I.
INTRODUCTION
1. Legal Research, Defined
It is a systematic, empirical, and critical investigation of legal
authorities to support a legal issue or fact, or even support court
De Roy v CA
decisions.
It is the process of finding the law, rules and regulations that
govern activities of human society. It is also defined as the
investigation for information necessary to support legal
decision making. (Rodriguez, 2002)
Legal research is generally the process of finding an answer to
a legal question or checking for legal precedent that can be
cited in a brief or at trial. Sometimes, legal research can help
determine whether a legal issue is a "case of first impression"
that is unregulated or lacks legal precedent. Virtually every
lawsuit, appeal, criminal case, and legal process in general
requires some amount of legal research.
Legal research is the search for authority that can be applied to
a given set of facts and issues. Legal research and analysis
involve determining how the law applies to the facts of the
case, which in turn requires knowledge of what the law is, how
to find it, and the general principles that govern its application
(Putman, 2004)
2.The Need for Legal Research
To provide competent representation* and uphold the standards
of the legal profession.
Requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for representation
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
a. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757
(1988)
G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988
Art. 2, CC - Effectivity of the law
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner,
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal,Sr., et
al., resulting in injuries to their family and death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do
so. 
Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered
judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents.
This decision was affirmed into by the Court of Appeals. 
On the last day of the 15-dayperiod to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of tie to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
appellate court. They again filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioner
filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null
and void the previous decision and claimed that the
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. 
 They contended that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case
at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the
petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident
if only they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.
Issue:
WoN the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day
period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended, could be applied to the case at bar.
Held:
The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to
the case at bar, notwithstanding the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
        There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme
Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the duty of the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which are published
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and
in publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 11 January 2010 of Acting
Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman,
614 SCRA 1 (2010 and 668 SCRA 468 (2012)
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC March 2, 2010
RE_ SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY
11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU
A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us for consideration are the interrelated matters listed
below.
a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and
received by this Court on January 18, 2010),
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the "Chief, Office
of the Administrative Services or
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court,
Manila," for the submission to the Office of the
Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known
forwarding address of former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate Justice Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez. The subpoena duces
tecum was issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b)
below, pursuant to Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The
Office of the Administrative Services
(OAS) referred the matter to us on January 21, 2010 with a
request for clearance to release the specified
documents and information.
b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano
and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the
Ombudsman as basis for the the subpoena duces
tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint
from the Ombudsman to determine the
legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.
c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on
February 9, 2010), signed by Acting
Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of the
Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman
Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano
complaint and referring it to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the
Memorandum1 issued on July 31, 2003 by
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints
against judges and other members of the
Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action.
OUR RULING
I. The Subpoena Duces Tecum
In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal order of February 4,
2010, any question relating to the legality and
propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman issued
has been rendered moot and academic.
The subpoena duces tecum merely drew its life and continued
viability from the underlying criminal
complaint, and the complaint’s dismissal – belated though it
may be – cannot but have the effect of
rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic.
As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members
of this Court, past and present, in relation
to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial
functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the
record the extent of the Ombudsman’s authority in these types
of complaints.
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full
authority to issue subpoenas, including
subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses
and the production of documents and
information relating to matters under its investigation.2 The
grant of this authority, however, is not
unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and
abide by the terms of the Constitution and our
laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on
the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of
subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of
subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum,
operates under the requirements of reasonableness and
relevance.3 For the production of documents to be
reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant,
the matter under inquiry should, in the first
place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain,
investigate and rule upon.
In the present case, the "matter" that gave rise to the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum was a criminal
complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged
violation by retired Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).
A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and
its attendant compulsory processes) is within
the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is
to consider the nature of the powers of the
Supreme Court. This Court, by constitutional design, is
supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power
is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual
controversies, but also to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or
instrumentality of government.4 As a rule, all decisions and
determinations in the exercise of judicial
power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose
judgment is final. This constitutional scheme
cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint
that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed
to the Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate
matters that have long been laid to rest by the
Court. Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral
attack on a judgment of this Court that, by
constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question.
A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this
Court has had the occasion to rule on the
liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019—the very same
provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.
In In re Wenceslao Laureta,5 the client of Atty. Laureta filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan charging
Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 for having
knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust
resolution in a land dispute. The Court
unequivocally ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions
are concerned, a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such
collective decision is "unjust" should not
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
prosper; the parties cannot "relitigate in another forum the final
judgment of the Court," as to do so is to
subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions,
to another body.6
In re Joaquin T. Borromeo7 reiterates the Laureta ruling,
particularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme
Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal
complaints against a judge should not be
turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a
judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where
the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a
judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity.
The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution
of judges, as follows:
That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute
judges for this impropriety, of rendering an
unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of
all the foregoing considerations, the
indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by
a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and there be also
evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order.
Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court
under our constitutional scheme, only this
Court – not the Ombudsman – can declare a Supreme Court
judgment to be unjust.
In Alzua v. Arnalot,8 the Court ruled that "judges of superior
and general jurisdiction are not liable to
respond in civil action for damages, and provided this rationale
for this ruling: Liability to answer to
everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the
judge would be inconsistent with the
possession of this freedom and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either
respectable or useful." The same rationale applies to the
indiscriminate attribution of criminal liability to
judicial officials.1avvphi1
Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the
legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme
Court, cannot prosper and should not be
entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are
absolutely immune from suit during their
term, for they are not. The Constitution provides that the
appropriate recourse against them is to seek their
removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.9 Only
after removal can they be criminally
proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and
thereafter, and for their official acts that do
not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them
and their liabilities therefor are as defined in
the above rulings.
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically
grants the Ombudsman the authority to
investigate impeachable officers, but only when such
investigation is warranted:
Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose
of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is
unwarranted for lack of legal basis and for
clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman
should spare these officers from the
harassment of an unjustified investigation. The present criminal
complaint against the retired Justices is
one such case where an investigation is not warranted, based as
it is on the legal correctness of their
official acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately
recognized the criminal complaint for what it
is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and
issuing a subpoena duces tecum.
II. The Ombudsman’s Dismissal of the Criminal Complant
As the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint
(Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline
Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-
09-0527-J) clearly implied, no complete
dismissal took place as the matter was simply "referred to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action."
Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this
Ombudsman action for the reasons we have already
discussed above. While both accused are now retired from the
service, the complaint against them still
qualifies for exclusive consideration by this Court as the acts
complained of spring from their judicial
actions while they were with the Court. From this perspective,
we therefore pass upon the prima facie
merits of the complainants Lozano’s criminal complaint.
a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint
By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the
participation of the accused in the
Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of
Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The retired Chief Justice and
retired Associate Justice allegedly
committed the following unlawful acts:
1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA;
2) Stating in the Resolution that the "Chin-Mallari property
overlaps the UP property," when the DENR
Survey Report stated that the "UP title/property overlaps the
Chin-Mallari property;"
3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set
aside a Decision for which five Justices
voted.
By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held
criminally accountable on the theory that
they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the
cited cases, thereby causing "undue injury"
to the parties to these cases.
After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint
against retired Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. We
fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the
discussions below.
a. Contrary to the complainants’ position, the Supreme Court
has the power to review the lower courts’
findings of fact.
The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the
power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of
the lower courts.10 It has the authority to promulgate rules on
practice, pleadings and admission to the
bar, and suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of
justice.11 Jurisprudence holds, too, that the
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual
findings of the lower courts, among other
prerogatives, in the following instances: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making
its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.12 Thus, contrary
to the complainants Lozano’ assertions in
their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can
and does rule on factual submissions before
it, and even reverses the lower court’s factual findings when
the circumstances call for this action.
b. Constitutional Provisions were misused.
The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly
misquoted and misused applicable constitutional
provisions to justify their case against the retired Justices. We
refer particularly to their use (or strictly,
misuse) of Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution
which they claim to be the governing rule that
the retired Justices should have followed in acting on Pael. This
constitutional provision states:
Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the
concurrence of at least five Members, but if such
required number is not obtained the case shall be decided en
banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or
in division may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc.13
For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these
terms, the complainants claim that the former
subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a majority
of only three members, the decision of the
First Division unanimously approved by its full membership of
five members.
Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts
and developments in Pael and accordingly
related these to the applicable constitutional provision, they
would have discovered that Pael was decided
in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution,
was the prevailing Charter. They then
would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and
decided by Division before the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 4(3), Article VIII of
this Constitution provides:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case, without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
en banc." (Emphasis supplied.)
This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs
to this day. Thus, the complainants’
argument and basis for their criminal complaint – that in ruling
on a motion for reconsideration, all five
members of the Division should concur – is totally wrong.
c. The elements of the offense charged are not sufficiently
alleged in the complaint
A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
301914 in two ways: (1) by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference;15 in either case, these acts must be
committed with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
"Partiality" is defined as a bias or disposition to see and report
matters as wished for, rather than as they
are. "Bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment or negligence,
but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious
wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. "Gross
negligence," on the other hand, is
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences as
far as other persons are concerned.16
The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts
and circumstances showing that the retired
Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or negligence. A judicial
officer’s act in reviewing the findings of
fact in a decision and voting for its reversal cannot by itself
constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and
proven, demonstrating a dishonest purpose,
conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his
or her part. A complainant’s mere
disagreement with the magistrate’s own conclusions, to be
sure, does not justify a criminal charge under
Section 3(e) against the latter. In the absence of alleged and
proven particular acts of manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith
and regularity are generally presumed in the
performance of official duties by public officers.17
For the criminal complaint’s fatal omissions and resultant
failure to allege a prima facie case, it rightfully
deserves immediate dismissal.
III. The Complainants’ Potential Liability for Filing the
Ombudsman Complaint
In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant
circumstances of the criminal complaints, we
cannot avoid considering whether the complainants Lozano
acted properly as members of the Bar, as
officers of this Court, and as professionals governed by norms
of ethical behavior, in filing their
complaint.
In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted
view of the powers of this Court to suit their
purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and
misapplied the provisions of the Constitution,
not just any ordinary statute. As lawyers, the complainants
must be familiar and well acquainted with the
fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to
apply the constitutional provisions in light
of their prevailing jurisprudential interpretation. As law
practitioners active in the legal and political
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
circles, the complainants can hardly be characterized as
"unknowing" in their misuse and misapplication
of constitutional provisions. They should, at the very least,
know that the 1973 Constitution and its
provisions have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and
that they cannot assail – invoking the 1973
Constitution – the judicial acts of members of the Supreme
Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987
Constitution was in effect. Their misuse of the Constitution is
made more reprehensible when the
overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they
used the 1973 provisions to falsely
attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court and its
Members.1avvphi1
In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the
genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers
commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain
disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of
constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that
reflects on their fitness for continued
membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very least, their
transgressions are blatant violations of Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved. (Emphasis provided.)
To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act
candidly and in good faith, an identical provision
is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Moreover, lawyers are sworn to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court…" before
they are even admitted to the Bar. All these
the complainants appear to have seriously violated.
In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants
Lozano should be heard, in relation to their
criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired
Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they
should not be held accountable and
accordingly penalized for violations of their duties as members
of the Bar and officers of this Court, and
of the ethics of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et
al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J for
utter lack of merit, and DECLARE as MOOT
and ACADEMIC the question of compliance with the
subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that
the Ombudsman issued against this Court.
We hereby ORDER the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano
and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano to
EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a non-extendible
period of 15 days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be penalized as members of
the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their
open disregard of the plain terms of the Constitution and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their
misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in
their criminal complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 The pertinent part of the Memorandum reads:
Henceforth, on the basis of the foregoing, and in keeping with
the spirit of the stated doctrine, all criminal
complaints against judged and other members of the Supreme
Court shall be immediately DISMISSED
and REFERRED to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
The dismissal shall not in any manner touch
on the merits of the complaint, and shall be made for the sole
purpose of referring the same to the
Supreme Court. (emphasis found in the original.)
2 Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 reads:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following
powers functions and duties:
xxxx
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as it may provide
in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of
public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records
and documents.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 13, Rule XI of the Constitution
are similarly phrased:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following functions and duties:
xxxx
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating
to contracts or transactions entered into
by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds
or properties, and report any irregularity to
the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and information.
3 See: Sections 3 and 4, Rule 21, Rules of Court.
4 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
5 232 Phil 353 (1987).
6 To quote the pertinent portions of Laureta, pp. 384-388:
As aptly declared in the Chief Justice’s Statement of December
24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts
in toto, "It is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme—
the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justiciable disputes public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them ‘unjust.’" It is
elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo v. Llorente (18 Phil 257,
263[1911]) ‘controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy
and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgment of courts
determining controversies submitted to
them should become final at some definite time fixed by law or
by a rule of practice recognized by law, so
as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which
rendered them for the purpose of correcting
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it
may have fallen…."
Respondents should have known that the provisions of Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
‘rendering knowingly unjust judgment’ refer to an individual
judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who
would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of
the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court
with jurisdiction to review the same, either of
the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal article
has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as
this Court or its Divisions who reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also
follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. (emphasis supplied)
xxxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and
prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the
Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and
in regular exercise of official duty and
judicial functions is to subvert and undermine the very
independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the
judiciary to the executive. xxxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s resolution and
claim that the members acted "with deliberate
bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or
violation of the duty of their high office to
act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of
the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate
acts and resolution and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow
such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without
violating the separation of powers mandated by
the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment
of this Court on legal issues submitted by
them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the
Supreme Court and which fall within
judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested
by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
7 311 Phil 441, 509 (1995).
8 21 Phil 308, 326 (1912).
9 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.
10 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(2).
11 Id., Section 5(5).
12 Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3,
2009; Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851,
June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 83-84; Malison v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 147776, July 10, 2007, 527
SCRA 109. 117; and Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No.
166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.
13 Part of the Criminal Complaint-Affidavit for Corrupt
Practices, signed by Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and
Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano, received by the
Ombudsman on September 8, 2009, Ombudsman
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
Records, pp. 1089-1189,1090.
14 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of the offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
15 Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, 492 Phil 669, 677 (2005).
16 Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 721 (2003);
and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 430 Phil 101, 115 (2002).
17 Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 722 (2003).
Sources of Legal Research
Legal research involves the use of a variety of printed and
electronic sources. The printed sources include the
Constitution,
statutei; court decisions, administrative rules and scholarly
commentaries.
Computer databases containing these and other materials
 have dramatically changed the nature of legal research and
improved its effectiveness. They have not, however,
eliminated its
complexities. The volume and variety of legal literature
continues
to grow, making the researcher's choice of tools and tactics
for each
problem more difficult than ever. A thorough
understanding of available
legal resources, both published and computerized, is
necessary.
2. There are as many procedures as there are problems,
and no
single approach can work every time.
Legal Research v. Legal Bibliography
Legal Research -It is the process of finding the law, rules and
regulations that govern activities of human society. It is also
defined as the investigation for information necessary to
support legal decision making.
Legal Bibliography-
-It is generally defined as the science or study of law books,
their history, evolution and description, their characteristics and
use, including such details as their authors, publishers, dates,
editions and degree of authoritativeness.
Importance of Legal Bibliography
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
-The efficient use of law books can only be learned by study
and application. It is an aid in the process* of analyzing a legal
question. *where to find the law, in what book, and how
Aim of Legal Bibliography and Research
-In order to provide legal basis for a claim, one must present
for consideration the authority which must be applied, and
which the court is bound to apply.
Sources of Law
Primary Sources
Primary sources of law are those recorded laws and rules
which will be enforced by the State. They may be found
instatutes
passed by the legislature, regulations and rulings of
administrative
agencies and decisions of appellate.courts,"
In a primarily civil law jurisdiction like the Philippines, the
products of legislative actions, codes and statutes, are the
first
major primary sources. Codes and statutes have come to
govern an
even greater variety of human activity.
 The second major category of primary sources is judicial Agencies also act in a "quasi-judicial" capacity by
decisions. conducting
Our Philippine Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hearings and issuing decisions to resolve particular
produce disputes.9
decisions that constitute our case law. 2. Secondary Materials
Our judicial system consists of a hierarchy of courts, Publications which are not primary authority but which
including discuss
a number of trial courts (RTC, MTC, MCTC), one or analyze legal doctrine are considered secondary
intermediate materials.
appellate court (CA), and a court of last resort, the Supreme These include treatises, commentaries, and encyclopedias.
Court. Some of
This system incorporates the processes of appellate review, the most influential legal writings are found in the
in which academic journals
higher courts review the decisions of lower courts, and known as law reviews of law schools, or in publications
judicial like
review, in which courts determine the validity of legislative the IBP Journal and the Lawyers Review. Secondary
and materials
executive actions. vary widely in purpose and quality, ranging from
authoritative
A third important primary source is administrative law, or
the treatises by great academic scholars to superficial tracts by
hack
regulations and decisions of government agencies. State
agencies writers. The best of these works such as the Civil Code of
the
promulgate regulations governing behavior within their
areas of expertise.

Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
Philippines by Arturo M. Tolentino and Remedial Law
Compen- dium by Florenz D. Regalado have a persuasive
influence on the
lawmaking process by virtue of the prestige of their authors or
the
quality of their scholarship. Secondary sources can help
analyze a
problem and provide research references to both primary
sources
and other secondary materials, 10
Finding appropriate secondary materials is most often
accomplished
through the use of law library catalogs, legal periodical
indexes, and other bibliographic aids. In addition, court
decisions
and other secondary sources frequently provide citations to
persuasive
treatises and law review articles."
3. Finding Tools
Our legislative, executive and judicial branches of government
have been enacting and promulgating codes, statutes, rules,
regulations
and court decisions and these have grown into a large body
of law. The researcher therefore needs search materials or
finding
tools in order to locate these legal sources. Without a topical
approach
to legal sources, researchers could not find existing statutes
or decisions on point.12
A varied group of finding tools provides such access. Digests
reprint headnotes summarizing points of law from court
decisions
Give thanks to others help but always remember to trust yourself -Kyle Cheng
in a subject classification and annotations summarize cases on
particular
topics. The SCRA Quick Index-Digest is one finding tool
available to the legal researcher. PHIL.JURIS and LEX
LIBRIS,
two comprehensive and competing computer-based legal
research
systems, provide the capability to search for cases and other
documents
by using practically any word or combination of words.13
Finding tools do not persuade, nor do they themselves have
any primary or persuasive authority. Finding tools are only a
means
for locating primary sources. It is then necessary to read those
primary sources to determine their applicability to a particular
situation. In legal research, as in other aspects of the lawyer's
work, one must employ a highly developed sense of relevance -
a
keen appreciation of which sources are legally and factually
relevant
to the specific inquiry.