POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.

ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020

CASE 1: ENCINAS vs. AGUSTIN, JR., and CAUBANG, 11 April 2013

Petitioner: CARLITO C. ENCINAS

Respondents: PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG

Facts:
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I and the petitioner was the Provincial Fire
Marshall in Nueva Ecija. Respondents’ claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00PM, petitioner informed them that
unless they gave him P5,000, they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-
flung areas. Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. They managed to give only P2,000 but they
failed to deliver the balance. Thus, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.

On 27 March 2000, Respondents filed a BFP Complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under R.A. No. 6975
or the DILG Act of 1990. The Complaint was then docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar
facts, respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as
with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City, their Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint). This time, they
accused petitioner of violation of Section 4© of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the Doctrine of Res Judicata applies in the proceedings conducted by the BFP.
2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

Ruling:
1) No. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise
of administrative powers. Administrative powers refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with
respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights
and obligations of the parties. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature , where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. In this
case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely
administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a
formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.

2) No. The Supreme Court finds petitioner administratively liable for his act of demanding P5,000 from
respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment. The SC will not disturb the factual findings of both the
CSC and the CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the administrative
agencies involved after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well as their consideration of the
evidence presented before them and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA must now
be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.

The SC ruled that petitioner’s act of demanding money from respondents in exchange for their non-
reassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as follows:
“Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence.”
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
CASE 2: VILLANUEVA ET AL. vs. PALAWAN COUNCIL, 25 February 2013

Petitioners: SALVA CION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD BUNDAC, DANNY CABIGUEN,
GREGORIO DELGADO, and BILLY BUNGAR
Respondents: PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PCSD), represented by Executive Director ROMEO
DORADO, and PATRICIA LOUISE MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , represented by Engineer FERNANDO ESGUERRA

Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making authority under RA 7611, the PCSD promulgated the Strategic Environment
Plan (SEP) Clearance Guidelines, which require all proposed undertakings in the Palawan province to have an SEP
Clearance from PCSD before application for permits, licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant
government agencies. Generally, the PCSD issues the clearance if the Environmentally Critical Areas Network
(ECAN) allows the type of proposed activity in the proposed site; it denies the clearance if the ECAN prohibits the
type of proposed activity in the proposed site.

The petitioners are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas, who sought the recall of the SEP
Clearance issued by PCSD to Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed small-
scale nickel mining project in the said barangay, which the PCSD denied for lack of basis.

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against PCSD and PLMDC with the RTC of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, for the nullification of the said SEP Clearance in violation of various provisions of
RA 761116 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. They alleged that these provisions prohibit small-scale nickel mining
for profit in the proposed site, which, they maintain, is not even a controlled use zone, but actually a core zone.

PLMDC and PCSD filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that it only the
Court of Appeals [CA] can take cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed against a quasi-judicial
body, in which the trial court agreed. Thus, Petitioners appealed directly to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not public respondent PCSD in issuing the SEP clearance exercised its quasi-judicial function.

Ruling:
PCSD has no quasi-judicial function. RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does not confer quasi-judicial
powers on the said body. Judicial or quasi-judicial function involves the determination of what the law is, and what
the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function must be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render a decision on
the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.

In issuing an SEP Clearance, the PCSD does not decide the rights and obligations of adverse parties
with finality. The SEP Clearance is not even a license or permit. All it does is to allow the project proponent to
proceed with its application for permits, licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant government
agencies. The SEP Clearance allows the project proponent to prove the viability of their project, their capacity to
prevent environmental damage, and other legal requirements, to the other concerned government agencies. The
SEP Clearance in favor of PLMDC does not declare that the project proponent has an enforceable mining
right within the Municipality of Narra; neither does it adjudicate that the concerned citizens of the said
municipality have an obligation to respect PLMDC’s right to mining. In fact, as seen in Section 5 of AO 6, the
PCSD bases its actions, not on the legal rights and obligations of the parties (which is necessary in adjudication), but
on policy considerations, such as social acceptability, ecological sustainability, and economic viability of the project.

PCSD’s receipt of documents and ascertainment of their sufficiency and accuracy are not indicative of a
judicial function. It is, at most, an investigatory function to determine the truth behind the claims of the project
proponent. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication, so long as there is no final determination of the
parties’ respective rights and obligations.

Lastly, the fact that the PCSD conducts public consultations or hearings does not mean that it is performing
quasi-judicial functions. AO 6 defines public hearing/public consultation simply as an “activity undertaken by
PCSD to gather facts and thresh out all issues, concerns and apprehensions and at the same time provide the
project proponent with the opportunity to present the project to the affected community.” Its purpose is not to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties but only to "ascertain the acceptability of the project in the
community and to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are considered," pursuant to RA 7611’s policy of
"encouraging the involvement of all sectors of society and maximizing people participation x x x in natural resource
management, conservation and protection." On the other hand, the purpose of hearings in judicial bodies is to
ascertain the truth of the parties’ claims through an adversarial process.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
CASE 3: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DRUGMAKER’S LABORATORIES, 5 March 2014

Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BFAD (now FDA)

Respondents: DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC.

Facts:
The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act”
primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure of foods, drugs and devices and
cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued
AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it
required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may release the
same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a
manufacturer to secure a Certificate of Product Registration (CPR) for these products. However, the implementation
of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the
same. The issuance of Circular No.1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement
with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8 s. of 1997
which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if there exist a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the
granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details
in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation
of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified into:

(1) Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in
existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.

(2) Interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which
the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being
administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the
statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the
same class which may be covered by the said rules.

(3) Contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or
things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO 292 s. of
1988 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and publication in order to be valid
and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.

Circulars No. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: a)
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; b) Interpret, clarify or explain existing
statutory regulation under which FDA operates; and/or; c) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer and
supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE testing
requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the
said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern –
as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation
and publication are needed for their validity.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
CASE 4: COURT OF ADMINISTRATOR vs. MACUSI, 11 September 2013

Complainant: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

Respondent: DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga

Facts:
Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in civil case for collection of sum of money with damages,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City, Kalinga. In a letter dated July 23, 2009, addressed to
Presiding Judge Dalanao of MTCC Tahuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status of the writ of execution
issued on September 10, 2008, since she had not received any report or information whether the said writ had
already been served. Paligan also furnished the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Tabuk City,
Kalinga, a copy of her letter.

Judge Dalanao referred the letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. He
reported that the said writ of execution was received by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 19, 2008. A
return was made on October 30, 2008 informing the court that the writ was returned “unserved.” Thereafter, no other
report on the writ was made.

Judge Dalanao also submitted a letter dated November 6, 2009 with an inventory of cases, pointing out that
the Sheriff was inconsistent: making reports in some cases, although some of said reports were late, and making no
reports at all in other case. He also noted that five years has already lapsed without execution in several cases.

Respondent Macusi defended himself by calling attention to the fact that he was appointed as Sheriff only in
2006, while some of the writs of execution in Judge Dalanao’s inventory of cases were issued as early as 1997.
While admitting that in some cases, there were late reports or no reports at all on the writs of execution, Macusi
argued that "(t)he rule states that the Sheriff must act with celerity and promptness when they are handed the Writs
of Execution; yet, the rule also states that when party litigants, in whose favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate
the efforts of the Sheriffs to implement those Writs, the latter are relieved from such duty and incur no administrative
liability therefor." Macusi additionally wrote that he did not report regularly despite the presence of the rules since he
“relied on the dictates of practicality so as not to waste supplies.”

The Executive Judge Wacas finds Macusi guilty of simple neglect of duty and meted the penalty of a fine of
₱4,000.00. The OCA recommended that the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative case. Macusi then submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30,2013, informing the Court
that he was deemed resigned from government service by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of City Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010 Local Elections. He prayed that the Court
dismiss the administrative case against him for being moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not the Macusi’s constructive resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2010 Local Elections renders the case against him moot.

Ruling:
It does not. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing
administrative sanction. Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render
said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during
the pendency of his case. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable.

Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Macusi had been careless and imprudent in
discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the expeditious disposition of cases. As
such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task. Simple neglect of duty signifies "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020
CASE 5: MENDOZA vs. COA, 10 September 2013

Petitioner: ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA

Respondent: COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
Petitioner was a general manager of Talisay Water District in Talisay City, Negros Occidental. The
Commission on Audit disallowed a total amount of P380,208.00 which Mendoza received as part of his salary as the
Water District's general manager from 2005 to 2006. The Commission found that petitioner Mendoza's salary as
general manager “was not in consonance with the rate prescribed under RA 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law and the approved Plantilla of Position of the district.” The Commission also found that petitioner
Mendoza's claim of salary was “not supported with an Appointment duly attested by the Civil Service Commission.”
Payment to petitioner Mendoza was, therefore, "illegal."

Petitioner Mendoza filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision." He
assailed the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally received a copy of this. This
deprived him of the opportunity to answer the Notice immediately. He also argued that Section 23 of the Provincial
Water Utilities Act of 1973 gives Talisay Water District board of directors the right to fix and increase his salary as
general manager and is an exception to the Salary Standardization Law. Finally, he argued that he had relied on
Section 23 in good faith. As such, he cannot be ordered to refund the salaries he had received.

The Commission on Audit denied petitioner Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. It found
that the Notice of Disallowance/s had been received by petitioner Mendoza's employee and ruled that petitioner
Mendoza is deemed to have received it constructively. It likened the service of the Notice of Disallowance/s to the
service of summons. As a general rule, summons must be personally served on the person to whom it is directed, but
substituted service is allowed in certain cases. The Commission also noted that "technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied" in administrative proceedings; therefore, petitioner Mendoza "cannot invoke the
defense of technicality.

Issue: Whether or not Mendoza was denied with due process as he was been deprived of the opportunity to
answer the Notice immediately.

Ruling:
No. Circumstances show that the Notice of Disallowance/s was served on the necessary officers in
accordance with the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit, stating Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
IV:
Sec. 5. Number of Copies and Distribution. - The report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of
disallowances and charges, and order or decision of the Auditor shall be prepared in such number of copies
as may be necessary for distribution to the following: (1) original to the head of agency being audited; (2)
one copy to the Auditor for his record; (3) one copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of
the government under audit; (4) other copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings.

Sec. 6. Finality of the Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, Order or Decision. - Unless a request
for reconsideration in filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or
decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the
parties concerned.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.

In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

Petitioner Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a
copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due
course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to
explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due
process."
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DELOVIAR, ANDREA B.
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSTY
ADMIN LAW JD - 4 SY: 2019-2020