Edition STUDIES AND OPINIONS

Who Is Playing Russian Roulette in Slovakia

Grigorij Mesežnikov
Ján Bartoš

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This publication appears thanks to the financial support from
the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Slovakia
and in cooperation with the Open Information Partnership.

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Edition

STUDIES
AND
OPINIONS

GRIGORIJ MESEŽNIKOV
JÁN BARTOŠ

Who Is Playing Russian Roulette in Slovakia

Institute for Public Affairs,, Bratislava 2021

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Grigorij Mesežnikov
Ján Bartoš

Who Is Playing Russian Roulette in Slovakia

Grigorij Mesežnikov is the author of Chapters 1-9 and 11.

Ján Bartoš is the author of Chapter 10.

© Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava 2021

ISBN: 978-80-89345-92-2 (paperback)

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CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................................ 8

1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 9

2. Slovakia: Democratization, integration, way to the West ............ 12

3. Russia vis-à-vis the West .................................................................. 15

4. “Soft” and “hard” power of Russia .................................................. 21

5. Historical, socio-cultural and political background

5. of pro-Russian sentiments in Slovakia ........................................... 29

6. The Russian trace in the legacy of national awakeners .............. 33

7. Public opinion in Slovakia: Perception of Russia ......................... 40

8. Slovak-Russian bilateral relations .................................................. 44

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9. Pro-Russian oriented actors in Slovakia ........................................ 55
9.1. Political parties ............................................................................ 55
9.2. Non-party actors ....................................................................... 110

10. Analysis of pro-Russian actors’ Facebook posts on Russia....... 125

10.1. Number of posts on select profiles ........................................ 125
10.2. Number of posts in time ......................................................... 128
10.3. Engagement of the public ....................................................... 132
10.4. The most successful posts on Russia in terms of
10.4. public engagement ................................................................... 141

11. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 147

Authors .................................................................................................. 149

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PREFACE

The Institute for Public Affairs (Inštitút pre verejné otázky – IVO) has
been mapping out activities of actors of foreign authoritarian influence
in Slovakia on a regular basis since 2014. Most of this monitoring takes
the form of studies elaborated as part of joint research projects with its
partner organisations.
Thanks to its cooperation with the Open Information Partnership and
financial support from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
in Slovakia, IVO has been able to publish the following complex analysis
on activities of actors of pro-Kremlin influence in Slovakia. Besides
mapping out the positions and attitudes of select representatives of this
ideological stream, the publication also discusses the broader back-
ground for Slovak pro-Russian actors’ operation – i.e. transformation
and foreign policy context, Slovak-Russian bilateral relations as well
as historical and socio-cultural factors affecting Russia’s influence in
Slovakia.
The authors sincerely believe that the publication Who Is Playing
Russian Roulette in Slovakia will meet with many readers’ vivid response
and will contribute to the ongoing public debate on priorities of internal
development and external orientation of the Slovak Republic.
IVO would hereby like to thank Ambassador of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands Henk Cor van der Kwast for his personal support to releas-
ing this publication.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Russian roulette is a game of chance that ends in death of one of the

players. In the 19th century, it became a popular pastime among Russian
army officers during long nights filled with cards and flowing with alco-
hol, usually in the company of loose women. The gist of the game was
the effort of boozed-up players to avoid the 16.6% probability of com-
mitting suicide in front of their co-players by shooting a revolver with
one out of six chambers loaded into their temple. Obviously, one of the
players eventually ended up losing the game along with his life.
As a figure of speech, the term “Russian roulette” is used to describe
dangerous behaviour bordering on thoughtlessness and absurdity, usu-
ally with unpredictable and even tragic ramifications. Politics is no ex-
ception as it has always attracted people with propensity to gambling.
As a rule, reckless political players undertake individual risks. In case of
losing, not only do they run the risk of personal losses but also that of
damage to their power status, public support, reputation and image. On
the other hand, they hope that if they win the gamble, they stand a
chance to cement their power position, drum up broader support among
voters or attract greater attention of the mass media.
But there are also politicians who will not hesitate to put at stake not
only their own political fate but also their country’s stability and its citi-
zens’ well-being. While doing so, they strive to use the potential gains to
their own benefit while passing the buck for the potential negative rami-
fications of their own reckless behaviour onto the government, the soci-
ety and other people in general. This modus operandi may prove particu-
larly dangerous if it concerns the country’s international position, the
fundamental course of its foreign policy, or bilateral relations with other
countries and integration groupings.

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 In a rather turbulent current situation in international relations, Slo-
vakia’s guiding principle is its solid anchoring in Western integration
structures. This anchor is the result of intense expert and public discus-
sions of the level of society as a whole, as well as important decisions
and strategic measures. But despite indisputable advantages that ensue
from Slovakia’s current status as a reliable member of the Western
community, there are forces on Slovakia’s political map that oppose
Slovakia’s fundamental foreign policy course, openly undermine it and
propose “alternatives”. The most radical of them is the country’s formal
secession from the Western community; this “alternative” is furthered
primarily by anti-systemic and extremist forces. A somewhat less radical
but in many ways similar to the previous one is establishing special bi-
lateral relations with countries that do not belong to the community of
Western democracies – of course, at the expense of the country’s ties
with its natural allies from the Western integration groupings.
Many protagonists of these “alternatives” tend to look toward Rus-
sia, an Eastern superpower that (under a different name) has signifi-
cantly affected the lives of Slovakia’s inhabitants in the 20th century as
a result of historical circumstances. They advocate developing tighter
bilateral relations and – perhaps in the future – creating a strategic bond
with this superpower, which might eventually lead to Slovakia’s seces-
sion from the democratic West.
What drives these political players to – instead of a stable alliance
with the West, which brings Slovakia long-term political stability, previ-
ously unseen economic prosperity and solid security guarantees – for-
ward intensified bonds with a declining superpower with an aggressive
foreign policy and an undemocratic political regime, which blatantly
violates international law standards, wages aggressive wars against
neighbouring as well as remote countries, supports dictatorships around
the world, persecutes (incarcerates, tortures or even murders) internal

10
opponents and strives for undermining democracy around the world?
How did it ever come to be that some Slovak supporters of “alterna-
tives” have chosen to play Russian roulette with their own homeland and
risk that if the imaginary revolver ever goes off, the bullet may destroy
the entire country? And how do the “alternatives” suggested by domes-
tic actors correspond to the “bids” that come from the Eastern super-
power?
The mission of this publication is to help the reader seek answers to
these and many other questions. It also brings information on funda-
mental characteristics of the contemporary Russian state, its foreign
policy priorities, and on what role in these priorities is played by Central
European countries including Slovakia. It maps out the scene of pro-
Russian forces in Slovakia and examines the harmony of their “alterna-
tive” notions of cooperating with the Eastern superpower with the
Kremlin’s strategic intentions in Europe.

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2. SLOVAKIA: DEMOCRATIZATION, INTEGRATION,
2. WAY TO THE WEST

Since 1990, the Slovak Republic has been a country with a democratic
regime that in 1993 became a sovereign state and in 2004 part of the
Euro-Atlantic community, i.e. a member state of the European Union
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over more
than three decades, Slovakia’s democratic and integration path has been
staked out by crucial decisions adopted by representatives of the na-
tion’s political elite. The citizens have granted legitimacy to these stra-
tegic decisions by taking part in national elections that have given birth
to broader ruling coalitions, which in turn have determined the basic
outlines of internal and foreign policy.
While constituting the political regime of modern Slovakia, a decisive
portion of the country’s political elite inclined to either actively further-
ing or at least accepting the model of liberal democracy. After the coun-
try had overcome the relapse of post-communist authoritarianism be-
tween 1994 and 1998, it remained within the boundaries of liberal de-
mocracy, although the rate of corruption penetrating the state’s vital
institutions was particularly high during the reign of political forces of
the populist-clientelist type. When adopting concrete socio-economic
measures, there have always been significant differences between ruling
coalitions formed by centre-right democratic parties on the one hand
and national-populist one on the other; however, the basic consensus
about maintaining fundamental standards and rules of constitutionalism
has been upheld. Since 1998 there have been no overt attempts to dis-
assemble the country’s democratic regime. And even though an anti-
systemic extremist subject that openly stands aside from this basic con-
sensus managed to clinch parliamentary seats in the 2016 elections and

12
more or less defended its position four years later, it has not yet been
able to disturb or destroy this consensus due to its insufficient political
weight.
As far as foreign policy orientation goes, the country’s political elite
at a certain point reached a consensus over a strategic decision that
Slovakia would become permanent part of the Euro-Atlantic community.
Slovakia’s entry to the EU and NATO following the mandatory accession
process confirmed its belonging to the community of world’s leading
liberal democracies. The country’s membership in both integration
groupings created optimum conditions for the stability of its democratic
regime, both in terms of its internal functioning and security guarantees
and protection against external threats. The consensus over the coun-
try’s pro-Western orientation eventually prevailed within the main-
stream segment of the political spectrum, although certain political
players’ positions differed regarding the ways of achieving it. There was
only one relevant political force – namely the already mentioned anti-
systemic extremist ĽSNS party – that not only openly questioned Slova-
kia’s EU and NATO membership but actively tried to abolish it through
initiating a petition to call a referendum on Slovakia’s secession from
both organisations.
Slovakia’s becoming a full-fledged member of the EU and NATO was
part of a tectonic geopolitical shift in Europe that took place over the
past three decades and has led to a complete turnover of Central Euro-
pean countries vis-à-vis integration projects in Europe. Before 1990, a
vast majority of Central European countries was part of the so-called
Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union that was created shortly after
World War II when communist parties supported from Moscow seized
power in these countries. But at the turn of the 21st century most Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, including several formerly Soviet
republics (namely the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-

13
nia), became part of Western political-economic and defence-security
structures, or the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Many other post-communist coun-
tries that remain outside of this bloc for the time being, including certain
Balkan states and several other formerly Soviet republics, are striving to
move in the same direction.
The process of internal reforms in all transitive post-communist coun-
tries including Slovakia has been affected primarily by the circum-
stances of internal development such as their economies’ condition,
their inhabitants’ social situation, their citizens’ political views and value
orientations, and their political leaders’ positions and decisions. How-
ever, adopting decisions vis-à-vis external players (e.g. foreign policy,
security and defence policy, participation in integration projects) has
been largely influenced by external factors (e.g. positions of states that
were already members of the integration groupings and determined the
criteria to be met by the would-be members, or joint policies of these
integration groupings) as well as positions of states that had compli-
cated or tense relations with the EU and NATO and were not too happy
about their planned enlargement.
These external factors have not lost their relevance even after Slova-
kia completed the accession process and became a full-fledged member
in both groupings, whether they worked in favour of this membership or
against it. But ever since 2004, these external factors have manifested
themselves in a modified form. The foreign policy of Russia stands out
among these factors as perhaps the most formidable one.

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3. RUSSIA VIS-À-VIS THE WEST

The Russian Federation that in 1992 became the successor state to the
former Soviet Union has always been openly critical of post-communist
countries’ efforts to join the EU and NATO. On the one hand, its officials
declared formal acceptance of the sovereign right of Central and Eastern
European nations, i.e. former member states of the Warsaw Pact (WP)
and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), to decide
freely on their future fate after the dismantling of pro-Soviet communist
regimes, including their ambition to join international partnerships ac-
cording to their free will. On the other hand, though, they were also very
vocal in expressing misgivings about the raison d’étre of former Eastern
bloc countries’ membership in Western integration groupings. They
were particularly active in criticising the decision of NATO to allow for-
merly communist countries to start the accession process, claiming that
NATO enlargement eastward was a violation of an agreement between
Western countries and the Soviet Union according to which the North
Atlantic Alliance would not accept any new members, although such an
agreement between NATO as an organisation and the Soviet Union was
in fact never concluded. Russian leaders argued that this process would
amount to threatening stability in Europe as Russia’s foreign policy
interests were being ignored while NATO’s external boundary was be-
coming dangerously close to its borders.
Russia has adopted a series of political and diplomatic measures
aimed at preventing post-communist countries from joining Western
integration groupings, pressurising individual countries – both member
states and candidate ones – and lobbying their political leaders’ posi-
tions to its own benefit. The Kremlin continues to stick to this strategy
until the present day: in order to thwart ambitions of two Western Bal-

15
kan states to join NATO, it staged an unsuccessful attempt at a coup
d’état in one of them (Montenegro) in 2016, and helped fan the flames
of domestic political turbulences in the other (Northern Macedonia) two
years later.
Russia’s opposition to Central European countries’ participation in
Euro-Atlantic integration processes intensified at the turn of the centu-
ries, after power in the Russian Federation was seized by a group
around Vladimir Putin that included many former officers of Soviet se-
cret services and their crony entrepreneurs, including the ones who had
operated in the grey economy with vivid ties to organized crime.1 Imme-
diately after Putin was elected president, he began to forward the auto-
cratic model of “sovereign democracy”, which gradually removed all
democratization gains of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and following
reforms of the first democratically elected Russian President Boris Yel-
tsin and has led to across-the-board furthering of authoritarianism as
the principal political modus operandi of the incumbent head of state.
The Kremlin soon began to promote this model around the world, seek-
ing potential partners and allies. Within a relatively short period of time,
the ruling group in the Kremlin managed to concentrate and consolidate
its power position in a way that has led to removing many chief ele-
ments of true political competition while preserving purely formal ele-
ments of the party system’s pluralism, to factual degradation of power
division principles and, last but not least, to effective establishment of
repressions with respect to political and ideological opponents.

1
For further details, see Dawisha, Karen: Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?
New York – London – Toronto – Sydney – New Delhi, Simon & Schuster, 2015;
Galeotti, Mark: The Vory: Russia's Super Mafia. New Haven, CT, Yale University
Press, 2019; Волчек, Дмитрий: Владельцы заплесневевших дворцов.
Путинизм и логика мафии [Volchek, Dmitriy: Rulers of Mildewy Palaces:
Putinism and the Logic of Mafia], Радио Свобоda, 6. 12. 2021; available at:
https://www.svoboda.org/a/31087512.html

16
 While many people perceive the disassembling of the Communist bloc
and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s as
the result of losing the arms race against the West as liberation of many
nations (including the Russian one) from the yoke of totalitarian re-
gimes, the incumbent Russian leadership spearheaded by Vladimir Putin
interprets the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War and its ensuing
dismantling as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th cen-
tury”. This theory coined by Vladimir Putin is currently the dominant
part of Russia’s official political and media discourse. The Kremlin ap-
parently finds it difficult to swallow the fact that after a forty-year ex-
perience with imposed/implanted communist regimes, most Central and
Eastern European nations prefer the Western liberal democracy to au-
thoritarianism of the Eastern provenance.
But if the dismantling of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopo-
litical catastrophe of the 20th century”, then everything related to its
existence and its foreign policy has automatically positive connotations
in the eyes of Kremlin leaders, including the installation of communist
regimes in Central and Eastern European countries after World War II,
the emergence of the “socialist camp” under Moscow’s guardianship,
and active attempts of Soviet leaders to preserve its unity such as mili-
tary invasions to Hungary in 1956 or to Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the
other hand, everything that has led to debilitation of the Soviet Union,
its subsequent dismantling and overcoming its legacy has negative con-
notations, including unilateral attempts at political reforms in some
socialist states, dissident and civil rights movements that opposed the
official ideology, the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the
1980s, the restoration of democratic regimes and eventual accession of
post-communist countries to the EU and NATO.
It was therefore little surprise that since the beginning of the 21st
century, foreign policy of the Russian Federation clearly began to mani-

17
fest elements of revisionism with respect to former WP and COMECON
member states and formerly Soviet republics as well as elements of
revanchism vis-à-vis the West. Leading officials of the Russian state and
the pro-government propaganda apparatus began to accentuate positive
interpretations of the model of mutual relations between the Soviet
Union and other countries of the Eastern bloc that existed prior to 1990,
completely ignoring the fact that communist regimes established in
Central and Eastern European countries after World War II were not the
result of these countries’ sovereign internal development but rather of
the Soviet Union’s geopolitical expansion. These communist regimes
were mere modifications of the model created by Soviet communists to
further the concept of building socialism in their country, which has been
exported into other regions of Europe. With respect to smaller states of
the “socialist camp”, the Soviet Union had always played the role of
patron and hegemon that emphasised its own imperial and geopolitical
superiority.
The Kremlin’s subscription to the legacy of the Soviet Union
through Soviet interpretations of historical events of the 20th century,
particularly its second half when the “socialist camp” was established,
inevitably clashed with fundamentally different interpretations that
took hold in Central and Eastern European countries following the
collapse of communist regimes. These interpretations combined re-
formist and democratisation efforts with the endeavour to disassociate
from their communist past and their dependence on the former
hegemon and, ultimately, become part of the community of Western
democratic countries.
When closely analysing verbal statements and actual foreign policy
steps of the incumbent Russian leadership, it is possible to draw a con-
clusion that the corporation that seized power in Russia at the turn of
the millennia follows geopolitically in the footsteps of the Russian Em-

18
pire as well as the Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet Union, i.e. state
entities whose principal characteristics included the desire for territorial
expansion and the endeavour to impose onto neighbouring nations its
own model of socio-political order. This authoritarian corporation is
hostile toward liberal democracy, opposes the project of European inte-
gration, and views the West as its nemesis. The principal mission of this
corporation is to alleviate as much as possible the negative aftermath of
the Soviet Union losing the Cold War to the West.
The rise of the authoritarian power model in Russia after a short de-
mocratisation intermezzo of Boris Yeltsin’s reign that lasted less than a
decade, its subsequent consolidation and revanchist geopolitical ag-
gression reeking with imperialist motives (e.g. the war in Georgia in
2008, the ongoing military conflict with Ukraine since 2014, or support-
ing the oppressive regime of Alexander Lukashenko with a clear inten-
tion to annex Belarus to Russia eventually), have ex post vindicated
those political forces in Central European countries that simultaneously
with establishing liberal-democratic regimes advocated and eventually
put through their unambiguous orientation at full-fledged EU and NATO
membership.
Over the past two decades, i.e. during the reign of Vladimir Putin,
Russia has created such a model of mutual relations with the West (both
with individual countries and their integration groupings such as the EU
and NATO), which is based on the notion that Russia is surrounded by a
zone of its own “privileged interests” that corresponds with the territory
of the former Soviet Union. The Kremlin has apparently adopted a no-
tion that Russia has the right to make power decisions, intervene and
determine mutual relations with states and nations that exist within this
zone as it sees fit while the West should refrain from any measures that
Russia does not deem appropriate. This approach goes hand in hand
with the already mentioned narrative about the dissolution of the Soviet

19
Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” as
well as with any activities the incumbent Russian leaders view as a rem-
edy to this “catastrophe” – with all potentially negative implications for
international relations in Europe and in the world.
But when the West insists to build its mutual relations with formerly
communist and post-Soviet states on the grounds of respecting their
free will and legitimate interests as sovereign partners, the Kremlin per-
ceives it as a threat to itself and reacts by accusing the West of efforts
to weaken and even subjugate Russia. A case in example was provided
by Vladimir Putin himself when he declared the following at the session
of the FSB collegium at the end of February 2021: “... we are facing the
so-called policy of containment of Russia ... this is not about competi-
tiveness, which is natural in international relations, but rather about a
consistent and very aggressive line aimed at thwarting our development,
decelerating it, creating problems on our external borders, provoking
internal instability, undermining the values that unify the Russian soci-
ety in order to, consequently, debilitate Russia and get it under external
control, the same way as it is happening in front of our very own eyes in
certain countries on the post-Soviet territory.”2

2
Заседание коллегии ФСБ России. Президент провёл заседание коллегии
Федеральной службы безопасности [Meeting of the board of the FSB of Russia.
President chaired a board meeting of the Federal Security Service]; available at:
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65068

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4. “SOFT” AND “HARD” POWER OF RUSSIA

An important part of any state’s external activities (e.g. in the field of

foreign policy and international relations) is the so-called “soft power”
that stands for the country’s ability to inspire favourable reactions to
measures adopted by its political representation, develop and
strengthen friendly relations with foreign subjects, and improve the
country’s image among foreigners through non-political means such as
culture, art, sports, academic cooperation, tourism, interpersonal con-
tacts, civil society, public diplomacy, etc.
The working of the soft power of any given state should be evaluated
in a multitude of contexts, including those related to the character of its
political regime, the hierarchy of its foreign policy priorities, the role of
the soft power in its foreign policy strategy, the characteristics of bilat-
eral relations between this state and the country to which this soft
power is applied, as well as to the internal situation in the country that is
targeted by a foreign state’s soft power.
When evaluating the soft power of the Russian Federation, one should
bear in mind that nowadays it is a state with a non-democratic regime and
non-liberal execution of power, a superpower with specific geopolitical
interests and assertive, even aggressive, foreign policy that is character-
ised by considerable expansiveness, including territorial expansion. One
should also remember that the soft power is an organic part of Russia’s
official state policy and – unlike in democratic states – is implemented
exclusively by state-run, quasi-state or crypto-state agencies and actors.
In his article entitled “Russia in the Changing World” written for the
Moskovskiye novosti weekly in 2012, President Vladimir Putin defined the
soft power as “a set of tools and methods designed to achieve foreign pol-
icy objectives without the use of weapons but rather through information

21
and other means of leverage”.3 This definition indicated that – in the words
of Alexander Dolinsky quoted by Peter Pomerantsev – “the Kremlin be-
lieves soft power to be a set of tools for manipulation. A sort of weapon.”4
An integral part of Russia’s soft power is forwarding socio-political
narratives that correspond to the principal vectors of Russian foreign
policy including interpretation of historical events, circumstances of
contemporary development in different regions of the world, and con-
crete steps taken by individual states. The actual content of the concept
of Russia’s soft power was described in the document entitled Strategy
for Russia. Russian Foreign Policy: End of 2010s – Beginning of 2020s
that was elaborated by government Council for Foreign and Defence
Policy and published in 2016. In a concentrated form, the document
formulates the value model that Russia offers to the outside world. It is
a model based on the notion of past restoration, which the authors view
as viable. The gist of this model is rejecting liberal democracy (which the
text euphemistically refers to as “Western universalism”) as a system:
“Russia has basically begun to offer to the majority in the world, includ-
ing the West, a viable set of values. In many respects, these values have
been inherited from the past; however, this past is currently recurring. It
is political and cultural pluralism, freedom of choice as opposed to
Western universalism, state sovereignty, national dignity, non-meddling
in others’ internal affairs, reliance on traditional social, personal and
family values, support to religions, and rejection of militant secularism.”5

3
Путин, Владимир: Россия и меняющийся мир in: Московские новости, Febru-
ary 27, 2012; available at: https://www.mn.ru/politics/78738
4
Pomerantsev, Peter: “Le Trahison des Experts and The Weaponization of Soft
Power” in: Aspen Review Central Europe, No. 4, 2014, p. 48-51; available at:
https://www.aspen.review/article/2017/le-trahison-des-experts-and-the-
weaponization-of-soft-power/
5
Стратегия для России. Российская внешняя политика: конец 2010-х –
начало 2020-х годов. Совет по внешней и оборонной политике, 2016; avail-
able at: http://svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/тезисы_23мая_sm.pdf

22
 One of the distinctive characteristics of Russia’s soft power is de-
clarative support of social conservativism and traditional values that
form the agenda of non-liberal, anti-liberal and reactionary movements.
Russia presents these values as a display of its own moral superiority
over the decadent West.6
In order to strengthen Russia’s influence in different environments
(e.g. geographic, socio-political, ethno-cultural, language, etc.), the pro-
tagonists of Russian soft power have created several basic narratives.
For the so-called “near foreign countries” (“blizhneye zarubezhie”),
for instance, they use the concept of the “Russian world”, which is aimed
at appealing primarily to citizens of the formerly Soviet republics but
also to ethnic Russians living in other foreign countries. The basic pre-
requisite to effective implementation of this concept as a tool of Russian
soft power is sufficient knowledge of the Russian language among its
potential recipients, their closeness to the Russian culture and strong-
self-identification with the “motherland”. Through furthering the “Rus-
sian world” concept, the incumbent Russian leadership strives to
strengthen pro-Russian socio-political forces in neighbouring foreign
countries, neutralise these countries’ efforts in the field of European and
Euro-Atlantic integration, and provoke aversion to the West as a com-
munity of states that share a certain system of values. The most fre-
quent targets of these activities include NATO and the EU, their policies,
principles and representatives.
The most vulnerable in this respect are post-Soviet states that take
part in the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, particularly Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldavia; all three states are pursuing concrete steps to-

6
Krekó, Peter et al.: The Weaponization of Culture: Kremlin’s traditional agenda and
the export of values to Central Europe, Budapest, Political Capital Institute, 2016;
available at: https://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-
content/uploads/PC_reactionary_values_CEE_20160727.pdf

23
ward intensified cooperation with the West, for instance signing associa-
tion agreements with the EU or participating in cooperation programmes
with NATO and its individual member states. The Baltic states whose
vulnerability ensues primarily from the presence of sizeable communities
of ethnic Russians (especially in Estonia and Latvia) are better off nowa-
days and more resistant to the pressure Russia brings to bear on them as
part of applying its soft power, mostly thanks to successful socio-
economic and political reforms and their EU and NATO membership.
Due to socio-political but partially also cultural, linguistic and confes-
sional reasons, prone to accepting basic postulates of the “Russian
world” concept may also be some inhabitants of post-communist coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe who belong to autochthonous – as
opposed to Russian-speaking – population. Here, we are referring espe-
cially to people who used to perceive the communist regime positively
and today they feel certain nostalgia for good old days. It is particularly
the citizens that are disillusioned by the liberal reforms and disappointed
over formerly socialist states joining the West that are targeted by Rus-
sia’s soft power. In many countries with Slavic populations, including
Slovakia, there are people who combine their aversion to the West with
cultural pan-Slavism and political Russophilia and who believe that the
“Russian world” concept may also be applied here.
Generally speaking, though, the “Russian world” concept simply can-
not be sufficiently appealing and effective to muster support of a signifi-
cant part of the population in Central European countries. Besides, the
concept is rather distant from local citizens’ ideas about potential alter-
natives to the existing system of government they may be disenchanted
about. Although it may play a support role in forwarding the idea of
solidarity among Slavic nations and intensifying cooperation between
Russia and Central European countries with majority Slavic populations,
it cannot provide a viable alternative that would be applicable in local

24
conditions, mostly due to its predominantly ethnocentric (as opposed to
socio-political) character.
Furthermore, effectiveness of the “Russian world” concept is also
limited by the fact that Russia is a country whose development stag-
nates in a number of areas as it is plagued by serious social problems
such as corruption, population ageing, alcoholism, crippled healthcare
system, ethnic tensions, etc. It is a country with heavy technological
retardation that seems unable to cope with the negative effects of sanc-
tions imposed by the West for its aggression against Ukraine, which are
beginning to expose tender spots of Russian economy and its depend-
ence on external development impulses. Under these circumstances,
building a positive image of Russia based on an ethnocentric concept or
any other concept that relies on the idea of offering a better alternative
is an uphill battle that is far from guaranteeing automatic success.
That is why the principal objective of Russian soft power in Central
European countries is criticising and provoking aversion to the system
of liberal democracy as well as ex post questioning their reform path
that has led to building the foundations of this system. At the same time,
Russian soft power seeks to reduce the rate of public support for these
countries’ EU and NATO membership and/or increase public opposition
to these organisations’ policies. Part of those activities is also accentu-
ating the actual or presumed flaws and problems of the democratic sys-
tem’s functioning in local conditions, encouraging people’s distrust vis-
à-vis democratic mechanisms and institutions, and linking existing prob-
lems to the very essence of the democratic system of government.
Since protagonists and promoters of Russian interests abroad do not
focus primarily on championing their own positive, attractive and viable
“alternatives” but rather on undermining and destroying socio-political
models that exist in the countries where they try to advertise their con-
cepts, several researchers who examine activities of authoritarian re-

25
gimes have suggested that such a model of asserting one’s influence
abroad be referred to as “sharp power”.7
The incumbent Russian leadership strives to debilitate or dismantle
liberal democracy as a system, which is why it considers almost every
enemy of liberal democracy around the world and particularly in Europe
to be their ally – either a strategic or a situational one, depending on the
circumstances.
The protagonists and promoters of Russian sharp power try to spin
the narrative that the very concept of liberal democracy is not suitable
for Central European nations, that it is obsolete and should be replaced
by another concept based on national, traditional, conservative and col-
lectivist values. According to their interpretation, liberal democracy is
not a system that creates optimum conditions for citizens’ freedom,
democratic system of governance and implementation of human rights
but rather merely a tool to promote power interests of large states (e.g.
the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France) while simultaneously
harming vital interests of small European nations. Ultimately, that is
why they should liberate themselves from this dominance (i.e. secede
from the EU and NATO) and establish closer cooperation with Russia.
The goal of questioning the concept of liberal democracy in Central and
Eastern European countries is to relativize and actually gainsay the results
of successful social transformation following the collapse of communist
regimes and, eventually, reverse the participation of transformed states in
the process of European integration. One of the side goals is also to por-
tray ex post the type or mutual relations that existed in the “socialist camp”
led by the Soviet Union as a more suitable model – certainly better than the

7
Walker, Christopher – Ludwig, Jessica: From ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Sharp Power’. Rising
Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World, Washington, D.C., National
Endowment for Democracy – International Forum for Democratic Studies,
2017; available at: https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Introduction-
Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence.pdf

26
liberal democracy one – which is allegedly based on equality, mutual assis-
tance and acceptance of post-communist countries’ national specifics.
In order to discredit liberal democracy, promoters of Russian sharp
power use various clichés and notions bordering on disinformation and
conspiracy theories, for instance the one on rampant bureaucracy on the
highest EU level (e.g. “dictate from Brussels”), on the homosexual
lobby’s conspiracy that aims to change Europe into “Gayrope” or “multi-
cultural” societies that presumably intend to destroy European culture
and Islamise the old continent through recurring migration waves.
The style of propaganda against liberal democracy depends on what
type of interaction with the West the incumbent Russian leaders prefer.
Currently, Russia perceives the West as its rival or enemy; therefore, it
intends to undermine its foundations to the maximum possible extent.
By pursuing its operations in the region of Central Europe, Russia
strives to identify the weakest links in the chain of the Western commu-
nity and initiate disruptive processes from within. At some point in the
future, these schemes obviously calculate with active participation of
forces (e.g. radical nationalists, Euro-sceptical populists, far-right ex-
tremists, far-left extremists, ideological apologists of communist re-
gimes, etc.) that may play a vital role in undermining and subsequently
destroying liberal democracy in Central European countries.
In order to attain this objective, Russia applies a multitude of tools
ranging from corruption activities to disinformation campaigns to cyberat-
tacks to instigating civil unrest. These tools target those institutions (or
states) Russia considers its enemies in order to weaken them from within
and thus create an environment that would be more accommodating to
Russia’s policies, positions and steps in the field of international relations.
It is important to bear in mind that the European Union is at the top
of the list of institutions Russia tries to undermine. As political scientist
and historian Anne Applebaum put it, “it is in Russia’s interest for

27
Europe to be weak. When Russia is dealing with European countries one
on one, it is the strongest. When dealing with Europe as a whole, it is the
weaker side. Russia’s goal is to weaken Europe as much as possible. If
Russia could destroy the EU and NATO altogether then it could play a
much bigger role, particularly in small countries where it would like to
use economic strength and political influence to preserve special status
for corrupt Russian companies. On the other hand, Putin feels threat-
ened by Europe or European institutions because they stand as an ex-
ample of successful democracy”.8
Russia’s strategic objective – i.e. the weakened EU – is in perfect
harmony with the overall goals of activities pursued by Europhobic,
radical-populist and extremist forces that operate in most EU member
states. Russia strives to shape Europe’s political scene in order to fulfil
its own strategic and tactical goals such as force the EU to lift economic
sanctions imposed on Russia. In most EU member states, Moscow di-
rectly supports pro-Russian lobby and interest groups that operate
within the political and media environment as active advocates of Rus-
sia’s state policies.
These groups include politicians, experts, academicians, journalists,
public intellectuals, bloggers, activists, etc. Their main mission is to en-
courage mutual mistrust between people, relativize distinctions between
democratic and non-democratic systems of government, blur differences
between facts and fiction, between truth and lies, between trustworthy
knowledge and its “alternative” interpretations in peoples’ perception
and thus create an atmosphere in which the targeted people cannot find
their footing in the barrage of information anymore and become re-
signed to seeking answers based on indisputable scientific evidence.

8
Vasilko, Tomáš: “Russia Wants Europe as Weak as Possible” (interview with Anne
Applebaum) in: GLOBSEC Daily, April 16, 2016.

28
5. HISTORICAL, SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
5. BACKGROUND OF PRO-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS
5. IN SLOVAKIA

A number of historical events that have significantly affected the fate of

Slovakia and the lives of its inhabitants in the 20th century were directly
related to the Russian Empire or its historical successor, the Soviet Un-
ion: World War I (1914–1918), the communist revolution (1917), World
War II (1939–1945), the Slovak National Uprising (1944), the commu-
nist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia (1948), the military invasion of the
Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia
(1968) and the subsequent Soviet occupation (1968–1991).
The Slovaks’ relationship to Russia and their views of Slovakia’s co-
operation with Russia have been significantly influenced by their politi-
cal experience after World War II. In February 1948, the Communist
Party seized power in Czechoslovakia and, with direct support and assis-
tance from Moscow, established a non-democratic regime. Czechoslova-
kia thus became part of the Soviet bloc and a member state of the WP
and COMECON. In Slovakia, the communist rule coincided with post-war
renewal and modernisation. The process of levelling out socio-economic
disparities that existed between the Czech and Slovak parts of the com-
mon state, along with the process of Slovakia’s industrialisation and
urbanisation, technological advancement of Slovak agriculture, devel-
opment of free education and healthcare systems – all these and many
other elements of modernisation during the four decades of the commu-
nist rule created favourable conditions for Slovaks’ less critical percep-
tion of the communist regime’s non-democratic character.
The “normalisation” process in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion in
August 1968 (which was a euphemism for personal purges and eradica-

29
tion of the Prague Spring’s reformist legacy) coincided with the process
of Czechoslovakia’s federalisation, which materialised Slovakia’s eman-
cipation ambitions under the guardianship of the Communist Party. This
was yet another circumstance that has dulled the Slovaks’ aversion to
the regime and partially even to the military occupation, which has con-
tributed to their less critical or even positive perception of the Soviet
Union or the Russians.
As a territory with prevailingly Slavic population, Slovakia in the 19th
and 20th centuries was largely under the influence of nationalist socio-
political, cultural and intellectual circles that emphasised the need to
develop special relations with Russia based on the language and cultural
closeness between the Slovaks and the Russians. These circles por-
trayed Russia as a true protector of small Slavic nations in Central and
South-Eastern Europe against their historical enemies such as Germans,
Hungarians and Turks. This narrative continues to be present in the
public discourse of a nation that did not have its own state for the most
part of its history and was in a subordinate position as part of larger
state entities until the early 20th century.
These facts explain the presence of the “Russian factor” in Slovakia’s
political and cultural discourse, which creates favourable conditions for
promoters of Russian influence and their domestic allies.
The shaping of attitudes of ordinary Slovaks and their political lead-
ers vis-à-vis Russia and its policies has been influenced by the views of
representatives of the national intellectual elite from the 19th century,
members of leftist intellectual circles of the interwar period and leading
Slovak communists after World War II (1948–1989). After the collapse
of communism, these views were subscribed to by several relevant po-
litical parties, especially nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), Marx-
ist-Leninist Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), Vladimír Mečiar’s popu-
list Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS, particularly between

30
1994 and 1998) and several leaders of Smer-SD. Since 1990, closer
cooperation with Russia has been advocated by adversaries of the EU,
NATO and the United States, certain social organisations (especially
nationalist and ultra-conservative ones), leading members of the anti-
systemic extremist scene, radical movements and groups of isolationist,
revisionist or even overtly neo-Nazi orientation.
In 2014–2015, during the breakout and escalation of the political and
military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, members of this ideologi-
cally ill-assorted conglomerate publicly supported the Kremlin, using
slogans that were practically identical with the main argumentation lines
of Russia’s state propaganda: meddling of the West with Ukraine’s in-
ternal political development; Ukraine as the arena of geopolitical battle
between the West (i.e. USA, NATO, EU, Europe) and Russia; the strug-
gle of Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine for their rights
and against the nationalist government in Kiev; aggressive intentions of
NATO against Russia and other Slavic nations; justification of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea; denying the presence of Russian troops and war-
fare technology on the territory of Eastern Ukraine, etc. The Russian-
Ukrainian war has provided a unique opportunity for actors of Russian
soft power (including institutions of Russia’s state propaganda) to build
a strong mutual bond that has allowed them to actively influence Slova-
kia’s party politics, public discourse and the public opinion. This alliance
provided the framework for cooperation that was later used even when
the debate did not focus on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its reper-
cussions but often quite different issues and developments.
On the opposite pole were diverse pro-European and pro-Western
segments of the Slovak society, including representatives of centre-right
parties, leaders of non-governmental and non-profit organisations, and
members of liberal and moderately conservative intelligentsia that sub-
scribed to the legacy of the Charter 77 dissident movement and partly

31
even that of the Prague Spring 1968 as the symbol of resistance against
Soviet hegemony.
While supporters of the former camp emphasised especially the eth-
nic, nationalist and language elements, i.e. mutual closeness between
the Russians and the Slovaks as Slavic nations, representatives of the
latter camp underlined primarily civil values such as freedom, democ-
racy, and every nation’s right of self-determination without any outside
meddling. The ensuing conflict could be characterised as a confrontation
between stalwarts of the archaic-traditionalist approach and carriers of
modernization tendencies.

32
6. THE RUSSIAN TRACE IN THE LEGACY OF NATIONAL
6. AWAKENERS

In the process of shaping the Slovaks’ views of and relations to the out-
side world, an important role is played by ideological legacies of out-
standing members of the national cultural and intellectual elite. A
prominent place among them is held by Ľudovít Štúr, the codifier of
modern Slovak language. Štúr is widely considered to be a formative
figure from the viewpoint of language and cultural identity of the Slovak
nation.
In his treatise entitled Slavdom and the World of the Future that was
first published in Russia in 1867, Štúr provided a rather comprehensive
idea of the character of the Slovaks’ relationship to Russia in the future.
The content of this work has recently become the subject of a vivid pub-
lic debate. Some historians view its impact on shaping the general pub-
lic’s views to be arguable at best, mostly because during Štúr’s lifetime
it was published only in foreign languages (Russian and German) and
therefore was actually not available to the general public in Slovakia.
However, it was known among those members of Slovakia’s intellectual
elite who shared common values with Štúr. This part of the elite and,
indirectly, his broader social environment was certainly influenced by
Štúr’s ideas.
Štúr’s views of Russia and its role in the world were undoubtedly
affected not only by his scepticism and low spirits caused by repeatedly
unsuccessful attempts of Slavic nations in Central Europe at national
emancipation and state sovereignty, but also by his lack of first-hand
experience with this vast country. Štúr has never visited Russia and
most of his information about the life in Russia and its social order and
system of government was second-hand. As author and essayist Juraj

33
Mesík wrote about Ľudovít Štúr and his contemporary Ján Kollár in his
book Myths about Russia: “They did not know Russia – and so they
boldly dreamed it up”.9
Enjoying an almost iconic status in Slovakia, Ľudovít Štúr ranks
among the greatest members of the Slovak nation’s cultural, intellectual
and political pantheon; there are institutions, state decorations, social
events, streets and squares that are named after him. His contribution to
development of the Slovaks’ national awareness is indisputable. On the
other hand, we know for a fact that certain opinions of many illustrious
historical figures were problematic, even controversial, and their projec-
tion of future relations between Slovakia and Russia was fallacious and
ahistorical already at the moment of its formulation.
However, in order to fully understand the circumstances of Slovakia’s
historical development and the place of the Slovak Republic as an inde-
pendent state in the contemporary system of international relations, it is
also necessary to know the content and context of proposals that turned
out to be unviable and were eventually rejected by modern Slovaks as
members of a sovereign national entity, although they were suggested
by outstanding members of the national cultural and intellectual elite,
including those who are nowadays celebrated as “national awakeners”.
Having examined the history of the Slavs and Slovaks in his book,
Štúr reached a conclusion that the optimum and only meaningful option
for all Slavic nations including the Slovaks, which in the 19th century
lacked a sovereign statehood, was to join Russia and effectively dissolve
in the Russian nation (including speaking of Russian as the official lan-
guage and their conversion to Orthodox Church). Many of Štúr’s opin-
ions feature elements that are characteristic for most advocates of the
idea of rapprochement with Russia in later historical periods: disassoci-

9
Mesík, Juraj: Mýty o Rusku [Myths about Russia], Bratislava, Institute for Public
Affairs, 2020, p. 44.

34
ating from the liberal West on the one hand and emphasising specific
values of the Russian nation and Russian state on the other.
One of the basic elements of Štúr’s concept was criticism of the
“spoilt” West, which had allegedly exhausted its entire development
potential and now it had to pass the baton to Slavdom, which was enter-
ing the stage of history as the principal driving force, with Russia and its
social order and system of government as its vanguard. Another impor-
tant element of Štúr’s concept was advocating the necessity to establish
a single Slavic state.
In his book,10 Štúr supported Russian autocracy (samoderzhavie) and
praised Russian Empire’s policies in Europe aimed at defending the
Slavs against their historical enemies. He outlined three possible scenar-
ios of the Slavs’ future fate: first, creating a federation of Slavic nations
without Russia; second, unifying all Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian
Empire so that it becomes the centre of Western and Southern Slavic
nations; third, incorporation of all Slavs by Russia. The most viable of
these three scenarios, Štúr argued, was the third one – i.e. merging with
Russia.
When evaluating the three options, Štúr argued that Russia would
not accept the formation of a federation of Slavic nations and would
destroy it “as a matter of principle”. According to Štúr, Slavic nations
could never get united under the leadership of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire as it had a “rotten foundation”, which would eventually bring
Slavic nations into lethargy. Štúr wrote that “in their spirit, the Slavs
yearn to join Russia, the sole sovereign and organised Slavic state and
their world representative” (p. 96) and that only this option “is correct
and has any future” (p. 101). According to him, the Slavs should “com-

10
All of Štúr’s statements presented in this section of the publication are quoted
from Štúr, Ľudovít: Slovanstvo a svet budúcnosti [Slavdom and the World of the
Future], Bratislava, Slovenský inštitút medzinárodných štúdií 1993.

35
pletely and without any exception join Russia” (p. 89), which is “the
tribal elder historically imposed upon us” (p. 102). The main reason why
the Slavs should join Russia “rests especially in the creative force of the
Russian nation and its ability to maintain everything it has created”.
Štúr particularly appreciated that “the Russian character, its commu-
nity system best conserves the spirit of Slavism; in its morals, strength is
wedded with modesty and geniality”, and that “Russian nation managed
to avoid the greatest flaw of Slavic desire for sovereign statehood and
succeeded in creating a strong and united state” (p. 108). Štúr appar-
ently admired the Russian state’s system of government as he wrote
that “in Russia, the nation hangs upon its gosudar tsar with endless love
and soulfulness, showing him respect and awe ... The nation gladly sub-
ordinates to commandments of the tsars in the belief that its tsars would
never be able to do it any harm” (p. 84). According to Štúr, “the nation
and the tsar are one in Russia – and that is the main source of the coun-
try’s strength; the nobility is devoted even without political freedoms ...
the towns are populated with patriotically-thinking inhabitants” (p. 106).
Pondering the fates of and mutual ties between individual Slavic
nations, Štúr reproached the Czechs for “letting themselves be led
astray by Western liberal views; their world view is completely indebted
to the West”. In other words, the Czechs did not have enough enthusi-
asm to get united with Russia. With respect to the Poles, Štúr advised
them to make peace “with strictness of the Russians” since, as he
claimed, the Poles had always sought to harm the Russians, taking part
in uprisings and “foreign societies” that were aimed against Russia, and
“spreading the coarsest, most shameless lies about the Russians among
others around the world” and fought the Russians over the position of
Slavic hegemon (p. 104). Štúr concluded that “if Poland is to have any
chance to preserve its ethnicity at all, it has the sole path to salvation
left, and that is to join Russia” (p. 103).

36
 Štúr believed that all Slavic nations should convert to the Orthodox
Church, which at that time was the Russian Empire’s official state relig-
ion. He claimed that the Orthodox Church “surpasses Catholicism and
Protestantism as it corrects their flaws and biases”. He argued that Ca-
tholicism had been imposed onto the Slavic world by foreigners who
“invaded our lands in order to rule us” and drove the Orthodox Church
away. He wrote that the Catholic Church “left us at the mercy of for-
eigners” (p. 116). According to Štúr, “only the Orthodox Church is in
accordance with the historical mission of the Slavs. The Slavdom will
never get along with Roman Catholicism. The Orthodox Church is the
“church of the Slavs and of the future” (p. 116).
In retrospect, it seems quite a paradox that a man who not only in his
lifetime but for another 150 years until the present day has been consid-
ered the embodiment of the Slovaks’ yearning for sovereign national
existence suggested such a solution for its historical fate that would in
fact amount to its gradual decline as a distinctive nation with its own
language, culture and historically inherited confessional preference.
The history proved the views of Ľudovít Štúr regarding the future fate
of the Slovak nation as incorrect, utopic, unfeasible, and contradicting
the historical development. There is nothing unusual or disqualifying
about the fact that a society refused to accept part of some thinker’s
legacy; however, it is important not to taboo Štúr’s historical fallacy but
openly discuss it while pointing out its broader contexts, both period
and contemporary ones. Equally important is to identify the reasons why
the Slovaks at the turn of the millennia preferred a strategic option that
differed from the one suggested by a prominent national awakener of
the 19th century.
Toward the end of the 19th century, Štúr’s legacy was further devel-
oped by another notable national awakener and Russophile who actively
advocated the concept of pan-Slavism, namely Svetozár Hurban Va-

37
janský, editor-in-chief of the cultural and literary magazine Slovenské
pohľady [Slovak Views] who promoted the idea of the Slovaks cuddling
up to “the giant Russian oak tree”. Vajanský idealised Russia’s feudal
system as he saw it as an example for arranging the social order in Slo-
vakia; he also argued that the Slovaks should speak the Russian lan-
guage, condemning the Ukrainians for their efforts to codify their own
mother tongue and criticising the Polish for resisting the Russian expan-
siveness.
A peculiar feature of cultural and political Russophilia in Slovakia is
that while in the 19th century this stream gained a foothold especially in
the non-liberal, anti-progressive and even reactionary environment, in
the 20th century it prevailed in the leftist environment. This may be
attributed primarily to the fact that early in the 20th century Russia
went through a series of revolutionary political changes that culminated
with establishment of the communist regime.
In the first half of the 20th century, Štúr’s Russophilia legacy was
revived by DAV, a cultural movement of left-oriented (de facto pro-
communist) intellectuals whose members advocated Slovakia’s inclina-
tion to Soviet Russia. Before World War II, this stream of thought found
political cover in activities of Slovak communists. In its most radical
form, this concept even toyed with the idea of “Slovakia’s Sovietisa-
tion”, i.e. its incorporation to the Soviet Union as its 16th republic. It was
planned to take place after the war in which the collaborationist regime
led by Jozef Tiso sided with Nazi Germany. But this concept was
thwarted due to the restoration of Czechoslovakia immediately after the
end of World War II. Nevertheless, this stream of thought found con-
tinuation in the form of alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union,
which Czech and Slovak communists furthered after they seized power
in February 1948.

38
 Nowadays, political Russophilia in Slovakia is largely rooted in the
concept of pan-Slavism, which hopes to establish the closest possible
relations between Slavic nations while entrusting Russia with a special
role of leader of the Slavic world and protector of smaller Slavic nations.
According to this concept, ethnic and language closeness is more impor-
tant than the type of social order and the model of mutual relations with
other nations. Consequently, modern states formed by Slavic nations
should feel attracted to Russia regardless of differences in the type of
political regime in place. In other words, democratic states of Central
and Eastern Europe with Slavic populations should naturally incline
toward authoritarian, non-democratic and imperialist Russia rather than
democratic states of the West.

39
7. PUBLIC OPINION IN SLOVAKIA: PERCEPTION
7. OF RUSSIA

Representative public opinion polls examining citizens’ perception of

their country’s foreign policy orientation, international relations and
individual states and nations reveal differences between inhabitants of
Slovakia and three remaining Visegrad Four (V4) countries – i.e. Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland – when it comes to views of Russia, its
policies and officials and the Russians as a nation. According to them,
the Slovaks stand out in terms of their less critical and more positive
attitude with respect to the Russian state, which in turn creates more
favourable conditions for activities of promoters of Russian influence.
A survey jointly carried out in 2011 by the Institute for Public Affairs
(IVO) and the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) examined people’s trust
vis-à-vis various nations. While one in three Slovak respondents (33%)
said they trusted the Russians, this sentiment was shared by only one in
five (21%) of their Polish and one in six of their Hungarian and Czech
counterparts (18% and 16%, respectively). For the sake of comparison,
only 23% of Slovak respondents in the same survey said they trusted the
Americans, compared to 32% of Hungarian, 34% of Czech and 44% of
Polish respondents.11
Trust and distrust with respect to different nations was also exam-
ined in a similar IVO/IVF survey from 2015. The shares of Slovak re-
spondents expressing trust and distrust in the Russians were exactly the
same, at 31% each. In Poland the ratio was 9% to 71%, in Hungary it was

11
Gyárfášová, Oľga: “Mental Map of the V4 Group or How Do We Perceive Each
Other?” in: Internal Cohesion of the Visegrad Group, Bratislava, VEDA 2013, pp.
100-111.

40
16% to 42%, and in the Czech Republic it was 17% to 52%, all in favour
of distrust.12
In 2015, the Polis Slovakia agency mapped out Slovak citizens’ ap-
proval of Russia’s military intervention in Syria. While almost half of all
respondents (47%) approved of the intervention (“definitely yes” and
“rather yes than no”), only one in three of them (33%) disapproved of it
(“rather no than yes” and “definitely not”).13
In 2017, the International Republican Institute (IRI) carried out a sur-
vey that examined V4 inhabitants’ views of Russia’s role in Europe. The
assertion that “Russia is a continuous external threat to Europe and
must be faced with a strong security alliance” was subscribed to by 22%
Slovak, 26% Hungarian, 36% Czech and 51% Polish respondents. The
assertion that “Russia should be viewed as a security partner and should
be included in European security structures; leaving Russia out would
reduce our security” was subscribed to by 75% Slovak, 59% Czech, 54%
Hungarian and 35% Polish respondents.14
In Globsec Trends 2018, a survey carried out by Globsec Policy Insti-
tute, over two in five Slovak respondents (41%) expressed support to
policies pursued by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the Czech Re-

12
Gyárfášová, Oľga – Mesežnikov, Grigorij: 25 rokov V4 očami verejnosti [25 Years
of V4 in the Eyes of the Public], Bratislava, Inštitút pre verejné otázky 2016, pp.
19-21.
13
“Prieskum: Na utečeneckú krízu najlepšie reagoval premiér Fico” [‘Poll: Premier
Fico Best Reacted to the Refugee Crisis’], SITA, October 27, 2015.
14
Public Opinion in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, International
Republican Institute – Center for Insights in Survey Research 2017; available at:
https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/four_country_full_presentation_may_24_2
017.pdf

41
public and Hungary, it was one in three (32% and 33%, respectively),
while in Poland it was only one in eight (13%).15
In a similar survey conducted by Globsec Policy Institute a year later,
one in four Slovak respondents (26%) considered Russia to be a threat
to their country. In Hungary it was almost one in three (31%), in the
Czech Republic it was over one in two (52%) and in Poland it was over
three in four (77%). On the other hand, over two in five Slovaks (41%)
perceived the United States as a threat, a view shared by only 20% of
Czechs, 16% of Hungarians and 12% of Polish.16
In 2019, the European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the
YouGov agency carried out a joint survey in which they mapped out
citizens’ views of international relations in 14 European countries. When
asked a hypothetical question of “Which side would you support in case
of a conflict between the United States and Russia?” one in five Slovak
respondents (20%) chose to side with Russia while only one in 16 (6%)
chose to side with the United States. In the remaining three V4 coun-
tries, the ratio of support for Russia and the United States was the op-
posite: 6% to 13% in Hungary, 9% to 23% in the Czech Republic and 6%
to 33% in Poland. The support for Russia was higher in Slovakia than in
any other examined country, and only in Slovakia did respondents’ sup-
port for Russia exceed their support for the United States.17

15
GLOBSEC Trends 2018. Central Europe: one region, different perspectives, Brati-
slava, GLOBSEC Policy Institute 2018; available at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2018.pdf
16
GLOBSEC Trends 2019. Central & Eastern Europe 30 years after the fall of the Iron
Curtain, Bratislava, GLOBSEC Policy Institute 2019; available at:
https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC-
Trends2019.pdf
17
Dennison, Susi: Give The People What They Want: Popular Demand For A Strong
European Foreign Policy, European Council on Foreign Relations 2019; available at:
https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/popular_demand_for_strong_european_foreign_
policy_what_people_want.pdf

42
 Most recently, this status quo was confirmed by the Globsec Trends
2020 survey conducted by Globsec Policy Institute. When asked which
country they would choose as their country’s strategic partner, almost
three in seven Slovak respondents (42%) preferred Russia while only
one in six of them (17%) preferred the United States. Again, the ratio of
preference between Russia and the United States was the opposite in all
remaining three V4 countries: 21% to 29% in the Czech Republic, 16% to
33% in Hungary and 6% to 69% in Poland.18
The findings of all cited public opinion surveys indicate that many
people in Slovakia continue to live in a world of geopolitical illusions
that is built on stereotypes inherited from the past and revived by local
as well as external promoters of Russian influence. What is truly disturb-
ing, though, is that this coincides with increasingly frequent elements of
aggression in the Kremlin’s foreign policy and elements of repression in
its internal policy.

18
GLOBSEC Trends 2020. Central Europe Eastern Europe & Western Balkans at the
Times of Pandemic, Bratislava, GLOBSEC Policy Institute 2020; available at:
https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GLOBSEC-Trends-
2020.pdf

43
8. SLOVAK-RUSSIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS

Po After the emergence of the independent Slovak Republic in January

1993, Slovak-Russian bilateral relations developed in a see-saw pattern.
In 1994–1998 when the country was ruled by the nationalist-populist
ruling coalition led by Vladimír Mečiar’s HZDS, the Russian Federation
sought to build special relations with Slovakia. Mečiar’s authoritarian
style of policy execution caused the country’s actual self-disqualification
from the process of European integration and enlargement of the trans-
atlantic partnership. For the Kremlin, this was certainly a step in the
desirable direction.
After the defeat of HZDS in fall 1998, the dynamism of Slovak-
Russian bilateral relations depended on the approach of dominant politi-
cal forces in both countries to broader circumstances of Europe’s politi-
cal development. In Slovakia, the political framework of Slovak-Russian
relations was shaped by the approach of individual governments to
country’s incorporation into Western political, economic, defence and
security structures.
The political formations that furthered unambiguous pro-Western
orientation of Slovakia (i.e. full-fledged EU and NATO membership)
strove to develop Slovak-Russian bilateral relations in a way that would
not negatively affect the country’s overall pro-Western course. In every-
day politics, this required separating economic cooperation (particularly
imports of raw materials for the energy industry) from chief priorities of
their political agenda, which meant eliminating ideology from bilateral
relations and minimising their effects on the country’s internal political
development.
On the other hand, the political formations that were not among the
prime movers of Slovakia’s pro-Western orientation tried to portray its

44
bilateral relations with Russia as virtually non-harmful to the country’s
overall pro-Western course. In the field of foreign policy, they advocated
a concept of some kind of symbiosis between Slovakia’s participation in
Euro-Atlantic integration and its friendly relations with the Russian
Federation.
This attitude was largely represented by Smer-SD led by Robert Fico,
which eventually ended up spending longer time in government than any
other political party in Slovakia. Since March 2020 it has been in oppo-
sition, which propelled it even closer to advocating pro-Russian posi-
tions in Slovakia’s foreign policy, although this shift had been percepti-
ble over the past several years. Although leading representatives of this
party tried to portray such a “balanced” approach as manifestation of
their foreign policy pragmatism, it has in fact been and remained incon-
sistent and unrealistic from the foundation up as it blatantly underrates
the fact that Russia has always rigorously opposed deeper integration of
post-communist Central European countries including Slovakia into
Western integration structures and that currently it strives to undermine
both the EU and NATO.
A new element in the internal policy context of bilateral Slovak-
Russian relations, which Slovak politicians must not ignore when defin-
ing their attitude to Russia, is the recent rise of populist and extremist
forces in Europe that are directly or indirectly supported from Russia as
well as the mass communication of toxic anti-Western and anti-
democratic content through “alternative” media and social networks.
The 2016 parliamentary elections marked the first time an extremist
ĽSNS clinched seats in the National Council of the Slovak Republic; in
the most recent elections in 2020, it more or less defended its position.
In the field of foreign policy, this party openly accentuates pro-Russian
positions, combining them with harsh anti-European and anti-Atlantic
rhetoric. In this subject’s representation in the Slovak parliament, Russia

45
has gained an unexpected – though rather problematic due to its public
image – ally on Slovakia’s political scene.
The fundamental circumstance affecting contemporary Slovak-
Russian relations is that the Kremlin in recent years began to pursue
policies aimed at weakening cohesiveness of the EU and undermining its
foundations, encouraging centrifugal tendencies within individual mem-
ber states, uncoupling Central and Eastern European wagons from EU
and NATO trains, relativizing and possibly even reversing the results of
social reforms following the fall of communist regimes in Central and
Eastern European countries, and establishing non-liberal regimes in
them with the help of anti-systemic and anti-European forces. In other
words, Russia’s current attitude to the West reveals its endeavour at
geopolitical revenge for the collapse of the Soviet Union and its inten-
tion to make Central Europe including Slovakia part of that revenge.
These foreign policy priorities and intentions are fully reflected in Rus-
sia’s approach to its bilateral relations with Slovakia.
One should bear in mind that nowadays, the Slovak Republic and the
Russian Federation represent countries with fundamentally different
social orders as well as systems of government. While Slovakia is a
country with a consolidated liberal-democratic regime, Russia is a coun-
try with a consolidated autocratic regime and an oligarchic system of
governance based on vertical power, absolute centralisation of state and
direct meddling of repressive apparatus with the political process in
order to prevent emergence of alternatives and power changes the rul-
ing corporation perceives as a threat.
The most recent definition of the broader framework and character of
Slovak-Russian bilateral relations can be found in Slovakia in an Unsta-
ble World: Foreign and European Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2020,
an official document elaborated and published by the Ministry of For-
eign and European Affairs. Several passages of the document repeatedly

46
emphasise that Slovakia’s affiliation to the Western community, ex-
pressed by its membership in the EU and NATO, is the most important
factor determining foreign policy priorities and execution of the coun-
try’s foreign policy: “The EU and NATO membership multiplies the
chances of forwarding and defending vital interests of the Slovak Re-
public. For both organisations, we therefore intend to be an engaged
and solidary partner that actively participates in joint solutions that
support stability, security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic space ...
The Slovak Republic’s membership in the European Union and the North
Atlantic Alliance is the expression of its strategic and value orientation
... The Slovak Republic shall continue to contribute to the strengthening
of unity, credibility and operability of both organisations. The basic pre-
requisite to this is maintaining strong transatlantic ties and developing
strategic and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and the
USA.”19
The foreign ministry’s document dedicated a single paragraph to the
issue of Slovak-Russian mutual relations, emphasising that Slovakia’s
foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia shall be closely coordinated with its EU
and NATO partners: “In the field of mutual relations with Russia, the
Slovak Republic shall concentrate on developing bilateral cooperation
with a special emphasis on the area of business and trade, which has in
the long term disproportionately focused on trading in energy raw mate-
rials. The Slovak Republic’s foreign policy with respect to Russia shall
continue to be closely coordinated on the EU and NATO platforms, in-
cluding the sanctions that are the response to the violation of interna-

19
Slovensko v nestabilnom svete. Zahraničná a európska politika Slovenskej republiky
v roku 2020, Bratislava, MZVaEZ 2020; available at: https://www.mzv.sk/documents/
10182/4238286/200710-zahranicna-a-europska-politika-SR-v-roku-2020

47
tional law by the annexation of Crimea and an insufficient progress in
the fulfilment of the Minsk agreements.”20
Since 2014, mutual relations between the EU and its member states
on the one hand and Russia on the other have been considerably af-
fected by the Russian-Ukrainian military and political conflict. Therefore,
the following passage of the mentioned document paints an undoubt-
edly relevant context to mutual Slovak-Russian relations. “Ukraine plays
a special part in Slovakia’s effort to maintain good neighbourly rela-
tions. The Slovak Republic’s strategic foreign policy interest is to sup-
port Ukraine in its free decision to approximate the EU and NATO, and
to assist in its transformation endeavour. The position of the Slovak
Republic regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in its
internationally recognised borders remains unchanged.”21 Interpretácia
tejto formulácie je jednoznačná – v konflikte medzi agresorom a obeťou
je Slovensko na strane obete, bojujúcej za slobodu a nezávislosť.
The interpretation of this formulation is unambiguous: in the conflict
between the aggressor and its victim, Slovakia remains on the side of
the victim that struggles for freedom and independence.
Another important document, The Security Strategy of the Slovak
Republic, which parliament passed in January 2021, speaks of the con-
flicts in Eastern Europe in a very unambiguous connotation: “We have
become witnesses to asserting power and territorial ambitions, illegal
use of force and violation of international law, strengthening of military
and non-military capacities, political and economic stagnation and
chronic instability in the region. The conflicts in Georgia and in Eastern
Ukraine that were provoked by aggressive behaviour of the Russian
Federation, as well as illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and Sevas-
topol, is a coarse violation of international law and ensuing political

20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.

48
commitments. The region of Eastern Europe is the source of numerous
potential threats also for the Slovak Republic, including a possibility of a
military intervention, hybrid, cybernetic and intelligence operations,
disinformation campaigns, organised crime, illegal proliferation of small
arms, and illegal migration.”22
The same document views the security aspect of bilateral relations
between Slovakia and Russia as follows: “It is in the interest of the Slo-
vak Republic to develop good mutual relations with the Russian Federa-
tion ... Russia is an important player and partner in tackling international
threats and challenges; at the same time, however, its confrontational
attitude to military, security and political matters presents a principal
challenge to the safety of our Euro-Atlantic space. The Slovak Republic
cannot overlook violations of the fundamental principles of international
law, attempts to meddle with other states’ democratic processes and
efforts to undermine the foundations of European security architecture,
including the unity of NATO and EU. Under the given circumstances, the
policy of the Slovak Republic vis-à-vis Russia shall remain based on
seeking intersections of common interests, but simultaneously on con-
ducting an open and critical dialogue on issues where our values and
interests part ways; therefore, in inevitable instances it shall endorse
adoption of restrictive measures.”23
In order to better understand the current state of Slovak-Russian
relations, let’s cite from annual reports on activities of the Slovak Infor-
mation Service (SIS). In its 2018 annual report that was released in
2019, SIS observed the following regarding Russia: “In line with stipu-
lated priorities, SIS in 2018 monitored activities of foreign intelligence

22
Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky 2020; available at:
http://mepoforum.sk/staty-regiony/europa/staty-eu-plus/vysehradska-4/
slovensko/navrhy-bezpecnostnej-strategie-sr-a-obrannej-strategie-sr/
23
Ibid.

49
services aimed against the interests of the Slovak Republic and its allies.
The activity of Russian intelligence services was aimed against pro-
tected interests of the Slovak Republic as member of the EU and NATO.
Members of Russian intelligence services most of whom operated on
Slovakia’s territory under diplomatic cover strove to recruit collabora-
tors within central state administration organs, security forces and in
the field of energy and defence.” In the report, SIS observed that Russia
“continued to view the Euro-Atlantic community as its main geopolitical
rival and a threat to its security and stability”. In the section dedicated
to hybrid threats, the SIS report informed that in Slovakia, “the Russian
Federation pursued activities that were primarily aimed at maintaining
sympathies of the Slovak public with respect to Russia, its culture and
policies, and at weakening the forces that are openly sceptical or critical
with respect to Russia. Also, the Russian party strove to make an im-
pression on its own domestic as well as foreign audience that the Slovak
Republic was a close ally of Russia which, though a member of NATO
and the EU, respects and understands Russian interests.”24
In late September 2020, SIS released its annual report for 2019, in
which it again described “activities of foreign intelligence services aimed
against the interests of the Slovak Republic and its allies”. According to
the report, “the activity of Russian intelligence services was aimed
against protected interests of the Slovak Republic as member of the EU
and NATO. Members of Russian intelligence services most of whom
operated on Slovakia’s territory under diplomatic cover strove to infil-
trate central state administration organs and security forces and to re-
cruit collaborators in the field of energy and military. They regularly
attended expert events focusing on energy and military issues where

24
Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2018 [Annual Report on SIS Activities in 2018], Brati-
slava, June 2019; available at: https://www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti-
2018.html#zahranicnopoliticka-oblast

50
they tried to contact persons of interest with access to sensitive classi-
fied information from the EU and NATO environment as well as persons
close to constitutional officials.” In the section dedicated to hybrid
threats, the SIS report pointed out that “the Slovak Republic as an EU
and NATO member state faced especially influence campaigns of for-
eign powers aimed at weakening political cohesiveness of both integra-
tion groupings in order to undermine their unity, operability and defen-
sibility. The foreign actors focused on influencing members of the elite,
expert communities and ordinary citizens with the intention to encour-
age distrust in said international organisations and question the willing-
ness of the allies to act on the commitment to solidarity ensuing from
[Slovakia’s] membership in these organisations.”
The SIS report also stated that “the primary source of campaigns
aimed at discrediting the EU and NATO was Russian sources (e.g. official
media, state institutions, think-tanks or experts) that set the strategic
course of this communication. Their messages were subsequently repro-
duced by similarly oriented media and organisations in European states.
The main propagators of pro-Russian narratives in the Slovak Republic
were pro-Russian civic organisations and social network groups, Russian
news media including their foreign affiliates, and so-called alternative
media. Like in the previous period, Russian propaganda largely relied on
abusing pro-Russian sympathisers who, acting on their own beliefs, non-
critically took over and spread these messages.”25
The unambiguous formulations of Slovak intelligence analysts have
repeatedly painted a truthful picture of the amply branched system of
activities aimed at harming Slovakia’s internal democratic arrangement
and its foreign policy ties.

25
Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2019 [Annual Report on SIS Activities in 2019],
Bratislava, September 2020; available at: https://www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-
o-cinnosti.html#zahranicnopoliticka-oblast

51
 In the second half of 2020, mutual Slovak-Russian relations were
rather negatively affected by a scandal involving expulsion of three Rus-
sian diplomats. The circumstances of the scandal were sufficiently
symptomatic of the overall approach of the incumbent Kremlin leader-
ship to foreign policy vis-à-vis the West as well as former countries of
the Soviet bloc that are currently member states of the EU and NATO.
What was the essence of this diplomatic scandal?
In August 2020, the Slovak foreign ministry announced that it had
asked three diplomatic employees of the Embassy of the Russian Fed-
eration in Bratislava to leave Slovakia’s territory on account of pursuing
activities incompatible with a diplomatic status. The decision followed
an internal investigation of the Slovak diplomatic service into the finding
that Slovakia’s general consulate in Petersburg had issued a Schengen
entry visa to a Russian citizen who subsequently used it to enter Ger-
many where – according to German police findings – he was instrumen-
tal in the murder of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a Georgian citizen of Che-
chen origin, in August 2019 in Berlin. The circumstances suggest that
the murder was an operation of GRU, a Russian secret service.
As it turned out, the visa had been issued to a person with a false iden-
tity who according to available information was a GRU operative. In its
communiqué on the expulsion of three Russian diplomats, the Slovak for-
eign ministry pointed out a direct link between its decision and the murder
in Berlin: “Furthermore, the visa issued by Slovakia’s general consulate in
Petersburg had been abused, which indicates perpetration of a serious
criminal offence on the territory of another NATO and EU member state.”26

26
Tóda, Mirek: “Slovensko vyhostilo troch ruských diplomatov, je to odveta za
zneužitie našich víz pri vražde v Berlíne” [‘Slovakia Expelled Three Russian Diplo-
mats in Response to Abuse of Our Visas in Berlin Murder’], Denník N daily, August
10, 2020; available at: https://dennikn.sk/1999069/slovensko-vyhostilo-troch-
ruskych-diplomatov-je-to-odveta-za-zneuzie-nasich-viz-pri-vrazde-v-berline/

52
 In Slovakia, the expulsion of three Russian diplomats caused a great
furore, mostly because it could be interpreted as an indicator of the
change in Slovakia’s incumbent administration’s attitude to mutual rela-
tions with Russia. Since the most recent parliamentary elections in Feb-
ruary 2020, Slovakia’s foreign policy has become less ambiguous and
more legible, which may be documented, inter alia, by the swift and em-
phatic response of the Slovak foreign ministry to the unacceptable con-
duct of Russian state officials.
In his reaction to the expulsion of diplomats, Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov did declare that he considered Slovakia a
“friendly country” that had previously not caused any political problems;
however, the wording of his statement de facto questioned Slovakia’s
independence in adopting the decision as Lavrov insinuated that the
Slovak foreign ministry had acted at the order of the third party. The
chief of Russian diplomacy stated that United States officials’ reactions
to the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Slovakia may indicate that
Washington had a role to play in the decision. “I believe this is not about
Slovakia,” said Lavrov, who pointed out that the head of the press de-
partment of the U.S. State Department positively evaluated the decision
to expel the Russian diplomats. The Russian foreign affairs minister also
stated: “In my opinion, no other foreign official has commented on this
situation in this way. Therefore, you can make your own conclusion on
who may have played a part and been involved in the decision the sover-
eign Slovakia adopted with respect to the three Russian diplomats.“27
As part of the previously announced “symmetric response”, Russia ex-
pelled three Slovak diplomats.

27
“Лавров заявил о возможной причастности США к высылке российских
дипломатов из Словакии“ [‘Lavrov Announced Possible U.S. Role in Expelling
Russian Diplomats from Slovakia’], Взгляд daily, August 11, 2020; available at:
https://vz.ru/news/2020/8/11/1054438.html

53
 In the end, the entire scandal was rather symptomatic of what charac-
terises Russia’s foreign policy for quite some time, i.e. that the Kremlin
perceives Russia’s bilateral relations with former WP and COMECON
member states through the prism of its own confrontation with the
West, particularly with the United States. And since many officials in the
Kremlin harbour nostalgic memories of the Soviet Union, they like to
imagine that the model of mutual relations between NATO member
states is similar to that of mutual relations between WP member states
before 1990 – i.e. a dominant hegemon who decides on everything and
subordinated vassals who blindly obey. This kind of attitude Russia
showed to a sovereign state like the Slovak Republic was a manifesta-
tion of elementary disrespect. Against the backdrop of similar scandals,
all verbal declarations of Russia’s officials about friendly and equal mu-
tual relations are merely empty talk.

54
9. PRO-RUSSIAN ORIENTED ACTORS
9. IN SLOVAKIA28

There is an ideologically diverse conglomerate of organisations and

persons operating in Slovakia that share positive relations vis-à-vis the
Russian state, i.e. the incumbent political regime in Russia and its prac-
tical policies. These subjects are characterised by varying rates of social
relevance and political influence. The following overview of these actors
– be it political parties or non-party associations – is based on long-term
observation of this issue as part of research activities of the Institute for
Public Affairs.

9. 1. Political parties

Slovakia’s political scene consists of established parliamentary and

non-parliamentary parties with specific programme priorities, ideologi-
cal profiles and attitudes to practical politics. As far as foreign and secu-
rity policy goes, we can distinguish among them formations with
pro-Western (i.e. pro-integration and pro-Atlantic) orientation, forma-

28
For the purposes of this publication, the adjective “pro-Russian” is used with
respect to political parties and individual politicians and/or public figures to de-
note contents (e.g. views, opinions, orientations, inclinations, affinities, etc.) that
express a positive relation to contemporary Russian state and its policies, to the
incumbent political regime in Russia and to activities pursued by institutions of
the Russian political regime. Here, it is used in the identical way as the adjective
“pro-Kremlin”, which is used to denote the place where political power in Russia
in concentrated. The characteristic feature of all analysed political parties and
persons regardless of their ideological preferences (i.e. right-left spectrum, na-
tionalism, conservatism, extremism) is their sympathy for contemporary Russian
state (regime), for its foreign and internal policy. The language, cultural, artistic
and other similar inclinations do not come into this analysis. In other words, the
adjective “pro-Russian” is not meant to denote their relation to the Russians as
an ethnic community nor to Russian culture, Russian art or Russian language but
exclusively to the Russian state, its policies and institutions.

55
tions with pro-Russian orientation, and formations with ambivalent ori-
entation. The following section shall examine three relevant political
parties – two with unequivocal pro-Russian orientation and one with
ambivalent orientation whose representatives nevertheless demonstrate
clear affinity to the Russian state. During the election term of 2016 –
2020, all three parties were represented in parliament and two of them
were part of the ruling coalition.
The analysis also focuses on several smaller political parties of dif-
ferent ideological profiles that support Russia and strive to influence the
public discourse to the extent that corresponds to their political rele-
vance. With a single exception, none of these formation is represented
in parliament.

Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko [People’s Party Our Slovakia]

Embodying political ambitions of Slovak far-right extremism, People’s

Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) is a leading representative of pro-Russian
oriented political forces. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, the party
received 8.04% of the popular vote and clinched parliamentary seats.
Four years later, it practically defended its position on the back of 7.97%
of the popular vote. Ever since it entered the legislative assembly five
years ago, it has been in opposition as its coalition potential (i.e. its ac-
ceptability to other parties that seek to form a government) nears zero.
ĽSNS is a party with radical anti-Western orientation, which is
clearly perceptible on its views of the EU and NATO. The party leaders
speak of both integration groupings exclusively in negative terms and
demand that the Slovak Republic secedes from the EU as well as NATO.
According to party leaders, Slovakia’s membership in the EU amounts to
“complete subordination” and “surrendering the basic pillars and signs
of statehood”. They claim that the EU imposes onto Slovakia homosex-
ual partnerships and privileging of “asocial parasites” (which is one of
ĽSNS many negative euphemisms for the Roma). ĽSNS leaders rarely

56
miss an opportunity to present their negative view of the EU. In March
2014, on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of emergence of the war-
time fascist Slovak state, ĽSNS Chairman Marian Kotleba who in 2013–
2017 was also governor of the Banská Bystrica region ordered a removal
from his office building of the EU flag, which the party newsletter Naše
Slovensko called “a European occupational rag”.
In its 2016 election programme entitled 10 Steps for Our Slovakia,
ĽSNS called NATO a “criminal pact that serves solely to forward power
interests of the USA”, pointed out “American war crimes” and promised
to “replace the one-sided orientation to the West with balanced coop-
eration with all countries of the world”. An authentic illustration of how
ĽSNS leaders perceive international affairs was an open letter Kotleba
as then governor of the Banská Bystrica Region sent to then Ukrainian
President Viktor Janukovych in January 2014. In the letter, Kotleba be-
sieged Janukovych not to give in to demonstrators protesting in Kiev.
According to Kotleba, the events in Ukraine had been provoked by ef-
forts of the EU to gain new markets and the endeavour of the “terrorist
organisation of NATO” to advance closer to the borders of the Russian
Federation. In the letter, Kotleba referred to demonstrating Ukrainian
citizens as “terrorists” and, “for the sake of the future of Slavic nations”,
he reminded Janukovych that “there is no negotiating” with terrorists,
mentioning the “fate of Serbian national hero Slobodan Miloševič”.29
In order to honour the convoy of the infamous Russian motorcycle gang
“Night Wolves” that was passing through Banská Bystrica in May 2016,
Kotleba ordered the Russian flag to be hoisted on his office building.
In October 2016, ĽSNS party newsletter published petition sheets as
part of its campaign to initiate a referendum on Slovakia’s secession

29
“Kotleba v liste vyzval Janukovyča, aby ochránil Ukrajinu” [‘Kotleba in Open Letter
Called on Janukovych to Protect Ukraine’], Webnoviny.sk, January 31, 2014; avail-
able at: http://www.webnoviny.sk/ slovensko/clanok/785081-kotleba-v-liste-vyzval-
janukovyca-aby-ochranil-ukrajinu/

57
from NATO and the EU. In the article that accompanied the petition, the
newsletter wrote: “NATO currently strives to occupy Ukraine and Rus-
sia. American troops are pushing ever closer to the Russian borders
while our treacherous politicians assist them.”30
In May 2019, before the most recent elections to European Parlia-
ment, the party newsletter published a statement entitled “We Shall
Never Allow a War against the Russian Federation!” which fully exposed
the prism through which this party perceives Russia’s interaction with
the outside world: “The vast Russian market and its natural resources
are a great allure for groups that yearn for world domination. No excep-
tion in this respect is the Brussels masters who seek every possible ex-
cuse to drag Europe into an open conflict with Russia. The deputies
representing ĽSNS in the European Parliament shall do everything in
their power to improve mutual relations with Russia. We shall promote
the abolition of nonsensical anti-Russian sanctions and the abandon-
ment of artificially fuelled anti-Russian hysteria.”31 The election edition
of the Naše Slovensko newsletter issued in February 2020 also included
Ten Commandments of ĽSNS in which the party promised to put through
“Slovakia’s secession from the criminal pact called NATO”. The newslet-
ter stated that ĽSNS was “the only parliamentary party that has the
courage to stand up for the Slovaks and to resist the nonsenses and
threats that stream in on us from the EU”. ĽSNS declared that “the fu-
ture of Slovakia is not in one-sided orientation to the rotten West but in
balanced cooperation with Eastern European countries and the Russian
Federation. After all, the anti-Russian sanctions have not harmed Russia
but Slovak producers”. One of the ĽSNS election slogans put “Slovak

30
“V NATO sme bábkou amerických zločincov! NATO vzniklo preto, aby nás zničilo.
Teroristov ochraňujú, nevinných zabíjajú” [‘In NATO We Are Puppets of American
Criminals! NATO Was Formed to Destroy Us. They Protect Terrorists While They
Kill the Innocent’], Naše Slovensko – noviny politickej strany Mariana Kotlebu, Octo-
ber 2016.
31
Naše Slovensko. Noviny Ľudovej strany, Volume 2, Issue 2, May 2019, p. 7.

58
interests” in a direct context with interests of the Russian Federation:
“We Shall Protect Slovak Interests! We Shall Abolish Anti-Russian Sanc-
tions!”32 When Marian Kotleba ran in the 2019 presidential elections,
one of his election slogans said: “Up For Slavic Togetherness, Up
Against a War with Russia!”
Between 2019 and 2021, the role of party vanguards in terms of pre-
senting its views on international relations on the highest level of Euro-
pean politics was played by two representatives that were elected to the
European Parliament (EP) in the 2019 elections on ĽSNS ballot: one was
Milan Uhrík, party vice-chairman who in January 2021 announced a de-
cision to leave the party due to his conflict with Kotleba; the other was
Miroslav Radačovský, a former judge who ran on the ĽSNS ballot as a
formally independent candidate and who announced a decision to termi-
nate his cooperation with the party in November 2019, citing disputes
over the fulfilment of financial obligations between MEPs and the party
on whose ballot they ran.33
But the different formal status of both MEPs elected on the ĽSNS
ballot (i.e. one a party member and its leading representative while the
other an independent candidate) made little difference when it came to
the views, opinions and positions on international politics they publicly
presented in parliamentary discussions. Both MEPs elected off the ĽSNS
ballot consistently supported policies of the Russian Federation, voting
against all EP resolutions that featured critical evaluations of these
policies, subscribing to interpretations of historical events and current
developments in Europe and the world that were identical with their
official interpretations by the Kremlin, and regularly chastising NATO,

32
Naše Slovensko. Noviny Ľudovej strany, Volume 3, Issue 1, February 2020, pp. 7, 13.
33
For further details on the crux of the dispute, see Kyseľ, Tomáš: “ĽSNS má v Bruseli
už len Uhríka, s exsudcom Radačovským sa rozhádali pre peniaze” [‘In Brussels, ĽSNS
Only Has Uhrík Now after Having Fallen Out over Money with Ex-Justice Radačovský’],
Aktuality.sk, November 14, 2019; available at: https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/740326/
lsns-ma-v-bruseli-uz-len-uhrika-s-exsudcom-radacovskym-sa-rozhadali-pre-peniaze/

59
the EU and the USA. Both MEPs operated in the EP as committed actors
of Russia’s influence.
During the period of 2019 – 2020, Milan Uhrík ranked among the
most active pro-Russian MEPs, which may be documented by the history
of his voting.34 He would frequently take the stand to publicly defend
policies of the Russian Federation and harshly criticise the West. The
views, opinions and positions presented by him strictly contradicted the
official foreign policy line of the Slovak Republic.
The following overview of his public statements that feature a rela-
tively broad palette of arguments backed by collected facts indicates
that Uhrík is a convinced supporter of policies of the incumbent Russian
leadership, both in international affairs and on the domestic scene, and a
truly diligent promoter of Russia’s influence in Slovakia and Europe.
In one of his appearances in a parliamentary debate in October 2019,
Uhrík spread a pro-Russian disinformation narrative about the events in
Ukraine at the end of 2013. He claimed that the anti-government pro-
tests at the time were sponsored and organised by Western secret ser-
vices and non-governmental organisations while remaining completely
silent about the role of Russia in the conflict. Uhrík called on the EU to
stop “meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs”, which in his interpretation
meant nothing else but cease supporting Ukraine in its conflict with
Russia. “If we wish to help establish peace in Ukraine, first of all we
must openly say how the whole thing started,” he said. “That it was
secret services and non-governmental organisations partly financed
from here, from Brussels, but mainly from Washington, which used frus-
tration of ordinary Ukrainians, their frustration from oligarchy and cor-
ruption, and staged first Maidan and then a civil war. After five years of

34
Krekó, Péter – Szicherle, Patrik – Molnár, Csaba: Authoritarian Shadows: Influence
of Authoritarian Third Countries on EU Institutions, Budapest, Political Capital Kft.,
2020; available at: https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-
admin/source/documents/authoritarian_shadows_in_the_eu_2020_09.pdf

60
conflict, after thousands of dead, after billions of euros and dollars
spent, the situation in Ukraine is worse than ever before and peace is
nowhere in sight. And why is that? Let me tell you without censorship. It
is simply because nobody cares about the Ukrainians in this conflict. The
only thing that matters here is to gain new markets for Western firms
and to weaken Russia’s position in Europe.”35
In his commentary under the video of his speech, Uhrík wrote: “Western
agents intend to sabotage the peace process in Ukraine. They don’t like
that the end of the conflict with Russia is in sight. After five years of war in
Ukraine, there are finally contours of a realistic (although not ideal) plan to
achieve peace in sight. The Ukrainians and the Russians basically agreed
with the so-called Steinmar [the author’s note: this is what the original
says] formula, i.e. organising elections in the Donbas area and awarding a
special status to this area. The only people who have a problem with this
are again European and American globalists (and their mercenary,
Poroshenko) who want and need the war and agitation against Russia at
any cost. This gang will stop at nothing to either take control of the Slavic
countries or set them against each other. It is only up to us to stand up to
them and tell them to leave us alone at last! We Slavs are no fools, and we
don’t need American agents, their “advice” and their wars.”36
In his article published by the Kultúra [Culture] fortnightly in Novem-
ber 2019, Uhrík lashed against “neo-Marxists, radical leftists and liber-
als” within the EU. One of his principal reservations against them was
their position on Russia. “Our Central European civilisation and cultural
heritage is not threatened only by the value derangement of liberals in
Brussels but also by their intensified agitation against the largest Slavic
nation – the Russians,” wrote Uhrík. “In less than three months of its

35
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-10-09-INT-1-
261-0000_SK.html
36
https://antipropaganda.sk/uhrik-siri-v-europskom-parlamente-proruske-
dezinformacie/

61
activity, the [incumbent] European Parliament has managed to adopt
three resolutions condemning the Russian Federation. It is clearly the
area in which the Euro-parliament is the most active. The first resolution
had to do with condemning Russia’s meddling with the situation in
Ukraine (as if the Western powers did not meddle with developments in
Ukraine). This resolution was passed in the presence of former Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko who was sitting in the VIP loge of the Euro-
pean Parliament. And, of course, in the absence of representatives of the
Russian Federation who did not get a chance to speak. The second anti-
Russian resolution had to do with accusing the incumbent Russian ad-
ministration of endorsing the breakout of World War II. In this resolution,
Western politicians reproach the Russian government led by President
Putin for “refusing to accept responsibility” for the German-Soviet pact
of Ribbentrop–Molotov, which allegedly helped Hitler set off World War
II. Of course, the resolution does not say a single word about the Munich
Agreement between the Western powers and Hitler. So far the most
recent anti-Russian resolution of the European Parliament has to do with
alleged spreading of disinformation and meddling with democratic elec-
tions as a tool of the so-called hybrid warfare. According to Brussels
politicians, propaganda, disinformation and foreign meddling with elec-
tions comes almost exclusively from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.
On the other hand, the EU, NATO and the third sector organisations
hooked up to the money from the USA and financial speculators spread
only objective truth in their political campaigns. Yeah, right...”37
In December 2019, Uhrík reacted via his Facebook profile to the deci-
sion to extend EU sanctions against Russia for its aggressive policy
against Ukraine as follows: “Three days ago, the EU with the consent
from the Pellegrini and Danko administration extended trade sanctions
against Russia by another six months. While Danko and Pellegrini speak
nicely of Russia in order to appeal to the people in Slovakia, their ad-

37
https://blbec.online/blb/155-milan-uhrik/zdielania/2?

62
ministration in fact silently and obediently supports anti-Russian agita-
tion, hoping that voters won’t notice that. The anti-Russian sanctions
whose objective is to stifle the rising Russia as much as possible have
caused over €180 billion worth of damage to firms based in EU coun-
tries. And they haven’t solved a thing... As long as anti-Russian agitators
are happy... If it was up to me, I would vote for abolishing these sanc-
tions even if it meant catapulting Merkel and Macaron [the author’s
note: this is what the original says] from their chairs”.38
In June 2020, Uhrík voted against a recommendation the EP adopted
before EU summit on the Eastern Partnership, which is a special format
of cooperation between the EU and select Eastern European countries,
former republics of the Soviet Union. Later, he explained his motives in
the following way: “I voted against this recommendation because behind
cooperation within the framework of Eastern Partnership is a geopolitical
game of third parties (USA and Russia). The EU acts merely as a media-
tor in this struggle, which in the end only makes maintaining peaceful and
stable relations with the Russian Federation more difficult.”39
Uhrík positively viewed not only foreign policy activities of Russia but
also internal policy measures of the Kremlin leadership. In July 2020, he
posted a Facebook status in which he called on Slovakia to draw inspira-
tion from Russia that recently amended its constitution: “Inspiration for
Slovak politicians – more national pride and less grovelling,” Uhrík head-
lined his status. “In a general plebiscite, the Russians approved exten-
sive changes to the Russian constitution, which unambiguously an-
chored traditional values, secured protection of their national sover-
eignty, and enacted valorisation of pension and social standards. Some
criticise that as part of the changes, the Russians allowed Putin to run
for presidency again, but that comes as no surprise given his high popu-

38
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/
39
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/sk/197763/MILAN_UHRIK/other-
activities/written-explanations#detailedcardmep

63
larity. In any case, many of the approved changes are good and might
serve as an inspiration for Slovak politics – for more national pride and
less grovelling. Up for good cooperation with Russia!”40
In full agreement with his previously advocated positions, Uhrík in
January 2021 voted against the EP resolution that condemned repres-
sive measures of the Russian government against Alexey Navalny, an
opposition leader whom the Russian secret service FSB first tried to
murder in August 2020 by using Novichok, a war chemical substance,
and then upon his return to Russia in January 2021 the police detained
and incarcerated him based on a previously fabricated charges and court
orders. Uhrík presented the reasons for his voting as follows: “Today in
Euro-parliament, we voted on condemning Russian Federation officials
for arresting Navalny. I voted against passing the resolution as it is
clearly aimed at increasing the pressure on Russia and render any eco-
nomic cooperation with it impossible under the pretext of supporting
Navalny as a dissident who is supposed to change the situation in Rus-
sia, but not in favour of civil society as the official reasons would like us
to believe but actually in favour of geopolitical interests that include
destabilisation and decline of Russia and forcing it to fall into line in the
power struggle between superpowers.”41
In January 2021, Uhrík criticised the cabinet’s proposal of the Security
Strategy of the Slovak Republic that was discussed in the Slovak parlia-
ment, calling it “yet another vassal document that furthers the domi-
nance of Americans in Slovakia and in the region”. He said that “on top
of the list of priorities, the new security strategy puts Slovakia’s obedi-
ence to the USA and only then its relations with NATO, the EU and oth-
ers. There is no mention of neutrality whatsoever. In other words, the
Slovak government will continue to be (and more and more officially so)
merely a bunch of American puppets ... I am convinced that NATO is a

40
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/
41
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/

64
residue of the Cold War and causes only problems in our times. In order
to maintain obedience of their vassal states within the alliance and de-
fend its raison d’étre, the Americans keep trying to seek an external
enemy. And so in recent years, they continuously provoke and pressurise
Russia just to be able to portray it as a threat that can only be withstood
under the wings of caring America ... In my opinion, ideological priorities
of Slovakia’s defence strategy should be as follows: first and foremost,
endeavour to achieve military neutrality; if military neutrality is not a
viable option in the short-term horizon (due to treaties, geopolitics, etc.),
then we should strive for defence cooperation with European states and,
ideally, also the Russian Federation...”42
Openly pro-Russian positions have regularly been presented also by
MEP Miroslav Radačovský who was elected off the ĽSNS ballot as an
independent candidate. Radačovský consistently opposed EP resolutions
criticising the Russian Federation for its foreign and internal policy meas-
ures, expressed open sympathies for the Russian state, identified himself
with its foreign policy steps (including the annexation of Crimea), empha-
sised the “Slavdom”, and criticised the Western states as well as the EU
and its institutions, including the EP in which he holds a seat himself.
In September 2019, during a debate on the resolution that sought to
condemn meddling with elections and democratic processes in EU mem-
ber states from abroad and spreading disinformation, Radačovský de-
clared: “Having heard and studied the reports on disinformation and hy-
brid wars, I gained an impression that we should all put on uniforms, get in
the planes and start an attack on Moscow. I do not consider it correct that
this report, and other reports as well, views Russia as the primary enemy
of the European Union”. Radačovský maintained that “dividing Europe
into the East and the West is unacceptable, and it is a road to hell ... Divid-
ing Europe by sanctions and missiles is unacceptable ... The European
house is only one and it is our common home. Such reports [as this EP

42
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/

65
resolution] are unacceptable because they are intended for militants, mili-
tantly oriented people, and you all know what it led to in history.“43
In September 2019, during a debate on the resolution that sought to
emphasise the importance of European historical awareness for the future
of Europe, Radačovský claimed that although the resolution specifically
mentioned the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, it was the Munich Agreement
that was in fact the principal cause of World War II. Radačovský called on
the EP to refrain from provoking “animosity between Russia and the rest
of the world because this animosity and this attitude of the European
Union may lead to another six million dead Jews, 25 million dead Slavs
and a lot of dead poor Germans in Dresden razed to the ground”.44
For the conspiratorial pro-Russian server Infovojna.sk, Radačovský
later commented on his voting against the resolution on the importance
of European historical awareness in this way: “For the sake of historical
objectiveness, it is necessary to point out that our current friends and
allies tore our homeland [Czechoslovakia] into pieces without even ne-
gotiating with us. This was the actual beginning of World War II in which
55 million people died and more than half of them were us, Slavs ... I
cannot subscribe to the non-objective disinformation attitude of most
EP deputies that the main cause of World War II was the Russians, i.e.
Slavs, or even that the war was started by a Slavic nation. That is why I
stood up against such disinformation in the EP.”45
In the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Radačovský sided with Russia and pro-
Russian forces in Ukraine, and endorsed the annexation of Crimea. In July
2019, he attended a roundtable in Brussels featuring Viktor Medvedchuk,
Ukraine’s pro-Russian political leader and relative of Russian President

43
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-09-17-INT-2-151-
0000_SK.html
44
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-09-18-INT-3-327-
0000_SK.html
45
https://www.infovojna.sk/article/video-radacovsky-v-europarlamente-varoval-
aby-sa-v-eu-nepodnecovalo-nepriatelstvo-medzi-ruskom-a-zvyskom-sveta

66
Vladimir Putin, who arrived at an invitation of MEPs who are members of
far-right, Eurosceptic and pro-Russian parties and factions. On his Face-
book profile, Radačovský informed that he took part in this event and that
“the principal issue of negotiations was establishing truce and peace in
Ukraine, in short, putting an end to the killing”.46 In his status, Radačovský
did not mention Russia as a party to the military conflict at all.
In December 2019, Radačovský called a draft of an EP resolution that
sought to condemn the Russian law on foreign agents a “fake”: “This is
a non-objective fake that is not based on fundamental facts. You all talk
about threats to opposition in Russia. But I took the effort, I took the
effort and I went through votes of the Russian parliament from 2012 to
2017 and 2019. These laws – the first, the second and the last – were
passed by the votes of 60% of the Russian Duma while not even Russian
opposition parties voted against, which means it is a decision of 250
million [the author’s note: this is what the original says] of Russian citi-
zens. This is an internal matter of Russia. It is a response to American
restrictions; therefore, let’s judge the matter objectively as opposed to
being Russophobes...”47
In April 2020, Radačovský criticised the EU for having failed to take
any measures against Latvia, which allowed marches of local collabora-
tionist military units’ veterans from the period of World War II who took
part in slaughtering Jews and Slavs. He juxtaposed this idleness to the
rising wave of resistance across Europe against the Russian motorcycle
gang Night Wolves and their effort to commemorate World War II anni-
versaries. Here, one must bear in mind that leading representatives of
this pro-Kremlin gang have been placed on the EU sanctions list for
taking part in occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in
2014 and in military operations in the war over Donbas, which is why

46
https://www.facebook.com/sudcaradacovsky/posts/838986903153669
47
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-12-19-INT-4-071-
0000_SK.html

67
they were banished from entering EU countries. Radačovský wrote: “But
Night Wolves, that is a problem alright! What a threat to Slovakia, to the
EU, and even to the entire world and to some of our Euro-bootlickers.
Young Russian patriots on motorcycles, without swastikas and other
Nazi symbols, well-behaved and harming nobody, who decided to lay
flowers on the graves of their fathers and grandfathers whose burial
mounds are scattered all around Europe. What a terrible threat! Who
cares about the marching neo-Nazis? It is the Night Wolves that must be
banished ... After all, why should we prevent Russian patriots from lay-
ing wreaths on the graves of their ancestors? A Euro-bootlicker and an
anti-Slav are always quick to find a reason and proper justification: be-
cause these Russian patriots have a different opinion on incorporation
of Crimea to the Russian Federation than the EU and Euro-bootlickers.
And because of their different opinion on the issue of Crimea, we are
ready to forbid them to lay wreaths on the graves of their relatives... By
the way, I also happen to have a different international law view regard-
ing the entry of the Crimean Republic into the Russian Federation than
Euro-bootlickers, and I am not alone with my opinion.”48
One should remember that for some time, there has been certain
asymmetry in mutual perception between ĽSNS and Russia. Although
ĽSNS leaders and party representatives in the Slovak and European
Parliament subscribe to the Kremlin’s overall foreign and internal policy
line by rejecting the EU and NATO and spreading clearly pro-Russian
positions and although they manifest open sympathies for the incum-
bent Russian leadership, the Kremlin itself perceives ĽSNS critically and
de facto disassociates itself from this party. In 2019, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation published a document entitled
On Situation of Glorifying Nazism, Spreading Neo-Nazism and other Prac-
tices Contributing to Escalation of Current Forms of Racism, Racial Dis-

48
https://blbec.online/blb/1358-judr-miroslav-radacovsky-ex-sudca-kandidat-na-
poslanca-ep/zdielania

68
crimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in which it provided its
own overview about neo-Nazi and extremist political forces around the
world. This is what the document had to say about ĽSNS: “It is a party
that openly subscribes to extremist ideas with elements of racial hatred
and actively uses the anti-Roma rhetoric. The party’s fundamental prin-
ciples include the ambition to establish a nationally and socially oriented
(i.e. national-socialist) state whose model they consider the pro-Nazi
wartime Slovak state. Its leaders including President Jozef Tiso, who
was sentenced to death penalty for war crimes, are adored within ĽSNS
as outstanding political figures with ‘invaluable contribution’ to the
forming of national statehood.”49
The political weight of ĽSNS, which can be expressed by election
results and voting preferences on the level of 8% and a zero coalition
potential, does not give this party too good prospects of participating in
government with other parties. Therefore, the chance of ĽSNS represen-
tatives to affect the adoption of political decisions is limited to their
activities in parliament. A recent split that occurred within the party in
February 2021 may eventually worsen its chances to preserve parlia-
mentary representation following the next elections. However, that
changes nothing about the fact that as long as they are represented in
parliament, its officials will certainly continue to promote anti-Western
and pro-Russian agenda in the field of foreign policy and to spread
among the population the pro-Kremlin narratives that undermine the
cohesion of democratic society.

49
О ситуации с героизацией нацизма, распространении неонацизма и других
видов практики, которые способствуют эскалации современных форм
расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними
нетерпимости. Доклад МИД России [On Situation of Glorifying Nazism,
Spreading Neo-Nazism and other Practices Contributing to Escalation of Current
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Re-
port of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia]. Moscow, 2019; available at:
https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/-
/asset_publisher/bB3NYd16mBFC/content/id/3193903

69
Slovenská národná strana [Slovak National Party]

Another relevant political formation with pro-Russian positions is the

Slovak National Party (SNS). The party suffered a fiasco in the 2020
parliamentary elections after receiving only 3.16% of the popular vote
and failing to clinch parliamentary seats. For four years leading up to
that flop (2016–2020), it was part of the ruling coalition with Smer-SD
and Most-Híd. Earlier, between 1994 and 1998, it was a coalition part-
ner of HZDS and the Workers’ Association of Slovakia (ZRS) and in
2006–2010 it formed a ruling coalition with Smer-SD and the HZDS. As
a party with parliamentary and government footing, the SNS had an
actual and immediate chance to influence the process of adopting politi-
cal decisions and shaping its supporters’ views practically since 1990.
During the period when it was led by radical nationalist politicians
such as Ján Slota and Anna Malíková-Belousovová, the SNS typically
manifested anti-Western inclinations such as anti-Americanism, anti-
Atlanticism and Euro-scepticism. These attitudes corresponded to the
party’s broader ideological profile as a national-populist political force
emphasising the priority of ethnic principle in politics and the idea of
solidarity of Slavic nations.
Nevertheless, not even the coarse anti-Atlanticism combined with
overtly pro-Russian positions of its radical leaders could prevent the
SNS from forming coalition governments with parties that formally de-
clared interest in Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO (e.g.
HZDS in 1994-1998) or later, when Slovakia already was a member of
both, with parties that formally declared interest in deepening EU inte-
gration and cooperation with NATO (e.g. Smer-SD in 2006-2010 or
2016-2020). The principal motivation of the SNS to form ruling coali-
tions with parties formally declaring the pro-Western course in foreign
policy has always been the consummation of power and the chance to
use the power position in favour of its leaders, nominees and clients.

70
 Year 2012 brought a radical change in the SNS leadership after lawyer
Andrej Danko was elected party chairman. Under his leadership, the SNS
gradually began to shed the stigma of a political subject with the sole
agenda of criticising Hungary, Hungarians and Slovakia’s Hungarian
minority. Public statements of party leaders suddenly stopped accentuat-
ing previous anti-Americanism, anti-Atlanticism and Euro-scepticism.
Under Danko’s leadership, the party stopped attacking the EU, NATO,
the USA and other European countries, including the neighbouring Hun-
gary. The SNS refrained from subscribing to exalted anti-Hungarian na-
tionalism and anti-Roma racism, which for many years had been the sole
agenda of its former chairman Ján Slota, author of numerous xenophobic
statements and actor of numerous scandals and asocial excesses includ-
ing alcoholic ones. Under Danko’s leadership, the SNS strove to earn the
image of a political party that understands the importance of Slovakia’s
affinity to integration groupings. In 2016, this gradually built pro-
integration image was supposed to be crowned by the decision to enter
the ruling coalition with Smer-SD and Most-Híd whose programme mani-
festo declared unambiguous pro-integration and pro-Atlantic foreign
policy orientation along with a campaign against domestic extremism
and fascism. In the context of the SNS’s overall development as originally
radical nationalist party, a truly historic landmark was its entry into the
ruling coalition with Most-Híd, a party that traditionally represented
many members of the Hungarian ethnic minority.
But all these changes merely formed a background to the magnificent
transformation of the SNS as part of the ruling coalition into a formation
that domestically as well as internationally lobbied for interests of an-
other state, namely the Russian Federation. The main protagonist of this
orientation was party chairman Andrej Danko, who tried to make sure
that his openly pro-Russian positions be not perceived as contradicting
the foreign policy priorities of the administration the SNS declared to
support. Danko strove not to put his pro-Russian positions in contradic-

71
tion to Slovakia’s commitments with respect to NATO and the EU.50 But
in fact, his advocating of pro-Russian attitudes had negative implica-
tions on the execution of the country’s foreign policy, its international
status and image. During the electoral term of 2016–2020 there were
many occasions when the SNS conditioned its consent with various
government decisions and measures by demanding that they refrain

50
This situation began to change when the SNS lost parliamentary representation
after the 2020 elections and began to combine its pro-Russian positions with
clearly negative self-disassociation from Western countries. In December 2020,
already a non-parliamentary party, the SNS criticised the cabinet’s proposal of
Slovakia’s new security strategy whose approval in parliament it had blocked pre-
viously. SNS Vice-Chairman Jaroslav Paška claimed that the document “fails to
comply with elementary principles of objective evaluation of the security environ-
ment and offer a credible political vision of guaranteeing a stable and safe life to
our citizens and peaceful progress to our state, especially when such an important
government document uses a non-diplomatic, assertive language to needlessly
attack global powers although all leading countries in the world are still interested
in maintaining safe trade cooperation with them in spite of numerous democratic
shortcomings”. Here, Paška was referring to China but especially Russia. He re-
proached the document for “attacking” Russia by emphasising its aggressive
measures vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia that amounted to violations of interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, Paška failed to disprove any actual facts stated in the
document. His opposition to the strategy was based on the opinion that the
document failed to feature “the same punchy formulations” in passages dedicated
to the USA, that it did not use the “same yardstick”, which according to Paška
would inevitably make Foreign Affairs Minister Ivan Korčok to “lash out equally
obstinately at Minister Pompeo or President Trump for the bombardment of Syria,
the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani or Iranian nuclear physicist Moh-
sen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, but also for destroying Iraq, Libya or the staging of
the coup d’état in Venezuela or military separation of Kosovo from Serbia”.
Paška’s commentary uses an openly anti-American diction as it not only ignores
the fact that Slovakia is a member state of NATO but it even considers its allies
and the North Atlantic Alliance itself to be a security threat and risk by asserting
that “an important government document on security of the Slovak Republic is
completely hollow in the field of identifying security risks and threats ensuing
from the uncontrollable geopolitical activities of the USA as well as NATO. It con-
ceals serious security threats and risks.” (Quoted from “Jaroslav Paška: Bezpeč-
nostná stratégia, či manifest slaboduchého vazalstva?” [‘Jaroslav Paška: Security
Strategy or Manifesto of Feeble-Minded Vassalage?’], SITA news agency,
December 12, 2020).

72
from criticising Russia, they are not perceived negatively by Russia or
they do not have negative effects on Russia.
Between 2016 and 2020, Danko held the post of chairman of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic, the second highest constitu-
tional post in the country. In over 30 years of Slovakia’s post-communist
democratic transformation, this post was never held by anybody who
would be a more devoted stalwart of Russia. For the Russian Federation
and its policies in the region of Central Europe, this was a particularly
welcome opportunity. Throughout his four-year stint as parliament
chairman, Danko behaved like an overt lobbyist advocating interests of a
foreign country; furthermore, not only did he do nothing to keep it secret
but, on the contrary, he did everything to make it ostentatiously obvious.
The intensity of Danko’s friendly and favourable attitude to the Russian
Federation merely increased in time.
If one was to sum up the reasons for Danko’s accommodating atti-
tude to Russia based on his own public statements, they would come up
with three basic arguments: first, Russia is an important, almost irre-
placeable partner to Slovakia, especially in the field of economy; second,
there are unique predispositions that force Slovakia to maintain good,
even outstanding relations with Russia; third, Danko himself as a person
has a very positive relation to Russia.
In the ruling coalition with Smer-SD and Most-Híd that governed the
country between 2016 and 2020, the SNS focused primarily on con-
summating the practical benefits of participating in government, espe-
cially in executive portfolios it acquired based on the coalition agree-
ment. But on top of it, it managed to achieve something it never had in
the past: thanks to the post of parliament chairman, it pulled strings in
the field of foreign policy, security and defence in a way that compli-
cated thorough observation of the country’s pro-integration and pro-
Atlantic orientation. For instance, the SNS thwarted passing the coun-
try’s new security strategy in parliament based solely on Andrej Danko’s

73
reservation that the draft prepared and approved by the cabinet, where
all SNS ministers voted for it, included a reference to a security threat
ensuing from Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian warfare activi-
ties in Eastern Ukraine. The SNS also refused to support a bilateral
treaty on cooperation with the United States in the field of defence un-
der the pretext that such an agreement would allegedly amount to limit-
ing Slovakia’s sovereignty, which the SNS opposed. As parliament
chairman, Danko repeatedly visited Moscow to present statements that
contradicted Slovakia’s official foreign policy line and conformed to
official foreign policy line of the Russian Federation. During his four-
year stint, there was no other world capital Danko would visit more fre-
quently than Moscow.
Between 2017 and 2019, Andrej Danko as parliament chairman made
a number of official state visits to the Russian Federation that included
meeting representatives of Russian government organs, giving speeches
at these organs’ soil, attending important events organised by Russian
supreme constitutional officials as well as events organised on the terri-
tory of the Russian Federation by international organisations. Danko
would also meet with leading Russian government officials at various
events in third countries he attended as the Slovak parliament’s chair-
man. He rarely missed an opportunity to refer specifically to his meet-
ings with his Russian partners, to convey to the general public his views
on Slovakia’s cooperation with Russia, Slovak-Russian bilateral rela-
tions or mutual relations between Russia and the EU. During these vis-
its, he did not comment on Slovakia’s relations with any other country
more frequently than on its relations with Russia.
The public messages Danko kept sending from these visits and events
may be summed up as follows: Slovakia must cooperate and maintain
good relations with Russia; Russia and Slovakia have specific qualifica-
tions for mutual cooperation, with the past serving a good example;
Slovakia should not respect the sanctions the EU imposed on Russia; all

74
limitations the West has imposed on Russia should be abolished. These
messages never featured a single trace of criticism of Russia’s policies,
solely praise.
In October 2017, Danko led a Slovak parliament’s delegation to a
session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Petersburg. During the visit,
he expressed his conviction that “the sanctions against Russia will pass,
and Russia and Slovakia will be able to develop trade relations”. He also
said he would do “everything to deepen cooperation between [the Slo-
vak parliament] and Russia’s State Duma because it will help the Slo-
vaks. We ought to carry on the good relations we used to have with
Russia. We used to have many high-quality Russian language teachers,
but we gave them up. We have neglected a lot, missed out on a lot, be-
cause we wanted to be different.” The SNS chairman added that “in
spite of the sanctions, Russia’s trade with EU countries and the USA is
thriving. We should not let ourselves miss this train. When there are
other states here, there must also be Slovakia”.51 Danko reiterated his
idea about the need to expand the teaching of Russian language in Slo-
vakia during his meeting with Sankt Petersburg Governor Georgiy Pol-
tavchenko. According to him, we should “make Russian language teach-
ers who have had to change their teaching qualifications to return to
teaching Russian language again”.52
One month later, in November 2017, Danko went on another official
visit of Russia during which he gave a speech at the plenary session of the
State Duma. The content of his speech provoked critical reactions in Slo-
vakia. The chairman of the Slovak parliament characterised the founda-
tion for future Slovak-Russian relations in the following way: “We are

51
“Danko: Verí, že sankcie proti Rusku pominú a rozvinieme ekonomické vzťahy”
[‘Danko: I Believe Sanctions against Russia Will Pass Away and We Will Develop
Economic Relations’], SITA news agency, October 10, 2017.
52
“Danko: Uvítal by viac ruštiny na slovenských školách” [‘Danko: I Would Welcome
More Russian Teaching at Slovak Schools’], SITA news agency, October 17, 2017.

75
Slavs; our culture, history but also perception of our surroundings are
interconnected and close. We understand each other; we trust each other.
But we cannot take that for granted; we must value the gift we have been
given and continue to develop our Slavic world together. By global stan-
dards, it is a unique formation that did not come to be by chance. To-
gether, we are part of it. It was this feeling of togetherness that helped us
overcome even the most difficult periods in our nation’s history. We were
not connected merely by some artificial ideology as we had thought. It
was our Slavic essence, our history, our ancestry.”53 During his visit,
Danko also met with State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin and the
Federation Council Chairwoman Valentina Matviyenko. Both officials
were placed on the sanction list of the EU and the USA in 2014 for their
personal participation in the illegal annexation of Ukrainian Crimea.
The Slovak parliament chairman’s speech in the State Duma pro-
voked a wave of criticism from opposition parties’ leaders as well as
representatives of one ruling party, namely Most-Híd. They all criticised
Danko for the very fact that in the capacity of a supreme constitutional
official of an EU member state he had decided to travel to Russia, which
was at the time facing Western countries’ sanctions for its aggression
against Ukraine, as well as for his address’s discrepancy with the coun-
try’s official foreign policy doctrine, for distorting history and ignoring
Slovakia’s current international position and commitments ensuing from
its EU and NATO membership.
On the other hand, Danko’s party colleagues tried to defend his posi-
tion. For instance, SNS Vice-Chairman Anton Hrnko said: “Slovakia is
not a world superpower, and cannot afford the luxury of forgetting
about its old friends when it gains new ones, and its new friends must
not behave like small children in a sandbox who condition their friend-

53
“Andrej Danko ako prvý Slovák vystúpil v ruskej Štátnej dume” [‘Andrej Danko
Became the First Slovak to Give Speech in Russian State Duma’], SITA news
agency, November 15, 2017.

76
ship by abolishing previous friendships”. According to Hrnko, Slovakia is
“deeply grateful to the Russian nation not only for liberating it from the
fascist occupation but also for providing a glimmer of hope to gain its
own sovereignty at the time of hard ethnic oppression ... The Slovak
Republic is a sovereign state with its own foreign policy interests. Part
of these interests is certainly not an inflammatory anti-Russian cam-
paign that seeks to portray Russia and its leading representatives as
nearly the cause of all evil that bothers Europe and the entire world.”
Hrnko claimed it is impossible to guarantee peace in Europe without “a
strong Russia”.54
Upon his return to Slovakia, Danko also fought to defend his address
in the Russian parliament. He declared that he stuck to every word in his
address and that it was an honour for him to be able to give a speech in
the State Duma. The SNS chairman also elaborated on his perception of
Slovak-Russian mutual relations. According to him, “all Russians cannot
be identified with Communism and we cannot judge nations based on
individual historical stages. Not every Russian is a communist, just like
we cannot say that every German must be a fascist. I cannot mix ideol-
ogy with an entire nation”. But Danko failed to clarify the examples he
based his assertions on and failed to specify who was “mixing ideology
with an entire nation”. Not a single opposition leader or Most-Híd repre-
sentative reproached Russia for communism or any other ideology; all
they did was point out that Russia was violating international law and
criticised Danko for refusing to take it into account at all and presenting
statements that contradicted the official EU line. The SNS chairman also
claimed that “despite sanctions, certain states do business with Russia
off their own bat” and emphasised that it was necessary to use experi-

54
“Hrnko: História ukáže, aký dôležitý to bol krok, povedal podpredseda SNS o
Dankovom prejave v Ruskom parlamente” [‘Hrnko: History Will Show Significance
of This Step, Said SNS Vice-Chairman on Danko’s Address in Russian Parlia-
ment’], SITA news agency, November 18, 2017.

77
ences of nations that are “historically better able to communicate with
Russia”.55 In doing so, Danko actually identified himself with the fact that
certain states (without specifying them) disobeyed sanctions against
Russia and indirectly recommended Slovakia to do the same. After some
time, the SNS chairman returned to his address in the State Duma again,
saying that giving a speech during its session was not an honour only for
him as parliament chairman but also for Slovakia and the Slovak nation.
He said he was only trying to demonstrate that “within the EU, we can
act like a bridge in matters that divide Europe” and that he viewed his
address a “historic moment as I was only the fifth politician over the past
ten years to have been given such an opportunity”.56
Another important state visit of Anton Danko to Moscow took place
in May 2019. The highlight of it was attending the annual military pa-
rade on the occasion of commemorating the anniversary of the end of
World War II in Europe, which is celebrated in Russia as the Victory Day
in the Great Patriotic War. Part of the visit was another round of talks
with State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin.
Shortly before his departure to Moscow, Danko publicly declared how
“very pleasantly surprised I was by the invitation. It is a display of in-
credible honour, which simply cannot be turned down”.57 In the Red
Square, Danko shook hands with President Vladimir Putin. Upon his
return home, he declared that “Slovakia must maintain good relations
with Russia also because of her energy dependence”. Shortly after-
wards, he said in a televised debate for TA3 that he regretted he was not

55
“TA3: Danko si stojí za svojím prejavom v Štátnej dume” [‘TA3: Danko Sticks with
his Address in the State Duma’], SITA news agency, November 19, 2017.
56
“NR SR: Danko si stojí za každým slovom svojho vystúpenia v ruskej Štátnej
dume” [‘NR SR: Danko Sticks to Every Word from His Address in Russian State
Duma’], SITA news agency, December 15, 2017.
57
“SR-Rusko: Danko navštívi Moskvu, zúčastní sa aj na prehliadke na Červenom
námestí” [‘Slovakia-Russia: Danko to Visit Moscow, Attend Parade on Red
Square’], SITA news agency, May 6, 2019.

78
president and he could not do what Czech President Miloš Zeman was
doing with respect to Russia. When reminded that State Duma Chairman
Volodin whom Danko was meeting regularly now had been placed on EU
and U.S. sanctions lists, Danko said that “the sanction list does not
amount to quarantine” and that other European countries’ officials also
visited Russia. He boasted that Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey
Lavrov personally asked him what he thought about the parade. He also
boasted about the fact that he was the sole parliament chairman of not
only EU countries but from the entire world attending the parade. “I
never dreamt of the honour I would receive,” he said.58 Danko apparently
did not realise that by emphasising the unique nature of his attending
the parade merely confirmed the extent of deep international isolation
of the incumbent Russian leadership and that it was Danko who failed to
manifest solidarity with Slovakia’s allies in the EU and NATO.
The SNS chairman repeatedly emphasised the unique nature of Slo-
vakia and his personal role with respect to Russia: “For Slovakia, it is
only beneficial when it keeps a door opened to the East and to the West.
Thanks in part to my work and my establishing the necessary contacts
and relationships, the Russian party is becoming increasingly interested
in possibilities of economic cooperation and potential business partner-
ships ... Parliament chairman discussing with Foreign Affairs Minister
Sergey Lavrov, President Vladimir Putin, holding talks with State Duma
chairman, keeping in touch with [Russian] minister of industry – that’s
something other state leaders envy us.”59
In July 2019, the SNS chairman visited Moscow again in order to
attend an international conference on development of parliamentarian-
ism. The bizarre aspect of an EU member state’s speaker of parliament

58
“TA3: Putinovi som sa neklaňal, tvrdí Danko” [‘TA3: I Didn’t Grovel to Putin,
Claims Danko’], SITA news agency, May 12, 2019.
59
“Danko: Správny politik by mal nadväzovať kontakty, ktoré sú pre Slovákov príno-
som” [‘Danko: The Right Politician Should Establish Contacts that Are Beneficial
to Slovakia’], SITA news agency, June 5, 2019.

79
attending this event was in the fact that contemporary Russia is a case
in example of negating fundamental principles of parliamentarianism
such as the absence of free and fair elections, manipulated ballot count-
ing, draconic requirements pertaining to registration of new political
parties, preventing representatives of opposition political forces from
participating in elections, the submissive status of parliament with re-
spect to so-called presidential vertical, etc. In Moscow, Danko was ac-
companied by a group of Slovak entrepreneurs who were supposed to
hold negotiations with representatives of African states on possibilities
of “expanding into the black continent in cooperation with Russian
firms”. Danko also presented his idea of what this cooperation should
look like. “The Russians have gained an outstanding foothold on the
black continent. They have been negotiating investment in joint ven-
tures in the long term, which has already been reflected in the balance of
trade between the Russian Federation and Africa. But they are getting
ready to invest at even a greater scale there, and in a number of areas,
too. And it was exactly this cooperation that Slovakia has been invited
to participate in.” According to Danko, Russia and China are leading the
way in trade statistics with Africa and “interstate cooperation such as
the one Slovakia has been invited to take part in involves a number of
countries nowadays. For instance, the Hungarians are already doing
business with their Russian partners in the field of railroad transporta-
tion in Egypt.”60
In November 2019, the SNS chairman visited Moscow to accept a
doctorate honoris causa from the Moscow State Institute of Interna-
tional Relations (MGIMO) for “development of Slovak-Russian relations,
cooperation and contribution on the level of parliamentarianism and for
his merits in the field of strengthening peace, international cooperation

60
“Danko: S Rusmi môžeme preraziť aj na afrických trhoch” [‘Danko: With the Rus-
sians, We Can Make a Breakthrough onto African Markets’], SITA news agency,
July 27, 2019.

80
and friendly relations between nations”. The gala ceremony was also
attended by State Duma Chairman Volodin. During his trip, Danko also
gave a speech at a conference dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the
Slovak National Uprising.61
In December 2019, Danko visited Moscow again. He used the oppor-
tunity to thank Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov for his
diplomatic work. “This is a great honour for me,” declared Danko. “I bow
to everything Mr. Lavrov does in the field of international relations and I
consider him to be one of the most prominent politicians of today.” Then
he made a pledge to the Russian minister to stop fascism in Slovakia:
“I will not allow Slovakia to be ruled by fascist parties. With Mr. Lavrov,
we often discuss on how to treat people who do not honour history. The
Slovak Republic does everything to commemorate the sacrifice of sol-
diers who fought in World War II.”62
While attending various events abroad, Danko rarely missed an op-
portunity to emphasise his personal ties to State Duma Chairman Vo-
lodin. In July 2017, the two officials met in Soul at a summit of parlia-
ment chairpersons of Eurasian states. On this occasion, Danko declared
that he has built “collegial and even friendly relationship” with the State
Duma chairman. When asked to comment on bilateral Slovak-Russian
relations in the context of the negative position of the EU, which im-
posed sanctions on Russia for its aggressive foreign policy, Danko said:
“Of course, there is a position of certain reservation on the part of the
European Union. But Slovakia has a certain specific. And I beg your
pardon, but we are obliged to cooperate with Russia, we are obliged to

61
“Predsedovi SNS a NR SR bol udelený čestný doktorát na jednej z najprestížne-
jších svetových univerzít” [‘SNS and NR SR Chairman Was Bestowed Honorary
Doctorate by One of the World’s Most Prestigious Universities’], SITA news
agency, November 7, 2019.
62
“Andrej Danko: Sľúbil som pánovi ministrovi Lavrovovi, že zastavíme fašizmus”
[‘Andrej Danko: I Promised to Mr. Minister Lavrov that We Would Stop Fascism’],
SITA news agency, December 5, 2019.

81
maintain outstanding relations with [the Russians] also because we are
dependent on them for our raw materials, we are dependent on them on
many levels.”63
Danko and Volodin met again in October 2018 at another summit of
parliament chairpersons of Eurasian states in Turkey. On this occasion,
Danko publicly regretted that due to sanctions he had not been able to
bring “this important summit” to Bratislava. According to Danko, “the
sanctions are a very unfortunate measure”. The head of the lower cham-
ber of the Russian parliament reacted by borrowing the diction of his
Slovak partner from his address in the State Duma in November 2017:
“We are Slavic nations, we belong to each other. The Slovak parliament
led by Andrej Danko does its best to improve communication between
the European Union and Russia. Thanks to that, our relations shall con-
tinue to grow richer and stronger.”64 Of course, there are no available
information that would confirm that activities of Slovak parliament and
its chairman have truly led to improved communication between the EU
and Russia.
In April 2018, Danko publicly expressed his satisfaction over the fact
that Slovakia did not expel Russian diplomats in reaction to attempted
murder of Sergey Skripal and his daughter by agents of the Russian se-
cret service GRU in Great Britain. In December 2018, after Slovakia ex-
pelled a diplomatic employee from the office of defence attaché at the
Russian embassy in Bratislava for pursuing intelligence activities aimed
against interests of Slovakia and NATO, Danko refused to comment on
the situation; however, he indirectly expressed dissatisfaction with the
scandal’s publicity by first declaring that “there is also a silent way of

63
“TA3: Sme povinní spolupracovať s Ruskom, vyhlásil Danko” [‘TA3: We Are
Obliged to Cooperate with Russia, Stated Danko’], SITA news agency, July 2, 2017.
64
“Most-Híd: Na zahraničnopolitickú orientáciu Slovenska má iný názor ako SNS”
[‘Most-Híd Has Different Views of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Orientation than the
SNS’], SITA news agency, October 10, 2018.

82
expulsion” and then trying to play down the gravity of the entire scandal:
“When you take a look at the history of expulsions of diplomats from the
East or from the West, it is a regular routine in [diplomatic] relations.”65
In February 2021, having remained out of the limelight for almost a
year, Danko publicly reacted to a statement by Prime Minister Igor Ma-
tovič on the possibilities of producing Russian vaccine Sputnik V in Slo-
vakia. Danko accused Matovič of misleading the public by speaking
about production of the vaccine in Slovakia. “Nobody in Russia wants to
produce Sputnik in Slovakia, even though I would very much wish for it. I
hereby repeatedly and publicly offer my helping hand in facilitating di-
rect negotiations with responsible ministers of the Russian Federation
regarding the purchase of vaccine Sputnik. If the Slovaks are denied the
chance to get vaccinated with Sputnik, your cabinet shall bear the full
responsibility. You do nothing for the registration of Sputnik or for the
purchase of Sputnik. I hereby call on you to open talks with the Russian
party about the purchase of Sputnik, instead of telling this nation fairy
tales about the production of Sputnik.”66
The activities pursued by Andrej Danko and his party colleagues from
the SNS justify a conclusion that between 2016 and 2020, part of the
ruling coalition in Slovakia was a political force whose verbal statements
and practical steps in the field of Slovak-Russian bilateral relations indi-
cated that it prefers interests of a foreign country to those of its own
that ensue from its membership in the EU and NATO. When faced with
problems emerging between the Western community of democratic
states and authoritarian Russia that is hostile vis-à-vis the EU and
NATO, the SNS and its chairman Danko always sided with Russia.

65
“Danko: Vyhostenie je bežná rutina v rámci vzťahov” [‘Danko: Expulsion Is Regu-
lar Routine in Diplomatic Relations’], SITA news agency, December 6, 2018.
66
“SNS: Pán Matovič, neklamte o Sputniku” [‘SNS: Mr. Matovič, Stop Lying about
Sputnik’], SITA news agency, February 6, 2021.

83
Smer – sociálna demokracia [Smer – Social Democracy]

Smer-SD is a political party with ambivalent attitude to Russia and its

policies. The ambivalence (and certain uniqueness that ensues from
it) of Smer-SD on Slovakia’s political scene rests in the fact that al-
though the party positions itself as supporter of pro-integration and
pro-Atlantic line in the country’s foreign policy (it declared this espe-
cially during the period when it held power), its programme docu-
ments barely reflect it and public statements of several of its repre-
sentatives at the level of highest party leadership and parliamentary
representation are openly pro-Russian. This shows most typically in
the refusal to adopt critical positions vis-à-vis Russia that would be
solidary with those of Slovakia’s allies and partners in NATO and EU,
or open opposition to decisions of these groupings’ supreme organs
(e.g. refusing economic sanctions and repeated calls to lift them). No
other political party in Slovakia manifests this ambivalence and two-
tiered approach in such visible forms as Smer-SD. Although the party
as a whole cannot be characterised as an overt promoter of Russian
influence, there are individuals within its ranks who fit that descrip-
tion indisputably.
Although Smer-SD spent 12 years in the position of a leading gov-
ernment force, until the present day it has not elaborated a detailed
programme in the field of foreign policy that would unequivocally reflect
its views and attitudes in this area. Before parliamentary elections of
2020, the party did not present any political programme whatsoever.
Before the most recent elections to European Parliament in 2019, Smer-
SD published three programme theses. One of them was an ambition to
turn Slovakia into “a bridge that connects the East and the West”, with
the following specification: “To us, Russia is an important partner, not a
threat, and our MEPs are prepared to contribute to restoring the dia-
logue between the East and the West”.

84
 A decisive influence over the views and attitudes of the party and its
leaders in the field of foreign policy has always had its Chairman Robert
Fico who held the post of Slovakia’s prime minister in 2006–2010 and
2012–2018. In the capacity of prime minister, Fico occasionally adopted
foreign policy views and positions that did not concur with official views
and positions of the cabinet he led. It was always in situations that in-
cluded Russia in the position of direct or indirect actor. In such situa-
tions, Smer-SD chairman either adopted standpoints that were close to
those of Russia or expressed greater understanding for the Russian
positions than for those of the EU and NATO. Such was the case of the
Russian-Georgian war (2008), the Russian-Ukrainian feud over gas
supplies (2008–2009), the project of building an American anti-missile
system in Europe (2007–2008), the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict
(2014 –) or the sanctions imposed on Russia for its aggressive conduct
in the field of foreign policy.
One must bear in mind that political socialisation of Robert Fico took
place in the final stages of the communist regime’s existence. Fico was
fully identified with the social order that had been created with direct
assistance of the Soviet Union. During his studies of law at Comenius
University, he joined the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS); shortly
upon graduation, he got a job with the Ministry of Justice. Not only did
he not take any active role in toppling the communist regime in 1989
but he did not even belong to any reform factions within the KSS. As
one of leading representatives of the post-communist SDĽ – which he
joined after it had already been founded – he became known for his
criticism of several reform measures implemented in Slovakia as part of
democratic transformation. He always considered the system that ex-
isted here before November 1989 to be socially more just, although he
admitted it was less free than the one the country began to build after
1989. Given his set of views and values, Fico’s positive perception of the
Soviet Union and Russia came as no surprise.

85
 Fico’s positive attitude to Russia and its policies began to show more
visibly after the post of president of the Russian Federation was taken
by Vladimir Putin. When Fico in 2008 publicly urged the Slovaks to
greater “solidarity” and stronger national pride,67 he mentioned the ex-
ample of Russians “whose pride was restored by President Putin”.68 The
chairman of Smer-SD made no secret of his admiration for Putin, com-
bining his sympathies for him with publicly defending Putin’s positions
on international issues. Fico was the only politician from EU member
states who in September 2011 attended the congress of the United Rus-
sia ruling party in Moscow at which Putin, then prime minister, and
Dmitriy Medvedev, then president, announced their joint decision to
swap their posts for the upcoming electoral term. Fico gave a speech at
the congress, declaring that “there cannot be full-fledged Europe with-
out Russia and strong Russia without Europe”.69 Smer-SD has main-
tained vivid contacts with United Russia ever since. In December 2012,
the congress of Smer-SD in Košice was attended by United Russia
member Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee of the State Duma.
In the process of Fico’s inclination to Russia, a certain role may have
been played by his mistrust vis-à-vis the United States, which he fre-
quently manifested. It is a well-known fact that people in Slovakia who
feel greater mistrust vis-à-vis the USA also tend to trust Russia, which
they view as the antipode to the USA. As opposition leader, Fico often
criticised the second Mikuláš Dzurinda’s administration (2002–2006)
for its allegedly servile attitude with respect to the United States and
condemned the United States for its invasion to Iraq, claiming that

67
“Fico na oslavách znovu vyzval k zjednoteniu spoločnosti” [‘At Celebrations, Fico
Again Called for Consolidation of Society’], ČTK news agency, August 29, 2008.
68
“Fico: Putin vrátil Rusom hrdosť, to je vážna vec” [‘Fico: Putin Restored the Rus-
sians’ Pride, That’s No Small Thing’], SITA news agency, March 6, 2008.
69
Chorvatovič, Marek: “Fico pozdravil éru Putina” [‘Fico Greeted the Era of Putin’],
Sme daily, September 26, 2011.

86
American troops in Iraq merely defended U.S. economic interests and
comparing their presence in Iraq to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by
the Soviet Union after 1968. Fico’s increasingly accommodating ap-
proach to Russia may have been catalysed by his calculation that it
might help boost electoral support of Smer-SD.
The attitude of Fico and the entire Smer-SD to the Russian-Ukrainian
military conflict in 2014–2015 was particularly revealing of his true col-
ours. Fico took pains to use more moderate characteristics to refer to
Russia’s policy and play down its direct political and military involvement.
For instance, Fico never spoke of aggression or occupation with respect to
Russian invasion to Crimea; instead, he frequently used the formula of
“violation of international law principles”. After 2014, Smer-SD chairman
consistently and repeatedly advocated lifting the sanctions the EU im-
posed on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. In doing so, he pre-
sented a plethora of arguments against the sanctions but not once – even
on a hypothetical level – mentioned a single argument in favour of these
sanctions, despite the fact that the imposing them was a joint decision of
all EU member states including Slovakia. Later on, he repeatedly spoke of
alleged ineffectiveness of the sanctions with poorly masked satisfaction.
As Russian military and paramilitary units were taking Crimea by
storm in February 2014, Fico who at that time was running for president
did everything to avoid addressing the issue and taking a clear stance,
although he was repeatedly called on to do so by the opposition and the
media. It was not until early March 2014, during a televised debate of
presidential candidates, that he first publicly presented his views of the
events in Crimea. But although he stated that they constitute “a violation
of international law”, he refused to name Russia directly, let alone explic-
itly condemn the country that was responsible for the violation.70 Later,

70
“Voľby: Hľaďme na vlastné národnoštátne záujmy, tvrdí Fico k Ukrajine” [‘Elections:
Let’s Mind Our Own National and State Interests, Said Fico about Ukraine’], SITA
news agency, March 4, 2014.

87
Fico described the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a “world propagandistic
war” and reproached the EU for listening only to “the Ukrainian voice”
while “nobody was too interested in hearing out the other party’s
voice”.71
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict was a model situation that was in
many respects symptomatic of the party’s behaviour in all matters
involving Russia. Officially, Smer-SD presented generally formulated
statements regarding the need to seek a “peaceful resolution” that
were meant to manifest its balanced position. In fact, public state-
ments by all representatives of Smer-SD including deputies of the
Slovak and European parliaments who commented on various aspects
and circumstances of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict were generally
critical of Ukraine, if not flat out anti-Ukrainian. While many party
officials spoke unequivocally in Russia’s favour, there was not a single
one who would present a standpoint that could be considered even
remotely pro-Ukrainian.
In September 2014, the party’s position on the conflict came into the
light after its deputies refused to include in the parliament’s resolution
regarding the situation in Ukraine a specific call on Russia to respect
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Instead, deputies for Smer-SD railroaded
through the assembly a different wording of the resolution in which the
parliament welcomed the Minsk agreement between the Ukrainian gov-
ernment and “insurgents” from Doneck and Luhansk areas and called
upon all parties to the conflict to respect it.72 Later, Fico publicly claimed
that Russia had done more than Ukraine for peaceful resolution of the
conflict.

71
“TA3: V prípade Ukrajiny ide podľa Fica o propagandistickú vojnu” [‘TA3: The
War In Ukraine Is a Propagandistic One According to Fico’], SITA news agency,
September 7, 2014.
72
“NR SR: Smer-SD nevyzval Rusko zastaviť agresiu voči Ukrajine” [‘NR SR: Smer-
SD Refused to Call on Russia to Stop Aggression against Ukraine’], SITA news
agency, September 24, 2014.

88
 In 2018, Fico emphatically opposed calls from abroad on the Slovak
Government to expel Russian diplomats in reaction to the attempted
murder of Sergey Skripal and his daughter by agents of Russian secret
service GRU in the United Kingdom, publicly welcoming a decision of the
Peter Pellegrini administration not to expel a single Russian diplomat.
As the chairman of a party that in March 2018 appointed Peter Pelle-
grini, who at that time was totally loyal to him, to the post of prime min-
ister, Fico undoubtedly influenced the cabinet’s decision-making on the
matter. Fico reiterated that Russia was a strategic partner of Slovakia,
which was interested in maintaining friendly relations with it as it was a
“sovereign country that adopts its decisions in a sovereign fashion”.
According to Fico, Slovakia had always been solidary with the EU but he
said he did not feel the EU being united regarding the Skripal case.
“Some people have a certain opinion; others have another ... Let’s not be
pig-headed here. When they present to us hard evidence, as opposed to
some pictures, then maybe we will take some sort of a stance on it. But I
refuse to destroy friendly relations with Russia just because somebody
else would have me to.” At the same time, Fico called the United King-
dom’s request that its allies join it in expelling Russian diplomats “inso-
lent”.73 He presented his position, which was rather undiplomatic vis-à-
vis the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the United Kingdom had
provided its EU and NATO allies with enough evidence to adopt an in-
formed stance on the scandal.
The chairman of Smer-SD frequently lobbied in favour of Russia at
his meetings with foreign officials. For instance, during his meeting with
Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe (CoE), he
pleaded for Russia to remain a Council of Europe member state: “Russia
needs the Council of Europe the same as the Council of Europe needs

73
“Koalícia: Russia potrebujeme, zhodujú sa Fico a Danko” [‘Coalition: We Need
Russia, Fico and Danko Claim in Unison’], SITA news agency, March 27, 2018.

89
Russia.”74 In a telephone conversation with French President Emmanuel
Macron, Fico tried to convince him about the importance to maintain
friendly relations with Russia: “We must not make the Russian Federation
our enemy number one as for all of us, that enemy is terrorism. It is in our
interest to have good, friendly relations, and I believe that mutual rela-
tions between the EU and Russia will develop in the same vein.”75
Unlike some other Slovak politicians, Fico was not too pro-active
regarding the “Russian” agenda, especially over the past several years.
Russia and its policies or the situation in Slovak-Russian mutual rela-
tions were not cardinal issues for the leader of Smer-SD as he preferred
to focus rather on the domestic political agenda. On the other hand,
though, his views as the party leader were sufficiently influential for
Smer-SD and its leading representatives, members and sympathisers.
After his forced resignation from the post of prime minister, though,
Fico began to grow more vocal regarding foreign policy issues, including
those related to Russia. In February 2021, Fico did not miss an opportu-
nity to express his opinion about Slovakia using the Russian vaccine
Sputnik V, which had not been registered in the EU, in his typical style of
jumping to far-reaching conclusions based on one concrete circum-
stance. These conclusions had to do with Slovakia’s place in the system
of international relations in the context of approach to Russia. Fico, who
had become known for his negative views of vaccination as such, sud-
denly labelled the initial Slovak Government’s decision not to purchase
this vaccine as a “display of anti-Russian attitude that will jeopardise
the interests of people in Slovakia”. The purchase of the Russian vaccine
had been vetoed at the cabinet session by the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Investment, Regional Development and Informatisation

74
“Fico: Generálny tajomník Rady Európy príde na Slovensko, chce vidieť Spišský
Hrhov” [‘Fico: Council of Europe General Secretary Will Come to Slovakia, Wants
to See Spišský Hrhov’], SITA news agency, October 18, 2017.
75
“Fico: Macron sa zaujímal o Ficov názor na Rusko” [‘Fico: Macron Was Interested
to Hear Fico’s Views of Russia’], SITA news agency, May 29, 2017.

90
Veronika Remišová who is also the chairwoman of the ruling party Za
ľudí. Remišová called the proposal to purchase non-certified Sputnik a
hazard with citizens’ health. Fico declared that the cabinet’s vote was
merely a staged game, that the cabinet in fact never wanted to purchase
the vaccine as it intends to “back down to the interests of Western pow-
ers, it is unilaterally oriented and does not desire balance [in interna-
tional relations]”.76
According to Fico, the refusal to purchase Sputnik V amounted to “the
end of Slovakia’s balanced foreign policy orientation; this is evidently and
blatantly anti-Russian because the Slovak Government obviously has its
own agenda and wants to accommodate Western ideas”. This diction
indicated that the leader of Smer-SD does not consider Slovakia to be a
sufficiently integrated part of the Western community and apparently
sticks to some other, alternative notion about its position in the world.
Fico emphasised that Smer-SD would always champion a philosophy ac-
cording to which the world has four cardinal points. The leader of Smer-
SD also criticised the new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic recently
approved by parliament, suggesting that it “betrays the cabinet’s ‘crav-
ings’ to portray Russia as a strategic danger”.77
As the chairman of Smer-SD, Fico has consistently backed another
leading party representative, namely Ľuboš Blaha, who has acted in the
long term as an open promoter of Russian influence. After the party split
up and the group around Pellegrini founded a new party Hlas-Social
Democracy, the already close relations between Fico and Blaha became
even closer.
Ľuboš Blaha, a long-term deputy and currently vice-chairman of
Smer-SD, is one of the most agile pro-Russian politicians in Slovakia

76
“Fico: Stopnutie vakcíny Sputnik je prejav protiruského postoja” [‘Fico: Stopping
the Sputnik Vaccine Is Display of Anti-Russian Attitude’], TASR news agency,
February 19, 2021; available at: https://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/fico-stopnutie-
vakciny-sputnik-je-prej/529319-clanok.html
77
Ibid.

91
today. Between 2016 and 2020, he held the post of chairman of the
Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs. During his stint in this
post, he often presented views that contradicted the official course of
Slovakia’s foreign policy and its membership in the EU and NATO. Dur-
ing the process of constituting the new parliament after the 2020 par-
liamentary elections, Smer-SD suggested him for the post of chairman
of the Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights, but he failed to mus-
ter the necessary support and was not elected. When assessing Blaha’s
candidature, other deputies reproached him mainly for his notorious
foreign policy views and obvious sympathies with non-democratic re-
gimes that violated human rights and fundamental freedoms (e.g. China,
Cuba, Belarus, Syria, Iran, Russia, or Venezuela).
Blaha championed pro-Russian attitudes back when he held the post
of secretary for international affairs of the Communist Party of Slovakia.
After he joined Smer-SD and was elected off its ballot to parliament in
2012, he naturally transferred his anti-Western and pro-Russian stances
as well as sympathies with dictatorship regimes and anti-imperialistic
rhetoric into internal structures of the party.
The peculiar feature of the obviously oxymoronic opinion mixture,
which is typical for this MP’s attitude to Russia, is the combination of
mutually incompatible leftist declarations (e.g. on social justice) and
adoration of the incumbent regime in Russia, which is based on the cor-
rupt oligarchic-kleptocratic model of economy and reactionary ideologi-
cal foundation that features not only elements of archaic nationalist
conservatism and clericalism but also corporatism and fascism, a fact
that has been pointed out in the long term by numerous leading Russian
analysts (e.g. Tatiana Vorozheykina, Andrey Zubov, Igor Yakovenko,
Leonid Gozman, Igor Eydman, Garri Kasparov, Fiodor Krasheninnikov,
Juriy Fiodorov, Dmitriy Oreshkin, Aleksandr Skobov, Andrey
Piontkovskiy, Andrey Kolesnikov, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Kirill Rogov and
others).

92
 Unlike SNS Chairman Andrej Danko, who focused primarily on issues
related to Slovak-Russian bilateral relations, Blaha’s pro-Russian
agenda focuses especially on defending foreign and internal policy of
the Russian Government, justifying concrete measures of the Kremlin
leadership, spreading Kremlin’s official historical and socio-political
narratives, supporting Russian militarism and uncritically adoring
Vladimir Putin.
In one of his articles, Blaha confessed that he was a stalwart of Rus-
sia a priori: “I defend Russia in its geopolitical disputes with the West
and I always state the reasons why”.78 When justifying his defending of
Russia, Blaha used the method of ideologically and politically motivated
selection, which ensued from his conviction that the incumbent Russian
regime is always right and will always prevail over the West. That re-
minds one very much of the paradigm of Soviet and communist propa-
ganda from the period of 1917–1991, which included spreading the
propaganda of success, attacking the bourgeois and decadent West,
condemning critics of the regime, supporting repressions against its
opponents, and concealing setbacks and failures. This mental setting
places the vice-chairman of Smer-SD in the same category with pro-
tagonists of the incumbent Russian state’s media and propagandist
machinery that defends imperialist policies of the Kremlin.
Blaha’s mindset may well be illustrated by his numerous communica-
tion outputs such as public statements, articles, interviews, and Face-
book statuses dedicated to concrete events and developments pertain-
ing to Russia in the field of foreign and internal policy.
Blaha’s views of the Russian-Ukrainian war in which he unequivocally
sided with Moscow spoke volumes about this mindset. He repeatedly

78
“Ľuboš Blaha reaguje na liberálnych fašistov z vulgárnej stránky Zomri
a im podobným indivíduám” [‘Ľuboš Blaha Reacts to Liberal Fascists from
Vulgar Zomri Website and Similar Individuals’], March 3, 2019; available at:
https://davdva.sk/lubos-blaha-reaguje-na-liberalnych-fasistov-z-vulgarnej-
stranky-zomri-a-im-podobnym-individuam/

93
argued that “Russia is not an enemy” and that “economic sanctions are
not the solution”. According to Blaha, Europe and Russia need one an-
other, “we need to converse with Russia, we ought to cooperate with
Russia”.79 Blaha maintained that Slovakia in no way perceives Russia as
its rival and that to Slovakia, Russia is “a friend, an ally and a strategic
partner”, although he conceded – similarly as Fico did – that in the case
of Crimea, Russia had made a mistake and violated international law.80
Blaha has always evaluated the situation in the Donbas area quite cate-
gorically and frankly, albeit in obvious contradiction to generally known
facts: “In the East, Ukraine fights its own citizens. I cannot solidarize
with a country that exterminates its own citizens. This is a struggle of
Ukrainians against Ukrainians, not a Russian invasion at all. Russia did
not invade Ukraine.” The aid that Ukraine received from the interna-
tional community as the victim of external aggression, Blaha perceived
in the following way: “From the aid for Ukraine I feel Russophobia,
loathing of Russia and the Russian people, 80 percent of which support
Putin.”81
Regarding Ukraine’s ambition to join the EU, which triggered Euro-
maidan events at the end of 2013 when Ukrainian citizens protested
against then President Viktor Janukovych for refusing to sign an asso-
ciation agreement with the EU at the pressure from Russia, Blaha com-
mented in a way that indicates his support of Russia’s veto of Ukraine’s
European future: “Ukraine will not become a member of the [European]
Union until we agree on it with Russia, and Russia will certainly never

79
“Blaha: Rusko nie je nepriateľ, treba s ním viesť dialóg” [‘Blaha: Russia Is Not an
Enemy, a Dialogue with It Should be Maintained’], SITA news agency, June 25,
2014.
80
“NR SR: Rusko je podľa Blahu priateľ Slovenska, ale porušuje právo” [‘NR SR:
According to Blaha, Russia Is Slovakia’s Friend but It Violates the Law’], SITA
news agency, April 28, 2014.
81
Hanus, Martin – Majchrák, Jozef: “Som marxista” [‘I Am a Marxist’], an interview
with Ľuboš Blaha, .týždeň weekly, No. 36, 2014.

94
approve of it.” In saying so, Blaha essentially recognised the right of
Russia to decide on the fate of another nation.82
The spectrum of events, development trends and issues related to
Russia Blaha publicly comments on is truly broad and always dichoto-
mous, always suggesting a confrontation between Russia on the one
hand and the West as a whole, individual Western countries, the EU,
NATO and Slovakia on the other. In all recorded cases, Blaha always
sided with Russia and always supported Russia against the West. He
took an active part in Russian propagandist campaigns in the identical
sequences as their protagonists in Moscow.
At the end of 2018, Blaha outlined the emergence of the world’s new
“geopolitical” division in which the West should assume a submissive
position with respect to Russia and China. He also suggested a set of
measures that should lead to this “peaceful” state of the world:
“…create a world order in which there will be more balance and multi-
lateralism; terminate the United States’ hegemony... It is important that
the power of Americans be outweighed by such powers as Russia, China
or India; we must terminate the Russophobia and all forms of economic
wars including the war of sanctions against Russia and Iran.”83
According to Blaha, “the struggle between supporters of the liberal
global order led by Western elites and the growing movement of resis-
tance against globalisation and Western imperialism is bound to con-
tinue; this struggle debilitates the West and, on the contrary, strength-
ens China and Russia that are building a new partnership; Russia con-
solidated its power position as it helped resolve the war against the
Islamic State in Syria”. There is no doubt about the side the author of

82
“Poslankyňa Smeru: Ukrajina do Únie nepatrí, pridruženie je nerozumné” [‘Smer
MP: Ukraine Does Not Belong to the Union, Its Association Is Ill-Advised’], Sme
daily, August 21, 2014.
83
“Ľuboš Blaha: 100 rokov od konca Prvej svetovej vojny” [‘Ľuboš Blaha: 100 Years
After the End of World War I’], November 11, 2018; available at:
https://davdva.sk/lubos-blaha-100-rokov-od-konca-prvej-svetovej-vojny/

95
this prognosis has chosen: “There is a new kind of balance emerging in
the world in which the Western powers will play second fiddle. Thanks
to their arrogant policies, the Western powers are edging themselves
out of the developing world. Their overbearing policies, hiding behind
the supremacy of liberal ideology, have become loathed by the entire
world. The sweet talk of human rights, freedom and democracy merely
camouflages the disgusting business for Western corporations.”84
At the end of 2019, Blaha expressed genuine joy over the news that
Russia had reportedly developed a new ballistic missile Avangard, which
was allegedly more effective than similar types of Western weapons:
“Russia has designed a new nuclear superweapon. The U.S. systems
would not be able to even aim at the new Avangard missile, let alone
shoot it down. Check, mate! The Russians checkmated the Americans...
That is the backward Russia they ridicule in the West. It seems they
have stopped laughing now. Well, where have the comrades from the
U.S. of A. made a mistake? The Western powers seem to be running a
bad streak.”85
In June 2020, Blaha supported a Stalinist interpretation of the begin-
ning of World War II, which Vladimir Putin from his revisionist position
used to set off a “memory war” against Poland and other European
countries at the end of 2019. Blaha clearly identified himself with the
interpretation of facts that have been repeatedly disproved by many
Russian historians such as Nikita Petrov, Boris Sokolov, Mark Solonin,
Viktor Suvorov, Nikolay Svanidze, Alexey Sobchenko and others. Equally
importantly, the conclusions that allegedly ensue from interpretations of
these facts have been labelled by these historians as incompetent, fabri-
cated, wilfully twisting the reality, ideologically motivated and untenable

84
“Blaha: S Čínou treba mať dobré vzťahy, lebo 21. storočie bude storočím Číny”
[‘Blaha: One Should Maintain Good Relations with China Because 21st Century
Will Be the Century of China’], SITA news agency, December 20, 2018
85
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2499744206930810/

96
from the expert viewpoint. But according to Blaha, “the Soviet Union
cannot be blamed for the breakout of the war; on the contrary, the Sovi-
ets’ endeavour to form a military alliance against Hitler was rejected by
the Brits, the French and the Poles ... The Western democracies bear
direct responsibility for the breakout of the war because they betrayed
Czecho-Slovakia in Munich. By the way, we thank the Russian president
for reminding us of it. The occupation of the part of the Polish territory
was at the time of war a tactical military inevitability thanks to which the
Soviet Union was later able to defeat Germany. The tactical agreement
of Molotov–Ribbentrop allowed the Soviets to get prepared for the war
and win it eventually; without this manoeuvre, the Germans would have
quickly occupied and enslaved the isolated Soviet Union.”86
In June 2020, Blaha subscribed to the Russian president’s propagandist
public statement about the death of liberalism, using the opportunity to
attack European Council Chairman Donald Tusk who had opposed Putin’s
view. In his commentary, Blaha even questioned Tusk’s right to criticise
the Russian leader and accused him of nationalist motives: “Putin de-
clared that liberalism is a relic. Tusk reacted to that by saying that relics
are authoritarianism, cult of personality and rule of oligarchs. Tusk does
not have any mandate to attack Russia ... I understand that as a Pole, he
feels hatred toward Russia and needs to let it out, but in the position of
the European Council chairman he should watch his tongue more care-
fully. It was childish and aggressive of him.”87
In international scandals involving subversive and/or openly criminal
activities of Russian secret services in Europe, Blaha always supported
Russia and condemned countermeasures adopted by EU and NATO

86
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2655113941393835/
87
“Blaha: Putin má pravdu, liberalizmus je mŕtvy. Jeho výsledkom je iba nerovnosť,
nesloboda a bordel” [‘Blaha: Putin Is Right, Liberalism Is Dead. Its Only Results
Are Inequality, Lack of Freedom and Mess’], June 30, 2020; available at:
https://davdva.sk/blaha-putin-ma-pravdu-liberalizmus-je-mrtvy-jeho-vysledkom-
je-iba-nerovnost-nesloboda-a-bordel/

97
member states. In April 2018, Blaha publicly called the reaction of West-
ern states to the attempt to murder Sergey Skripal and his daughter an
“anti-Russian hysteria based on adolescent circumstantial evidence” and
declared that “there is no evidence against Russia”.88 A month later, he
declared “it is shameful of several EU member states to resort to expel-
ling Russian diplomats”.89 In reaction to Slovak opposition leaders who
demanded that the government would show solidarity with Slovakia’s
allies and expel Russian diplomats, Blaha declared: “Besides hysteric
Russophobia, they have nothing left to say. They just hate Russia, that’s
all. And they dance to the tune of Western powers...”90
When the incumbent administration in August 2020 expelled three
Russian diplomats in reaction to the GRU agents abusing Slovak visa to
murder a Georgian émigré of Chechen origin in Berlin, Blaha published a
status on his Facebook account that read: “The expulsion of Russian
diplomats is a completely unnecessary act of hostility by which the Ma-
tovič administration seriously damaged good relations between the
Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation. It makes me feel sad be-
cause the Russian Federation is not our enemy and it is in our national
interest to maintain the best possible economic, political and cultural
relations with the Russians.” It was little surprise that Blaha did not
criticise the unacceptable act of violence by the Russian secret service,
which was the actual reason behind deterioration of Slovak-Russian
bilateral relations.91

88
“Blaha: Očakáva, že Slovensko čo najrýchlejšie pošle nášho veľvyslanca späť do
Moskvy” [‘Blaha Expects Slovakia to Send Our Ambassador Back to Moscow as
Soon as Possible’], SITA news agency, April 4, 2018.
89
“NR SR: Blaha v pléne odsúdil izraelský „masaker“ Palestínčanov” [‘NR SR: Blaha
Condemned Israelis for ‘Massacring’ Palestinians’], SITA news agency, May 15, 2018.
90
“Blaha: Očakáva, že Slovensko čo najrýchlejšie pošle nášho veľvyslanca späť do
Moskvy” [‘Blaha Expects Slovakia to Send Our Ambassador Back to Moscow as
Soon as Possible’], SITA news agency, April 4, 2018.
91
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2705233369715225

98
 Blaha proved his worth as a devoted pro-Kremlin propagandist also in
his commentaries dedicated to the series of scandals involving Alexey
Navalny, Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption activist, whom
the Russian secret service FSB first attempted to murder in August
2020 using Novichok, a war chemical substance, and then in January
2021, upon his return to Russia from Germany where he was hospital-
ised after the poisoning, the police detained him at the airport and in-
carcerated him based on fabricated charges.
In September 2020, Blaha published another status on his Facebook
account in which he claimed that “the case of Navalny has triggered
intelligence games and nobody knows where the truth lies”. Blaha re-
ferred to the allegedly “intercepted conversation between Warsaw and
Berlin”, a forgery from the workshop of Lukashenko’s regime’s propa-
ganda that was supposed to confirm that the West was trying to use the
Navalny case to weaken Russia. According to Blaha, “it will come to
light that Western intelligence services are bending the truth only to be
able to attack Russia ... Even without this evidence, I personally find it
utterly unlikely that Navalny was poisoned with Novichok. To me, it
rather feels like an excuse for someone who needs to kick Russia once
again. And so that someone waves Novichok about again, as if Western
secret services were running out of imagination.”92
In October 2020, after authorised chemical laboratories in Germany,
France, Sweden and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons published results of their analyses, which all confirmed that
Navalny had indeed been poisoned by Novichok, and the EU imposed
sanctions on responsible Russian institutions and individuals, Blaha
published another raving commentary: “The European Union imposed
further sanctions on Russia. This is a fatal mistake. These sanctions
were imposed because of Navalny and his little quinsy. The poor chap

92
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2728444940727401

99
had a running nose after being allegedly attacked with the most terrible
and deadly nerve gas and spent a week in a German hospital. And now
let’s all go and punish the Russians. And the Slovak Government assists
in that. This is absurd!” Blaha also offered his interpretation of the
scandal’s background: “What is the result of this anti-Russian hysteria
that was artificially created by Western secret services? The result is
more sanctions against Russia, manipulated Western public and con-
crete geopolitical or corporate interests of the USA and Western Euro-
pean powers. It is plain to see this is what the case of Navalny is all
about. They want to destroy the Russian Federation and get it under
control like they did in the 1990s, to throw the Russians on their knees
and to control them ... But Vladimír Putin is standing in their way, and
that is why they are kicking him. In doing so, they use dummy puppets
such as Navalny.”93
In January 2021, after the Bellingcat investigative group revealed the
identity of members of the FSB commando that had tried to murder
Navalny, which was ex post confirmed by Navalny’s personal conversa-
tion with one of its members upon his return to Moscow and his incar-
ceration, Blaha wrote this: “Navalny is just a plain big bad thief, that’s
all: a big bad thief with contacts to Western secret services. Such a des-
perate big bad thief that he even made up a story about Novichok in his
undies – how pathetic and awkward! Nobody in Russia or in Slovakia
cares [about Navalny] – enough about him already!”94 In harmony with
the Russian regime’s propaganda, Blaha attempted to dispute credibility
of an investigative documentary film produced by the Foundation to
Combat Corruption (FBK) that revealed shocking facts about a spec-
tacular palace built for Vladimir Putin in the town of Gelendzhik by the
Black Sea.

93
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2767752920129936
94
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2859997960905431

100
 In January 2021, Blaha commented on a flurry of mass civic demon-
strations that demanded to release Navalny and other political prisoners
in Russia. “Today, another hoax is being spread about mass demonstra-
tions in Russia. Rumour has it that the entire country is shaking with
anger of Navalny’s supporters. And reality? In a 150-million Russia, about
a thousand of demonstrators set out to streets today, creating small
bands comprising several dozens of people in a handful of towns that can
be reached by the tentacles of American non-governmental organisations
... Dear Mr. President Putin, we wish you the best of success! We keep
our fingers crossed for the Russian nation – our friends!”95
Vladimir Putin was the most frequently adored person in Blaha’s
communication outputs. Blaha identified himself with the Russian presi-
dent not only in terms of shared views but also as a person who is also
allegedly haunted by Slovakia’s “liberal media”: “Slovak liberal media
spread lies every blessed day: hoaxes about Fico, hoaxes about Blaha,
hoaxes about Putin...”96
In October 2020, Blaha published on his Facebook account an article
on the occasion of Vladimir Putin’s birthday. A sort of panegyric in
prose, it is a unique piece of literary work from the viewpoint of content
and style as it was dedicated to a foreign political figure and published
in Slovakia probably for the first time since 1953. Before then, similar
hagiographic articles used to be published by Czech and Slovak press
about Soviet dictator Josif Stalin. Let’s quote this odd ode in full:
“When he came to power, Russia was a socially and morally devas-
tated country, ruled by oligarchs and American NGOs.
“Crime, chaos, poverty, mafia... a wild capitalism of the Yeltsin type.
“Then he arrived and within a couple of years, the state wielded au-
thority again. He confiscated oligarchs’ stolen property and brought it
back to the state. He restored people’s dignity and social rights.

95
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2859997960905431
96
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2859997960905431

101
 “He brought Russia back on the track of economic growth and dra-
matically increased the standard of living. He chased away American
NGOs and instilled a sense of honour to the Russians. He established
order and stability.
“The Russian Federation again became a superpower they are afraid
of in the West. They are helpless and so they spread silly Russophobia
– because they fear competition, because they fear a strong Russia.
“Thanks to him, the world politics has found its lost balance again
and the Americans have stopped playing the arrogant world cops.
Yes, that must have really hurt the Western hawks. But the rest of the
world has that much more to cheer about.
“Once again, the Russians feel pride in their nation and belief in their
state’s strength. Once again, they feel respect for their national his-
tory as they put an end to the dark liberal 1990s when the West ex-
pediently trampled the Russians in order to bring them to their knees.
“It was he who brought Russia back on its feet again and today, his
enemies are trembling in fear of him.
“It was he who brought a new strength to Russia.
“It was he who brought social peace and a new hope.
“He is an outstanding personality that deserves respect. I saw him in
person last year as he gave a speech at a conference in Moscow and I
can testify to this – few have charisma like he does.
“Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
“A statesman. A true leader.
“And so, the greetings from Slovakia reach your ears: Many happy re-
turns, Mr. President!”97

The communication outputs of Smer-SD Vice-Chairman Ľuboš Blaha

dedicated to Russia may be characterised by his full self-identification

97
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2760179834220578/

102
with the Kremlin’s official position on the one hand and ignoring verifiable
facts, spreading false assertions, twisting contexts and harshly attacking
ideological and political opponents of the incumbent Russian regime on
the other. The ironic style of Blaha’s argumentation often makes an infan-
tile impression. The timing, the content and the diction of his communica-
tion outputs indicate that their author takes great pains to synchronise
them with the main direction of the Russian state propaganda machinery.
During the 12 years Smer-SD spent in power, its two-tiered approach
to foreign policy, which in the long term manifested through declaring
harmony of the party’s foreign policy positions with the country’s official
foreign policy course and simultaneously tolerating personal views of its
individual leaders that obviously contradict this course has led to weak-
ening the pro-Western vector in everyday practical execution of Slova-
kia’s foreign policy and strengthening the pro-Russian sentiment in the
country’s political discourse and public opinion.

Slovenské hnutie obrody [Slovak Revival Movement]

An actor on the radical far-right and nationalist scene, the Slovak Re-
vival Movement (Slovenské hnutie obrody – SHO) is a political formation
with clearly pro-Russian orientation. The SHO was founded in 2004. It
operated as a civil association until 2019, when it was registered as a
political party. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, it received 0.2% of
the popular vote. In its programme documents, it declares that it “strives
to encourage and deepen national awareness and patriotism of the Slo-
vaks”, that it intends to “contribute to defending statehood and sover-
eignty of the Slovak Republic” and that its “programme is based on the
work and legacy of Ľudovít Štúr”.98
The party emphasises that it supports “traditional values such as
family, culture, honour and faith” as well as “sound world view and pa-

98
https://sho.sk/kto-sme/

103
triotism” and that it campaigns against “moral decline of society”. With
respect to Slovakia’s national history of the 20th century, it acts as a
revisionist organisation that openly subscribes to the legacy of Jozef
Tiso, leader of the wartime Slovak state. SHO representatives attempt
to apologise policies of the wartime Slovak state with respect to Jews,
including their deportations to concentration camps, by pointing out
that “it was a historical development”.
In the long-term, the SHO opposes Slovakia’s membership in the EU
and NATO, emphasising its devotion to the concept of pan-Slavic soli-
darity and expressing sympathies for policies of Russia, which according
to SHO leaders has justified interests in Central Europe. On its official
website, the SHO declares: “...the community of Slavic nations has al-
ways been and will always remain our closest ally language-wise, cul-
ture-wise and spiritually”.99 As a civil association, the SHO used to co-
operate with two Russian organisations, namely National People’s
“Sobor” [Council], based on an official agreement, and the “Styag”
[Flag] Association, which SHO Chairman Róbert Švec has described as
an organisation with identical or similar values. Among its friendly or-
ganisations, the SHO official website also lists “Dobrovolets” [Volun-
teer], a Russian Orthodox military and patriotic club.
As its motto, the SHO official website features a statement by Ivan
Ilyin, a Russian conservative monarchist philosopher who is considered
by several Russian authors to be a promoter of fascist ideas regarding
development of society whose ideological legacy is currently champi-
oned by Russian President Vladimir Putin. As far as social networks go,
the SHO established its homepage on the Russian social network VKon-
takte. In its programme, the SHO declares that it will not support “anti-
Russian sanctions” and that “it plans to make Slovakia into a militarily
neutral country in the long-term horizon”.100

99
https://sho.sk/kto-sme/
100
https://sho.sk/predstavujeme-vam-volebny-program-sho-alternativa-pre-slovensko/

104
Komunistická strana Slovenska [Communist Party of Slovakia]

The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), which currently dwells outside

parliament, is a political party that furthers the traditional Soviet narra-
tive about development of socialism in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia
and other Central and Eastern European countries. It is an anti-capitalist
party with overtly anti-Western attitudes in the field of foreign policy. In
the long term, it criticises Slovakia’s membership in NATO, which lead-
ing party officials label as an organisation of “criminal nature”. With
respect to the EU, the party assumes a Eurosceptical position with a
strongly leftist Marxist-Leninist rhetoric.
The KSS adopts unambiguously pro-Russian positions in the field of
international relations, defend foreign policy measures of the Russian
regime, and support its key decisions in the field of internal policy. In the
Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the KSS adopted a clearly pro-Russian and
anti-Ukrainian position. The articles published during the conflict’s esca-
lation on the official KSS website (written either by Slovak authors or
taken over from foreign sources) indicated that the party views the Mai-
dan revolution as an illegal coup d’état staged by the West, especially
the United States, that the power in Kiev had been usurped by the “fas-
cist forces”, that Russian-language inhabitants of the Donbas area had
to take up arms in order to defend their rights, and that the Ukrainian
army was killing civilians. The party condemned the EU for imposing
economic sanctions against Russia, labelling its criticism of Russia’s
policy vis-à-vis Ukraine as part of the information war the West has
started against Russia.
The Slovak communists ostentatiously advertise ideological closeness
to their Russian counterparts associated in the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (KPRF) led by Gennadiy Zyuganov. The official KSS
website regularly publishes documents taken over from the KPRF. At the
same time, the party supports Vladimir Putin, even regarding issues on

105
which the KPRF differs with the Kremlin, for instance in the field of social
policy. One of the articles published on the official KSS website reads:
“After the law on pension reform in the Russian Federation took effect,
many began to curse Putin, accusing him of all socio-economic problems
of Russia. This is not correct. This is [a display of] political illiteracy ... The
decision about the cannibalistic pension reform in the Russian Federation
was not adopted personally by Putin but rather by the social class stand-
ing behind him and consisting of new-fangled privatisation oligarchs ...
President Vladimir Putin as a former member of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and a leading expert of intelligence services of the for-
mer Soviet Union, in contemporary politics following the treasons of Gor-
bachev and Yeltsin, in order to save the Russian economy from a total
collapse, to strengthen Russia’s international position and to encourage
national awareness of its citizens, and under the pressure of the modern
Russian oligarchy profiled himself not as a communist but as a national
democrat. Therefore, the current socio-economic problems of Russia must
not be attributed solely to Putin but the entire ruling class.”101
The KSS endorsed the Kremlin’s official position on the scandal of
Alexey Navalny, subscribing to one of its key propagandist narratives
about the foreign origin of protests that broke out around the country
following Navalny’s incarceration. An official statement of the KSS press
service speaks of “relentless cold war against Russia, its government
and personally against V. V. Putin”. According to the party, “the owners
of supranational corporations adopted a decision on his toppling accord-
ing to the scenario of ‘colour revolutions’ a long time ago. It is also obvi-
ous that external activities are precisely coordinated with the neo-liberal
caste inside Russia.” The KSS did not hesitate to link the Navalny case
to foreign developments: “The arrival of Biden at the White House guar-
antees a new chapter of tense relations with Washington. It was no

101
Nišponský, Peter: “Rusko – komunisti – svet” [‘Russia – Communists – World’],
January 22, 2019; available at: http://kss.sk/Rusko-komunisti-svet

106
coincidence that Mr. Navalny welcomed the inauguration of a new
American president-globalist ... Navalny ‘happened to appear’ in Mos-
cow as a ‘victim of an assassination attempt’ and in order to support
him, they tried to make children and youth of school age take part in the
protests through the TikTok social network.”102

Other political parties

There are four other minor parties on Slovakia’s political map that
may be labelled as subjects with pro-Russian orientation; using such a
characteristic may be justified by relatively brief declarations from their
programme documents.
In the 2020 parliamentary elections, representatives of two of these
subjects ran on the ballot of extremist ĽSNS.
The first is Kresťanská demokracia – Život a prosperita [Christian
Democracy – Life and Prosperity], a clerical-nationalist party whose
three representatives were elected to parliament in 2020. In its brief
programme pamphlet, the party promised it would champion “lifting
economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and establishing the
atmosphere of cooperation instead of confrontation”. The party opposes
the enlargement of NATO to include countries that “are struggling with
internal ethnic and territorial feuds”. This is de facto euphemism for
three post-Soviet countries (i.e. Moldavia, Georgia and Ukraine) that
have fallen victims to Russia’s direct or indirect military aggression that
has made them lose control over considerable parts of their respective
sovereign territories.
The other such subject is Národná koalícia [National Coalition], a na-
tionalist-conservative party whose leaders also ran on the ĽSNS ballot but
failed to clinch parliamentary seats. The party’s programme document for

102
“Čomu a komu má poslúžiť Navaľnyj” [‘What and Whom is Navalny Supposed to
Serve’], January 27, 2019; available at: kss.sk/comu-a-komu-ma-posluzit-navalnyj

107
the 2019 elections to the European Parliament reads: “The interests of EU
members are also being undermined by economic sanctions against Rus-
sia, which harm economies of several EU member states while big Euro-
pean corporations pursue vivid business activities in Russia. The sanctions
against Russia should be revised at least, and if their purpose is to resolve
domestic political problems of some EU members or the United States,
then these sanctions and other repressive measures against the Russian
Federation should be adopted on the bilateral level.”103
Another political subject with a pro-Russian orientation is Vlasť
[Homeland], which was founded in 2011 under the name DNES, later
renamed to Civic Party DNES and yet later to Party of Civic Left (SOĽ).
In October 2019, SOĽ was renamed again to Vlasť, which was meant to
serve a single purpose: the entry of Štefan Harabin, former Slovak Su-
preme Court chairman and justice minister (for HZDS), and unsuccessful
candidate in the 2019 presidential elections to the realm of party poli-
tics. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, Vlasť received 2.93% of the
popular vote and failed to qualify to the assembly.
While Harabin is the leader of this originally marginal political sub-
ject, he is not its formal statutory representative (i.e. chairman). Since
its most recent renaming, Harabin has become its sole recognisable face
and his publicly communicated views and opinions have become the only
litmus paper of its overall philosophy and orientation. As far as Russia is
concerned, Harabin’s views and standpoints are obvious from the fol-
lowing statements: “Russia is not a threat; I would abolish anti-Russian
sanctions immediately ... Whether Crimea was annexed or not must be
decided by a court of law and not by statements of several perhaps cor-
rupt politicians from the EU.”104 “I consider Russia under Putin’s leader-

103
Programové tézy Národnej koalície pre voľby do Európskeho parlamentu 2019
[Programme Theses of the National Coalition for Elections to the European
Parliament 2019]; available at: https://narodnakoalicia.sk/programove-tezy-
narodnej-koalicie-pre-volby-do-europskeho-parlamentu-2019/
104
https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/posts/2408409222769242/

108
ship to be a stabilisation and consolidation element in world politics and
security. Without cooperation with Russia, there will be no long-term
peace and prosperity in Europe.”105
In March 2020, when Russia dispatched a military-medical mission to
Italy, Harabin unwittingly lifted a veil on Kremlin’s possible intentions
when he published a status on his Facebook account: “In return, Italy
will veto anti-Russian EU sanctions, which significantly and nonsensi-
cally harm also our economy. Day after day, it becomes crystal clear that
Russia led by Putin is not an aggressor or a security threat as some
Slovak Soros podpindosniks would like us to believe.”106 Eventually, the
foreign policy forecasts of Vlasť leader did not materialise as Italy did
not veto the proposal to extend EU sanctions against Russia.
The last mentioned party with a pro-Russian orientation is Slovenská
ľudová strana Andreja Hlinku [Slovak People’s Party of Andrej Hlinka],
which ran on its own in the 2020 parliamentary elections and received
0.28% of the popular vote. Its foreign policy orientation may be gath-
ered based on the following sentence from its election programme be-
fore the most recent European elections: “Strategically, the European
Union must seek cooperation with Russia and Mediterranean states.”107
For the time being, the summary political weight of Slovak political
parties with pro-Russian or ambivalent foreign policy orientation does
not give them the potential to reverse the country’s official pro-Western
foreign policy doctrine. But it is not for the lack of trying as their repre-

105
https://www.hlavnespravy.sk/caputova-rusko-je-pre-nas-hrozbou-harabin-rusko-
predstavuje-pod-vedenim-putina-stabilizacny-prvok-vo-svetovej-politike-
bezpecnosti/1696878
106
https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/posts/2736010276675800. “Podpindos-
niks” refers to a term used among less educated Russian radical nationalists to refer
to persons with positive views of the United States. In their vocabulary, Americans
are called “pindosy”. Harabin is the first public figure in Slovakia to use this term.
107
Volebný program. Eurovoľby 2019. Slovenská ľudová strana Andreja Hlinku [Elec-
tion Programme. European Elections 2019. Slovak People’s Party of Andrej
Hlinka]; available at: http://www.slsah.sk/volebny-program-eurovolby-2019/

109
sentatives in public power organs actively strive to turn Slovakia’s for-
eign policy away from the West and sway it closer to Russia. On the
practical level, their endeavour manifests through attempts to block the
adoption of legislative and executive measures aimed at strengthening
the country’s ties to its Western allies. Also, these politicians submit
proposals that objectively comply with foreign policy designs and inter-
ests of the Russian Federation. Last but not least, they strive to influ-
ence the views of the general public in favour of Russia and its policies
through their public presentations and published outputs.

9. 2. Non-party actors

Let us now shift our attention toward two organisations that differ in
terms of their missions and activities but are rather similar when it
comes to pro-Russian orientation. One is a officially registered civic
association whose mission is to encourage cooperation between Slova-
kia and Russia; the other is an unregistered paramilitary club whose
members regularly make public statements about their mission, which is
to defend Slovakia against its external enemies.

Slovensko-ruská spoločnosť [Slovak-Russian Association]

The Slovak-Russian Association (SRS) pursues activities aimed at sup-

porting Russia and its policies and at strengthening Russia’s influence
over Slovakia’s internal and foreign policy since 2006. It is undoubtedly
one of the most agile actors on the pro-Russian scene in Slovakia. The
official SRS website aggregates information, opinion and analytical pieces
produced by SRS representatives, Russian government institutions and
pro-government media, the Russian embassy in Bratislava, and pro-
Russian media from neighbouring countries (especially the Czech Repub-
lic) with an obvious ambition to justify internal and foreign policy line of
the incumbent Russian leadership and undermine policies of the West.

110
Since 2014, information activities of the SRS focus primarily on question-
ing Ukraine as a sovereign state and criticising its government’s policies.
The founder and the most famous representative of the SRS is Ján
Čarnogurský, a Catholic dissident and activist before November 1989
and a member of various administrations (both Czechoslovak and Slo-
vak) in several electoral terms after November 1989. Between 1990 and
2000, he held the post of chairman of the Christian Democratic Move-
ment (KDH), later he joined and even spearheaded the informal public
movement that opposed Slovakia’s NATO membership. For many years,
Čarnogurský profiled himself as a conservative opponent of liberalism
and a critic of several aspects of contemporary policies of the Western
countries. For quite some time, he has advertised his positive views of
internal and foreign policy of the incumbent Russian leadership led by
Vladimir Putin.
On behalf of the SRS and as a private person, Čarnogurský gets in-
volved in various anti-Western and pro-Russian activities such as taking
part in public demonstrations (e.g. rallies protesting plans to build NATO
military bases on Slovakia’s territory and furthering Slovakia’s secession
from NATO, or welcoming members of Russian motorcycle gang Night
Wolves), giving speeches at various conferences and seminars, signing
various public proclamations and writing essays and articles.
Čarnogurský actively champions pro-Russian narratives. He is a
member of the so-called Valdai Discussion Club; he regularly travels to
Russia to attend its sessions and upon his return he informs the public
about the contents of these sessions and especially his meetings with
President Putin.
Čarnogurský’s views of Russia, its policies with respect to the West,
and its mutual relations with post-communist countries including Slova-
kia are products of a broader concept this former politician and activist
developed over a longer period of time. It is exactly this relatively com-
prehensive and conceptualised narrative that strongly distinguishes

111
Čarnogurský from other promoters of Russian influence in Slovakia. This
narrative includes:
• Perception of Russia as a Slovakia’s permanent strategic ally;
• Opinion that Slovakia had been “manoeuvred by lies and pressure”
into joining NATO, so that its territory could be used as a forefield
against Russia;
• Conviction that eastward enlargement of NATO in spite of the
promise of non-enlargement, which the Soviet Union allegedly re-
ceived from the West, is wrong;
• Idea that Russia must defend itself against the West, which is ap-
proaching its external border and strives to weaken it;
• Idea that Russia cannot pursue policies that are identical with poli-
cies of Western countries as “it always ended up badly for Russia
whenever Russia began to pursue pro-Western policies”;108
• Thesis that currently it is Russia that has become the principal ad-
vocate of traditional values and morality, which are being jeopard-
ised in the West;
• Conviction that “a government of a strong hand is better equipped to
provide for Russia’s state and societal needs than a pluralist govern-
ment of the Western type. It was the concentration of power in the
hands of the United Russia party that established greater order in the
functioning of Russia’s economic and state apparatus following a pe-
riod of deep decline caused by perestroika and Yeltsin’s rule.”109
According to Čarnogurský, mutual relations between Russia and the
West have been on a collision course since 2000 due to wrong policies

108
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Prejav na stretnutí Česko-ruskej obchodnej komory” [‘Address
to the Meeting of Czech-Russian Chamber of Commerce’], July 9, 2014; available
at: http://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/360711/prejav-na-stretnuti-cesko-ruskej-
obchodnej-komory.html
109
Ibid.

112
of the latter. He argues that after the victory in the Cold War, the West
demanded Russia to “take over its methods” while America decided to
establish a new world order, which did not take Russia into account as a
geopolitical competitor. In his interpretation, Čarnogurský somehow
omitted the reasons for deteriorated mutual relations that may have
ensued from policies pursued by Russia.110
In 2008, Čarnogurský did not hesitate to adopt an overtly pro-
Russian position with respect to Russia’s military aggression against
Georgia. After a ceasefire agreement had been reached, he visited
Southern Ossetia at an invitation from Russian authorities and upon his
return to Slovakia, he bore a witness that was supposed to confirm the
Russian version of events in this part of Georgia, which de facto remains
under Russia’s occupation until the present day.111 In 2012, Čarnogurský
endorsed Russian organs’ repressions against members of punk band
Pussy Riot for their improvised anti-Putin prayer in the Cathedral of
Christ the Saviour in Moscow.
In one of his articles published upon his return from a Valdai Discussion
Club session, Čarnogurský summed up Russian pro-government journal-
ists’ reservations against the United States that confirmed the narrative
about the endeavour of the West to weaken and undermine Russia. It is
obvious from the article’s diction that its author fully subscribes to their
interpretation of the issue as well as with Putin’s position that Russia will
no longer tolerate “unilateral steps of the United States”.112
In yet another of his published articles, Čarnogurský revived in Slova-
kia’s public discourse the concept of Slovakia joining Russia under the
assumption that the Slovaks would again feel “existentially threatened”.

110
Ibid.
111
Čarnogurský, Ján: “II. Horúce miesta Kaukazu: Južné Osetsko” [‘Hot Spots
of the Caucasus: Southern Ossetia’], October 2, 2008; available at:
http://www.jancarnogursky.sk/clanky/43/ii-horce-miesta-kaukazu-jun-osetsko
112
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Tvrdá Putinova reč” [‘Putin’s Harsh Speech’], November 3, 2014;
available at: https://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/368248/tvrda-putinova-rec.html

113
“Geopolitical possibilities of Slovakia consist in its location on the (east-
ern) edge of the historically Western part of Europe. Ján Kollár wrote that
the Slovaks/Slavs should lean against ‘that mighty oak tree’, namely
Russia. Ľudovít Štúr wrote in his work Slavdom and the World of the Fu-
ture that Slovakia should become a principality that would form part of
the Russian Empire. Gustáv Husák wrote to Moscow that the Slovaks
would prefer the status of a Soviet Union republic to non-autonomous
status within the Czechoslovak Republic. All these ideas have been au-
thored by illustrious figures of Slovakia’s history. They present important
signals in case the current international order would fall into crisis and
the feeling of existential threat would return ever in the future.”113 The
quoted formulation reveals that Čarnogurský works with a concept of
territorial arrangement in which Slovakia would border with Russia. Ap-
parently, he somehow overlooked the existence of sovereign Ukraine.
An impulse for Čarnogurský to intensify his publication output was the
revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian military and
political conflict. He published a stream of articles on his blog and gave a
series of interviews to mainstream media, establishing himself as one of
the most prolific authors in Slovakia with respect to the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict. Čarnogurský unequivocally endorsed Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea, labelling it a return of a historical territory. He described
the political changes in Ukraine following Euromaidan events as an anti-
constitutional power coup. According to him, Ukraine fell into a crisis
because its governments “dragged it toward the West”.114 Čarnogurský

113
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Rok 1945 a obnovenie Československa – tézy” [‘1945 and
Restoration of Czechoslovakia – Theses’], April 30, 2015; available at:
https://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/380057/jan-carnogursky-rok-1945-a-
obnovenie-ceskoslovenska-tezy.html
114
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Ad: Marek Bličšák: Ján Čarnogurský – na druhej strane
barikády” [‘Re: Marek Bliščák: Ján Čarnogurský – On the Other Side of the Barri-
cade’], May 2, 2014; available at: http://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/355193/Ad-
Marek-Blicsak-Jan-Carnogursky-na-druhej-strane-barikady.html

114
was one on very few mainstream public figures in Slovakia that positively
viewed activities of Slovak volunteers who fought in Eastern Ukraine on
the side of pro-Russian separatists and the Russian Army. He saw them
as a display of developing relations with “our friends in Ukraine”.115
After Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 had been shot down in July 2014,
Čarnogurský published two articles in which he clearly sided with the
Kremlin’s interpretation of this tragedy based on the claim that the air-
craft was shot down by a Ukrainian fighter. In support of his standpoint,
Čarnogurský presented facts used before him by advocates of the Rus-
sian version of events, including those that had been disproved or clearly
established as false. Čarnogurský concluded that if the evidence testi-
fied to Ukraine’s role in shooting down the aircraft, then President Petro
Poroshenko, Prime Minister Arseniy Jacenyuk and Defence Minister
Valeriy Heletey are suspect of perpetrating a war crime, which is why
“South-Eastern Ukraine” has every right to free itself from under such
rule and liberate from it the “entire Ukraine” because “all is allowed
against criminals”.116
In March 2019, the SRS chairman publicly chastised an article by
Robert Ondrejcsák, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, in which
he criticised Russia for meddling with Ukraine’s internal affairs. The
Embassy of the Russian Federation reacted by publishing a statement in
which, contrary to all diplomatic protocols, attacked the state secretary,
prompting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon the Russian am-
bassador and point out to him the statement’s unacceptable content.

115
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Pomoc pre Podkarpatskú Ukrajinu” [‘Aid for Sub-Carpathian
Ukraine’], December 30, 2014; available at:
https://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/371923/pomoc-pre-podkarpatsku-
ukrajinu.html
116
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Voči zločincom je všetko dovolené” [‘All Is Allowed against
Criminals’], August 28, 2014; available at:
https://carnogursky.blog.sme.sk/c/363864/voci-zlocincom-je-vsetko-
dovolene.html

115
In this dispute between the Slovak Government and the Russian Em-
bassy, Čarnogurský sided with the latter. He used this opportunity to
discuss “broader reasons for not to allow Russophobia in Slovakia”.117
According to the SRS chairman, Russophobia “is inconsistent with our
historical traditions. We are approaching the 200th anniversary of pub-
lishing Kollár’s Slávy dcéra [Daughter of Glory], which includes a verse
‘lean against that mighty oak tree’. The weight of Russia in international
relations increases. We will need Russia’s support yet. Many states
whose international pull is greater than that of Slovakia strive for good
relations with Russia. For the sake of illustration, look at Israeli Prime
Minister wrapping President Putin in cotton wool.”118 The very next day,
the Russian state-run media and propaganda agency Sputnik published
a detailed analysis of Čarnogurský’s commentary.
Čarnogurský’s indirect recommendation that Slovakia should wrap
Putin (i.e. Russia) in “cotton wool” was particularly peculiar, mostly
because of completely incomparable contexts. As a NATO member state,
Slovakia is protected thanks to allied commitments against any external
aggression, including potential aggression from Russia, which views
NATO as an enemy force. Israel, which is not member of any military
alliance, is in a different situation, especially when it faces increased
strategic threat coming from Iran as a result of inter alia Russia’s direct
military involvement in neighbouring Syria.
Along with Russia, Iran got involved in the Syrian civil war on the side
of dictator Asad. Also, it is no secret that one of Iran’s principal ambi-
tions is to get closer to Israel militarily. Under the rule of the theocratic
fundamentalist regime, Iran has openly striven for liquidation of the

117
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Škodia Slovensku” [‘They Harm Slovakia’], March 10, 2019; avail-
able at: http://www.srspol.sk/clanek-jan-carnogursky-skodia-slovensku-18320.html
118
“Čarnogurský: Izraelský předseda vlády se k Putinovi chová jako v bavlnce”
[‘Čarnogurský: Israeli Prime Minister Wraps Putin in Cotton Wool’], Sputnik news
agency, March 11, 2019; available at: https://cz.sputniknews.com/slovensko/
201903119417920-jan-carnogursky-izrael-predseda-vlady-putin/

116
Jewish state since the late 1970s. The reason for intense communication
between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin over the past several years was to secure such con-
ditions for the continuation of Israeli tactics of liquidating any Iranian
military equipment transported through Syria for the terrorist pro-
Iranian and anti-Israeli Hezbollah movement in Lebanon that might help
minimise the risk of open Israeli-Russian military confrontation in Syria.
Therefore, the context of mutual Slovak-Russian relations is not compa-
rable in any respect to the context of Israeli-Russian relations.
After all, a certain example of how the incumbent Russian leadership
honours agreements with other countries may be served by the case of
Russian reconnaissance aircraft Il-20 that was shot down by mistake in
September 2018 by the Russian anti-aircraft system S-200 operated by
the Syrian air defence. Russia accused Israel that its F-16 fighter jet used
the Russian aircraft to “cover” it from S-200 in Syrian air space, this
despite all available data from monitoring devices confirmed that the
Israeli aircraft was already above the Israeli territory at the time of shoot-
ing down the Russian Il-20. After the incident, the Russian media and
propaganda machinery unleashed a harsh anti-Israeli campaign reeking
of open anti-Semitism, which eventually had to be calmed down by Putin
himself. The shot-down Russian aircraft may serve as a case in point that
in conflict situations, the incumbent Russian regime does not hesitate to
blame other countries for its own failures (or those of its allies).
Naturally, Čarnogurský could not miss the opportunity to comment
on the circumstances of incarcerating opposition leader Alexey Navalny
and the subsequent reaction of the Russian public. In February 2021, the
SRS chairman wrote that “the entire propagandist operation with the
code name ‘Navalny’ turned out to be a splash in the water” as a public
opinion poll carried out by the Levada Centr agency during the protests
against Navalny’s incarceration showed that Vladimir Putin’s popularity
among the Russians had not declined. Čarnogurský interpreted the

117
situation in which the police brutally intervened against peacefully dem-
onstrating citizens and blocked public access to places of announced
demonstrations as follows: “Perhaps due to the low public turnout at
demonstrations for Navalny, or maybe due to the Levada poll findings,
the organisers have called off demonstrations announced for the upcom-
ing and following weekends. The Belarussian model of protests against
powers that be apparently did not work in Russia.”119
Via the SRS official website, its chairman regularly comments on
developments involving Russia and on latest news coming from the Rus-
sian Federation. In his articles, praise for Russian achievements is com-
bined with criticism of Western states’ policies; only those foreign lead-
ers who further the pro-Russian agenda are viewed positively by him.
Following suit every step of the way is also the SRS whose official web-
site does publish materials from various sources but their typical fea-
tures include adoring policies of the incumbent Russian regime, defend-
ing public statements presented by Vladimir Putin, and unconditionally
supporting political measures adopted by the Russian regime at home
and abroad.

Slovenskí branci – Národná dobrovoľná občianska domobrana [Slovak

Conscripts – National Voluntary Civic Home Guard]

Self-described as “Domobrana” [home guard], the grouping of Slovak

Conscripts (Slovenskí branci – SB) was founded in 2012. It is a non-
registered defence club, i.e. a paramilitary structure. The association
characterises itself as an “apolitical, non-profit organisation whose mis-
sion is to encourage the feeling of patriotism, love for nature and our
cultural heritage among young people through various voluntary activi-
ties and pro bono events such as environmental education, helping peo-

119
Čarnogurský, Ján: “Putinova podpora v Rusku neklesla” [‘Support for Putin in
Russia Has Not Dropped’], February 7, 2021; available at: http://www.srspol.sk/clanek-
jan-carnogursky-putinova-podpora-v-rusku-neklesla-21483.html

118
ple in the case of natural disasters, organising physical competitions for
children ... We strive to teach and prepare young people to tackle vari-
ous crisis situations, to protect themselves, their families or friends and
their homeland. We strive to achieve this through a series of defence
trainings we organise regularly and during which we teach: survival
skills in nature, first aid, hygiene, combat tactics (both conventional and
guerrilla combat style), handling arms, hand-to-hand combat, topogra-
phy, radiation, chemical, and biological protection.”120 SB leader and
founder Peter Švrček completed military training with the Russian
“Styag” [Flag] Association. In 2016, the SB set up its “civilian wing”, a
civic association called Our Homeland – Our Future (Naša vlasť – Naša
budúcnosť), which was duly registered with the Ministry of Interior.
The official SB website provides no information on the club’s ideologi-
cal background since the society emphasises its “apolitical” character.
Based on the published news and comments of discussion participants on
its official Facebook profile, though, one may draw a conclusion that the
club subscribes to the heritage of the Slovak National Uprising and “com-
bating fascism”, takes part in commemorative events related to World
War II as the arena of combating fascism and Nazism, shows respect to
war victims and fallen soldiers of the Red Army, disassociates itself from
the regime of the wartime Slovak state led by Jozef Tiso, and rejects “Na-
zism and fascism”. In the past, though, several SB members including
Švrček attended commemorative events organised by far-right groupings
(e.g. SHO) to celebrate the wartime Slovak state and Tiso. Švrček later
explained his participation in these events by his “youth” and “stupidity”.
Currently, SB leaders object to the media describing their society as an
extremist organisation. However, a 2012 report by the Ministry of Interior
indeed described this society as a “militantly-oriented group” and placed
it in the category of “groupings with extremist elements”. The report also
observed that the SB “publicly supported activities of the Slovak Revival

120
https://www.facebook.com/notes/1980043902251558/

119
Movement”121, an ultra-nationalist grouping that declares pan-Slavic ideas
and adores the fascist regime of the wartime Slovak state. Although the
society refuses to be characterised as “extremist”, it uses typical far-
right/extremist vocabulary in public statements criticising its ideological
opponents from the mainstream environment (e.g. “violent Antifa”,
“ultraliberals” or “neoliberals”) and, like far-right groupings, combines
subscription to Christianity with attacking “Islamic expansionism”.
The content of SB communication outputs indicates that the society
subscribes to the concept of pan-Slavic solidarity and supports Russia in
international politics issues. One of the founding members of the SB,
Martin Keprta, left for Eastern Ukraine in 2014 to combat on the side of
Russian troops and pro-Russian separatists. According to the club’s
leaders, Keprta’s SB membership had expired before his departure to
Ukraine and he did not have any ties to the organisation whatsoever.
Nevertheless, information from various channels indicates that other SB
members left to take part in combat activities in the Donbas area as
well. The society’s leaders disputed that information, claiming such SB
members would have been expelled. In an interview for the Aktuality.sk
news portal, Keprta said he had decided to go and fight in Donbas be-
cause he felt inspired by “the concept of Slavdom and values like tradi-
tions and family, everything the EU combats and denies at the root”. In
the interview, Keprta also said: “Our goal is Novo-Russia and recogni-
tion of a Doneck independent republic. I am a member of its official
army. This is to say that in the time of peace, I will remain in the bar-
racks, waiting until my homeland summons me to service again.”122

121
Správa o plnení úloh vyplývajúcich z koncepcie boja proti extrémizmu na roky 2011
– 2014 za rok 2012 [Report on the Fulfilment of Tasks Ensuing from the Strategy
to Combat Extremism in 2011 – 2014 for 2012]; available at:
www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/Index/Mater-Dokum-1590910
122
“Spoveď Slováka, ktorý bojuje za proruských separatistov” [‘Testimony of a
Slovak Who Fights on the Side of Pro-Russian Separatists’], Aktuality.sk, Febru-
ary 23, 2015, http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/271050/nevzali-ho-do-armady-siel-
k-separatistom/

120
 In an interview for the Denník N daily, SB Chairman Švrček claimed
that he had visited Russia “as a private person”, to take part in “the
training with Russian Cossacks”. In the same interview, another SB
leader Filip Rázga refused to admit the Russian Army’s presence in
Ukraine. According to him, Crimea held a “referendum, and 91 percent of
the people voted for its incorporation to the Russian Federation”. Rázga
also claimed that “there are opinions that say Russia annexed Crimea,
and then there are opinions that say people voted for incorporation in a
referendum”. When asked about the situation in Crimea, Švrček re-
sponded with a rhetorical question: “Should the citizens’ right to self-
determination not be respected?”123
In 2018, the SB played a minor role in the attempt to establish a
European headquarters of the Night Wolves motorcycle gang in Slova-
kia on the premises of a training camp in Dolná Krupá, which had previ-
ously been used by the SB.
Officially supported by the Russian Government, the Russian “patri-
otic” motorcycle club first entered awareness of the Slovak public in the
spring of 2015 when its leader Alexandr Zaldostanov, a.k.a. Surgeon,
announced a motorcycle tour around Central Europe with Berlin as the
final destination to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Russian vic-
tory over Nazism. In Russia, Night Wolves are an integral part of a con-
glomerate of pro-government organisations and societies that have
been mobilised by Russian power organs in order to influence the popu-
lation through propaganda tools. This gang’s ideological foundation
combines Stalinism, nationalism, superpower chauvinism, Orthodox
monarchism, chernosotenstvo124 and adoration of the incumbent Russian
regime led by Putin.

123
Mikušovič, Dušan: “Rozhovor s brancami: Čo je zlé na cvičení so zbraňou v lese?”
[‘An Interview with a Recruit: What’s Bad about Exercising with Weapons in the
Woods?’], Denník N, Febuary 25, 2015; available at: https://dennikn.sk/57900/
rozhovor-s-brancami-co-je-zle-na-tom-cvicit-v-lese-zbranou/

121
 Since 2014, Night Wolves have been regularly trying to organise
public happenings in foreign countries in close cooperation with the
Russian government, including its diplomatic service. The choreography
and stage direction of these happenings is rather simple: a convoy com-
prising Russian riders in Night Wolves outfits and local riders makes a
spectacular arrival at some noteworthy place and in cooperation with
pro-Russian interest groups they organise a commemorative happening
attended by the general public, always under Soviet and Russian flags
(both state and military), banners and slogans celebrating the Soviet
Union and Russia. The main mission of these happenings is to spread
Russian/Soviet interpretations of World War II and neutralise histori-
cally well-founded versions about the true role of the Stalinist Soviet
Union in starting the war and the far-reaching negative consequences of
the rule of communist regimes the Soviet Union implanted in Central
European countries after World War II. These happenings are filmed in
full and subsequently broadcast on Russian federal television channels
so that their viewers can see ordinary people from foreign countries as
they welcome their “Slavic brothers”.
Since many members of Night Wolves took active part in the military
occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and fought on the side of
Russian troops and pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas area, the Euro-
pean Union placed their leaders on the list of persons that are banned
from entering its territory. That is why the leaders of Night Wolves coop-
erate with Russian-speaking citizens of the Baltic countries to penetrate
into EU member states. Between 2015 and 2019, this was the principal
method of how Night Wolves convoys made it to Slovakia. They com-
prised mostly Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia, who first made it
through Lithuania to Poland thanks to their EU passports, then they trav-
elled across Poland dressed in civilian clothes and once they reached
Czech and Slovak territory they put on their traditional outfits – leather

124
An anti-Semitic movement in Russia in early 20th century.

122
jackets and helmets with Russian, Orthodox and Soviet symbols and mo-
tifs. Pro-Russian activists supported by the Russian embassy organised a
commemorative event at the Slavín burial ground and memorial in Brati-
slava, which was also attended by Night Wolves members and supporters
along with Russian diplomats and Slovak pro-Russian politicians.
Inspired and encouraged by that event’s success, Night Wolves de-
cided to expand the scope of their activities in Slovakia. In June 2018,
they announced plans to open a headquarters in Slovakia that would
represent the organisation across Europe. In the village of Dolná Krupá
near Trnava, Jozef Hambálek, businessman, voluntary firefighter and
avid biker who describes himself as a Slovak Night Wolf had built a
training camp that was formally intended to serve as a military museum
and that already served as the ground for decommissioned military
equipment such as tanks, armoured vehicles, etc. It was this training
camp that SB members had regularly used for their training before the
plans of Night Wolves leaked to independent press and subsequently to
the general public, prompting state organs to intervene in order to
thwart the plans for setting up Night Wolves’ European headquarters.
The pan-Slavic and pro-Russian orientation of the SB was also mani-
fested in their attempt to penetrate primary school curricula in the form
of “patriotic” lectures for pupils in East Slovakia. During the lectures, SB
lecturers used a map entitled “The Territory Our Nation Inhabits”, which
showed the territory inhabited by Slavic nations as a single state
spreading from the Adriatic through Central Europe all the way to the
Pacific Ocean.
In 2015, Filip Rázga on his Facebook profile outlined his own scenario
of future developments in the context of the refugee crisis in Europe:
“Europe will toss and turn in fragmentation and chaos; there will be first
victims; the multiculturalists will babble some nonsense; realistic people
will defend themselves; the blood will flow. The politicians will run away
and will philosophise from across some ocean or not at all. The economy

123
will collapse completely ... And then either we will all go to Russia, or
Russia will come to us. And this is what America is after, to make us kill
each other and bleed ourselves to death. In case of potential resistance,
the NATO troops stand by; they will protect the elite and wait and pro-
voke Russia. After they find out that inhabitants are against them, the
situation will lead to a stalemate as the Russians are not stupid and they
will wait until the moment of irreversible confrontation. And then it is
the end of the world as we know it.”125
SB leaders are equally dissatisfied about the fact that Slovakia is
currently a member state of NATO and therefore it belongs to a different
military and political grouping than Russia. “The Cold War that was
supposed to be over by now has merely taken a break only to resume
again with an even greater intensity. But now we stand on the opposite
side of the barricade; now the Russian is officially our enemy.”126
Although SB leaders refuse to officially define Slovakia’s enemy they
would oppose in a hypothetical/potential military conflict with Slova-
kia’s participation, their public statements indicate that members of this
paramilitary club would not fight on the side of Slovakia’s EU and NATO
allies; on the contrary, given their ideological preferences, especially
anti-Atlanticism and pan-Slavic and pro-Russian views, they would
rather side with Russia.

125
“Extrémistov vedie aj oceňovaný vedec zo SAV: Slovenskí branci začínajú byť
profesionálmi”, [‘Prize-Winning Scientist Who Leads Extremists: Slovak Recruits
Are Beginning to Turn Professionals’], Topky.sk daily, October 8, 2015; available
at: http://www.topky.sk/cl/10/1502635/Extremistov-vedie-aj-ocenovany-vedec-
zo-SAV--Slovenski-branci-zacinaju-byt-profesionalmi
126
18 rokov v NATO. Nie je čo oslavovať [‘18 Years in NATO: Nothing to Celebrate’],
December 11, 2020; available at: https://www.facebook.com/slovenskibranci1/photos/
a.1462594147329872/2754156024840338/

124
10. ANALYSIS OF PRO-RUSSIAN ACTORS’
10. FACEBOOK POSTS ON RUSSIA

10. 1. Number of posts on select profiles

The following chapter features a quantitative analysis of posts pub-

lished on Facebook accounts of ten of the most notorious pro-Russian
actors in Slovakia during the past 30 months spanning August 1, 2018,
and January 31, 2021 (see Table 1). For the analysis, we used the Apify
data extraction service in combination with partial manual verification of
individual posts’ contents.

Table 1: Analysed profiles

Number of Facebook URL:

Name of the profile
followers https://www.facebook.com/...

Ľuboš Blaha 96,313 LBlaha

Štefan Harabin 77,472 harabinstefan
Andrej Danko 71,952 andrejdanko.sk
Milan Uhrík 70,462 ing.milan.uhrik
Slovak Revival Movement 44,146 slovenskehnutieobrody
Miroslav Radačovský 25,224 sudcaradacovsky
Slovak Conscripts 19,538 slovenskibranci1
Ján Čarnogurský 10,470 jan.carnogursky
Communist Party of Slovakia 07,430 KomunistickaStranaSlovenska
Slovak-Russian Association 02,475 SlovenskoRuskaSpolocnost

Source: Facebook.com, February 2021.

125
 On the ten examined Facebook profiles,127 we searched for occurrence
of the following keywords: Russians, Russia, Putin, Moscow, Stalin,
Lavrov, Soviet, USSR, Lenin, Russophile, Russophobic. Where possible,
we visually checked the posts to make sure that they included pictures
or shared interactions with obviously Russian motifs. The analysis in-
cludes all posts that contained the mentioned keywords, regardless of
whether Russia was or was not the main subject of the post.
Statistically, it was impossible to evaluate the degree of pro-Russian
attitudes expressed in the examined posts. Nevertheless, a brief content
analysis indicated that most examined posts were pro-Russian; with
some profiles, for instance the ones of Ľuboš Blaha, Ján Čarnogurský, or
Štefan Harabin, this goes practically for all posts. Only a smaller propor-
tion of the posts was neutral or featured only a brief or solitary reference
to Russia; such posts were found on the profiles of Slovak Conscripts,
Milan Uhrík, or the Slovak Revival Movement. None of the examined
profiles featured a single post that would be openly critical of Russia.128

127
Besides these profiles, we also analysed the profile of Robert Fico (face-
book.com/robertficosk), which during the examined period published 474 posts but
only three of them (0.6%) included some of the keywords and therefore was not in-
cluded in this analysis due to the low number of posts on Russia. For similar reasons,
the analysis did not include the current Facebook profile of Marian Kotleba (face-
book.com/Kotlebaofficialfanpage), which was created relatively recently (July 4,
2020), or the official profile of ĽSNS (facebook.com/KotlebovciLSNaseSlovensko),
which is not overly active (several-month-long publishing hiatuses are no exception)
and does not have too many followers.
128
Interesting in this context is the ambivalent position of the Facebook profile of the
Communist Party of Slovakia regarding the incumbent regime in Russia. Its post
published on August 17, 2019, reads: “Currently underway in Moscow is a protest of
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation under the slogan ‘For Fair Elections’
that has been allowed by the Government of the Russian Federation. The commu-
nists as the strongest opposition party in parliament also express dissatisfaction
over decisions of the election commission. But their goal is not to disrupt the state
or to serve foreign powers’ interests, as it is the case of neoliberal opposition en-
couraged and financed from the West, but to snatch the state away from the oligarchs
and return it to the working people. The Russian communists have our solidarity and
support.”– www.facebook.com/KomunistickaStranaSlovenska/posts/2689891461021376

126
 The overall number of posts featuring a reference to Russia during the
entire examined period was 1,090. Most frequently, such a reference ap-
peared in posts on the profile of Ľuboš Blaha, which averaged 17 of these
posts per month (i.e. one every other day). The Communist Party of Slo-
vakia ranked second, publishing on average 5.4 posts with a reference to
Russia per month. On the opposite pole was the profile of Slovak Con-
scripts, which published only 0.5 such post per month. The remaining
seven profiles averaged between one and three posts with a reference to
Russia per month (see Table 2).

Table 2: Total number of posts featuring a reference to Russia (August

2018 – January 2021)
Number Number % of posts Average
of posts of posts with monthly num-
Name of the profile with without reference ber of posts
reference to reference to to Russia with reference
Russia Russia on all posts to Russia
Ľuboš Blaha 511 1,014 33.5 17.0
Communist Party of Slovakia 163 0851 16.1 5.4
Andrej Danko 090 1,070 07.8 3.0
Slovak-Russian Association 073 0094 43.7 2.4
Ján Čarnogurský 058 0075 43.6 1.9
Štefan Harabin 055 0950 05.5 1.8
Milan Uhrík 046 0893 04.9 1.5
Slovak Revival Movement 045 1,908 02.3 2.0 *)
Miroslav Radačovský 033 0189 14.9 1.3 **)
Slovak Conscripts 016 0393 03.9 0.5
TOTAL 1,090 7,437 12.8 36.3

Notes: *) Average for 22 months as the Facebook profile of the Slovak Revival
Movement (SHO) took a break between November 2019 and June 2020; in spite
of this hiatus, its Facebook profile published more posts than any other profile.
**) Average for 25 months as the Facebook profile of Miroslav Radačovský was
created in January 2020.
Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com
127
Besides the absolute number of posts/articles, an interesting indicator is
the share of posts featuring references to Russia on the total number of
posts. With Ľuboš Blaha, this share was quite high, at about one third
(see Table 2). But the highest share (almost 44%) was recorded on pro-
files of the Slovak-Russian Association and Ján Čarnogurský, which is
quite understandable given the principal focus of their activity. At the
same time, it is interesting that even on these profiles a majority of
posts/articles did not make a reference to Russia.

10. 2. Number of posts in time

It was interesting to analyse the development of the number of posts

over time. On the one hand, it turned out that posts about Russia were
relatively evenly spread over the two-year period (see Graph 1), while
their overall number slightly declined. On the other hand, the number of
posts without a reference to Russia tended to tide and subside: a higher
frequency was recorded between March and May 2019 (presidential
elections in Slovakia and elections to the European Parliament), be-
tween February and March 2020 (parliamentary elections in Slovakia)
and since September 2020 (second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic).
During the first wave of the pandemic (April through August 2020), the
number of these posts tended to decline.
Graph 1 also shows a five-month growth period in the number of posts
toward the end of 2019 and 2020. It is interesting that during the second
wave of the pandemic (i.e. the end of 2020) the growth was steeper than
a year before. In 2019, the average monthly number of posts increased
from 240 (end of summer 2019) to 300 (beginning of 2020), amounting
to a growth by 25%, while over the same period one year later it increased
from 235 to almost 330, i.e. by 40%. The second wave of the pandemic,
the measures adopted by the Igor Matovič administration, the mutual

128
relations within the ruling coalition – all that caused an unusually strong
tidal wave of Facebook posts published on the ten examined profiles and
– as will be discussed later – also that of people’s engagement.

Graph 1: Monthly numbers of posts with/without a reference to Russia on

all examined profiles (average for the past six months)

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
01 03 05 07 09 11 01 03 05 07 09 11 01
2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2021

Posts with a reference to Russia Posts without a reference to Russia

Note: The profile of the Slovak Revival Movement took a publishing hiatus
between November 2019 and June 2020 (perhaps the posts were published and
later deleted; in any case, they are unavailable now), which is why the number of
SHO posts during this period (only for the purposes of this Graph) was taken as
the average from the preceding period.
Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

Both of these trends that can be observed over the past two years –
i.e. a slight decline in the overall number of posts with references to
Russia and the fluctuating number of other posts that is currently on the
rise – caused a decline in the share of posts on Russia on total posts
(see Graph 2).

129
 Given the consistently high number of posts on Russia published by
Ľuboš Blaha, there was a question whether the overall decline in the
share of posts on Russia was not caused by the same decline on Blaha’s
profile. The analysis showed this was not the case: even when eliminat-
ing Blaha’s profile from the overall set of profiles, the shape of the curve
remained similar, showing the same declining trend (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Monthly shares of posts with a reference to Russia on all posts

(average for the past six months, %)
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
01 03 05 07 09 11 01 03 05 07 09 11 01
2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2021
All 10 profiles Nine profiles (minus Ľuboš Blaha’s profile)

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

The average daily number of posts with a reference to Russia pub-

lished on all examined profiles combined was 1.2. Graph 3, which pre-
sents the development in the number of posts over time not based on
calendar months but based on the past 30 days average, shows the gen-
erally declining trend in the number of posts and simultaneously the
fluctuations in particular days or shorter time periods.

130
 As far as individual calendar months are concerned, the highest activ-
ity was recorded in May 2019 with 71 posts on Russia. In this month
alone, Andrej Danko published 18 posts; most of them were related to
his attending the military parade in Moscow on the occasion of celebrat-
ing the end of World War II and his meeting with Vladimir Putin. Yet,
Danko was still no match for Ľuboš Blaha who published 25 posts on
different issues over the same period; the Communist Party of Slovakia
published 15 posts of various kind but mostly emphasising Russia’s role
in defeating fascism while all remaining profiles combined for 13 posts.

Graph 3. Average daily number of posts with a reference to Russia during

the past 30 days (September 1, 2018 – January 31, 2021)
3

2,5

1,5

0,5

0
IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII I
2018 2019 2020 ´21

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

During the entire examined period, there was one day with nine pub-
lished posts, three days with seven posts, five days with six posts, etc.
On the record day of November 26, 2018, most published posts com-

131
mented of the Russo–Ukrainian feud in the Azov Sea.129 On May 8 and
9, 2019 (seven posts each), they were dedicated mostly to the end of
World War II and the military parade in Moscow. On March 10, 2019, the
seven posts discussed mostly the summoning of the Russian ambassa-
dor to Slovakia by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.130
The period of the lowest interest in Russia stretched from July 6,
2020 until August 11, 2020; during this period of 37 days, only 10 posts
were published. At the end of January and in February 2021, the overall
number of posts increased again due to the purchase of Russian COVID-
19 vaccine Sputnik V. But February 2021 does not fall within the exam-
ined period. On the other hand, the overall number of posts with refer-
ences to Russia peaked in May 2019. It may be safely assumed that the
situation would have been repeated in May 2020 had the Kremlin not
postponed the annual military parade in the Red Square on the occasion
of the 75th anniversary of the Victory Day on account of the pandemic.131

10. 3. Engagement of the public

Engagement stands for a sum of actions taken by the readers of each

concrete post. They are expressed by a number that combines the num-
ber of comments, shares and reactions. The overall level of engagement
is the measurement of a post’s success. It is also referred to as engage-
ment of the public. Table 3 features overall engagement data for all
examined profiles. The final column of Table 3 expresses the percentage
share between engagement vis-à-vis one post with a reference to Russia
and one post without such a reference.

129
For further details about this issue, please see
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-kerch-idUSL8N1Y00NI
130
For further details, please see p. 115.
131
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-putin-
idUSKCN21Y2I4

132
Table 3: Number of interactions with posts featuring a reference to Russia
(August 2018 – January 2021)

Average Average One post on

Posts on Other per one per one Russia / one
Name of the profile
Russia posts post on post not on post not on
Russia Russia Russia (%)

Ľuboš Blaha 2,688,346 7,599,383 5,261 7,494 070.2

Milan Uhrík 0 162,939 3,887,551 3,542 4,353 081.4

Štefan Harabin 0 145,968 2,097,180 2,654 2,208 120.2

Andrej Danko 0 136,992 1,390,200 1,522 1,299 117.2

Miroslav
Radačovský 0 48,557 0 320,319 1,471 1,695 086.8

Ján Čarnogurský 0 16,745 0 023,751 289 317 091.2

Slovak Conscripts 0 3,858 0 113,202 241 288 083.7

Communist Party 0 37,726 0 195,403 231 230 100.8

of Slovakia

Slovak Revival 0 6,863 0 253,620 153 133 114.7

Movement

Slovak-Russian 0 1,555 0 2,196 21 23 091.2

Association

TOTAL 3,241,131 15,626,989 - *) - *) - *)

Note: *) In these columns, the absolute figures or their overall ratio are not
featured as they do not have any information value; the number of reactions to
Ľuboš Blaha’s posts as well as the number of his posts on Russia is so high that
it jacks the overall ratio to unreal though mathematically correct value of 140%.

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

133
 Arranging all posts published on individual profiles from the most
successful ones (i.e. the ones with the greatest level of engagement) to
the least successful ones provides us with a fairly good idea of issues
that resonate the most among these profiles’ followers. They are mostly
posts without a reference to Russia.
The most “explosive” posts of Ľuboš Blaha are currently the ones
criticising the incumbent administration and particularly Igor Matovič.
All of his top three posts are harshly anti-Matovič posts with the overall
level of engagement at 154,000. In the top 50, there are 40 posts with a
reference to Matovič but only nine posts with a reference to Russia (the
highest of them ranks 19th)132. Out of the top 50 posts, 45 were pub-
lished after the 2020 parliamentary elections.
The posts with the highest level of engagement on the Facebook
profile of Milan Uhrík are aimed against migrants, Brussels and Matovič.
The most successful post with a reference to Russia is 22nd.133
Štefan Harabin ran in the 2019 presidential elections and the 2020
parliamentary elections on the back of a relatively intense online cam-
paign. But it would be a big mistake to think that his Facebook activity
subsided following his double election fiasco. His top 20 posts in terms
of public engagement feature only two campaign posts from January
and February 2020 that rank 8th and 18th, respectively. All the remain-
ing most successful posts have been published since the 2020 parlia-
mentary elections, the most successful ones toward the end of 2020 and
in January 2021. Harabin’s post with the highest level of public engage-
ment is a video-commentary headlined “Lukashenko Is Just a Pale Imita-
tion of Dictator Matovič”.134 The highest-ranking post with a reference

132
https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2558171354421428
133
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/posts/985509431802169
134
https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/posts/2917998095143683;
although this post had over 30,000 shares (!), over 2,700 comments and over
22,000 reactions, it was not included among posts with a reference to Russia.

134
to Russia is 35th.135 On the other hand, the truth remains that his posts
dedicated to Russia are generally slightly more successful than the rest:
about half of Harabin’s pro-Russian posts rank in the top third of the hit
list in terms of public engagement.
The most successful post with a reference to Russia published by
Andrej Danko is 12th.136 Like in the case of Harabin, Danko’s posts on
Russia are slightly more successful than the rest; however, this shows in
the middle of the list rather than on its top. Danko’s posts published
toward the end of 2020 provoked the most public engagement; most of
them criticise the incumbent administration, although they are not
nearly as harsh as the posts published by three previously mentioned
politicians. It is their lesser aggressiveness that is most likely the reason
for the lower rate of public engagement (please compare to Table 3).
Out of top ten posts published by Miroslav Radačovský, five are
dedicated to recently-deceased former police president Milan Lu-
čanský.137 His most successful post on Russia is 12th.138
The list of the most successful posts published by Ján Čarnogurský is
topped by seven posts without a reference to Russia, followed by five
posts with a reference to Russia.139 The 1st and the 4th place belongs to
posts containing details from a criminal case file against Marian Kočner
140
while the 2nd and 3rd place belongs to posts about Lučanský.

135
https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/posts/2736010276675800
136
https://www.facebook.com/andrejdanko.sk/posts/2349037781976148
137
Radačovský is the legal representative of the family of Milan Lučanský.
138
https://www.facebook.com/sudcaradacovsky/posts/965994690452889
139
Posts number eight and nine:
https://www.facebook.com/jan.carnogursky/posts/2722255741220724,
https://www.facebook.com/jan.carnogursky/posts/2763790473733917
140
Čarnogurský published details from the case file on wiretapping of journalists
in a Bratislava café at:
https://www.facebook.com/jan.carnogursky/posts/2709552632491035

135
 The most successful posts of Slovak Conscripts average between
1,000 and 2,000 interactions except the viral post from March 13,
2020,141 i.e. the onset of the first wave of the COVID-19 epidemic, whose
message was as follows: “Home Guard of Slovak Conscripts, within its
personnel and logistical capacities, is prepared to extend a helping hand
to the population in order to help people cope with this crisis situation”,
which combined for the public engagement of 23,000 interactions. The
profile’s most successful post with a reference to Russia ranks at 20th
place.142
The Facebook profile of the Communist Party of Slovakia is the only
one of all examined profiles whose most successful posts prevailingly
date back to the period of 2018–2019 rather than 2020 (see Graph 4).
Although the profile also publishes topical information, for instance
news on trade unionists’ initiatives, statements regarding the current
political situation and news about the communist movement from vari-
ous countries around the world, the three most successful posts are
nostalgic retrospective glances summing up the “achievements” of living
in the regime before November 1989. The top posts with references to
Russia rank 10th and 11th on the list.143
The profile of the Slovak Revival Movement shows vivid activity in
terms of publishing and sharing news of varied content (e.g. video-
commentaries, statements, news on socially motivated visits to fami-
lies, the movement’s regional activities, etc.), averaging almost three
posts per day with a relatively low level of public engagement. The
most successful posts deal with various issues, including American
military bases, Matteo Salvini’s quotes on migration, obligation to

141
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskibranci1/posts/2518750485047561
142
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskibranci1/posts/2137724539816826
143
https://www.facebook.com/KomunistickaStranaSlovenska/posts/2891300884213765,
https://www.facebook.com/KomunistickaStranaSlovenska/posts/3054443494566169

136
have a negative COVID-19 certificate, or anti-government protests in
November 2020.144 The post on Russia from March 2019 is 16th on
the list of the most successful posts.145
The Slovak-Russian Association’s Facebook presentation is rather
confusing. The association does not publish its own posts but shares
external posts written by various authors. In 2018, it shared several
posts by Roman Ruhig, former candidate for the post of Bratislava
mayor, without much explanation. The association’s relatively peculiar
way of administering its profile is reflected in the generally low rate
of public engagement. Out of its posts concerning Russia, the great-
est public engagement (with only 120 interactions) was recorded by
the blatantly false news on the reasons for shooting down the Malay-
sia Airlines Flight 17, which claimed that the Netherlands accused
Ukraine and not Russia while in fact it was the other way around.146
Graph 4 provides an overview of 10 percent of the most successful
posts on each examined profile divided according to the time of publish-
ing. It is plain to see from the Graph that the five most successful profiles
reached the greatest level of public engagement in the most recent pe-
riod, i.e. from October 2020 through January 2021. These five profiles are
the most popular, with the highest average public engagement, which
grows even further recently. The rule of the thumb seems to be that the
more popular the profile was in the past, the faster is the recent growth
in its popularity. On the other hand, the five least successful profiles in
terms of public engagement seem to stagnate (please see also Graph 5).

144
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskehnutieobrody/posts/10155968814501837,
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskehnutieobrody/posts/10155961728351837,
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskehnutieobrody/posts/10157372630211837,
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskehnutieobrody/posts/10157409697436837,
145
https://www.facebook.com/slovenskehnutieobrody/posts/10155950822896837
146
https://www.facebook.com/SlovenskoRuskaSpolocnost/posts/2026366007407051

137
 Graph 4: One tenth of the most successful posts of each profile between
January 2019 and January 2021. When were they published?
4Q 2020 + Jan'21 1Q–3Q 2020 1Q–4Q 2019
time span 4 months time span 9 months time span 12 months

ĽB 82 % 15 % 3%
AD 65 % 8% 27 %
MU 53 % 23 % 24 %
ŠH 47 % 30 % 23 %
MR 43 % 18 % 39 %
SRM 49 % 9% 42 %
JČ 41 % 53 % 6%
SC 32 % 48 % 20 %
CPS 15 % 23 % 62 %

Legend: ĽB – Ľuboš Blaha, AD – Andrej Danko, MU – Milan Uhrík, ŠH - Štefan

Harabin, MR – Miroslav Radačovský, SRM – Slovak Revival Movement, JČ – Ján
Čarnogurský, SC – Slovak Conscripts, CPS – Communist Party of Slovakia.

Note: The Slovak-Russian Association is not listed on account of irregularity of

publishing its posts.

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

The trend of enormous increase in public engagement of the five most

successful profiles over the past four or five months is illustrated by
Graph 5. A reasonable assumption would be that the rate of public en-
gagement should increase in a linear fashion. But this is not the case.
The growth of the curve of average engagement is exponential, just like
in the case of other social phenomena such as the COVID-19 pandemic:
there is no telling as to how it will evolve later or when and why the
curve will begin to flatten or decline. Figuratively speaking, one could
say that the COVID-19 pandemic also brings about concomitant pan-
demic phenomena with identical quantitative characteristic.

138
Graph 5: Average number of interactions per one post on the four profiles
with the highest level of public engagement
12000

10000 Ľ. Blaha

8000 M. Uhrík

6000 Š. Harabin

4000
A. Danko
2000

0
I/2019 I/2020 I/2021

Note: Data for each month show the average for the past six months.
Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

The analysis of possible reasons for the massive growth in public

engagement described in Graph 5 exceeds the scope of the present
study; however, at least three explanations are patently obvious:

(1) False (e.g. purchased) interactions from bogus Facebook accounts.

While this reason cannot be ruled out, it is not likely due to the following
two reasons: first, the growth is gradual, without ruptures, as opposed to
jumpy; second, a similar growth has been posted by different actors whose
only common characteristic is closeness to currently opposition parties.

(2) People’s more intense following of social networks during the lockdown
as more people are home and spend their time of the Internet. Although
this explanation deserves a more detailed analysis, it is hardly the decisive
one because during the first wave of the pandemic (March – May 2020),
people’s mobility was restricted even more than during the second wave
and yet it did not produce such a steep growth in the level of Facebook

139
engagement (during the first wave, there was even a slight decline in the
average engagement with respect to certain profiles – please see Graph 5).

(3) The most probable reason is therefore increasing dissatisfaction of

people (including, but not limited to, people who did not vote for the par-
ties of the incumbent ruling coalition) with the Igor Matovič administra-
tion and its adopted measures that manifests, inter alia, through intensi-
fied activities on Facebook profiles of opposition leaders. This hypothesis
is supported by the fact that the three actors whose profiles saw the most
massive growth in terms of public engagement (i.e. Blaha, Uhrík, and
Harabin) were in the long term among the harshest, most relentless and
most overt critics of the Igor Matovič administration.

Graph 6: Average number of interactions per one post with a reference

to Russia and per one post without it on the profile of Ľuboš Blaha

12000
Posts without
10000 a reference to
8000 Russia

6000
Posts with a
4000 reference to
Russia
2000
I/2019 I/2020 I/2021

Note: Data for each month show the average for the past six months.
Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

We also tried to answer the question of whether public engagement in-

duced by posts containing Russian keywords tends to change in time
similar to public engagement induced by other posts (see Graph 6). In
other words, whether the posts on Russia maintain their average success
and their public engagement stagnates while public engagement induced

140
 by other posts (e.g. the ones criticising the incumbent administration)
increases rapidly. The analysis showed this is not the case. As an example,
Graph 6 focused specifically on Ľuboš Blaha who publishes the most
posts on Russia. It turned out that public engagement increased in a very
similar way with respect to posts on Russia and to posts on other issues.

10. 4. The most successful posts on Russia in terms of public engagement

Graph 7 depicts the 100 most successful posts in terms of public en-
gagement published on each examined profile, highlighting the posts
that featured a reference to Russia.

Graph 7: The most successful posts in terms of public engagement

(August 2018 – January 2021; posts on Russia are highlighted in black)
1st 100th
MU
SRM
SC

CPS
ĽB
ŠH
MR
AD

SRA
JČ

Legend: MU – Milan Uhrík, SRM – Slovak Revival Movement, SC – Slovak Conscripts, CPS
– Communist Party of Slovakia, ĽB – Ľuboš Blaha, ŠH - Štefan Harabin, MR – Miroslav
Radačovský, AD – Andrej Danko, SRA – Slovak-Russian Association, JČ – Ján Čarnogurský

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, February 2021; source data: Facebook.com

141
 As a way of conclusion, let us present a brief sample of posts featur-
ing a reference to Russia that induced the greatest rate of public en-
gagement; naturally, we focused on the four politicians whose Facebook
profiles are the most popular.

Ľuboš Blaha, 1st place, March 1, 2020

https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2558171354421428
7,500 reactions; 4,300 comments; 11,000 shares

Well, this is big, my friends! This is a bomb!

WHAT WAS THE OĽANO CAR DOING IN FRONT OF AMERICAN
RESIDENCE JUST HOURS AFTER ELECTIONS?
I just laid my hands on a photograph of an office car of the Trnava
self-governing region, which is under the political control of OĽaNO.
You won’t believe where this car was parked today, on a Sunday
morning, one day after elections. Those who are familiar with Bratislava
see it already. Those who are not – hold your hats! It was parked in front
of the residence of American embassy in Slovakia.
DID YOU SELL OUT SLOVAKIA, IGOR?
With all due respect, it seems that our big hero Matovič and/or some of
his OĽaNO underlings went to collect instructions from the Big Brother
immediately after elections.
Bravo, Mr. Pentovič! Is this how the future premier defends our national
interests?
...
JUST IMAGINE THAT SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAPPENED IN FRONT
OF A RUSSIAN EMBASSY – THAT WOULD BE SOME FURORE!
Just imagine that a new American president-elect would report to the
Russian Embassy the morning after election Tuesday – the American
media would feed on such a scandal for several years!

142
So how can it be that Americans perpetrate something like this in Slovakia?
This is a scandal no matter how you slice it! It seems that fraudster
Matovič has sold Slovakia to the Americans just a few hours after
elections. Shame on you!
...
Throughout the campaign, I warned people that the right would turn
Slovakia into an American colony. Well, it barely took a few hours since
elections and here we go. Please, spread this news, friends. There are
just too many coincidences on a Sunday morning, don’t you think?

(The post has been abridged for editorial reasons)

Ľuboš Blaha, 2nd place, October 7, 2020

https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2760179834220578
17,000 reactions; 1,600 comments; 3,200 shares

When he came to power, Russia was a socially and morally devastated

country, ruled by oligarchs and American NGOs.
Crime, chaos, poverty, mafia... a wild capitalism of the Yetsin type.
Then he arrived and within a couple of years, the state wielded authority
again. He confiscated oligarchs’ stolen property and brought it back to
the state. He restored people’s dignity and social rights.
He brought Russia back on the track of economic growth and dramati-
cally increased the standard of living. He chased away American NGOs
and instilled a sense of honour to the Russians. He established order and
stability.
The Russian Federation again became a superpower they are afraid of in
the West. They are helpless and so they spread silly Russophobia
– because they fear competition, because they fear a strong Russia.

143
Thanks to him, the world politics has found its lost balance again and
the Americans have stopped playing the arrogant world cops. Yes, that
must have really hurt the western hawks. But the rest of the world has
that much more to cheer about.
Once again, the Russians feel pride in their nation and belief in their
state’s strength. Once again, they feel respect for their national history
as they put an end to the dark liberal 1990s when the West expediently
trampled the Russians in order to bring them to their knees.
It was he who brought Russia back on its feet again and today, his ene-
mies are trembling in fear of him.
It was he who a new strength to Russia.
It was he who brought social peace and a new hope.
He is an outstanding personality that deserves respect. I saw him in
person last year as he gave a speech at a conference in Moscow and I
can testify to this – few have charisma like he does.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
A statesman. A true leader.
And so, the greetings from Slovakia reach your ears: Many happy
returns, Mr. President!

Ľuboš Blaha, 3rd place, July 2, 2019

https://www.facebook.com/LBlaha/posts/2345496245688941
10,000 reactions; 2,300 comments; 8,400 shares

They have lied to us for years. They have humiliated Russia for years.
But those times are gone. The people see Russia grow and the West
decline.
It is time to tell you the truth about the Russian Federation.
(The post is followed by a video of Ľuboš Blaha from Russia)

144
Andrej Danko, 1st place, May 9, 2019
https://www.facebook.com/andrejdanko.sk/posts/2349037781976148
6,800 reactions; 1,100 comments; 409 shares

I THANKED PRESIDENT PUTIN

In the end, they surprised me. I was able to speak in person to Mr. Presi-
dent Putin. It is a day I will never forget. I thanked him on behalf of the
Slovak Republic for our liberation and wished him all the best.

Štefan Harabin, 1st place, March 22, 2020

https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/posts/2736010276675800
3,800 reactions; 370 comments; 3,600 shares

In return, Italy will veto anti-Russian EU sanctions, which significantly

and nonsensically harm also our economy. Day after day, it becomes
crystal clear that Russia led by Putin is not an aggressor or a security
threat as some Slovak Soros podpindosniks would like us to believe.

The most successful posts by Milan Uhrík mention Russia without mak-
ing it the chief subject-matter of the post. The reference is often made
with respect to NATO or the United States. The analysis showed that
Facebook profiles of Milan Uhrík, Slovak Conscripts and the Slovak
Revival Movement generally feature rather few posts with references to
Russia (please see Table 2 and Graph 7), and that very few of them are
typically pro-Russian. Therefore, in order to illustrate how Milan Uhrík
promotes the issue of Russia, we selected the number ten on the list of
his most successful posts mentioning Russia.

145
Milan Uhrík, 10th place, December 27, 2020
https://www.facebook.com/ing.milan.uhrik/posts/1331324580553984/
4,000 reactions; 321 comments; 391 shares

One should learn from the best. Little Jesus brought me an ideal present
for long winter evenings. Do you know this one? I recommend watching
it also in the film version (The Putin Interviews), although it is about
three years old. Have a nice weekend!

(The post is complemented by a photograph of Vladimir Putin from the

cover of book by Oliver Stone Interviews with Putin)

With respect to the first presented post by Ľuboš Blaha, which is simul-
taneously the post with the highest public engagement out of all 1,090
posts from the ten examined profiles, one must bear in mind that Russia
is very often mentioned in posts that criticise the United States or
NATO. This testifies to the resurrection of a bipolar perception of the
world (i.e. West bloc vs. East bloc) among the authors whose Facebook
profiles are not consistent with the official pro-Atlantic foreign policy
doctrine of the Slovak Republic. For the sake of illustration: out of 511 of
posts with a reference to Russia by Ľuboš Blaha, as many as 372 also
feature a reference to the United States or NATO; in the case of Andrej
Danko, it is 12 out of 90, in the case of the Communist Party of Slovakia
it is 32 out of 163, in the case of Milan Uhrík it is 29 out of 46 and in the
case of Štefan Harabin it is six out of 55147.

147
For further details, please see infographic at:
https://www.ivo.sk/buxus/images//rozne/InfographicRR1.jpg

146
11. CONCLUSION

The number of politicians and public figures in Slovakia who are

tempted to play Russian roulette for the fate of their country substan-
tially exceeds the scope of the present publication.
One area that certainly deserves special attention is mass media and
the entire information environment as this is where Russian roulette
players occur in abundance. There is a plethora of various “alternative”
periodicals that publish their own views as well as online platforms that
recycle content from other sources. Regardless of differences in the
approach to processing the published content and specifics in editorial
policies, they have the one essential thing in common – they are willing
to be the tool of promoting political power of a foreign country, which
seeks to influence internal political development in our country as well
as in its immediate and broader surroundings – in the region of Central
Europe, but also in Western Europe and in the world. The goal of pro-
moting this influence is to gain sympathies and support of local people
and local politicians and thus encourage the Kremlin to pursue its geo-
political objectives.
Other pro-Russian players whose activities deserve special attention
can be found in the field of party politics. Some of them are members of
political parties examined by this publication, but others operate else-
where. Also, there are certainly many other authors (e.g. bloggers, activ-
ists) who have been zealously emphasising, adoring and promoting poli-
cies of the Eastern superpower for years.
The principal mission of this publication was to point out the funda-
mental discrepancy between Slovakia’s foreign policy priorities in con-
temporary turbulent world, their value framework and democratic con-
tent of our social order and system of government on the one hand and

147
the subversive activities of domestic promoters of foreign influence on
the other. But there is another important dimension, which is the moral
one. That dimension holds a truthful mirror to sycophantic pipe dreams
of members of Slovakia’s pro-Kremlin lobby who support the repressive
regime that persecutes its ideological and political opponents and has
already driven hundreds of thousands of Russians away from their home-
land. These lobbyists claim that they merely care that our countries co-
operate with one another and maintain the best possible mutual rela-
tions, that people in Slovakia learn more about Russian culture, art and
science, and that the Slovaks become more interested in the lives of Rus-
sian people. In truth, however, they are siding with those who make ordi-
nary Russian people’s lives a misery by curtailing their freedoms, sup-
pressing their human rights, hampering the sound development of the
Russian society, and in the end harming Russian culture, art and science.
They are siding with a regime that invades neighbouring countries, kills
their inhabitants, occupies their territories and supports local dictators
and their repressive policies in many other countries around the world.
Sure the Slovak admirers of the Kremlin must know about all that, but
they pretend like this does not concern them, or worse yet, like none of
that existed. In doing so, though, they shoulder part of the responsibility
for backing the Kremlin regime in its wrongs and depravities, assisting
and legitimising its reprehensible policies.
One day, a true revolution will engulf Russia and the incumbent re-
gime will be gone forever. The future of the vast country in the East will
be determined by those who today fill the squares and streets of Rus-
sian cities despite police brutality to make their voice heard against
corruption and political despotism along with those who are currently in
prisons or in exile. Will the devoted Slovak stalwarts of Kremlin policies
of today find the strength to look them in the eye?

148
AUTHORS

Grigorij Mesežnikov, PhDr., is a political scientist who graduated from the Faculty
of Arts at the Moscow State University. In 1983–1993, he worked at Comenius
University in Bratislava; in 1993–1997 he worked at the Cabinet of Political Sci-
ence of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He is a co-founder of the Institute for
Public Affairs, which he joined in June 1997; he has been its president since Febru-
ary 1999. In 1994–1998, he was the secretary of the Slovak Political Science
Association. He has published expert studies in monographs, collections and jour-
nals in Slovakia and other 22 countries around the world. He specialises in issues
of party systems’ development and party politics as well as the issue of democratic
transformation in central and eastern European countries. He regularly analyses
developments on Slovakia’s political scene for domestic and foreign media. He was
the editor (co-editor) and author (co-author) of several dozens of book publications,
including Global Reports on the State of Society in Slovakia (1999–2006), and the
chief author of the chapter on Slovakia for Nations in Transit reports published by
Freedom House (1998–2014). He has been to research fellowships in Sweden
(1992) and the United States (1994); in 2006, he graduated from the Reagan –
Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the National Endowment for Democracy in
Washington, D. C. In 2012, as part of his individual research project supported from
the Taiwan Fellowship programme, he worked at the Department of Political Sci-
ence of the National Taiwan University in Taipei. In 2019–2020, he was a visiting
expert at the Institute for Human Sciences – Institut für die Wissenschaften vom
Menschen (IWM) in Vienna as part of the Europe’s Futures programme.

Ján Bartoš, MA, graduated from the Faculty of Arts at the Trnava University. He
has worked with the Institute for Public Affairs since 2010 as a project manager
and analyst. He has co-authored the following publications Municipal Elections
2014: Financing Campaigns in Elections of Slovak Regional Capital Mayors (Institute
for Public Affairs, Bratislava 2015), Authoritarian Shadows in the European Union
(Political Capital, Budapest 2020), Infodemia in Slovakia 2020: Disinformation and
Conspiratorial Scene In the Time of COVID-19 (Institute for Public Affairs, Brati-
slava 2020). He has participated in research projects dedicated to simulated stu-
dents’ elections, civic participation and threats related to disinformation.

149
Grigorij Mesežnikov
Ján Bartoš

Who Is Playing Russian Roulette in Slovakia

Translated by: Fiona Borská

Layout and cover: Ján Bartoš
Cover photo(flag): jannoon028 – www.freepik.com
Print: ŠEVT a. s.

© Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava 2021

ISBN: 978-80-89345-92-2 (paperback)
EAN: 9788089345922

150