ASSYRIAN P R O P A G A N D A A N D T H E

FALSIFICATION O F H I S T O R Y IN T H E ROYAL
INSCRIPTIONS OF SENNACHERIB

by

ANTTI LAATO
Âbo

Recent studies dealing with the history of Israel and J u d a h

generally regard the Assyrian royal inscriptions as reliable sources
of historical information vis-à-vis events in Israel and Judah. This
tendency is connected with the view—which prima facie is
plausible—that these Assyrian inscriptions originate from the time
immediately following the events they describe, and therefore one
would expect them to provide a more reliable picture than biblical
texts which have undergone a long and complicated process of
redaction. A good example of this modern tendency is found in the
historical reconstruction of Sennacherib's campaign in J u d a h in
701 B.C. Today, the great majority oí scholars seem to regard the
statements made in the inscriptions of Sennacherib which recount
one version of this historical event as reliable and accurate in con-
trast to the biblical version of the mysterious setback of the Assyrian
army (2 Kgs xviii-xix // Isa, xxxvi-xxxvii), which is regarded as a
legendary product of the reign of Josiah or even as late as the exilic
period. 1 However, scepticism is also warranted concerning the

1
Perhaps the most important studies are the following H Barth, Die Jesaja-
Worte in der Josiazeit Israel und Assur als Thema einer produktiven Neuinterpretation der
Jesajauberheferung (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1977), R E Clements, Isaiah and the Delive-
rance of Jerusalem A Study of the Interpretation of Prophecy in the Old Testament (Sheffield,
1980), W Werner, Eschatologische Texte injesaja 1-39 Messias, Heiliger Rest, Volker
(Wurzburg, 1982), F J Gongalves, L'Expédition de Sennacherib en Palestine dans la
Littérature Hébraïque Ancienne (Pans, 1986), C Hardmeier, Prophétie im Streit vor dem
Untergang Judas Erzahlkommunikative Studien zur Entstehungssituation der Jesaja- und
Jeremiaerzahlungen in II Reg 18-20 undjer 37-40 (BZA W 187, Berlin and New Yoik,
1990) In some other studies a more cautious treatment of the Assyrian sources
has been suggested See, e g , Β S Childs, Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis (London,
1967), Ν N a ' a m a n , " S e n n a c h e r i b ' s campaign to J u d a h and the date of the Imlk
s t a m p s " , VT 29 (1979), pp 61-86, Η Wildberger, Jesaja 28 39 (Neukirchcn-
Vluyn, 1982), A R Millard, " S e n n a c h e r i b ' s Attack on H e z e k i a h " , The Tyndale
Biblical Archaeology Lecture 1984, pp 61-77, A Laato, " H e z e k i a h and the Assyrian
Crisis in 701 Β C " , SJOT2 (1987), pp 49-68, and especially in Who η Immanuel?

© E J Brill, Leiden, 1995 Vetus Testamentum X L V , 2

 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 199

historical reliablity of the royal inscriptions of Sennacherib which

portray this military campaign. The aim of this article is to examine
critically the historicity of the military reports of the Assyrian royal
inscriptions. We shall demonstrate that it is possible to verify that
the Assyrian royal inscriptions contain "historical" assertions that
are problematic. In particular, we shall concentrate on the inscrip-
tions of Sennacherib. We shall demonstrate that there are some
typical literary and stylistic devices in Sennacherib's inscriptions
which are used when there is reason to believe that an attempt has
been made to veil a military setback. Then we shall once again pose
questions regarding the historicity of Sennacherib's account of his
campaign against Hezekiah, the king of J u d a h . We attempt to
demonstrate that Sennacherib's account contains stereotypical
literary and stylistic devices which may indicate that Sennacherib
set out to veil a military setback suffered by his army in Palestine.
Therefore, in spite of the fact that Sennacherib's account provides
much reliable data on the campaign, it tendentiously censors every
military setback. This study will raise questions on the larger
historiographical problem of how the ancient sources are to be used
(Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, etc. royal inscriptions) in the
reconstruction of the historical events of the ancient Near East.

I
The official reports of the military campaigns in the ancient Near
East were deeply influenced by the prevailing political and religious
ideology. The king was regarded as under the protection of the
gods, and this was used to legitimate his position among his own
people. Such legitimation implied that the military campaigns of
the king were regarded as being under divine blessing. It was
believed that the gods would provide for the king and his army and
see to it that their enemies were defeated. It can be said that a social
expectation connected with the religious and political legitimation

The Rise and the Foundering of Isaiah 's Messianic Expectations (Äbo, 1988), C S Seitz,
Zion 's Final Destiny The Developments of the Book of Isaiah A Reassessment of Isaiah 36-
39 (Minneapolis, 1991) Seitz, in his criticism as well as his treatment of the tex-
tual material in Isa i-xxxix, concurs with my approach at many points However,
he fails to document this agreement for his readers but presents only his critical
reactions to my approach I shall return to Seitz's studies of Isaiah elsewhere
200 ANTTI LAATO

of the king forced the king to provide a response. A seccessful

military campaign provoked a positive response from soceity,
especially when the society had the opportunity to celebrate its suc-
cess. Official ceremonies were thus arranged when the victorious
army of the king returned from battle. Another important way of
reporting the victory was through inscriptions and reliefs which
were displayed in public places.
When the king suffered a military setback it was more difficult
for him to provide a positive proclamation for his people. Unsuc-
cessful military campaigns were regarded as strong indications that
the king was no longer favoured by gods. The king thus fell under
the threat of losing the divine right to his kingship in the eyes of his
people. It was not uncommon for a king to be dethroned after his
unsuccessful military campaign(s). However, the king, after having
experienced a military seback, had the opportunity to use inscrip-
tions and reliefs to make the necessary report to the society, and in
this way claim that he was still the legitimate ruler of his country.
Inscriptions and reliefs would thus give the impression that he had
been victorious even though the historical reality had been dif-
ferent. Written texts and pictures were regarded in the ancient
Near East as reflecting hisorical reality. They were the images of
the reality. There was no such institution as "critical scholarship"
which might call into question the accuracy of the inscriptions or
reliefs. Therefore, it is clear that ordinary people could easily be
manipulated by these public documents. Especially when the king
suffered a military setback it was possible to "reverse reality" by
means of rhetoric so that the needful social response was fulfilled.
It is not always easy to test the reliability of an ancient inscription
because our knowledge of the historical circumstances referred to in
the text are often based solely on that particular document. There-
fore, there is frequenly no other control mechanism than "common
sense" available to test the reliability of the historical assertions
made in the inscription. However, several historical events of the
ancient Near East are reported in two different sources and, more
importantly, from two different viewpoints. Such cases present us
with the opportunity to compare the way in which the portrayal of
the historical events reported in these sources agrees and differs
between the two texts. In these cases we have a possiblity of
evaluating how a sociologically appropriate response was provided
to the people in order to fulfil expectations concerning the legitima-
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 201

tion of the king. T h u s the people were manipulated to believe some­

thing which did not have any reasonable historical basis.
An excellent example of an ideological report which was intended
to fulfil society's expectations is found in the report on the battle of
Kadesh on the Orontes in Ramesses I P s 5th regnal year. This bat­
tle has been reported in Egyptian and Hittite sources respectively.
T h e Egyptian version of the battle (which has been preserved in
many copies) contains inscriptions and reliefs which are full of
details relating how the Egyptian army was victorious. 2 Typical of
Ramesses I P s reports are boastful statements such as: " M y majesty
caused the forces of the foes from Khatti to fall on their faces, one
upon the other, as crocodiles fall, into the water of the Orontes. I
was after them like a griffin; I attacked all the countries, I alone.
For my infantry and my chariotry had deserted me; not one of them
stood looking back. As I live, as R e loves me, as my father Atum
favors me, everything that my majesty has told I did it in truth, in
the presence of my infantry and my chariotry" (Lichtheim [η. 2],
p . 62). In the relief Ramesses is depicted as standing alone in his
chariot slaughtering Hittite soldiers. The inscription is full of
boasting about Ramesses' courage and how the Egyptian soldiers
exalted their king after having seen his bravery. T h e inscription
ends with the description of the treaty of peace between Egypt and
the Hittite Empire. The reader is given the impression that the
enemy was forced to make peace with Egypt: " M y majesty over­
powered them, I slew them without sparing them; They sprawled
before my horses, And lay slain in heaps in their blood. T h e n the
vile Chief of Khatti wrote and worshipped my name like that of R e
. . . " (pp. 70-1). In the last lines of the inscriptions the arrival of the
victorious Egyptian army to Egypt is depicted: "Welcome, our
beloved son, King Usermare-sotpenre, the Son of Re, Ramesse, Beloved
of Amun, given life! They granted him millions of jubilees forever
on the throne of R e , all lowlands and all highlands lying prostrate
under his feet for even and all t i m e " (p. 71).
T h e Hittite version of the battle is different. It is brief but gives
a strikingly different point of view on the battle: " A t the time that
Muwatalhs took the field against the king of the land of Egypt and

2
See Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature II The New Kingdom (Berke-
ley, 1976), pp 57-72 Concerning the reliefs see, for example, ANEP, no 337, and
Y Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Discovery
(London, 1963), p p 238-41
202 ANTTI LAATO

the country of Amurru, and when he then had defeated the king of
the land of Egypt and the country of Amurru, he returned to the
country Apa. When Muwatallis, my brother, had (also) defeated
Apa, he [returned to] the Hatti land, but [left] me in the country
of A p a " (ANET, p. 319). This text claims that the Hittite army was
victorious in Kadesh. The reality was probably that the Hittite
army gained the upper hand in the battle, even though there is no
reason to believe that the Egyptian army was totally defeated. That
the Hittite army was victorious receives support from the following
evidence. First, the Hittite army was still functional after the battle
of Kadesh in the country of Apa (the region of Damascus) which
gives us reason to believe that if anyone was victorious at Kadesh
it was the Hittites. 3 Second, we know that Ramesses II was forced
to do battle in Canaan during his 6th-8th regnal years. This can be
explained by the hypothesis according to which the cities of Canaan
had received information that the Egyptian army had been defeated
at Kadesh and that this provided the impetus to launch a rebellion
against Egypt. 4
In Ramesses' 21st regnal year the parity treaty between Hattusil
III and Ramesses II was made. We know of this treaty both from
Egyptian hieroglyphs (upon the walls of the Temple of Anion at
Karnak) and from the Hittite cuneiform texts of Boghazköy. The
treaty was a diplomatic compromise which guarded both Egyptian
and Hittite political interests in Palestine (ANET, pp. 199-203).
This political agreement shows that both the Hittite and the Egyp-
tian Empires were still powerful. Therefore, they regarded a peace
agreement as a mutually beneficial alternative for them both in
order to avoid further bloody strife. It is worth noting that this
treaty is framed in neutral terms in both Egyptian and Hittite
sources. Apparently, it was an important political principal to state
the content of the treaty in an objective and respectful way. 5 Later

3
See F Cornelius, Geschichte der Hethiter Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der geogra-
phischen Verhaltnisse und der Rechtsgeschichte (Darmstadt, 1979), pp 229-32, 237 η
31
4
See R O Faulkner, The Cambridge Ancient History II/2a (3rd edn , Cambridge,
1975), pp 226-9
5
T h e recent archaeological excavations at Aphek have revealed data which can
be interpreted as an indication of the diplomatic peace between the Egyptian and
Hittite Empires See M Kochavi, A F Ramey, I Singer, R Grveon, A
Demsky, Aphek-Antipatris 1974-1977 Inscriptions (Tel-Aviv, 1978), M Kochavi,
Aphek in Canaan The Egyptian Governor's Residence and Its Finds (Jerusalem, 1990)
 ASSYRIAN P R O P A G A N D A 203

in Ramesses' 34th regnal year—apparently on the basis of this

political treaty—a marriage was arranged between the Egyptian
Pharaoh and a Hittite princess. In the so-called " M a r r i a g e Stela"
(at Karnak, Elephantine and Abu Simbel) Egyptian political prop­
aganda is again discernible. T h e explanation is given that the Hit­
tite kingdom was defeated by the great Egyptian Pharaoh,
Ramesses, and that this is reason why the Hittites attempted to con­
solidate their relationship with the Pharaoh. They sent the princess
with great tribute to Ramesses, and therfore he was pleased. T h e
relief in the temple of Abu Simbel depicts the Hittite king and his
princess entering the palace of Ramesses (ANEP, no. 399).
The battle of Kadesh is a good example of the way in which
ancient inscriptions do not provide us an unequivocally reliable pic­
ture about the course of a military campaign. T h e Egyptian report
is especially tendentious and gives us an account which is problem­
atic in terms of historical reality. In the following section we shall
deal with the reports on historical campaigns in Sennacherib's own
inscriptions and in the Babylonian Chronicle, and discuss various
reasons for regarding Sennacherib's accounts of the course of his
military campaign as unreliable.

II

T h e Babylonian Chronicle ( = BabChr) provides us with another

Mesopotamian viewpoint on the campaigns of Sennacherib. 6 T h e
text of the BabChr on the reign of Sennacherib (1 ii 19-37) is almost
entirely preserved. This source describes the first, fourth, sixth,
seventh and eighth campaigns of Sennacherib and sometimes dif­
fers strikingly from the Assyrian accounts. As noted in section I, the
general tendency in Assyrian annals is to avoid mention of setbacks
altogether. However, BabChr reveals that the Assyrian army suf­
fered defeats during its campaigns against Elam (and Babylonia).
In the following I shall deal with the way in which the five cam­
paigns of Sennacherib as reported by BabChr differ from the
descriptions in Sennacherib's own royal inscriptions. 7
6
A Κ Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Locust, Valley, 1975)
7
Sennacherib's royal inscriptions have been published in D D Luckenbill, The
Annals of Sennacherib (Chicago, 1924) See also R Borger, Babylonisch-Assyrische Lese­
stucke (Rome, 1979) In this article I refer to Sennacherib's inscriptions according
to Luckenbill's edition—because it is much more complete and easy to u s e — b u t
the reader may also consult the texts published in Borger's study
204 ANTTI LAATO

(1) T h e section in BabChr 1 n 19-23, which is partly framentary,

is related to Sennacherib's first campaign against Merodach-
baladan at the beginning of his reign The general description cor­
responds well to Sennacherib's own accounts in the Chicago (and
Taylor) Prism (ι 20-64) as well as to his earlier accounts The First
Campaign, the Bellino Cylinder (lines 5-19), the Rassam Cychnder
(which is practically identical with the Chicago and Taylor Prisms),
Bull inscription ( = Bull 4, lines 3-9) Assyria was victorious and, as
a consequence of the campaign, Bel-ibm was installed on the throne
of Babylon However, the name of Bel-ibm appears only in the
First Campaign inscription, the Bellino Cylinder and the Rassam
Cychnder 8 all of which were written before his rebellion against
Assyria In the subsequent versions of the inscription of Sen­
nacherib his name is not mentioned
(2) T h e second military operation of Sennacherib which is
recounted in the Babylonian Chronicle was directed against Bel-
lbm who had rebelled against Assyria Bel-ibm was dethroned and
Ashur-nadin-shumi, the son of Sennacherib, was appointed to the
throne (BabChr 1 η 26-31) This military operation corresponds to
the fourth campaign of Sennacherib described on the Chicago and
Taylor Prisms (m 50-74), and Bull 4 (lines 33-7) However, there
is no reference to the dethronement of Bel-ibm in Sennacherib's
own annals T h e reason for this silence in the Assyrian sources is
probably connected with an attempt to give the impression that the
Assyrian decision to instai Bel-ibm on the throne was not as unsuc­
cessful as it in fact turned out to be Therefore, his dethronement
was simply ignored in the Assyrian sources In connection with the
first campaign, the name Bel-ibm disappears from those of Sen­
nacherib's inscriptions which were written after the rebellion of Bel-
lbm O n the other hand, the name Ashur-nadin-shum was men­
tioned also in subsequent editions simply because he remained loyal
to Assyria

(3) Sennacherib's invasion of Elam during the reign of Hallushu-

Inshushinak I is recounted in BabChr 1 n 36-45 It is reported that
Sennacherib ravaged and plundered Nagitum, Hilmi, Pillatum and
H u p a p a n u This corresponds well to Sennacherib's own accounts
in the Chicago (and Taylor) Prisms (ìv 36-9) and in the Walters Art

See Borger (η 7)
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 205

Gallery inscription 9 (line 17) where these four regions, and one
additional Nagitu-di'bina, are mentioned. However, the Babylo-
nian Chronicle adds that after these events Hallushu, the king of
Elam, marched on Akkad and penetrated to Sippar. Ashur-nadin-
shum was taken as prisoner and Nergal-ushezib was put on the
throne of Babylonia. The king of Elam also forced the Assyrian
army into retreat. This military setback is not mentioned in Sen-
nacherib's annals. O n the other hand, Sennacherib gives the
impression that he was victorious from the beginning to the end of
his sixth campain against Elam and Babylonia. He reports in the
Chicago and Taylor Prisms that he conquered the five above-
mentioned regions and that he then defeated Nergal-ushezib
( = Shuzubu, the Babylonian) " o n my r e t u r n " (iv 46-53) and cap-
tured him. However, the Babylonian Chronicle reveals that Sen-
nacherib apparently was forced to organize a new military cam-
paign against Babylonia and Elam because the Elamite troops had
"effected an Assyrian retreat". This being the case, the impression
given in the Chicago and Taylor Prisms that Sennacherib defeated
Elam and took Nergal-ushezib prisoner in the same military cam-
paign ( = the sixth campaign) is historically problematic. It is worth
noting that in Bull 4 which was written immediately after the sixth
campaign there is no mention that Nergal-ushezib was taken
prisoner. In fact, there is no mention of Nergal-ushezib at all in
Bull 4. Neither is there any mention of the Elamite troops having
effected an Assyrian retreat. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that Nergal-ushezib was not taken prisoner until the seventh cam-
paign. In the Chicago and Taylor Prisms Sennacherib combines
the events of these two campaigns, asserting that he had been able
to defeat his enemy already in his sixth campaign.

(4) The fourth military operation reported in the Babylonian

Chronicle was connected with the earlier military setback suffered
by the Assyrian army in the battle against the Elamite king,
Hallushu (BabChr 1 ii 46-iii 12). The description begins with the
military operation of Nergal-ushezib who captured, plundered and
sacked Nippur. In the subsequent military revenge operation
Assyrian troops defetated Nergal-ushezib in the district of Nippur,
took him prisoner and transported him to Assyria. This cor-

9
See this inscription in A.K. Grayson, "The Walters Art Gallery Sennacherib
Inscription", AfO 20 (1963), pp. 83-96.
206 ANTTI LAATO

responds to the report of the sixth campaign given by Sennacherib

in the Chicago (and Taylor) Prisms (îv 46-51), even though it is
reasonable to assume that the Assyrian king was able to defeat
Nergal-ushezib only in the seventh campaign The Babylonian
Chronicle continues to describe how Hullushu was dethroned by
his own son, Kudur-(Nahhunte), in a rebellion and how after this
event Assyrian troops went down to Elam and plundered it from
Rashi to Bit-Burnaki The Babylonian Chronicle does nor report
that Assyrian troops gained control of Babylonia at that time O n
the contrary, Mushezib-Marduk ruled in Babylonia and continued
an anti-Assyrian policy The devastation of Elam by Sennacherib's
army during the domestic conflict in Elam is apparently connected
with the account of Sennacherib's seventh campaign found in the
Chicago (and Taylor) prisms, the Nebí Yunus inscription (lines 29-
44) and in the Walters Art Gallery inscriptions, (lines 19-46) Sen-
nacherib does not mention the domestic conflict m Elam but con-
veys the impression that he was victorious against the powerful
Elamite army He reports that he devastated the same areas men-
tion in BabChr (both names Rashi and Bit-Burnaki are mentioned
in Sennacherib's own inscriptions) 10 Further, he states that
Kudur-Nahhunte ( = Kudur-nahnundu) left his royal city,
Madaktu, and escaped to Haidala Then he puts forward an
explanation for not entering the royal city of the Elamite king
" T h e month of ram, (with) extreme cold set in and the heavy
storms sent down ram upon ram and snow I was afraid of the
swollen mountain streams, the front of my yoke I turned and took
the road to Nineveh" (Chicago // Taylor ν 7-11, cf Nebí Yunus,
lines 42-4, the Slab inscription, lines 23-4) This explanation 11
hardly represent the whole truth Sennacherib had not regained
control in Babylonia, and he apparently had no clear knowledge of
the domestic affairs in Elam (ι e how strong it was politically), and
so he did not want to run the risk of being caught in the cross-fire
with Elam in front and Babylonia behind
(5) The fifth military operation of Sennacherib mentioned in the
Babylonian Chronicle is reported in BabChr 1 in 13-27 The reign

10
See the Chicago (and Taylor) Prisms ìv 70 the Nebí Yunus inscription line
38, the Walters Art Gallery inscription lines 33 4
11
Α Κ Grayson, The Cambridge Ancient History III/2 (2nd edn , Cambridge
1991), ρ 108, seems to regard this report of Sennacherib as reliable
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 207

of Kudur-Nahhunte was short, only one year, after which his

brother, Humban-nimena, ascended the throne. T h e Babylonian
Chronicle recounts how the new king of Elam mustered his troops
and waged war against Assyria at Halule and forced an Assyrian
retreat. However, he became ill and died later. At the same time
Assyrian troops captured Babylonia. Mushezib-Marduk was taken
prisoner and transported to Assyria. This military operation was
also reported in several of Sennacherib's own inscriptions (Chicago
// Taylor ν 17-vi 35; the Walters Art Gallery lines 46-126; the
Bavian inscription; Nebi Yunus lines 44-55; the Slab inscription
line 25—Rev. line 27), but not a single reference to any military
setback can be found in any of them. In the Chicago and Taylor
Prisms Sennacherib reports that Kudur-Nahhunte died at the com­
mand of Ashur before his appointed time, and thus seeks to explain
the domestic conflict in Elam as being caused by Ashur (v 11-13).
The most curious treatment of an historical event concerns the bat­
tle at Halule, where the Assyrian troops were forced to retreat
according to the Babylonian Chronicle. Instead of reporting this
setback, the royal inscriptions of Sennacherib are full of boasting
over how the Assyrians defeated the enemy. Scholars have devoted
a great deal of discussion to whether Elam or Assyria was victorious
at Halule. According to A.K. Grayson, the Elamite troops were
victorious and Sennacherib's report is " a prodigious falsehood". 1 2
J . A . Brinkman presents additional written evidence (YBC 11377)
which shows that in the year after the battle of Halule Babylon was
beseiged by Assyrian troops and the city was full of misery. H e con­
cludes that "if the battle of Halule was a reverse for the Assyrians,
the setback was quite short-lived". 1 3 H . W . F . Saggs notes that
Halule was situated on the Tigris near Diyala which traditionally
was the south-eastern border of Assyria. If this is so, Elamite troops
would have been in a position to invade Assyria. H e concludes that
the Assyrian army was strong enough to stop the Elamite troops
and therefore that the battle of Halule was, from the Assyrian point

12
"Problematical Battles in Mesopotamian H i s t o r y " , in H G Gutersbock and
T h Jacobsen (ed ), Studies in Honor of Benno Landsberger on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday
(Chicago, 1965), pp 337-42, see also his treatment of the question in (n 11) pp
108-9
13
" S e n n a c h e r i b ' s Babylonian Problem An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , JCS 25 (1973),
p p 89-95
208 ANTTI LAATO

14
of view, indeed a victory. In my view, Saggs's interpretation is
not convincing. It seems to me that the battle of Halule is not so
much an indication that the enemy threatened to invade Assyria as
it is evidence of an Assyrian attempt to gain control over Babylonia.
As noted above, there is no indication that Babylonia was under
Assyrian control at that time. Mushezib-Marduk reigned in
Babylon and continued an anti-Assyrian policy. It seems clear that,
after having defeated Nergal-usezib, Sennacherib attempted to take
control over the whole of Babylonia. The decisive battle took place
at Halule, and there is evidence which suggests that Assyria was not
victorious there, as the Babylonian Chronicle gives us reason to
believe. Nevertheless, the subsequent historical events reveal that
the battle was not a total setback for Assyria either. It was the sud­
den death of Humban-nimena after the battle of Halule—as stated
in the Babylonian Chronicle—which inspired Sennacherib to
launch a new attempt to conquer Babylonia. O n the latter occasion
he had success.
In Sennacherib's own inscriptions the battle of Halule is depicted
as a total victory for the Assyrian army. The Chicago (and Taylor
prisms) recount numerous details relating how Mushezib-Marduk
( = Shuzubu the Chaldean) and his Elamite allies were humiliated
(iv 53-vi 35). In particular, Sennacherib mentions that he defeated
the Elamite troops in Halule (v 60-vi 35). This long description of
the military confrontation (which has parallels in other inscriptions
where the eighth campaign is reported) contains several details
which poignantly illustrate the total defeat of the Elamite troops,
e.g.: ' ' T h e i r testicles I cut off, and tore out their privates like the
seeds of cucumbers of Siwan" (vi 10-12). Further, it is mentioned
that Humban-nimena ( = Umman-menanu) escaped from the
battlefield, a detail which conflicts with the account of the Babylo­
nian Chronicle. There is reason to believe that the detail is an
obvious falsification of the historical reality, and critical readers
must interpret Sennacherib's account as a simple reference to the
departure of the Elamite troops from the battle field after the
Assyrian troops had been forced to retreat. Similar exaggerated
descriptions can be found in other inscriptions too. Perhaps the
Walters Art Gallery inscription respresents the most brutal falsifica­
tion of the course of the historical events at Halule. The inscription

14
Η W F Saggs, The Might that was Assyria (London, 1984), ρ 102
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 209

concentrates on the description of Sennacherib's military action

against Humban-nimena. In lines 11-15 we read how the Babylo-
nians request military aid from the king of Elam. Then Sen-
nacherib's defeat of Humban-nimena's father (lines 16-19) and
brother (lines 19-46) is described. After this introduction Sen-
nacherib proceeds to recount how he humiliated Humban-nimena
himself, and it is mentioned, among other things, that at Halule " I
harvested their skulls like shrivelled grain and piled (them) up into
h e a p s " (lines 112). However, Sennacherib's inscriptions provide
no clear indication that Assyria gained political control over any
(Babylonian or) Elamite territories at that time. In the light of the
account in the Babylonian Chronicle it is reasonable to suggest that
this detailed description of the battle of Halule in Sennacherib's
inscriptions attempted to veil the military defeat suffered by the
Assyria. Nevertheless, we must consider the fact that there was
some basis for Sennacherib's boasting. After all, his enemy soon
disappeared—not through the military operation of the Assyrian
army but as a result of illness.
The description of the battle of Halule in Sennacherib's own
inscriptions can be compared with Sargon's assertion that at the
beginning of his reign he was able to defeat the Elamite king, H u m -
banigash, on the plain of Dêr. 1 5 However, the Bab-Chr 1 33-5
boldly states: ' 'Humban-nikash (I), king of Elam, did battle against
Sargon (II), king of Assyria, in the district of Der, effected an
Assyrian retreat, (and) inflicted a major defeat upon t h e m . " The
historical fact that Sargon was able to defeat Merodach-baladan in
Babylon only after ten years indicates that the Babylonian Chroni-
cle gives us a more realistic description of the events (cf. Saggs [n.
14], p. 92).

Ill
In the previous section we showed that the historical accounts in
the Babylonian Chronicle differ strikingly from some of the
4
'historical" reports from Sennacherib's own annals. We saw that
15
See D . D . Luckenbill, Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia II (Chicago,
1927), pp. 26 (§ 55), 40 (§ 79 "I smashed the might of Humbanigash, the Ela-
mite"), 45 (§ 92), 61 (§ 118), 70 (§ 134 "I shattered the might of Humbanigash,
king of Elam"), 72 (§ 137 "exalted prince ( = Sargon), who came face to face with
Humbanigash, king of Elam, in the outskirts of Dêr and defeated him"), 101 (§
183). See furthr Grayson (n. 12), pp. 340-2.
210 ANTTI LAATO

at many points Sennacherib has attempted to give the impression

that his military campaigns have been successful even though he
had in fact suffered military setbacks. The fact that Sennacherib's
own inscriptions were recorded soon after the time of the military
campaigns they describe does not change their propagandistic
nature. It seems that whenever the Assyrian army suffered setbacks
they were censored or interpreted in some propagandistic and
therefore historically unreliable manner. In this section we will
present in more detail the particular literary and stylistic devices
used in Sennacherib's inscriptions when military setbacks are being
concealed.
(1) Omission of facts. A good example of omitting facts in the subse-
quent editions of Sennacherib's royal inscriptions is the case of Bel-
ibni. His appointment to the kingship of Babylonia by Sennacherib
was mentioned in the earlier inscriptions which dealt only with the
first three campaigns, but it was ignored in later editions after it
had become evident that Bel-ibni fomented a rebellion against
Assyria as the Babylonian Chronicle indicates. As a result there was
no reason to mention him in the subsequent editions, since he was
an example of an unsuccessful Assyrian policy. Another good
example from a later time is Esarhaddon's attempt to conquer
Egypt in his seventh regnal year. According to BabChr 1 iv 16 ''the
army of Assyria was defeated in Egypt". This unsuccessful cam-
paign in 673 B.C. was ommitted from Esarhaddon's own inscrip-
tions. Reports on the Egyptian campaign appear only in Esarhad-
don's inscriptions when the Assyrian army managed to gain the
upper hand. Both the Zenjirli (Borger: § 65) and Nahr el Kelb (§
67) inscriptions deal with the successful Assyrian campaign against
Egypt. 16 We have demonstrated in the previous section that on
several occasions the Assyrian inscriptions—even though they were
written soon after the events they narrate—ignore all references to
military setbacks. For example, there is no mention of the Assyrian
retreats before the forces of both Hallushu and Humban-nimena.
Therefore, when other historical sources exist, which indicate that
the Assyrian army suffered military setbacks, we must carefully

16
See R Borger, Die Inschriften Asarhaddons Königs von Assyrien (AfO Beiheft 9
(Graz 1956) For more detailed discussion see A Spahnger, "Esarhaddon and
Egypt An Analysis of the First Invasion of E g y p t " , Onentaha NS 43 (1974), pp
295-326
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 211

consider the possibility that these sources contain correctives to the

one-sided descriptions of Assyrian sources.
(2) Combination of different viewpoints which are presented to give the reader
the impression that the Assyrian army was victorious. A typical example
is the Walters Art Gallery inscription which concentrates on the
unsuccessful Assyrian military operation against Elam at the plain
of Halule during the time of Humban-nimena. In order to give the
reader the impression that the Assyrian army had been victorious,
this military operation was connected with previous succesful cam-
paigns against Elam in the time of Humban-nimena's father (i-na
tar-si mHal-lu-si abi-sú, line 16) and brother (i-na tar-si mKu-du-ri ahi-
sú, line 19). By means of this rhetorical strategy the reader is led
to think that Humban-nimena was the third unsuccessful represen-
tative of the royal dynasty in Elam. It is worth noting that this
inscription was intended to be read publicly already during the time
of Sennacherib, because it was written on stone and not buried in
the building foundation.
In the Bavian inscription we find an artificial explanation for
Sennacherib's "victory" at the plain of Halule. He notes that the
king of Elam and the king of Babylon escaped from the battlefield
(lines 37-9) " a n d they did not come back" (lines 40). Sennacherib
became angry apparently because his enemies were so cowardly
that they shunned fighting (lines 40-2). Sennacherib concludes:
" T o the day of their death they did not come out nor did they make
w a r " (lines 42-3). What Sennacherib says here may partially allude
to an historical event: the king of Elam died soon after he had
forced Assyria into retreat. This made the revenge of Assyria possi-
ble and ultimately led to the destruction of Babylon. The Bavian
inscription continues: " I n my second campaign I advanced swiftly
against Babylon . . . " (line 43). From an historical point of view
Sennacherib's account appears to constitute a propagandistic
falsification. He avoids speaking of an obvious Assyrian military
setback and instead interprets an historical event, namely the illness
of the king of Elam, as an Assyrian victory at Halule.
Another good illustration is Sennacherib's own account of his
sixth campaign against Elam. In the final versions (Chicago and
Taylor prisms) Sennacherib appears to assert that he had succeeded
in dethroning Nergal-ushezib from his reign in Babylon when he
was returning from his victorious campaign against Elam. How-
ever, when we read the Bull inscription (Bull 4), which apparently
212 ANTTI LAATO

was written soon after the sixth campaign, we find no mention of

the dethronement of Nergal-ushezib. O n the contrary, Sennacherib
repeats accounts of his victory in Nagitu, Nagitu-di'bina, Hilmu,
Billatu and Hupapanu several times and ends his account by referr-
ing to this same victory (see lines 48-51, 57, 80-6, 95-6). There is
no reference to the subsequent military setback when Hallusu,
according to the Babylonian Chronicle, effected an Assyrian
retreat. When Sennacherib in the final versions boasts that he
dethroned Nergal-ushezib and defeated the king of Elam, he com-
bines subsequent military operations with his sixth campaign in an
historically unreliable way. Nergal-ushezib was not dethroned until
a later military operation, and the king of Elam was defeated in a
domestic rebellion in Elam which subsequently provoked a new
Assyrian military (apparently relatively restricted) operation in the
districts of Elam.
(3) Boasting which lacks concrete reference to political hegemony. The best
example is Sennacherib's "victory" at the plain of Halule. The
first reports of this battle are relatively brief. We have already seen
how Sennacherib in the Bavian inscription (lines 35-43) avoids
speaking of his military setback but boasts that he has been vic-
torious over the king who had escaped from the battlefield and did
not wish to battle again. In the Nebi Yunus inscription Sennacherib
boasts that he put to the sword 150,000 warriors, and that the
enemy kings fled from the battlefield (lines 47-55). A similar
explanation can be found in the Slab inscription (lines 13-21). The
most detailed descriptions of the battle are found in the Chicago
and Taylor Prisms as well as in the Walters Art Gallery inscription.
The Chicago and Taylor Prisms contain a lengthy description of
Sennacherib's eighth campaign (v 17-vi 35). In that description
many details—which apparently are connected with historical
reality in some way—have been collected and used to give the
impression that the Assyrian army had been victorious at the plain
of Halule. These details include: Sennacherib's request for divine
empowerment (v 62-77), the capture of one high official of the king
of Elam (v 82-8), the killing of enemies in battle (vi 1-10),17 the
slaughtering of some enemies who had been captured (vi 10-12),
the collection of gold daggers of some soldiers (vi 14-16), the disap-

17
Of course, the Assyrians also inflicted military losses on the Elamite and
Babylonian troops at Halule
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 213

pearance of the enemey kings from the battlefield, which is inter-

preted as a sign of military defeat in the face of the Assyrian army
(vi 16-35). In spite of this detailed description there is no mention
of any concrete political hegemony which Sennacherib should have
gained in Babylonia or Elam. In the light of the Babylonian
Chronicle the lack of concrete political success should be taken as
an indication that the Assyrian army suffered a setback. A similar
exaggerated description of the battle at Halule can be found in the
Walters Art Gallery inscription.
(4) Aggressive presentation of enemies. A peculiar feature of Sen-
nacherib's annals is the use of demeaning references to enemies
who have caused him difficulty. In the Walters Art Gallery inscrip-
tion Humban-nimena is called " a rash fellow who had neither
insight nor counsel" (lines 15-16). The Chicago and Taylor Prisms
pronounce against his capacity for sound judgement in a similar
way: " w h o possessed neither sense nor j u d g e m e n t " (v 14-15, 33-
4), while the Slab inscription asserts that he " h a d not any sense"
(Rev. line 6). Mushezib-Marduk ( = Shuzubu, the Chaldean) who
together with the Elamite kings was a source of great problems for
Sennacherib is called " a weakling hero, who had no knees, a slave,
subject to the governor of the city of Lahiri" (v 20-2). It is worth
noting that Sennacherib normally refers to his military opponents
using conventional phrases such as " t h e king of L N " , especially
when he has won a great victory over them. A reading of Sen-
nacherib's inscriptions suggests that the frequent occurrence of per-
jorative adjectives and attributions is connected only with those
enemies who have caused significant military problems for the king
of Assyria.

IV
Sennacherib's account of his third campaign in Palestine con-
tains propagandistic literary and stylistic devices similar to those
noted above in section III. Accounts of this third campaign are also
given in several of Sennacherib's annals.
According to the Chicago (and Taylor) Prisms, Sennacherib's
third campaign was directed at Palestine. First, he overthrew King
Luli of Sidon, who fled to Cyprus without resisting. Next came the
battle of Eltekeh, at which the rebels, who were supported by Egyp-
tian and Ethiopian troops, were put down. Thereafter, Sen-
214 ANTTI LAATO

nacherib rushed to attack Philistia and J u d a h . He says that he con­

quered 46 fortified cities of J u d a h and many small villages and gave
them, or some of them, to the princes of Philistia. Hezekiah himself
took refuge in Jerusalem, which was soon besieged by the
Assyrians. Sennacherib does not mention conquering Jerusalem.
O n the other hand, he claims to have exiled 200,150 citizens of
J u d a h . As a conclusion to his account of the third campaign he
describes how Hezekiah sent great tribute to the Assyrian king at
Nineveh. Sennacherib describes the " s i e g e " of Jerusalem as
follows (iii 27-49): "Himself, I made a prisoner in Jerusalem, his
royal residence, like a bird in a cage. I surrounded him with earth­
work in order to molest those who were leaving his city's gate . .
Hezekiah himself, whom the terror-inspiring splendor of my lord­
ship had overwhelmed and whose irregular and elite troops which
he had brought into Jerusalem, his royal residence, in order to
strengthen (it), had deserted him, did send me later, to Nineveh,
my lordly city, together with 30 talents of gold, 800 talents of silver,
... In order to deliver the tribute and to do obeisance as a slave he
sent his (personal) messenger" (ANET, p. 288).
Sennacherib's third campaign is also mentioned in several other
inscriptions. The oldest literary source for Sennacherib's third
18
campaign is his " L e t t e r to G o d " . This inscription, which is not
preserved in its entirety, was, according to N. N a ' a m a n , made
public shortly after the end of Sennacherib's campaign. The letter
tells of his recapture of G a t h 1 9 and Asheka, which Hezekiah had
taken during his rebellion (cf. 2 Kgs xviii 6-8). The account in the
Rassam cychnder is largely similar to that of the Chicago and
Taylor Prisms. This text contains a slightly different version of
Hezekiah's tribute which he sent to the Assyrian king at Nineveh.
Bull 4 (lines 18-32) follows the same lines as the Chicago (and
Taylor) Prisms, though somewhat more briefly. The shorter Bull
inscription does not deal with the fourth campaign against Babylon
in 700. Of his opponents in the Palestine campaign Sennacherib

18
T h e text has been published by Ν N a ' a m a n , " S e n n a c h e r i b ' s 'Letter to G o d '
on his C a m p a i g n to J u d a h " , BASOR 214 (1974), pp 25-39
19
T h e n a m e " G a t h " is not cleary preserved in the text, but is a possible recon­
struction This letter serves to explain the difficult passage in Micah ι 10, where
the prophet laments the fate of Gath Sometimes commentaries solve the problem
of why Micah bemoans the fate of Gath in addition to the cities of J u d a h by sugge­
sting a conjecture See e g J L Mays, Micah (London, 1976), ρ 53
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 215

mentions only two: King Luli of Sidon, and Hezekiah of J u d a h .

Sennacherib describes Hezekiah rather brusquely (lines 20-2); " I
laid waste the large district of J u d a h and made the overbearing and
proud Hezekiah, its king, bow in submission" (ANET, p. 228). It
is remarkable that the shorter Bull inscriptions does not mention
the victory at the battle of Eltekeh (the defeat of Egypt and
Ethiopia). The Nebi Yunus Inscription does not mention Sen-
nacherib's fourth campaign against Babylon either. Again, only
King Luli of Sidon and Hezekiah of J u d a h are mentioned as the
main opponents in the third campaign (lines 13-15). Finally, we
can also mention the famous Lachish reliefs in Sennacherib's palace
at Nineveh, which were discovered in the middle of the 19th cen-
tury by A . H . Layard. 2 0 They depict the Assyrian army's attack on
the town of Lachish along siege ramps, and the surrender of the
town, as well as the presentation of the spoils before Sennacherib
as he sits on his throne. The text on these reliefs reads: "Sen-
nacherib, king of the world, king of Assyria, sit upon a nîmedu-
throne and passed in review the booty (taken) from Lachish (La-ki-
su)" (ANET, p. 288).
In studying the historical value of the information in the Assyrian
annals it should be noted that two other sources, the biblical texts
(2 Kgs xviii 17 ff. =Isa. xxxvi: 2 ff.) and Herodotus (II 141)
indicate that the Assyrian army suffered defeat in its campaign in
the West (against Palestine and Egypt). Given this evidence, we
must carefully scrutinize Sennacherib's account with a view to
determining which claims in fact attempt to transform military set-
backs into victories by means of rhetoric.

1. The first problem encountered in reading the account of this

third campaign is the question why Sennacherib suddenly returned
to Nineveh. What caused this sudden withdrawal from Jerusalem?
Sennacherib does not say. Instead, he goes on to tell how Hezekiah
sent a great tribute after him to Nineveh. Attemps have been made
to explain this swift withdrawal to Nineveh by claiming that
Merodach-baladan was causing unrest in Babylon and so Sen-
nacherib had to hasten back to his capital. But the fourth campaign,
in Babylon in 700, probably caused no great problems for Sen-
nacherib. According to the Chicago and Taylor Prisms, Sen-
20
Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan
and the Desert (London, 1853), pp 149 ff
216 ANTTI LAATO

nacherib easily gained the upper hand over his enemy Merodach-
baladan, since the latter fled without attempting to engage the
Assyrian army (according to Bab-Chr 1 ii 26-31 Sennacherib was
victorious). That may also be the reason why he does not mention
this campaign at all in the shorter version of the Bull inscription or
in the Nebi Yunus Inscription. The threat from Babylon does not
seem to have been great in 700. It is also worth noting that the
Rassam cyclinder from the year 700 does not mention this fourth
campaign at all. So it would seem that it was not militarily
necessary for Sennacherib to hurry from Palestine to quell a new
rebellion in Babylon. Otherwise, he would likely have included
some note to that effect on the Rassam Cyclinder such as ' O n my
return I defeated Merodach-baladan again . . . " (cf. the phrase
"Sennacherib went down to A k k a d " in BabChr 1 ii 26-7 which—
even though it is stereotypical—indicates that the Assyrian army
came from Assyria and not from Palestine).
Could perhaps the great tribute which Hezekiah paid be
intended to placate Sennacherib, so that he would leave J u d a h and
Jerusalem in peace? Theoretically speaking it is possible. However,
Sennacherib does not say that the great tribute which the main
rebel Hezekiah sent to him was paid to procure an Assyrian retreat.
Rather, it seems that Sennacherib simply ends his account by refer­
ring to the tribute of Hezekiah sent to Nineveh in order to give the
impression that his military campaign against Hezekiah had ended
successfully (see below).
T h e biblical sources refer to a second attack by the Egyptian and
Ethiopian armies against the Assyrian army (2 Kgs xix 8; Isa.
xxxvii 9). However, 2 Kgs xviii 17 ff.// Isa xxxvi-xxxvii seem to
represent a conflation of two independent traditions, 2 1 which make
this supposed second Egyptian invasion improbable. In my view,
the explanation that the Egyptian and Ethiopian armies forced Sen­
nacherib to leave Jerusalem in peace seems artificial, since they
were already fighting against Assyria at Eltekeh where they suffered
defeat. Y. Aharoni has suggested that the battle of Eltekeh took
place only after the invasion of J u d a h . 2 2 This theory can hardly be
right, for the following reasons:

21
Cf my literary-critical approach to Isa xxxvi-xxxvii // 2 Kgs xvin-xix, which
differs from the usual approaches Laato, Immanuel (η 1), p p 271-81
22
The Land of the Bible A Historical Geography (2nd edn , Philadelphia and Lon­
don, 1979), p p 388-9
 ASSYRIAN P R O P A G A N D A 217

(a) Sennacherib's own accounts emphasize that the battle of Eltekeh

was fought before the invasion of J u d a h , and that Egypt and
Ethiopia fought there together with Hezekiah's troops and the
Philistines: " T h e y < t h e officials, nobles and people of Ekron and
Hezekiah > had become afraid and had called (for help) upon the
kings of Egypt (Musuri) (and) the bowmen, the chariot (-corps) and
the cavalry of the king of Ethiopia (Meluh^a), and army beyond
counting—and they (actually) had come to their assistance. In the
plain of Eltekeh (Al-ta-qu-u), their battle lines were drawn up
against me and they sharpened their w e a p o n s " (ANET, p . 287).
This would hardly have been said if the lands of J u d a h and Philistia
had been invaded before the battle of Eltekeh. Philistia and J u d a h
simply could not have fought at Eltekeh if Sennacherib had first
destroyed them.
(b) Three prophetic oracles in Isa. xxx 1-5, 15-17, xxxi 1-3 are often
regarded as originating from the prophet Isaiah. If this is the case,
then they indicate that men from J u d a h were present at the battle
of Eltekeh. According to Isa. xxx 1-5, J u d a h planned its revolt with
Egyptian support. Isa. xxx 15-17 is Isaiah's pronouncement of
judgement on the Judaeans who wished to fight with horses, a fact
which indicates aid from Egypt // Ethiopia. Their armies included
large cavalry and charioteer divisions as indicated in Sennacherib's
inscriptions. Isaiah predicts that J u d a h will suffer defeat in the com­
ing battle. Isa. xxxi 1-3 is best explained as having been composed
after the battle of Eltekeh. It is still clear here that J u d a h is to expect
hard times when Assyria, in all probability, invades J u d a h the next
time (see Isa. xxxi 3 ) . 2 3
In summary, we may conclude that Sennacherib seems to veil the
reason behind his sudden withdrawal from his campaign in J u d a h .
No adequate explanation has been put forward for the withdrawal
of the Assyrian army.
2. Another problem is the payment of tribute. In his annals, Sen­
nacherib emphasizes that Hezekiah sent great tribute to him in
Nineveh. 2 Kgs xviii 14-16 also deals with Hezekiah's payment of
tribute. 2 4 T h e biblical context indicates that Hezekiah sent this

23
See the more detailed interpretation of these texts in Laato, I m m a n u e l (η.
1), p p . 218-25, and the literature cited there.
24
Often, scholars suggest that 2 Kgs xvii 14-16 (or xviii 13-16) is a reliable
J u d e a n source—based on some annalistic source—which corroborates the account
218 ANTTI LAATO

tribute to Lachish. It is worth noting that Sennacherib's own

accounts also indicate that Hezekiah sent a mission to Sennacherib
while Assyria was still pillaging in J u d a h . The king of Assyria
relates that he released the former king of Ekron, Padi, from
Jerusalem and returned him to his throne in Ekron. This would
have been possible only if Hezekiah had been willing to surrender
to the Assyrian king. In connection with the release of Padi,
Hezekiah presumably also paid tribute to Sennacherib, as is
indicated in 2 Kgs xviii 14-16. Sennacheribs reports: " I made Padi,
their king, come from Jerusalem (Ur-sa-h-im-mu) and set him as
their lord on the throne, imposing upon him the tribute (due) to me
(as) overlord" (ANET, p. 288). Theoretically speaking, it is possi­
ble that Hezekiah paid tribute in two instalments: first, in J u d a h
in connection with the release of king Padi. However, Sennacherib
was not satisfied with this tribute, and demanded the surrender of
Jerusalem, to which Hezekiah would not agree. The siege of
Jerusalem began, and some factor or factors led to Sennacherib
giving up the siege. H e returned to Nineveh, whither Hezekiah
sent another tribute, pledging his allegiance But it is also possible
that Sennacherib refers to the first yearly tribute which Hezekiah
sent to him in Nineveh. In any case, the fact that Sennacherib ends
his own account by referring to the tribute of Hezekiah which had
been sent later to Nineveh indicates that Sennacherib wanted to
give the impression that his campaign in J u d a h had been suc­
cessfully concluded, even though Hezekiah, the main rebel, wras not
dethroned.
3. A third problem is how it was possible at all for Hezekiah to con­
tinue as king of J u d a h . King Luli of Sidon was replaced by
T u b ' a l u ; King Sidqia of Ashkelon was deported. Why did
Hezekiah remain on the throne, even though he was one of the
25
main instigators of the rebellion? Both archaeology and historical
sources clearly indicate that Sennacherib wanted thoroughly to
destroy J u d a h . It seems incredible that Sennacherib, who had con-

of Sennacherib's own inscriptions This view is partly right, but as I have demon­
strated 2 Kgs xviii 14-16 is not complete and does not give any leason for the with­
drawal of the Assyrian army See Laato, Immanuel (η 1), pp 281-3
25
Concerning the archaeological data see D Ussishikin, " T h e Destruction of
Lachish by Sennacherib and the Dating of the Royal J u d e a n Storage J a r s ' ' , Tel
Aviv 4 (1977), pp 28-60, N a ' a m a n (n 1), pp 61-86, Laato, Immanuel (η 1), pp
251-60
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 219

quered almost all the fortified towns of J u d a h , would have been

satisfied to leave Jerusalem and Hezekiah in peace without
demanding that the gates of Jerusalem be opened to the Assyrian
army. That Hezekiah, one of the main rebels, was not willing to
open the gates of Jerusalem to Sennacherib is a clear indication that
he was not prepared to submit unconditionally to Assyrian rule.
What we can read from Sennacherib's own account is only that he
shut Hezekiah up in Jerusalem "like a caged b i r d " , and then sud-
denly the account presupposes that Sennacherib is back in Niniveh
receiving the great tribute which was sent to him from J u d a h .

4. One should also note the precision with which Sennacherib

describes the humiliation of Hezekiah compared with that of other
kings. He gives a precise account of how many cities he conquered
and how much tribute he received from Hezekiah. There is cer-
tainly a flavour of exaggeration when Sennacherib says that he
deported 200,150 residents from J u d a h (the Chicago and Taylor
Prisms iii 24 and the Rassam cyclinder). That such an inordinately
high number of exiles appear already in the Rassam Cyclinder,
written in 700 B.C., soon after the battle, indicates that Sen-
nacherib has resorted to propaganda in order to bolster his cam-
paign. This high number can be compared with the report that Sen-
nacherib slaughtered 150,000 Elamite (and Babylonian) soldiers in
his campaign at Halule.
5. Finally, we should also consider the disparaging and bitter terms
used to describe Hezekiah, such as "Hezekiah, the J e w " (the
Chicago and Taylor Prism ii 76, iii, 18 and the Rassam Cylinder)
and " t h e strong, proud Hezekiah" (shorter Bull Inscription). The
epithet "Hezekiah, the J e w " can be compared to the more conven-
tional epithets for other kings: "Sidqia, king of Ashkelon", "Luli,
king of Sidon" (the Chicago and Taylor Prisms and the Rassam
Cyclinder). The mention of the name Hezekiah seems to arouse in
Sennacherib a certain aggressiveness, so that he cannot speak of
him in a respectful way as he does of his other enemies.
We have seen that the annals of Sennacherib do not clearly state
why the siege of Jerusalem was suspended. Everything indicates
that Sennacherib wanted to conquer Jerusalem and remove
Hezekiah, who was not willing to open the gates of Jerusalem. In
fact, Sennacherib did not achieve his goal, but had to abandon the
siege of Jerusalem. These circumstances prompt us to ask whether
220 ANTTI LAATO

Sennacherib attempted to veil some setback which the Assyrian

army had suffered. In the light of the four criteria established in sec-
tion III we note that Sennacherib's account of his third campaign
contains stylistic devices similar to those which have been used
when an apparent military setback is being concealed. First, we
may note that Sennacherib circumvents explaining his reasons for
the withdrawing the Assyrian army and why the main rebel,
Hezekiah, had been allowed to continue as king in Jerusalem
(criterion 1). Second, Sennacherib ends his account by referring to
Hezekiah's great tribute, indicating an attempt to give the impres-
sion that his campaign against J u d a h had ended successfully. Thus
Sennacherib combines a later historical event (the tribute sent to
Nineveh) with his earlier military campaign (criterion 2). Third, we
should mention some exaggerated claims in Sennacherib's account
of the number of exiles, 200,150. Nevertheless, Sennacherib's
boasting, fictitious as it is, relates to his claims to political
hegemony. So we have no reason to suggest that Sennacherib's
campaign was totally unsuccessful. Nevertheless, we have reason to
believe that he tried to veil the setback which had forced his retreat
to Nineveh (cf. criterion 3). Finally, we have seen that Sennacherib
uses pejorative adjectives and attributes to describe Hezekiah
(criterion 4).
We are now ready to deal with the other historical sources which
refer to Sennacherib's third campaign.

V
In his own historical writings, Herodotus (484?-424?) sought to
chronicle the causes behind the Persian Wars. 2 6 In his view, the
reader must become aware of the living conditions and culture of
the whole Eastern world in order to comprehend these causes.
Therefore, in his book he presents a very broad picture of the cul-
ture and history of ancient Persia, the Near East and Egypt. In his

26
"Wollen wir selber präzisieren, was Herodot bei semer historié vorgeschwebt
hat, so müssen wir sagen Sein Ziel ist die Geschichte der Perserkriege und der
Vorgange, die als " U r s a c h e n " auf diese hinfuhren Aber zum Verständnis dieser
Kampfe ist es fur seine griechischen Leser notwendig, die ganze östliche Volker-
welt mit ihren physischen Lebendingungen und ihren kulturellen Lebensentfal-
tung kennen zu l e r n e n " M Pohlenz, Heorodot Der Erste Geschichtschreiber des Abend-
landes (Stuttgart, 1961), ρ 89
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 221

d e s c r i p t i o n of E g y p t i a n h i s t o r y , H e r o d o t u s m e n t i o n s a m y s t e r i o u s
defeat suffered b y S e n n a c h e r i b ' s a r m y at P e l u s i u m ( I I , 141). T h e
b r o a d e r context of this passage is I I , 9 9 - 1 4 2 , w h e r e H e r o d o t u s cites
tales told b y E g y p t i a n priests.
T h e next king, I was told, was a priest of Vulcan, called Sethôs. This
monarch despised and neglected the warrior class of the Egyptians,
as though he did not need their services. Among other indignities
which he offered them, he took from them the lands which they had
possessed under all the previous kings, consisting of twelve acres of
choice land for each warrior. Afterwards, therefore, when Sennache-
rib, king of the Arabians and Assyrians, marched his vast army into
Egypt, the warriors one and all refused to come to his aid. O n this
the monarch, greatly distressed, entered into the inner sanctuary,
and, before the image of the god, bewailed the fate which impended
over him. As he wept he fell asleep, and dreamed that the god came
and stood at his side, bidding him be of good cheer, and go boldly
forth to meet the Arabian host, which would do him no hurt, as he
himself would send those who should help him. Sethôs, then, relying
on the dream, collected such of the Egyptians as were willing to follow
him, who were none of them warriors, but traders, artisans, and mar-
ket people; and with these marched to Pelusium, which commands
the entrance into Egypt, and there pitched his camp. As the two
armies lay here opposite one another, there came in the night, a mul-
titude of field-mice, which devoured all the quivers and bowstrings
of the enemy, and ate the thongs by which they managed their
shields. Next morning then commenced their fight, and great multi-
tudes fell, as they had no arms with which to defend themselves.
There stands to this day in the temple of Vulcan, a stone statue of
Sethôs, with a mouse in his hand, and an inscription of this effect—
" L o o k on me, and learn to reverence the gods". 2 7

T h i s story h a s m o s t likely b e e n p r e s e r v e d fairly precisely in t h e

form in w h i c h t h e E g y p t i a n priests told it. T h o u g h it c o n t a i n s
l e g e n d a r y features ( e . g . , d e s t r u c t i o n b y field m i c e ) , it c o n t a i n s t w o
i n t e r e s t i n g details:

1. N e i t h e r M a n e t h o n o r t h e E g y p t i a n inscriptions c o n t a i n t h e n a m e
S e t h ô s (cf. Contra Apionem I, 15). H o w e v e r , t h e n a m e Sanakharibos
clearly refers to t h e A s s y r i a n k i n g S e n n a c h e r i b . T h i s b e i n g t h e case,
it is likely t h a t t h e l e g e n d refers to S e n n a c h e r i b ' s t h i r d c a m p a i g n ,

27
The translation is from "The History of Herodotus", Great Books of the
Western World 6: Herodotus, Thukydides (Chicago, 1980), p. 79.
222 ANTTI LAATO

where his opponents were Egypt and Ethiopia, among others.

However, neither Assyrian nor Old Testament sources indicate
that Assyrian troops attempted to invade Egypt (see, however, a
poetical expression about the hybris of Sennacherib in Isa. xxxvii
24-5).
2. This legend is in a sense parallel with the Old Testament narra­
tive 2 Kgs xviii 17 ff. ( = Isa. xxxvi 2 ff.). Both speak of a myste­
rious setback suffered by Sennacherib's army. The Old Testament
story of the angel who destroys the army (2 Kgs xix 35) is most
likely a theological portrayal of destruction caused by a plague, as
indicated in 2 Sam. xxiv 15-16 and Ps. lxxviii 49-50 (cf. also Amos
iv 10). The destruction by field mice mentioned in Herodotus per­
haps also depicts a plague. Some Greek texts refer to this (such as
Iliad i 8-62), and 1 Sam. v-vi, in which mice were believed to
spread disease. Though Herodotus II 141 is rightly described as a
legend, the possibility cannot be ruled out that such a story, which
circulated among Egyptian priests, contained some traces of the
actual historical events, such as the destruction of Sennacherib's
army by plague. The pre-Hellenic god Apollo Smintheus was the
ascribed origin of the feared scourges of mice or of other epidemics.
(Field)mice were regarded as animals dedicated to him. The name
Smintheus is in fact etymologically dervied from the word µυς
( = mouse). It was perhaps the Philistines who brought the worship
of Smintheus to Asia, the mouse-sacrifice in 1 Sam. v-vi for the
destruction wrought by disease is probably a sign of the worship of
28
Apollo Smintheus among the Philistines. It is possible that Egypt,
as Philistia's neighbour, was influenced by the latter's worship of
Apollo Smintheus. So it is reasonable to assume that even in Egypt
the mouse was used as a symbol of the spread of disease and
destruction. 2 9
In examining the historical value of the story preserved by Hero­
dotus, the following facts should be borne in mind:
(a) It is a legend preserved among Egyptian priests, completely

28
See Burchner, " S m i n t h e , S m i n t h o s " , Paulys Real-Encyclopadie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft 2 Reihe III/l (Stuttgart, 1927), cols 724-5 G A W a m w n g h t ,
" S o m e early Philistine history", VT 9 (1959). 73-84, esp 77-8, J Β Geyer!
" M i c e and rites in 1 Samuel v-vi" VT 31 (1981), pp 293-304
29
Cf L L Honor, Sennacherib's Invasion of Palestine A Critical Source Study (New
York, 1926), pp 58-60
 ASSYRIAN P R O P A G A N D A 223

independent of the Old Testament story (2 Kgs xviii 17 ff. ; Isa.

xxxvi 1 ff.).
(b) It supports the Old Testament story in that the Assyrian
army—even in Sennacherib's time—is said to have suffered a
mysterious defeat in the military campaign directed at Pale­
stine/Egypt.

VI

Several scholars have discussed the nature of the so-called Isaiah

legend in 2 Kgs xviii 17-xix 36 // Isa. xxxvi-xxxvii and shown that
many features of this text correspond well to the historical circum­
30
stances of the time of Isaiah. The only detail in the biblical des­
cription which is obviously unhistorical is the exaggerated number
of the Assyrian soldiers whom " t h e angel o f Y H W H " destroyed.
As we know from other biblical and ancient Near Eastern sources,
such numbers may differ greatly from one version to another. If we
assume that a large number like 185,000 is an absurd exaggeration
(which originates from the subsequent transmission of the tradi­
tion) and that the biblical account together with Herodotus provi­
des an account about the bubonic plague or some other disease
which forced the Assyrian army to retreat from its campaign in
J u d a h , it is not difficult to solve the problems which Sennacherib's
own accounts present.
Sennacherib's campaign began with an attack on King Luli of
Sidon. But there was no battle, for Luli fled to Cyprus from his
capital, Tyre. Sennacherib relates in the Chicago prism that there­
after Lull's cities of " G r e a t S i d o n " (Tyre) and "Little S i d o n "
(Sidon), as well as Bit-zitti, Zaribtu, Mahalliba, Ushu, Achzib and
Akko, gave in to him without a struggle. When Luli had fled to
Cyprus, the kings of Amurru, namely the kings of Shamsimuruna,
Sidon, Arvad, Byblos, Ammon, Moab and Edom, made haste to
pay tribute to Sennacherib. Sennacherib appointed king T u b ' a l u of
Sidon to the throne instead of Luli, apparently because T u b ' a l u
had shown allegiance by paying tribute to the Assyrian king. There-

30
See e g H o n o r (η 29), Η Wildberger, " D i e Rede des Rabsake vor Jerusa­
l e m " , ThZ 35 (1979), pp 35-47, idem, Jesaja 28-39, E Vogt, Der Aufstand Hiskias
und die Belagerung Jerusalems 701 ν Chr ( R o m e , 1986) Laato, Immanuel (n 1), pp
271-96
224 ANTTI LAATO

after, Sennacherib conquered the cities taken by king Sidqia of

Ashkelon, namely Beth-Dagon, J o p p a , Banaibarka and Asuru.
Another phase of the campaign which was decisive took place on
the battlefield near the town of Eltekeh, where the Egyptian and
Ethiopian cavalry had come under the command of Tirhakah (see
31
Isa. xxxvii 9 ) to aid J u d a h , the Ekronites and probably
32
Ashkelon as well. At Eltekeh the united army of the rebelling sta­
tes was routed. The Chicago prism tells us that Sennacherib took
as prisoners the Egyptian charioteers and princes as well as the
Ethiopian charioteers. Isa. xxxi 1-3 can be seen as confirming the
great victory of Assyria.
After the battle of Eltekeh Sennacherib probably divided his
army into two divisions, for no great resistance was expected from
either Philistia or J u d a h . O n e division of the army marched
33
towards Ashkelon, and the other, under Sennacherib's command,
towards Eltekeh and T i m n a h . Having taken these two towns, the
Assyrian king departed for Ekron. When the city was overwhel­
med, a bloodbath began; all Sennacherib's opponents were killed.
This is a good illustration of the cruelty with which Sennacherib
dealt with his foes. In connection with the conquest of Ekron, Sen­
nacherib relates that he brought Padi from Jerusalem and set him
on the throne of Ekron. But this could not have happened before
Hezekiah was willing to surrender, i.e., only when Sennacherib
was outside Lachish (2 Kgs xviii 14-16).
After Ekron Sennacherib finally turned his gaze towards J u d a h .
It is possible that Sennacherib also divided his army on this occa­
sion. According to the ' 'letter to G o d " in the annals, he first took
Asheka and Gath. After the surrender of these towns, the way to
Lachish and the other towns of J u d a h was open. Hezekiah sent
word to the Assyrian king in Lachish that he wished to surrender
and would pay whatever was required (2 Kgs xviii 14-16). Senna-

31
Concerning xxxvii 9 and its connection with the earlier traditions see my
literary-critical analysis in Laato, Immanuel (η 1), pp 271-81
32
Ashkelon was probably present at the battle of Eltekeh, since its king did not
want to surrender to Sennacherib
33
In the Chicago and Taylor Prisms Sennacherib mentions how, before the
conquest of these towns, he seized Ashkelon But this does not mean that Ashkelon
was taken soon after Sidon T h e conquest of Ashkelon is mentioned because, after
the conquest of Sidon, Sennacherib seized those towns near Sidon which Sidqia
had taken Cf Vogt (η 38), p p 17-18
 ASSYRIAN PROPAGANDA 225

cherib required a great tribute of the king of J u d a h , and Hezekiah

sent it to Lachish. At this time he also handed over the former king
of Ekron, Padi, whom the Ekronites had imprisoned and sent to
Hezekiah, to be kept in Jerusalem. Apparently, Sennacherib was
not satisfied with the tribute he received, but demanded that the
gates of Jerusalem be openend to the Assyrian army. T o force
Hezekiah to open the gates of Jerusalem to the Assyrian army, he
dispatched a large force under the command of his chief officier
( = Rabshakeh) to the Jerusalem area while he himself stayed to
conquer the Shephelah area. It is possible that at some stage the
Edomites attacked the Negeb in revenge for Hezekiah's seizure of
the hills of Seir (1 Chr. iv 41). 34
When it was clear that Sennacherib would not agree to leave
Jerusalem in peace, but had sent a great army of conquest to Jeru-
salem and its environs, the Jerusalemites began to panic. They
must have heard of what Sennacherib had done to the Ekronites.
Thus, for the leaders of Jerusalem the future did not appear bright.
For this reason many of Hezekiah's troops fled and were taken pri-
soner by the Assyrians (cf. Isa. xxii 3). Hezekiah himself stayed
with the faithful, under siege in Jerusalem, awaiting salvation.
What happened after this is not entirely clear. It is known that the
Assyrian army was never able to conquer Jerusalem, though eve-
rything indicates that Sennacherib set out with a firm intention to
annihlate the capital of J u d a h as well. The Assyrian army's with-
drawal from Jerusalem can best be explained by a plague breaking
out in the army and devastating its ranks. 3 5 As a result the army
was not able to maintain its siege positions. When Sennacherib
heard of this catastrophe, he was forced to return to his own land
and leave J u d a h in peace. Isa. xxii 2 may also indicate that the pla-
gue broke out in Jerusalem too. Here Isaiah refers to the many
Jerusalemites who died during the siege, though not pierced by the
sword. This cannot imply starvation, because the siege was of short

34
Edom attacked J u d a h in 588-6, taking advantage of its decline by plundering
its towns as indicated by Obadiah
35
W e may ask if tradition, Isa xxxvii 24 and Herodotus II, 141 are sufficient
evidence for the view that Sennacherib also tried unsuccessfully to conquer Egypt
in 701 If such a campaign was under way a plague may have swept through Sen-
nacherib's camp, which was on the road to Egypt In any case it is clear that such
a catastrophe was taken as a sign from the gods that it was time to stop the
campaign
226 ANTTI LAATO

duration and Isa. xxii 12-14 clearly shows that the Jerusalemites
had sufficient food. O n the other hand, some disease (like a plague)
may well have caused this mortality. In that case v. 2 lends support
to the view that a plague swept through Jerusalem and the Assyrian
camp in 701 and forced Sennacherib to return to Nineveh.
As a result, Sennacherib reorganized the governments of Phili-
stia and J u d a h , handing over to the Philistine princes those towns
which Hezekiah had captured in Philistia and probably also the
Shephelah region. In order to ensure that Sennacherib would not
return later and seize Jerusalem, Hezekiah sent a great tribute to
Nineveh (with his first annual payment of tax?!) to assure Senna-
cherib of his allegiance. Thus Sennacherib may have left Hezekiah
on the throne, saving face in so doing. In spite of the destruction
wrought by the plague, he had good reason to boast in his annals
of how greatly he had humilated the proud king of J u d a h , ending
his account with the great tribute paid by Hezekiah.
O u r examination in this article should give a new impulse, for
Old Testament scholars at least, to re-evaluate their attitude to
historical propaganda which orignates from ancient Iraq.
 ^ s
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