REMEDIAL LAW

I. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
REMEDIAL LAW is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtaining redress for their invasion [Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also
known as Adjective Law.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates, defines, and regulates rights.
PROCEDURE is the method of conducting a judicial proceeding. It includes whatever
is embraced in the technical terms, pleadings, practice, and evidence. It is the
means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases
is put to action [Manila Railroad vs. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523].
JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto &
Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245]. It is the power with which courts are invested with the
power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for
the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs.
Molina, 166 SCRA 39].
JURISDICTION VENUE
The authority to hear and determine a case The place where the case is to be heard
or tried
A matter of substantive law A matter of procedural law
Establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter Establishes a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent
Fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties May be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties
PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the
court is called upon to decide a particular situation and release the parties from their
correlative obligations but if it would result in adverse consequences to the parties
and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative consequences
in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793; Naga
Telephone Co. vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539].
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION:
(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case (2) Jurisdiction over the
parties (3) Jurisdiction over the res
It is conferred by law (BP 129), and does not depend on the objection or the acts or
omissions of the parties or anyone of them [Republic vs. Sangalang, 159 SCRA 515].

It is not waivable, except in cases of estoppel to question or raise jurisdiction [Tijam

vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29].
It is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled or not, to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired by the filing of the initiatory pleading, like a complaint.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by the proper service of
summons, or by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to the
authority of the court [Paramount Industries vs. Luna, 148 SCRA 564].
It is acquired by the seizure of the thing under legal process whereby it is brought
into actual custody of law, or it may result from the institution of a legal proceeding
wherein the power of the court over the thing is recognized and made effective
[Banco-Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291].
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:
(1) Territorial jurisdiction (2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter (3) Jurisdiction
over the person of the accused
It is determined by the geographical area over which a court presides, and the fact
that the crime was committed, or any of its essential ingredients took place within
said area [US vs. Jueves, 23 Phil. 100]. It is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of its commission [US vs. Mallari, 24 Phil.
366]. It is acquired by the voluntary appearance or surrender of the accused or by
his arrest [Choc vs. Vera, 64 Phil. 1066].
INSTANCES WHEN A COURT MAY LOSE JURISDICTION EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
ATTACHED TO IT:
1 When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of
jurisdiction [Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717].
2 Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by a subsequent
law. The reason is that, the State loses the power to prosecute when the law is
repealed, hence, the court has no more power to decide [People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil.
1000].
3 When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where the court fails to
provide counsel for the accused who is unable to obtain one and does not
intelligently waive his constitutional right [Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663].
4 When the proceeding s in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated, abandoned
or declared void [Seven vs. Pichay, 108 Phil. 419].
5 When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended
to operate as to actions pending before its enactment [Bengzon vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA
284].
6 Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836].
7 When the law is curative [Garcia vs. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331].
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: Should one branch be permitted to equally
assert, assume, or retain jurisdiction over a case in controversy over which another
coordinate or co-equal branch has already assumed jurisdiction, then that would be
sanctioning undue interference by one branch over another. With that, judicial
stability would be meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice
[Parcon vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262].
JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount
therof; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. [Sec. 2,
RA 7691].
JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC):
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000,
or for civil actions in Metro Manila where such value exceeds P50,000 except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC;
3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds P200,00, or in Metro Manila where such demand or claim exceeds P400,00;
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds P200,00 or probate mattes in Metro Manila where such value exceeds
P400,000;
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising juridicial or quasi-judicial functions;
7. In all civil actions and civil proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and
8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds P200,000, or in such other cases in Metro Manila
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds P400,000.
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS (CA):
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs;
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
omissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948;
4. The CA shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its original
jurisdiction, such as actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs, (b) cases falling
within its appellate jurisdiction where a motion for new trial based only on newly
discovered evidence is granted by it.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC):
1. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and other
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the SC en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon;
3. Cases on matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence
of at least three of such Members.
4. The Supreme Court has the power to:
(a) exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus;
(b) review, revise, reverse, modify, of affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulations is in question;
(2) all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
(4) all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed in reclusive perpetua or higher;
(5) all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
CLASSES OF JURISDICTION:
General – power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from
the plenary powers of the court.
Special or Limited – restricts the courts jurisdiction only to particular cases and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by the governing law.
Original – power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for
judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.
Appellate – authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or
judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review.
Exclusive – power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other
courts at that stage.
Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinate – power conferred upon different courts, whether
of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same
case in the same or different judicial territories.

Jurisdiction has, in this connection been defined as the authority to hear and
determine a cause. (Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin [1913], 25 Phil., 245.)
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As is seen, a mere statement of the case is sufficient to deny the relief prayed for. It
is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a
motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its
loss, it having been exercised in accordance with the established forms and methods
of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country. We have held in numerous
case that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court
to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing
the acts complained of. We have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to the cause
are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be,
they cannot be corrected by certiorari. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to
dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's court and, therefore, had
jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto. This being the case, the
consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof
are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the
decision by a court of one of the fundamental question before it does not, except
perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction
whichever way it may decide. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
cause, the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does
not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision
rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the
person and the subject matter, the decision of all other question arising in the case is
but an exercise of that jurisdiction. (Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. Rep., 245; Gala
vs. Cui, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; De Fiesta vs. Llorente, 25 Phil. Rep., 554.)
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Recurring now to the point at issue let us first recall that the portion of section 26 of
the Organic Act relating to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, an
exact transcription of a portion of section 9 of the Philippine Bill, has invariably been
construed by the courts to mean that the Philippine Legislature can add to, but
cannot diminish, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance. (Weigall vs, Shuster [1908], 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25
Phil., 44; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 37.) Jurisdiction has, in this connection
been defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause. (Herrera vs. Barretto
and Joaquin [1913], 25 Phil., 245.) Our precise inquiry then becomes one of
determining if the Philippine Legislature, by enacting that portion of section 138 of
the Administrative Code which authorizes divisions in the Supreme Court, has
diminished the authority of the Supreme Court to hear and determine causes.

Where a court has jurisdiction of an action, it has jurisdiction to decide every

question pertaining to the same. (Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil., 245.)

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MUTATIS MUTANDIS. The necessary changes. This is a phrase of frequent practical

occurrence, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be
altered, when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like.

Mutatis mutandis is a Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need
to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The
term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables
set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ –
"all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier.

It carries the connotation that the reader should pay attention to the corresponding
differences between the current statement and a previous one, although they are
analogous. This term is used frequently in economics, philosophy and in law, to
parameterize a statement with a new term, or note the application of an implied,
mutually understood set of changes. The phrase is also used in the study of counter-
factuals, wherein the requisite change in the factual basis of the past is made and
the resulting causalities are followed.

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Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner
Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated
the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and
executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or
the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution
vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of
the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of
control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19,
Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a
death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of
the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that
of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to
commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only
the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the
government.

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Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. 5

The elements of res judicata are as follows:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action.6
For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." 11Res judicata lays the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit.12

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.13

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INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. CA
GR 97336 FEBRUARY 19, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of
their agreement that latter will marry her based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
Petitioner was an exchange student in the Philippines who courted and
promised marriage to private respondent. He asked her to live with
him and after he had took the virginity of private respondent, his
moods started to change and even became violent. He then wanted to
repudiate their agreement of marriage and confessed that he was
already married to someone else. This prompted private respondent
to file a case for damages wherein the trial court decided in her favor.
The trial court based its decision on (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of
loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent
and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions
— made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the
end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends
and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. CA affirmed
this decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case
at bar?
Held:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This notwithstanding,
the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing
norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X".
A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can
not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though
the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22
In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress.
Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.