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I. JURISDICTION
A. CLASSES OF JURISDICTION
- Jurisdiction according to its nature: original, appellate
ORIGINAL APPELLATE
When actions or proceedings may be when it has the power to review on appeal the
originally filed with it. decisions or orders of a lower court.

- Jurisdiction according to its object; corresponding principles

a) Over the subject matter
 the power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it [1 Riano 71, 2014 Bantam
Ed., citing Black’s Law Dictionary 767, 5th Ed.]
 power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong
[Reyes v. Diaz, G.R. No. L- 48754 (1941)]

b) Over the person of the parties

 refers to the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. [De Pedro v. Romansan
Development Corp, G.R. No. 194751 (2014)]
 It is also called jurisdiction in personam which is the power required before a court can enter a
personal or an in personam judgment. [Pennoyer vs Neff, 95 US 714 (1878)]
 It is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil or criminal, except in actions in rem
or quasi in rem. [Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147 (2016)]

Kinds:
a. Over the plaintiff
b. Over the defendant
c. Over non-parties – It is a principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not formally or originally
a party to a litigation may nevertheless be acquired, under proper conditions, through the voluntary
appearance of that person before the court. [Rodriguez v. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-38314 (1974)]

i. How jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired

 upon the filing of the complaint [De Pedro v. Romansan Development Corp, G.R. No. 194751 (2014)]
 By the mere filing of the complaint, the plaintiff, in a civil action, voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. [Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147 (2016)]
 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired:
1. By his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or
2. By service of summons. [Sec. 20, Rule 14; Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759 (2013)]

Voluntary Appearance of the defendant gives the court jurisdiction over his person despite lack of
service of summons or a defective service of summons. Since his voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons
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c) Over the res

 refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is the subject of the action [1
Riano 104, 2014 Bantam Ed.]
 “Res,” in civil law is a “thing” or “object.” It is everything that may form an object of rights, as opposed
to a “persona,” which is the subject of rights. It includes object, subject matter or status [1 Riano 86,
2016 Bantam Ed., citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1172, 5 th Ed.]

How Acquired:
 a. By seizure of the thing under legal process whereby, it is brought into actual custody of the law
(custodia legis); or
 b. From the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made effective (potential jurisdiction over the res) [Biaco v.
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417 (2007); El Banco EspañolFilipino v. Palanca, G.R.
No. 11390 (1918)]
 In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take
actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. [Marcos, Jr. v. Republic, G.R.
No. 189434

d) Over the issues

 power of the court to try and decide the issues raised in the pleadings of the parties [Reyes vs
Diaz, G.R. No. 48754 (1941)]

 An issue is a disputed point or question to which parties to an action have narrowed down
their several allegations and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a decision [1 Riano 83,
2016 Bantam Ed., citing Black’s Law Dictionary 745, 5 th Ed.]

 CONFERRED BY:

a. The pleadings of the parties, which present the issues to be tried and determine whether or not
the issues are of fact or law [Reyes v. Diaz, G.R. No. L48754 (1941)]

b. Stipulation of the parties as when, in the pre-trial, the parties enter into stipulations of facts or
enter into agreement simplifying the issues of the case [Sec. 2(c), Rule 18]

c. Waiver or failure to object to evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Here the parties
try with their express or implied consent on issues not raised by the pleadings. [Sec. 5, Rule 10]

e) Over the territory

B. ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION: subject matter, parties, issues

C. JURISDICTION OF REGULAR COURTS

1. SC
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E) Jurisdiction of the SC under R. A. No. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948) as

amended by R. A. No. 5440.
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the SC. The SC shall have OJ over
 cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original
 EJ in petitions for the issuance of writs of CPM against the CA. 

In the ff cases, the SC shall EO & CJ with RTCs : 

1. In petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus; and 
2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade. 
The SC shall have EJ to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law
or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided, in 
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished,
arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused
on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of
whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether
they have been tried jointly or separately; 
(2) All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization; and 
(3) All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private person or entity. 
The SC shall further have EJ to (RRRM/A) review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in 
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question; 
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toil, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto; 
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; 
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases
mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the CA; and the
final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified
or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and 
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(5) Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission on Elections,

Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission
and the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
***
 

2. CA
D) Jurisdiction of the CA under B. P. Blg. 129 as amended by R. A. 7902.
> Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) OJ to issue writs of (CPMQH) mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) EOJ over actions for annulment of judgment of RTCs (under Rule 47); and
(3) EAJ over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the SEC, the
Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the CSC,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the SC in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under PD No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the 4th paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
> power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials or hearings in the CA must be continuous and must be completed within  (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice." (As amended by R. A, No. 7902)

3. RTC
B) Jurisdiction of the RTCs under B. P. Blg. 129 as amended by R. A. 7691. 
Section 19. Jurisdiction of the RTC  in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,/ any interest
therein, where the assessed value exceeds  (P400,000,00), except for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer (FEUD) of lands/buildings, original  jurisdiction of which is conferred
upon the MeTCs, MTC in cities, MTCs, MCTCs
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(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds
(P2,000,000.00); 
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds (P2,000,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; (Repealed
by Section 5(d) of R. A. No.8369, The Family Courts Act of 1997.)
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and (Repealed bySection 5 of R. A. No. 8369.
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds  2M

Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – RTC shall exercise OJ: 

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and 
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. 

Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – RTCs shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all

cases decided by MeTCs, MTCs, MCTCs  in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such
cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required
by the RTCs. The decision of the RTCs in such cases shall be appealable by petition for
review to the CA which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima
facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. 

Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The SC may designate certain
branches of the RTCs to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the
jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the SC
may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. 

Section 3 of R. A. No. 11576 introduces a new provision, to wit:

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SEC. 3. Delegated Authority of the SC to Adjust the   Jurisdictional Amounts for First and
Second Level Courts. – The SC, unless otherwise provided by law, without prejudice,
however, on the part of the Congress to adjust the amounts when the  circumstancesso
warrant, may adjust the jurisdictional amount for first and second level courts to:
(1) reflect the extraordinary supervening inflation  or deflation of currency;
(2) reflect change in the land valuation; or
(3) maintain the proportion of caseload  between first and second level courts.
- ***
-

a. Intellectual property courts

b. Special courts
2. Family courts
- ***
-
C) Jurisdiction of the Family Courts under R. A. No. 8369, otherwise known as
The Family Courts Act of 1997.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
(a) x x x x;
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; 
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; 
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those
relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together
under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected
children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related
laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;(Inapplicable)
i) x x x x;
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j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of

Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by RA
No. 7658; and 
k) Cases of domestic violence against: 
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical
abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood,
integrity and freedom movement; and 
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to
their development. 
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
1. MeTC
MTC in Cities
MTC
MCTC

IN CIVIL CASES
 
A) Jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC, MCTC and MTCC under B. P. Blg. 129 as
amended by R. A. No.7691 and R. A. No. 11576.
R. A. No. 11576 was signed by the Pres on July 30, 2021 and would have taken effect
15 days after its publication. The amendments introduced by R. A. No. 11576 are
underlined.
Section 33. Jurisdiction of MTC, MeTC, MCTC in Civil Cases. –:
 
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over:
 civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
 including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate,
 or amount of the demand does not exceed (P2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged: 
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 Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation

expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
(2) EOJ over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession; and
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
 title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed (P400,000.00), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: 
 Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."

(4) EOJ in admiralty and maritime actions where the demand or claim does not
exceed (P2,000,000.00).

Section 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases.

MeTC, MTC,MCTC may be assigned by the SC to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested
lots where the value of which does not exceed (P100,000.00),
 such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in
the same manner as decisions of the RTCs."

Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial
Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or
applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional
Trial Judges sit. 
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***

2. Sandiganbayan

CIVPRO CASE DOCTRINES

(Jurisdiction and Rules 1 to 33)

I. JURISDICTION

6. SANDIGANBAYAN

SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 162059             January 22, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

1) A government scholar in U. P., in her capacity as student

regent who is not receiving any salary, may be charged with estafa
in the Sandiganbayan under Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606
which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise jurisdiction
over “Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. A
student regent performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. Compensation is merely
incidental and not an essential element of public office.
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2) A public official may be charged in the Sandiganbayan with

estafa if it is alleged in the information that she committed the same
in relation to her office under Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. A
public officer is said to have committed the crime in relation to her
office if she committed the same while in the performance of his
official functions or if she took advantage of her office to commit
the crime.
3) Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners
to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as an order denying a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed. The reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.

DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 191894               July 15, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

1) The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a Regional

Director of the BIR with Salary Grade 26. Under P. D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional
Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Since Regional
Director is not included among the public officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), he must have a salary
grade of at least 27 to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2) The Supreme Court has ruled that the following are included
among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A)
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(1) (a) to (g) to be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, to

wit: (1) a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod; (2) a department
manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth); (3) a student regent of the University of the
Philippines and (4) a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the
Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and
Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
DE LIMA vs. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) Under Section 90 of RA 9165, the RTC shall exercise

jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of
RA 9165 even if the same is committed by a public officer having a
salary grade of at least 27 and the crime is committed in relation to
her office. Section 90 of RA 9165 is an exception, couched in the
special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section
4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the
latter is to be considered as an exception to the general. The only
exception to the exception is when the violation of R. A. No. 9165 is
committed by a minor in which case the Family Court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action.
7. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE CUERDO
G.R. No. 175723               February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
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1) A superior court exercising exclusive appellate jurisdiction

over a particular case pending in a lower court shall likewise
exercise original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued by such lower court in
the said case pending. Pursuant to this doctrine, since the Court of
Tax Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a case
for tax refund pending in the RTC, it follows that the CTA also
exercises original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in said tax
refund case.

2) It would be incongruent with the pronounced judicial

abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the
law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC
by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the
CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial
court in the same case. The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC should carry
with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid
of such appellate jurisdiction.
3) While there is no express grant of such power to the CTA,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests on the
Supreme Court and lower courts judicial power which includes the
duty of the courts x x x to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
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In view of the foregoing, the power of the CTA includes that of

determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.
CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY CO. vs. PROV. OF
NUEVA ECIJA
G.R. No. 196278               June 17, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) An action for injunction pending before the RTC seeking to

enjoin a local government from collecting real property tax
from a taxpayer is a local tax case over which the CTA
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Since the CTA
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such case, it also
exercises original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari
filed by the taxpayer seeking to annul the order of the RTC
denying his application for a writ of preliminary injunction
in said case. The doctrine established in the case of City of
Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo was applied in this case.
2)

LOMONDOT vs. JUDGE BALINDONG

G.R. No. 192463               July 13, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
1) The Shari’a Appellate Court was established by R. A. No.
9054 to exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the
Shari’a District Courts. It shall also exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus,
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and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate

jurisdiction. Considering, however, that the Shari’a Appellate Court
has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice
and two Associate Justices, appeals or petitions from final orders or
decisions of the SDC shall be filed with the CA shall be referred to a
Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably
composed of Muslim CA Justices.
MUN. OF TANGKAL vs. HON. BALINDONG
G.R. No.  193340 January 11, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:

1) While the Code of Muslim Personal Laws vests on SDCs

concurrent jurisdiction over personal and real actions wherein the
parties involved are Muslims, the SDC has no jurisdiction over an
action for recovery of possession of real property filed by a Muslim
individual against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim, the
reason being that the real party in interest in the case is not the
mayor but the municipality which cannot be considered a Muslim.

D. CONCEPT, DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATION OF THE

FOLLOWING:

1. Delegated Jurisdiction
2. Special Jurisdiction
3. Limited Jurisdiction
4. Primary Jurisdiction

UNDURAN vs. ABERASTURI

G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
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1) Pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act

of 1997 (IPRA), the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same Indigenous Cultural
Communities and Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP) group. When such
claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP.

Thus, even if the real issue involves dispute over a land which
appear to be located within the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is
not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try and
decide the case. In exceptional cases1 under Sections 52, 54 and 62
of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims
and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same
ICC/IP group.
2) The IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole
jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the
rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, the NCIP
maintains primary jurisdiction over: (1) adverse claims and border
disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (2)
cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles (CADTs); and (3) disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights
between members of the same ICC/IP group.
3) Under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
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same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or
among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the
proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under
Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well
as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over
adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of
ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued
CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/ IPs, or
members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of
ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group.

LBP vs. DALAUTA

G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, the SAC (RTC) may

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over a petition for
determination of just compensation filed by the landowner despite
the fact that the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation of
the subject property had long attained finality by the lapse of 15
days from notice.

Although the rules speak of directly appealing the decision of

adjudicators to the SAC, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus,
direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
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2) The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a

judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the 'justness' of the decreed compensation. 
3) There is nothing contradictory between DAR’s primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters"
and SAC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation. The first refers
to administrative proceedings, while the second refers
to judicial proceedings.

5. Residual Jurisdiction
DEV. BANK OF THE PHIL. vs. CARPIO
G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Residual jurisdiction is the authority of the trial court to issue

orders (1) for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; (2)
to approve compromises; (3) to permit appeals by indigent litigants;
(4) to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2,
 18

Rule 39; and (5) to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided
these are done after the trial court has lost jurisdiction over the case
and prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal to the appellate court.
2) The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a
stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction
over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage
is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of
the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the
trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal
of the appeal.
3) Before the trial court can exercise residual jurisdiction over a
case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted, a judgment
rendered and an appeal perfected. If trial has not been conducted, the
court cannot exercise residual jurisdiction.
6. Equity Jurisdiction
REGULUS DEV., INC. vs. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016
BRION, J.:

1) While the RTC may have lost its appellate jurisdiction over
the case due to its dismissal in the MTC, it may still exercise equity
jurisdiction in order to provide complete justice. A court may
exercise equity jurisdiction in cases where it is unable, as a court of
 19

law, to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case

because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a
given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction,
among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution. Thus, the order of the RTC as an appellate court which
allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and
occupation of the leased premises was issued pursuant to its equity
jurisdiction because it has already lost its appellate jurisdiction.
2) The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from
its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not
have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment
case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment
case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the
complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of it’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.
3) A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening
events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution of the
issue without any practical use or value.39 Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness
except when, among others, the case is capable of repetition yet
evades judicial review.
7. Epistolary Jurisdiction
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. REYES
G.R. No. 180771               April 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 20

1) Epistolary jurisdiction is the presumed power of the court to

relax technical rules of procedure in public interest litigation such as
accepting letters from oppressed people as petitions to initiate
appropriate proceedings in court in lieu of petitions filed in strict
compliance with the technical rules of procedure. The petitioners in
the instant case invoked the “epistolary jurisdiction” of the Supreme
Court to accord resident mammals such as whales, dolphins and
porpoises locus standi in the case.

Under the concept of “epistolary jurisdiction”, courts are said to

have the constitutional duty to deliver speedy and cheap justice at
affordable cost in Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The courts must
adopt new kinds of procedural techniques in dealing with PIL. Many
technical rules of procedure must be relaxed. Acting on letters
written by or on behalf of the oppressed people is one such strategy
by which the courts can facilitate access to justice. Letters may be
converted into writ petitions for the reason that one could not expect
a person acting pro bono on behalf of oppressed individuals to incur
expenses from his pocket to have a regular writ petition prepared by
a lawyer.
2) The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward
of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.
3) The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows
filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any
Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of
environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It
 21

is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not

real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party
in interest.
Oposa v. Factoran expanded the concept of "real party in
interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a
recognition of this court's ruling in. This court recognized the
capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit
on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's
access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
4) Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic under
the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

9. Expanded/Extended Jurisdiction
EDCEL C. LAGMAN vs. PIMENTEL III
G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018
TIJAM, J.:
 22

1) Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution grants the courts

judicial power (1) to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and (2) to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. The first part is to
be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter
part, an innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as the
court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction,
courts can now delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government traditionally considered as political if such act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Jurisdictional Estoppel
Duero vs. CA (farmer)
G. R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002

1) The defendant, an unschooled farmer, is not barred by laches or

estoppel from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
case in his motion for reconsideration of the order denying his petition for
relief from judgment despite his having actively participated in the trial of
the case by filing a motion for new trial and petition for relief from
judgment in the same trial court. For estoppel to apply, the action giving
rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
2) Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its
misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, it
was the plaintiff who filed the complaint before the RTC which did not have
jurisdiction over the action to recover real property. The defendant, an
unschooled farmer, could not be expected to know the nuances of
 23

jurisdiction and related issues. He should not be penalized for committing

the honest mistake of initially filing his motions with the RTC, before he
realized that the case was outside the RTC’s jurisdiction. To hold him in
estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a
proper resolution of his case.

It is also important to note that the defendant raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case was
still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial
as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for
reconsideration.

Donato vs. CA
G. R. No. 129638 December 8, 2013

1) The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the

CA is to file with the Supreme Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. However, if the error, subject of the recourse,
is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to him would be a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. 

Gonzaga vs. CA
G. R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002

1) A party who files an action with a court to secure affirmative relief

cannot, after failing to obtain such relief in a final and executory judgment,
assail the jurisdiction of the court. The issue is not whether the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or not but whether the
party should be barred by estoppel from raising the issue of the court’s lack
 24

of jurisdiction which he himself invoked by filing the action with the court
having no jurisdiction.

MANILA BANKERS vs. NG KOK WEI

G.R. No. 139791               December 12, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) The defendant who actively participated in the trial of the case in the
RTC and did not raise the issue of its lack of jurisdiction in his appeal with
the Court of Appeals is estopped from raising for the first time the issue of
the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction in the petition for review on certiorari which
he filed with the Supreme Court. A party cannot participate in the
proceedings and submit the case for decision and then accept the judgment,
only if favorable, and attack it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. 173946               June 19, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

1) The principle of estoppel by laches applies only when the issue is the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It finds no
application whatsoever if the issue is the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Under Section 1 of Rule 9, if the defendant fails to
raise the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his person either in a
motion to dismiss or in his answer, he is deemed to have waived such
objection. Estoppel by laches would have no relevance whatsoever.
Hierarchy of Courts
AGAN vs. PIATCO
 25

G. R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003

1) In a petition for certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when (1) the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the lower courts or where (2) exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction. The rule may
also be relaxed if (3) exceptional circumstances exist and the case is
of transcendental importance such as when it involves the construction and
operation of the country’s premier international airport. Another reason for
relaxing the rule on hierarchy of courts is when (4) crucial issues submitted
for resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal
interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution and other important
laws.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY vs. ATIENZA

G. R. No. 154599  January 21, 2004
1) For the Supreme Court to give due course to a petition for certiorari
in derogation of the rule on hierarchy of courts, a special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance must be shown in the
petition. The SC has consistently adhered to the judicial policy that it will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Liga’s
petition is bereft of such requirements.

SAINT MARY CRUSADE vs. RIEL

G.R. No. 176508               January 12, 2015
 26

BERSAMIN, J.:

1) The filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari directly with the
Supreme Court to assail the order of the RTC dismissing his petition for
econstitution of title is in violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort (to the SC) is allowed
only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that
ustify the same. The Supreme Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
mpertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more
undamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. 
INTRAMUROS ADMIN. vs. OFFSHORE CONSTR’N
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
LEONEN, J.:

1) A petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court to

assail the judgment of the RTC affirming the decision of the MTC is not
only an improper remedy, a petition for review under Rule 42 being the
correct one, it also violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.
2) The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts is
intended to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only
determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before
them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may
include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance
in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they
 27

are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly
perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as
these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts
occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual
case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action.
The consequences, of course, would be national in scope.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. GALLEGOS
G.R. No. 210759               June 23, 2015

1) Lower courts should not construe a resolution of the Supreme Court

as a mere request, and should comply with it promptly and
completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a
recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful
order and directive. Judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts take
their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as
a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a
necessity. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law
which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary itself.
Residual Prerogatives
 28

KATON vs. PALANCA

G.R. No. 151149             September 7, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

1) “Residual prerogative” is the power of a court under Section 1 of Rule

9, whether the court is exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, to motu
proprio dismiss the case when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
“Residual prerogative” is different from the “residual jurisdiction” of a
court embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41.

2) In Gumabon v. Larin, it was held that the motu proprio dismissal of a

case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.
Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a
violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, however, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when
it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
PAT-OG vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 198755               June 5, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:
 29

1) Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same

parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the others.
2) Sec 9 of R.A. No. 4670 provides that the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee constituted therein. Also, under Sec 23 of R.A. No.
7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board
of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing,
to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher
for causes enumerated therein. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it
had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.

Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation

FIRST SARMIENTO vs. PBCOM

G.R. No. 20283 June 19, 2018
LEONEN, J
 30

1) To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter

is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal
relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief
sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a
claim over a sum of money or real property results as a consequence of the
principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
doctrine established in this case overturned the ruling in the case of Home
Guaranty vs. R-II Builders where it was held that even if the action is for
annulment of contract which normally is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, if the real objective is to recover real property, the action will
be treated as a real action and therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.

II. RULES 1 – 5
A. Actions, Commencement (S3 and S5, R1)

ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE

GR No. 138822, January 22, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

1) As held in Suson vs. CA and Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion, the non-
payment of the correct docket fees does not warrant the immediate
dismissal of the case or permissive counterclaim provided such docket
fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period and there is no showing that the plaintiff or counterclaimant
has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees.
 31

2) As capsulized in Valencia v. CA, the tests that may be used in

determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, are as
follows:

1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?

2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim

absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?

3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s

claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?

4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the

counterclaim?

If the answer to any of the foregoing questions is “yes”, the

counterclaim is compulsory.

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court

of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires
“a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the court.”

PROTON PILIPINAS vs. BANQUE NATIONALE

G. R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005
 32

1) The failure of the plaintiff to pay the correct docket fees because
he merely relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court which turned
out to be incorrect is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the case
but he should be allowed to pay the correct docket fees. This is in line
with the ruling in Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion where it was held that if
the plaintiff was not in bad faith and has demonstrated his willingness to
pay the deficiency in the docket fees, then the case should not be
dismissed but he should be allowed to pay the correct docket fees
provided it is paid within the prescriptive or reglementary period. In
Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, the case was dismissed
because it was shown that there was an effort on the part of the plaintiff
to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS vs. FORMARAN

G. R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009

1) If there was a clear attempt on the part of the plaintiff to avoid paying
higher docket fees for a real action by filing an action for annulment of
contract when his real purpose was to recover title to real property, then
his case should be dismissed without allowing him to pay the deficiency.
Payment of the correct docket fees is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY vs. COBARRUBIAS

G. R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010

1) The payment in full of the appeal docket fees is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional. The failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal
docket fees shall be a ground for the dismissal of his appeal and the
judgment appealed from becoming final and executory. The right to appeal
 33

is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege. For this reason, appeal
must be made strictly in accordance with the requirements prescribed by
law.

GIPA vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

G.R. No.177425               June 18, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) Applying the rule that the payment of the full amount of appellate
court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and jurisdictional, the failure of
the appellant to pay the 30-peso deficiency in the appeal docket fees
despite the lapse of 9 months from notice warrants the dismissal of the
appeal. The appellant’s invocation of the liberal application of the rules
cannot be granted because of his failure to adequately explain his failure to
abide by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the application of the
rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
reasons warranting such departure.
2) The rule that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court. 
SY-VARGAS vs. ESTATE OF OGSOS
G.R. No. 221062 October 05, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) The nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not

the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
 34

counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other

hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that
no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter.

2) A party’s failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should

not necessarily lead to the dismissal of his permissive counterclaim. It
has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of
the claimant to defraud the government.

CAMASO vs. TSM SHIPPING, INC

G.R. No. 223290 November 07, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1) It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part
of the claimant to defraud the government.
In the instant case, when the petitioner filed with the CA
his certiorari petition by mail, he attached thereto a personal check as
payment of the docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of
payment, the attachment of such personal check shows that the petitioner
exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this
 35

exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the
government.
2) There are certain peculiar circumstances that may warrant a relaxation
of the rules on payment of docket fees. The strict application of the rule
may be qualified by the following: first, failure to pay the docket fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court
in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of
circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
B. One suit for one action (S3, R2)
Splitting a single cause of action (S4, R2)
Joinder of causes of action (S5, R2)

DYNAMIC BUILDERS vs. PRESBITERO

G.R. No. 174202               April 7, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

1) Rule 2, Sect 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a

party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause
of action." Moreover, Sec 4 discusses the splitting of a single
cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of
action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose
primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the
courts.
 36

This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public

respondent’s Decision and Resolution on the protest — the same
Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition
before the RTC. In essence, petitioner seeks the same relief
through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This
violates the rule against forum shopping.
2) In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants
resorting to two different for a for the purpose of obtaining the
same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is
important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or
administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to
grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different
courts or for a on the same issues. forum shopping is present
when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1)
parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
3) RA No. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the
SC, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or
entity to restrain, prohibit or compel the bidding or awarding of a
contract or project of the national government. The only
exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency involving
 37

a constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary restraining

order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
C. Parties to civil actions (S1, R3)
Joinder of parties (S6, 7, R3)
Indispensable and necessary parties (S7 & 8, R3)
Class suit (S12, R3)
Death or separation of a party (S16,17, 18, R3)
Transfer of interest (S19, R3)
Contractual money claims (S20, R3)
RELUCIO vs. OPEZ
G.R. No. 138497            January 16, 2002
PARDO, J.:

1) A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the

defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of
a cause of action are:
(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
(b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and
(c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 11
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be
rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.
 38

2) A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who

ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action. In the context of the wife’s petition to be
appointed sole administratrix of the conjugal properties, forfeiture of
her husband’s share thereof, support and accounting, she would be
accorded complete relief if her husband is ordered to account for his
alleged conjugal partnership property, give support to her and her
children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with to the wife and
dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property
with her. The husband’s concubine with whom he lived for many
years would not be a real party in interest in the petition.
If the concubine is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom
there can be no final determination of an action. The concubine is
likewise not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a
judgment ordering the husband to make an accounting of his
conjugal partnership with the wife, and give support to respondent
and their children, and dissolve the husband’s conjugal partnership
with his wife, and forfeit the husband’s share in the property co-
owned by him and his wife. Such judgment would be perfectly valid
and enforceable against her husband without his concubine being
impleaded as co-responded with him.
DE CASTRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115838           July 18, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
 39

1) When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the

obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency,
each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The
agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-
principals. Since the agent/obligee may recover the whole obligation
from any one of the co-principals/co-obligors, the former may sue
any one of the latter to recover the whole obligation without joining
the others based on Article 1216 of the Civil Code. The other co-
principals/co-obligors are neither necessary or indispensable parties.
2) In Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc., it
was ruled that x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit filed by the oblige/creditor. Article 1216
of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone
of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously'.
ORQUIOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141463            August 6, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) A judgment cannot be enforced against the judgment

obligor’s successor-in-interest if (1) the latter was not impleaded as
a defendant; (2) he purchased the subject property from the
judgment obligor before the filing of the action; (3) he acquired
Torrens title over the property immediately after the purchase and
(4) he relied on judgment obligor’s Torrens title over the subject
property at the time of the purchase. The rule would be different if
the four conditions are not present.
CHINA BANKING CORP. vs. OLIVER
 40

G.R. No. 135796             October 3, 2002

QUISUMBING, J.:

1) In an action for annulment of the deed of mortgage filed

against the mortgagee by a person who claims to be the registered
owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor with the same name
as the petitioner and who submitted a TCT of the mortgaged
property is not an indispensable party.
A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by
a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. In the
instant case, the mortgagee has interest in the loan which is distinct
and divisible from the mortgagor’s interest in the land he used as
collateral for the loan.
Further, a declaration of the mortgage’s nullity in the case will
not necessarily prejudice the mortgagor. The mortgagee still needs
to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who in turn can
raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them. A party is also not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply
avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of the mortgagee and the
mortgagor. The latter’s participation in this case will simply enable
the mortgagee to make its claim against the mortgagor in the case,
and hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus, it was the
mortgagee who should have filed a third-party complaint or other
action versus the mortgagor.
 41

DAVID vs. PARAGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 176973               February 25, 2015
1) As a rule, an appellate court may only resolve errors that were
assigned by the appellant. The appellate court may, however, by way of
exceptions, resolve unassigned errors if they pertain to the following
matters:

a) Matters affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;

b) Matters which are evidently plain or clerical errors

within the contemplation of the law;

c) Matters the consideration of which is necessary in

arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice;

d) Matters of record which were raised in the trial court

and which have some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;

e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and

f) Matters upon which the determination of a question

properly assigned is dependent.

2) A compromise agreement could not be the basis of a judgment or

the dismissal of the complaint and counterclaims if it was entered into
with an entity which is not a party to the suit.
 42

3) The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence

of all indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction
to try the case and render a valid and binding judgement.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions

of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a mere procedural matter. Rather, it is a blatant
violation of the absent party’s constitutional right to due process.
LAND BANK vs. CACAYURAN
G.R. No. 191667               April 17, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) A longtime resident of the municipality has the locus standi

to file a taxpayer’s suit against certain municipal officials and Land
Bank to assail, among others, the validity of the loan applied for by
the municipality with Land Bank for a municipal project on the
ground that the lot used as collateral thereof is property of public
dominion and therefore, beyond the commerce of man. Land Bank’s
argument that the taxpayer’s suit is improper because the proceeds
of the loan to be used for the construction of the project are not
public funds is untenable because, eventually, the loan would be
paid form public funds.
2) It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
 43

invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer,

however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other
words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met
namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is
directly affected by the alleged act.
LOTTE PHIL. CO. vs. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1) In a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals by

the employees against the NLRC and the principal (Lotte) assailing
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC declaring the labor-
only contractor (7J), not the principal (Lotte), as the employer and
therefore liable for illegal dismissal and the employees’ backwages,
the labor-only contractor is an indispensable party and should have
been impleaded as respondent, together with NLRC and the
principal, Lotte.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in
interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the
employer of petitioners (employees).
2) An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
 44

necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority

to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case". Thus,
without the presence of an indispensable party to a suit,
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
CARABEO vs. DINGCO
G.R. No. 190823               April 4, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
1) The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which
do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental.
In the present action for specific performance, the plaintiff was
pursuing a property right arising from a contract of sale, whereas the
defendant was invoking nullity of the contract to protect his
proprietary interest. Since the action involves property rights, it
survives the death of party.
2) The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of
authority. Thus, any action taken by the counsel on behalf of his
deceased client would have no effect.
DE LA CRUZ vs. JOAQUIN
G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005
 45

1) The Rules require that when a party to a pending action dies, he

should be substituted by his legal representatives. This requirement is
necessitated by due process. Thus, even if there is no or there is belated
formal substitution in accordance with the Rules but the legal
representatives of the deceased party were recognized by the court and
were able to participate in the case, the decision remains valid.

The general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is

not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the
case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
2) Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. 
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in
one case amounts to res judicata in another.41 We note, however,
petitioners’ claim that the subject matter of the present case has already
been litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine is res
judicata.
Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in
the previous suit. The term literally means a "matter adjudged, judicially
acted upon, or settled by judgment." The principle bars a subsequent suit
involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Public
policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given
point in time.
 46

The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment

or order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered on the merits of the
controversy; (3) the court that rendered it must have had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must have been --
between the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
The onus of proving allegations of forum shopping rests upon the
party raising them. The latter must therefore provide the court with
relevant and clear specifications that would show the presence of an
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the present
and the earlier suits.
NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788               November 27, 2009
BRION, J.:

1) There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to bring suit

in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for
profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner
thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name,
and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical
or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to
file or defend an action in court. In an action involving the sole
proprietorship, therefore, it is the proprietor who is the real party in
interest. The descriptive words "doing business as “name of sole
proprietorship" may be added to the title of the case, as is
customarily done.
 47

2) The registration of the sole proprietorship in the name of one

person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the
woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
DIVINAGRACIA vs. PARILLA
G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) In an action for judicial partition, all the co-heirs and

persons having an interest in the property, including vendees and
those who have allegedly sold their respective shares, are
indispensable parties. An action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of all said parties.
2) An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
 48

ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO vs. VILAR

G.R. No. 225309 March 06, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

1) The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The

presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the
right to act in a case. Thus, the failure to implead an indispensable
party to a suit will render all the proceedings thereof null and void
and prevent the judgment of the court from attaining real finality.

D. VENUE OF ACTIONS OF REAL

AND PERSONAL ACTIONS

PACIFIC CONSUL’NTS vs. SCHONFELD

G.R. No. 166920             February 19, 2007
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1) While stipulations regarding venue are considered valid and

enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should
be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but,
rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict
venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them. For a
stipulation regarding venue to supersede the provisions of Rule 4, it
 49

must use the restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in

this court," "in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else
but/except —," or words of equal import.
2) “Forum non conveniens” (forum is not convenient) is the
doctrine which allows a court with jurisdiction over a case to dismiss
it because the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice
would be better served if the case were brought in a court having
proper jurisdiction in another venue — compare change of venue.
The mere fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle forum
non coveniens for the following reasons: First. The Labor Code of
the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground
for the dismissal of the complaint. Second. The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense. Third.
The following circumstances are present: [a] Philippine Court may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided,
that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision.
BIACO vs. COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
G.R. No. 161417             February 8, 2007
TINGA, J.:

1) An action in personam is an action against a person on the

basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against
 50

the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem
is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or
lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements.
2) While in an action in rem or quasi in rem it is sufficient if
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, the defendant must still
be properly served summons not to vest on the court jurisdiction
over him but to satisfy the requirement of due process. The violation
of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want
of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the
judgment of the trial court.
3) Foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both
actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential. Service of summons on the defendant is
required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over
 51

his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play,

so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in which he
has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the
adverse party, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity
to defend in the action, should he be so minded.
4) Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act
committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by
the prevailing party.11 Extrinsic fraud is present where
the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or
where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and
connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK vs. YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796               July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial

foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it
does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest
 52

therein. In the light of the foregoing, the venue of the extrajudicial

foreclosure or mortgage need not be the same as the venue of the
action to recover the deficiency, which, being a personal action,
shall be commenced in the proper court of the place where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

2) The court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case on the

ground of improper venue.
3) It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it
is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action
is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of
Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or
possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property is a real action.  The real action is to be commenced and
tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal
actions.  such actions may include those brought for the recovery of
personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages
for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue
of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for
which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
 53

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. RAMOS

G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017
REYES, JR., J:

1) In Briones v. Court of Appeals, it was held that in cases

where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or
coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive
venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the
parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the
ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint
directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should
not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue.
To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this
nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact,
precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such
stipulation is contained.

2) Stipulations on venue may either be permissive or restrictive.

"Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that
the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place
agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of
the parties respecting the matter."

As a rule, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive

merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves
the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating
venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
 54

designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute

actions arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say,
as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule
4.

Thus, since restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the

general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and
categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place
or places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4.
In Spouses Lantin, the Court ruled that "the
words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue are
restrictive. In the instant case, the following stipulation on venue is
considered restrictive, to wit:

18. In the event of suit arising from out of or in connection with

this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this
mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of
action exclusively in the proper court/s of Makati, Metro Manila,
the mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue.

2) Service made through registered mail is proved by the

registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the
person mailing of facts showing compliance with the rule.
E. SUMMARY PROCEDURE vs. SMALL CLAIMS

- What are their salient characteristics

- How to determine if the case is summary or
under small claims
- OCA 45-2019: increased amounts of small
 55

claims to P400,000.

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. MONDEJAR

January 22, 2014 G.R. No. 200804

1) Considering that decisions of the MTC in small claims cases are,

under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases (A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC, effective October 1, 2008) are final and unappealable, the
prevailing party may immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless,
the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2) The foregoing general rule has been enunciated in the case of
Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held
that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked
when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of
the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually
determines the propriety of certiorari.
III. KINDS OF PLEADINGS (Rule 6)
 56

(S1 to S13)

A. Pleadings: Complaint, Answer, Counterclaim, Cross-claim,

Reply, Third-Party Complaint, Counter-counterclaim.

- Permissive vs. Compulsory counterclaim

B. Defenses: Negative, Affirmative, Negative Pregnant

ALBA vs. MALAPAJO

G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.:

1) To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or

permissive, the following questions must be answere: (a) Are the
issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’
claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A “yes”
answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
LIM TECK CHUAN vs. UY
G. R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J.:

1) Under Rule 17, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of

his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the
 57

dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be

without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the
same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to
have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the
complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest such preference to
the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff’s motion
to dismiss.  These alternative remedies of the defendant are available
to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. 

METOROBANK vs. CPR PROMOTIONS

G.R. No. 200567               June 22, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) A defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be

interposed at the time he files his Answer, and the failure to do so
shall effectively bar such claim. In the instant case, what
respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Then, realizing, based on its
computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess
bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their
Appellant’s Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents’
belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their
failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently,
respondents’ claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.
VALDEZ vs. DABON
 58

A.C. No. 7353 November 16, 2015

Per Curiam:

1) While respondent interposed a blanket denial of the romantic

involvement that he had with a woman not his wife, nonetheless he
seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not
attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. More telling is
that respondent devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the
affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual
abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of the
woman, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
The respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled
with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant
is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance
alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. It is clear from
respondent’s Comment that his denial only pertained as to the
existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial
thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with
Sonia.
CANELAND SUGAR CORP. vs. ALON
G.R. No. 142896             September 12, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
 59

1) In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative

pregnant is defined as a "form of negative expression which carries
with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact itself is admitted."
IV. RULE 7: PARTS AND CONTENTS OF A PLEADING (S1-
6)
A. Parts: Caption, Body, Relief, Date
B. Signature and Address
C. Verification vs. Certification
D. Parts vs. Contents

ALMA JOSE vs. JAVELLANA

G.R. No. 158239               January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory are

as follows - A final order disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the
court has determined. An interlocutory order does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
 60

the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to
ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
Whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether
appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an
appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.

MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSING

G.R. No. 186720               February 8, 2012
REYES, J.:
1) The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has
 61

relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification

considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

2) In the following instances, the signature of one of several

plaintiffs or petitioners in the verification or certificate of non-forum
shopping was deemed sufficient:

a) In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v.

Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association, it was held that
the signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complied with the rules because all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense.
b) The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v.
Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the
certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of
the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest.
c) Where all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a
common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common
cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof, the
signature of one of the petitioners in the verification or certification
would suffice.
d) Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a
common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that
only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification
of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the
action.
 62

3) The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a

condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its
purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct
any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized
exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action
for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
a) Where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo
had no jurisdiction;
b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; 
d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; 
e) Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there
is extreme urgency of relief;
f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process;
 63

h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.
4) There is forum shopping when the elements of litis
pendentia are present, i.e., between actions pending before courts,
there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites
for auter action pendant or lis pendens. 

COA vs. PALER

G.R. No. 172623               March 3, 2010
CORONA, J.:

1) Where the petitioner is the Commission on Appointments, a

government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its
Chairman, there is no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally
know the truth of the facts alleged in the petition may sign the
verification. 

With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum

shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
 64

plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel, unless he

has been duly authorized.

BASAN vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.

G.R. Nos. 174365-66               February 4, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

1) While the general rule is that the verification and

certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them may be
deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement.
The rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.

When under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when

all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
certification requirement.
PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO
G.R. No. 207041 November 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

1) Under the amendatory Resolution dated January 14, 2014

which amended Bar Matter No. 1922, the failure of a lawyer to
indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or
 65

her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the

dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the
prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

2) Before Bar Matter No. 1922 was amended, the failure of the
investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number
and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal action. The old provisions of
B.M. No. 1922 required practicing members of the bar to indicate in
all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.
An information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an
initiatory pleading because it is a written statement that contains the
cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the State as
represented by the prosecutor, against the accused. Like a pleading,
the Information is also filed in court for appropriate judgment.
Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely within the ambit of
Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.

2) To avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases

brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution,
dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing
the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause
 66

the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty
and disciplinary action."
POWERHOUSE, INC. vs. REY
G.R. No. 190203 November 07, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.:
1) The following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board
resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the
President of a corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case. The rationale behind this rule is that these
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation are deemed
to be in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition.

2) In the instant case, the verification and certification attached

to the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was signed the
President and General Manager of the petitioner corporation, one of
the officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception.
HEIRS OF GABRIEL vs. CEBRERO
G.R. No. 222737 November 12, 2018
PERALTA, J.:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
 67

As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby. Verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance

therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons".

2) The certification against forum shopping must be signed

by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.

3) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be

executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign,
 68

he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel

of record to sign on his behalf.

V. RULE 8: MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN

PLEADINGS (S1-S13)

A. Allegations in pleadings: ultimate facts and

evidence
B. Actionable documents: how to allege, how to
contest
C. Affirmative defenses in the answer; effects

FERNANDO MEDICAL vs. WESLEYAN UNIV.

G.R. NO. 207970 January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on

the pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by
the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends
on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate
facts alleged in the complaint. The defending party’s answer either
admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer
admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the
truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer
properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.

2) The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts

of the adverse party’s pleadings not only when it expressly confesses
 69

the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to deal with them
at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by
specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes
only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of
fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending
party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the denial
is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material
allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only
the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so
in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so
specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the
amount of unliquidated damages.
GO TONG ELEC. vs. BPI FAM. SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 187487               June 29, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) Under Section 8 of Rule 8, the mere use of the phrases

"specifically deny” the material allegation “for being self-serving
and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes" does not
constitute an effective specific denial of said material allegation. A
denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become
specific by the use of the word "specifically." Neither does it
become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a
 70

broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are "self-

serving" or are intended "to suit plaintiff’s purposes."
2) The authenticity and due execution of the plaintiff’s
actionable document may be properly denied by the defendant
declaring under oath in his answer that he did not sign the document
or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Failing in this, the
defendant will be deemed to have admitted both the genuineness and
due execution of the actionable document. Section 8 of Rule 8
provides, as follows:
Section 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or
defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does
not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
ASIAN CONST. & DEV. CORP. vs. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 176949               June 27, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) A document is actionable when an action or defense is

grounded upon such written instrument or document. In the instant
case, the Charge Invoices are not actionable documents per se as
these "only provide details on the alleged transactions." These
documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these
are evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondent’s cause of action is not
 71

based on these documents but on the contract of sale between the

parties. Under the 2019 amendments, however, evidentiary matters
must be attached to the complaint together with the judicial
affidavits of witnesses.
Section 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an
action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document,
the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in
the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to
the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading.
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. 117434      February 9, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:

1) The admission by the adverse party of the due execution and

genuineness of a document simply means that "the party whose
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by
him.” When the law makes use of the phrase 'genuineness and due
execution of the instrument' it means nothing more than that the
instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its
face from the one executed.
 72

2) However, admission by the adverse party of the due

execution and genuineness of a document does not preclude him
from presenting evidence to prove that the contents thereof is not
true or accurate.

VI. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

(S1 to S3)

A. Effect of failure to plead

B. Waiver of defenses and objections
C. Default
- when to declare
- how to declare
- Order of default vs. judgment by default;
remedies
BDO vs. TRANSIPEK
G. R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009

1) The proper remedy for an order of default is not a motion for

reconsideration but a motion to lift order of default under Section
3(b) of Rule 9. A motion to lift order of default should be verified
and the defendant must show that he was prevented from filing his
answer within the prescribed period due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense.

SALVADOR vs. RABAJA

G.R. No. 199990               February 4, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
 73

1) A party’s failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not

result in him being declared in default. Under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to
file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if
a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can
present his evidence ex parte. Section 5 of Rule 18 provides, as
follows:

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to

appear (at the pre-trial conference) shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte
and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

BITTE vs. JONAS

G. R. No. 212256 December 9, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
1) A defendant who has been declared in default is not
precluded from appealing the judgment by default. The rule is that
the right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can
be done on grounds that (1) the amount of the judgment is excessive
or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that (2) the plaintiff
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that (3)
the decision is contrary to law." If a party who has been declared in
default has in his arsenal the remedy of appeal from the judgment of
default on the basis of the decision having been issued against the
evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and
opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court. Despite
being burdened by the circumstances of default, the defaulted
 74

defendant may still use all other remedies available to question not
only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before
this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
VII. RULE 10: AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
PLEADINGS (S1 to S9)
A. Amendments: 1) a matter of right or discretion
2) formal or substantial
B. Amendment to conform to evidence, not necessary
C. Effects of Amendments
D. Supplemental pleadings

YUJUICO vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET

G.R. No. 211113        June 29, 2015
PEREZ, J.:

1) The rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to

amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is
amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if
the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it
is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon
prior leave of court.

2) As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat

motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is
especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early
stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial. Our case law had long
 75

taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in

the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be
prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for
leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the
proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of
an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended
pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.
LISAM ENTERPRISES vs. BANCO DE ORO
G.R. No. 143264               April 23, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter

particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and
that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the
action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the
amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such
amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the
higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

2) The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to

pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
 76

especially in this case where the amendment was made before the
trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed
by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
3) Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored
and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that
every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts
and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry
of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of
permission to amend.
REMINGTON INDUS. SALES CORP. vs. CA
G.R. No. 133657            May 29, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1) The filing of a motion to dismiss does not preclude the

plaintiff from amending the complaint as a matter of right, a motion
to dismiss not being a responsive pleading. If the rule is otherwise,
the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be
rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to
do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the
complaint before he files an answer.

2) Section 2 of Rule 10 states that a pleading may be amended

as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only
means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule
is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this
 77

provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed

without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any
material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer.
3) Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have
been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file
an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented
any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the
complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant
still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations
against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer.
Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his
complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer
by the defendant.
X. RULE 13: FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS,
JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS (S1 to S19)
PALILEO vs. PLANTERS DEV. BANK
G.R. No. 193650               October 8, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) The filing with the court or service to the adverse party of a

motion or pleading by courier service (LBC) is a mode not provided
in the Rules. Under the 2019 amendments, this rule is no longer
applicable.

HEIRS OF MIRANDA vs. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 179638               July 8, 2013
 78

1) Under Section 3 of Rule, pleadings may be filed in court

either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of
filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is
the date of receipt. Since the filing of the Notice of Appeal via a
private courier is a mode of filing not provided in the Rules, the date
of its delivery of pleadings to the LBC could not to be considered as
the date of filing thereof. Instead, it is the date of actual receipt by
the court which would be deemed as the date of filing of the NOA.
This rule may no longer apply because of the 2019 amendments.

XI. RULE 14: SUMMONS (S1 – S23)

VALMONTE vs. CA
G.R. No. 108538     January 22, 1996

1) In actions in rem or quasi in rem, such as partition, jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is not a resident and not found in the Philippines, he must be
served summons extraterritorially in accordance with S17 of R14.
Service of summons in the manner provided in S17 is not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of
the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in
the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take
steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.6
 79

As explained in the leading case of Banco Español Filipino v.

Palanca :
An action quasi in rem differs from an action in rem in that in the
former a specific defendant is named and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening
the property.
In an action for partition, which is an action quasi in rem, a
defendant who is not a resident and not found in the Philippines cannot be
properly served summons for purposes of complying with due process
through her co-defendant/husband in the Philippines absent special
authority to receive the summons on her behalf. She must be served
summons in accordance with S17 of R14.

MILLENIUM IND. COM. CORP. vs. TAN

G.R. No. 131724. February 28, 2000

1) It is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on

persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
In G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,  we ruled that
although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated
in Section 13 of Rule 14 (this is under the old rules prior to 1997), if it
appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose
has been attained.

In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated

the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance, to wit:
 80

(a) There must be actual receipt of the summons by the

person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the
summons from the Sheriff to the person served;

(b) The person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's

return; and

(c) There must be actual receipt of the summons by the

corporation through the person on whom the summons was
actually served.

The third requisite is the most important for it is through such

receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.

Since summons was served on the defendant corporation on

November 21, 1995, the ruling in this case was based on Section 13,
Rule 14 of the old rules prior to the July 1, 1997 amendments.

E. B. VILLAROSA v. BENITO
GR No. 136426, Aug 06, 1999

1) Service of summons on the branch manager of defendant E. B.

Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro,
instead of upon the general manager at its principal office was improper
and did not vest on the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
This ruling was based on Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

SANTOS, JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION

 81

G.R. NO. 170943, September 23, 2008

1) Under Section 14, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

service of summons by publication on a defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown will vest on the court jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant even in actions in personam.

2) A defendant who was served summons by publication because his

whereabouts are unknown need not be furnished notice of further
proceedings after he is declared in default. He simply could not be served
notice of further proceedings because his whereabouts are unknown.
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility.
MASON vs. CA
G.R. No. 144662 : October 13, 2003

1) The doctrine of substantial compliance established in the

Millenium case which was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were
still in force and effect has already been overturned by the ruling in the
Villarosa case which was decided based on the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus, service of summons on defendant corporation through
its filing clerk was declare invalid by the Supreme Court.

JOSE v. BOYON
G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003

1) The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the

service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of
 82

personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because

substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It
is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only
as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and
fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders
said service ineffective.12
2) With regards to the requirements of substituted service of
summons and the effect of noncompliance with the subsequent
proceedings therefor, the SC has held that the impossibility of
personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot
be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
3) Extraterritorial service of summons, particularly service of
summons by publication, applies only when the defendant is not a
resident and not found in the Philippines and the action is in
rem or quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the
trial court was an action for specific performance, an action which
the SC has consistently considered as an action in personam.

MANOTOC vs. CA
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
 83

1) The following are the requirements for a valid

substituted service of summons:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The sheriff’s return must show that defendant could not be
personally served summons within a reasonable time or that there is
impossibility of prompt personal service or summons. A period of
one month from the issuance of summons within which to
personally serve summons on the defendant can be considered
"reasonable time".
It must be shown in the sheriff’s return that he made at least
three (3) attempts on at least two different dates to personally serve
the summons on the defendant. He must also cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find
the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant
must be specified to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
 84

A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained

the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
The person on whom the substituted service will be made must
be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in
the Return.
ONG v. CO
G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015

1) The ruling in this case strictly applied the doctrine established in

Manotoc with regards to a valid substituted service of summons. In this
case, the SC declared that the substituted service of summons as invalid
because of the following reasons, to wit:
“The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the
attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve
the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after several futile
attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state
the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal
service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the
attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each
unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were
inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant
 85

in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on

petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to
justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person

who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply
stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It
did not expound on the competence of the security officer to
receive the summons.

Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to

indicate any portion of the records which would describe the
specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent
did not even claim that petitioner made any voluntary
appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-
0306.”

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407         January 17, 2005

1) Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in

order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be
followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than
that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.

The server must clearly state in his return that he left a copy of
the summons and the complaint at the residence of the defendant at
the time of the service with a person of sufficient age and discretion
 86

then residing therein. He must also indicate in his return what

specific actions he took to make sure that the residence where he left
a copy of the summons was the actual residence of the defendant at
the time of the service. Moreover, he must clearly show the efforts
he took to determine that the person with whom he left the summons
was a resident of the house of the defendant and that he was of
sufficient age and discretion.

The ruling in this case with regards to substituted service of

summons follows close the rulings in Manotoc vs. CA, Hamilton vs.
Levy and Keister vs. Narcereo.

DOLE PHILIPPINES v. QUILALA 

GR No. 168723 Jul 09, 2008

1) Initially, the SC opined that there was no proper service of

summons on the defendant corporation because summons was
served on an employee of another corporation and there was no
showing that she was duly authorized by the president of the
defendant corporation to receive the summons for him. The SC,
however, eventually ruled that the court acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant corporation by the latter’s voluntary appearance.
The filing by the defendant of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
 87

In the case at bar, when the defendant corporation filed a

motion for additional time to file responsive pleading, it effectively
sought affirmative relief from the court, invoked its jurisdiction and
acknowledged receipt of the summons thereby voluntarily
submitting itself to its jurisdiction.

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. v. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL

ROBINA CORP.
G.R. No. 181517, July 06, 2015

1) The rules on service of summons upon a   domestic

private juridical entity must be strictly complied with, otherwise, the
court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.

In the case at bar, summons was served on a certain Tinio, a

member of the defendant corporation’s accounting staff. Although it
was claimed that Tinio received the summons upon the instruction
of the defendant corporation’s general manager, such fact did not
appear in the sheriff’s return. Neither was the sheriff presented to
testify to such fact. This is regardless of the fact that the defendant
corporation may have actually received the summons. The doctrine
of substantial compliance has already been superseded.

GUY vs. GACOTT

January 13, 2016 G.R. No. 206147

1) Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or

mutual agency, whereby any partner can generally represent the
 88

partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit

against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and
every partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical
entity that has a distinct and separate personality from the persons
composing it.

In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a

judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties
and their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the
action in court. A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action
or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded
therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of
a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. The principle
that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action
or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., the Court declared that a
person not impleaded and given the opportunity to take
part in the proceedings was not bound by the decision
declaring as null and void the title from which his title to
the property had been derived. The effect of a judgment
could not be extended to non-parties by simply issuing an
alias writ of execution against them, for no man should be
prejudiced by any proceeding to which he was a stranger.

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. v. TIARA

COMMERCIAL CORP.
G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017
 89

1) Service of summons on the financial supervisor of the

defendant corporation was improper and did not vest the court
jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. Section 11 of Rule 14
requires strict compliance and the old doctrine that substantial
compliance is sufficient no longer applies. In E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito, the SC ruled that the liberal construction
of the rules cannot be invoked as a substitute for the plain
requirements stated in Section 11 of Rule 14. In Mason v. Court of
Appeals,  it definitively ruled that Villarosa settled the question of
the application of the rule on substantial compliance.
The SC ruled, however, that while the defendant corporation
was not properly served summons, it voluntarily appeared before
and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court when it filed its
pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction
over it and even prayed that it be allowed to reserve the presentation
of additional evidence.

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION v. CA

GR No. 158836, Sep 30, 2015

1) In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy

Hong Pi, et al., the SC discussed that voluntary appearance in court
may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court.

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is

acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted
over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule
 90

that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions (a) to
admit answer, (b) for additional time to file answer, (c) for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and (d) to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission
to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept
of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over
his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

1)Special appearance operates as an exception to
( the general rule on voluntary appearance;

2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of

the court over the person of the defendant must be
( explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and

3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary

submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking
(
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate

Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency could not be deemed as
a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of the case show that
the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and
 91

repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First

Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.

TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. NUSTAD

G. R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
1) While petitioner’s motion to dismiss challenged the
jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground of improper service of
summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary
appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the
proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.

XII. RULE 15: MOTIONS (S1 – S13)

REPUBLIC vs. DIMARUCOT
G.R. No. 202069 March 07, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:
1) The 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of
movant but for the adverse party, in order to avoid surprises and
grant the latter sufficient time to study the motion and enable it to
meet the arguments interposed therein. The duty to ensure receipt by
the adverse party at least three days before the proposed hearing date
necessarily falls on the movant.

Depending on the nature of the case and the issues involved

therein, however, the application of the above mentioned rule may
be relaxed. It is well settled that procedural rules may be relaxed in
 92

the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the strict and rigid

application, of procedural rules which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.

NOTE: The foregoing doctrine is no longer applicable because

of the 2019 amendments which removed the requirement of notice
of hearing for all litigious motions.

ACAMPADO vs. COSMILLA
G.R. No. 198531 September 28, 2015
PEREZ, J.:

1) A Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious (ligigious)

motion that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing
and service to the adverse party as mandated by Sections 4 and 6 of
Rule 15. The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be
directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place
for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously
complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does
not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of
court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to
act upon.

NOTE: The foregoing doctrine laid down in the instant case

and in Laude vs. Gines-Jabalde is no longer applicable because of
the 2019 amendments which removed the requirement of notice of
hearing for all litigious motions.
 93

DE GUZMAN vs. OCHOA

G.R. No. 169292 April 13, 2011
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Section 8 of Rule 15 defines an omnibus motion as a motion

attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is
an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other
omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at
the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred
from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1,
Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is
barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred
by the statute of limitations or prescription.

2) In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of

defective verification and certification of forum shopping only when
they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this
ground was existent and available to them at the time of the filing of
their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain
this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and
certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no
longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
dismiss.

NOTE: Rule 16 has been deleted and some of its provisions

have been transposed to Rule 15.
 94

XV. RULE 19: INTERVENTION (S1 – S4)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. SISON

G.R. No. 185954       February 16, 2010

1) To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,

two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding.

The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the

matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a
legal interest in the appeal to the Court of Appeals of its own
resolution finding respondent Sison administratively liable. It is not
one which would be directly affected by the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. It must be remembered that the legal interest required
for an intervention must be direct and immediate in character.
Moreover, what was brought on appeal before the Court of
Appeals was the very Decision by the Office of the Ombudsman
(finding respondent Sison administratively liable). Plainly, the
Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an
advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of the
appealed case.
 95

2) Petitioner’s motion for intervention was filed out of time.

Rule 19 provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the
instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on
July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on
June 26, 2008.
In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of the
Ombudsman v. Samaniego. That case, however, is not applicable
here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion for
intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA.
In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of the
Ombudsman v. Samaniego.22 That case, however, is not applicable
here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion for
intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA.

AÑONUEVO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI

G.R. No. 178221               December 1, 2010

1) A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit

discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action
or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court
has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action
or proceeding, to intervene therein.

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an

uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply
an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the
allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only
 96

be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind

of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
RODRIQUEZ vs. CA
G. R. No. 168286 August 24, 2005

1) The rule is well-settled that after the intervenor has been

allowed by the trial court to appear in the action, any compromise
agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the intervenor that
does not defeat or constitute a waiver of their respective claims
against the defendant will not give the latter a valid ground to ask for
the dismissal of the original action filed by the plaintiff against him
nor the intervenor’s claim against him.

YAO vs. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828             October 24, 2003

1) A judgment creditor has no legal interest in the matter in

litigation that would warrant his intervention in an action for
prohibition filed by a person not a party in the original action whose
share in a property co-owned with the judgment debtor was
wrongfully levied for execution sale.

Assuming he had a legal interest in the matter in litigation, his

motion to intervene was properly denied by the trial court for having
been filed more than a month after judgment was rendered in the
action for prohibition.

PINLAC vs. CA,

G.R. No. 91486 September 10, 2003
 97

1) On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines,

represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the SC a motion for
intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention in a petition for certiorari
where the SC has already rendered a decision. To justify granting
the RP’s motion for intervention despite its late filing, the SC made
the following pronouncements:

“The rule on intervention, like all other rules of

procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court
fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to
facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims
overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing
thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has
allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was
allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed
judgment was already submitted for decision in the
Supreme Court.
In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was
granted even after the decision became final and
executory, thus
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention
shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the
full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same. But needless to say, this discretion should be
exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all
the circumstances obtaining in the case.
 98

CHIPONGIAN vs. BENITEZ-LIRIO

G. R. No. 162692 August 26, 2015

1) Intervention is "a remedy by which a third party, not

originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein
to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings." If an intervention
makes a third party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-
in-intervention should form part of the main case.  Accordingly,
when the petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP-797,
his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became
part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject
to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, which deals with appeals in special
proceedings.
Thus, petitioner’s appeal by notice of appeal of the judgment of
the court dismissing his complaint-in-intervention was improper.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in
special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal as
required by Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

XVII. RULE 23 – 29: MODES OF DISCOVERY

A. Rule 23. Depositions pending actions (S1-29)

PEOPLE vs. M. C. SERGIO

 99

G. R. No. 240053 October 9, 2019

Hernando, J,:

1) Under Section 5 of Rule 119, the prosecution may, under

Rule 23, take the deposition of its witness who is in prison awaiting
execution in a foreign country. This is a liberal interpretation of
Section 5 of Rule 119 which allows the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness before the court before which the case is
pending if he is too sick or infirm to appear before the court or has to
depart from the Philippines without a definite date of returning.
DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC. vs. REYES
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993

1) Petitioner objects to the taking of deposition of two

witnesses of the adverse party in Taipei (Taiwan) on various
grounds.

The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a

foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its
'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the
deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of
the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a
commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action
is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the
Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-
examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse
party.
Petitioner also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode
of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to
 100

trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is
no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-
trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of
witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a
Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the
event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of
Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and
executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
Dasmariñas further claims that the taking of deposition under
the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where the
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently
unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to
present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from
the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is
obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to
the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge."
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account
rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It
precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits
such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual
appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without
being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the
Judge."
 101

PEOPLE vs. WEBB

G. R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
1) The trial court judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when she denied accused Webb’s motion to take
deposition by oral examination of five US-based defense witnesses
whose testimonies were only intended to prove the veracity of the
contents as well as the admissibility of certain exhibits which, in
fact, had already been offered by the accused Webb and admitted in
evidence by the trial court.

The trial court was correct in opining that the depositions

proposed by accused Webb to be taken from the five U.S. based
witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature.
The trial court also correctly observed that allowing the taking of
deposition would only be a superfluous exercise that will not
reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on
record.

VDA. DE MANGUERRA vs. RISOS

G.R. No. 152643             August 28, 2008

1) The deposition of a prosecution witness who is claimed to be

too sick to travel and appear before the court where the criminal case
in pending cannot be taken under Rule 23. Such prosecution witness
may only testify and be examined before the court where the case is
pending under Section 15 of Rule 119. The prosecution’s claim that
its witness is very sick does not exempt her from the application but,
in fact, places her squarely within the coverage of Section 15 of
 102

Rule119 which expressly applies when the prosecution witness “is

too sick or infirm to appear at the trial.

The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the

purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear
mandate of Section 15 of Rule 119. If the deposition is made
elsewhere, as allowed by Rule 23, the accused may not be able to
attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness’ deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.
Section 15 of Rule 119 is designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights.

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G. R. No. 175730 July 5, 2019

1) In regard to the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition filed

by petitioner, it is important to note that there are two instances
when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule
23:  (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has
been served.  Both instances presuppose that the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.  By seeking the relief
contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  Thus,
petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the
lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief
through the said provision.
 103

GO vs. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
1) The conditional examination of a sick and infirm prosecution
witness who cannot testify at the trial must still be done before the
court where the case is pending as mandated by Section 15 of Rule
119. The deposition of the prosecution witness cannot be taken
somewhere else, much less in a foreign country under Rule 23.

To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and

not before the very same court where the case is pending would not
only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to
observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra[19] where we further declared that –
While the prosecution has the right to preserve the testimony of
its witness in order to prove its case, the rules which are designed
mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights should
prevail. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

B. Rule 25: Interrogatories to parties (S1-S6)

AFULUGENCIA vs. METRO BANK

G. R. No. 185145 February 5. 2014
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1) Section 6 of Rule 25 which provides that “a party not

served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal” applies even when the adverse is a
corporation and the persons whose testimony in open court is sought
to be compelled are officers or employees thereof.
One of the purposes of Section 6 of Rule 25 is to prevent
fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order
and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party
who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case
if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition
or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant
result that a prior written interrogatory might bring.

PHIL. HEALTH vs. OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL

G.R. No. 193158 November 11, 2015

1) In an administrative case, a party’s motion to avail of modes

of discoveries such as Written Interrogatories under Rule 25 and
Production or Inspection of Documents or Things under Rule 27
may be denied in the following instances:

a) The facts sought to be elicited from through the written

interrogatories could already be seen from the allegations in as well
as attachments to the pleadings of complaint and answer;
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b) The written interrogatories are mistakenly addressed to an

officer of the adverse party who has no personal knowledge of the
facts sought to be elicited through the written interrogatories;

c) All the facts and issues that the movant wants to determine
through the written interrogatories could be addressed in the
summary hearing of the administrative case;

d) If the resort to the mode of discovery is clearly intended to

delay the summary proceeding of the administrative case.

D. Rule 26. Admission by adverse party (S1 – S5)

DUQUE vs. YU
G.R. No. 226130 February 19, 2018

1) Section 2 of Rule 26 provides that when a party to whom a

request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact fails to file a sworn statement answering it, he shall be
deemed to have admitted each of the matters of which admission
was requested.
The foregoing rule, however, does not apply when the party to
whom such request for admission was served had already
controverted the matters subject of such request in his earlier
pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission
have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the
requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. 
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The rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode

of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and
tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a
pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already
been alleged in the pleadings.
XIX. Rule 31: Consolidation or Severance (S1, 2)
REP. OF THE PHIL. vs.
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO
G.R. No. 199501               March 6, 2013

1) In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is

used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation
but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their
separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together
but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge
the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action
to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
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In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by

petitioner RP (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was consolidated with the
complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case
No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve the same parcel of
land and common questions of law and fact, each action retains its
separate and distinct character.
The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be
reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case
determines which private party has the better right of possession
over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues and
seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of
separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the
cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession proceeded
independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of
accordingly by the trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance
of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a judgment
already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting
the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is
consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound
discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not
mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case
from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on
such case.
METROBANK vs. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 169677               February 18, 2013

1) The general rule is that all the issues and claims in a case
should be tried jointly. It is only in exceptional instances when there
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are special and persuasive reasons for departing from the rule that
the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may allow that distinct
issues or causes of action asserted in the same case be tried
separately from the main action. The court may properly allow such
separate trial if the party seeking it clearly shows that a separate trial
would avoid prejudice, promote justice and further convenience for
and give a fair trial to all the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan committed grave

abuse of discretion when it ordered a separate trial of the cause of
action against Metrobank stating that the same was distinct and
separate from the case against the original defendants.
The cause of action against Metrobank was, in fact, necessarily
connected with the cause of action against the original defendants.
Should the Sandiganbayan decide in the main case that the subject
properties are ill-gotten and should be forfeited, such decision would
definitely prejudice Metrobank as it would also be deprived of its
title over the subject properties. If the case against Metrobank is
tried separately from the main action, such separate trial would
deprive Metrobank of its right to rebut the evidence presented by the
Republic in the main action.
XXI. Rule 33: Demurrer to Evidence (S1 and S2)

RADIOWEALTH FIN. CO. vs. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 138739               July 6, 2000

1) When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is

reversed on appeal, the appellate court shall not remand the case for
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further proceedings but rather should render judgment on the basis

of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff.

CABADOR vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 186001               October 2, 2009

1) In determining whether the motion filed by the accused is a

demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial, the court must consider (1) the
allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at
which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.

The fact that most of the allegations in the accused’s motion to

dismiss referred to the more than five-year delay in the prosecution
of the case as well as the repeated failure of the prosecution to
present and formally offer its evidence, making only a passing
mention of the weakness of the evidence against the accused, and
the fact that the motion was filed even before the prosecution has
formally offered its evidence, should establish that what was filed by
the accused was a motion to dismiss on the ground of the denial of
his right to a speedy trial and not a demurrer to evidence. The
distinction is important because if what was filed was a demurrer to
evidence and there was no leave of court, then its denial would
deprive the accused of his right to present evidence. A denial of a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the denial of the accused’s right
to a speedy trial would not, under any circumstance, deprive the
accused of his right to present evidence.

CLAUDIO vs. SARAZA

GR No. 213286 Aug 26, 2015
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1) A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss filed by the

defendant after the plaintiff has rested his case on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to produce at least prima facie evidence to prove the
material allegations in his complaint constituting his cause of action
against the defendant and consequently rendering the plaintiff
without any right to the reliefs he prayed for.
Thus, if after resting his case the plaintiff was able to produce
evidence that, standing alone and in the absence of controverting
evidence, would suffice to prove his cause of action against the
defendant, a demurrer to evidence filed by the latter should be
denied.

FELIPE vs. MGM MOTOR TRADING CORP.

G. R. No. 191849 September 23, 2015

1) If the defendant is able to show in his demurrer to evidence

that the plaintiff, after resting his case, failed to prove by prima facie
evidence the material facts alleged in the complaint constituting his
cause of action against the defendant and therefore not entitled to the
reliefs he prayed for, the trial court would be justified in granting the
demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case.

REPUBLIC vs. GIMENEZ

G. R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
Leonen

1) Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of

the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his
part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows
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that he is not entitled to the relief sought." The order of dismissal

must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting
demurrer is a judgment on the merits. It is imperative that it be a
reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and
the law on which it is based.

Demurrer to evidence should not be granted on the basis alone

of the plaintiff’s delay in formally offering his evidence because it
essentially deprives him of due process.

2) The quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings

under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases —
preponderance of evidence.

3) When a criminal case is dismissed on demurrer to evidence,

the dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal. Thus, once the court
grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. The prosecution, however, may
assail such acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

4) A judgement by the Sandiganbayan in a civil forfeiture case

under R. A. No. 1379 may properly be appealed to the SC by way of
Rule 45.

5) The Rules provide that "the court shall consider no evidence

which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary
because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
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at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the
purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

To consider a party's evidence which was not formally offered

during trial would deprive the other party of due process. Evidence
not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by
the court.

6) The purpose of requiring specific denials from the defendant

is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which
he intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he
relies upon to support the denial. There is, therefore, a proper
specific denial if the defendant sufficiently discloses the matters
which wishes to disprove during the trial and the matters he relies
upon in making such denial.
MACAPAGAL ARROYO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 220598 April 28, 2017

1) The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper

to assail an order of the court in a criminal action denying the
accused’s demurrer to evidence, the reason being that another
remedy is available in the ordinary course of law which is for the
accused to go to trial. Moreover, Section 23 of Rule 119 expressly
provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment."
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The foregoing rule, however, is not absolute. The Constitution

itself has imposed upon the courts the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and
despotic exercise of discretion. Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution expressly grants the courts the power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one
side. This is because the courts have the bounden constitutional duty
to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrer to evidence, the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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