1
1. G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.*
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home
on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor
was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment
for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the
other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of AmelitaMalabed, the
owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home and in
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the
latter took over the management of the business. Amelita
made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that
indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship
between the two and hence, there could be no illegal
dismissal in such a situation.
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who
set aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor
arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for
certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.
Held:
No.
Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to
the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then
appealable to the Office of the President. However, the
new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding
appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon
themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by
virtue of their role under the check and balance system
and the perceived intention of the legislative body who
enacted the new rules.
“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the
checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially
to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle
of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
2. IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO [A.M.
No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992]
Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court
of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990
addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of
his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records
that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of
the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov.
29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He
was then appointed as appellate justice and later
accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of
Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb.
1986 brought about reorganization of the entire
government including the judiciary. A Screening
Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative
power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner
to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA.
However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he
now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his
seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of
issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted
Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was
later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected
by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner
cannot claim such reappointment because the court he
had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the
date of his last appointment.
Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a
continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any
claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to
said EO No. 33.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct
from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary
government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A
revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of
the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it as as sudden,
radical, and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence.
A government as a result of people's revolution is
considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family
of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others.
In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed
through direct exercise of the Filipino power.
Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the
claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
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G.R. No. L-63557 October 28, 1983
LINGNER & FISHER GMBH, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO L.
PRONOVE JR. and PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES,
INC., respondents.
FACTS
DEUTCHE MILCHWERKE DR. A. SAUER (DMW for brevity)
was a firm in West Germany manufacturing PRODUCTS
(probably chemicals) under the trademarks FISSAN, etc.
Private respondent Philippine Chemical Laboratories, Inc.
(PHILCHEM, for brevity) is a local company which
apparently also manufactures and sells chemicals.
On February 28, 1963, DMW and PHILCHEM executed a so-
called Agency AGREEMENT the basic provision of which
was that PHILCHEM would be the exclusive importer of the
PRODUCTS into the Philippines. The benefit to PHILCHEM
would be the profits realized from re-sale in this country of
imported PRODUCTS. Other relevant provisions, generally
stated, were that:
(a) The term of the AGREEMENT was five years renewable
automatically for five years each time unless one party
gives due notice of termination to the other.
(b) PHILCHEM could manufacture the PRODUCTS locally
with raw materials from sources other than LINGNER, but in
such case DMW will have to be paid 5% of 80% of
PHILCHEM's wholesale prices.
(c) After termination of the AGREEMENT, PHILCHEM will be
entitled, for five years, to 10% royalty on sales of PRODUCTS
in the Philippines (hereinafter to be referred to as the
ROYALTY CLAUSE).
(d) "All legal settlements within the compass of this
AGREEMENT shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts."
The AGREEMENT was automatically renewed once, or up
to February 28, 1973, and finally terminated on August 31,
1977.
On July 20, 1979, PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER
for P1,055,000.00 under the ROYALTY CLAUSE. The claim
was discussed between PHILCHEM and TANNER of
BEECHAM with the intervention of the Law Firm. No
settlement having been arrived at, PHILCHEM, on August
6, 1980, filed a complaint against BEECHAM alone in Civil
Case No. 38086 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The summons issued could not be served on BEECHAM, the
Sheriff having reported that BEECHAM was neither a
company registered in the Philippines, nor resident at the
given address of Unit A, Padilla Building, Emerald Avenue,
Pasig, Metro Manila.
PHILCHEM then filed an amended complaint, this time
making LINGNER and BEECHAM as the defendants, and
pleading that summons could be served on the Law Firm
as an agent of the defendants. The Law Firm submitted a
special appearance in the case on behalf of LINGNER,
and, also on behalf of LINGNER, moved for dismissal on the
grounds (a) that LINGNER was not a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines and hence could not be
sued locally, and, (b) that LINGNER could not be served
with summons through the Law Firm. It will thus be noted
that two issues were being raised. The first was whether or
not LINGNER was doing business in the Philippines; and the
second was whether or not LINGNER could be validly
summoned through the Law Firm as its agent. The Trial
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss, assuming that LINGNER
could be sued in this jurisdiction, and holding that LINGNER
can be served with summons through the Law Firm.
LINGNER went on certiorari to the Intermediate Appellate
Court where it reiterated the plea that summons could not
be validly served on it through the Law Firm; and it also
requested that a hearing be held, conformably to the
provisions of Section 9(3) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, on
the question of whether or not LINGNER was doing business
in this country.
The Appellate Court held that summons served through
the Law Firm was valid on the strength of Johnlo Trading
Co. vs. Flores (88 Phil. 741 [1951]); and it further ruled that
receiving evidence on whether or not LINGNER was doing
business in the Philippines could not be justified under the
cited Batas PambansaBlg. 129.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the
case
HELD
YES
The Appellate Court acted correctly in denying the
request for an evidentiary hearing. Evidence necessary in
regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the
Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction
contemplates "incidental" facts which were not touched
upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court. The
law could not have intended that the Appellate Court
would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue
in a case, which properly pertains to Trial Courts.
It is our view that evidence as to whether LINGNER was
doing business in the Philippines, even before the Trial
Court, is no longer necessary in view of the fact that
PHILCHEM and LINGNER were contractees in the
AGREEMENT and the claim of PHILCHEM is based on the
ROYALTY CLAUSE of that AGREEMENT. Whether LINGNER is
or is not doing business in the Philippines will not matter
because the parties had expressly stipulated in the
AGREEMENT that all controversies based on the
AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts". In other words, there was a covenant on venue to
the effect that LINGNER can be sued by PHILCHEM before
Philippine Courts in regards to a controversy related to the
AGREEMENT.
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to
conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally
appears before a Court complaining that he had not
been validly summoned, that the case filed against him
should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually
served on said defendant.
For the expeditious determination of this controversy,
therefore, in view of the insufficiency of evidence that
LINGNER is doing business in the Philippines, which is a sine
 3
qua non requirement under the provision of Section 14,
Rule 14 1 of the Rules before service of process can be
effected upon a foreign corporation and jurisdiction over
the same may be acquired, it is best that alias
summons on LINGNER be issued, in this case under the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, 2 in relation to Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, which recognizes the principle that venue
can be agreed upon by the parties. If a local plaintiff and
a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue,
summons by publication can be made on the foreign
corporation under the principle of liberal construction of
the rules to promote just determination of actions.
4. G. R. No. 132767 - January 18, 2000
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner,
v.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, DAVAO CITY and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
SUBJECT:
Remedial Law:
i. Jurisdiction – DARAB; R.A. No. 6657;
ii. Eminent Domain – Just Compensation;
iii. Primary Jurisdiction
FACTS:
Parcels of land owned by the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB ) were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform
for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).
Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by the
Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), PVB filed a
petition for a determination of the just compensation for its
property with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders
of the DARAB.
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides:
Sec. 51. Finality of Determination. — xxxx Any
order, ruling or decision shall be final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was
affirmed.
PVB filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was
likewise denied. Hence, he filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court raising the argument that DAR
adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just
compensation for the taking of lands under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such
jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the
fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day
period of appeal provided from the decision of the DAR
adjudicator.
ISSUE:
Whether the DAR has that the power to decide just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No.
6657.
RULING:
DAR has jurisdiction.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
Sec. 50 Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. — The
DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) xxxx
Sec. 57 Special Jurisdiction. — The Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.
The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all
appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case
for decision.
There is nothing contradictory between the provision of
§50 granting the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive
original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform,” which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the
provision of §57 granting Regional Trial Courts “original and
exclusive jurisdiction” over (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2)
prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. The
first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings. Under R.A. No. 6657, the
Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary
determination of the value of lands placed under land
reform program and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by
notifying the landowner of the government’s intention to
acquire his land and the valuation of the same as
determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt
of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the
landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative
proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional
(RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case
may be, depending on the value of the land, for the
purpose of determining the compensation for the land.
The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested
parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides
the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. If
the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring
the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly
§50 thereof, Rule XIII, §11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
provides:
 4

Land Valuation Determination and Payment of
Just Compensation. — The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation
shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be
brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice
thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one
motion for reconsideration.
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an
acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A.
No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that,
because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for
determination of just compensation has thereby been
transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means
that, in accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR
as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the
lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in
the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less
“original and exclusive” because the question is first
passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative determination. For
that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the
courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are
the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
motion for reconsideration of thd denial order,
invoking as an additional ground the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the case under the
authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Pending the resolution of said motion for
reconsideration, private respondents filed another
motion datedNovember 9, 1988, for the supervision
of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the trial court
granted the motion of private respondents and denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the
CA upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the
case?
Held:
With the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which
took effect on August 29, 1987,the regional trial courts
were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian
reform matters.The said jurisdiction is now vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Thus, the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private
respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft
of authority to act on the same. The allegation of private
respondents that their complaint was filed on
November 3, 1987, and not on February 13, 1988 is
immaterial since as of eitherdate Executive Order No.
229 was already in effect.

Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was

filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, §11 of
the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court
correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
————————————————-
IMPORTANT NOTE: This Ruling has been abandoned by the
Supreme Court in a 2017 en banc case ([CASE BrieF No.
2017-0611] Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eugenio
Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017). The Court ruled
that “Since the determination of just compensation is a
judicial function, the Court must ABANDON its ruling
in Veterans Bank, Martinez and Soriano that a petition for
determination of just compensation before the SAC shall
be proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not filed within
the 15-day period prescribed under the DARAB Rules.”

5. QUISMUNDO VS. CA

Facts:

On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of

petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial court praying
that their relationship with petitioner be changed from
share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. On
March 16,1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that
should allegedly govern the relationship of the
parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No.
3844, as amended. The trial court denied the motion for
lack of merit. On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a
 5
6.Laresma vs Abellana G. R. No. 140973
7. Ortigas v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89 (1983)
G.R. No. L-36098 January 21, 1983
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE
JOSE B. HERRERA, 120 SCRA 89, G.R. No. L-36098, January
21, 1983
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent entered into an
agreement whereby for and in consideration of P55,430,
the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with
a special condition that should private respondent as
purchaser complete the construction including the
painting of his residential house on said lot within two years,
petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private
respondent the amount of P10.00 per square meter.
When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private
respondent accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of
the same and requested for his refund amounting to
P4,820.
Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private
respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages with the City Court of Manila, against petitioner.
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action and improper venue. City Court Judge Jose B.
Herrera in his order held in abeyance the resolution on the
motion until after the trial of the case on the merits.
A reconsideration of the said order having been denied,
petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction. A motion to dismiss was filed by
private respondent, and on November 17, 1972, the
petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of
private respondent in his complaint, being less than
P10,000, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among
others that: (a) as detriment from the allegations of the
complaint, the action is for specific performance of
contract; and (b) actions in which the subject of litigation
is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints
for specific performance of contract are exclusively
cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case is for the collection of a sum of
money.
2. Whether or not the city court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case on its merits
Ruling:
1. NEGATIVE. The action involved in this case is one for
specific performance and not for a sum of money and
therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation, because
what private respondent seeks is the performance of
petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a
refund but under certain specific conditions still to be
proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum
of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation because the
obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any
specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has
agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon
compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only
upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him
under the written contract be demanded, the action is
one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of
a sum of money is only incidental which can only be
ordered after a determination of certain acts the
performance of which being the more basic issue to be
inquired into.
2. NEGATIVE. JURISDICTION IS LODGED TO CFI (now RTC).
 6
Although private respondent's complaint in the court a
quo is designated as one for a sum of money and
damages, an analysis of all the factual allegations of the
complaint patently shows that what private respondent
seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under
the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10
per square meter or in the total amount of P4,820, but only
after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will
give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus fall under
CFI’s Jurisdiction (now the RTC).
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Civil Procedure – Payment of Docket Fees – Claim
Damages should be Stated in the BODY and
PRAYER of pleadings
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; Filing Fees;
Environmental facts of Magaspi vs. Ramolete case,
different from case at bar.—ln the Magaspi case, the
action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for
the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although
the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to
be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion
as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the
court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular."
Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the
amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee. In the present case no such
honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the
prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and
specific performance. The docketing fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of actual date
of filing in court.—As reiterated in the Magaspi case the
rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment
of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint.—
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present
case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should
be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Court frowns at
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint of
omitting any specification of the amount of damages in
the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint which is clearly
intended to thwart payment of correct filing fees.—The
Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who
filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P 78 million is alleged in the
body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of
the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded
when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the
anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through
another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the
body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to
the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court
directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket f ee is obvious.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Warning of Supreme
Court that drastic action will be taken upon a repetition of
the unethical practice.—The Court serves warning that it
will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical
practice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement that henceforth
all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and that the damages should be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees; Any pleading that fails to
comply with the requirement shall not be accepted or
admitted.—To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions,answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee; An amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court,
much less payment of the docket fee based on amount in
the amended pleading Magaspi vs. Ramolete case which
is inconsistent with this decision, is reversed.—The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed. Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, No. L-75919 May 7, 1987
FACTS: A complaint for specific performance was filed by
Manchester Development Corporation against City Land
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute
a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also
alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of
payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it
was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint.
 7
Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said
docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester
that their action is primarily for specific performance
hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court
ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint.
Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the
amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was
however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment complaint should
be admitted.
RULING: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be
based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since
the proper docket fee was not paid for the original
complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed
which can be amended. So the any subsequent
proceeding taken in consideration of the amended
complaint is void. Manchester’s defense that this case is
primarily an action for specific performance is not merited.
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations
and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for
damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is
capable of pecuniary estimation. Further, the amount for
damages in the original complaint was already provided
in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER
clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of
the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar
irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that
from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall
be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
8) Piapi vs..Talip
G.R. NO. 138248, 07 SEPTEMBER 2005
FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein petitioners,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 18, Digos,
Davao del Sur, a complaint for Reconveyance and
Damages for a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares
situated in Piapi, Davaol del Sur, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry
of Deeds issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has a
market value of P15,000. They alleged that they have
openly possessed such land for thirty (30) years in the
concept of owner, and that respondent, Talip, fraudulently
obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case as considering that the assessed value of the land
is P6,030. Under Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction.
Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as
the total assessed value of the property is P41,890, as
shown by Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment
Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur, Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr.
On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction hence this certiorari petition alleging
that Section 19 (1) of BP Bilang 129, as amended, gives the
RTC jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance
since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance.
HELD:
The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to
HuguetevsEmbudo; where petitioners argued that a
complaint for annulment of a deed of sale and partition is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Supreme Court ruled that
the nature of an action is not determined by the caption
of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for.
When the ultimate objective of the petitioners, is to obtain
title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court
having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property
subject thereof. However, they failed to alleged therein
the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what
they stated was the market value of the land which was at
P15,000.00.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property,
or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be
alleged by the claimant. It bears reiterating that what
determines
jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the
reliefs prayed for. Petitioners' complaint is for
reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their
action involves the title to or interest in real property, they
should have alleged therein its assessed value. However,
they only specified the market value or estimated value,
which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 33
(3), it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over the case.
RULES:
Section 19 (2) of BP Bilang 129. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest thereon, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (3)
Exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
 8
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
9. G.R. No. 166876. March 24, 2006.* CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
ARTEMIO INIEGO,1 petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE JUDGE
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City
of Manila, and FOKKER C. SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
12/11/1999 – A freight truck allegedly being driven by
Pinion & owned by Iniego hit Santos’ jitney.
3/1/2002 - Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and
damages against Pinion and Iniego.
8/24/2002 – Santos filed a Motion to Declare defendant in
Default allegedly for failure of Iniego to file his answer
within the final extended period.
8/28/2002 – Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things,
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of
the case.
10/21/2002 – Judge Purganan granted Motion to Dismiss
Iniego but the Motion to Declare Defendant Iniego in
Default was denied. (Iniego’s explanation that order was
sent to a wrong address has merit)
Iniego – RTC/MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the case –
cause of action is CLAIM FOR DAMAGES (exceeds P400k).
Actions for damages based on quasidelict are actions that
are capable of pecuniary estimation.
RTC/Purganan - Main cause of action was quasi-delict.
Since fault or negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the
subject of pecuniary estimation, RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Main cause of action was quasi-delict. Since fault or
negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of
pecuniary estimation, SC has exclusive jurisdiction.
CA - denied Iniego’s appeal for lack of merit.
Complaint:
- Actual damages: P40k
- Moral damages: P 300k
- Exemplary damages: P150k
- Total Damages: P490k
- Plus: Attorney’s Fees: P50k
ISSUE:
1. WON actions for damages based on quasi-delict
are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation
2. WON moral and exemplary damages claimed by
the private respondent should be excluded from
the computation of the above-mentioned
jurisdictional amount because they arose from a
cause of action other than the negligent act of
the defendant
RULING:
Re: Issue 1: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts
are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a
sum of money for the damages suffered because of the
defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are
therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
BP 129: what must be determined to be capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of
action, but the subject matter of the action. Ascertain the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money:
- claim capable of pecuniary estimation
- jurisdiction: depends is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial
Courts] would depend on the amount of the
claim.
If basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like suits
to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage
- subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money
- cognizable exclusively by RTC
In this case: The damages claimed in such actions
represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to
the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to
be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the
principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto
or a consequence thereof.
The fault or negligence of Iniego, therefore, is
inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and
there can be no action based on quasi-delict without a
claim for damages.
We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for
damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Re: Issue 2 - The amount of damages claimed is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of
courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the
same or from different causes of action.
Total amount of damages claimed by the private
respondent nevertheless still exceeds the jurisdictional limit
of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
The distinction he made between damages arising
directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from
a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more
apparent than real, as the damages sought by
respondent originate from the same cause of action: the
quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the employee and
the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer
in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the
damages claimed, without distinction.
All claims for damages should be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of
whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he
may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of
said section provides that where the claims in all such
joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test
of jurisdiction.
WON the different claims for damages are based on a
single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the
total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the
case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the
 9
total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and
exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.
In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts
are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As
such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the
municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages
claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all
kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the
jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise
from the same or from different causes of action.
10. G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO,
TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL
SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO,
LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO
SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu filed before the
MTC of Talisay, Cebu a complaint to expropriate a
property of the respondents heirs of Francisco Pastor. The
MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public
use after payment of just compensation. In an action for
eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the
action also involves real property is merely incidental. An
action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC and not with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that the action for eminent domain or
condemnation of real property is a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the
assessed value of the property involved which determines
the jurisdiction of the court. Section 3, paragraph (3), of
Republic Act No. 7691, provides that all civil actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property with an
assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTCs. The Tax
Declaration shows that the assessed value of the land
involved is only P1,740.00. Hence, it is the MTC which has
jurisdiction.
Petitioner thus appealed directly to the SC, raising a pure
question of law.
Issue:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over cases for eminent
domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos?
Held: Yes.
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment
or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now RTC).
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimationAn expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to
take private property for public use.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound
to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the propriety of the expropriation.
11. G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.*
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J.
WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed
a complaint w ith the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire
insurance policy w ith a prayer for the judicial declaration
of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a w rit of preliminary attachment. The
complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs
of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may
be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about
Fifty Million Pesos.
Only the amount of P210.00 w as paid by private
respondent as docket fee w hich prompted petitioners'
counsel to raise his objection. Said objection w
asdisregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro w how
as then presiding over said case.
Meanwhile, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the
judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that
in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
Upon submission of amended complaint and
reassessment of docket fees respondent w as required to
pay P39,786.00 as docket fee. This w as subsequently paid
by private respondent. On October 16, 1986, or some
 10
seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00 and another P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the low er court did not acquire jurisdiction over case
on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper
docket fee. NO
2. Whether or not the principle laid down in Manchester
case may be applied retroactively. YES
RULING:
1. Petitioners‟ contend that while private respondent had
paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered
in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by
private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having
paid the same, the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support
of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court
in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, as follow
s: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The court ruled that the
principle in Manchester could very w ell be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in
the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of
the second amended complaint. However, in
Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket
fee until] the case was decided by this Court. Thus, in
Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void. In the present case,
a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The
promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have
had that sobering influence on private respondent who
thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the
respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket
fee as may be ordered. Hence, the SC directed the
docket clerk to determine the proper docket fee that must
be furnished by respondent.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same
rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL,
petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte,
Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and
Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk
of Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
FACTS:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte,
three (3) actions for recovery of possession
(accionespublicianas ) were separately instituted by
Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants,
docketed as follows:
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) vs. MaximoTacay Civil Case No. 2211.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1)
Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790
square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No.
T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the
defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere
tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property,
Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate
the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused; and (4) the last
demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the
same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied
by the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered
to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped by
them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:
1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2 ) Actual damages, as proven;
3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court
may fix ;
4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees
of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;"
and
5) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and
remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.
 11

The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten
notation (evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading,
"P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten
words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention
apparently being to make the entire phrase read, "
P5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven.
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the
defendants by common counsel . Every motion alleged
that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the
case —
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the
mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ...
Supreme Court dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify
all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from
defendant;" and
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute.
ISSUE:
WON the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction of the case in
accordance with Circular 7?
RULING:
Yes, the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction of the case.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts
being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It
is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for
the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for
recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an
accionpubliciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction
in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount
of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with
the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value
of the property.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties
who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any
specification of the amount of damages," the omission
being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing
fee."
There are actions or proceedings involving real property,
in which the value of the property is immaterial to the
court's jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for
assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or
proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery
of money and/or damages, in which the value of the
property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the
trial court's competence.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing
of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment
of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time
of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment
of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may
grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees
prescribed for an action involving real property have been
paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages
(actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the
real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee.
And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance
that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof

An action for recovery of possession of real property may

be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or
exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within
the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.

Batas PambansaBilang 129 provides that Regional Trial

Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia
over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies regardless of
the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth
more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies
even where the complaint involving realty also prays for
an award of damages; the amount of those damages
would be immaterial to the question of the Court's
jurisdiction.

Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot

thus be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the
dismissal of the actions at bar.
12