Guide for the Judges of the International Court of Justice

Table of Contents
1. Introduction to the ICJ
2. ICJ statute
3. Summary of the case
4. Relevant agreements
5. Structure of the judgment
6. Further reading
7. Bibliography

Introduction to the ICJ

The International Court of Justice, with its seat in the Peace Palace in The Hague, has been
the home of international arbitration since 1946. It is the main judicial organ of the United
Nations and was established by the UN Charter in 1945.

The purpose of the Court is to settle the legal disputes submitted by States and offer advice
on legal questions referred to it by the United Nations organs and specialized agencies, all the
while respecting international law. Simply put, the ICJ helps settle disputes between
sovereign states.

The Court is composed of 15 judges, elected for nine-year office terms by the UN General
Assembly and the Security Council. For the principle of continuity to be upheld, one third of
the Court is elected every three years. Unlike most other organs of international
organizations, the Court is not composed of representatives of governments. Members of the
Court are independent judges whose first task, before taking up their duties, is to make a
solemn declaration in open court that they will exercise their powers impartially and
conscientiously.

ICJ statute:

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The International Court of Justice has a Statute comprising 70 articles, which outlines its
functions and composition. This statute represents the ground rules for the functioning of the
Court and offers a good summary of its principles. Among its articles you will find the
procedure for selecting judges, the general jurisdiction of the court and how documents
should be presented to the Court. It is highly advisable that you are familiar with the
foundational text of the court and understand its spirit.

ICJ STATUTE: link

Summary of the Case

On 16 July 2018, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States with regard to alleged
violations of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and
the United States (hereinafter the “Treaty of Amity” or the “1955 Treaty”). The same day,
Iran also submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures aimed at preserving
its rights under the 1955 Treaty, pending the Court’s final decision in the case.

The Court then sets out the factual background of the case. It notes in this regard that, on 8
May 2018, the President of the United States issued a National Security Presidential
Memorandum announcing the end of its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) — an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme reached on 14 July 2015 by
Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany and
the European Union — and directing the reimposition, with regard to Iran, of “sanctions
lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA”. In the Memorandum, the President indicated
in particular that Iran had publicly declared that it would deny the International Atomic
Energy Agency access to military sites, and that, in 2016, Iran had twice violated the
JCPOA’s heavy-water stockpile limits. It was announced that “sanctions” would be
reimposed in two steps. Upon expiry of a first wind-down period of 90 days, ending on 6
August 2018, the United States would reimpose a certain number of “sanctions” concerning,
in particular, financial transactions, trade in metals, the importation of Iranian-origin carpets
and foodstuffs, and the export of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Following a

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second wind-down period of 180 days, ending on 4 November 2018, the United States would
reimpose additional “sanctions”.

Thus, on 6 August 2018, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 13846
“Reimposing Certain Sanctions” on Iran and Iranian nationals. In particular, Section 1
concerns “Blocking Sanctions Relating to Support for the Government of Iran’s Purchase or
Acquisition of U.S. Bank Notes or Precious Metals; Certain Iranian Persons; and Iran’s
Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors and Port Operators”. Section 2 concerns
“Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Sanctions Relating to Iran’s Automotive
Sector; Certain Iranian Persons; and Trade in Iranian Petroleum, Petroleum Products; and
Petrochemical Products”. Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide for the modalities of “‘Menu-based’
Sanctions Relating to Iran’s Automotive Sector and Trade in Iranian Petroleum, Petroleum
Products, and Petrochemical Products”. Section 6 concerns “Sanctions Relating to the Iranian
Rial”. Section 7 relates to “Sanctions with Respect to the Diversion of Goods Intended for the
People of Iran, the Transfer of Goods or Technologies to Iran that are Likely to be Used to
Commit Human Rights Abuses, and Censorship”. Section 8 relates to “Entities Owned or
Controlled by a United States Person and Established or Maintained Outside the United
States”. Earlier Executive Orders implementing United States commitments under the
JCPOA are revoked in Section 9. Section 2 (e) of Executive Order 13846 provides that
certain subsections of Section 3 shall not apply with respect to any person for conducting or
facilitating a transaction for the provision (including any sale) of agricultural commodities,
food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.

This may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions relied on by the Applicant
appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could be founded; it need not
satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case.
The Court notes that, in the present case, Iran seeks to find the jurisdiction of the Court on
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
1955 Treaty . The Court must first determine whether it has prima facie jurisdiction to rule on
the merits of the case, enabling it — if the other necessary conditions are fulfilled — to
indicate provisional measures.

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Relevant agreements

The 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and
the United States

The 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (hereby referred to as
the Treaty of Amity) was a significant step forward for US-Iran diplomatic relations,
outlining clearer terms for partnership with a country that was at the time considered an oasis
of peace and stability in a mostly dangerous and unstable region. After the 1979 Iranian
revolution, the tides turned in Washington, leading to a relationship that was more and more
strained as the time went by, but the Treaty of Amity (with its provisions that invoked the
ICJ’s involvement should violations occur) remained a way to resolve grievances
diplomatically or judicially. This Treaty has been invoked several times in cases before the
ICJ, notably after the destruction of Iranian oil platforms (Oil Platforms case, Islamic
Republic of Iran v. USA) and after the occupation of the US embassy by Iranian militants
(United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, USA v. Islamic Republic of Iran).

The Treaty follows a „standard practice” of US bilateral treaties, guaranteeing economic and
military cooperation insofar as there are no significant violations of its terms. After the first
decision taken in the present case in 2018, which ordered lifting some sanctions related to
essential items, the USA announced its unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty. Considering
the alleged violations took place at a time when the USA was still a party of the Treaty, ICJ
jurisdiction will not be affected by the withdrawal, however that of future cases might be.
Considering that jurisdiction was already favourably decided upon in this case, our
simulation will decide how to award the case based on merits, or the substance of the case.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a treaty that was initially negotiated by the EU+3
(China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States,
with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
and the Islamic Republic of Iran, for the purpose of limiting Iran’s nuclear programs to
peaceful purposes. The JCPOA marked a dramatic shift in the attitude of Iranian officials,

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paving the way to the EU+3 lifting previous sanctions placed on them for violations of
international law concerning nuclear weapons. It outlined multiple measures that would have
to be taken by Iran in order to ensure a complete elimination of medium-enriched uranium
and a significant reduction of low-enriched uranium on its territory.

The JCPOA was, according to experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
an effective way of channeling Iran’s nuclear ambitions to peaceful uses. In the years after the
adoption of the document, Iran was following the proposed “roadmap”, progress which was
verified in 2018 by independent inspectors from the IAEA. Despite this, American president
Donald Trump claimed that Iran had been violating the terms of the agreement and
conducting a secret research operation with the purpose of producing nuclear weapons
(named the AMAD Project). Iranian officials denied this, and their denials were supported by
the IAEA investigation, which concluded that while there had been such a project, its
activities could not be traced further than 2009, and there was no room for reasonable
suspicion that it had been covertly continuing. President Trump nonetheless decided to
revoke the USA’s commitment to the terms of the JCPOA in 2018 and reimpose the
corresponding sanctions on Iran, decision which was universally criticized by the parties of
the JCPOA. This move may have been influenced by the position of Israel, a close ally of the
USA and a particular priority of president Trump, whose officials insisted that the AMAD
project was continuing behind closed doors. Trump suggested that he would renegotiate the
deal to come up with better terms for the Americans, but he did not fulfill this promise.

After the USA’s withdrawal, Iran filed the present case against the USA, alleging that through
reimposing sanctions (Executive Order 13846 “Reimposing Certain Sanctions” on Iran and
Iranian nationals) it had violated the Treaty of Amity, specifically Articles IV (1), VII (1),
VIII (1), VIII (2), IX (2) and X (1).

Structure of the Judgment

I. Date of the Judgment

II. Names and signatures of the Judges authorizing the Judgment

III. Names of the parties and their respective Advocates

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 IV. Summary of the trial

V. Summary of the facts

VI. Legal grounds

VII. Merits of each Claim

VIII. Position of the Parties

IX. Tribunal’s Assessment

X. Decision

XI. Dissenting and Concurring opinions

Judgement Example

Further reading:

The full text of the JCPOA:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

The full text of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights:
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Treaty-of-Amity-Economic-Relations-an
d-Consular-Rights-between-the-United-States-of-America-and-Iran-Aug.-15-1955.pdf

Bibliography

Bean, J. (2020, November 13). Iran dusts off the 1955 Treaty of Amity one last time in effort
to stave off U.S. sanctions — Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law.
https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/iran-dusts-off-the-1955-treaty-of-amity-on
e-last-time-in-effort-to-stave-off-us-sanctions

Frances, I. (n.d.). Iran institutes proceedings against the United States with regard to a dispute

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 concerning alleged violations of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights between Iran and the United States, and requests the Court to indicate
provisional measures.

Hussain, M. (2022, April 21). Joe Biden deserves the blame for killing the Iran nuclear deal.
The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2022/04/21/iran-nuclear-deal-biden-irgc/

Morello, C. (2018, October 3). U.S. terminates 1955 treaty with Iran, calling it an ‘absolute
absurdity.’ The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-terminates-1955-treaty-
with-iran-calling-it-an-absolute-absurdity/2018/10/03/839b39a6-3bcf-42b1-a2d5-04bf
e1c5f660_story.html

News. (n.d.). The White House. Retrieved June 29, 2022, from
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jc
poa-taking-additional-action-counter-irans-malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-
weapon/

Stephen, P. (n.d.). Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s
Nuclear Programme.

icj.org

Latest developments: Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) Latest
developments | Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) |
International Court of Justice (icj-cij.org)

Summary 2018/6: Summary of the Order of 3 October 2018: Summary of the Order
(icj-cij.org)