Sterk, 2005; Pridemore,
Chamlin, & Cochran, 2007; Stack, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1992; Van Popple,
1996). Although scholars often update, reinterpret, or revise Durkheim’s original
views, there is now a general consensus that social features influence suicide rates.
With some exceptions, existing research on suicide is based largely on studies
carried out in the United States and Europe. This leaves us to question whether the
results of these studies are replicable in nations with substantially different religious,
cultural, social, and institutional structures. Greater research is required in non-
Western cultures to determine if commonly held theories are generalizable to such

307

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308   Violence Against Women

nations or whether they are based on a set of cultural and socioeconomic contexts
peculiar to the West (Kohn, 1987). One major aspect of this issue—especially as it
relates to the role of social structure in suicide rates generally and to Durkheim’s
ideas specifically—is that in the West the individual is usually thought of as autono-
mous, independent, free, and possessing inalienable rights (Young, 2002). In most
Eastern nations, on the other hand, the emphasis on group harmony makes the
wishes or desires of the individual secondary to the whole. Thus, although in the West
the concept of self is predicated on autonomous individuality, in the East the concept of
self is predicated on a harmonious collectivity. Because of this different self-conceptual
framework, it should come as no surprise that the idea of inalienable rights, of some-
thing to which each individual has an absolute claim, is alien to the social context of
Eastern nations.
Despite many socioeconomic and cultural changes in Iran, cultural traditions and
the centrality of the family have remained strong (Adib, 1995), and the kinship sys-
tem in Iran is more integrated than it is in Western societies. In Iran, for example,
most of the elderly live in three-generation households. Given the importance of
family ties in Iran, divorce is a salient measure of low integration in and regulation
of family life. Durkheim (1951) also discussed this issue and viewed the divorced as
exhibiting less integration. Furthermore, research in Western nations often finds a
positive association between divorce and suicide (Stack, 1992). In Iran, however,
prior research has shown a negative association between divorce and female suicide
rates (Aliverdinia, 1995). Furthermore, married Iranian women are significantly
more likely than married Iranian men to attempt and complete suicide (Janghorbani
& Sharifirad, 2005). This suggests that the prevailing type and/or main causes of
suicide in Iran are different from those found in the West.
Given what we know about Iranian culture and society, and using Durkheimian
concepts, it may be that fatalistic suicide is the dominant type of suicide in Iranian
society, at least among women. This is because Iranian society is closely integrated
and highly regulated in all respects. Thus, in the present study of Iran, we stray from
Durkheim’s most famous hypothesis concerning social deregulation and anomic
suicide and instead focus on the much less often tested notion of overregulation and
fatalistic suicide. To test this hypothesis, we argue that those parts of the country in
which Iranian women are able to have greater freedom from the excessive controls
of the normative system, and from the traditional influences of family and the local
community will be those areas that exhibit a lower female suicide rate.

Background: Female Suicides and Methods of Suicide in Iran

Despite the fact that the suicide rate in Iran has been increasing for much of the
past two decades, compared to most Western industrialized nations, the Iranian sui-
cide rate is low (Management and Planning Organization of Iran, 2006).1 According

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 Aliverdinia, Pridemore / Women’s Fatalistic Suicide in Iran   309

to recent data, the suicide rate in Iran is about 5.5 per 100,000. Although precise
estimates are impossible here as elsewhere, the data also suggest that for every com-
pleted suicide there are between 8 and 25 attempted suicides. The mean age of sui-
cide victims is 29 years old, and those aged 15 to 29 compose the largest group of
people who commit suicide (Askari, 1998; Mohammadi, 2004). The provinces with
the highest overall suicide rates are Ilam, Bushehr, Kohgiluyeh va Boyer-Ahmad,
Khuzestan, Fars, and Kerman. These contiguous provinces in south central and
southwest Iran are generally considered the poorest in the country.
Initial research on suicide in Iran points to a different sex-specific pattern than that
which prevails elsewhere. Female rates of attempted suicide are much higher than for
males (Janghorbani & Sharifirad, 2005), and female and male rates of completed
suicide are nearly equal. Contrary to Western countries where single elderly men
often exhibit the highest rates of suicide, the highest rates in Iran are found among
young married women. It appears that marriage serves as a stronger protective factor
against suicide for men than for women. In fact, as suggested by our focus on fatal-
istic suicide among Iranian women, marriage actually seems to act as a risk factor for
suicide among females.2 Research conducted in Tehran Province since 1961 shows
that there have been a greater number of females than males who committed suicide.
Furthermore, between 60% and 80% of suicides in Turkensahra, Ilam, and Lorestan
provinces consist of young women between 18 and 25. In provinces such as Zanjan
and Gilan, male suicides exceed female suicides, though the number of female sui-
cides has been increasing in recent years (Aliverdinia, 1995; Mohammadi, 2004).
Geographic location has an influence on the most common method used to carry out
suicide in Iran. Currently, the majority of Iranian men who commit suicide hang
themselves, whereas 83% of women who commit suicide do so via self-immolation
(Iran’s Police Headquarters, 2005; see also Ahmadi, 2007; Dastgiri, Kalankesh,
Pourafkary, Vahidi, & Mahmoodzareh, 2005; Janghorbani & Sharifirad, 2005).
The proportion of all women who commit suicide through self-immolation has
increased in the past several years (Tobaei, 1999). In Kermanshah and Ilam provinces,
for example, Dastgiri et al. (2005) showed that the incidence of self-immolation rose
markedly during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many women who choose this
method make it clear (via statements or suicide notes) that they burned themselves to
death as a protest against their appalling family conditions. These appear to be fatal-
istic acts and rebellions against prevailing conditions, rather than representing a clear
desire to end one’s life.
As suggested by our focus on fatalism and suicide among Iranian women, we
believe it likely that the patriarchal society is one cause of suicide among Iranian
women, especially in the less developed regions of the country. The traditional family
structure among Iranians, especially among the families in the nomadic and ethnic
groups in provinces such as Ilam and Kohgiluyeh va Boyer-Ahmad, is built on the
culture of male domination. In these cultures, women are sometimes forced into mar-
riage at a young age, creating a fatalistic outlook and little hope of self-realization.

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310   Violence Against Women

Similarly, violent and demoralizing acts such as domestic violence, create not only a
difficult present but also a bleak future. Recent research in Iran, for example, showed
that women in arranged marriages were three times more likely than those who were
not in arranged marriages to experience domestic violence (Nojomi, Agaee, &
Eslami, 2007).
The few studies of suicide in Iran have revealed that family problems—including
addiction of the spouse, age differences, lack of understanding between spouses,
polygamy, and lack of interest in family affairs—are important reasons for suicide
among Iranian women, as are marriage at a young age and the excessive cultural
sensitivity related to the taboo of divorce (Taghavi, 2003). Individual-level research
on women who have taken their lives shows that they have suffered degradation in
the family, male domination, marriage at a very young age, arbitrary and arranged
marriages as part of the culture of their clan, and large differences of age between
younger women and older husbands (Shams, 2003). These risk factors related to
marriage and the family are exacerbated as, generally speaking, Iranian studies have
revealed that religious belief and zeal result in fewer divorces.
Economic repression may be another important factor for fatalistic suicides
among Iranian women. A general review of the economic conditions in Iran shows
that only 27% of the employed population of the country is female. Compared even
to underdeveloped nations, the rate of female employment in Iran is very low
(Statistical Centre of Iran, 2005). The most important reasons for lower levels of
employment among women include rising general levels of unemployment, the eco-
nomic difficulties resulting from the war with Iraq, and most important, stagnation
of handicraft and agricultural activities. Aside from the general lack of jobs, the most
important obstacle preventing higher female employment is the unfair treatment of
women that is prescribed in unwritten social customs and traditional norms, as well
as a lack of belief in female competence among policymakers and executives.

Theoretical Framework

In our study, we test Durkheim’s ideas as they relate to fatalistic suicide as an

explanation for the geographic distribution of female suicide rates in Iran. Durkheim
argued that the suicide rate is a social fact that can be interpreted as an indicator of
social solidarity within a society (Durkheim, 1951). He argued that social structure
is created from the intersection of two independent parameters: integration and
regulation. Integration has been defined as the extent of social relations binding a
person or a group to others such that they are exposed to the moral demands of the
group. Regulation is defined as the normative or moral demands placed on the indi-
vidual that come with membership in a group (Bearman, 1991). Durkheim believed
varying levels of integration and regulation led to four types of suicide. In brief, low
integration is suspected of creating higher levels of egoistic suicide, whereas

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 Aliverdinia, Pridemore / Women’s Fatalistic Suicide in Iran   311

extremely high integration can produce altruistic suicide. Low regulation, on the
other hand, is believed to be associated with anomic suicides, whereas high regula-
tion is believed to produce fatalistic suicides.
Although Durkheim (1951) chose to define women in traditional families as
socially integrated, the experienced lives of many women in traditional societies may
actually more closely resemble his definition of fatalism—that is, an excessively
regulated existence “with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently checked
by oppressive discipline” (p. 276). The category of fatalistic suicide was largely
constructed for purposes of symmetry, and because it would undercut Durkheim’s
claims about the role of modern urban life serving to increase the incidence of sui-
cide, he never seriously examined the possibility that social integration could result
in suicide (Kushner & Sterk, 2005). Yet one can imagine fatalistic suicide resulting
from excessive regulation among those whose futures are blocked, whose aspirations
are denied, and who live under moral despotism.

Summary of Hypotheses
Given this review of the literature, both on the background of suicide in Iran and
on fatalistic suicide, we expect a positive relationship between levels of fatalism
among women and female suicide rates. In other words, higher levels of female
repression should be associated with higher rates of female suicide.

Data and Method

The unit of analysis in our study was the Iranian province. The sample consists
of pooled data on 25 provinces for 4 years each, 1997 to 2000, so that n = 100.

Measurement
The dependent variable was the female suicide rate per 100,000 population. Data
on suicide were supplied by the Iran Women’s Participation Centre (2001).
We employed three variables—female education, industrialization, and female
participation in the labor force—to gauge the level of female oppression, and thus
fatalism, in each province. The level of female education was measured as the percent-
age of all women over the age of 23 in each province who graduated from a university.
These data were obtained from the Management and Planning Organization of Iran
(2006). The level of industrialization in each province was measured as the amount of
industrial electricity consumption (Management and Planning Organization of Iran,
2006). Energy consumption is a common measure of development and industrializa-
tion in cross-national studies. Electricity consumption is closely related to common
definitions of industrialization, is used by sociologists (Grusky, 1983) and by econo-
mists and other scholars of development as an indicator of industrialization, and has

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312   Violence Against Women

been shown to be closely tied to economic growth in developing nations (Yuan, Zhao,
Yu, & Hu, 2007). Female participation in the labor force was measured as the percent-
age of all working-age women in the provincial population who were employed
(Management and Planning Organization of Iran, 2006).
We employed a measure of crime as an indicator of social deregulation to control
for the potential effect of deregulation on suicide rates. In this case, however, we
expect higher crime rates to be associated with a lower female (fatalistic) suicide
rate, as it represents a lower degree of control. The evidence for the association
between social cohesion and crime in the criminological literature is so strong and
consistent (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997) that others have also used crime
rates as a proxy for social disorganization (Walberg, McKee, Shkolnikov, Chenet, &
Leon, 1998). Our specific measure for this was the number of arrests for drug-related
offenses per 100,000 population. This is an official measure obtained from the
Narcotics Drug Control Headquarters of Iran (2006).
The level of poverty in each province was measured as the percentage of the
population receiving support from the Iranian welfare system (Komiteh Emdad). In
this case, a component of the poverty measurement also represents overregulation,
as higher levels of poverty are associated with the less developed and more tradi-
tional regions of the country. These data were obtained from the Management and
Planning Organization of Iran (2006).
All models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Common
exploratory data analysis techniques were employed, and regression diagnostics and
tests of model sensitivity were carried out.

Results
Table 1 shows female, male, and total suicide rates per 100,000 persons in each
of the 25 provinces. The five provinces with the highest female suicide rates in 2000
were Ilam (24.91), Kermanshah (24.09), Kohgiluyeh (9.13), Semnan (7.78), and
Lorestan (7.76). The five provinces with the lowest female suicide rates were Ardebil
(0.17), Mazandaran (0.23), Esfehan (0.35), Tehran (0.57), and Khuzestan (0.80).
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 2. We see that all of the correlations are
in the expected direction. In terms of our theory, provincial female suicide rates are
negatively correlated with levels of industrialization (r = –0.46), female education (r =
–0.47), and female labor force participation (r = –0.38). Furthermore, as expected,
female suicide rates were positively correlated with levels of poverty (r = 0.58) and
negatively correlated with crime rates (r = –0.20).
Table 3 reveals the results of model estimation. Each of our three measures of
female oppression is associated with the female suicide rates in the expected
d­ irection. The results show that provinces with higher levels of female education
(β = –.180, p = .044), female participation in the labor force (β = –.180, p = .028),

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 Aliverdinia, Pridemore / Women’s Fatalistic Suicide in Iran   313

Table 1
Suicide Rates (by Sex) per 100,000 Residents in Iranian Provinces, 1997-2000
1997 1998 1999 2000

Province Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men

Azerbaijan Sharghi 4.69 6.06 2.91 5.40 2.70 5.83 2.54 3.91
Azerbaijan Gharbi 4.81 7.56 5.77 5.66 5.12 5.49 4.73 5.73
Ardebil 6.05 7.63 1.38 4.05 1.20 4.55 0.17 0.84
Esfehan 4.76 5.56 1.23 3.62 1.72 3.61 0.35 0.81
Ilam 15.51 14.04 34.08 18.48 39.03 20.60 24.91 14.42
Boshehr 12.01 8.21 4.58 3.40 6.66 7.51 2.11 1.54
Tehran 3.04 4.45 1.08 2.46 1.17 2.32 0.57 1.07
Chahar Mahal 6.63 7.55 9.49 50.95 7.59 7.21 5.21 3.34
Khorasan 6.30 6.46 6.97 6.09 5.18 5.46 4.85 3.69
Khuzestan 5.66 4.82 5.28 4.11 3.54 2.96 0.80 1.29
Zanjan 10.50 12.79 8.44 9 6.40 6.55 1.54 3.70
Semnan 7.82 8.13 4.84 5.32 3.96 6.34 7.78 6.61
Sistan 1.77 1.60 0.35 1.89 0.34 1.62 1.30 2.31
Fars 7.14 5.46 3.89 3.81 4.92 4.82 3.33 3.68
Kurdistan 12.10 8.90 6.56 7.50 3.97 4.55 4.05 3.93
Kerman 4.06 3.73 2.09 5.80 4.90 8.09 1.45 1.97
Kermanshah 16.47 11.68 14.01 14.28 27.67 17.86 24.09 14.81
Kohgiluyeh 11.17 11.69 9.87 6.76 6.80 2.79 9.13 5.12
Gilan 4.53 7.80 2.82 4.71 1.57 5.39 1.48 3.09
Lorestan 10.55 6.69 9.06 9.46 13.92 9.15 7.68 7.76
Mazandaran 4.45 7.02 4.85 5.48 3.39 2.59 0.23 3.05
Markazi 7.02 7.95 6.94 9.64 3.04 7.96 3.34 6.17
Hormozgan 5.05 4.75 2.28 6.78 1.11 3.84 2.35 1.37
Hamedan 8.33 12.84 6.60 10.21 6.09 11.12 2.39 5.97
Yazd 7.40 6.74 2.42 5.08 6.59 7.24 6.75 3.69
Total 5.88 6.38 4.42 5.25 4.53 5.08 3.24 3.80

Source: Iran Women’s Participation Centre (2001).

and industrialization (β = –.168, p = .036) have lower levels of female suicide mor-
tality. We also found that provinces with higher rates of poverty (β = .218, p = .033)
and lower rates of crime (β = –.212, p = .044) have higher female suicide rates.

Methodological Limitations
There are limitations to this research that must be taken into account when inter-
preting our results. First, there is little prior research on fatalistic suicide. Although
we believe our selection of Iran provides a logical case study for examining the
association between the oppression of women and the resulting female suicide rate,

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314   Violence Against Women

Table 2
Correlation Matrix
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Female suicide rate 1.00

2. Industrialization –0.46** 1.00
3. Female education –0.47** 0.24* 1.00
4. Poverty 0.58** –0.30** 0.18 1.00
5. Female labor force –0.38** 0.52** 0.11 –0.37** 1.00
6. Crime rate –0.20* 0.19* –0.25* 0.22* 0.21 1.00

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 3
Provincial Female Suicide Rates Regressed on Independent Variables
Independent Variables b β SE p

Constant 17.48 .001

Female education –.005 –.180 .081 .044
Female labor force –.001 –.180 .081 .028
Industrialization –.58 –.168 .098 .036
Poverty .001 .218 .093 .033
Crime rate –.078 –.212 .090 .044
Adjusted R2 = .35

our results should be considered preliminary until more studies on this topic have
been undertaken. Similarly, there is scant research on suicide in Iran and, more gen-
erally, in Islamic nations (Afifi, 2006). Although it is important to be among the first
to carry out this type of work, we recognize that an absence of a tradition of research
on this topic in Iran does not allow us to learn from the mistakes of others and leaves
our research vulnerable to the criticisms of future refined analyses.
Also, it is well known that measuring suicide is a difficult task. There is no doubt
that strict religious prohibitions against suicide in Iran, as in some other nations, result
in underenumeration of suicides, and this level of underenumeration likely varies by
province. However, a redeeming aspect of our study in this regard is that undercounts
are likely to be greater in more religious and less developed areas of the country. Thus,
the statistical impact of this undercount would be to underestimate the strength of the
association between our measures of female repression and female suicide rates. In
other words, this situation means that our estimates are conservative in nature, as these
areas are where we would expect (and, in fact, found) the highest female suicide rates.
Finally, our analyses contain all recorded female suicides, regardless of their
“type.” In other words, although our theoretical focus is on fatalistic suicides among

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 Aliverdinia, Pridemore / Women’s Fatalistic Suicide in Iran   315

Iranian women, we have no way of actually knowing what percentage of the suicides
that occurred could actually be classified as fatalistic. This is, of course, a limitation
of any structural-level analysis such as this.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although rates of male suicide mortality are much higher than female suicide mor-
tality in most nations of the world, male and female suicide mortality in Iran are nearly
equal, and rates of attempted suicide appear to be considerably higher among females
(Janghorbani & Sharifirad, 2005). Furthermore, Iranian women often choose a dra-
matic and deadly form of suicide, self-immolation (Ahmadi, 2007; Dastgiri
et al., 2005).3 Both of these facts likely represent the fatalistic outlook among many
Iranian women who choose suicide, especially in certain parts of the nation. As a
result, our findings appear to be very different from those studies undertaken in
Western nations that show deregulation and lower levels of integration to be associated
with higher suicide rates. In Iran, at least for women, social integration and regulation
are positively related to the geographic distribution of female suicide rates.
As an institution, the Iranian family traditionally considers the wife under the
custody of the husband. Unemployed women or stay-at-home wives and/or mothers,
who together compose the majority of adult Iranian women, have a deep feeling of
dependence on the family and are rarely able to express their own individuality within
this framework. Similarly, Iranian society as a whole is reluctant to consider a defini-
tion of social personality of a woman that is independent of her role within her family.
Indeed, many would consider an attempt to do so in an extremely negative light. On
the other hand, a man may form his own social status independent of his family.
The exclusion of women from many social and economic rights and benefits
results in their confinement to a life solely within the home. This passive role sets
women outside of society and excludes them from shaping or taking part in social
developments. As such, women have little active role in the routine management of
affairs in contemporary life, except for their somewhat active presence in the Iranian
health care and education sectors. Although it is true that some legal, social, and
political developments that benefit women have occurred in Iran, the traditional
place of women in this patriarchal society still holds sway.
Especially in less developed regions, women face severe confinement and restric-
tions because of the tribal structure of communities and the extreme fanaticism
prevailing in many tribal areas, such as in the provinces of Ilam and Kermanshah.
This fatalism may be reinforced by the burdens of bearing and raising a large number
of children and the domestic violence that many women face (Ahmadi, 2007;
Nojomi et al., 2007; Poureslami, MacLean, Spiegel, & Yassi, 2004). Although our
main thesis here is that greater access to individual freedom should result in fewer

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316   Violence Against Women

suicides, the availability of mass media in even these traditional areas may have an
unexpected effect. Although exposing girls and women in these areas to the possibil-
ity of the greater freedom of expression they view on television, in the context of
their continued repression this may serve to exacerbate their feelings of fatalism.
Freedom is something close at hand but nevertheless unattainable because of the
rules and traditions under which they continue to live.
As an example of some of the traditions that continue, much of the tribal population
in Ilam has the same attitude toward a female criminal and a woman who has experi-
enced the violent victimization of rape: An unwritten law considers the punishment of
death acceptable for many such women. These women are often compelled to commit
suicide because of the mental anguish to which they are subjected by their family and
community. There are many instances in which the family kills a female member to
safeguard its “prestige,” ironically pretending that it was a suicide.4 With so few
sources of protection, even after being victimized, women often do in fact commit
suicide in these circumstances. We can see in these situations that the suicide, then, is
not an expression of a sincere desire for death but instead the result of repression and
a fatalistic outlook, as well as a way to send a message to society. This coincides with
the findings presented here, which show that female suicide rates are higher in prov-
inces such as Ilam and Kohgiluyeh va Boyer-Ahmad that exhibit high levels of social
regulation but lower in provinces such as Tehran and Mazandaran that have relatively
lower levels of regulation and greater societal development and freedom for women.
Overall, one may consider the variation in female suicide rates in Iran an indica-
tion of inflexible and enduring traditional norms. In other words, fatalistic suicide is
a result of social overregulation, and it reveals the excessive external controls women
face. In such instances, fatalistic suicide brings a freedom from miserable and seem-
ingly hopeless circumstances.
Of course, if what we have argued is true, it implies that a lesser degree of social
regulation in the industrial areas such as Tehran is indicative of less restrictive social
norms that, even if violated, may not be punished so severely. One of the hallmarks
of globalization is the increase in the role of civil society and civil participation.
Globalization may reduce the role of national governments and demand a more
active participation of the forces of civil society: individual citizens, media, organi-
zations, and businesses. As a growing segment of the Iranian civil society in the
more developed regions of the country, women are gaining greater influence not
only in the government but also on more general norms and values and using this
influence to promote greater involvement and activism and to lobby politicians to
respond to women’s needs. Furthermore, as has occurred elsewhere in places such
as China, the development of mass media and communications has aided in improving
the intellectual standing of some women, as greater access to media and communica-
tions makes them increasingly aware of their rights.
More and better educational opportunities are also available for women in the more
developed parts of Iran. These opportunities can help women avoid or alleviate the

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 Aliverdinia, Pridemore / Women’s Fatalistic Suicide in Iran   317

difficulties and associated fatalism that face their counterparts, who are subjected to
tribal rules and traditions in other regions of the nation. Aside from the more apparent
possibilities, greater education and freedom mean greater social capital and mecha-
nisms for coping with difficult situations. Not only are more positive community
organizations, counseling options, and other social services available, but less hyper-
regulation of women’s activities allows them to take advantage of these possibilities.
On the other hand, poorer women and those with little education are more susceptible
to the frustrating conditions they face because of their isolation from counseling and
their lack of knowledge of various solutions or services that might exist.
Those areas with greater participation of women in the labor force are also those
areas with lower female suicide rates in Iran. Workforce participation not only means
greater economic security and freedom but also greater social freedom via multiple
pathways, greater freedom from traditionally assigned roles, an enlargement of the
scope of daily social activities, and the possibility of greater self-realization and inde-
pendence. Our results confirm that those provinces with greater participation of
women in the labor force have lower levels of female suicide mortality. This example
presents us with the opportunity to discuss the intricacies of theory as they relate to
too much and too little integration and regulation. Economic development and social
change can also bring disintegration to social control mechanisms and a reduction in
the dominance of the community over the individual. Thus, although an increase in
freedom from overly excessive regulation may result in fewer fatalistic suicides, a
breakdown in integration and social regulation can result if there is a swing in the
opposite direction, thus resulting in a greater number of different types of suicide.
This suggests a parabolic relationship between suicide rates and social integration/
regulation.
In these more developed parts of the nation, Iranian women are beginning to
move their traditional society toward greater equality. About two thirds of students
in Iranian universities are female. This alone has resulted in a rise in their awareness
and demands.
In sum, Iranian regions that exhibit greater freedom from overregulation for women
are those regions that also show lower suicide rates. Industrialization, labor force par-
ticipation, and education all play a role in this association. We might also infer that as
Iran moves toward more development and away from hyperregulation of women’s
activities, the female suicide rate in the nation as a whole will diminish.

Notes
1. Iranian penal law prescribes no penalty for suicide or for collaboration in its commitment. This is
because it is widely viewed that the penalty against the person who has committed suicide will not serve
as a preventive measure for the community, and also any legal measure against the family of the person
who has taken his or her life would only serve to inflict further damage on the deceased’s relatives.
2. Despite this, prior analysis has shown that children serve a far stronger protective shield for women
against suicide than they do for men (Aliverdinia, 1995).

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3. In contrast, studies from European countries, Australia, and North America have shown that men com-
mit suicide by self-immolation more than women (Krummen, Kelly, & Klein, 1998). According to Cameron,
Pegg, and Muller’s (1997) study of Australia, for example, nearly all the suicides via self-immolation were
male. At any rate, self-immolation in general is an extremely rare method of suicide in Western nations.
4. There is, of course, no way of discerning such information from the vital statistics data we employ.
For a media report from neighboring Iraq about increases in immolation among women, both self-inflicted
and as a result of “honor killings,” see Peraino (2007).

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Akbar Aliverdinia is an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Social Sciences at the
University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran. He is also a member of the Iranian Sociological Association.
His main areas of research include substance abuse, suicide, deviance, and crime rates in Iran. His publi-
cations on these topics have appeared in International Criminal Justice Review, European Journal of
Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice, and several Iranian journals.

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320   Violence Against Women

William Alex Pridemore is associate professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of
Criminal Justice at Indiana University. His main research interests include social structure and violence,
the impact of social change and of hazardous drinking on homicide and suicide in Russia, and the meas-
urement of crime and deviance. His recent publications have appeared in Criminology, Journal of
Quantitative Criminology, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Social Forces, American
Journal of Public Health, and Addiction.

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