CRUZ, PAITIM VS.
CSC permanent appointment for the position of Executive Assistant
Facts: Zenaida C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray,
Bulacan, falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a
co-employee in the said office, took the examinations for the
latter. Carmelita Esteban requested the CSC to investigate the
matter, appending to said letter, pictures purporting to be
those of Gilda Cruz and Zenaida Paitim.
On March 31, 1995, a "Formal Charge" for "Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service" was filed against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim,
with the Civil Service Commission.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a
general denial of the material averments of the "Formal
Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed
a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will
continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process
because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the
Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.
Thereafter, an "Investigation Report and Recommendation"
was then forwarded, to the Civil Service Commission for its
consideration and resolution.
On July 1, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution
No. 981695 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges and
ordered their dismissal from the government service.
Issue: W/N petitioners' constitutional right to due process was
violated where respondent commission acted as the
investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all
at the same time, against petitioners. -NO.
Ruling: The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself
does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial
findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme
Court.[8] The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were
duly investigated by the CSC and found that after a careful
examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents
guilty as charged.
It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged
after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies
against them. They were properly informed of the charges.
They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to
defend themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that
there was a denial of due process much less the lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the
case.
CSC vs. ALBAO
Facts: On September 1, 1998, the Office of the Vice President
of the Republic of the Philippines issued an original and
IV to respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. It requested the retrieval of
the said appointment paper and instead of heeding the
request, petitioner disapproved the appointment. On October
5, 1998, petitioner issued an Order holding that it has found
that a prima facie case exists against Albao for Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Documents. Respondent filed an
“Urgent Motion to Resolve” which was denied as well as his
motion for reconsideration by the Civil Service Commission.
Respondent filed a petition for review before the CA alleging
that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
resolutions in relation to the case and granted the said petition.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has
original jurisdiction to institute the instant administrative case
against respondent Albao through the CSC-NCR.
RULING: The rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. Republic v. Court of Appeals also
enunciated that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts
and administrative agencies.
Section 47 (2), Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads
of government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over
their own subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. It is only
when the penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned
penalties that an appeal may be brought before the Civil
Service Commission which has appellate jurisdiction over the
same.
Respondent Albao was a contractual employee in the Office of
the Vice President before his appointment to a permanent
position, which appointment was, however, requested to be
retrieved by the Office of the Vice President and at the same
time disapproved by the Civil Service Commission, hence the
Vice President of the Philippines, as head of office, is vested to
commence disciplinary action against respondent Albao.
Nevertheless, the SC does not agree that petitioner is helpless
to act directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of
dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by
respondent in connection with his appointment to a
permanent position in the Office of the Vice President.
The present case, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the
integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the
provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted
by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and
power to administer the civil service system and protect its
integrity, by removing from its list of eligibles those who
falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.

SINGSON VS. NLRC
Facts: Singson was employed by private respondent Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter PAL) as Traffic Representative
Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7,
1991, petitioner was assigned to serve the check-in counter of
Japan Air Lines (hereinafter JAL) for Flight 742. Among the
passengers checked in by him was Ms. Lolita Kondo who was
bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in, Ms. Kondo lodged a
complaint alleging that petitioner required her to pay US
$200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any
receipt. A confrontation took place where petitioner was asked
by the security officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by
Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession. However, when
the lower panel of the check-in counter he was manning was
searched, the sum of two hundred sixty- five dollars (US $265)
was found therein consisting of two (2) one hundred dollar
bills, one (1) fifty dollar bill, one (1) ten dollar bill and one (1)
five dollar bill. Petitioner was administratively charged and
investigated by a committee formed by private respondent
PAL.
In his affidavit, petitioner admitted that he was the one who
checked in Ms. Kondo and her Japanese companions. They
checked in five (5) pieces of luggage which weighed 80 kilos
and within the allowed limit for check-in baggage. He attached
the claim checks to the jacket of their tickets, returned the
tickets and passport to Ms. Kondo. He then heard an
altercation involving a woman passenger with excess hand-
carried baggage who was being charged for it; she was
insisting she had paid for it in the counter but could not
produce a receipt. The passenger turned out to be Ms. Kondo
and she was accusing Cocoy Gabriel as the one who charged
her for excess baggage. Mr. Gabriel at that time was assigned
at the THAI Airways counter, hence, it was impossible that a
passenger for a JAL flight would pay him US $200. Petitioner
was talking to the JAL's representative when two PAL
employees and Ms. Kondo approached them. He was told of
Ms. Kondo's claim that she paid the excess baggage fee to him.
Petitioner was surprised at the accusation since Ms. Kondo had
no excess baggage when she checked in.
The investigation committee found petitioner guilty of the
offense charged and recommended his dismissal. Private
respondent PAL adopted the committee's recommendation
and dismissed him from the service effective June 7, 1991.
On September 12, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint against
respondent PAL before the NLRC-NCR for illegal dismissal,
attorney's fees and damages. The case was docketed as NLRC-
NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 and raffled off to then Labor
Arbiter Raul T. Aquino. Aquino found the evidence adduced by
private respondent PAL in terminating petitioner's employment
insufficient. Aquino declared petitioner's dismissal illegal and
ordered his reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL
appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On May 19, 1995,
the Second Division of public respondent NLRC, composed of
Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay, Rogelio I. Rayala and
Raul T. Aquino as presiding commissioner, promulgated its
Resolution reversing the decision of then Labor Arbiter Aquino
and dismissing the complaint against respondent PAL.
Petitioner filed on June 5, 1995, a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution and an
Amended Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 1995. Public
respondent NLRC, thru the Second Division with only two
commissioners taking part, namely, Commissioners Calaycay
and Rayala, denied the motion.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of jurisdiction when the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC and as a
member thereof, participated actively in the promulgation of
the aforesaid decision and in the consultation of the members
thereof in reaching the conclusion before it was assigned to
the ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, we hold that petitioner was
denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated,
as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC,
in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing
his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII,
Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,[10]
each Division shall consist of one member from the public
sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one
member each from the workers and employers’ sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners
who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since
he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He
should have inhibited himself from any participation in this
case.
TEJANO VS. DESIERTO
Facts: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan
implicated petitioner as persons involved in the irregular
withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered petitioner to file
their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper
information against petitioner and was thereafter referred for
review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the
resolution of Graft Investigation Officer, Deputy Special
Prosecutor recommended the approval of the memorandum of
Special Prosecution Officer.Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special
Prosecutor, concurred in the approval. Ombudsman concurred
thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information
for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
was filed before the Sandiganbayanpetitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation.The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his motion for
reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned
to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable
cause existed to indict petitioner Special Prosecutor Micael
recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation
was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and
concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved
the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the
marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to
prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor Micael
filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his
memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the
disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation
to dismiss the case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman
Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the
merits because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III
Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment
alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course
to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was the
second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act
of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation were
already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner manifested before the
Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s failure to
resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13
dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed the Office
of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion. In a
memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor
Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos changed his previous position and
recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman
Desierto when he retired, approved Joselito Ferrer’s
memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in
Criminal Case. The First Division of this Court issued the
temporary restraining order prayed for.The instant petition was
transferred to the Second Division of this Court.
Issue: W/N Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of
discretion. -YES
Held: Attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto
for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case
despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing
of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having
participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant
case and having recommended the filing of appropriate
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse
himself from participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his
Deputies.
REPUBLIC VS. EXPRESS TELECOM
Fact: Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate
of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate
and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority
(PA). Shortly thereafter the NTC issued directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their
respective applications before the Commission and prior to the
issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to
Bayantel’s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-
parte motion to admit an amended application. the notice of
hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of
the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to
all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on
the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete
the presentation of its evidence, the NTC grant of two (2)
separate Provisional which resulted in the closing out of all
available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein
applicant, and in order that this case may not remain pending
for an indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency becomes available. NTC issued Memorandum re-
allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency
spectrum for the expansion of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed
an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new
frequency bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted
BayanTel’s motion to revive the latter’s application and set the
case for hearings. Extelcom filed an Opposition praying for the
dismissal of Bayantel’s application which was denied for lack of
merit. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, which was granted. Petitioner filed
MR but subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC filed
the instant petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issue: Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative
and should be applied to the Respondent even with the
absence of Publication Requirement.
Held: No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one
of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take
effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC fall
squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned
in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and categorical.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the
1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take
effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said
Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such
publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. LUCAS
Facts: Raquel Linatok filed with the office of filed with the
Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture an
affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency for misconduct. The
complaint stemmed from the alleged act of Jose Lucas of
touching and caressing complainant's thigh running down to
her ankle. After a formal investigation by the Board of
Personnel Inquiry, it issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of
suspension for one month and one day. The CSC, however,
found him guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of Appeals set
aside the CSC resolution and reinstated that of the board and
ruled that respondent was denied due process as he came to
know of the modification of the charge against him only when
he received notice of the CSC resolution dismissing him from
the service. In its petition to the Supreme Court, petitioner
contended that a formal charges in an administrative case need
not be drafted with the precision of an information in a
criminal prosecution.
Issue: WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when
the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on the charge of
simple misconduct
Held: Yes. As Lucas was merely charged with simple
misconduct but was convicted of grave misconduct, he was
deprived of his right to due process. In which the Court held
that “We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a
basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and proceedings.”
PIA VS. GERVACIO
Facts: The petition stems from a complaint filed in December
2001 by respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), in his
capacity as Dean of the College of Economics, Finance and
Politics (CEFP) of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines
(PUP), against Pia who was then a professor at PUP. Dannug
claimed that Pia was directly selling to her students a book
entitled "Organization Development Research Papers" at a
price of P120.00 per copy, in violation of Section 3, Article X of
the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.
Pia's act was also claimed to be violative of several memoranda
issued by PUP officials against the sale of books, articles or any
items by any faculty member directly to their students.[6]
Furthermore, the books were believed to be overpriced at
P120.00 each, being mere bound machine copies of reports
and research papers that were submitted by Pia's former
students. Dannug attached to his complaint a list of the
students who were allegedly made to buy copies of the book.
For her defense, Pia argued that her students were not forced
to buy copies of the book, even submitting a certification to
that effect from students who had bought from her. Pia also
claimed that the list of students attached to the complaint was
a mere attendance sheet of Dannug's students in a research
writing class, and not as Dannug claimed it to be.
After preliminary conference and the parties' submission of
their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.
Pia was declared guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. It was explained: It is of no moment that
the students were not forced to buy the book. It stands to
reason that the respondent [Pia], as teacher, exercises moral
ascendancy over her students, such that an offer made by her
directed to the students, to buy something from her, operates
as a compulsion which the students [cannot] easily avoid.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Office of
the Ombudsman's decision finding Pia guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Ruling: The settled rule provides that factual findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when they are affirmed by the CA.[19] Furthermore,
only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not its function to review evidence on record and
assess the probative weight thereof.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA have
sufficiently identified Pia's act that constitutes Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Although Pia
questions the weight that should be accorded to the list of
students attached to the complaint of Dannug, it is significant
that she readily admitted having directly sold copies of the
book/compilation "Organization Development Research
Papers" to her students, an act that is proscribed among PUP
faculty members, by the submission of a certification from her
students claiming that they were not forced to buy copies of
the book.
Pia's argument that she was not properly charged with the
offense for which she was found guilty of committing still does
not warrant her exoneration from the offense. In Avenido, we
emphasized that the designation of the offense or offenses
with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not
controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense
where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented
sufficiently proves one's guilt. Citing the case of Dadubo v. Civil
Service Commission, we held in Avenido that the charge
against the respondent in an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance
of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation
of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.

Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have

been committed by Pia amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, and that she has been afforded a
full opportunity to present her side and refute the act imputed
against her, the Court finds no cogent reason to nullify the
ruling made by the CA on Pia's guilt.