Russian Social Science Review

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrss20

Russia and the United States: Reflecting on the

Conflict

Viktoria Zhuravleva

To cite this article: Viktoria Zhuravleva (2020) Russia and the United States: Reflecting on the
Conflict, Russian Social Science Review, 61:3-4, 193-205, DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2020.1776544

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2020.1776544

Published online: 27 Jul 2020.

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RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
2020, VOL. 61, NOS. 3–4, 193–205
https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2020.1776544

Russia and the United States: Reflecting on the

Conflict
Viktoria Zhuravleva

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In recent decades, since the collapse of bipolarity, conflict nature; mutual
relations between Russia and the United States have images; messianic concepts;
been constantly moving back and forth between lim­ misunderstanding; different
ited cooperation and limited conflict. The logic of this political models; reliance on
personal contact; rivalry;
movement and its trajectory are determined by cul­ transformation of the World
tural–psychological, internal political, and interna­ Order
tional factors. All three levels of factors are
examined, along with the conflictual nature of
Russian–American relations and prospects for their
further development. Apparently, competing messia­
nic concepts, radically different internal political pro­
cesses, a lack of firm economic ties, and rivalry at the
international level are preventing both countries from
changing the existing trajectory of relations.

This article was the result of a course of lectures for students at several
Russian universities. It is practically impossible to be an American-studies
specialist in Russia and not discuss the topic of Russian–American relations.
Sooner or later, this topic enters the professional life of any Russian expert on
America. In her professional field of study, the author has examined bilateral
relations primarily through the lens of the American political process. This
article rather belongs to the genre of a scholarly essay—these are reflections
on a topical issue, are purely subjective, and lack any claim to absolute truth.
The author primarily seeks to understand why relations between the

English translation © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian text © 2017 “Mirovaia
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia.” “Rosiia i SShA: razmyshliaia nad konfliktom,” Mirovaia
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2017, no. 5, pp. 5–13.
Viktoria Yur’evna Zhuravleva, candidate of political science, is the Head of Research Group for US and
Foreign Policy at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International
Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO).
The article has been supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, project 151830069,
“World Order Crisis: Expert Community Answers.”
Translated by Simon Patterson. Translation reprinted from Russian Politics and Law, vol. 55, no. 6. DOI:
10.1080/10611940.2017.1574499.
© 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
194 V. ZHURAVLEVA

countries have been so complex historically, and whether there is an escape

from the latest major crisis that Russian–American relations entered in 2014.
***
The tension that we observe today in the relations of Russia and the United
States is hardly a new situation. In fact, in the last 25 years of existence of the
Russian state, relations between the two countries have been constantly balancing
on the verge of conflict, moving from “friendly embraces” to serious accusations
and mutual ultimatums. Essentially, the relations of the two leading powers in the
post-bipolar reality differs little from relations between the USSR and the United
States, with only the difference that the international status of both countries has
changed. Russia took the change in its status very hard, and has yet to get over it.
The history of the “superpower” still has a serious influence on Russian foreign
policy in general, and on its relations with the United States in particular.
The years of post-bipolar interaction clearly revealed the main features of
Russian–American relations, which lie at the basis of their “fluctuating conflict
nature.” Above all, relations of these two countries are specific in their nature, and
they lack a firm economic basis, are limited to a narrow sphere of military–political
cooperation, and finally depend to a considerable degree on personal contact of the
heads of state.
Three levels of factors may be singled out that determine the specifics and
dynamics of Russian–American relations: cultural–psychological, domestic–
political, and international.

The cultural–psychological level

The cultural–psychological level comprises two elements: the way both
countries perceive themselves, and the way they see each other. In other
words, the image of the “self” and the image of the “other.”

Two messianic ideas1

Russian and American perceptions of themselves are surprisingly alike. Both the
United States and Russia see themselves as “superpowers,” that is, nations that
determine the world order. This image has a messianic idea at its core, which is
contained in the cultural–political matrix of both countries. The mythological
form of each is different, but from the standpoint of international activity, their
essence is the same.
For the United States, the messianic idea comprises three foreign policy
myths, which at different stages of their development have firmly entered the
public consciousness. Their basis is the most profound national identification
myth, known as the “American dream.” At the center of this myth is the idea of
America as the promised land, which at the same time is the highest stage of
development of humanity and its last hope of salvation. In 1630, the governor
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 195

of Massachusetts John Winthrop delivered a sermon for future colonists, “A

Model of Christian Charity,” where he formulated the principles of organizing
a new society [1]. Quoting the Book of Isaiah, he called the United States “a city
upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” Subsequently, this idea of being
God’s chosen ones is found in many early Puritan documents. Victory in the
War of Independence and the creation of the United States strengthened
Americans’ ideas about being “God’s chosen ones.”
Gradually, the first foreign policy myth grew out of this—“American
exceptionalism,” in accordance with which the United States was foreor­
dained on high to be a world leader, a model for others, something that no
other country in the world could lay claim to.
This myth still forms the foreign policy vision of both American society and
American government. Its paradox is that Americans themselves are very critical
of the federal government—the level of dissatisfaction and distrust in the United
States is one of the highest in the world. But this has no influence whatsoever on
their perception of the political system as a whole—they are profoundly con­
vinced and sincerely believe that it is the best in the world and can serve as an
example for all other countries. The federal government actively uses this
national belief, and many foreign policy initiatives are conducted under the
banner of “American exceptionalism.”
The very phrase can be found in official documents and presidential
speeches throughout the entire history of the United States. It was especially
popular with the Democratic president Barack Obama: Besides the fact that
he referred to American exceptionalism in his speeches, it is mentioned
directly or indirectly seven times in the National Security Strategy of 2015
[2]. Perhaps this is not so often for a document of 35 pages, but it is still quite
a lot, given that in the previous National Security Strategy of 60 pages it is not
mentioned even once! The idea is primarily directed toward the domestic
consumer. However, over the years of overcoming the financial crisis,
a mobilizational tool turned into a strategy concept that lay at the basis of
many reform projects of the Democratic administration, that is fully
accepted by the two-party political elite, and that will evidently find a place
in the strategies of the next administration [2].
The second myth of “manifest destiny” was the next foreign policy
embodiment of the “American dream.” It was fully formed by the mid-19th
century. The term itself was first used in 1845 in an article by John O’Sullivan
during the period of the U.S. conquest of the North American continent. The
United States was expanding its territories: First it annexed Texas, then
California. The idea of “manifest destiny” served as the ideological basis
for this expansion. It stated that the Lord God himself had destined the
United States to rule over the entire North American continent [1].
Later, the idea was used as a base for the a wide range of American foreign
policy initiatives. In the 20th century, actions inspired by this idea were no
196 V. ZHURAVLEVA

longer limited to the North American continent alone, although the term
itself began to be heard much more rarely.
In 1941, the new embodiment of this idea was the third foreign policy
myth of the United States—the “American century.” The twentieth century
was declared the century of the United States, and the zone of its direct
interests became the entire world.
All three myths—“American exceptionalism,” “manifest destiny,” and the
“American century”—comprise the idea of American messianism.
According to Batalov, “As the US expanded and came out on to the world
stage, the idea of the mission strengthened, and became part of the foreign
policy credo. America saw itself as a messenger of Providence, which was
predestined to ‘show humanity in every corner of the world the path to
justice, independence and freedom.’ As Woodrow Wilson said, ‘America
must be prepared to use all its moral and physical strength to assert these
human rights around the world’” [1, p. 266].
All American presidents have since repeated Wilson’s words in one
context or another. The greatness of America, and its responsibility for the
destiny of humanity, are evoked in official speeches and official documents,
for example, the National Security Strategy. The modern world has changed
a great deal, but Americans’ certainty that they are appointed to carry out
a “great mission” continues to increase.
At the same time, American messianism, which has Protestant roots, not
only proposes the function of a national inspirational figure, but must also
have specific embodiment, implementation, and success. Since the 1990s,
after the formulation of the concept of “promoting democracy,” the demo­
cratic regime, which is seen by the United States as universal, has become
a specific form of realization of American messianism. All recent adminis­
trations, both Democratic and Republican, have indefatigably carried out
various projects to increase the number of democratic countries in the world:
from providing transitional regimes with “moral” support and constant
financial aid, to controversial military campaigns under the auspices of
establishing democracy. Supporting democracy in the world is also set
down in writing by each new administration in the National Security
Strategy, with differing details and specifics.
Russia has its own Orthodox messianism, which does not offer any
advantages to be derived from messianic activity, but also aspires to the
salvation of humanity. It rests on the Russian idea, which on the one hand
has its roots in Orthodox belief, and on the other is a continuation of the
“Roman idea” of the construction of a universal civilization, capable sooner
or later of uniting all humanity, ending the conflicts that tear it apart and
overcoming barbarism. The basis of the Russian idea (as in the United States)
is being God’s chosen people. According to the “Tale of Prince Vladimir,”
Old Russia was the lawful heir of all ancient world monarchies. Thus, the
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 197

political theory was formed that Moscow is the Third Rome, the heir of
Rome and Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire. This
doctrine was the ideological basis of the founding of the Tsardom of
Moscow. This state was gathered and formed under the symbolism of the
Messianic idea. The Russian idea was formed throughout the entire history
of the Russian state. Russian philosophers and writers of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries made a great contribution to this concept—Dostoevsky,
Soloviev, Rozanov, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Karsavin, Ilyin. The core of the
Russian idea is messianism, serving humanity. If the monk Filofei, the author
of the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome, talked of the religious mission
of Russia, later it also began to mean the social, cultural, and political mission
of Russia—a country thqt was destined to transform the world and thus save
humanity.
In the USSR the social myth of the Soviet state and the Soviet person
became a new embodiment of the Russian idea. The Soviet idea integrated
Marxist ideas of the proletariat as the liberator of humanity with Orthodox
messianic ideas. Although outwardly the Soviet idea was completely devoid
of any Christian element, it was similarly religious in its essence and retained
the idea of uniting the world for the sake of its salvation.
In the concept of the Russian idea, Russia is portrayed as “a unique
country, which does not resemble Europe, Asia or America, Orthodox in
spirit (despite its multi-confessional nature), which is predestined from on
high to carry out a special mission, to act as a unifier of the church, ideas and
cultures, and enable the formation of a universal person, the unification of
East and West, and unification of humanity and its salvation” [1, p. 191]. It is
this idea that we are now seeing and hearing in Russian foreign policy
rhetoric.
Thus, we may talk of the existence of two specific messianic concepts for
the salvation of the world, which place rivalry of two countries at the deepest
level of national self-awareness.

The “Other” versus the “stranger”

The second element of the cultural–psychological level is how the two coun­
tries see each other. And here the images are completely different. Russia and
America have always been and remain antipodes for each other [3].
Both on the level of mass consciousness and on the level of the govern­
ment, for the United States Russia has always, even in good periods, been
a country with a reputation for despotic government and an impoverished
populace. For the Russian mass consciousness, except during periods of
harsh anti-Americanism, such as the current period, the United States has
always been and remained a country of freedom, individualism, and a high
level of prosperity.
198 V. ZHURAVLEVA

Even if parity was acknowledged, mainly in military strength, “America

has never regarded Russia as a great society. It has never been drawn to
Russia and never wanted to be like it, in any way at all. Americans never
wanted to live the way that people lived in Russia” [3, p.360]. For Russia, the
United States was a bearer of a positive element, a country that had achieved
a high level of development, a great country. Russia was drawn to America,
even if it never admitted as much [3].
For the Russian Federation, the United States is a constant alter ego. It
seems to be conducting a constant interior dialogue with this. The Russian
government actively plays the American card in relations with its foreign
policy partners, and in relations with society.
In political philosophy, this is called creating the image of the “Other.”
The “Other” is what the state can regard as a model, or use as a “scapegoat,”
blaming it for its own domestic and foreign policy failures. This image
changes depending on circumstances and political necessity, but is an invi­
sible presence in the rhetoric and actions of the Russian government.
In the United States, the Russian card is also present in the political
struggle of the power elite for the electorate, but usually used during
a period of conflict between the two countries.
The United States has regarded Russia differently at different times, going
as far as seeing it as an enemy during the Cold War and trying to declare it as
such in the acute phase of the Ukrainian crisis. But the image of a “stranger”
dominated—incomprehensible, unattractive and inspiring feelings of suspi­
cion and anxiety. After the collapse of the USSR, the United States attempted
to transform the identity of Russia to make it a “friend,” but only a junior
partner, of course. However, this attempt failed. And although today’s Russia
is no longer regarded as an enemy like the USSR, it is not regarded as an
“ally” or as a “friend” either. This image of the “stranger” was the result of the
frustration and disappointment that arose from the unsuccessful attempt by
the United States to remake Russia in its own image.
Depending on the political goals of the specific administration, the image
of the “stranger” is transformed very easily into the image of an “enemy,”
reviving former fear and hatred in Americans toward an incomprehensible
and aggressive Russia. This was carried out successfully by Obama’s admin­
istration. In a short period, Russia in the eyes of the average American shifted
from the camp of allies to the camp of enemies: At the height of the
Ukrainian crisis in 2014, 68% of Americans called Russia “an unfriendly
state or even an enemy” [4].
The incompatible images of each other, which are easily transformed by
governments into negative and even hostile, lie at the basis of mutual lack of
understanding and mistrust, which dominate in bilateral relations, both at
governmental level and at the level of society. There is mistrust in the
statements and promises of political leaders and in actions on the
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 199

international stage. There is a lack of understanding of behavior, motives,

and the internal policy specifics of each other. Both of these factors make it
only too easy to move from cooperation to mutual mass hysteria, which
completely rules out tolerance and respect in bilateral relations. A lack of
understanding, which in times of crisis turns into a reluctance to understand,
and to complete emotional and psychological isolation and alienation, inevi­
tably aggravates and prolongs conflict.

Domestic politics
Incompatible images of each other on the level of mutual perception are
intensified by opposing models of power and society on the level of the
political process, which are not only objectively different but are also dis­
torted, sometimes to an unrecognizable degree, because of the lack of under­
standing that creates serious obstacles to achieving stable interaction.
The internal political process in both countries is indeed developing
according to different models and schemes. For all the criticism of
American democracy, the political process in the United States involves the
participation of several levels of authority, society, and business. Political
decisions take a long path from the political agenda of the president or party
to effective legislation, or from a political statement to a real law. Most
agenda items or political statements never make it to fruition.
The Russian model of government is more centralized and hierarchical. The
decision-making mechanism in the United States resembles a spider’s web,
whereas in Russia it is more like a pyramid. The American federative system
compared with the Russian system is decentralized, and federal authorities are
seriously restricted in their powers. Power in Russia is personified, while in the
United States it is structured. The political decision-making mechanism in the
United States is cyclic, party structured, institutionalized, scattered, and ideolo­
gized. In Russia it is personally oriented, hierarchized, and with a considerable
share of interdepartmental rivalry. In the United States, the high level of policy
continuity, succession of ideas, and power structures in general from one
administration to the next operate within a common conceptual framework.
In Russia, a change of power always creates a certain stress for the system, and
brings about not only institutional changes, but also conceptual shifts.
Finally, the fundamental difference of political processes of these two
countries is the level of independence of foreign policy from the internal
political process. In the United States, foreign policy is one of the spheres of
the joint activity of the authorities, business, and society, although it is
mainly carried out by the president. It is subject to the logic of interaction
of the main participants; furthermore, it is usually hostage to other spheres of
activity that are of higher priority for the American government—social and
economic.
200 V. ZHURAVLEVA

In Russia, foreign policy is a top presidential priority. The president

determines foreign policy strategy and carries it out through the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry. It does not seem to be connected
to domestic policy at all, although of course various political forces also
influence the president, but the interdepartmental rivalry is much lower, and
the influence of the legislative branch is minimal.
While Russia and the United States understand the difference in their
political models, they react to this in different ways. For the United States, it
is characteristic to reduce the complexity of the Russian political process to one
basic feature—the centralized nature of power with the dominant position of
the president. The objective predominance of the Russian president in the
foreign policy sphere and the secondary nature of the legislative branch is
transferred by the United States to the entire political decision-making
mechanism. As a result, such fundamental features as the parallel coexistence
of bureaucratic structures and the rivalry of political elites are simply excluded
from the Russian political process. In reality, these factors not only determine
internal policy processes but also often adjust Russia’s actions on the interna­
tional stage, while in the Americans’ restricted perception they are only
determined by one person—the Russian president. This analysis, besides
being unable to take into account all the factors of the Russian political process,
inevitably rules out the possibility of a change in the Russian model, meaning
that Americans’ perceptions are confined within set limits.
Russia, in its reaction to the difference of American political reality, is
more inclined to ignore it and transfer its model of power to the United
States. The result of this reaction is an expectation of behavior within the
boundaries of its own model, or something similar to it. In particular, Russia
often expects a similar level of authority and influence of the American
president on the political process and foreign policy in particular, ignoring
a key element in understanding American political reality: The president is
just one of the structural elements, constitutionally endowed with very
insignificant powers. The success of his administration depends on how he
can organize interaction with all the elements involved in the process of
making and implementing political decisions.

The remote logic of the American political process

Several key characteristics of the American political process should be given
separate attention, as they have fundamental importance for understanding
Russian–American relations.
Above all, the system laid down by the American Constitution rules out
the very possibility of president alone resolving key questions of policy.
Indeed, every one of the branches of power in the United States has its
own separate sphere of powers, but the political decision-making process
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 201

involves the participation of both the executive and legislative branches. The
form of involvement that is most understandable and predictable for the
Russian side, when every international agreement requires the president’s
signature and the ratification of legislative power, in American reality not
only faces institutional competition and conflict but also the party organiza­
tion of power, which in recent decades has seriously complicated the inter­
action of the American Congress and the president, and also restricts his
capabilities, especially in comparison with his Russian counterpart.
Nowadays, the Democratic and Republican parties take very different views
of the political process. Over the last 20 years, political parties in the United
States have transformed from a tool for resolving disputes between competing
branches of power into an additional factor of conflict in the American
political process. Besides the fact that Congressmen from opposing parties
cannot reach a compromise, laws are passed exclusively on a one-party basis,
and the president can only reach an agreement with Congress if his party has
control of the majority of seats in at least one chamber. Given that divided
party control over branches of power has practically become the norm today,
it is increasingly difficult for the president to implement his agenda.
Additionally, the involvement of political parties in the decision-making
process presupposes the dependence of this process not only on the agenda
of the current president and his ability to reach an agreement with congress,
but also on the agenda of both parties, one of which controls the White
House, and the other of which dominates on Capitol Hill.
However, the recent radicalization of political parties has led to a situation
when the agendas of both parties increasingly differ. At present, each branch
of power tries to pursue its own agenda, which is determined by the party
that controls it. The result is that federal power is unable to implement 80%
of pre-election promises and international projects.
In this atmosphere, foreign policy, which previously has always had lower
priority than socioeconomic issues owing to the American electorate’s focus
on economic prosperity, increasingly becomes a hostage to domestic politics.
Besides official institutions of power and political parties, lobby groups are
also involved in the U.S. policymaking process. Lobbyists are practically
guides in the American corridors of power. Their influence is great in both
domestic and foreign policy. A relevant example is the current sanctions of
the United States against the oil and gas sector of Russia. Interest groups of
Arab oil- and gas-producing nations, above all Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
support the preservation and intensification of restrictions. Legislation in
the United States restricts the lobbying activity of foreign governments, but
the existing complex system of interactions, which also have a personal
nature, between the political leadership, American energy companies, and
oil-producing countries helps to advance the interests of participants.
202 V. ZHURAVLEVA

The lobbying mechanism involves direct contact with key figures of the
Western region that interests them, and also appeals for services of special
lobbyist organizations in the United States. These organizations have long
experience of working with congressmen and other figures who make
decisions.
Such lobby organizations as Qorvis Communications LLC, Square Patton
Boggs, and Loeffler Group, for example, provide services to improve the
image of Arab nations, and also individual political and cultural figures,
while companies have a party specialization—they usually work with either
the Republicans or the Democrats. Arab nations also carry out political
lobbying in the fuel and energy complex through such companies as Exxon
Mobil, Chevron, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Koch Industries,
Fleishman Hillard Vanguard, and so on.
In the personal sphere, the interests of Arab oil producing countries are
usually lobbied by Republican politicians connected with the energy sphere.
In the administration of George W. Bush they were Vice-President Dick
Cheney, Senator Joe Lieberman, and advisor Andrew Card. In the Obama
administration, this involved the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
John Boehner, the leader of the Democratic minority, Harry Reid, Senator
John McCain, and many others.
Besides the OPEC countries, sanctions directly affect the interests of
American oil companies, which also support maintaining them. Sixteen
American oil companies created an influence group with the aim of abolish­
ing the ban on supplying raw materials abroad, moving in on OPEC coun­
tries and Russia on world markets. They succeeded: In December 2015,
Congress passed and Obama signed a law lifting the ban on the export of
American oil, which had been in force for 40 years.
In its turn, Russia is practically not represented in the lobby structures of
the United States, in many ways because this institution is absent in Russian
political life, and its significance is underestimated by both business and the
government. At the same time, in the present conflict between the United
States and Russia, the activity of Russian business to protect its interests may
prove to be one of the most important tools for changing the general
international trend toward the isolation of Russia.
Finally, another important feature of the American political process
usually ignored by Russia is its electoral logic. The United States has
a classical electoral system of power, which means that both congressmen
and presidents are elected by American citizens, and their political career
depends on electoral moods. Congressmen cannot take a single important
decision without reckoning with their electorate. As the House of
Representatives is reelected every two years, the electoral campaign on
Capitol Hill never ends. In election years, only issues that are important
for voters remain on the agenda of Congress or the White House, while
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 203

foreign policy either takes a back seat, or becomes an additional factor for
consolidating politicians and the electorate. In this period, electoral rhetoric
intensifies, in which traditional “bogeymen” are often revived, including
Russia.
For Russia, the protracted, conflicted, unpredictable, multifactored and
multi-actor policymaking process in the United States means the need to
take a sober attitude to both the promises of American presidents and the
strident, often harsh and drastic announcements of American congress­
men, especially in election years. The American system of power takes
a long path of coordination, acceptance, approval, and signing, from
promises and declaration to real actions and laws. It is rare that the
political will of one of the branches of power leads to the implementation
of a promise or declaration. An excessively emotional reaction from the
Russian side to promises or declarations simply inflames the atmosphere,
and is unlikely to help in lobbying the country’s interests.
Despite the multichannel nature of the American political process and
the possibilities that it offers its international partners for advancing and
protecting their interests, and also for strengthening bilateral ties,
Russian–American relations are still restricted by the logic of interperso­
nal contact, which manifests itself in the fact that the interaction of the
presidents dominates in relations between Russia and the United States.
This did not come about solely because Russia transferred its own model
of power analytically to the United States. Both the American perception
and Russian perception of each other’s political process helped to
strengthen this dominating characteristic of bilateral relations. On the
one hand, Russia, based on its own model of power, was traditionally
focused on this logic of relations, and on the other hand the United
States was not inclined to step outside its own reductive perception of
the Russian political process.
Indeed, Russian–American relations traditionally depend on the ability of
the two presidents to establish interpersonal contact. If contact exists, this is
practically a guarantee of partnership, but if contact breaks down, then the
relationship suffers as a whole. The fact that relations depend to a high degree
on personality makes them short-term-ist and unstable by their nature.
Essentially, this scheme of interaction does not give the two countries any
alternative if relations between the two leaders break down for some reason, as
the parallel process of establishing interdepartmental connections develops
very slowly and is limited to only a few narrow spheres of interaction. In the
last two decades, a stable structure of independent ties has not formed at the
legislative level, among executive agencies, businesses, financial structures, or
public, scientific, and cultural organizations, which makes it easy for conflict
between the countries to intensify, reducing all contacts between leaders to the
necessary minimum to ensure national and international security.
204 V. ZHURAVLEVA

The international level

At the highest level of factors determining Russian–American relations, the
level of international politics, the main element is rivalry for world influence,
which has always been inherent to relations of the two powers. Throughout
the 20th century, the United States and Russia (or the USSR), even in periods
of formal alliance (such as World War II), regarded each other as potential
rivals, each offering its own scenario of international development. After the
collapse of the USSR and the bipolar system, the United States remained the
only superpower and believed it had the right to determine the rules and
norms of world politics. Russia emerged from the Cold War era as an
economically and politically weak and unstable country, with a severe
“superpower complex.” The new unipolarity perfectly suited the foreign
policy logic of the U.S. leadership, which regarded itself as the undoubted
winner of the Cold War, but did not suit Russia at all. The idea of multi­
polarity, which involved the concept of a globally interdependent world, was
much more attractive for Russia. At the same time, in the initial post-Cold
War years American leadership was not really disputed, as Russia was too
weak and too focused on preserving its integrity to offer any alternative
global strategy. At the same time, Russia insisted that while the United States
was the strongest power, it was only the first among equals.
By contrast, the United States believed that it had formed the international
system after the collapse of bipolarity, taking on sole responsibility for preser­
ving stability and the functioning of institutions that formed in the Cold War
years. In this system, Russia was seen exclusively as an object of American
policy. Depending on how much Russia agreed to follow in the United States’
wake, it was regarded by Washington as either a friendly or unfriendly country.
However, from the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Russia gradually
began to pursue a more independent policy on the world stage. For America,
this meant the potential return of a traditional rival. It was prepared to protect
a system it considered its own, and to react to any Russian actions, even
formally breaking established international rules and norms.
The Ukrainian internal political crisis took place right at a time when both
countries were prepared for a renewal of conflict. Essentially, the crisis was
the latest stage in the transformation of the world order, as besides the fate of
the Ukrainian nation, the fate of a new international system is being decided.
The stakes are very high, and the issues of international leadership and
control are on the agenda. Who sets the rules of the game on the interna­
tional stage, and to whom they will apply, depend on how the conflict
between Russia and the United States ends. For Russia, this is an opportunity
to regain its superpower status. For the United States, it is a question of
preserving international leadership and the system it built over the past
decades [5]. Given the lack of firm economic ties, and the way that the
 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 205

countries perceive each other, this new phase of the conflict may be pro­
longed. Furthermore, the longer the conflict continues at an international
level, the more firmly the image of the “enemy” will be reinvigorated, and the
more difficult it will be to emerge from the conflict.
The paradox is that contemporary global politics does not preclude the
coexistence of several messianic concepts for governing the world. Since the
end of the Cold War, the world has become more complicated: The multi­
directional processes and numerous challenges that modern-day nations face
can no longer be controlled by one power independently. For all the supre­
macy of the United States, its readiness to take responsibility and preserve its
international leadership, with every new conflict and terrorist attack it
becomes clear that it cannot and must not control everything just by itself.
The brief moment of unipolarity has passed. Modern international chal­
lenges and threats can only be faced collectively. The United States needs
strong and independent partners, which can take a share of responsibility for
global well-being, even if they will also carry out their own messianic plan to
save humanity. An understanding of this may fundamentally change
Russian–American relations.

Note
1. This article does not aim to study the national identity of the two countries. In
her analysis, the author relies fully on the works of the outstanding Russian
American studies specialist Eduard Yakolevich Batalov.

References
1. Batalov, E. Ia. Russkaia ideia i amerikanskaia mechta. Moscow: Progress-
Traditsiia, 2009.
2. Zhuravleva, V. Iu. Evoliutsiia podkhodov administratsii Obamy
k obespecheniyu natsional’noi bezopasnosti. Available at http://www.imemo.
ru/index.php?page_id=502&id=1602.
3. Batalov, E. Ia., Zhuravleva, V. Iu., and Khozinskaya, K.V. “Rychashchii
medved’” na “Dikom Vostoke.” Obrazy sovremennoi Rossii v rabotakh amer­
ikanskikh avtorov: 1992–2007 gg. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009.
4. Swift, A. “In U.S., Record 68% View Russia as Unfriendly or an Enemy.”
Gallup, March 27, 2014. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/168110/
record-view-russia-unfriendly-enemy.aspx.
5. Zhuravleva, V. Iu. “Ideino-politicheskie korni amerikanskogo liderstva.” US
v Canada: Economics—Politics—Culture, 2014, no. 11, pp. 19–32.