1. Heirs of Hinog Bertuldo Hinog v.

v. Melicor ABALOS The trial court granted the motion but later on reinstated the case after the
payment of the correct docket fee.
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Hinog Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo
Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo
Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita Instead of filing for an MR, a supplemental pleading was filed by Atty.
C. Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Petalcorin appending therein the Deed of Sale of the lot in question. The trial
Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong, court denied the supplemental pleading on the ground that the Deed is a
Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III) new matter, never mentioned in the original answer prepared by Bertuldo’s
original counsel.
Respondent/s: MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition
BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE
Issue: (1) WON the petitioners may challenge the court’s jurisdiction? NO
Doctrine: After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by (2) WON the non-payment of the proper docket fee at the time of the filing of
seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental the complaint automatically causes the dismissal of the action? NO
pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred
by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party Ratio:
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the (1)
court's jurisdiction in the same case.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief
in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents,
Facts: The Balanes, the private respondents in this case, filed a complaint
petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's
for the recovery of ownership and possession as well as removal of
jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter
construction and damages (moral & exemplary) against Bertuldo Hinog.
challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would
It was alleged that the Balanes are the owners of a 1400sqm parcel of land
amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy
in Bohol, which they have rented to Bertuldo for 10 years with an annual
of the Court.
rental of 100php. Bertuldo, thereafter, constructed a house of light materials
in the said lot.
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did
not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket
However, after the expiry of the 10 years, Bertuldo refused to surrender the
fees. Instead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated
lot and even claimed ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of
in the proceedings before the trial court. It was only in September 22, 1998
absolute sale executed by one Tomas Pahac, with the alleged conformity of
or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of
the Balanes.
a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the
motion to expunge by Bertuldo's heirs.

Trial on the merits ensued but Bertuldo died without completing his After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before
evidence. the trial court and even invoked the trial court's authority in order to
ask for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely
Consequently, Bertuldo III designated Atty. Petalcorin to be his new counsel. stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by
The latter filed a motion to expunge the complaint and nullify all proceedings estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Although the
on the ground that the amount of damages claimed is not stated so the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as
proper docket fee was not paid by the Balanes hence the court did not the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may
acquire jurisdiction. Under the Manchester Ruling, Non- payment of the be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.
correct docket fee is jurisdictional.

1 | CIVPRO 2D
(2) The Court has held that the Manchester rule has been modified in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, which defined the following
guidelines involving the payment of docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fees
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
XXX
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket
fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment.[46] Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED

for lack of merit.
No costs.

2 | CIVPRO 2D
 2. De la Cruz v Joaquin AVILLON acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.
Petitioner/s: Spouses Julita de la Cruz and Felipe de la Cruz 3. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs
Respondent/s: Pedro Joaquin is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the
Doctrine: deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due
A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves process was violated.
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in 4. The heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in
defense of the deceased. the case. The appellate court had ordered his legal representatives
to appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal
Facts: had been ordered correctly.
1. A complaint was filed by Pedro Joaquin for the recovery of 5. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of
possession and ownership, cancellation of title, and damages jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due
against Sps. de la Cruz. process is not violated, as when the right of the representative
2. Joaquin alleged that he obtained a P9000 loan in 1974 from the or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
Sps., payable on 1979. This was secured by a Deed of Sale of a formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
parcel of land in Nueva Ecija in favor of the Sps. promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased
3. The parties also executed another document called “Kasunduan”. plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision.
4. Joaquin alleges that:
a. The Deed of Sale is actually an equitable mortgage as Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
seen in the Kasunduan Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners
5. RTC ruled that the parties entered into a sale with a right of
repurchase, and Joaquin exercised his right to repurchase when he
made two valid tender of payments. The Sps. were required to
reconvey the property.
6. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. In a Resolution in 2004, the CA
ordered the substitution by legal representatives, in view of
Joaquin’s death in 1988.
7. The Sps. assert that
a. There being no substitution by the heirs after Joaquin died
during the pendency of the case, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over litigation.

Issue: WHETHER the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the
death of Joaquin - NO

Ratio:
1. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of
Rule 3 ROC.
2. The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without
the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but
also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts

3 | CIVPRO 2D

3. Limbauan v Acosta - BALAGTAS
Petitioner/s: Charles Limbauan
Respondent/s: Faustino Acosta
Doctrine: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Facts:
1) In 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate in Kalookan for a
leprosarium.
a) However, the Gov’t only used 1/5th of the property.
b) AND under RA 4085, segregation of those with leprosy is
no longer mandated.
2) In the meantime, the State found it necessary to establish new
residential areas and utilizing inexpensive land in order to serve
low-income families whose housing needs can only be met by the
Government.
a) On April 26, 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 843
i) Allocating the property to the Department of
Health, the National Housing Corporation, the
PHHC and Department of Social Welfare and
Development
3) It was also decreed that:
a) More precise identities of the parcels of land allocated to
the government will be made only after a final survey shall
have been completed.
4) A joint PHHC-Bureau of Lands team was tasked to undertake the
necessary segregation survey and inquiries on private rights within
the Estate.
a) In the Interim, it was decreed that no transfer of title
shall be made until the enactment of a law allowing
the use of the site for purposes other than that of a
leprosarium.
5) In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant
portion of the Tala Estate and constructed his house.
a) In August, 1982, Faustino Acosta, who was then a
Barangay Councilman, executed a deed styled
"Registration of Property", attested by the Barangay
Captain over another vacant portion of the Estate.
6) Faustino Acosta then took possession of the property, constructed
a fence around the perimeter of the property and planted
vegetables thereon.
a) However, in 1984, Paulino Calanday took possession of
the said property without the consent of Faustino,
constructed an edifice thereon and used the same as a
beerhouse.
b) When Faustino remonstrated, Paulino led two (2) criminal
complaints against Faustino with the Metropolitan Trial
Court for "Malicious Mischief" and "Unjust Vexation".
i) However the Court issued an Order dismissing
the cases for failure of Paulino to comply with PD
1508.
7) Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita
Roces.
a) Juanita and Faustino entered into an oral contract of lease
over the parcel of land for a monthly rental of P60.00.
b) About a year thereafter, Juanita suddenly stopped paying
to Faustino her rentals for the property.
i) It turned out that Juanita conveyed the
beerhouse to her nephew, Charles Limbauan,
who assumed the lease from his aunt and who
then paid the monthly rentals for the property in
the amount of P60.00 to Faustino.
c) However, in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying
rentals to Faustino claiming that:
i) Since the property was government property,
Faustino had no right to lease the same and
collect the rentals therefore.
(1) However, Faustino did not file any
complaint nor unlawful detainer against
Charles.
8) Congress then approved Republic Act 7999:
a) Under which the State converted a portion of the Estate,
with a total area of 120 hectares, for use as a housing site
for residents and employees of the Department of Health,
with the National Housing Authority as the leading
implementing agency.
9) After the passage by Congress of Republic Act 7999, Faustino led
a complaint against Charles with the Lupon for ejectment, for failure
of Charles to pay his rentals from October, 1987.
a) The Lupon issued a "Certification to File Action"
10) On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of
Legal Aid of the University of the Philippines, sent a letter to
Charles:
4 | CIVPRO 2D
 a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property within five days
from notice
i) For his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the
amount of P60.00 a month since October, 1987.
b) Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate
the property.
11) Faustino, then led, on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful
Detainer" against Charles with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
a) Praying for the immediate restoration of the premises to
Faustino
12) Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino Acosta sent another letter
of demand to Charles Limbauan, dated March 7, 1996:
a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property this time within
15 days from notice,
i) Otherwise, Faustino will institute the appropriate
action for his eviction from the property.
ii) Charles Limbauan received the letter, on March
13, 1996, but refused to vacate the property.
iii) Faustino forthwith led a "Motion to Approve
Attached Amended Complaint" with the Court
which was granted by the Court.
13) Charles Limbauan interposed the defense that:
a) That Faustino had no cause of action against him
i) because the property on which the beerhouse
was constructed is owned by the government
since the government is the owner of the
property, Faustino had no right of possession
over the property and collect rentals therefore.
(1) Besides, it was unfair for Faustino, who
was already in possession of the lot at
No. 786 B. San Roque, Barangay 187 to
still claim possession over the subject
property.
b) And that the Court had no jurisdiction over the action of
the Faustino
i) As it was one of accion publiciana and not one
for unlawful detainer.
14) The MTC ruled in favor of Faustino.
a) Found that Faustino adduced evidence that Charles
Limbauan was a lessee over the property and, hence, the
Charles Limbauan was estopped from assailing Faustino’s
title over the property.
15) Charles Limbauan then led a "Petition for Review" with the CA and
posed the following issues:
a) whether or not the remedy of the Respondent in the
Metropolitan Trial Court for unlawful detainer was proper;
b) the subject property was government property and, hence,
cannot be the lawful subject of a lease contract between
the Petitioner and Respondent and, hence, the latter had
no right to have the Petitioner evicted from the property
and to collect rentals from him.
16) The CA dismissed the Petition for Review and affirmed the MTC’s
decision.
17) Charles Limbauan argues that there must be a prior demand to
vacate the leased premises and pay the rent and a 15-day period
from the time of demand must have lapsed before a complaint for
unlawful detainer may be commenced pursuant to Section 2, Rule
70. 1
a) According to Charles Limbauan, Faustino’s demand letter
gave him a five-day period only instead of fifteen (15) days
within which to comply with the demand to vacate.
i) A jurisdictional requisite, not having been
complied with, the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WoN the MTC erred in allowing the Amendment as its purpose
was to confer jurisdiction of the case upon itself -- NO, the MTC was
correct in allowing the Amendment by Faustino.
Ratio: [Only read #1 and #2 if u really want to understand the case (or if u
still have time), but if ur in a real hurry, proceed to #3 cuz that’s the important
part in this case]
1) In re: Section 2, Rule 70 (unlawful detainer)
a) The demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the
action for unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-
payment of rentals, as in this case.
b) The same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer
suit must be commenced:
i) Only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse
or expiration of 15 days in case of lands and 5
days in case of buildings:
(1) From the time the demand is made
upon the lessee.
c) The demand required and contemplated in Section 2 of
Rule 70 is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose
of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay
rent.
1 Metals Engineering vs CA (1988)
5 | CIVPRO 2D
 i) It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must
be pursued before resorting to judicial action
(1) Such that full compliance with the
demand would render unnecessary a
court action.
d) In short, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two
requisites must concur:
i) There must be failure to pay rent or to comply
with the conditions of the lease; and
ii) There must be demand both to pay or to comply
and vacate within the periods speci ed in Section
2, particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5
days in the case of buildings.
(1) The first requisite refers to the existence
of the cause of action for unlawful
detainer while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in
order that said cause of action may be
pursued.
e) As the subject matter in this case is a parcel of land, the
expiration of the fifteen-day period is a prerequisite to the
filing of an action for unlawful detainer.
2) In re: Faustino’s observance of the 15 day period:
a) Faustino’s first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave
petitioner five (5) days from receipt within which to pay the
unpaid rentals and vacate the premises.
i) Limbauan received the demand letter on January
10, 1996 while Faustino brought the action for
unlawful detainer on February 7, 1996, which
was clearly more than 15 days from the time
petitioner received the demand letter on
January 10, 1996 and well within the one-year
period set forth by Section 1, Rule 70.
ii) Thus, the fact that respondent's demand letter
granted petitioner five (5) days to pay and to
vacate the subject property is of no moment
(1) Because what is important and required
under Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the
lessor to allow a period of fifteen (15)
days to lapse before commencing an
action for unlawful detainer.
iii) Evidently, Faustino actually complied with this
requirement.
(1) Hence, MTC did not err for assuming
jurisdiction over Faustino’s complaint
and in not dismissing the same.
3) In re: Amendment
a) Upon the advice of the MTC, Faustino sent another
demand letter dated March 7, 1996 to Limbauan, this time
giving the latter fifteen (15) days within which to vacate the
subject property.
i) When Limbauan still refused, Faustino was
compelled to file a Motion to Approve Attached
Amended Complaint.
(1) The said motion was rightly granted by
the MTC in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 102
(a) Under this provision, a party
has the absolute right to
amend his pleading whether a
new cause of action or change
in theory is introduced, at any
time before the filing of any
responsive pleading.
(b) Undoubtedly, when Faustino
led his Amended Complaint on
May 16, 1996, no responsive
pleading had yet been filed
by Limbauan, thus, the MTC
validly admitted the said
amended complaint.
b) It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored
and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice
in order to determine every case as far as possible on its
merits without regard to technicalities.
i) This principle is generally recognized in order
that the real controversies between the parties
are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action
and needless expense.
c) Limbauan also contends that the MTC's purpose for
admitting the amended complaint was to eliminate the
jurisdictional defect of the original complaint.
2 Just to clarify: these were Accounts Receivables of Globe and Filmal since they
were selling subdivision houses through Contracts to Sell; they assigned it to PNB so
that if the buyers would pay, the proceeds would automatically go to PNB
6 | CIVPRO 2D
 i) Limbauan cites cases which declared that: the said demand letter dated March 7, 1996 was received
(1) The amendment of the complaint could by petitioner on March 13, 1996.
not be allowed when its purpose is to i) The letter granted Limbauan fifteen (15) days
confer jurisdiction upon the court, since within which to pay and vacate the subject
the court must first acquire jurisdiction property.
over the case in order to act validly ii) Faustino’s Amended Complaint was led on May
therein. 16, 1996 which was obviously two (2) months
d) Limbauan’s contention is devoid of merit. from the time petitioner had notice of the
i) As earlier discussed, Faustino’s original demand, and again more than 15 days as
complaint was free from any jurisdictional flaw required by Section 2, Rule 70.
and the MTC had jurisdiction over the case to h) In sum, Faustino clearly satisfied the jurisdictional
begin with. requirement of prior demand to vacate within the period
ii) Thus, the cited cases are not applicable in the set by the rules.
instant case. i) The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over both
iii) Hence, the MTC was correct in allowing the the original complaint and the amended
amendment. complaint.
e) Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that what determines
the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint Dispositive:
and the character of the relief sought.
f) A complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The
alleges that the withholding of the possession or the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is
refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily hereby AFFIRMED.
employing the terminology of the law.
i) Here, Faustino alleged that he acquired SO ORDERED.
possessory rights over the subject property by
virtue of a government grant.
(1) He leased the property to Limbauan for
a monthly rental of P60.00.
(2) When Limbauan failed to pay the
rentals, Faustino eventually sent two
demand letters asking petitioner to pay
and vacate the premises.
(3) Limbauan refused, thereby depriving
Faustino of possession of the subject
property.
(4) Clearly, the complaint alleges the
basic elements of an unlawful
detainer case, which are sufficient for
the purpose of vesting jurisdiction
over it in the MTC.
g) Likewise, Limbauan’s allegation in his petition that he
received Faustino’s second demand letter on May 8, 1996
was belied by the records of this case, the truth being that,

7 | CIVPRO 2D
 4. BORNALES
Petitioner: Spouses Anthony and Percita Oco
Respondents: Victor Limbaring
DOCTRINE: In an action on a contract, only the parties involved in such
contract are real parties in interest. Absent any stipulation that such
contract would involve third persons (Contracts pour artrui) or that such
transaction would result into a trust relationship (which would make a
trustor a real party in interest) would deem a third person NOT A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.
FACTS:
1. A certain Sabas Limbaring subdivided his lot covered by TCT
5628 into two lots. He then executed a part of such lot in favor
of Jennifer Limbaring through a deed of sale and another in
favor of Sarah Jane Limbaring. Accordingly, the original TCT
was cancelled and a TCT was issued each to Sabas and Jane.
2. Sensing some irregularities, Sabas’s daughter Percita Oco
filed a case of perjury and falsification of documents against
her uncle Victor Limbaring, the father of Sarah and Jennifer.
3. During the pre-litigation conference called by the City
Prosecutor, the parties agreed that the two parcels of land
should be reconveyed to Percita who was to pay respondent
all the expenses that had been incurred and would be incurred
due to the transfer of the titles to her name.
4. Victor demanded P30,000 for the estimates expenses for
documentation, capital gains and documentary stamp taxes
and other registration fees.
5. Percita succeeded in lowering the amount to P25,000 for which
she executed an undertaking.
6. Pursuant to their agreement, Victor facilitated the transfer of
the titles to Percita from his daughters. Percita left without
paying the P25,000.
7. Thus, Victor filed a complaint of rescission of the sales
contracts with recovery of possession and ownership of the
two parcels of land.
8. Oco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Victor was
not the real party in interest.
9. Victor contended that he was trustor, whose property was
being held in trust by his daughters. He averred that on the
assumption that he was not the real party in interest, he was
entitled to an amendment of the pleadings.
10. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
11. Oco filed an Answer with counterclaim alleging that:
a. Respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and
to have a certificate of title issued in his name but
failed because RA6657 prohibited the acquisition of
more than five hectares.
b. Through deceit and manipulation respondent was
able to convince Sabas to execute the two deeds of
sale
c. Sabas informed Percita that the agricultural land had
never been sold
d. She refused to pay the P25,000 because the
suspensive conditions stated in the promissory note
had never been complied with.
e. She paid for all the expenses incurred in their
transaction
f. Her alleged failure to pay the P25,000 and for other
deceits, Victor filed a criminal complaint, resulting for
the Victor to be guilty of forum shopping.
g. Victor was not the real party in interest and had no
legal standing to sue
h. The lots were acquired without paying any
consideration, thus should be returned to Percita
without consideration as well.
i. Deeds of Sale reconveying the lots acknowledged
receipt of consideration.
j. Oco filed a Demurrer to evidence
k. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim
l. Court of Appeals: A trust relationship was created
when Victor purchased the lot in favor of his
daughters thus, he is a real party in interest
m. Oco appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE/S:
1. Is Victor Limbaring a real party in interest? - NO
RATIO:
1. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that “a real
party in interest is the party who stands to party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest”
2. The abovementioned rule has 2 requirements: (a) to institute
an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest and (2)
8 | CIVPRO 2D
 the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.
3. The purposes of these provisions are (a) Prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title, or
interest in the case (b) require that the actual party entitled to
local legal relief be the one to prosecute the action (c) avoid
multiplicity of suits and (d) discourage litigation and keep it
within certain bounds pursuant to sound public policy.
4. Interest – within the meaning of the Rules means material
interest or an interest in the issue to be affected by the decree
or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved.
5. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
6. Not a real party in interest = case is dismissible on the ground
of lack of cause of action
7. Parties to a contract are the real parties in interest in an action
upon it, as consistently held by the Court. Thus, third parties to
be involved must be stated expressly (such as contracts pour
artrui). A mere incidental benefit is not enough.
8. In this case, the action involved is an action on a contract
which clearly show that Jennifer and Sarah Limbaring were the
vendors and Percitaa Oco was the vendee. As a rule these
three should the only be real parties in interest.
9. An argument that a trust relationship was formed is untenable.
In this case, there was no trust relationship that was
established. Victor only presented bare assertions ta trust was
created. Respondent failed to rebut the presumption that it is a
gift in favor of the child. Failure to rebut that the land given to
the daughters were actually not gifts but constitutes a trust
relationship does not create a trust relationship at all. This
scenario is the exemption of implied trusts in Art. 1448 of the
Civil Code.
10. Absent any clear proof that a trust was created, Victor cannot
be deemed a real party in interest.

9 | CIVPRO 2D
 5. Caravan Travel v. Abejar - BULATAO
Petitioner/s: CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Respondent/s: ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
Doctrine:
One who exercises substitute parental authority over the victim’s person
suffers actual loss and is considered as a real party in interest.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Facts:
● Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound
lane of Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV,
Parañaque City.
● A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-bound lane,
opposite Reyes.
● To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit
Reyes.
● Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her
aid and loaded her in the back of the van.
● Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to
bring Reyes to the hospital.
● Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked
inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van.
● An unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
hospital.
● Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the
van was Caravan.
● Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing
travels and tours.
● Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its
service driver.
● Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.
● Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the
accident.
● Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and
the person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for
damages against Bautista and Caravan.
● Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that
Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
● Summons could not be served on Bautista.
● Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant.
● The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion.
● RTC: found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the
vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar.
● CA: affirmed with modification.
● Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
CA’s assailed Resolution.
● Hence, this Petition was filed.
Issue:
1. W/N respondent Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an
action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death.
2. W/N petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Ratio:
I.
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered
actual loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.
● It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive
subject of the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or
negligence.
● The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less
the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana
and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the
inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from
culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover
damages from the person responsible therefor.
II.
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for
quasi-delict provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.
● Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
● The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules:
○ First, Article 2180's specification that "[e]mployers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees . . .
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.”
10 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○ Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that
registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by
the operation of their vehicles.
● These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in
which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle.
● Article 2180 requires proof of two things:
○ First, an employment relationship between the driver and
the owner;
○ Second, the driver acted within the scope of his or her
assigned tasks.
● On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered
owner of the vehicle.
● Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner
that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
● In light of this, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both
the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must
first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the
vehicle in question.
● Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have
been proven.
● As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
● This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the
vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that
between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry
the costs of moving forward with the evidence.
● The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to
the public.
● Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration
of the van that hit Reyes.
● The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van.
● Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
● Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises.
● It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability
under Article 2180.
● This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following:
○ First, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista;
○ Second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
assigned tasks;
○ Or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
● On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at
the time of the accident.
● On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the
accident.
● On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the
requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
● Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to
operate another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code
● Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when
it selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual
violation of law.
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because
Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious.
● The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.
● It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the
action.
● Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a
necessary party—should not have been dropped as a defendant, or
that petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been dropped,
petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed
with Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim
against Bautista as its remedy.
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded
actual damages to respondent.
● Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be
proved by the Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the
funeral expenses of Reyes. Thus, the Certificate that she identified
and testified to is not hearsay.
● Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found
Bautista grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that
Bautista's gross negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes'
death.
● As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from
the negligence of its driver.
● For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity is justified.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in
11 | CIVPRO 2D
the amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the time it was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from petitioner
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Regional Trial Court Decision until
full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the Court of Appeals Decision until full
satisfaction.

12 | CIVPRO 2D
 6. Guy v. Gacott - CAPACITE
Petitioner/s: Michael Guy
Respondent/s: Atty. Glenn Gacott
Doctrine:
A judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court.
A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does
not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall
be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party.
Facts:
● Gacott (from Palawan) purchased 2 transreceivers from Quantech
Systems Corp. (in Manila) through its employee, Medestomas.
○ Major defects - Gacott personally returned
○ Medestomas received and promised to replace within 2
weeks.
● Gacott did not receive the replacement units.
○ QSC: there were no available units and that it could not
refund the price.
● Gacott filed for damages.
○ RTC ordered QSC and Medestomas to pay Gacott -
became final so Gacott got a Writ of Execution
● Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but a general
partnership where Guy was the General Manager.
○ Sheriff verified in DOTC-LTO and learned that Guy had
vehicles registered.
○ Gacott instructed sheriff to attach 1 of the motor vehicles,
which he did.
■ Notice of Attachment was served upon the
custodian of DOTC-LTO and Guy.
● Guy filed a Motion to Lift Attachment, saying that he was not a
judgment debtor, and thus, his vehicle could not be attached.
○ RTC denied: Guy should be treated as general partner
who may be held solidarily liable with QSC and
Medestomas.
● Guy moved for reconsideration: he was neither impleaded as a
defendant nor validly served with summons and thus, RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
○ RTC denied; CA affirmed
Issue:
1. W/N the RTC’s jurisdiction over QSC extended to the person of
Guy
a. Flawed service of summons, but voluntary appearance
cured the defect
b. A partner must be separately impleaded before he can
be bound by a judgment - so NO
Ratio:
a.
● Section 11, Rule 14 of Rules of Civil Procedure - when the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the
service of summons may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
○ Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such
provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the
persons authorized to receive summons for juridical
entities.
■ QSC was never shown to have been served with
the summons through any of the enumerated
authorized persons to receive such
○ Service of summons upon persons other than those
officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons.
● Service of summons is merely procedural in nature and the lack of
or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the
defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an
answer.
○ QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons.
Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired through
voluntary appearance.
b.
● Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual
agency, whereby any partner can generally represent the
partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit
against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and
every partner.
○ A partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and
separate personality from the persons composing it.
● In relation to the rules of civil procedure, a judgment of a court is
conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-
in-interest after the commencement of the action in court.
○ A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or
proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not
13 | CIVPRO 2D
 impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely
affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party.
■ conforms to the guarantee of due process of law
● Guy was never made a party to the case.
○ He did not have any participation in the entire proceeding
until his vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became
QSC's "co-defendant debtor" during the judgment
execution stage.
● Money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor.
○ The power of the court in executing judgments extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone.
○ The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the
judgment debtor, not that of a third person.
● With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the partners is
not solidary.
○ The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be
raised by a partner impleaded in a complaint against the
partnership.
○ In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the
partners' liability be solidary in nature.3
■ It was not shown that Guy or the other partners
did a wrongful act or misapplied the money or
property he or the partnership received from
Gacott.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012
Decision and the March 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94816 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, is ORDERED TO
RELEASE Michael C. Guy's Suzuki Grand Vitara subject of the Notice of
Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.

3 Rule 6, Section 7

14 | CIVPRO 2D
 7. Tatlonghari v. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank - CASAMA
Petitioner/s: Sps. Tatlonghari & Eugenia Tatlonghari (Sps. Tatlonghari)
Respondent/s: Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank (Bangko)
Doctrine: As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat
motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is
especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of
proceedings or, at least, before trial.
Facts:
● A certain Pedro Ilagan filed a complaint for annulment of SPA, PN,
and REM against Bangko and sheriff of Batangas before the RTC
● He alleged that the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC had
posted and published notices of Sheriffs Sale against him as the
attorney-in-fact of a certain Matilde Valdez (Valdez), married to
Crispin Brual (Brual), and herein petitioners spouses Ernesto
and Eugenia Tatlonghari, setting the auction sale of properties
belonging respectively to the said couples allegedly for the
satisfaction of Pedro's indebtedness to Bangko amounting to
P3,000,000.00.
● He denied that he obtained a loan from Bangko and that Sps.
Tatlonghari or Valdez constituted him as an atty-in-fact for the
purpose of mortgaging their respective properties as collateral to
Bangko.
● After the original complaint was filed, Pedro convinced Sps.
Tatlonghari to join him in the civil case against Bangko
● Pedro informed Sps. Tatlonghari that Bangko used a falsified SPA
and made it appear that they had authorized him to obtain a loan
from it, secured by a real estate mortgage on their property which
was the subject of foreclosure proceedings
● Sps. Tatlonghari did not issue any SPA in favor of Pedro so they
agreed to join him in the case. They accepted Atty. Castillo
(Pedro’s counsel) to represent them
● Sps. Tatlonghari and Pedro together with Valdez and Brual, as
plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint (First Amended Complaint
- FAC) against defendants.
● Atty. Salva of the Salva Salva & Salva Law office entered the
appearance of the law firm as collaborating counsel for plaintiffs.
● Through Atty. Salva, plaintiffs filed a manifestation and motion for
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) to include
additional plaintiffs Sps. Tolentino and Sandoval, who had
previously purchased the mortgaged property of Valdez
● Valdez and Brual had since died so it is also sought to include their
estate and heirs as plaintiffs, as the latter’s consent to substitute
their predecessors could not be secured. Eugenia (Pedro’s spouse)
was included as plaintiff
● RTC admitted SAC; While the case is pending, Sps. Tatlonghari
discovered evidence which shows that it was Tolentino, one of
the co-plaintiffs was responsible for the anomalous
transaction with Bangko
● As Atty Castillo and Salva, the collaborating counsels of record,
were both hired by Pedro and Tolentino, Sps. Tatlonghari decided
to engage the services of their own counsel which is Atty.
Villanueva.
● Atty. Villanueva filed then a motion leave to file for third amended
complaint (TAC) alleging that the title to their property had already
been consolidated in favor of Bangko, and the original and
amended complaints contained no allegations or prayer pertaining
specifically to their cause of action against Bangko, which might bar
them from getting the complete relief in the civil case.
● TAC fully described the property in question and stated that it
was an entirely different property from the one covered by
REM in favor of Bangko. Sps. Tatlonghari prated for the
reconveyance of their property which Bangko maliciously and
unlawfully foreclosed.
● RTC denied motion to leave to file TAC. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether the motion for leave to file TAC must be denied? NO
Ratio:
● Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his
pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended
only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the
pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is
served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior
leave of court.
● As long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made
with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are
justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading.
● Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same
becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
appears that the court had abused its discretion.
● A meticulous inspection of the records reveal that other than
the allegation that they did not execute any SPA in favor of
Pedro authorizing him to use their property as collateral for his
loan with the bank, the FAC and SAC are bereft of any material
allegations pertaining to their personal involvement in the
case against Bangko.
● They contained no cause of action with respect to that of Sps.
Tatlonghari. SAC only contain specific relief for Sps. Sandoval
15 | CIVPRO 2D
 who purportedly the true and lawful owners of the property shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in
previously registered in the name of deceased Valdez. the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court,
● The RTC should have allowed such admission if only to prevent the intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his
circuitry of action and the unnecessary expense of filing another compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
complaint anew. Although it is true that the RTC exercises payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
discretion in this respect, it should have been more circumspect rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client
and liberal in the exercise of its discretion. With the admission of
the Third Amended Complaint, the ultimate goal of determining the
case on its real facts and affording complete relief to all the parties
involved in this case would then be realized.
● It appears from the records that the inexcusable delay upon which
the denial of Sps. Tatlonghari's motion was grounded was not their
fault nor was the same deliberately caused. Records are bereft of
evidence to show that such delay was attributable to them, or that
in filing their motion, they were impelled by bad faith.
● With respect to the lack of conforme of Atty. Salva on the Sps.
Tatlonghari's motion, there is no rule requiring the written
consent of a former attorney prior to his substitution. (Sec. 26,
Rule 138)
● What the rule requires is mere notice to the adverse party.
(Sec. 26, Rule 138)
● An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears. As such, Atty. Villanueva, who has
entered his appearance on behalf of the Sps. Tatlonghari and filed
their motion for leave to file third amended complaint, should be
recognized as their new counsel of record who is fully authorized to
act for and on their behalf.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated August 5, 2015 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126390 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7 is directed
to ADMIT petitioners' third amended complaint and continue with the
proceedings with utmost dispatch.
Notes:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from
any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in
court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In
case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in
his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced
to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he

16 | CIVPRO 2D
 8. Casent Realty v. Philbanking Corporation
CHANG | G.R. No. 150731| September 14, 2007 | VELASCO, JR., J.:
Petitioner/s: Casent Realty Development Corporation
Respondent/s: Philbanking Corporation
Doctrine: Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses
founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it.
It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides
the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the
Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying
it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted
Facts:
● On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 is the Decision and Resolution of
the CA in the case entitled Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty
Development Corporation.
○ The CA reversed the Order of the Makati City RTC,which granted
petitioners demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed
by respondent.
● In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty executed 2 promissory notes (PNs) in
favor of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) amounting to Php 981K, one
would become due on June 25, the other on June 27, 1985.
● Aug. 8, 1986: the PNs were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation
through a Deed of Assignment.
● Philbanking alleged that despite demands, Casent failed to pay the PNs
upon maturity such that its obligation already amounted to Php 5.6M as of
July 15, 1993. Philbanking filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the
Makati City RTC for the collection of said amount.
● In its Answer, Casent raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
1.The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same
was barred by estoppel, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches,
prescription, payment, and/or release;
2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded
and conveyed Casent’s property in Iloilo City to Philbanking, with the
intention of totally extinguishing Casent’s outstanding accounts with it.
● Petitioner presented a Confirmation Statement issued by
respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of
December 31, 1988.
3. Casent complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the
repurchase of the property since the obligation was fully paid. Philbanking
sent confirmation statements in the latter months of 1989, which showed that
Casent had no more outstanding loan; and
4. Assuming that Casent still owed Philbanking, the latter was already
estopped since in October 1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by
50% to wipe out a deficit of PhP 41,265,325.12.
● The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
conference.
● Thereafter, Philbanking presented its evidence and formally offered its
exhibits.
● Casent then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,
pointing out Philbanking’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which
raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of
the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the
Dacion obliterated petitioners obligation covered by the promissory notes,
the bank had no right to collect anymore.
RTC: ruled in favor of Casent and dismissed the complaint.
CA: reversed the decision of the RTC.
● It ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be
resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to
relief under the facts presented and the law.
● Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which
alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at
issue.
● The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, Philbanking clearly had
the right to proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty.
● Casent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Argument of Casent:
● when it presented these documents in its Answer, Philbanking should have
denied the same under oath.
● Since Philbanking failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution
of said documents were deemed admitted, thus also admitting that the loan
was already paid.
Argument of Philbanking:
● Philbanking states that while it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters were
deemed controverted pursuant to Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
● Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan of
petitioner.
17 | CIVPRO 2D
 Issues:
1. Does respondent’s failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission
of the genuineness and due execution of these documents? YES.
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to
evidence? If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient
to warrant the dismissal of the complaint? YES.
[Note: Petitioner still lost the case because the Dacion and the confirmation
statement did not prove that Casent’s liability has been extinguished. Read
the Notes.]
Ratio:
● Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
● Gutib v. Court of Appeals: defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue.
○ What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a
demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
based on the facts and the law.
○ The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which
pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects
such as capacity to sue.
● Casent points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement,
which were submitted in the Answer, should have been specifically
denied under oath by Philbanking in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets
forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.
● The facts referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by
the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings.
○ These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice,
stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendants evidence.
● Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted
the genuineness and due execution of said documents. This judicial
admission should have been considered by the CA in resolving the demurrer
to evidence.
● Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceeding in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
● On appeal to the CA, Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a
Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted
anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to
deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of
defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new
matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.
● We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or
defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of
denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely
provides the effect of failure to file a Reply.
● Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document,
a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the
genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
● Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence.
● We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines,
Inc. that [w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific
18 | CIVPRO 2D
verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001
Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO
ORDERED.

Notes:
Issue: WON the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove that
petitioners liability was extinguished.

Ratio:
● Respondent asserts that in executing the Dacion, the intention of
the parties was to settle only the loans of petitioner with
respondent, not the obligation of petitioner arising from the
promissory notes that were assigned by Rare Realty to respondent.
● Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of
evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes.
Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to
show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
● Long story short, Philbanking was able to prove that the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement extinguished Casent’s liability to it, which is
different from Casent’s liability to Rare Realty.

19 | CIVPRO 2D

8. Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito
Petitioner/s: Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor
Jaime C. Villanueva and the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi,
Respondent/s: Antonio B. Betito
Doctrine: Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the
complaint tenders several issues.
Facts:
● In NPC v. Province of Albay the Court found that NPC is liable for
unpaid real estate taxes on its properties (geothermal plants)
located in the Province of Albay. The properties were previously
sold at an auction sale conducted by Albay to satisfy NPC’s tax
liabilities. As the sole bidder, Albay acquired ownership over said
properties.
● The NPC, through its then President Malixi, and Albay, represented
by then Governor Salalima, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) where NPC agreed to settle its tax liabilities
estimated at P214M.
● Tiwi Mayor Corral requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful
tax shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPCs properties
were located relative to the payments already made by NPC to
Albay. The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 12-
92 requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay to hold a
joint session for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the
NPC payments. Governor Salalima replied that the request cannot
be granted as the initial payment was only an earnest money and
that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being
validated.
● Because of the conflict between Tiwi and Albay, NPC requested a
clarification from the Office of the President as to the extent of the
shares of the LGUs in the real estate tax collections.
● The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92
authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi in the
recovery of their rightful share in the realty taxes. Mayor Corral
sought the services of respondent Atty. Antonio B. Betito and Atty.
Alberto Lawenko. They entered into a Contract of Legal Services.
The contract provided, among others, that Betito and Lawenko
would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty
taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.
● OP, through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T.
Carpio, opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely
recognized and established NPCs realty taxes. The sharing
scheme and those entitled to the payments to be made by NPC
under the MOA should be that provided under the law, and since
Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may remit such
share directly to Tiwi.
● NPC President Malixi, through a letter, informed Mayor Corral and
Governor Salalima that starting with the January 1993 installment,
NPC will directly pay Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA.
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No. 09-
92 which authorized the Provincial Treasurer to sell the real
properties at a public auction, and to cause the immediate transfer
thereof to the winning bidder; and declared as forfeited in favor of
Albay, all the payments already made by NPC under the MOA.
● From Albay’s refusal to remit Tiwi’s share stemmed several
administrative complaints and court cases that Atty. Betito allegedly
handled on behalf of Tiwi to recover the latter’s rightful share in the
unpaid realty taxes, including the case of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.
In this case, the Court held, among others, that the elective officials
of Albay are administratively liable for abuse of authority due to
their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful share of Tiwi in the
subject realty taxes.
● Betito sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after
rendering legal services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his
Complaint for sum of money, he claims that he handled numerous
cases which resulted to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the realty
taxes, which resulted to the collection of the amounts of P110.9M
and P35.5M from the NPC as well as other amounts. Under the
Contract of Legal Services, he is entitled to 10% of whatever
amount that would be collected from the NPC.
● However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan to
pass an appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorneys
fees, the SB refused to pass the ordinance and to pay what is justly
owed him. Betito prayed that
○ Tiwi be ordered to pay P11M in attorneys fees and 10% of
the other amounts to be determined during trial plus
interest and damages;
○ that the Sangguniang Bayan be ordered to pass the
necessary appropriation ordinance;
○ that the municipal treasurer surrender all the receipts of
payments made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to
December 1996 for the examination of the court;
○ and that Tiwi pay P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
● Petitioners, current officials of Tiwi admitted that the Sangguniang
Bayan passed Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said resolution
authorized then Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract.
20 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○ Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when she bound Tiwi
to 10% of the amount of realty taxes recovered from NPC.
○ The legal services should have been limited to the
execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v.
Province of Albay as per Resolution No. 15-92.
○ they are not aware of the cases which respondent
allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi since these cases
involved officials of the previous administration;
○ That the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective
○ that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the
opinion rendered by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Carpio and not through the efforts of respondent
○ As to the amount of P110.9M in realty taxes, the same
was received by Albay and not Tiwi
○ the amount of P35.5M is part of the share of Tiwi in the
utilization of the national wealth.
● Betito filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and/or
partial summary judgment
● RTC: the trial court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Betito
○ Petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the
Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92.
Consequently, the genuineness and due execution of
these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the authority
of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was
deemed established
○ the authority given to Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer was
not only for the purpose of executing the decision in NPC
v. Albay but extended to representing the interest of Tiwi
in other cases as well. Further, the said resolution did not
impose as a condition precedent the ratification of the
subject contract by the Sangguniang Bayan in order to
render it effective. Lastly, the trial court ruled that the
answer admitted, that Tiwi was paid the amounts of
P110.9M and P35.5M, hence, Betito is entitled to 10%
thereof as attorney’s fees under the terms of the contract
● CA affirmed the RTC decision
○ Petitioners cannot claim that the contract required
ratification because this is not a requisite for the
enforceability of a contract against a local government unit
under the express terms of the contract and the provisions
of the LGC.
○ petitioners are estopped from questioning the
enforceability of the contract after having collected and
enjoyed the benefits derived therefrom.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings
and/or summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the
case at bar. – YES
Ratio:
● Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the
complaint tenders several issues.
● A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the
material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the
judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such
other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading. However, when it
appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were
admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or
disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses
which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiffs main
cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered.
● In the instant case, records reveal that Betito and Tiwi set-up
multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively, with some
failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of
evidence for resolution. The generalized conclusion of both the trial
and appellate courts that petitioners answer admits all the material
averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis. For this reason,
a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of
justice and in order to expedite the disposition of this case which
was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the
issues that can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand
only those issues that require a trial on merits as hereunder
discussed.
● Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the
genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services
was impliedly admitted by petitioners for failure to make a sworn
specific denial thereof as required by Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court. This rule is not applicable when the adverse party does
not appear to be a party to the instrument. In the instant case, the
subject contract was executed between Betito and Lawenko, on the
one hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the other.
None of the petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and
21 | CIVPRO 2D
 appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing of the Complaint, were
parties to said contract. Nonetheless, in their subsequent
pleadings, petitioners admitted the genuineness and due execution
of the subject contract. We shall, thus, proceed from the premise
that the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal
Services has already been established. Furthermore, both parties
concede the contents and efficacy of Resolution 15-92. As a result
of these admissions, the issue, at least as to the coverage of the
subject contract, may be resolved based on the pleadings as it
merely requires the interpretation and application of the provisions
of Resolution 15-92 vis--vis the stipulations in the subject contract.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 19, 2005 Decision
and March 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
79057 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings to determine the reasonable amount of
attorneys fees which respondent is entitled to in accordance with the
guidelines set in this Decision.

22 | CIVPRO 2D

9. Sps Santos v. Alcazar - CRUZ
Petitioner/s: Sps. Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos
Respondent/s: Lolita Alcazar, represented by her Atty-in-Fact Delfin
Chua
Doctrine: The genuiness of a document must be denied under oath in the
Answer otherwise it will be deemed admitted as evidence.
Facts:
● Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted
through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for sum of
money against spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect
the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter
from LCC amounting to ₱1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid
despite written demand.
● Alcazar’s cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by hand by petitioner
Fernando
● “This is to certify that I acknowledge my obligation in the amount of
One Million Four Hundred Fifty Six Thousand (₱1,456,000),
Philippine Currency with LEGAZPI COLOR CENTER, LEGAZPI
CITY.” (only signed by Fernando and NOT Ma. Elena)
● Alcazar thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Sps to pay
her the sum of ₱1,456,000.00, with interest at the rate of 3% per
month; attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱72,800.00, and ₱1,500.00
per court appearance; and costs of the suit.
● Alcazar alleged in her Complaint:
4. That as part of the agreement, defendants also obligated themselves to
pay plaintiff at the rate of 3% interest per month based on the unpaid
principal, to cover the cost of money;
5. That as of December, 2000, the total obligation of defendants with plaintiff
which consists of principal and interest was ₱1,456,000.00, a copy of the
document where defendants acknowledged their unpaid obligation is hereto
attached as Annex "B"; (referring to the above Acknowledgment)
6. That on January 5, 2001, plaintiff sent a final demand to defendants to
pay the indebtedness, but said demand fell on deaf ears and defendants did
not even bother to communicate with plaintiff, copy of the demand letter is
hereto attached as Annex "C";
● Sps sought the dismissal of the Complaint, alleging among others
that –
4. Paragraph 5 is specifically denied as the document which Defendant
Fernando T. Santos signed does not reflect the true contract or intention of
the parties, the actionable document is incorrect and has to be reformed to
reflect the real indebtedness of the defendants;
5. Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the same does not
reflect the correct amount. The defendants[’] computation is that the amount
of ₱600,000.00 is the only amount due and the instrument used as the
actionable document does not reflect the correct substance of the
transaction and indicates a reformation of the actionable document;
6. Paragraph 7 is specifically denied as defendants are willing to pay the
correct amount, not the amount in the complaint as the same does not
indicate the correct amount owing to the plaintiff;
● The trial court essentially held that Sps, in their Answer,
admitted that they entered into transactions with the
respondent for the delivery of paint and construction
materials,
● CA affirmed
Issue: W/N Sps failed to deny the authenticity of the
“Acknowledgement” in their Answer thus making such document
admissible as evidence. YESSSSSSSSSSssss
Ratio:
● Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the
Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second
time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said
hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case.
● While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails
over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the
original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and
formally offered in evidence by the party proponent.
● More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed
admitted.
● "By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such
document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits
that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that
the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as
that the signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x
x; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other
capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x; or that
23 | CIVPRO 2D
 it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its
genuineness and due execution."
● "There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with
respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of which
are admitted by the adverse party." With the consequent admission
engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the
Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper
authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to
mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their
Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court
believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and
there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove
the claimed indebtedness.
● The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt,
is "valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a
document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into."
● The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners’
waiver of their right to present evidence renders the
Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions between
the parties and the consequential indebtedness incurred
● However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be
held liable for the judgment amount of ₱1,456,000.00, since Ma.
Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment.
● She may be held liable only to the extent of ₱600,000.00, as
admitted by her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no
case against her may be proved over and beyond such amount, in
the absence of her signature and an acknowledgment of liability in
the Acknowledgment.
● The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument
shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically
denies them under oath, applies only to parties to the document.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27,

2007 Decision and May 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87935 are AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that petitioner
Ma. Elena Santos is held liable for the principal and interest only to the
extent of ₱600,000.00.

24 | CIVPRO 2D
 10. CUA North Greenhills Association v Morales
Petitioner/s: North Greenhills Association
Respondent/s: Atty. Narciso Morales
Doctrine: The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive are as follows
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent
the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim
as well as defendant's counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal if
properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate
action to collect it
Facts:
● Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills subdivision in San
Juan City
● His house is located alongside club Filipino avenue and adjacent to
Mckinley park, a space operated by North Greenhills Association
(NGA)
● He had a personal access door, which he built through a wall
separating his house from the park
● NGA is the undisputed owner of the park acquiring such through a
donation by Ortigas and Co.
● NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of
the park adjacent to the residence
● Part of the design was a restroom to serve the needs of the park
● Atty. Morales objected to the construction of the restroom and filed
a complaint before the HLURB seeking demolition of the pavilion
which was then being built
● In an amended complaint, he alleged that for 33 years he had an
open, continuous, immediate access to the subdivision park and
that such access to the park was one of the considerations in his
purchase of the lot
● He also claimed that the construction was illegal because it violated
his right to immediate access to the park
● NGA in its answer with compulsory counterclaim rejected the
assertions and contended the following
○ That as absolute owner of the park, it had the right to
fence the property and impose reasonable conditions for
the use thereof
○ The construction was for the benefit of all NGA members
including Atty. Morales and that use of the side entrance
for 33 years could not have ripened into an easement of
right of way.
○ It also sought payment of 878,778.40 corresponding to
annual membership dues since 1980
● HLURB arbiter ordered the removal of the pavilion
○ WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering respondents of the removal of
the pavilion and the relocation of the common toilet in a
place where it will not be a nuisance to any resident.
Respondents are further directed to remove the
obstruction to the side door of the complainant. All other
claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
● NGA appealed and the HLURB Board modified the decision
○ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Regional Office is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly,
respondent NGA is ordered to relocate the restroom
constructed or being constructed in the McKinley Park
away from the walls of any resident and where it will not
block complainant's side door access to the park.
● NGA appealed to the OP and the OP affirmed the decision
● NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of Rules of Court
before the CA
● CA affirmed the decision
○ As to the counterclaim of NGA for association dues, the
CA held that the claim was in the nature of a permissive
counterclaim, which was correctly dismissed by the OP.
● MR denied
Issue:
1.)WON HLURB had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Atty Morales?
YES
2.)WON the restroom built is a nuisance per accidens? NO
3.)WON NGA had the right to block Atty. Morales’ access to the park? YES
4.)WON CA correctly ruled that the counterclaim for unpaid association
dues was a permissive counterclaim? YES (RELEVANT ISSUE CAN
SKIP TO THE END)
Ratio:
WON THE RESTROOM WAS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS
25 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance
● Proper appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal is
required before a property is deemed a nuisance per accidens
● Conclusions of the CA were speculative
- “The said toilet, to Our mind, poses sanitary issues which
could adversely affect not only the Respondent but his
entire household as well. Even if there exists a perimeter
wall between Respondent's house and the toilet, the odor
emanating from the latter could easily find its way to the
dining area, and the foul and noxious smell would make it
very difficult and annoying for the residents of the house to
eat. Moreover, the proximity of the toilet to Respondent's
house places the people residing therein at greater risk of
contracting diseases both from improperly disposed waste
and human excrements, as well as from flies, mosquitoes,
and other insects, should petitioner NGA fail to maintain
the cleanliness in the said structure. Verily, the
determining factor when the toilet is the cause of the
complaint is not how much it smells or stinks but where it
is located as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”
● By the use of the words "would, should, could," it can be discerned
that the CA was not even sure that the restroom has caused such
annoyance to Atty. Morales or his family.
● NO certification by the city health officer was ever submitted
WON NGA HAD THE RIGHT TO BLOCK ATTY. MORALES’ ACCESS
● Under the civil code, NGA as owner of the park may exclude others
from access to, and enjoyment of its property
● NGA’s legal right to block the access door is beyond doubt. Atty.
Morales never introduced any evidence that he had acquired any
right by prescription or by agreement or legal easement to access
the park through his side door
● He also never claimed that the side door was his only access to the
park
● A right as a member to use the park, does not allow him to assert
his access to the park through his side door
WON THE COUNTER CLAIM WAS PERMISSIVE
● The counterclaim for unpaid dues was permissive and therefore the
affirmation of its dismissal was proper
● A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief,
which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's complaint
● It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the
court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction and will be
barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in
the same case
● a counterclaim is compulsory if there should exist a logical
relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim
○ there exists such a relationship when conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail
substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and
the court;
○ when the multiple claims involve the same factual and
legal issues;
○ or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties.
● The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows
○ (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
the counterclaim largely the same?
○ (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory rule?
○ (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
○ (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim?
● A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory. Otherwise it is permissive
● Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only to the
propriety of barring Atty. Morales from accessing the park through
the side door and whether the restroom constructed by NGA is a
nuisance per se. On the other hand, the counterclaim is simply
concerned with collecting from Atty. Morales his unpaid association
dues for the past thirty (30) years.
● Payment or non-payment of association dues are distinct matters
that do not relate to whether the main cause of Atty. Morales
against NGA was proper.
26 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● WON there was payment is irrelevant to the main issues
considering that the pleadings filed essentially reflected an
admission of membership of Atty. Morales in the association.
● Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal
if properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate
separate action to collect it

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 13, 2015
Decision and the February 3, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 131707, are REVERSED insofar as it affirmed (1) Atty. Morales'
entitlement to an unbridled access to the park through his side door; and (2)
the order to relocate the restroom to another area.

27 | CIVPRO 2D
 11. DE VERA - Padilla vs Globe Asiatique a. Order: granted preliminary attachment after finding that
Globe et. al. are guilty of fraud
Petitioner/s: Aida Padilla b. Before the Pasay RTC could act on all the motions, Globe
Respondent/s: Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp., Filmal Realty et. al. filed a complaint for damages in the Pasig RTC
Corp., Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee (Globe et. al.) against Padilla and Judge Gutierrez of the Pasay RTC.
7. Pasig RTC
Doctrine: A counterclaim arising from an unfounded suit may proceed a. Globe et. al. claimed that:
despite the dismissal of the main complaint pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17. i. The malicious unfounded civil action by Padilla
wrought havoc to their businesses and lives
Facts: ii. The CTS Facility Agreements were novated by a
1. Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several Contracts to term loan. Padilla knew this and with malice,
Sell (CTS) Facility Agreements with Globe Asiatique Realty and executed a “perjured” Affidavit.
Filmal Realty, represented by Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee, President b. They also sought to hold the RTC Judge liable for issuing
and Vice-President, respectively, of the two corporations. the writ of preliminary attachment.
2. Pursuant to and as a condition for the CTS Facility availments, c. Padilla filed her Answer with Compulsory
Globe et. al. executed Deeds of Assignment covering accounts Counterclaim, praying for the dismissal of Globe et. al.’s
receivables4 over subdivision houses they would sell through complaint on the ff. grounds:
Contracts to Sell with their buyers. i. Submission of a false certification of non-forum
a. They acknowledged the total amount ₱1.3B released. shopping and blatant commission of forum
3. In 2010, Globe et. al. defaulted. shopping (failure to disclose a criminal complaint)
4. In a letter, PNB made a formal and final demand upon Globe et. al. ii. Litis pendentia
to settle the total amount of ₱974,377,159.10. iii. Failure to attach the alleged actionable document
a. It claimed that it discovered 231 out of 240 Contracts to (term loan) in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 8
Sell to have either non-existent addresses of buyers or the iv. Failure to state a cause of action
names of the buyers are non-existent or both. v. Cannot be personally held liable for her official
5. PNB filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and acts done for and in behalf of PNB
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before d. Judge Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ff.
the Pasay RTC against Globe et. al. They alleged: grounds:
a. Fraud and misrepresentation committed by Globe et. al. i. No cause of action against him; and
b. The Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping ii. the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
attached to the complaint was signed by PNB’s SVP of the and his person, movant being of co-equal and
Remedial Management Group, Padilla, who likewise concurrent jurisdiction
executed an "Affidavit in Support of the Application for e. The Pasig RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment”. f. It later issued an Order (2012), stating that:
6. Pasay RTC i. Acting on [Globe et. al’s] Complaint is a
brazen violation of the principle of judicial
stability, which essentially states that the
judgment or order of a court of competent
4 Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any
stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or
court of concurrent jurisdiction for the simple
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by
serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by reason that the power to open, modify or vacate
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee the said order is not only possessed but is
fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in restricted to the court in which the judgment or
the case of buildings. order is rendered

28 | CIVPRO 2D
 ii. The Court would have to pass upon the veracity
of Globe et. al.’s claims that they were unjustly
injured by the orders issued by Pasay RTC
iii. Therefore, upholding once more the principle
of judicial stability, this Court is impelled to
refuse to hear the counterclaims of Padilla.
Issue: WoN the dismissal of the complaint automatically results in the
dismissal of counterclaims pleaded by the defendant - NO
Ratio:
1. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
against an opposing party.
a. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and
independent cause of action which, though alleged in the
answer, is not part of the answer.
b. Counterclaims may be either compulsory5 or
permissive.
2. Padilla’s counterclaim for damages in her Answer before the
Pasig RTC is compulsory.
a. She alleged suffering and injury caused to her as a
consequence of the filing of the baseless complaint.
b. The court, however, dismissed her counterclaim upon the
same ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution
supposedly would entail passing upon the validity of
orders and processes still pending before the Pasay RTC.
3. Before the 1997 Rules, the Court held6 that if a court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses
the same, then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the
5 Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the
case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
6 Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives
money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of
a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner
while it is in the custody of the partnership.
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.
principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no
jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.
4. Under the 1997 Rules, it is now explicitly provided that the
dismissal of the complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action.” (Sec. 3, Rule 17)
5. Perkin v Dakila:
a. Distinction must be made over respondent's
complaint and over petitioner's counterclaim — while
it may have no jurisdiction over the former, it may
exercise jurisdiction over the latter. The compulsory
counterclaim attached to petitioner's Answer ad cautelam
can be treated as a separate action xxx. Petitioner could
have instituted a separate action for the very same claims
but, for the sake of expediency and to avoid
multiplicity of suits, it chose to demand the same in Civil
Case No. MC99-605. Jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter and the parties in the counterclaim must
thus be determined separately and independently from the
jurisdiction of the same court in the same case over the
subject matter and the parties in respondent's complaint.
6. In the present case, the Pasig RTC should have allowed
Padilla’s counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the
dismissal of Globe et. al.’s complaint, the same being
compulsory in nature and with its cause not eliminated by
such dismissal.
a. She was hailed to a separate court (Pasig RTC) even
while the dispute in the Pasay RTC was still being
litigated, and she already incurred expenses defending
herself, having been sued in her personal capacity.
b. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury
and misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support
of the application for writ of attachment before the Pasay
RTC) — with hints at possible criminal prosecution apart
from that criminal complaint already filed.
c. The Pasig RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the
counterclaims upon the same ground for dismissal of the
complaint, i.e., lack of jurisdiction in strict observance of
the policy against interference with the proceedings of a
co-equal court.
7. Globe et. al. contend that if Padilla is allowed to prove her
counterclaims before the Pasay RTC, they have no choice but to
justify their action in filing their case before the Pasig RTC by going
back to the allegations in their complaint that they are merely
29 | CIVPRO 2D
 vindicating themselves against the perjured affidavit executed by
petitioner which led to the issuance of the illegal orders of the
Pasay City RTC that resulted to the damage and injury sustained
by respondents.
a. Obviously, Globe et. al. are invoking judicial stability which
we find inapplicable insofar as Padilla’s counterclaim
arises from Globe et. al.’s unfounded suit.
b. Padilla faulted Globe et. al. in prematurely, and in a
contumacious act of forum shopping, filing a separate
damage suit when there is no final judicial determination
yet of any irregularity in the attachment proceedings
before the Pasay City RTC.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated

November 12, 2012 and May 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 155 in Civil Case No. 73132 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Said court is hereby directed to proceed with the presentation of
evidence in support of the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner Aida
Padilla.

30 | CIVPRO 2D
 12. MBTC V. CPR PROMOTIONS -- DOMASIG
Petitioner/s: Metrobank
Respondent/s: CPR Promotions & Sps. Reynoso
Doctrine: A defending party’s compulsory counterclaim must be
interposed at the time he files his answer. Failure to do so will bar
such claim.
Facts:
● CPR promotions obtained a loan from Metrobank covered by 15
promissory notes all signed by Metrobank’s treasurer, president of
CPR and Sps. Reynoso. Total amount = P12.8M
● As a security, Sps. Reynoso executed 2 deeds of real estate
mortgage (REM) and also a continuing surety agreement binding
themselves solidarily with CPR to pay all loans the latter obtained
from Metrobank.
● The loans matured and the respondents defaulted, prompting
Metrobank to file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the
properties, which were subsequently sold at a public sale. Despite
the sale, Metrobank alleged that there is still a deficiency worth
P2.6M which the respondents failed to pay despite repeated
demands. Thus, this action for collection of sum of money.
● RTC: in favor of Metrobank
● CA: in favor of respondents. Adjudged that Metrobank should return
P722k representing the remainder of proceeds of the foreclosure
sale with 6% interest per annum FROM THE DATE OF FILING
THE ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM ON MARCH 26, 1999 until
paid to respondents.
Issues:
1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. -
NO
2. WoN Metrobank was able to prove the amount claimed. - NO
Ratio:
1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. -
NO. Metrobank belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.
Test in determining whether a claim is compulsory or permissive:
1. Are the issues of fact/law raised by the claim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims,
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s
claim as well as defendant’s claim?
4. In there a logical relation bet. the claim and counterclaim such that
it would result to substantial duplication of effort and time by parties
and court if trials will be conducted separately? (known as THE
COMPELLING TEST OF COMPULSORINESS)
● A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the
amount due should be interposed as a COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. (reasons: both cases, substantially same
evidence is needed; adjudication in one will bar another case; 2
opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions; the
compelling test of compulsoriness was satisfied)
● AS TO THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS (related to civpro), a
defending party’s compulsory counterclaim must be interposed at
the time he files his answer. Failure to do so will bar such claim.
Initially, respondents claimed moral and exemplary damages and
atty’s fees. Later on, in their appellate brief filed before CA, the filed
a counterclaim to seek the recovery of excess of bid price. Their
belated assertion is fatal and will not cure their failure to timely raise
such claim; thus, barring their claim.
2. Given MTBC’s conflicting allegations as to the amount due as of
the date of foreclosure, the computation offered by metrobank can’t
be accepted at face value. It also failed to substantiate its claims.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13,
2012 Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of
refund in favor of respondents in the amount of P722,602.22 with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby DELETED
31 | CIVPRO 2D

13. Quintos vs. Nicolas - FADERGUYA
Petitioner/s: Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra
Respondent/s: Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro
Ibarra, David Ibarra
Doctrine: Dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court cannot defeat
the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided there is no
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Facts:
1. Petitioners Quintos, Dancel, Ibarra, and respondents are siblings.
They inherited a 281 sqm parcel of land in Tarlac, which is now the
subject of dispute between them.
2. The respondents brought an action for partition against petitioners
but it was dismissed for failure of the parties to appear despite due
notice. Neither party appealed, thus, the ruling on the partition
proceeding became final.
3. Respondents then resorted to executing a deed of adjudication to
transfer the property in favor of the ten siblings. As a result, new
TCT was issued.
4. Respondents then sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property
in favor of co-respondents Candelarios. An agreement of
Subdivision was also entered which resulted to the name of
Candelarios inscribed in the TCT.
5. Petitioners then filed a complaint for quieting of title alleging that:
a. During their parent’s lifetime, their properties were
distributed to the siblings, and that the land and house
subject of this case was given to the petitioners as part of
their share.
b. They had been in adverse possession of the property for
40 years.
6. Respondents contend that petitioners are already barred by
estoppel because the petitioners offered to buy 7/10 of the share of
respondents, thus, recognizing the respondent’s ownership over
the 7/10 share.
7. Moreover, by way of counterclaim, the respondents allege the
partition of the property.
8. RTC dismissed the case finding that Candelarios own the 7/10
share over the land.
9. Aggrieved, petitioners now contend that respondent’s counterclaim
of partition is already barred by laches or res judicata.
Issue:
1. WoN respondent’s counterclaim for partition is already barred
by laches or res judicata. - NO
Ratio:
1. There is res judicata when the following requisites are present:
a. The judgment or order is final;
b. Judgment must be on the merits, that is, it was rendered
after a consideration of evidence or stipulations submitted
by the parties;
c. Judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and
d. There must be, between first and second actions, identity
of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.
2. In this case, respondents admit that they filed an action for partition
which was dismissed and has attained finality. The subject property
in the partition case and the present case is the same, and that in
both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. Lastly,
there is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are
the same, but also between those in privity with them such as
between their successors.
3. According to the rules of court, dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits and is
necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action, unless otherwise provided.
4. However, dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any
time, provided there is no actual adjudication of ownership of
shares yet.
5. Art. 494 provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
6. The law expressly provides that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common.
7. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3, and the
right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of Civil Code, the latter
must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
right of a co-owner through promulgation of rules.
8. Art. 496 supports this view as it provides that “Partition shall be
governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with
the Civil Code.”
9. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be
barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition
cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter
once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined
with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court
32 | CIVPRO 2D
 determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or
no longer exists.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22,
2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case
is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for
purposes of partitioning the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.

(Partly granted siya because mali daw CA in saying agreement for

subdivision was valid)

33 | CIVPRO 2D
 14. Go v. Rico, GR No. 140682, April 25, 2006- GARCIA
Petitioner/s: WILSON GO and PETER GO
Respondent/s: ANITA RICO, in substitution of the late Pilar Rico
Doctrine: a certification against forum shopping by counsel and not by
the principal party himself is no certification at all.
The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party
himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone
else, whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or
tribunals.
Filing of a belated certification against forum shopping does not cure the
defect since it should have been filed simultaneously with the petition.
(see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
Facts:
● Wilson Go and Peter Go, petitioners, filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against defendants Pilar Rico (now deceased), mother of
Anita Rico, respondent herein, Catalina Pablico, Violeta Medrano,
Elmer Molit, Osmando Pagdanganan, Bobby Marquisas, Alexis
Leynes, and all persons claiming rights under them.
● Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the land
with an existing building in Quezon City
○ The building units were leased to several of the
respondents which is now expired
○ their continued stay in the leased premises is on a month-
to-month basis;
● Petitioners then sent the defendants, a reminder of the termination
of their monthly lease contracts with demand to vacate
○ despite notice, the defendants refused to do so.
● Respondents contend that petitioners do not own the premises
○ Since it was part of the estate of the late Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura, which is now subject of the probate
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
○ In effect, the defendants allege that they are the lessees of
Felisa Tamiode Buenaventura since 1988; that their lease
contracts have not been terminated
○ Further, the defendants allege that a fictitious sale took
place between Bella A. Guerrero, then special
administratrix of the estate, in her personal capacity, and
the petitioners
■ This was done without approval of the probate
court and in conspiracy with the petitioners
○ the probate court removed Bella Guerrero as special
administratrix and appointed in her stead Resurrecion
Bihis who renewed the lease contracts with the
defendants
● The MeTC ordered the ejectment of the defendants (for petitioners)
● RTC reversed MeTC- that the determination of ownership is an
indispensable issue (for defendants)
● The CA dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply
with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum shopping (against
petitioners)
○ It was the counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, who signed
the same instead of the petitioners themselves
● In MR with CA, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo alleged that she was
compelled to sign the certification against forum shopping
because petitioner Wilson Go left for the United States to
attend to his ailing father, while petitioner Peter Go was in
Cebu for an important business commitment
○ that if she waited for any of the petitioners to sign the
certification, the period to file the petition could expire
○ and that she has a Special Power of Attorney wherein
petitioners authorized her to represent them during the
pre-trial and hearing
● Petitioners attached to their motion the certification against forum
shopping signed by petitioner Wilson Go (in the MR with CA)
○ But MR still denied
● Petitioners now assert that the court should have applied the Rules
on certification against forum shopping liberally in their favor.
Issue:
W/N the counsel is permitted to sign a Certification against non-forum
shopping? - NO (see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
Ratio:
● The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith (the pleading)
● Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice
● The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency
○ there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
34 | CIVPRO 2D
 before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
● These provisions are mandatory requirements in the filing of the
Certification against forum shoppping
● a certification by counsel and not by the principal party
himself is no certification at all
● The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party
himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than
anyone else, whether he has initiated similar action/s in other
courts, agencies or tribunals
● petitioners filing of a belated certification against forum shopping
did not cure the defect considering that it should have been
filed simultaneously with the petition.
● Secondly, they failed to show justifiable cause for their failure
to personally sign the certification
○ The explanation is an afterthought as it was not alleged by
counsel in her certification against forum shopping
● The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioners in favor of
their counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, is merely for the latter to
represent them during the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and is
not a substitute for the required certification against forum
shopping duly signed by the petitioners
● While we have ruled time and again that litigants should have the
amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause
free, as much as possible, from the constraints of procedural
technicalities however, equally settled is the rule that, save for the
most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules
is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice

Dispositive:
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53342 are
AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

35 | CIVPRO 2D
 15. GUEVARRA
Petitioner/s: THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY et, al
Respondent/s: ELPIDIO UY
Doctrine: The certification of non-forum shopping may be signed not only
by the petitioners but also any of the principal parties.
There was substantial compliance with the Rules when only the
petitioner signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of
non-forum, shared a common interest in them, had a common defense in
the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective, raising
only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
The subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may
call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure
Facts:
● Republic Act No. 7227 and EO no. 40 s 1992 were passed whereby
BCDA was created for the conversion of military reservations and
their extension and to raise fund for the by the sale of portions of
Metro Manila military camps.
● To carry out the Project and other fund generating projects
pursuant to RA 7227 and EO 40, the BCDA entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), designating the latter as Project Manager.
● Thereafter, the BCDA, PEA, and the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) executed a Pool Formation Trust Agreement (PFTA),
creating an asset pool to generate funds for the development of the
Project.
● After the requisite public bidding, the PEA entered into a
Landscaping and Construction Agreement (LCA) with respondent
Elpidio Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison
Development and Construction. Subsequent to the LCA, the same
parties forged a negotiated Construction Agreement.
● The LCA stipulated that respondent shall fulfill his contractual
obligation within a period of 450 calendar days from its start,
reckoned 14 days from respondent’s receipt of the notice to
proceed. Specifically, the scope of respondent Uy’s work in the
LCA was to construct three (3) vertical structures, the Terrasoleum
structures, and the landscaping.
● Aside from respondent, two other contractors were engaged in the
Project—Makati Development Corporation (MDC) and Romago
Electric, Inc. (REI)
● The parties presented diametrically opposing versions on its
progress. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that there were delays in
the construction and landscaping under the LCA, and for which
several extensions were granted to respondent Uy by PEA.
● Respondent asserted that the delays were justified and not
attributable to him, as portions of the Project were delivered
piecemeal and could not be worked on immediately pending the
completion of work by the other contractors.
● Petitioners maintained that respondent Uy was in delay with work
"slippage" beyond tolerable levels and that respondent had already
pulled out his equipment and machineries, and stopped working
sometime in October 1999.
● Respondent Uy received from PEA a Letter of Termination of the
LCA which prompted him to file a civil case for Injunction and
Damages with the Parañaque RTC against PEA, petitioner BCDA,
and private petitioners. The RTC judge issued a 72–hour
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining petitioners from
excluding respondent from his contractual obligations under the
LCA. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the same Judge in the
said trial court, who, after the preliminary hearing of the case,
extended the TRO for 17 days.
CA: RTC has jurisdiction to hear the injunctive case and to issue the TRO
Petitioner: under R.a. no. 7227, the implementation of projects for the
conversion of military bases into productive uses shall not be restrained or
enjoined except by an order of the supreme court, hence, the lower court
has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case.
Respondent:
● petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration from the
assailed CA Decision, an alleged pre-requisite before this Court
can entertain petitions under Rule 45
● the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
defective as only one of the petitioners affixed his signature,
(Ramon P. Ereneta) and such sole signatory cannot represent
petitioner BCDA as no Board Resolution was presented conferring
such authority
● there is no proper joinder of parties considering that the major issue
raised by petitioner BCDA is its invocation of RA 7227.
Issue:
WON the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective
as only one of the petitioners affixed his signature - NO
WON RTC has jurisdiction to hear an injunctive case and to issue a TRO
against the BCDA. - YES
36 | CIVPRO 2D
 Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
Ratio: subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Signature of a principal party sufficient for verification and certification Jurisprudence has recognized complaints for injunction with a
● There is compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Dismissal prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
of appeals that is purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. injunction.
● While only petitioner Ramon P. Ereneta signed the verification and ● The Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint of
certification of non-forum shopping such is not fatal to the instant respondent Uy it being a case in which the subject of litigation for
petition. permanent injunction against the termination of his contract, is
● In Calo, we agreed with petitioners that the signature of only one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
petitioner in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
satisfies the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Dispositive:
Rules on Civil Procedure. In Calo, we relied on Condo Suite Club WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the July 31, 2000
Travel, Inc., v. NLRC30 —where we ruled that the certification of Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The
non-forum shopping may be signed not only by the petitioners but Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City, Branch 260 is directed to hear without
also any of the principal parties. delay Civil Case No. 99-0425 for Injunction and Damages, but is prohibited
● In the instant case, Mr. Ramon P. Erenta, a member of the from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction.
Investment Committee of the Heritage Park Management
Corporation, is a principal party in the instant case having been
impleaded in Civil Case No. 99-0425 pending in the RTC.
● More so, in Calo, we also cited Cavile, et al. v. Heirs of Clarita
Cavile, et. al.31 where the court held that there was substantial
compliance with the Rules when only the petitioner signed in behalf
of all the other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping
being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, shared a
common interest in them, had a common defense in the complaint
for partition, and filed the petition as a collective, raising only one
argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
● In the same vein, this is also true in the instant case where
petitioners have filed their petition as a collective, sharing a
common interest and having a common single defense.
● Anent the lack of a BCDA Board Resolution authorizing Ramon P.
Ereneta, such defect has been substantially complied with by the
subsequent filing of a Letter of Authority to represent and sign
pleadings for and on behalf of BCDA in the instant case.
● In Jaro v. Court of Appeals, the court held that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of
the rules of procedure." At any rate, this petty technicality deserves
scant consideration where the question at issue is one purely of law
and there is no need to delve into the veracity of the allegations in
the petition. As we have held time and again, imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure are to be disregarded, except where
substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced.
RTC has jurisdiction over action for injunction
● Firmly established is the doctrine that "jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law." Section 19 of BP 129 shows that a

37 | CIVPRO 2D
 16. Mediserv Inc. vs CA INFANTE
Petitioner/s: Mediserv Inc
Respondent/s: Landheights Development Corporation
Doctrine: It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked
in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence
of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.
Facts:
● On September 1994, Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of China Banking Corporation as security for a
loan. The mortgage was constituted on a 500-square meter lot with
improvements located in Manila.
● Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the real
estate mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale
Landheights Development Corporation emerged as the highest
bidder with a bid price of P17,617,960.00 for the subject property.
● April 1998, Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila an Application for Possession of Real Estate Property
Purchased at an Auction Sale under Act No. 3135 and was
eventually issued with the TCT.
● On March 2000, Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the
subject property, filed a verified complaint for ejectment against
Mediserv before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
● MeTC of Manilarendered a decision in favor of Landheights.
Mediserv appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila and was
granted. MR by Landheights was also denied. Pet for review with
the CA was also dismissed because the written authority of
Dickson Tan to sign the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint and answer, are
not attached to the petition
● Landheights filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently
submitted a Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of
Directors affirms the authority to file the Petition for Review.
Hence, the CA reinstated the petition for review.
● Thus, Mediserv went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that
failure to comply with the requirements on certification against
forum shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus asserts that the appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for review filed by
respondent corporation.
● Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and
subsequently submitted a Secretary’s Certificate stating that the
Board of Directors affirms the authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file
the Petition for Review. CA then reinstated the petition for review.
● Mediserv then went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that
failure to comply with the requirements on certification against
forum shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
dismissal of the case.
● Mediserv asserts that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
reinstating the petition for review filed by respondent corporation.
Issue: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated
the petition.
Ruling: No
Ratio:
● Mediserv cites Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with
the requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case.
● Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
● A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party need
not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleading may sign the verification.
● On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a
certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in
a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith,
38 | CIVPRO 2D
 (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any ● Thus, if the SC has allowed the belated filing of the certification
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi- against forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings,
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other with more reason should it sanction the timely submission of such
action or claim is pending therein; certification though the proof of the signatory’s authority was
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete submitted thereafter.
statement of the present status thereof; and ● Here, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of authority to
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted to
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint the CA.
or initiatory pleading has been filed. ● It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in
● In one case, the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
the petitioner corporation’s counsel; hence, the CA dismissed the error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the
petition for failure to comply with Revised Supreme Court Circular essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
No. 28-91, as amended. The motion for reconsideration was attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure
denied because the petitioner has not adequately explained its are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used
failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed by only to help secure substantial justice.
one of its officers. Neither has it shown any compelling reason for
the SC to disregard strict compliance with the rules. Dispositive:
● In one case, the SC explained that the requirement regarding WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The September 16, 2003 and
verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such November 7, 2003 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading,
non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is
pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in light of the
an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and foregoing discussion with DISPATCH. With costs against the petitioner.
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of SO ORDERED.
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court
may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.
● On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping
is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications
against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory
is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
● The SC in numerous relaxed the rule requiring the submission of
the certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance
under justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the
certification.

39 | CIVPRO 2D
 17. Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank - JOSEF
Petitioner/s: ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO G.R. No. 151098
GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO,
BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO Present:
ARAHAN CHUA
Respondent/s: TRADERS ROYAL BANK
Doctrine: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the
latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be
required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence
to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment
for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant
may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing
evidence.
Facts:
● In mid 1977 Danilo Chua obtained a loan from the Traders Royal
Bank in the amount of P75,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land.
● The loan was not paid and thus the bank commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the property.
● On the rescheduled auction sale, the Sheriff of Quezon City sold
the property to the bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of
P24,911.30.
● The other petitioners (Gajudo) assailed this because bid price was
shockingly or unconscionably low.
● [Petitioners] filed a complaint in the RTC against [respondent]
Traders Royal Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City seeking the annulment of the
extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by [the] city sheriff
of Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16711 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the conventional redemption
thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
● The bank, filed its answer with counterclaim, asserting that the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was done in accordance
with law; that petitioners slept on their rights when they failed to
redeem the property within the one year statutory period;
● Upon discovering that the foreclosed property was sold by the bank
to the Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed
property, had already been cancelled, the petitioners refiled the
complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the Ceroferr
Realty Corporation.
● Summons were served on the bank. Supposing that all the
defendants had filed their answer, the petitioners filed a motion to
set case for pretrial, which motion was, however, denied by the
Trial Court in its Order on the ground that the bank has not yet filed
its answer.
● The petitioners filed a motion to declare the bank in default,
thereunder alleging that no answer has been filed despite the
service of summons on it on 26 September 1990.
● The Trial Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon
submission by petitioners of proof of service of the motion on the
bank.
● Upon proof that petitioners had indeed served the bank with a copy
of said motion, the Trial Court issued an Order of default against
the bank.
● On petitioner's’ motion, they were by the Court allowed to present
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered the new
questioned partial decision.
● Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial
decision by default against it.
● The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Even if the CA stated
that the erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed
before the trial court was not an excusable negligence by the
bank’s counsel and that these were binding on the bank, the
petitioners had not convincingly established their right to
relief as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale
of the mortgaged property.
● They stated that an extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not require
personal notice to the mortgagor, that there was no allegation or
proof of noncompliance with the publication requirement and the
public posting of the notice of sale, and that there was no showing
of inadequacy of price as no competent evidence was presented to
show the real market value of the land sold or the readiness of
another buyer to offer a price higher than that at which the property
had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that the bank
had agreed to sell the property back to them. After pointing out that
the redemption period had long expired, respondent’s written
communications to Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the
former had made a proposal for the latter to buy back the property
at the current market price.
● The petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments
flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the
same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133 (Preponderance
of Evidence rule - which basically states that the party having the
40 | CIVPRO 2D
 burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence)
Issues: W/N the CA erred in failing to apply the provisions of Sec 3, Rule 9
([and in applying instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.) - No
Ratio: No, the CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no
incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them.
Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure the trial court is directed to take
when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the
court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as
his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on whether to
require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets
down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted.
was inadequate. Thus, there was no ground to invalidate the
sale.
2. The petitioners have not convincingly established their right to
damages on the basis of the purported agreement to
repurchase. Without reiterating our prior discussion on this
point, we stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory
damages must be proved even under Section 3 of Rule 9.
In sum, the petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the
strength of their position, notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed
in presenting their evidence ex parte. Not in every case of default by the
defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically.
Dispositive: Petition is DENIED.

The party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a

preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. This principle holds true, especially when
the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be
granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with
preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.

Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for,

once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted
by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party.
Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except
that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court.

Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, if the evidence

presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the
complaint must be dismissed.
While petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3
of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages
by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Moreover, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the
evidence for the following reasons.
1. The petitioners were not deprived of their property without
cause. There has been no allegation or proof of
noncompliance with the requirement of publication and public
posting of the notice of sale. Neither has there been competent
evidence to show that the price paid at the foreclosure sale

41 | CIVPRO 2D
 18. Martinez v Republic LOYOLA
Petitioner/s: Jose R. Martinez
Respondent/s: Republic of the Philippines
Doctrine: A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal
from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order
of default.
FACTS:
1. Martinez filed a petition for registration in his name for three
parcels of land located in Cortes, Surigao del Sur with an area of
3,700sqm. He alleged that
a. He had acquired the property in 1952 through purchase from
his uncle whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to
1870s;
b. He had remained in continuous possession of the lotsl
c. The lots remained unencumbered;
d. They became private property through prescription;
e. He had to initiate the proceedings since the Director of Land
Management Services failed to do so despite the completion of
the cadastral survey.
2. RTC of Surigao del Sur set the case for initial hearing and ordered
the publication of the notice.
3. Republic opposed the application on the grounds that:
a. Martinez’ possession was not in accordance with Sec 48 (b)
of CA141;
b. His muniments of title were insufficient to prove bonafide
acquisition and possession of the property;
c. The lots formed part of public domain.
4. RTC issued an Order of General Default because no party
appeared to oppose the application during the hearing, and
subsequently, decreed the registration of the lots in the name of
Martinez. RTC concluded that Martinez and his predecessors have
been in open, continuous, public possession of the lots for over 100
years.
5. LRA informed RTC that only 2 lots were referred to in the Notice
published since the other lot was omitted due to the lack of an approved
survey plan.
6. CA reversed RTC and ordered the dismissal of the application on
the ground that the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient to
support his application.
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s: WoN Republic, through OSG, can still appeal the RTC’s decision
after it had been declared in default – YES
RATIO:
1. A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal
from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set
aside the order of default.
2. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended,
the order of default may be issued if no person appears and answers
within the time allowed. The RTC appears to have issued the order of
general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before
it on the hearing, despite the fact that the Republic had already duly
filed its opposition
3. RTC erred in declaring oppositor in default simply because he
failed to appear on the day of the initial hearing.
4. RTC should have accorded the oppositor ample opportunity to
establish its claim. However, the SC cannot decide on the
validity of the default order since Republic did not challenge
such.
5. According to Rule 9, Section 3 of the RoC, the effects on the
parties of an order of default are:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in
the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may
any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice.
42 | CIVPRO 2D
 (c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim
states a common cause of action against several defending
parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so,
the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus
filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
6. Under the 1997 RoC and Lina v. Court of Appeals:
a. The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion,
under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he
has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b. If the judgment has already been rendered when the
defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion
for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c. If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may file
a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has
been presented by him.
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law,
even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of
default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to appeal
unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in
this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this
day.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.

43 | CIVPRO 2D

19. Philipping Savings Bank vs Papa- Lim
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
Respondent/s: JOSEPHINE L. PAPA
Doctrine:
- Filing and service are different from each other, but they go
hand in hand in determining if the pleading, motion or any
other document was filed within the reglementary period
- To prove service a party must attach the affidavit of the
person who mailed the motion or pleading. Otherwise, it is
deemed as not filed
Facts:
● Papa obtained a flexi-loan of P207,600.00, payable in installments
from PSBank.
● For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note.
● On due date, Papa defaulted on her loan. Despite repeated
demands, she was unable to pay her loan.
● PSB filed in the Metc a complaint for collection of sum of money
against Papa. In response, Papa claims that she had already paid
the obligation thru the staggered payments she made to the bank.
The metc ruled in favor of PSB.
● RTC: Ruled in favor of Papa because PSB was unable to prove the
existence of the PN. The RTC decision was rendered on Oct 14,
2009. PSB received the decision on Oct 26, 2009.
● PSB filed its MR on Nov 10, 2009 to the court while Papa received
the MR on Nov 11, 2009.
● In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa claims
that the RTC decision had already attained finality. Papa explained
that although PSB filed the motion for reconsideration on 10
November 2009, it appears that service of the said motion was
made 1 day late as PSB availed of a private courier service instead
of the modes of service prescribed under the Rules of Court. As
such, the MR is deemed to have been made not on the date that it
was deposited to the private courier but in the date that it was
received by Papa (Nov 11, 2009)
Issue: WON the RTC decision has attained finality due to the service of
the MR to Papa beyond the prescribed period? Yes
Ratio:
● Filing and service is different from each other. Filing is the act of
presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court. On the
other hand, service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or paper concerned.
● However,filing and service go hand in hand when in determining if
the pleading, motion or any other paper was filed within the
applicable reglementary period. The Rules require every motion set
for hearing to be accompanied by proof of service thereof to the
other parties concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to
act on it, effectively making such motion as not filed.
● The kind of proof of service required will depend on the mode of
service used. Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 13. Proof of Service . — Proof of personal
service shall
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof
thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately
upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy
of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
● The court considers filing by private courier as the same as filing
via ordinary mail. Thus, to prove service, a party must attach an
affidavit of the person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further,
such affidavit must show compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court which provides that service shall be made by
registered mail. It is only when it is unavailable that that service
may be done by ordinary mail.
● PSB’s service by private courier failed to comply with Rule 13 sec 7
as it did not explain the reason why it did not use registered mail.
Moreover, it was not accompanied by the affidavit of the person
who sent it to the private messengerial service.
● Since PSB's MR is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the running of
the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and
considering that PSB's appeal was filed only after the expiration of
the 15-day period on Nov 10 2009, such appeal has not been
validly perfected. As such, the subject Oct 14 2009 decision of the
RTC had already attained finality as early as Nov 11 2009.
Dispositive:
44 | CIVPRO 2D
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
21 July 2011 Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112611 are AFFIRMED.

45 | CIVPRO 2D
 20. Pascual v. First Consolidated Rural Bank - LUMBRE
Petitioner/s: Sergio Pascual and Emma Servillion Pascual
Respondent/s: First Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL), Inc., Robinsons
Land Corporation, Atty. Antonio Espinosa, Register of Deeds, Butuan City
Doctrine: Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals provide that motions sent through private messengerial
services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the
same
FACTS:
Pascual filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA to nullify a
decision in a SpecPro case in the RTC.
After filing of the responsive pleadings, the CA scheduled the preliminary
conference and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs.
Instead of filing the briefs, Pascual filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. Pascual wanted the appellate
court to resolve their motions first and hold in abeyance the pre-trial.
The CA resolved the case against Pascual. The appellate court’s reason,
among others, was that:
“It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be
suspended or dispensed with, or that their motions be resolved first, as the
same are discretionary upon the court taking cognizance of the petition.
Furthermore, their failure to furnish private respondent Robinsons Land
Corporation a copy of their Motion for Reconsideration of our denial of their
TRO and/or WPI, and to submit proof of service thereof to this court is
tantamount to failure to obey lawful orders of the court.”
ISSUE: Whether the motions and other papers sent to the CA by private
messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA’s actual
receipt - YEST
RATIO:
The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on
November 24, 2011. Under Section l, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, they
had 15 days from receipt (or until December 9, 2011) within which to move
for its reconsideration or to appeal to the Supreme Court.
They dispatched the Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16
November 2011) on December 9, 2011 through private courier (LBC).
The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering
that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial
services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the
same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011.
Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution
promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed
resolution final and executory by operation of law.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions
of the Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

This (failure to obey lawful orders of the court) the CA ruled, is one ground
for dismissing their petition.

Pascual then moved for reconsideration, (from the ratio, it appeared that
such motion was sent via private messengerial service [LBC]) but was
denied for being filed out of time. Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful
Motion for Reconsideration which the CA also denied.

Hence this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

46 | CIVPRO 2D
 21. MANZANO
Petitioner/s: CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN
Respondent/s: BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK)
Doctrine: The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient
of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time,
substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by
publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Facts:
● In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a
real property in Valle Verde II, Pasig City.
● In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy
of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property.
● To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property
covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale.
● Sps. Borlongan found out that BDO filed a complaint for sum of money
against Tanchom Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations
obtained from the bank.
● Carmelita was one of those impleaded, who supposedly signed 4 security
agreements to guarantee the obligation of Tancho Corp., amounting to
P13.5M
● The Makati RTC issued an order directing the service of summons to all
the defendants at the business address of Tancho Corp - Fumakilla
Compound.
● However, such property has already been foreclosed by BDO and its
ownership has already been consolidated in BDO’s name. Thus, the
summons were unserved because the defendants were no longer holding
office at the Fumakilla Compound
● There was only a single attempt for the personal service of summons;
BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by publication. It was granted.
● BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment
against the defendants. It was granted by the Makati RTC.
● The sheriff failed to serve the summons since Carmelita was no longer
residing at the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per
information gathered from the security guard on duty." The Makati RTC
declared the defendants, including Carmelita, in default.
● The Makati RTC found the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33
plus 12% interest; The Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution stating that
in the event that the judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the
obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the defendants to
satisfy the award.
● The Sheriff failed to serve the Writ of Execution because the defendants
were not operating in the Fumikilla Compound.
● The property of Sps. Borlongan became the subject of an auction, and
BDO was the highest bidder.
● After such discovery, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on
Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents, with the Pasig RTC.
● He claims that the property is family home that belong to their conjugal
partnership of gains and that the surety agreements were signed without
his consent and did not redound to the benefit of their family
● BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata and failure to state a
cause of action
● The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because it
has already been decided upon by the Makati RTC and that the husband
of a judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate
and independent action to determine the validity of the levy and sale of a
property.
● On MR, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification: it could not
annul the surety agreements since Eliseo was not a party to those
agreements and the validity and efficacy of these contracts had already
been decided by the Makati RTC.
● Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
● The CA ruled in favor of BDO and ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from
hearing the case commenced by Eliseo. It found that Eliseo is not a
stranger who can initiate an action independent from the case where the
attachment and execution sale were ordered.
● On appeal before the SC, the Court denied Eliseo’s petition
● The Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the
issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of BDO
● Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, and the issuance of
a TRO before the CA. She claims that the Makati RTC had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as the service of summons were defective. It
was denied. Hence, this petition
Issue: WoN the CA erred in not issuing a TRO - YES
Ratio:
● For a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO, it must only
inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right
that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
47 | CIVPRO 2D
● In this case, Carmelita has a clear and unmistakable right that must be SETASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 155 is ordered to
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject continue with the proceedings and decide Civil Case No. 73761 with
property but her constitutionally protected right to due process before she reasonable dispatch.
can be deprived of her property. (2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of the
● The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 are REVERSED and SETASIDE.
process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining,
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. prohibiting, and preventing respondent Banco De Oro, its assigns,
● As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When transferees, successors, or any and all other persons acting on its behalf
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of from possessing, selling, transferring, encumbering or otherwise exercising
time, substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by acts of ownership over the property subject of the controversy. Said TRO
publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are shall remain valid and effective until such time as the rights and interests of
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 shall have been determined and
● The hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are as follows: finally resolved.
(1) Personal service;
(2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time; and
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
● The rules on the service of summons other than by personal service may
be used only as prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by
statute. The impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by
stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and
that such efforts have failed before substituted service may be availed.
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month) which eventually resulted in failure to
prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts
made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
● In this case, summons were served via publication, yet such resort was
unjustified:
○ There was only a single attempt by the sheriff to personally serve
summons
○ Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts - her address can be found in the General Information
Sheet of Tancho Corporation, a public document

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.

(1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133994 are hereby REVERSED and

48 | CIVPRO 2D
 22. MANOTOC v. CA - MEDEL
Petitioner/s: MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC
Respondent/s: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA
TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
Doctrine: The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to
it.
The Sheriff’s Return must state with particularity the attendant facts and
circumstances which would show impossibility of personal service. It must
also state that the summons was left with a person of suitable age and
discretion residing in defendant’s house or residence.
Facts:
● Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts
judgment rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu,
Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita
Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil
Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes
Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of
Court.
● Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a
Summons addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium
Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig City.
● The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly
served upon Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
Manotoc at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When
Manotoc failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in
default through an Order.
● Hence, Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the
address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra
Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of
business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
(2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the
procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted
service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of
Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would
be ineffective and futile.
● The trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss on the strength
of its findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint,
was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue,
Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of
respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption that
the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular
performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
Issue: Whether or not the substituted service is valid. NO.
Ratio:
● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance
in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons,
any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is null and void.
● In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant
is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in
character and in derogation of the usual method of service. Hence,
it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
● Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which
applies to this case provides: If the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section
[personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
DISCUSSION ON THE REQUIREMENTS TO EFFECT A VALID
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
● IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE
49 | CIVPRO 2D
 ○ The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must
show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service.
○ Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff
is given a reasonable time to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is
mentioned.
○ Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably
prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the
other party.
○ To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the
branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a
return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service.
The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of Court,
which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within
the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one
month from the issuance of summons can be
considered reasonable time with regard to personal
service on the defendant.
○ For substituted service of summons to be available, there
must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one
month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates.
● SPECIFIC DETAILS IN RETURN
○ The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the
facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and
time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries
made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to
justify substituted service.
● A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION
○If the substituted service will be effected at defendants
house or residence, it should be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
○ A person of suitable age and discretion is one who
has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years
old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons.
○ The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in
the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal
age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant
of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly
and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
● A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE
○ If the substituted service will be done at defendants office
or regular place of business, then it should be served on
a competent person in charge of the place.
○ Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be
made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or
manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in
the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons.
SHERIFF’S RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several
attempts were made to serve the summons with complaint
and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above
entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE
MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium
Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29
Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours
of the day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant
is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.That
on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of
summons was resorted to in accordance with the Rules of
Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said summons with
complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz,
caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn
Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said
building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with
50 | CIVPRO 2D
 the said defendant at the given address who acknowledged ● Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return
the receipt thereof of said processes but he refused to sign. lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky
de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this is the resident caretaker of Manotoc.
Honorable Court of origin, duly served for its record and ● It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in
information. the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her
stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in
INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE IN THE CASE AT BAR her dwelling. With Manotoc’s allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not
● A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have
the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr.
Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a
valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved strong indication that he did not have the necessary relation of
inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has confidence with Manotoc.
become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched ● Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid
phrases of on many occasions several attempts were made to substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court
serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during perforce must be annulled.
the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises. Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is
● Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be hereby GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
surrounding the service of summons be described with more Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET
particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service. ASIDE.
● It has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas,
who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
petitioner.
● The court, in another case, ruled that the narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad
and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances
should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the
attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the
alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in
the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and
those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt
personal service.
● Granting that such a general description be considered adequate,
there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the
summons must be left with a person of suitable age and discretion
residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of
suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the
house or residence of defendant.

51 | CIVPRO 2D
 23. Ong v Co - NAVARRO
Petitioner/s: YUK LING ONG
Respondent/s: BENJAMIN T. CO
Doctrine: Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for
annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
● Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and
respondent Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on
October 3, 1982
● In 2001, Co filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC
○ Co stated that petitioner’s address was 600 Elcano St.,
Binondo, Manila
● In 2002, Co filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC
○ Co indicated that Ong’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street,
Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City
● RTC issued summons
○ Process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that
substituted service of summons with the copy of the
petition was effected after several futile attempts to
serve the same personally on Ong
○ Said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a
security officer
● RTC rendered a decision finding respondent’s marriage with
petitioner as void ab initio and stated that:
○ summons was served on petitioner but she failed to file
her responsive pleading within the reglementary period
○ petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations
● In 2008, Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation directing her to appear before the said agency
because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to
cancellation proceedings since her marriage with Co was nullified
by the court
● Ong was furnished with the copies of the following documents:
1. 1st petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;
2. 2nd petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;;
3. Decision of the RTC Parañaque on 2nd petition, declaring
the marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio; and
4. their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated
thereon
● Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court before the CA claiming that she was never notified
of the cases filed against her
● Ong alleged that:
1. Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately
indicated a wrong address to prevent her from
participating in the trial;
2. jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in the
2nd petition because of an invalid substituted service of
summons as no sufficient explanation, showing
impossibility of personal service, was stated before
resorting to substituted service of summons;
a. the alleged substituted service was made on a
security guard of their townhouse and not on a
member of her household
● CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for
annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit
Issue:
1. W/N the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the
purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court -- NO
2. W/N the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner – NO
Ratio:
● Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it
allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that
has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be
discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with
● Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only
two grounds for annulment of judgment:
1. extrinsic fraud
2. lack of jurisdiction
ON EXTRINSIC FRAUD (WRONG ADDRESS)
● Ong’s contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud is too
unsubstantial to warrant consideration
ON THE LACK OF JURISDICTION (SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF
SUMMONS)
52 | CIVPRO 2D
 ● Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the
judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action (substantive law), or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (procedural law;
involves the service of summons or other processes on the
petitioner)
● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in
court.
● If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can
be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid
out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall
be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Requirements of a substituted service of summons (MANOTOC V CA):
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted
in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service
● Several attempts = at least three tries preferably on at least two
different dates + sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful
(2) Specific Details in the Return
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service
○ date and time of the attempts on personal service
○ inquiries made to locate the defendant
○ name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant
○ all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
● The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or
at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons
● must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons
IN THE CASE AT BAR:
SERVER’S RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with
copy of petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23
Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said documents were
received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
thereat.
● The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts
undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons
on petitioner
● The server did not state the specific number of attempts made
to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and
the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the
underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not
explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the
petitioner, who was the defendant in the case.
● The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who
received the summons, on behalf of petitioner
● It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly
Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
thereat”
● Aside from the server’s return, Co failed to indicate any portion of
the records which would describe the specific attempts to
personally serve the summons
● Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met,
there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly,
the decision must be declared null and void
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and
the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
106271 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002
53 | CIVPRO 2D
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby
declared VOID.

54 | CIVPRO 2D
 24. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation
GR No. 194751, 26 November 2014 -- PEÑALOSA
Petitioner/s: Aurora De Pedro
Respondent/s: Romasan Development Corporation
Doctrine: The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service
of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot
be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation
of the usual method of service.
Facts:
● Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan) filed several
complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of
title against numerous defendants. One of them is Aurora de Pedro
(De Pedro).
● Romasan said it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in
Antipolo City, as evidence by its Certificate of Title.
● Mr. Rodrigo Ko, a representative of Romasan, discovered in 1996
that De Pedro put up fence in the property. Ko confronted De Pedro
about it but De Pedro was able to show a title and documents
evidencing her ownership. Upon investigation by Romasan, it was
discovered that the DENR issued free patents to De Pedro covering
a portion of the subject property.
● Romasan is now challenging the grant made to De Pedro and
several others. Romasan filed a complaint and claimed that the
issuance by the DENR was illegal since the property was already
released for disposition to private individuals.
● Attempts were made to personally serve summons on De Pedro
but they all failed. The officer’s return dated Feb 22, 1999 had the
following content:
OFFICER’S RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of
February, 1999, I have served a copy of the summons
with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999
issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-
entitled case on the following, to wit;
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that
according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their
[sic] is no person in the said given address.
● Romasan then filed a motion to serve summon and the complaint
BY PUBLICATION. The motion was granted and was published in
People’s Balita.
● Thereafter, Romasan moved to declare all defendants in its
complaints, including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their
answers.
● Since none of the defendants filed an answer, the RTC then issued
an order declaring the title and free patents issued to all defendants
null and void.
● Shortly after, De Pedro, through her counsel, filed a motion for
new trial claiming that her counsel received the notice of the Jan 7,
2000 decision on March 16, 2000. De Pedro also asserted that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of
improper and defective service of summon, claiming that the Feb
22, 1999 summon was not personally served upon her. Also, she
argued that this present case should have been dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia because the same property was the
subject of a pending civil case in another court.
● The RTC dismissed her motion for new trial and said that a
summon was validly served upon her through publication.
● De Pedro then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail
the RTC decision. However, the CA dismissed her petition and
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
● Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Was the service of summon by publication (substituted service)
justified? -- No.
Ratio:
● In this case, the Sheriff’s return shows no detail of his effort to
serve the summon personally. Hence, no substituted service or
service by publication will be allowed based on such defective
return.
● As a rule, Personal Service of Summons is the preferred mode of
service. However, other modes of serving summons may be done
when justified. Service of Summons by Publication in a newspaper
of general circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent
is designated as an unknown owner or if his whereabouts are
“unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”
● But such defect is cured when the defendant or respondent
voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is
generally construed as sufficient service of summons. As in this
55 | CIVPRO 2D
 case, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is ● In this case, the grounds she asserted for a motion for new trial and
tantamount to voluntary appearance. the action for annulment are the same: lack of jurisdiction and litis
pendentia. The Court ruled that her actions raising the same
● Proper service of summon is needed because failure to serve grounds reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by
summons means that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the abusing and making a mockery of legal remedies provided by law.
person of the defendant.
○ Jurisdiction over the persons of defendants or
respondents is acquired by the court either through a (1) Dispositive:
valid service of summons; or (2) voluntary submission. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; The Court of Appeals July 7,
Voluntary submission is made when defendant 2010 decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 96471 is AFFIRMED.
participates in the trial despite improper service of
summons
○ Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the
type of action – whether action in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the person is still needed in
action in in rem and quasi in rem to satisfy the
requirements of due process. Due process requires that
those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified.
Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper
service of summons is imperative.
● When other modes are availed, the Sheriff’s return must contain
circumstances that warranted the deviation from preferring personal
service of summons. Otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld.
● A Sheriff’s return enjoys a presumption of regularity if it contains (1)
details of the circumstances of his attempt to serve the summons
personally; and (2) particulars showing the impossibility of serving
the same within reasonable time. No presumption of regularity if the
return was merely pro forma.

● Despite the foregoing, the SC ruled that the CA was correct not to
grant De Pedro’s motion for new trial because “lack of court
jurisdiction over her person” is not one of the grounds to grant a
new trial. It should have been the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment.
● However, De Pedro was barred from filing a petition for annulment
of judgment. Under the Rules, an action for annulment of judgment
may be based only on two grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack
of jurisdiction.
● In several cases, the Court has held that such action may NOT be
invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and
lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.".

56 | CIVPRO 2D
 25. CARSON REALTY v. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY, GR No.
225035, 2017-02-08 || Regado || Velasco Jr., J:.
Petitioner/s: Carson Realty & Management Corp
Respondent/s: Red Robin Security Agency and Monina Santos
Doctrine:
● Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the
parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal
service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that
the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in
charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant.
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
This, however, is tempered only by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority
Facts:
● On March 2007, respondent Santos filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioner Carson with the RTC. As
per the Officer's Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server
Pajila, a copy of the Summons dated April 11, 2007, together with
the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon Carson at its
business address through its "corporate secretary," Precilla S.
Serrano.
● Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of
Carson, Atty. Roxas filed an Appearance and Motion dated April
25, 2007 with the court wherein the latter entered his appearance
and acknowledged that the Summons was served and received by
one of the staff assistants of Carson.
● Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension of 15 days from April 27,
2007 within which to file a responsive pleading.
● The RTC noted the appearance of Atty. Roxas and granted his
request for extension of time to file a responsive pleading.
● Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to
dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Summons dated April 11,
2007 was not served on any of the officers and personnel
authorized to receive summons under the Rules of Court.
● In her Comment, Santos countered that while the Summons was
initially received by Serrano, who as it turned out was a staff
assistant and not the corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation
acknowledged receipt of the Summons when Atty. Roxas alleged in
his Appearance and Motion that he may not be able to comply with
the 15-day prescribed period.Thus, when Carson sought for an
affirmative relief of a 15-day extension from April 27, 2007 to file its
pleading, it already voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
● On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted his
Officer's Report stating in essence that he attempted to serve the
alias Summons dated September 24, 2007 on the President and
General Manager of Carson, as well as on the Board of Directors
and Corporate Secretary, but they were not around.
● Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez, the
'"secretary" of the company, to bring the alias Summons to the law
office of Atty. Roxas but to no avail
● This prompted him (process server) to resort to substituted
service of the alias Summons by leaving a copy thereof with a
certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the latter also refused to
acknowledge receipt of the alias Summons
● Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons
was again improperly and invalidly served as his law office was not
empowered to receive summons on behalf of Carson.
● the RTC denied the motion filed by Santos to declare Carson in
default due to improper service of summons.
● Thereafter, Santos requested the RTC for the issuance of another
alias Summons. The RTC granted this request and issued an alias
Summons dated September 9, 2008.Santos filed a second Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default in January 2009. The RTC granted
the motion and allowed her to present her evidence ex-parte in its
Order dated June 29, 2009.
● On August 27, 2009, Carson filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Order of Default.The RTC denied the same.
● Carson filed an urgent Motion for reconsideration. In the meantime,
Santos filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set for Hearing and for
Reception of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of Court
RTC Ruling: Denied Carson’s urgent MR and granted Santos’ Ex-Parte
Motion to set case for hearing and for reception of evidence before the
branch clerk
CA Ruling: Denied the petition filed by Carson and ruled that the RTC had
properly acquired jurisdiction over Carson due to its voluntary appearance in
court.
57 | CIVPRO 2D
Issues:
(1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson -YES
(2) Whether Carson was properly declared in default - YES
Ruling:
RTC Acquired jurisdiction over Carson .The substituted service of
summons is valid
● In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through
personal or substituted service of summons.
● However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service and personal service of summons is preferred
over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to
resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted
service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons
within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business of the defendant.
● We find that resort to substituted service was warranted since the
impossibility of personal service is clearly apparent.
● The foregoing requirements for a valid substituted service of
summons were substantially complied with.
● Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service
to Carson's officers, as shown by the efforts made by Process
Server Pajila to serve the September 8, 2008 alias Summons on
Carson's President/General Manager. In particular, several
attempts to serve the summons on these officers were made on
four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16, 2008,
October 27, 2008, and October 28, 2008, but to no avail.
● On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served the
summons on Fernandez, Carson's receptionist, due to the
unavailability and difficulty to locate the company's corporate
officers.
● The pertinent portion of the Return states: Substituted service of
summons was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias
Summons at the company's office through its employee, MS.
LORIE FERNANDEZ, however, she refused to acknowledge
receipt of the process.
● Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its
officers not to receive the Summons.
In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted
service, such is of little significance in view of the fact that the RTC
had already acquired jurisdiction over Carson early on due to its
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a
civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon
them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
however, is tempered only by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
● Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC
when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion
dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the
Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to
file its responsive pleading. As noted by the CA, Carson failed to
indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by
way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of the
service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of
additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Carson was properly declared in default
● It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from
Carson's failure to file its responsive pleading despite its voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court reckoned from its
filing of the Appearance and Motion, and not due to its failure to file
its answer to the September 8, 2008 alias Summons
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 20, 2015
and Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA¬ G.R. SP
No. 121983 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
58 | CIVPRO 2D
59 | CIVPRO 2D
 26. Robinson v. Miralles - Rodriguez
Petitioner/s: Remelita M. Robinson
Respondent/s: Celita B. Miralles
Doctrine: For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or
upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of
business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.
Facts:
● Celita Miralles filed with the RTC of Paranaque City a complaint for
sum of money against Remelita Robinson. Allegedly, Remelita
borrowed US$20,054.00 from Miralles as shown by a Memorandum
of Agreement they both executed.
● Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However,
per return of service of Sheriff Maximo Potente, she no longer
resides at such address.
● The trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19
Baguio St., Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City, Robinson’s new
address. Again, the summons could not be served.
● According to the Sheriff: “The Security Guard assigned at the gate
of Alabang Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I
could effect the service of the summons to Robinson. The security
guard alleged that Robinson had given them instructions not to let
anybody proceed to her house if she is not around.
○ I explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff
serving the summons to Robinson, and if she is not
around, summons can be received by any person of
suitable age and discretion living in the same house.
Despite all the explanation, the security guard by the
name of A.H. Geroche still refused to let me go inside the
subdivision and served the summons to Robinson. The
same thing happened when I attempted to serve the
summons previously.
● Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof
together with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the
name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the
original copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to
Robinson.
● Miralles then filed a motion to declare Robinson in default for her
failure to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons.
The Trial court allowed her to present her evidence ex parte.
● The trial court ruled in favor of Miralles. A copy of the order was
sent to Robinson by registered mail at her new address. Upon
motion of Miralles, the trial court issued a writ of execution.
● Robinson then filed a petition for relief from judgment by default,
claiming that she was not properly served summons. Hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was valid. YES.
Ratio:
● Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her. In a civil action, service of summons is
the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. Any judgment without such service, in the
absence of a valid waiver, is null and void.
● Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as
amended, thus:
○ SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant – Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
○ SEC. 7. Substituted service – If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at the
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
● Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred
over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method
extraordinary in character.
● Robinson contends that the security guard is not the proper party to
receive summons:
○ We have ruled that the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and
fully and any substituted service other than that authorized
by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown
upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the
60 | CIVPRO 2D
 spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that
governs.
○ In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused
entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The
latter informed him that Robinson prohibits him from
allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever
she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to
effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
Robinson.
○ We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s
declaration. Nor did she deny having received the
summons through the security guard.
○ Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she
must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trail
court that summons has been properly served upon
Robinson and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and we AFFIRM the
assailed Orders of the RTC, Branch 274, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No.
00-0372. Costs against petitioner.

61 | CIVPRO 2D
 27. Orion Security Corporation vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., - SAN
DIEGO
Petitioner/s: ORION SECURITY CORPORATION
Respondent/s: KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC.
Doctrine:
1. in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that
the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was
one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring
that the latter would actually receive the summons
2. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Facts:
● Orion Security Corporation is engaged in the business of providing
security services. One of its clients is Kalfam Enterprises, Inc.
● Kalfam was not able to pay Orion for services rendered. Orion thus filed
a complaint for collection of sum of money.
● The sheriff tried to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint on
the secretary of Kalfam's manager. However, Kalfam's representatives
allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt.
● When Kalfam failed to file an Answer, Orion filed a motion to declare
Kalfam in default.The trial court, however, denied the motion on the
ground that there was no proper service of summons on Kalfam
● Orion then filed a motion for alias summons, which the trial court
granted.
● The process server again left the summons and a copy of the complaint
through Kalfam's security guard, who allegedly refused to acknowledge
their receipt.
● Again, Kalfam failed to file an Answer and Kalfam was declared in
default.
● Thereafter, Orion was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte
● According to Orion, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam due
to the its voluntary appearance. Orion insists substituted service of
summons on Kalfam's security guard is substantial compliance with the
rule on service of summons, in view of the exceptional circumstances in
the present case.
● Kalfam however, counters that the special appearance of its counsel
does not constitute voluntary appearance.
● Kalfam maintains that its filing of an opposition to Orion's motion to
declare Kalfam in default and other subsequent pleadings questioning
the trial courts jurisdiction over it does not amount to voluntary
appearance.
● Kalfam stresses it was not properly served with summons via
substituted service since the security guard on whom it was purportedly
served was not the competent person contemplated by Section 7, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court
● TC ruled in favor of Orion. CA reversed it saying that summons was not
validly served on Kalfam
Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent either by (1)
valid substituted service of summons on respondent; or (2) respondents
voluntary appearance in the trial court and submission to its authority. - NO
for both.
Ratio:
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil
case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or
through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority
● As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant.
● It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a
reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.
● Kalfam's president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons
against respondent, either in person or by substituted service.
● Note that in case of substituted service 7, there should be a report
indicating that the person who received the summons in the
defendants behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation
of confidence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons
● Orion failed to show that the security guard who received the summons
in respondents behalf shared such relation of confidence that
respondent would surely receive the summons.
● The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam by the its
voluntary appearance in court proceedings.
7 SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies
at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
62 | CIVPRO 2D
● A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
● Kalfam, in its special appearance, precisely questioned the jurisdiction
of the trial court on the ground of invalid service of summons. Thus, it
cannot be deemed to have submitted to said courts authority.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 17, 2004 and Resolution dated April 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70565 are AFFIRMED. Let the case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon valid service of
summons to respondent. No pronouncement as to costs.

63 | CIVPRO 2D
 28. TORIO- B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ameploquio
Reality
Petitioner/s: B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc.
Respondent/s: R.S. Ameploquio Reality
Doctrine: If the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally
within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be
resorted to. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service
must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The
statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized
by statute is considered ineffective.
Facts:
1. BD Long Span Builders and R.S Ampeloquio Realty entered into a
contract where BD Long Span agreed to render “rip rapping” construction
services at Ampeloquio International Resort in Cavite for Php50M. They
entered into another contract for Php30M. To secure performance, BD Long
Span deposited a cash bond (Php800K).
2. R.S Ampeloquio failed to comply with its obligations under the
Agreements, resulting in the cancellation of the project. BD Long Span
demanded the return of the cash bond but RS Ampeloquio refused.
3. BD Long Span filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract
and damages against respondent. Summons and a copy of the complaint
were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy.
4. RS Ampeloquio failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the
complaint. Upon motion of BD Long Span, RTC declared RS Ameploquio in
default. RTC ruled in favor of BD Long Span. CA reversed. BD Long Span
appealed to the SC, hence the case at bar.
Issue:
Did the CA err in ruling that there was invalid service of summons upon
respondent, and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over RS
Ampeloquio?-- NO
Ratio:
1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case
is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through
their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process.
As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires
no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is
null and void.
2. Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.' When the defendant
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
3. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In
case of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be
made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to
render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served
on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
4. However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally
within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted
to. Section 7 of Rule 14 provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.' If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
5. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown
by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and
that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service
is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary
in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective.
64 | CIVPRO 2D

6. In this case, the Return by Process Server provides:
This is to certify that:
On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, undersigned
tried to cause the service of the Summons together with the attached
complaint & its annexes in the above-entitled case to the defendant at his
given address on record. Mr Romel Dalahoy, a staff of said Realty received
the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes as evidenced
by the former's signature as appearing on the original copy of the aforesaid
Summons.
Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes to
Atty. Evangeline V. Tiongson, Clerk of Court V, this Court, is respectfully
returned, DULY SERVED, by substituted service.
new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default after
the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4) he may also appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him.19 Thus,
respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal
and question the validity of the trial court's judgment without being
considered to have submitted to the trial court's authority.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court
of Appeals' Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30
September 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. Let the case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings upon valid service of summons to
respondent.

October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City

Angelito C. Reyes
Process Server

7.Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant

(respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule
14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendant's
staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the
server's first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that
prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant.

Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member
who received the summons in respondent's behalf, shared such relation of
confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons.
Thus, following our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioner's
contention that service on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial
compliance with the requirements of substituted service.

8. Petitioner's contention that respondent's filing of Notice of Appeal

effectively cured any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is
well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the
following remedies, to wit: (1) he may, at any time after discovery of the
default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order
of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (2) if
judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for

65 | CIVPRO 2D
 29. ZABALA - Wong v Factor-Koyama
Petitioner/s: ALEXANDER TAM WONG
Respondent/s: CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA
Doctrine: Before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to
try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the defendant. Resorting to substituted
service, after merely trying to serve the summons at the defendant’s
residence on three different dates while he was in his office, is improper.
Facts:
A Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages was
filed with the RTC by private respondent Koyama against Wong.
● Koyama alleged in her Complaint that Wong deliberately refused to
execute and deliver a deed of absolute sale, and to surrender the
TCT of a condominium in California Garden Square, Mandaluyong
City, which she had already bought from him.
● Koyama further averred that she had been renting out the subject
property to foreign tourists, but Wong padlocked the same while
she was in Japan attending to her business. When she requested
him to open the subject property, he reportedly mauled her, causing
her physical injuries, and also took her personal belongings.
The RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence in Quezon
City. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the
Complaint and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff
Baloloy.
● In his Return, he indicated that the summons should already be
deemed DULY SERVED.
● According to him, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve
the summons at Wongs residential address on three different
dates, but Wong was always not around according to the latters
housemaids. Sheriff Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons
with Mira, Wong’s caretaker, who is of legal age, and residing at the
same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to
acknowledge or receive the same.
After the lapseof the 15-day reglementary periodand upon motion of
Koyama, the RTC declared Wong in default and allowed Koyama to present
her evidence ex parte.
Wong, by special appearance of counsel,then filed with the RTC a Motion to
Dismiss asserting that there was no service of summons upon him, hence,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not
given the opportunity to oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in
default.
RTC denied, CA dismissed Wong’s petition for Certiorari (improper remedy).
Hence, Wong filed the instant petition.
IN THE MEANTIME, since the neither the CA nor the SC issued a TRO, the
RTC continued the hearing of the case. It allowed Wong to cross-examine
Koyama, which Wong’s counsel extensively did, even though the previous
order of default had not been lifted. The RTC allowed this in the interest of
justice and fair play.
Issues:
1. WON the Sheriff properly resorted to substituted service of
summons --- NO
2. WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant Wong --- YES
Ratio:
1. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloy’s Return, finds that
he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the
summons.
Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through
the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service
of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the
manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service.
● Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal
service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even
though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon
another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings.
The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show
the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service. Proof of service of
summons must:
66 | CIVPRO 2D
(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; examined Koyana, despite knowledge that the order of default had not yet
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and been lifted.
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or By actively participating in the hearing, he effectively acknowledged full
regular place of business, of the defendant. control of the RTC over the case and over his person as the defendant
therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be jurisdiction of said trial court.
stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted The Court further stressed the fact that the RTC already rendered a Decision
service renders the service of summons ineffective. and Wong filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. Given these developments,
the Court deems it unnecessary to still address the issue of whether Wong
Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on was improperly declared in default by the RTC in its Order.
three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is
nothing else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted
extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. Dispositive:
● During his visits to Wongs residence, Sheriff Baloloy was informed IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against the
by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. petitioner.
● There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to
know Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or
personally serve the summons upon him at his office.
● Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to
serve the summons at the formers residence on one of the dates,
there was no indication that Wongs absence was other than
temporary or that he would not soon return.

Sheriff Baloloys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on

his part to locate Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during
Sheriff Baloloys visits, since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not
connote impossibility of personal service of summons upon him.
● It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a
sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal
service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to
try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be
resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant.

2.The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary

appearance before it.
Even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.

The Court here noted that the RTC acquired jurisdiction NOT when Wong
filed a motion to dismiss, BUT when he, through counsel, extensively cross-

67 | CIVPRO 2D
 30. Cezar vs. Ricafort-Bautista ABALOS
Petitioner/s: Virgilio P CEZAR
Respondent/s: HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 260, City of Parañaque and
SPECIFIED MATERIALS, CO
Doctrine: A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person
Facts: Specified Materials Corp. filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money against petitioner arising from the latter's failure to pay the
construction materials it purportedly purchased under a credit line extended
by private respondent. As petitioner failed to pay for the construction
materials
private respondent sent two letters to petitioner and his brother, Perfecto,
reminding them of their obligation. Private respondent's representatives met
with petitioner in order to reconcile their conflicting records. During said
meeting, petitioner allegedly admitted that he failed to take into account
some deliveries. Petitioner then requested that they meet again after two
days so that he could verify his documents but he failed to show up for the
subsequent meetings.
Thereafter, private respondent sent a final demand letter to petitioner.
After the filing of the complaint, summons was issued to petitioner and this
was served by the Sheriff Marquez, stating in his return that it was served to
petitioner thru Mr. Arsenio Robles, an employee of the former who is
authorized to transact business, as per his signature appearing below
summons.
Petitioner failed to file his Answer. Thus, private respondent moved that he
be declared in default which was granted by the court. Private respondent
was able to present its evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside
Decision arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person. This motion was denied.
Following the denial of its Motion to Set Aside Decision, petitioner filed
before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Preliminary Injunction
with Prayer for TRO. This petition was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a MR
but this was denied. Hence, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the SC which denied the same for failure to comply with
procedural requirements.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution before the trial
court. The scheduled hearing of this motion was ordered reset after
petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing. The records
also disclose that the rescheduled hearing did not push through and in fact,
it was rescheduled a couple of more times per agreement of the parties.
Finally, public respondent granted private respondent's Motion for Execution.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: WON the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner by virtue of substituted service of summons effected by
sheriff Juan C. Marquez.
Ratio:
There are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or
respondent is acquired – either through the service of summons upon them
or through their voluntary appearance in court.
The Rules of Court requires that, whenever practicable, summons must be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. In case the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering the summons to
him or her. However, in the event that summons cannot be served within a
reasonable time, the Rules permit that substituted service may be resorted
to.
In this case, the sheriff employed the substituted service of summons. It
must be emphasized that laws providing for modes other than the personal
service of summons must be strictly followed in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent or defendant. Compliance
therewith should appear affirmatively on the return.
As the sheriff's return in the present case does not contain any statement
with regard to the impossibility of personal service the same is patently
defective and so the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions will not lie.
Nevertheless, we still hold that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the trial
court. Although the substituted service upon him of summons was defective,
said defect was cured by his voluntary appearance.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An
appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a
68 | CIVPRO 2D
cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction
ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an
appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or
answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear
without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless
by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he
thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

As the records of this case disclose, after private respondent moved for the
execution of the trial court's decision, petitioner filed a motion for a re-setting
of the court's hearing thereon.
Hence, in this case, petitioner's filing of a Motion for Re-setting of the
Hearing effectively cured the defect of the substituted service of summons.
Petitioner's insistence of lack of jurisdiction over his person is utterly lacking
in any legal basis.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is

DISMISSED. The Decision dated 9 September 1997 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 96-0473 is hereby
AFFIRMED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 16
June 1999 is hereby LIFTED

69 | CIVPRO 2D
 31. Belen v. Chavez - AVILLON
Petitioner/s: Sps. Domingo M. Belen and Dominga P. Belen herein
represented by their atty-in-fact Nery B. Avecilla
Respondent/s: Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, presiding Judge, RTC branch 87,
Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his orders and Sps.
Silvestre and N. Pacleb and Patricia A. PACLEB, represented therein by
the attorney in fact Joselito Rioveros
Doctrine: The Court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case by means of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance
and submission to the authority of the Court.
Facts:
1. The instant petition originated from the action of Sps Pacleb,
represented by their atty in fact Rioveros, for the enforcement of a
foreign judgement against Sps Belen.
2. Sps Pacleb argue that they secured a judgement by default in a
case rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California. This
judgement ordered Sps. Belen to pay $56,204.69 representing loan
repayment.
3. The summons was served on Sps Belen’s address in San
Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and was received by a certain
Marcelo.
4. The counsel for Sps Belen, Atty Alcantara, filed an answer arguing
that Sps Belen were actually residents of California, USA.
5. In view of Sps Belen’s failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the
RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for Sps Pacleb.
6. Before the presentation of evidence, Atty Alcantara filed a motion to
dismiss. The RTC held the ex parte presentation of evidence in
abeyance. But the motion was eventually denied by the RTC.
7. During the pendency of the proceedings, Atty Alcantara died
without the RTC being informed.
8. The RTC promulgated a decision against Sps Belen. A copy of the
decision intended for Atty Alcantara was returned with the notation
“Addressee Deceased”. Another copy of the decision was sent to
the Laguna address of Sps. Belen.
9. Sps. Pacleb obtained a writ of execution which lead to Sps Belen’s
property being levied.
10. Atty Culvera entered his appearance for Sps. Belen and he
subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. This was
denied.
11. Atty Culvera also filed on Jan 6, 2004 a Notice of Appeal from the
RTC decision arguing that he only received a copy of the decision
on Dec 29, 2003.
12. Sps. Belen elevated the case via Rule 65 to the CA, imputing grave
abuse of discretion. This was dismissed by the CA.
Issue:
WHETHER the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps Belen thru
either the proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty.
Alcantara - YES, service to Sps Belen were defective but by virtue of
Atty. Alcantara’s appearance, the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Ratio:
SUMMONS
1. The action in the instant case is in the nature of an action in
personam because Sps. Pacleb are suing to enforce their personal
rights under the foreign judgment.
a. In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a
non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself
to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person. If he is not found in the state, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot
validly try and decide the case against him.
b. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker
wherein a non-resident was served with summons through
his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who
was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil
case filed by him.
2. It has been consistently maintained that Sps Belen were not
physically present in the Philippines. Atty. Alcantara had already
averred that Sps Belen were residents of California, U.S.A. and that
he was appearing only upon the instance of petitioners' relatives.
3. The service of summons on Sps Belen's purported address in San
Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest
in court jurisdiction over their persons.
4. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous
pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons
of Sps Belen. Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly
authorized by Sps Belen to appear on their behalf. Atty. Alcantara
attached in the motion to dismiss a duly authenticated copy of the
judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of
petitioner Domingo Belen's U.S. passport. These documents could
have been supplied only by petitioners, indicating that they have
consented to the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on their behalf. In
sum, petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves through
Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
70 | CIVPRO 2D
COPY OF THE RTC DECISION
5. Upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship
between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the
RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners.
6. The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known
address" by registered mail is also defective because it does not
comply with the requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of
Rule 13 on service by registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 13
contemplates service at the present address of the party and not
at any other address of the party.
7. Therefore, the running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not
commence upon the service of the RTC decision to Atty.
Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It is deemed served on Sps
Belen only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29 December
2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 06 January
2004 is within the reglementary period and should be given due
course.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88731 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
orders dated 7 July 2004 and 2 February 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87 are SET ASIDE. The RTC is also ordered to
GIVE DUE COURSE to the Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Culvera on 06
January 2004. Costs against private respondents. aD

71 | CIVPRO 2D
Motefalcon v Vasquez - BALAGTAS
Petitioner/s: Dolores Motefalcon & Laurence Montefalcon
Respondent/s: Ronnie Vasquez
Doctrine: Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent
resident may be by substituted service.
A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence,
office or regular business place. It is immaterial that defendant does
not receive actual notice.
Facts:
1) In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for
acknowledgment and support
a) Against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez
i) Before the RTC of Naga City.
2) Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez:
a) She prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-
petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live
birth he signed as father.
b) According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of
P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born
in 1993.
c) Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school
allowance despite repeated demands.
d) Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not
legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
3) A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in
Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
a) Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in
Manila.
b) Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of
court, who informed the court of the non-service of
summons.
4) Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default.
a) The court denied it for lack of proper service of
summons.
5) In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int.
President Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila"
upon petitioners' motion.
a) Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted
service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's
return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's
surname.
6) Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer.
7) On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default
for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of
summons.
a) Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of
the proceedings at his last known address, but these were
returned as he had allegedly moved to another place
and left no new address.
8) In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers:
a) Explaining that they had no ill- motive and that Dolores
gave a truthful testimony.
b) The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the
allegations by his silence.
c) It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth,
being a public document, is irrefutably a prima facie
evidence of illegitimate filiation.
9) In the same year, Vasquez surfaced.
a) He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed.
b) Appeal was granted by the court.
c) Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court
erred in trying and deciding the case as it "never"
acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in
awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly
"excessive and exorbitant."
10) The appellate court noted that the service of summons on
Vasquez was "defective" as there was no explanation of
impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect
personal service.
11) Petitioner’s Arguments:
a) Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as
Vasquez had left as overseas seafarer when the sheriff
served the summons on July 19, 2000 in Taguig.
b) Noting that Vasquez's seaman's book indicated that he left
the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on
October 12, 2000, they criticize the appellate court for
anchoring its rulings on mere technicality.
c) Petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal
method if one is temporarily away from the country as
personal service abroad or by publication are not ordinary
means of service.
12) Vasquez’ Arguments:
a) Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of
summons should have been personal or by publication
i) As substituted service is proper only if a
defendant is in the country.
72 | CIVPRO 2D
 b) Vasquez also added that the sheriff's return did not
state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the
summons.
Issue: WoN there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to
clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person.
Ratio:
1) To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of
summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a
reasonable time, then by substituted service.
2) It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees.
a) They go back to the country once their contracts expire,
and wait for the signing of another contract with the same
or new manning agency and principal if they wish.
b) It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino
seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban
areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning
agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the
province where he originates.
3) In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he
has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed.
a) Notice may then be taken that he has established a
residence in either place.
4) Residence is a place where the person named in the summons
is living at the time when the service was made, even though
he was temporarily abroad at the time.
a) As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident
temporarily out of the country.
b) Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule
14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
— When any action is commenced against a defendant
who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines, as under the
preceding section.
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates
to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
5) Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also", it
is not mandatory.
a) Other methods of service of summons allowed under the
Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-seaman.
6) Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons.
a) But was personal service of summons practicable?
Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified?
7) Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable
since the defendant was temporarily out of the country.
a) To proceed with personal service of summons on a
defendant-seaman who went on overseas contract work
— would not only be impractical and futile — it would
also be absurd.
8) The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact
that the Naga City-based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in
Camarines Sur to serve the summons personally on Vasquez.
a) When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained
the whereabouts of Vasquez.
b) Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the
Naga court commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to
serve the summons.
c) Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about
Vasquez's whereabouts, signifying that they did not
immediately resort to substituted service.
d) There was no undue haste in effecting substituted service.
e) The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time
to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there
was indeed no precipitate haste in serving the
summons.
73 | CIVPRO 2D
9) In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was
valid and justified because previous attempts were made by the
sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail.
a) Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the
concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty.
b) Also, the person who received the alias summons was of
suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's
dwelling.
c) There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence,
as evidenced by his employment contract, executed under
the supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
d) Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment
and seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's
letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what was
correctly mentioned in the alias summons that Bejer
received.
i) She must have informed Vasquez one way or
another of the suit upon his return in October
2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with
Fathom Ship Management.
e) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time
to have the default order set aside.
i) The default judgment was rendered on May 28,
2001.
ii) He also had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
(1) But he did nothing.
10) The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at personal
service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines
Sur to the final substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC
sheriff was almost eight months, a reasonable time long enough to
conclude that personal service had failed and was futile.
11) Montalban v Maximo discussion by the SC:
a) We held in said case that the normal method of service of
summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted
service because personal service abroad and service by
publication are not ordinary means of summoning
defendants.
b) Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily
absent resident may be by substituted service as
domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in
personam therein.
c) "Residence" is the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at
the time.
i) A plaintiff is merely required to know the
defendant's residence, office or regular
business place.
ii) He need not know where a resident defendant
actually is at the very moment of filing suit.
iii) He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the
person upon whom service was actually made
delivers the summons to the defendant or informs
him about it.
iv) The law presumes that for him.
v) It is immaterial that defendant does not
receive actual notice.
d) More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its
spirit.
i) The absence in the final sheriff's return of a
statement about the impossibility of personal
service does not conclusively prove that the
service is invalid.
ii) Such failure should not unduly prejudice
petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact
done.
iii) Proof of prior attempts at personal service may
have been submitted by the plaintiff during the
hearing of any incident assailing the validity of
the substituted service had Vasquez surfaced
when the case was heard.
iv) In fact, he was declared in default.
(1) It was only when a judgment against
him was rendered by the trial court that
he questioned the validity of service of
summons before the appellate court.
(2) Such failure to appear, and then later
to question the court's jurisdiction
over his person, should not be taken
against herein petitioners.
e) Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only
came to know of the case when his mother told him about
the trial court's decision and the sheriff's return on the
substituted service which carries a presumption of
regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith
and credit.
i) The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is
prima facie evidence of the facts set out in it.
74 | CIVPRO 2D
 ii) Only clear and convincing evidence may
overcome its presumption of regularity.
iii) Given the circumstances in the present case, we
agree that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty on the part of the sheriff
stands.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 29, 2003 and Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga
City in Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby REINSTATED.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

75 | CIVPRO 2D
 32. Palma v. Galvez BORNALES
Petitioner: Leah Palma
Respondents: HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as
PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO
CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO
DOCTRINE: A dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is
as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between
the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore,
assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some
way give him notice thereof
FACTS:
· Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the
Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O.
Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault,
negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her
will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the
surgery.
· Although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was
doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein
pertained that of somebody else.
· Respondents filed their respective answers.
· Palma subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were
all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein
private respondent Agudo.
· Summons were subsequently issued to them.
· RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating
that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint
and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband
Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private
respondent was out of the country.
· Counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer 4 stating that he was just
engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the country
and the Answer was already due.
· The Counsel of Private Respondent asked for another extentsion
stating that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would
be sent to private respondent for her clarification/verification before the
Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20
days to file the Answer.
· Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground that
the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly
served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that
service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court.
· Petitioner opposed this arguing that a substituted service of
summons on private respondent's husband was valid and binding on
her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not
exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by
personal or substituted service.
· RTC issued its assailed Order granting private
respondent'smotion to dismiss. It found that while the summons was
served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's
husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on
her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served,
thus, she was not personally served a summons
· Petitioner is now before the Court alleging that the public
respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (Rule 65 Certiorari)
ISSUE/S: Did Judge Galvez committed a grave abuse of discretion amount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of improper service of summons - YES/NO
RATIO:
· In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former.
· Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily
out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus,
service of summons on her is governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court:
Ø Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
— When an action is commenced against a
76 | CIVPRO 2D
 defendant who ordinarily resides within the
Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.
(Emphasis supplied)
Ø SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status
of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal
service as under section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem su􀁊cient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.
Ø SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justi􀀻able
causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's
office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
· The Court held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the
place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time.
· The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the
house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service
of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction.
· The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists
between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and,
therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to
defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
· In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent
was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her
residence with her husband,Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt
thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who
was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the
summons on private respondent's behalf.
· RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private
respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for
Extension of Time to File Answer.
· In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already
invoked the RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the
motions for extension of time to file answer be granted.
· Filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
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33. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading
Petitioner/s: PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD.
Respondent/s: DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
Doctrine: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of
the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.
Facts:
● Respondent Dakila Trading entered into a Distribution Agreement
in 1990 with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Singapore and engaged in the business of manufacturing,
producing, selling or distributing various laboratory/analytical
instruments. In the agreement, PEIA appointed the respondent as
the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines.
○ Dakila Trading was also granted the right to purchase and
sell the products of PEIA subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the Distribution Agreement.
○ PEIA, on the other hand, shall give respondent a
commission for the sale of its products in the Philippines.
● Under the same agreement, respondent shall order the products of
PEIA, which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or
from Perkin-Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP), an
affiliate of PEIA.
○ PEIP is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, and involved in the business of wholesale
trading of all kinds of scientific, biotechnological, and
analytical instruments and appliances.
○ PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP.
● In 1997, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement.
prompting respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong, a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with
Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
● RTC ruled denying the prayer for attachment.
● Dakila filed for Ex Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for
Leave of Court to Deputize Dakila’s General Manager to serve
summons outside of the Philippines. This was granted by the RTC.
An alias summons was served to Perkinelmer Asia (Singapore
based sole proprietorship owned by PERKIN, allegedly distinct from
PEIA).
● PEIP moved to dismiss, stating that there is no cause of action.
PERKIN alleged that Service of summons was erroneous.
● Dakila filed a motion to admit amended complaint, which sought to
change name of PEIA to PERKIN. It claims that PEIA became a
sole proprietorship owned by PERKIN and changed its name to
Perkinelmer Asia.
● RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of PEIP, compelling PEIP to file
Answer to Amended Complaint.
● Dakila now alleges that PERKIN’s ownership over personal
property in the form of shares of stocks in PEIP. The allegations,
being mainly for damages, relates to a property which PERKIN has
claim or interest or lien, thus, falling under the requisites of
extraterritorial service under Rule 14. Thus, summons was validly
served.
Issue: W/N the service of summons was proper - No.
Ratio:
● There can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon
it, because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a
sum of money and damages is, indeed, an action in personam, as it
deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent
by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the
Distribution Agreement.
● The cause of action is anchored on the claim that petitioner
unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the action
instituted by respondent affects the parties alone. It is an action in
personam: any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.
● Being an action in personam, personal service of summons within
the Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
○ This is not possible in the present case because the
petitioner is a non-resident and is not found within the
Philippines.
○ The allegation in the Amended Complaint that petitioner
had personal property (shares of stock) in PEIP which is
within the Philippines did not make the case fall under the
instances under Sec 15 Rule 14.
● Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, there are only four instances wherein a defendant who
is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff;
78 | CIVPRO 2D
 (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident’s property has been
attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service
of summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave
of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
● Also, mere allegations of personal property within the Philippines
does not necessarily make the property subject of an action.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 4 April 2006, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78981, affirming the Orders, dated 4 November 2002 and 20
June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in
Civil Case No. MC99-605, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as against
the petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and all the proceedings
against petitioner in the court a quo by virtue thereof are hereby DECLARED
NULL AND VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
212, is DIRECTED to proceed without further delay with the resolution of
respondent’s Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to defendant PEIP,
as well as petitioner’s counterclaim. No costs.

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 33. Macasaet v. Co - RELUCIO
Petitioner/s: ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,
ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND
RANDY HAGOS
Respondent/s: FRANCISCO R. CO, JR
Doctrine: The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists
either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within
a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected
either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Facts:
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite, a
daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its
Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias
Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its
Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of
an allegedly libelous article petitioners published.
The RTC in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant,
including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street
corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.
In the morning of Sept 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the
stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and
unavailable.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving
the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office.
He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained
why in his sheriff's return.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging lack of
jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual
substituted service of summons.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their
answers to the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules of
Court. MR denied. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue: W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners. —YES
Ratio:
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam — the power of the
court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action — is an
element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not
required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it
acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to
the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the
proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a)
to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to
afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought
against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired
in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid
waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.
The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant
himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a)
by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy
at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
80 | CIVPRO 2D
charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted service
because the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his
substitute

Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of

petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of
September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each
attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not
available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and
gathering news."

After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second
attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office
during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further
attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile.
The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion.

He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal

service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly
authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the
personal service within a reasonable time.

In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the serving officer

was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses
served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several
pleadings in the RTC. They had also availed themselves of the modes of
discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their
voluntary appearance in the action.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8,
2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

(Note: Issue regarding Abante Tonite being neither a natural or a juridical

person and therefore could not be sued —CA categorized Abante as a
corporation by estoppel, having represented itself to the public as a corp)

81 | CIVPRO 2D