A Typology of Ontological Insecurity Mechanisms

International Studies Review (2023), viad016
ANALYTICAL ESSAY
A Typology of Ontological Insecurity

Mechanisms: Russia’s Militar y Engagement
in Syria
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/25/2/viad016/7173277 by guest on 24 May 2023

HUGO VON ESSEN
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden
AND
AUGUST DANIELSON
Uppsala University, Sweden
Because of the novel explanations it generates for states’ security- and

identity-related behavior, the concept of ontological security has been used
increasingly in the International Relations (IR) literature in recent years.
However, the abundance of interpretations of the concept means that it is
often used in conflicting ways. To counter the risk of conceptual stretch-
ing and provide the foundation for a common research agenda, this article
constructs a typology of ontological security mechanisms. Two dimensions
of ontological insecurity are highlighted: the sources and the causes of
anxiety. We argue that the source of anxiety can be reflexive, relational, or
systemic, while the cause of anxiety can be either shame or discontinuity.
These two dimensions produce six mechanisms of ontological insecurity
that reflect how the concept is used in the contemporary ontological se-
curity literature in IR. By specifying these mechanisms, we argue that the
typology offers IR scholars the ability to produce even more nuanced and
fine-grained explanations of state behavior driven by ontological insecu-
rity. Finally, to demonstrate the utility of this typology, the article provides
an illustrative case study of Russia’s engagement in the conflict in Syria in
2015–2017.
El concepto de seguridad ontológica se ha utilizado cada vez más en la
bibliografía de las Relaciones Internacionales (RRII) durante los últimos
años, debido a que genera nuevas explicaciones para el comportamiento
relacionado con la seguridad y la identidad de los Estados. Sin embargo,
la abundancia de interpretaciones sobre este concepto provoca que, a
menudo, se use de manera contradictoria. Este artículo construye, con
el fin de contrarrestar el riesgo de estirar los conceptos y para asentar las
bases para una agenda de investigación común, una tipología de mecan-
ismos de seguridad ontológica. Destacamos dos dimensiones de la inse-
guridad ontológica: las fuentes y las causas de la ansiedad. Argumentamos
que la fuente de la ansiedad puede ser de carácter reflexivo, relacional
o sistémico, mientras que la causa de la ansiedad puede radicar en la
vergüenza o en la discontinuidad. Estas dos dimensiones producen seis
mecanismos de inseguridad ontológica que reflejan cómo se utiliza este
concepto en la bibliografía contemporánea sobre la seguridad ontológ-
von Essen, Hugo, and August Danielson. (2023) A Typology of Ontological Insecurity Mechanisms: Russia’s Military
Engagement in Syria. International Studies Review, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad016
© The Author(s) (2023). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an
Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2 A Typology of Ontological Insecurity Mechanisms
ica en las RRII. Argumentamos, al especificar estos mecanismos, que su

tipología ofrece a los académicos de las RRII la capacidad de producir ex-
plicaciones aún más matizadas y detalladas del comportamiento del Estado
que viene impulsado por la inseguridad ontológica. Por último, el artículo
proporciona, con el fin de demostrar la utilidad de esta tipologwía, un
estudio de caso ilustrativo de la participación de Rusia en el conflicto en
Siria entre 2015 y 2017.
Du fait des éclairages nouveaux qu’il jette sur les questions sécuritaires
étatiques (et la posture identitaire qui les accompagne), le concept de
sécurité ontologique, est depuis quelques années, de plus en plus util-
isé par la recherche en relations internationales. Néanmoins, l’abondance

d’interprétations du concept est le reflet des désaccords qui l’entourent.
Pour contrer le risque de détournement conceptuel et poser les bases
d’un programme de recherche commun, cet article propose une ty-
pologie des mécanismes de sécurité ontologique. Deux dimensions de
l’insécurité ontologique sont analysées, à savoir les sources et les causes
de l’anxiété. Nous posons comme hypothèse que les sources de l’anxiété
peuvent être réflexives, relationnelles ou systémiques, tandis que la cause
de l’anxiété peut être soit la honte, soit un sentiment de discontinuité.
Ces deux dimensions croisées génèrent six mécanismes d’insécurité on-
tologique, qui reflètent l’utilisation du concept dans la recherche contem-
poraine en relations internationales ayant trait à la sécurité ontologique.
Par l’identification de ces mécanismes, nous avançons que cette typolo-
gie permet aux chercheur·euses de produire des explications plus nu-
ancées et détaillées des comportements étatiques générés par l’insécurité
ontologique. Enfin, afin de démontrer l’utilité de cette typologie, l’article
propose comme cas d’étude l’implication de la Russie dans le conflit syrien
entre 2015 et 2017.
Keywords: ontological security, identity, foreign policy, Russia,

Syria conflict
Introduction
In the past two decades, the concept of ontological security has had a significant
impact on the theorization of how and why states interact in the way they do. While
traditional accounts of state security refer to physical safety, “security as survival” and
protecting the territorial integrity of the state, ontological security instead focuses
on the relation between a state’s collective identity and feelings of security. For this
reason, ontological security is often described as “security as being” (Giddens 1991).
This type of security is built on national stories and institutionalized routines and
relations with other states, which stress the need for individuals to “continuously an-
swer existential questions” about the self, and the social and material outside world
in order to both achieve agency and proceed with life without debilitating anxiety.
At the core of most ontological security studies (OSS) therefore is the assumption
that states act as if they are subjects that feel emotions and consequently react to
those emotions (Solomon 2018, 938).1
The introduction of the concept of ontological security into the International Re-
lations (IR) literature has led to novel explanations for an ever-increasing range of
phenomena in world politics, from conflict and cooperation to stability and change,
and foreign and domestic policy. However, as the field has grown, the concept of
ontological security has become somewhat ambiguous. Scholars understand and de-
fine the concept in different ways, drawing on different parts of its theoretical roots
1
For a discussion on different approaches to theorizing the role of emotions behind state action, see Hutchison
and Bleiker (2014).
Hugo von Essen and August Danielson 3
and focusing on different aspects of its application and usage. While the plurality
of approaches to the concept has led to a number of fruitful insights on theorizing
world politics,2 there is arguably an inherent trade-off between a broad definition
of a concept and its theoretical utility. This risk is often referred to as conceptual
stretching (Sartori 1970), or “the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit
the new cases” (Collier and Mahon 1993, 845), and therefore becomes vague and
less useful.
However, adopting this perspective does not mean that we believe that ontolog-
ical security should be defined as a single, unitary theory that allows for generaliz-
able cross-case comparisons. Rather, we believe that it is important to encourage a
plurality of approaches to ontological security while at the same time ensuring that

OSS scholars have a common set of meanings that they can draw on when theoriz-
ing how and why states act on the basis of their “security as being.” There is there-
fore an urgent need to analyze, classify, and categorize the different understandings
and meanings of ontological security in the literature. While there are several ac-
knowledged central disagreements that scholars have used to divide and categorize
the field of OSS in IR (Browning and Joenniemi 2017; Zarakol 2017; Kinnvall and
Mitzen 2020), we argue that none of these are successful at or sufficient or optimal
for untangling the web of approaches identified in the literature, as they concern
divisions that are not central to the field, not reflected in a large majority of the
studies or ignored by most scholars. An important caveat is that this article only
covers literature focusing on state-level ontological insecurity (see below).
The purpose of this article is thus two-fold. First, the article aims to describe,
analyze, and categorize the variations in understanding and use of the concept of
ontological security in the IR literature and, based on that overview, develop a typol-
ogy of ontological insecurity mechanisms. In doing so, our goal is to provide OSS
scholars with a set of tools that can help them distinguish between different “types
of ontological insecurity,” thereby facilitating further constructive dialogue in and
growth of the field. Second, the article aims to demonstrate the utility of this typol-
ogy, and to show that different understandings of the drivers of ontological security
also lead to different explanations for what drives actors’ behavior. By distinguishing
between these diverse explanations, we provide a more fine-grained and nuanced
understanding of how ontological insecurity functions in practice, thereby going
beyond the catchall notion of ontological insecurity that includes many if not all of
these explanations.
The main contributions of the article are theoretical. Through the typology, the
article elucidates and furthers our understanding of the concept of ontological in-
security in IR by showing how and why it is understood, theorized, and used in dif-
ferent ways. In doing so, the article improves our understanding of the different
mechanisms of ontological insecurity that can drive agents’ behavior. This helps
scholars, and underscores the need, to look beyond a simple binary of “ontologi-
cally secure/insecure” and understand the many different types of ontological in-
securities and existential anxieties that agents experience. In this sense, the aim of
the article is close to that of Srivastava (2020), who similarly develops a typology of
mechanisms of social construction in international politics. In addition, the article
also provides the foundations for a common understanding of ontological insecu-
rity mechanisms, thereby facilitating a coherent research agenda. Gerring (1999)
outlines eight criteria for conceptual adequacy to which all concept formation is
subject,3 and current use of the concept of ontological security is arguably lacking in
respect to several of these. The typology of this article thus improves the coherence of
the concept’s attributes and instances, the differentiation of the concept from other
similar concepts, the depth, or the number, of properties shared by the instances,
2
For a recent overview of the diversity of the field of OSS, see Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi (2020, 877–78).
3
These are familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility.
and the theoretical and field utility of the concept. Furthermore, the typology’s clas-
sification of mechanisms counters the risk of conceptual stretching (Collier and
Mahon 1993).
Empirically, the article also contributes to the research on Russia’s ontological
security-seeking while also advancing our knowledge of Russian foreign policy in
general and conflict engagement in particular. The case of Russia’s engagement in
the conflict in Syria is chosen because of the high probability of finding indicators
of mechanisms of ontological insecurity. It therefore serves as an illustrative case for
the typology developed below.
The article first details the origins of the concept of ontological security in psy-
chology and sociology, on which the understanding of the concept in IR is primar-

ily built. This overview introduces some of the key attributes of ontological security
that IR scholars have utilized in their own definitions and understandings of the
concept. Second, the article analyzes how the concept has been understood, theo-
rized, and used in IR, identifies the common core of the understanding and use of
the concept, and outlines central disagreements in the field. Third, the two main
dimensions of the article’s typology are presented and explained. Fourth, the arti-
cle presents the six mechanisms that form the typology and illustrates its utility by
applying the typology to a case study of Russian ontological security-seeking in its
engagement in the conflict in Syria in 2015–2017.
Ontological Security in International Relations

The concept of ontological security was first theorized by R.D. Laing, who described
an ontologically secure person as having a “sense of his presence in the world as
a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person” (Laing 1960,
39). It was then further developed by Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991), whose work
is the theoretical starting point for many, but far from all (see below), IR studies
concerned with ontological security.
The Ontological Security Framework of Giddens

According to Giddens, ontological security “refers to the confidence that most hu-
man beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of
the surrounding social and material environments of action” (Giddens 1990, 92).
Ontological security begins in early childhood as a child develops trust in its care-
givers and thereby learns to trust itself. Importantly, trust as an emotional defense
sustains the critical day-to-day maintenance of ontological security, the practical
consciousness—a sort of dormant mental state that can be brought into conscious-
ness at will. The practical consciousness “brackets out” lurking existential questions
that constantly threaten the individual with paralyzing anxiety—such as whether she
has only the self, whether other persons exist, and whether the experienced world
is real4 —allowing her to live as if she has answers to these questions (Giddens 1991,
37). The practical consciousness is perpetually intersubjectively constructed and
realized through everyday routines, primarily of social interaction, since our sense
making of ourselves and the world depends on our daily connections with others
(Giddens 1991, 41).
Self-identity—a cardinal existential question that is especially salient in IR—is de-
fined by Giddens as “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or
his biography” (Giddens 1991, 53). Thus, self-identity is continuously reconstructed
through reflexive monitoring, interpretation, and autobiographical narration—
mostly confined to the practical consciousness. The integrity of the self-identity
is protected through day-to-day routines that “filter out” existential threats and
4
Ejdus (2018) construes these questions as related to existence, finitude, relations, and autobiography.
through updating it by integrating new events in life (Giddens 1991, 54). Although
the self-identity is protected by integrating new events in life, and can thus often
withstand serious environmental changes, its integrity can be threatened by for-
eign, alternative narratives. Intersubjectivity therefore plays a crucial role here, as
our self-identity and its constitutive narration depend on their communication to
and recognition by others. Moreover, the reflexive understanding of ourselves is
contingent on our awareness of others: “Intersubjectivity does not derive from sub-
jectivity, but the other way around” (Giddens 1991, 51).
Finally, what characterizes the ontologically insecure individual? Without onto-
logical security, the individual might lack trust in the integrity of herself, lack feel-
ings of biographical continuity and aliveness, and may be consumed by anxiety and

obsession over existential risks and therefore unable to act through agency. Be-
yond the practical consciousness’ bracketing of existential questions lies the chaos
of overwhelming anxiety, “the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other
persons” (Giddens 1991, 36), which Giddens equates with dread—“the antithesis of
trust” (Giddens 1990, 100). Fundamentally, anxiety derives from the human capac-
ity to think counterfactually and beyond current circumstances, which in turn is
made possible by the individual’s ontological awareness of and trust in external re-
ality (Giddens 1991, 47–48). Thus, the constant (but usually bracketed) threat of
existential anxiety as a general condition for every single individual is inevitable.
Shame is a type of anxiety especially relevant to ontological security in IR. Shame
is linked to the self’s perceived insufficiency and is directly connected with self-
identity, as shame is anxiety about the ability of the narrative to endure threats to its
consistency or social appropriateness (Giddens 1991, 65). Shame erodes trust in the
self and in the external world, since shame makes the individual question whether
she really knows who she is, and by extension if she really knows what the world is
(Giddens 1991, 66).
From Giddens and Beyond: Fundamentals and Divergences

After Giddens, ontological security was brought to IR by pioneering scholars who
found it useful for finding new approaches to the analysis of security and identity
(see, e.g., Huysmans 1998; Kinnvall 2004; Steele 2005; Mitzen 2006; Zarakol 2010).
Kinnvall and Mitzen (2017, 4–5), cite three reasons why ontological security is espe-
cially relevant to IR. First, it is a different way to interpret security that generates new
ways to understand actions and behaviors, such as routines, habits, and rhetoric, as
security-seeking. This also suggests novel explanations for classic phenomena such
as conflict and war. Second, it draws attention to connections between anxiety, un-
certainty, and the ability to sustain a sense of self, which are highly salient in an
ever more globalized world of growing anxieties and identity-related issues. Third,
as relations are a fundamental part of ontological security, this enables analyses of
the security dynamics of cooperation as much as in conflict.
In general, the field can be said to deal with “the relationship between identity
and security, and between identity and important political outcomes in world poli-
tics” (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017, 3). The concept of ontological security is thus used
in IR to explain how and why actors in world politics reflexively construct their selves
through narratives and routinized behaviors in relation to other actors, and how
this then affects and can explain political outcomes. For this reason, OSS can also
be placed within the larger “relational” turn of IR, in which relations and processes
are perceived as constituting both the actors and the environment of international
affairs (Jackson and Nexon 2019).
However, since the concept’s introduction to IR, the literature on ontological
security within the field has grown extensively, and in the process become muddled
and hard to survey due to the many differences and disagreements over the use
and understanding of the concept. Furthermore, the analysis is situated at different
levels with different dependent variables, focused on different aspects of ontological

security-seeking, and drawing on different parts of Giddens’ original framework in
combination with many other theories.
Some central disagreements have been proposed, or could be conceived, as po-
tential ways to divide and classify the OSS literature. One is whether ontological
security should be regarded as a basic human need, met through different soci-
etal institutions in different periods and cultures (Zarakol 2017), or whether the
phenomenon has emerged with modernity (Giddens 1990, 105).5 Another division
deals with security as “becoming” rather than “being” and is manifest in the criticism
of Browning and Joenniemi (2017), who argue that much of the IR literature on on-
tological security has conflated the self with identity and reduced ontological security

to merely a question of maintaining a securitized, stable identity. This is problem-
atic as identities are never “completed,” and ontological security is always an on-
going, fragile project. As Cash (2020) emphasizes, identities can be maintained in
many different ways. Kinnvall and Mitzen (2020, 241) offer a similar critique6 of
the field’s bias towards studying efforts to maintain the status quo, which therefore
concentrate on conflict and security dynamics.
The most conspicuous disagreement within OSS is arguably the level of analysis of
the ontological security-seeking actor. While Laing and Giddens both developed the
concept with regard to the individual, the early paradigmatic scholars of ontological
security in IR justified their extrapolation of the concept to the state level by arguing
that assuming that states seek ontological security is no different from assuming that
they seek physical security7 ; that since states are an important source of ontological
security for their individual members, states can be treated “as if” they themselves
seek it; and that given that states act as if they are individuals, it is also theoretically
productive to analyze them as such (Mitzen 2006, 351–53). Another, more recent,
argument understands collective-level ontological security as an emergent, bottom-
up phenomenon that arises from microlevel interactions (Ejdus and Rečević 2021).
Nonetheless, this controversial analytical move has been criticized for ignoring vi-
tal parts of Giddens’ broader theory and finding less empirical support (Krolikowski
2008), for straying too far from its sociological roots (Croft 2012), and for ignoring
that states lack reflective selves (Lebow 2016). Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2017)
contend that in adapting the concept to fit the methodological and epistemological
premises of IR, scholars have alienated their research from the more psychoanalyt-
ical understanding of the concept in other social sciences. Interestingly, Giddens
himself acknowledged the value in IR of treating states as agents, as “modern states
are reflexively monitored systems (Giddens 1991, 15). Since state-level analysis is
predominant in both IR in general and the OSS subfield in particular, this article
only analyzes the state-level literature.8 Nonetheless, the article’s typology should
also have heuristic value for the individual-level ontological security literature.9
While the critique that is expressed in these disagreements is not just relevant
but pivotal as it applies to much of the literature, it is a general critique of how the
IR ontological security literature as a whole understands and uses the concept. It
is therefore not optimal for distinguishing and classifying the differences in under-
standing that exists within the field, and for providing the foundation for a common
research agenda.
5
Tillich (2000, 57) argues that different types of anxiety have been dominant in different eras of Western civiliza-
tion: antiquity—anxiety about death; the Middle Ages—anxiety about condemnation; and modern society—anxiety
about meaninglessness.
6
See also Rossdale (2015), Rumelili (2015), and Lebow (2016).
7
For earlier debates on state anthropomorphization, see Wendt (2004).
8
Even so, the individual-level strand is significant and growing. For notable examples, see Kinnvall (2004), Kinnvall
(2007), Krolikowski (2008), Innes (2017), Browning (2018), and Steele (2019).
9
For examples of other approaches to the level-of-analysis issue, see Cash (2017), Innes (2017), and Narozhna
(2020).
The Many Roots and Branches of Ontological Security

Crucially, more and more IR studies theorize ontological security beyond Giddens
by instead drawing on other intellectual sources for new ideas on how to understand
and conceptualize ontological security, subjectivity, and identity. These include po-
litical philosophers (e.g., Hobbes), existentialists (e.g., Heidegger, Kierkegaard,
May, and Tillich), psychoanalysts (e.g., Freud, Lacan, and Winnicott) and other
thinkers (e.g., Laing). As Kinnvall and Mitzen (2020) argue, an overreliance on
Giddens has impeded our understanding of ontological security.
New ways of understanding the creative role of anxiety—as opposed to fear—
in opening up different avenues for action10 have become especially important

for reinvigorating the use of ontological security in IR and remedying its above-
mentioned biases toward the status quo and a politics fearful of change. Existen-
tialist conceptions understand anxiety as a basic human condition—rather than a
specific emotion or deviant state of mind—that is derived from our knowledge of
our own mortality.11 Thus, Kierkegaard posits the object of anxiety as “nothing” and
compares it to the dizziness of staring into an abyss (Kierkegaard 2014, 43, 61), while
Heidegger describes anxiety as a fundamental mood (Grundbefindlichkeit) caused by
our own experience: “Anxiety (…) springs from Dasein itself” (Heidegger 1962,
395), and May (1977, 191) explains anxiety as a “threat to the essential (…) security
of a person.” Relying on Kierkegard and Heidegger, Tillich (2000, 41) develops a
typology of three different types of anxiety, or how “self-affirmation is threatened by
nonbeing”: at the ontological level about death, at the spiritual level about mean-
inglessness, and at the moral level about condemnation.
Rumelili (2020, 2021) builds on Hobbes’ understanding of anxiety as a back-
ground condition in his state of nature and on Heidegger’s conceptualization of
“mood”12 in understanding anxiety in IR as a constitutive condition and a recur-
ring public mood by discussing how in certain times and places, anxiety becomes
widely shared. This collective anxiety not only gives rise to fear, securitization, and
populism, but also contains the seeds of radical agency and change. Berenskoetter
(2020) leans on Heidegger and Kierkegaard in exploring the relation between
and roles of the concepts of anxiety and agency and criticizing their understand-
ing in OSS. The core assumption that humans need stability for agency wrongly
links insecurity with inaction and certainty with action, and therefore cannot ex-
plain how anxiety also can engender radical, emancipatory agency. Drawing on
May, Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi (2020) argues in favor of distinguishing between
neurotic and normal anxiety—a distinction explicitly rejected by Giddens—and
thus rectify conceptual ambiguities.13
Another philosophical source of new ideas on developing OSS is psychoanaly-
sis, and many scholars have found inspiration in the theorization of Freud, Lacan,
Winnicott, and others.14 In psychoanalytical thought, whereas fear is situational and
associated with a distinct threat, anxiety “disregards the object” (Freud 1974, 395,
quoted in Giddens 1991, 43). Building on Lacanian theorization on anxiety, Zevnik
(2021) directs our attention to the role of anxiety both in the constitution of the
subject and as transformative power for political action, while Eberle and Daniel
(2022) explore the relationship between geopolitics and anxiety to engage with
OSS. Other scholars have drawn on Lacanian conceptions of fantasy (Eberle 2018;
10
See, for example, Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet (2017), Browning (2018), Mitzen (2018a), Arfi (2020), and
Gustafsson (2021). See also Homolar and Scholz (2019) on how crises lead agents to action rather than inaction.
11
Giddens similarly views anxiety as a general state of emotions that attacks the root of the self and “threaten[s]
awareness of self-identity” (Giddens 1991, 45).
12
See also Ringmar (2017, 2018).
13
While interesting, this objection is more of a clarification of what should be meant, respectively, by “anxiety” and
“ontological insecurity.” We therefore follow the trend in the literature in using these terms synonymously.
14
See, for example, Burgess (2017), Mitzen (2018b), and Ejdus (2021).
Kinnvall 2018) and identity (Hagström 2021) to further our understanding of nar-
ration processes in OSS and challenge OSS assumptions about the need for stable,
consistent, and coherent narratives. Cash (2017, 2020) argues that Giddens’ con-
ceptualization of OS does not adequately accommodate unconscious processes and
finds inspiration in Winnicott and Klein.
This widened intellectual and philosophical basis for the study of ontological se-
curity in IR and the original approaches it has generated in recent years have made
our understanding of the underlying concepts and how to apply them richer, more
nuanced, and better equipped to analyze the world of international politics. How-
ever, it has also exacerbated the problems of conceptual stretching and ambiguity
described above. For example, the attention paid in OSS to the concept of anxiety

in recent years has done much to widen and strengthen the field’s theoretical basis,
but has also led to divergences over whether anxiety is an impediment or enabler of
action, and a temporary or perpetual condition (Krickel-Choi 2022a). Thus, there
is still a clear need to find a way to classify the literature in terms of how the concept
of ontological security is used.
The Dimensions of the Typology of Ontological Insecurity

This section describes the two dimensions used to construct the typology of ontolog-
ical insecurity mechanisms. Before doing so, however, a brief note should be made
on how we conceptualize a mechanism of ontological insecurity. For us, a “mecha-
nism” of ontological insecurity denotes the nature and process of the threat to the
ontological security of a given agent. By mechanism, we therefore mean in what way
the ontological security of the agent is threatened, or the existential question that
is not being adequately answered and the type of (existential) anxiety the agent is
consequently experiencing. In other words, different threats to the ontological se-
curity of the agent lead to different existential questions that the agent fails to “an-
swer” satisfactorily. Giddens (1991, 37) describes these as “questions of time, space,
continuity and identity.” Similarly formulated in an IR context, Subotic (2018, 299)
argues that “states may be insecure about their international status, or about their
alliances and friendships, or about their secure identities, or about their biograph-
ical continuities.” Given that we focus on the nature of the ontological security of
a given agent—or, in other words, what makes the agent ontologically insecure—
we can also label these mechanisms as constitutive mechanisms. For this reason, we
depart from the conventional usage of the term mechanism, which instead solely
focuses on the triggering cause and resulting outcome of that cause. Stated differ-
ently, we are less interested in what specifically causes an agent to feel ontologically
insecure and more interested in what constitutes that anxiety.
It is important to note that, from our perspective, mechanisms of ontological
insecurity are not the same thing as methods of ontological security-seeking—or
the means of countering ontological insecurity. Instead, a method of ontological
security-seeking can be understood as an outcome of a mechanism of ontological
insecurity. The interaction between the context and the mechanism (i.e., the way
in which the ontological security of the agent is threatened) will often, but not al-
ways, lead to a strategy for countering that insecurity. While our typology aims to
formulate the main mechanisms of ontological insecurity, it is also interesting to
identify the methods of ontological security-seeking analyzed in the literature, not
least since arguably they should at least be partly connected to the dimensions that
constitute the mechanisms of ontological insecurity. However, for the sake of par-
simony, we have decided not to include the method of ontological security-seeking
in the typology.
In order to define the main mechanisms of ontological insecurity, we draw on
two dimensions of ontological security that are often conflated. The first dimen-
sion of the typology is the source of ontological insecurity, which considers whether
Table 1. Key concepts related to mechanisms of ontological insecurity
Cause of ontological insecurity That which instigates a perceived need to increase one’s
ontological security, such as shame and discontinuity
Source of ontological insecurity Where ontological insecurity comes from: from within
(reflexive), as a result of interactions with others (relational),
or through internalization of the norms of the current
international system (systemic)
Mechanism of ontological insecurity The nature of the threat to the ontological security of the
agent. Contextual variations affect how the mechanism
produces a method of ontological security-seeking.
Method of ontological security-seeking The means of countering ontological insecurity

Site of ontological security-seeking Where ontological security is mainly sought: either
internally/domestically or externally/internationally
an agent’s insecurity stems from reflexive narrational processes, social interactions

with other agents, or internalization of the norms of the current international sys-
tem. The second dimension is the cause of ontological insecurity, which can be un-
derstood as that which instigates a perceived need to increase one’s ontological
security. We argue that a cause of ontological insecurity can affect the outcome of
ontological insecurity—methods of ontological security-seeking—through different
mechanisms. We also argue that the source of ontological insecurity moderates the
cause, making some mechanisms more likely depending on certain combinations of
sources and causes. A summary of our usage of these closely interrelated concepts
can be found in table 1.
The two dimensions (source and cause) that underpin the typology of ontological
insecurity mechanisms are outlined below.
Dimension 1: Sources of Ontological Insecurity

As noted above, the first dimension of the typology is related to where an agent’s
ontological insecurity stems from, or its source. We argue that sources of ontological
insecurity can be put into three categories: reflexive, relational, and systemic.
Ontological insecurity that stems from reflexive processes can be understood as
anxiety rooted in perceived deficiencies in the autobiographical narrative that sus-
tains one’s self-identity. The reflexive part of ontological security therefore high-
lights the construction of one’s self-identity through inward-looking processes of
reflexive awareness and monitoring, and the importance of maintaining continuity
from past to present and future in the autobiographical narration of the self.15 The
outside social and material world is understood and filtered through this reflexive
narration.16
Relational ontological insecurity is anxiety that arises primarily through perceived
deficiencies in one’s interactions and relations with others. The relational part of
ontological security thus deals with the construction of one’s self-identity through
intersubjective processes of routinized social interactions and relationships with
other actors. From this perspective, an agent’s self-identity and its narrative are
sustained through ongoing conflicts or cooperation, struggles of recognition,17 or
stigmatization,18 or securitizations of identity and “othering.”19
15
This approach draws from narration theorization, for example, Somers (1994), Patterson and Monroe (1998),
and Berenskoetter (2014).
16
For recent examples, see, for example, Gülsah Çapan and Zarakol (2019) and Macmillan (2022).
17
This approach draws from recognition theorization, for example, Ringmar (2002), Haacke (2005), and Wolf
(2011). See, for example, Gustafsson (2016) and Narozhna (2022).
18
For example, Zarakol (2011).
19
See, for example, Rumelili and Çelik (2017) and Bachleitner (2021).
Systemic ontological insecurity is anxiety that comes from processes of change in

the outside world and one’s place in it. The systemic part of ontological insecurity
therefore focuses on the structure, norms, rules, and institutions of the interna-
tional system, or order, in which one is situated, and how changes, challenges, and
insufficient adherence to these can give rise to anxiety for the agents within the sys-
tem. Agents in the system depend not only on its stability and continuity, but also on
their perceived compliance and conformity to the norms and rules of the system,
for their ontological security. Importantly, in seeking ontological security, agents
also engage in continuously (re)creating, upholding, and changing the system. Sys-
temic ontological insecurity thus differs from relational ontological insecurity in the
sense that the ontologically insecure agent’s point of reference is the international

system rather than the other actors within that system.
Many studies in OSS touch on the divide between different sources of insecurity.
Kinnvall and Mitzen (2017, 6) describe it as intra-subjective/internal versus inter-
subjective/external approaches. Zarakol (2010, 6) compares it with the tension be-
tween psychology and sociology, and equates it to the agent–structure problem.20
Darwich (2016, 484) delineates it as either endogenous or exogenous sources of
identity. Hom and Steele (2020) outline first-, second-, and third-image processes
of ontological security. Eberle and Handl (2020) develop a model of narratives on
three levels—about the self, a significant other, and the international system. How-
ever, the source of ontological insecurity is seldom distinguished from the site of
ontological security-seeking, or where the methods of ontological security-seeking
play out. Here, we can conceptualize two ideal types, internal and external sites,
which essentially correspond to the domestic scene (internal) and the international
scene (external). In other words, the site of ontological security-seeking can be un-
derstood as the main intended audience for an agent’s attempts to increase their
ontological security.
In the literature, the sites of ontological security-seeking and sources of onto-
logical insecurity are often used interchangeably, with internal sites often meaning
reflexive sources of anxiety while external sites often mean relational or systemic
sources of anxiety. We argue, however, that the source of ontological insecurity and
the site of ontological security-seeking do not always overlap. States often seek to
counteract relational sources of anxiety through security-seeking methods on the
internal/domestic scene, and vice versa. For example, the ontological insecurity
of a state that finds itself at the bottom of some international ranking is primarily
driven by a relational source of anxiety. However, the state’s way of answering this
anxiety might still be located internally, for instance, by communicating directly to
its citizens that the ranking in question is flawed and that the country should there-
fore be seen as having higher status. In other words, simply because the source of a
certain state’s ontological insecurity is relational does not mean that the answer to
this anxiety must always be sought in the international arena, or that the intended
audience for this response must be external. For this reason, we argue that it is vi-
tal not to conflate the source of ontological insecurity and the site of ontological
security-seeking.
Dimension 2: Causes of Ontological Insecurity

The second dimension of the typology comprises causes of ontological insecurity,
which we define as that which instigates a perceived need to increase one’s onto-
logical security. In other words, the cause of ontological insecurity is what makes an
agent feel that it is lacking something. However, for an agent to feel inadequate, it
needs some sort of framework to understand itself through. While the source de-
notes where this framework “comes from,” the cause of ontological insecurity des-
20
See also Wendt (1987).
Table 2. Typology of ontological insecurity mechanisms
Cause of anxiety/ontological insecurity
Shame (a lack of Discontinuity (a lack of

self-regard) certainty/ stability)
Reflexive Mechanism 1: inadequacy Mechanism 2: distrust of

in one’s own eyes the self
Source of anxiety Relational Mechanism 3: inadequacy Mechanism 4: distrust of
in the eyes of others others
Systemic Mechanism 5: inadequate Mechanism 6: distrust of
norm compliance the outside world

ignates the aspect that the agent in question perceives that it lacks. We argue that
two overarching causes of ontological insecurity can be identified in the literature:
shame, or a lack of self-regard; and discontinuity, or a lack of certainty or stability.
Shame, according to Giddens, is anxiety about the coherence, consistency, and
adequacy of our biographical narrative and the actions that sustain it, and should
thus “be understood in relation to the integrity of the self” (Giddens 1991, 65). In
essence, shame has to do with a lack of “the warmth of a loving self-regard” (Giddens
1991, 54). Tillich describes this as “the anxiety of guilt and condemnation,” the non-
being that “threatens man’s moral self-affirmation” (Tillich 2000, 51). As her own
eternal judge, ever watching, ever aware, holding herself responsible for the choices
given her by her freedom, the agent demands herself to answer what she has done
to fulfill her destiny, to actualize her potential (Tillich 2000, 51–52). Thus, shame
emerges when the agent perceives her self-identity to be inadequate or inferior in
some way, by apprehending inconsistencies or insufficiencies in her autobiographi-
cal narrative and its constitutive actions from her own point of view (reflexive), from
the perceived view of others (relational), or from comparisons with the perceived
norms of her outside world (systemic).
Discontinuity, meanwhile, is anxiety over the continuity of the self and existence.
In this sense, discontinuity is intimately tied to the inability to feel trust in oneself,
in others, and in the world. For this reason, this cause of ontological insecurity pre-
vents an agent from bracketing existential threats and living “as if” she has answers
to existential questions (Giddens 1991, 37). This is the “anxiety of fate and death”
of Tillich (2000, 42), the most elementary nonbeing that threatens the basic self-
affirmation of simply being. Our existence is characterized by contingency—of our
place in time, and our place in space, and of the very reality of the outside world—
meaning “the lack of ultimate necessity, the irrationality, the impenetrable darkness
of fate” (Tillich 2000, 44–45). Therefore, the ontological insecurity of discontinu-
ity emerges when the agent apprehends threats to the certainty and stability of her
narrative (reflexive), to her relations and interactions with others (relational), or to
her social and physical outside worlds (systemic). Crucially, both causes of ontological
insecurity can arise from all three sources identified above.
A Typology of Ontological Insecurity Mechanisms

This section describes the mechanisms of ontological insecurity that constitute the
article’s typology (see table 2). The combinations of the two dimensions described
above produce the six mechanisms of ontological insecurity, which, we argue, also
reflect the main approaches in the literature regarding how the ontological security
of an agent is or can be threatened. The mechanisms are (1) inadequacy in one’s
own eyes, (2) distrust of the self, (3) inadequacy in the eyes of others, (4) distrust in
others, (5) inadequate compliance with the norms of the international system, and
(6) distrust of the outside world.
In order to demonstrate the utility of this typology, this section describes each
mechanism in turn, and discusses how previous studies of ontological insecurity
have used these mechanisms. In addition, the section provides examples of each
mechanism from a case study of Russia’s engagement in the conflict in Syria. The
case study is merely illustrative; the goal is not to provide thorough and exhaustive
explanations of Russia’s actions, but to show how mechanisms of ontological insecu-
rity play out in practice. Specifying, how these mechanisms of ontological insecurity
“work” will serve as a guide for future studies on ontological security that wish to
provide specific explanations for the phenomena that they are studying.

The material analyzed is a sample of Russian discourse on Russia’s military en-
gagement in Syria between September 2015 and December 2017.21 The case of
Russia was chosen because it is likely to be a more promising case than many other
states for finding signs of ontological insecurity, not least with its chaotic history that
includes two society-transforming revolutions in the twentieth century, its outsider
status and conflict-ridden relations with the West (Zarakol 2011), and its ongoing
struggles to be recognized as a great power (Tsygankov 2012). The engagement in
Syria is chosen for its suitability for finding a large sample of discourse that might
express ontological insecurity. The case of Russia’s engagement in Syria is thus cho-
sen on the basis that it maximizes the likelihood of identifying illustrative examples
of the six mechanisms of ontological insecurity outlined below.
Since it is rare to find direct statements of ontological insecurity (i.e., “Russia is
anxious about threats to the consistency of its narrative”), we must make indirect in-
ferences from statements that express ontological security-seeking, which can then
provide clues to underlying insecurity.22 Here, previous research helps us to under-
stand what kind of ontological security-seeking can be expected from Russia—what
methods of ontological security-seeking are used in response to what threats, which nar-
ratives are constructed and activated, and who the relevant “others” are, with which
interactions take place. How each mechanism has been operationalized is presented
together with a description of each mechanism.
Mechanism 1: Inadequacy in One’s Own Eyes

The first mechanism comprises anxiety about the coherence and integrity of the
self-identity and its narrative. In Giddens’ framework, a failure to trust one’s self-
integrity is one of the signs of ontological insecurity and is deeply connected with
shame (Giddens 1991, 54). As mentioned above, shame is anxiety about the coher-
ence, consistency, and adequacy of our biographical narrative, and the actions that
sustain it (Giddens 1991, 65). For this mechanism, shame is the product of anxiety
regarding the coherence and adequacy of the self. An agent suffering from this type
of ontological insecurity “may not possess an over-riding sense of personal consis-
tency or cohesiveness, […] unable to assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine,
good, valuable” (Laing 1960, 42).
21
Two types of sources have been used in our analysis: official and semiofficial. We borrow this division from
Kazharski (2020, 27), where official discourse is the “discursive practices that belong to individuals that are immedi-
ately and officially involved in the exercise of power in Russia,” that is, statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Semiofficial discourse is the “discursive practices coming from those individuals
and entities that are not directly involved in the exercise of power but are closely linked to the existing structures of
power and often form a discursive continuum with them,” such as think tanks and similar organizations (Kazharski
2020). Our initial analysis included articles from four think tanks closely connected to the Russian government: Dia-
logue of Civilizations (DOC), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Valdai Club, and the Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies (RISS). Our analysis of the official and semiofficial discourses found that no significant variation
existed between the two sets of sources, and the indicators of all six mechanisms could be found in both.
22
This is in line with how ontological (in)security is usually studied in IR. See, for example, Subotic (2016).
Two examples of this mechanism are Steele (2005), who explains the British non-
participation in the American Civil War by analyzing its reflexive biographical nar-
ration, which was used to ensure the stability of its self-integrity and avoid the shame
of not acting in accordance with its self-identity; and Lupovici (2012), who analyzes
the conflicts between different identities of Israel in connection with its relationship
with Palestine.
In the case of Russia, evidence of this mechanism would be indicated through
indirect signs of shame over the inconsistency and incoherence of Russia’s actions
with its identity and narrative. Russia strives for an identity as an influential and
powerful global player and tries to maintain a narrative of being a “great power”
(Clunan 2014; Narozhna 2021). We would therefore expect potential ontological

insecurity to be seen through Russian representatives’ concern for and descriptions
of how Russia’s actions reflect and confirm this status and narrative of power and
greatness. This mechanism is therefore operationalized as statements expressing
and referring to the “Russian actions reflecting/confirming its status as an impor-
tant/great/global power.”
There are many examples of this indicator, such as this quote by Russia’s For-
eign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “[In Syria Russia was] assuming responsibility for these
global developments as one of the world’s largest countries and a permanent member
of the UN Security Council. Russia’s diplomatic efforts were aimed at showing leader-
ship” (Lavrov 2015b) [emphasis added]. Similarly, Putin argued that “[W]e crossed
another milestone in 2014 when Crimea and Sevastopol were reunified with Rus-
sia. Russia declared a voce piena its status as a strong state with a millennium-long
history and great traditions (…) We are acting with the same confidence now [in
Syria],” (Putin 2015d) and “[In] the struggle against international terrorism [in
Syria] our country has demonstrated its unquestionable leadership, willpower and re-
sponsibility” (Putin 2016b) [emphasis added].
The end of the cold war left Russia no longer one of the world’s two superpowers,
and this strong need to narrate its actions as demonstrating its responsibility and
leadership as an important global player indicates anxiety about the coherence and
consistency of its actions with its great power narrative. It also reflects the fact that
Russia’s power has declined. This can be seen ever more clearly in the semiofficial
discourse: “[In] Syria, Russia demonstrated that its military forces have overcome
the state of deep crisis they remained in in the 1990–2000 s. (…) it is impossible to
ignore Russia as a great state” (Tebin 2015) [emphasis added]; through Syria, Russia is
“consolidating its role as a responsible global power that assists in resolving common
security issues” (Kortunov and Timofeev 2017), and:
It’s no secret that Russia at all forums and on all platforms has positioned itself as a
great power worthy of the role of one of the power centers of the multipolar world.
However, the policy pursued by the Kremlin has not matched its ambitions. (…) How-
ever, Russian foreign policy has gradually evolved. (…) The Syrian campaign appears
to be the first genuine Russian initiative of a global nature (…) As a result, the Russian
operation in Syria has become a sort of test of Russia’s compliance with a great-power status.
(Mirzayan 2015) [emphasis added]
Mechanism 2: Distrust of the Self

While mechanism 1 is related to threats to the coherence of the narrative, mechanism
2 instead concerns threats to its continuity. The first sign of ontological insecurity
is precisely a “lack [of a] consistent feeling of biographical continuity” (Giddens
1991, 53). As the narrative that makes up self-identity must continuously be up-
dated through the integration of new events in the outside world, it “cannot be
wholly fictive” (Giddens 1991, 54). These events, however, can pierce the protective
emotional cocoon of basic trust, flooding the agent with anxiety (Giddens 1991,
40). The narrative can also be threatened by alternative, foreign versions told by
others (Giddens 1991, 55). This type of anxiety can be compared to what Laing de-
scribes as engulfment, in which the individual dreads relating to anything or anyone,
including herself, because in the relation she might lose her autonomy and iden-
tity (Laing 1960, 44). Threats to the continuity of the narrative are often caused
by crises or traumas that cannot be easily incorporated into the current narrative.
Thus, while mechanism 1 is related to anxiety as shame over actions and behaviors
that are incompatible with the narrative, mechanism 2 is related to anxiety about
the ability of the narrative itself to withstand threats that might rupture it. The focus
in mechanism 1 is therefore on shame-inducing incompatible actions of the agent,
while in mechanism 2 the focus is on traumatizing continuity-threatening crises.

Subotic (2016) focuses on this mechanism in analyzing Serbia’s policies on
Kosovo’s independence. In response to great crises that threatened the state’s bi-
ographical continuity, an overarching narrative was strategically used to anchor
policy changes in a continued self-identity. Gustafsson (2020) also addresses this
mechanism when analyzing international reconciliation through the construction
of conflicting Chinese and Japanese war memory narratives. Several scholars have
previously analyzed Russia’s ontological security-seeking in relation to this mech-
anism. Hansen (2016) analyzes how “the West” has been cast as the main enemy
and “Other” in Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union to strengthen the Rus-
sian sense of self through a securitization of identity. Kazharski (2020) details the
construction of a Russian civilization–based identity that unites societal cleavages
through the narration of certain historical ruptures as “traumas.”
In this case study, the mechanism is thus operationalized as statements expressing
and referring to (1) “historical narrative biographical cues such as Russia’s history
and historical role, and Russian historical struggles and traumas” and (2) the “his-
torical battle with the West, and ‘othering’ of the West.”
There are many examples of statements expressing narrative cues related to cer-
tain interconnected historical themes, such as the extensive history of Russian strug-
gles: “We have equal respect for the defenders of ancient Russia, the Russian Empire,
the heroes of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War [WWII]. […] We will not forget how
our defenders fearlessly risk their lives to fulfill their military duty in Syria” (Putin
2016c) [emphasis added]. A similar thesis is the notion of Russia’s long history of
protecting humanity against existential threats, as Putin frequently mentions in re-
lation to Syria: “As has happened many times in history, Russia made a crucial, decisive
input to the defeat of the criminal forces [Islamic State (ISIS)] that challenged the
entire civilization” (Putin 2017b) [emphasis added]. This need to frame the engage-
ment in these historical terms shows how Russia attempts to counter its insecurity by
shaping these crises, and Syria, as traumas that Russia has overcome. This is repeat-
edly connected with perhaps the most salient and, in Russian minds, most cardinal
of Russian struggles against evil: the war on Nazism: “The historical parallels [with the
fight against Nazism] in this case are undeniable. Today we have again come face to
face with a destructive and barbarous ideology” (Putin 2015d) [emphasis added].
Against the backdrop of post–Soviet Russian weakness, Syria is often depicted as
Russia’s redemption and reconquering its historical importance: “Therefore one
can safely say that Russia has reinstated its historically essential role as the guarantor of
global stability” (Lavrov 2017a) [emphasis added]. This suggests that through Syria,
Russia’s narration strives to integrate the still unhealed rupture of the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
Crucially, the autobiographical narration of the engagement is also discursively
tied up with the long history of resisting Western domination, and here we reach
the second indicator. Thus, the West as a hostile “other” assaulting Russia is used
to securitize a stable, historically cohesive, Russian identity: “Having stopped the
neo-Weimar expansion of Western alliances, […] Russia is regaining its traditional and
internationally important role as one of the main, if not the main, suppliers of
security” (Karaganov 2017) [emphasis added]. Similarly, Putin has linked Western
denunciations of Russia’s Syria engagement with attempts at Western domination
in previous conflicts such as Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and World War I, by arguing
that in all these conflicts, “what worries our opponents the most is (…) the unity
and cohesion of the Russian nation (…) attempts are made to weaken us from within”
(Putin 2016d) [emphasis added]. Again, this pervasive need to “other” the West is
indicative of ontological insecurity about the narrative’s continuity.
Mechanism 3: Inadequacy in the Eyes of Others

The third mechanism is linked to existential anxiety about self-worth and the value

of our biographical narrative in the eyes of others. This is also connected to hav-
ing one’s self recognized by others. Shame again comes into play not primarily
because of its connection to the coherence or continuity of our narrative, as in
mechanisms 1 and 2, but because of its connection with the adequacy and social ac-
ceptability of the narrative: “Shame depends on feelings of personal insufficiency”
(Giddens 1991, 65). The intersubjectivity of the process of constructing our self-
identity means that how others think of us matters for our ontological security. As
Cooley (1922, 183) states, “the thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the
mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined
effect of this reflection upon another’s mind.”
In a case study on Croatia, Subotic (2018) analyzes how postcommunist states
in Europe use political memory in reflexive domestic settings to seem more fully
and legitimately “European,” and thereby counter their existential anxiety about
inferior status. Similarly, Zarakol (2010) analyzes Turkey’s and Japan’s ontological
insecurity through relational dynamics associated with the “shame produced by hav-
ing a particular (inferior) status,” manifest in the intersubjective pressure from the
West to apologize for past crimes (Zarakol 2010, 20). Here, as in similar studies,
stigmatization plays a major role (see, e.g., Adler-Nissen 2014).23 This has also been
studied in relation to Russia; Salajan (2019) describes how Russian identity is built
on the notion of being a “great power,” but that lack of recognition from other
“great powers” has led to ontological insecurity.24
This mechanism is thus operationalized as statements expressing and referring
to “Comparisons of morality, power and status with Western states.” These specific
comparisons, related to Russia’s engagement in Syria, can be commonly found in
the case study sample, indicating Russian existential anxiety about inferiority. The
Russian version of Syria is that (1) the conflict arose because of Western meddling,
(2) the Western coalition to combat terrorism was useless and illegal, (3) Russia
therefore entered to save the day, and (4) this reaffirmed its status as a global power
and demonstrated its relative might vis-à-vis the West. This discursive story consists of
three overarching comparative themes of morality, power, and status. Morality pits
Western meddling against Russian responsible action, thereby emphasizing Russian
ethical superiority over Western egoistic geopolitical machinations:
We know who decided to oust the unwanted regimes and brutally impose their own rules. Where
has this led them? They [the West] stirred up trouble, destroyed the countries’ state-
hood, set people against each other (…) thus opening the way to radical activists,
extremists and terrorists. (Putin 2015d) [emphasis added]
Conversely, the Russian engagement is pictured in stark contrast: “there is an alter-

native to this kind of arrogant and destructive policy (…) They [Russia’s efforts]
have proved to be very important, correct, professional and timely” (Putin 2017a) [em-
phasis added].
23
This subfield draws much on Goffman’s work on stigma, for example, Goffman (2009).
24
See also Narozhna (2022).
The second, and perhaps most important, comparison theme is that of Russian
capability versus Western ineptitude, or the significant consequences of Russia’s ac-
tions versus the inefficiency of the West’s. Putin claimed that “over the nearly 18
months that a US-led coalition has been carrying out airstrikes (…) there has been
no result” (Putin 2015b). In comparison, Russia’s engagements “have made it pos-
sible to preserve Syria’s statehood, to stop mass murders, executions, and terror
against civilians; have made it possible to launch a political settlement of the conflict
in that country, to restore normal life and to return tens of thousands of refugees”
(Putin 2017b). Finally, the third theme is the comparison of status, consisting of
Russian ascent and Western downfall. Thus, Russia’s engagement in Syria has had
far-reaching effects on Russia’s standing relative to the West: “Russia will probably

become the major force in the region, with or without the US” (Yakis 2017). In sum,
the three themes of downward comparisons, highlighting Russia’s superiority con-
trasted with Western inferiority, indicate Russian ontological insecurity about the
value and sufficiency of its narrative and self-identity in the eyes of others.
Mechanism 4: Distrust of Others

The fourth mechanism of ontological insecurity involves a lack of (basic) trust and
certainty in the stability and continuity of our relations with others. In Giddens’
framework, trust in others is foundational for our ontological security, our sense of
self, and our belief in our self-integrity (Giddens 1990, 114), and “trust in others
(…) is at the origin of the experience of a stable external world and a coherent
sense of self-identity” (Giddens 1991, 51). This is related to Laing’s petrification, a
type of anxiety in which the agent fears losing her subjectivity through others treat-
ing her not as a live, autonomous person with agency, but as a thing, thus petrifying,
depersonalizing, and turning her “into a dead thing, into a stone, into a robot […]
an it without subjectivity” (Laing 1960, 46). The agent thus afflicted “requires con-
stant confirmation from others of his own existence as a person” (Laing 1960, 47).
Mitzen (2006) analyzes this mechanism in her groundbreaking study on how
states seek ontological security through routinized relations with significant oth-
ers. As regards previous studies on Russia exploring this mechanism, Russo and
Stoddard (2018) see the Eurasian regional cooperation between Russia and Kaza-
khstan as a method of ontological security-seeking in response to anxieties about
their relations with others.
In the case study, we would expect signs of this anxiety to be seen indirectly
through Russia’s need to emphasize the continuity and stability of its relations with
others. While this concerns relations in general with many different “others,” it also
specifically relates to Russia’s ambiguous relations with its main “other,” that is, the
West. Even in adversarial relations, actors seek certainty and continuity for their on-
tological security, and despite all the hostility and strife, Russia is still interested in
maintaining a stable and continuous relationship with the West, not least so as to
enable the West’s recognition of Russia. This mechanism is therefore operational-
ized as statements expressing and referring to either (1) “Russian concern for, and
actions demonstrating, its stable, enduring and trustful relations with others” or (2)
“Russian concerns about, and efforts for ensuring, the stability and continuity in its
working relationship with the West.”
As regards the first operationalization, a recurrent topic in the Russian discourse
on its engagement in Syria is the successful cooperation between Russia and other
actors, enabled by good relations, Russian willingness and capacity to cooperate,
and Russia’s consideration for others’ interests and inclusion. Thus, Putin argued
that “[in Syria] we are working with all the participants of this process with due
respect for their interests” (Putin 2017a), and “we do not want any new Somalias
there because this is all in close vicinity of our borders; we want to develop normal
relationships with these countries. We have traditionally, and I want to stress it,
traditionally been on very friendly terms with the Middle East” (Putin 2015a). This
is also seen in the semiofficial discourse: “Today, almost all countries in the Middle
East are interested in Russia’s involvement and view it as the main partner capable
of influencing the situation in the region” (Naumkin 2017); “[the Syrian peace pro-
cess is a] demonstration of Moscow’s trustworthiness as a mediator in a complicated
process involving parties with diverging interests” (Roknifard and Azizi 2017).
Continuing with the second operationalization, Russian representatives often
speak about the need, and Russia’s willingness, to cooperate with the West in the
fight against terrorism in Syria, despite Western reluctance and geopolitical ruses:
After all, World War II saw several nations unite against an absolute evil, Nazism, and

defeat it, forgetting about their differences, including ideological ones, which divided
the Soviet Union and the West then, unlike the current period. (…) [In Syria] a
coalition can be created if our partners don’t link this task of global importance to
their striving for unilateral geopolitical gains. (Lavrov 2015a).
The overall picture seems to be of a Russia desperately trying to uphold stability

and certainty in its relations with the West: “The main thing is that we have created
conditions for the start of a peaceful process. We have managed to achieve positive,
constructive cooperation with the United States of America and a number of other
countries” (Putin 2016b). To a question on whether he expected the West’s negative
reaction to Russia’s engagement in Syria, Putin answered that “[w]e hoped at least
for the natural in such cases close military and expert coordination with the US-led Global
Coalition (…) [h]owever, the reaction of the United States and Western partners
was quite restrained,” and despite unanswered Russian cooperation requests, “[w]e
are ready to cooperate with Washington” (Putin 2015e) [emphasis added]. All of these
statements indirectly indicate Russian distrust in the stability and continuity of its
relations with others, especially regarding its relations with the West.
Mechanism 5: Inadequate Norm Compliance

Like mechanisms 1 and 3, the cause of mechanism 5 is shame. However, whereas the
anxiety in mechanisms 1 and 3 stems from the perceived inadequacy of our actions
and narratives in our own (mechanism 1) and others’ (mechanism 3) perceptions,
respectively, in mechanism 5 the anxiety is instead connected to our dependence
on our outside world and is caused by perceived inadequacies of our actions and
narratives in comparison with larger normative orders. The source of the anxiety
here then is systemic and is linked to the agent’s perceived (mis)fit with the norms,
rules, and values of the international system or structure, or the symbolic order to
use Lacan’s framework. Shame makes us distrust not only ourselves, but also the
very reality of our external environment (Giddens 1991, 66), and destroys the ever-
important trust: “the focal element in a generalized set of relations to the social
and physical environment” (Giddens 1990, 99). Importantly, our self-identities both
shape and are shaped by the international realm within which they are positioned,
and these processes then affect our ontological security.
Eberle and Handl (2020) analyze this mechanism by describing how states main-
tain autobiographical continuity through adjustments on three different narra-
tional levels—the highest of which is the international order, “upon which [the
agent’s identity] depends and to whose maintenance it contributes.”25 Similarly,
Hom and Steele (2020) demonstrate the role of third-image theorizing in ontolog-
ical security processes by analyzing “the international […] as a collective agency
project.” Crucially, self-identity narratives must deal with the coherence, and anxi-
ety, of the inner self, of that self’s external environment (the international), and of
25
Eberle and Handl (2020, 45) note that role theory provides another avenue for similar reasoning on relations
between the self and the international order.
the relations between the two. Berenskoetter and Giegerich (2010) understand Ger-
many’s investment in the European Union’s (EU) European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) as a way to gain ontological security by building an international or-
der whose norms sustained the stability and authenticity of the German state’s self.
With regard to studies on Russia, Larson (2020) shows how Russia and China are co-
operating in Eurasia to construct a common identity as outsiders rejecting Western
norms in response to denied recognition as great powers by the West, while Mälksoo
(2019) has developed a framework on the connection between transitional justice
and foreign policy that explores the relation between states’ identity and interna-
tional norms, which is then used to analyze Russian foreign policy.
In the case study, indications of this mechanism would therefore be (indirect)

signs of shame over the inadequacy or incompatibility of Russia’s narrative and
identity with (its perception of) the international system and its norms. This mecha-
nism is therefore operationalized as statements expressing and referring to “Russian
concern for, or actions demonstrating, its adequacy or suitability in relation to the
norms of the international system.”
One of the most common themes in Russian discourse on its Syrian engagement
is its legitimacy, in line with international law and the norms and rules of the es-
tablished international order: “I will stress again: it is fully legitimate and its only
goal is to help restore peace” (Putin 2015b). Unlike the illegitimate Western coali-
tion, “Russia (…) is acting on the basis of international law” (Putin 2017a). Russian
anxiety about its actions’ propriety is indicated by the frequent rebuttals of West-
ern accusations: “In any case, it should not be we who end up accused of every
possible sin. This is simply indecent. We have been showing restraint [in Syria]”
(Putin 2016a). The congruence of Russia’s actions and views with fundamental sys-
temic norms and rules and the view of the international community is repeatedly
underlined:
We believe that solutions can be found to the most difficult of today’s problems just
by relying on international law, the principles of equality, and respect for each other’s inter-
ests, by appreciating the cultural and civilisational diversity of the modern world and
recognising the right of nations to decide their future. These views are shared by the
overwhelming majority of countries. (Lavrov 2015b) [emphasis added]
As discussed above, as part of the process of seeking ontological security through

coherence with the norms of the outside world, agents also engage in constructing
this world and its norms. In the case of Russia, this duality is manifest in its incom-
patible needs to both fit in with the norms of the Western-built international order
and its understanding of who is a great power while simultaneously resisting Western
hegemony by reshaping this order. In September 2015, at the beginning of Russia’s
military involvement in Syria, Putin argued that since Western powers fight against
ISIS in Syria, Russia ought to as well, as “[W]e have always consistently supported the
fight against international terrorism” (Putin 2015c) [emphasis added]. This incon-
gruous wish to at the same time both renounce and be accepted by Western norms
is also expressed in the semiofficial literature: “[Russia’s engagement in Syria] is
based on the developed rules of the game and, importantly, enjoys absolute legitimacy
and is being conducted through the existing international system. That is the way a
respected great power is supposed to behave, and not as the Americans have done over
the last fifteen years” (Mirzayan 2015) [emphasis added]. Again, Russia is somewhat
paradoxically trying its best to both live up to what Western norms define as “great”
while also criticizing the very source of those norms.
Mechanism 6: Distrust of the Outside World

The cause of mechanism 6, like mechanisms 2 and 4, is perceived discontinuity.
However, it is not perceived challenges to our trust in the stability and continuity of
our own narratives (mechanism 2), or in our relations with others (mechanism 4),
but in our very social and material external world. Just as an ontologically secure
agent needs trust in herself and her relations with others, she also needs trust in
her outside world in order to achieve agency. The reality of the social and material
outside world is one of the fundamental existential questions (Giddens 1991, 55).
Fundamentally, the self is dependent on the outside world, such that “reality has the
basic structure of self-world correlation and that with the disappearance of the one
side, the world, the other side, the self, also disappears” (Tillich 2000, 42). Laing de-
scribes this anxiety as fear of implosion, the “experience of the world as liable at any
moment to crash in and obliterate all identity” (Laing 1960, 45). Like mechanism
5, the source of the anxiety in mechanism 6 is systemic but instead of shame related

to the self-identity’s (in)congruence with the norms of the international system, it
is rather ontological insecurity about the very continuity and stability of the struc-
ture and order of the international system, and of its norms, rules, and institutions.
Thus, the individual “can no more live in a ‘secure’ world than he can be secure ‘in
himself’” (Laing 1960, 42).
Johansson-Nogués (2018) focuses on this mechanism in analyzing the EU’s onto-
logical insecurity through the erosion of its basic trust, related to crises and desta-
bilizing developments in its neighborhood. Adler-Nissen (2014) analyzes how states
in the international system use stigmatization as a way to seek ontological security
and out of “uncertainty about what actually holds international society together”
(Adler-Nissen 2014, 144). Karp (2018) also adopts this mechanism when analyzing
the ontological insecurity struggles over Germany’s identity as a leader in Europe
and the tensions between this narrative and the “increasing unpredictability of insti-
tutions and processes Germany relies on” (Karp 2018, 77). Interestingly, Solomon
(2018) explores and demonstrates how wider social affective environments and at-
mospheres can provide ontological security despite instability and uncertainty.
As distrust of the outside world can concern both social and material dimensions
(Ejdus 2021; Krickel-Choi 2022b), this mechanism is operationalized as statements
expressing and referring to both: “Russia’s international cooperation as part of the
creation/upkeep of the stability/continuity of international norms,”26 and “threats
to the stability/continuity of Russia and its material environment.” Indications of
this mechanism would then be (indirect) signs of Russian anxiety about the stabil-
ity/continuity of its outside world. Many instances of both operationalizations can
be found in the sample, indicating Russian anxiety about the stability/continuity of
the international order on which it depends.
Starting with the first indicator, the repeatedly stressed general message is that
Russia’s military engagement in Syria is a responsible international multilateral co-
operation that is part of the process of creating and ensuring the stability, sustain-
ability, and fairness of the international order:
[…] creating a fair democratic international system is our major challenge. […] The in-
ternational system must adapt to what is really going on in the world. […] We need to
approach other situations the same way [as Syria]. If we ensure inclusion in all processes
[…] this will reflect the trends of the modern world and the need to take into account the new
realities in the world, global politics and economy. (Lavrov 2016b) [emphasis added]
The world is going through a difficult, turbulent period in the evolution of a new poly-
centric system of global order. There is growing competition over the format of the future inter-
national system. […]. Our country is doing its best to normalise the situation and ease
tensions in the world. To this end, we use our participation in the UN, the G20, the
EAEU, BRICS, the SCO and many other multilateral formats. (Lavrov 2016a) [em-
phasis added]
26
A major difference between the operationalizations of mechanism 4 and mechanism 6 is that the former concerns
cooperation with specific (significant) others while the latter concerns participation in the international community.
This is also emphasized in the semiofficial discourse: “The [Russian] Syria oper-
ation has so far been a special success story. (…) Respect for the norms of in-
ternational law and co-existence, which the West systematically violated, are being
reestablished” (Karaganov 2017).
Continuing with the second indicator (material), the prevailing framing of the
engagement in Syria in the discourse is that of a critical defense against a terri-
ble threat, vital to ensuring Russia’s physical security, stability, and continuity—and
thus indicating ontological insecurity about its material environment. Putin under-
scores these threats repeatedly: “Our military personnel are fighting in Syria for
Russia, for the security of Russian citizens” (Putin 2015d). This is also reflected in
the semiofficial discourse: “if Russia remains an idle bystander (…) the chaos, in-

stability and terrorism generated in the Arab world will ultimately spill over Russia’s
borders” (Kortunov 2016) [emphasis added].
Conclusions
The concept of ontological security has proven to be a valuable tool for explaining
state behavior. However, the variety of interpretations of the concept has led to it
being used in conflicting ways and increased the risk of conceptual stretching. In
order to provide a common foundation for research and facilitate a more nuanced
understanding of ontological insecurity, we have in this article developed a typology
of ontological security mechanisms. This typology distinguishes between the sources
of anxiety, which can be reflexive, relational, or systemic, and the causes of anxiety,
which can be shame or discontinuity. The combinations between these sources and
causes of anxiety produce six mechanisms that can enable scholars to distinguish be-
tween different types of ontological insecurity as well as generate more fine-grained
explanations of state behavior. To demonstrate the utility of this typology, we have
provided an illustrative case study of Russia’s engagement in the conflict in Syria.
Given the findings presented above, there is evidence to suggest that all six mech-
anisms of ontological insecurity are present and driving Russia’s behavior in its en-
gagement in the conflict in Syria. There are therefore good reasons to claim that
Russia’s ontological security is threatened and that Russia experiences existential
anxiety. The six mechanisms also emphasize the large variations in ontological in-
security that are at work in this case. In other words, each mechanism provides
different explanations for the types of existential anxiety active in the case of Rus-
sia’s military engagement in Syria, or, stated differently, how the ontological secu-
rity of Russia is threatened and how Russia seeks to counter this threat in order to
maintain its ontological security. Furthermore, and more importantly, this finding
demonstrates that with different understandings of what ontological insecurity “is,”
we end up looking at different outcomes in terms of foreign policy decision-making
as well as having different interpretations of why those specific outcomes are the
result of a state’s ontological security concerns.
Even if this means that we can draw quite different conclusions about how a state
experiences ontological insecurity, and acts on that anxiety, there is nothing wrong
with this plurality. On the contrary, our main argument is precisely that distinguish-
ing between these diverse explanations is crucial for gaining a fine-grained and
more nuanced understanding of how ontological insecurity functions in practice.
More specifically, the typology developed in this article allows us to determine which
ontological insecurity mechanisms are active, that is, the type of existential anxiety
a state is grappling with or in what way a state’s ontological security is threatened.
The typology also allows us to better understand which discursive statements are
connected to which mechanism of ontological insecurity. In the case of Russia’s en-
gagement in Syria, this does not necessarily mean that ontological insecurity is the
sole or prime cause of Russia’s behavior. Rather, it indicates that Russian ontologi-
cal security concerns are part of the causes of the behavior. In other words, Russia
is seeking ontological security and trying to mitigate and counter these existential
anxieties through its engagement in the conflict in Syria.
The typology thus makes many contributions to the field. While we already know
that there are many ways to understand ontological security, the typology developed
in this article has further emphasized how different understandings of the concept
lead to different conclusions regarding how the ontological security of agents is
threatened and the type of existential anxiety the agent is experiencing. In so doing,
we argue that it provides a solution to the risk of conceptual stretching. Compared
to how the concept of ontological insecurity has been used in previous studies as a
catchall term for many different mechanisms of ontological insecurity, our typology
improves the degree to which the concept meets several of Gerring’s criteria of

“conceptual goodness” (Gerring 1999, 367).
Furthermore, this article also opens up several avenues for future research on the
mechanisms of ontological insecurity. A first avenue concerns the conditions that
govern activation of the mechanisms. Specifically, what makes a certain mechanism,
and not others, affect an agent’s behavior in a specific case? A second is the relation
between the mechanisms. Are there patterns, in terms of the presence of multi-
ple mechanisms, where some combinations occur more often than others? Do the
mechanisms affect one another, for example, through synergy effects? Finally, what
relations exist between certain mechanisms, certain sources of ontological insecu-
rity, and certain methods of ontological security-seeking? Answers to these questions
would provide a more refined understanding of how ontological insecurity drives
state behavior.
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A Typology of Ontological Insecurity Mechanisms - Russia's Military Engagement in Syria

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International Studies Review (2023), viad016

A Typology of Ontological Insecurity

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Because of the novel explanations it generates for states’ security- and

ica en las RRII. Argumentamos, al especificar estos mecanismos, que su

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Keywords: ontological security, identity, foreign policy, Russia,

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Ontological Security in International Relations

The Ontological Security Framework of Giddens

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From Giddens and Beyond: Fundamentals and Divergences

levels with different dependent variables, focused on different aspects of ontological

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The Many Roots and Branches of Ontological Security

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The Dimensions of the Typology of Ontological Insecurity

Table 1. Key concepts related to mechanisms of ontological insecurity

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an agent’s insecurity stems from reflexive narrational processes, social interactions

Dimension 1: Sources of Ontological Insecurity

Systemic ontological insecurity is anxiety that comes from processes of change in

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Dimension 2: Causes of Ontological Insecurity

Table 2. Typology of ontological insecurity mechanisms

Cause of anxiety/ontological insecurity

Shame (a lack of Discontinuity (a lack of

Reflexive Mechanism 1: inadequacy Mechanism 2: distrust of

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Mechanism 1: Inadequacy in One’s Own Eyes

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Mechanism 2: Distrust of the Self

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Mechanism 3: Inadequacy in the Eyes of Others

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Conversely, the Russian engagement is pictured in stark contrast: “there is an alter-

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Mechanism 4: Distrust of Others

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The overall picture seems to be of a Russia desperately trying to uphold stability

Mechanism 5: Inadequate Norm Compliance

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As discussed above, as part of the process of seeking ontological security through

Mechanism 6: Distrust of the Outside World

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