FIRST DIVISION

ESTATE OF FELOMINA G.R. No. 156809

G. MACADANGDANG,
represented by Court Appointed Present:
Administrator ATTY. OSWALDO
MACADANGDANG, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioner, CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION,* JJ.

LUCIA GAVIOLA,
AGAPITO ROMERO,
CRISTINA QUIONES,
BOY LAURENTE,
AGUSTINA TUNA,
SOTERO TAPON,
BUENAVENTURA MURING, SR.,
ROGELIO PASAJE,
FE TUBORO, ESTANISLAO PEN,
PABLO NAVALES, and Promulgated:
JOSE DAGATAN,
Respondents. March 4, 2009
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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 July 2002 Decision [1] and
the 10 December 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62002.

The Antecedent Facts

On 18 January 2000, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty. Macadangdang), acting

as administrator of the Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang (petitioner), filed an
action for Unlawful Detainer with Damages against Lucia Gaviola, Agapito
Romero, Cristina Quiones, Boy Laurente, Agustina Tuna, Sotero Tapon,
Buenaventura Muring, Sr., Rogelio Pasaje, Fe Tuboro, Estanislao Pen, Pablo
Navales, and Jose Dagatan (respondents). Respondents were occupying, by mere
tolerance, portions of four parcels of land in the name of the late Felomina G.
Macadangdang, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-6084, T-6085, T-
6086, and T-6087, all in the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.

In a Decision[3] dated 27 June 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Davao City, ruled in favor of petitioner, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all the
persons claiming rights under them to:

a) vacate their respective possession over the subject premises, and remove their
structures built therein at their expense;

b) pay plaintiff the sum of P500.00 a month, for each defendant, for the use and
occupation of the said premises commencing the date of this decision until they
vacate the same;

c) pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00, each defendant, as attorneys fee; and

d) cost of suit.

Defendants counterclaims being compulsory are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondents appealed from the MTCCs Decision.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order[5] dated 14 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City dismissed the appeal for respondents failure to file an appeal memorandum.

On petitioners motion, the RTC remanded the case to the MTCC for execution of
judgment in its Order[6] dated 22 September 2000.

On 3 October 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial.

In an Order[7] dated 16 October 2000, the MTCC ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution after payment of the execution fee.

In an Order[8] dated 30 October 2000, the RTC denied respondents motion for
reconsideration. The RTC ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion
after the dismissal of respondents appeal.

Respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals assailing the
RTCs 14 September 2000 Order.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision promulgated on 26 July 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the 14
September 2000 Order and remanded the case to the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a matter of policy, the dismissal of an appeal on
purely technical grounds is frowned upon. The Court of Appeals ruled that rules of
procedure are intended to promote and not defeat substantial justice and should not
be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The Court of Appeals further ruled
that litigants should be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits of their
cases without the constraints of technicalities.

The Court of Appeals ruled that a distinction should be made between failure to
file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and failure to file the appeal
memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
would result to failure of the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over the
appealed decision. Thus, the assailed decision would become final and executory
upon failure to move for reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to file the
appeal memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court would only
result to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to
move for its reconsideration. Thus, the RTC erred in denying respondents motion
for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the
client, the rule is not without exceptions such as when its application would result
to outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or when a client would
suffer due to the counsels gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

In its 10 December 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
RTCs dismissal of respondents appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the RTC. Petitioners allege that the case
stemmed from an unlawful detainer case where the Rules on Summary Procedure
apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners also allege that due to the
mandatory character of Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the RTC correctly dismissed the appeal.Petitioners also pointed out that
respondents Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial was neither verified nor
accompanied by affidavits of merit as required under Section 2, Rule 37 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Applicability of the Rules on Summary Procedure

Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[9] Since the case before the the
MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue
delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings
is prohibited,[10] including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.[11]

However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited

pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before
the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on
Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents
motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.

Procedure on Appeal

Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -

(a) Upon receipt of the complete records or the record on appeal, the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant
to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the
lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse
party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the
appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the
period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the RTC dismissed respondents appeal for their failure to file an
appeal memorandum in accordance with Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs dismissal of the
appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client,
the circumstances in this case warrant a departure from this general rule. The Court
of Appeals ruled that respondents counsel only realized his failure to submit the
appeal memorandum when he received a copy of the dismissal of the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that exceptions to the general rule are recognized to accord
relief to a client who suffered by reason of the counsels gross or palpable mistake
or negligence.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel
in the realm of procedural technique.[12] There are exceptions to this rule, such as
when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright
deprivation of ones property through a technicality. [13]

In this case, respondents counsel advanced this reason for his failure to submit the
appeal memorandum:
c. That there was a delay in the filing of defendants-appellants[] appeal
memorandum due to the heavy backlog of legal paperwork piled on the table of
the undersigned counsel, and he realized his failure to submit defendants[] appeal
memorandum when he received a copy of the dismissal of the case. This is to
consider that he is the only lawyer in his law office doing a herculean task.[14]

We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule. The cause of the
delay in the filing of the appeal memorandum, as explained by respondents
counsel, was not due to gross negligence. It could have been prevented by
respondents counsel if he only acted with ordinary diligence and prudence in
handling the case. For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. [15] In one case, the
Court ruled that failure to file appellants brief can qualify as simple negligence but
it does not amount to gross neglience to justify the annulment of the proceedings
below.[16]

Finally, respondents were not deprived of due process of law. The right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process.[17] It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law.[18] The Court notes that in their memoranda,[19] respondents admitted that they
signed an agreement that they would vacate the land they occupy not later than 28
February 1998. They refused to vacate the land only because they were not
relocated as promised by the owner. Respondents claimed that the land was later
declared alienable and disposable, and the decision was affirmed by this
Court. Hence, respondents alleged that petitioner no longer had the right to drive
them out of the land. However, respondents did not even indicate the case number
and title, as well as the date of promulgation of the alleged Supreme Court
decision, in their memoranda.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 26 July 2002

Decision and the 10 December 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62002.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
Designated member per Special Order No. 570.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-38. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and
Mario L. Guaria III, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id. at 111-117. Penned by Presiding Judge George E. Omelio.
[4]
Id. at 116-117.
[5]
Id. at 118. Penned by Judge Augusto V. Breva.
[6]
Id. at 125-126.
[7]
Id. at 141.
[8]
Id. at 140.
[9]
Section 1(A), Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[10]
Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372 (2000).
[11]
Section 18(c).
[12]
R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, 19 October 2005, 473
SCRA 342.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Records, p. 144.
[15]
Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 358.
[16]
Redea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 389.
[17]
Producers Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812 (2002).
[18]
Id.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 312-321, 323-332.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice
requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to
file appellants brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the
opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed
because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or
not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.[14]

Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of

discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the
failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to
him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate
court sans notice to the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an
indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate court
has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant
has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the
appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the
appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was
held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but
the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal
reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his
abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his
appeal.[15]
 THIRD DIVISION

GREGORIO DIMARUCOT y G.R. No. 183975

GARCIA,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,*
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 20, 2010
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RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For resolution in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Resolution[1] dated July 23, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30466 denying petitioners omnibus
motion to reconsider the August 29, 2007 Resolution dismissing his appeal, to
expunge the same from the Book of Entries of Judgment, and to give petitioner a
period of thirty (30) days within which to file the appellants brief.
The antecedents:

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 98-M-98 for Frustrated Murder in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, under the following
Information:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 1997, in the municipality of
Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an iron pipe and with
intent to kill one Angelito Rosini y Go, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and hit
with the said iron pipe the said Angelito Rosini y Go, hitting him on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, which ordinarily would have caused
the death of the said Angelito Rosini y Go, thus performing all acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Angelito Rosini y
Go which prevented his death.

Contrary to law.[2]

After trial, on September 11, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision[3] convicting
petitioner of frustrated homicide, and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused GREGORIO aka GEORGE
DIMARUCOT y GARCIA liable of (sic) the lesser offense of Frustrated
Homicide, this Court hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day, as maximum, of imprisonment.

Accused is further directed to pay complainant Angelito Rosini y Go, actual

damages broken down as follows: the amount of Nineteen Thousand One
Hundred Ten Pesos and Sixty Five Centavos (P19,110.65) for the
hospitalization/medical bills and the amount of Thirty Six Thousand Pesos
(P36,000.00) as loss of income.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner thru his counsel de
parte requested and was granted additional period of twenty (20) days within which to
file said brief.[5]This was followed by three (3) successive motions for extension
which were all granted by the CA.[6] On August 29, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution
dismissing the appeal, as follows:
Considering the JRD verification report dated July 24, 2007 that the
accused-appellant failed to file his appellants brief within the reglementary period
which expired on June 6, 2007, his appeal is considered ABANDONED and thus
DISMISSED, pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[8] his counsel admitting that he was at
fault in failing to file the appellants brief due to personal problems emanating from
his [counsels] wifes recent surgical operation. It was thus prayed that the CA allow
petitioner to file his appellants brief which counsel undertook to submit within
seven (7) days or until October 4, 2007. By Resolution[9] dated November 27,
2007, the CA, finding the allegations of petitioner unpersuasive and considering
that the intended appellants brief was not at all filed on October 4, 2007, denied the
motion for reconsideration. As per Entry of Judgment, the Resolution of August
29, 2007 became final and executory onJanuary 4, 2008.[10]

On May 8, 2008, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) To Reconsider August

29, 2007 Resolution, (2) To Expunge The Same From Book Of Entries Of
Judgment, and (3) To Give Accused-Appellant A Final Period Of Thirty Days To
File Appellants Brief. Petitioner reiterated that his failure to file the appeal brief
was solely the fault of his lawyer who is reportedly suffering from personal
problems and depression. He also cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May
30, 2008) and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and
pulmonary emphysema), attaching copies of his birth certificate, medical
certificate and certifications from the barangay and church minister.[11]

In the assailed Resolution dated July 23, 2008, the CA denied the omnibus motion
holding that petitioner is bound by the mistakes and negligence of his counsel,
such personal problems of a counsel emanating from his wifes surgical operation
are not considered mistake and/or negligence contemplated under the law as to
warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of petitioners appeal for failure to file
appellants brief. Thus, when appellant did not file a petition before this Court to
assail the validity of the August 29, 2007 andNovember 27, 2007 resolutions,
the August 29, 2007 resolution attained finality and entry of judgment thereof is in
order.[12]

The petition has no merit.

Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as

amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The
Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with
notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to
file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.

xxxx

It is clear under the foregoing provision that a criminal case may be dismissed by
the CA motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his
brief within the prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the appellant means that
a notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal should
not be dismissed.[13]
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice
requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to
file appellants brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the
opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed
because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or
not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.[14]

Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of

discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the
failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to
him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate
court sans notice to the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an
indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate court
has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant
has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the
appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the
appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was
held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but
the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal
reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his
abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his
appeal.[15]

Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by petitioner and his counsel of
the reglementary periods for filing motions and perfecting appeal. While still at the
trial stage, petitioners motion to admit and demurrer to evidence was denied as it
was not seasonably filed (petitioner was granted fifteen (15) days from August 8,
2001 within which to file demurrer to evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only
on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.[16] Before the CA, petitioner and his
counsel filed no less than four (4) motions for extension to file brief, which was
never filed nor attached in the motion for reconsideration of the August 29, 2007
Resolution dismissing the appeal. The last extension given expired on June 6,
2007, without any brief submitted by petitioner or his counsel. And even when he
filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, still no appellants brief was attached by
petitioner. Neither did petitioner file any petition before this Court questioning the
validity of the August 29, 2007 resolution and the November 27, 2007 denial of his
motion for reconsideration. The dismissal of his appeal having become final, it was
indeed too late in the day for petitioner to file the Omnibus Motion on May 8,
2008, which was four (4) months after the finality of the resolution dismissing the
appeal.

Having been afforded the opportunity to seek reconsideration and setting aside of
the motu proprio dismissal by the CA of his appeal for non-filing of the appeal
brief, and with his subsequent inaction to have his appeal reinstated after the denial
of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner cannot impute error or grave abuse on
the CA in upholding the finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance with the
requirement of notice or show cause order before the motu proprio dismissal under
Section 8, paragraph 1 of Rule 124had thereby been cured.[17] Under the
circumstances, the petitioner was properly declared to have abandoned his appeal
for failing to diligently prosecute the same.

Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer
allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional depression. The negligence
and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.[18] There are exceptions to this
rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the
outright deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality. However, in
this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. [19] The
admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his
appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more
vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more competent
lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on
appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with
a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioners age and medical
condition.Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their
clients.[20]

Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief
within the reglementary period. Thus, we explained in Redea v. Court of Appeals:
[21]

In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will
suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account of the gross
negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel
was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed
under the impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellants
brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the
court of origin for new trial.

Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels
negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients
liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of these
exceptions obtains here.

For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear

abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. Here, petitioners counsel
failed to file the appellants brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as
simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the
annulment of the proceeding below. (Emphasis supplied.)

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The
party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[22]
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice. The Rules must be followed, otherwise, they will
become meaningless and useless.[23]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution

dated July 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30466
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 893 dated September 20, 2010.
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 885 dated September 1, 2010.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 19-22. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[2]
Records, p. 2.
[3]
Id. at 530-536. Penned by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.
[4]
Id. at 536.
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 46-51.
[6]
Id. at 52-66.
[7]
Id. at 68.
[8]
Id. at 69-72.
[9]
Id. at 75-76.
[10]
Id. at 78.
[11]
Id. at 79-88.
[12]
Rollo, p. 20.
[13]
Masas v. People, G.R. No. 177313, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 280, 285, citing Foralan v. CA, 311 Phil.
182, 185-186 (1995).
[14]
M.R. Pamaran REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED (2007 ed.) p. 666,
citing Baradi v. People, 82 Phil. 297, 298 (1948).
[15]
Id.; Salvador v. Reyes, 85 Phil. 12, 17 (1949).
[16]
Records, pp. 215, 219-225, 254-255.
[17]
See Salvador v. Reyes, supra note 15, at 16-17.
[18]
Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 111, 116, citing Sapad v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 132153, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 304, 308.
[19]
Cario v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 166036, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 43, 47, citing Estate of Felomina G.
Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 565, 572-573.
[20]
Lumbre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160717, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 419, 432, citing Delos Santos v.
Elizalde, G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 14, 17.
[21]
G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 389, 402.
[22]
Polintan v. People, supra note 18, citing Spouses Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 95, 100-101 (1998).
[23]
Id. at 117, citing Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421, January 26, 1998, 285 SCRA 49, 54-
55.