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Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences

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Forensic science service provider

models – Is there a ‘best' option?
a
Keith Bedford
a
Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) Ltd. ,
Auckland, New Zealand
Published online: 18 May 2011.

To cite this article: Keith Bedford (2011) Forensic science service provider models – Is
there a ‘best' option?, Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 43:2-3, 147-156, DOI:
10.1080/00450618.2010.541498

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 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences
Vol. 43, Nos. 2–3, June–September 2011, 147–156

Forensic science service provider models – Is there a ‘best’ option?

Keith Bedford*

Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) Ltd., Auckland, New Zealand
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The form and functions of a forensic science service provider are determined by
interactions between:

. the legal system under which it operates;

. the law enforcement agency or agencies which it services;
. the policies of the government of the country concerned;
. the historical legacy of the evolution of services in that country.

In New Zealand, the forensic science services that support the criminal justice
system are provided mainly by ESR, a Crown Research Institute (CRI),
established under an Act of Parliament that sets out principles of operation. As
a CRI, ESR operates as a financially self-sustaining, crown-owned company
under a fee for service arrangement. This is an unusual service provider model
internationally. In this paper, the strengths and weaknesses of this model will be
described and contrasted with other options. This organisational model fosters
independence, management flexibility and responsiveness to changes and
challenges. This will be illustrated with descriptions of forensic science
developments in New Zealand and the challenges associated with these, including
the introduction of LCN (low template DNA) services, approaches to evidence
interpretation, familial matching, collaborative projects with NZ Police on
improving the effectiveness of forensic science and initiatives to add value to the
forensic science services delivered.
Keywords: forensic science; service provider model; fee for service; Crown
Research Institute

Introduction
The form and functions of a forensic science service provider are determined by
interactions between:

. the legal system under which it operates;

. the law enforcement agency or agencies that it services;
. the policies of the government of the country concerned;
. the historical legacy of the evolution of forensic science services in that
country.

*Email: keith.bedford@esr.cri.nz

ISSN 0045-0618 print/ISSN 1834-562X online

Ó 2011 Australian Academy of Forensic Sciences
DOI: 10.1080/00450618.2010.541498
http://www.informaworld.com
 148 K. Bedford

New Zealand has a legal system that is derived from the English ‘common law’
heritage. Whilst numerous differences of detail have evolved with the passage of time
between the laws of New Zealand and the laws of England, there is a shared heritage
of legal concepts and conventions that extends also to other countries using what has
become known as the Anglo-American legal system, including Australia. Such
countries have similar rules of evidence; for example, in regard to the way in which
expert witnesses present their evidence within the framework of the adversarial legal
system.
The New Zealand Police was formed as a national body in 1886, modelled on the
police forces that made up the English police system. It retains many similarities in
practices and methods of operation but there are also significant differences, some of
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which reflect the fact that it comprises a single, national organisation. The effective
strength of the police as at 30 June 2009 was 8,776 sworn members and 3,105 non-
sworn1. It is responsible for policing a population of 4.3 million in a total land area
of 267,000 square kilometres2, an area slightly larger than that of the United
Kingdom or the State of Victoria, Australia3. The New Zealand Police has
responsibility both for investigating crime and for initiating prosecutions.
The radical economic and public service reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s
in New Zealand led to the restructuring of government science and research and the
introduction of the Crown Research Institutes Act. The Institute of Environmental
Science & Research Limited (ESR) was established as a Crown Research Institute
(CRI) under that new Act in 1992. ESR was formed from parts of the former
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR Chemistry), the former
Department of Health (Communicable Disease Centre) and regional Public Health
Laboratories. Through that heritage, ESR can trace its origins back through
predecessor organisations, including DSIR Chemistry, to the establishment of the
Colonial Laboratory in Wellington in 1865. In due course, regional laboratories were
established, each headed by a ‘Government Analyst’. Forensic work and food and
drug analyses formed a significant part of the work of the fledgling organisation
from its very early days4.
As a CRI, ESR is incorporated as a company under the NZ Companies Act. The
shareholders of ESR are the Minister of Research, Science and Technology and the
Minister of Finance. ESR is, for the purposes of the Public Finance Act 1989, a
Crown Entity. As well as being subject to the requirements of Companies Act, the
CRI Act sets out ‘principles of operation’. These require of a Crown Research
Institute5:

. That research . . . should be undertaken for the benefit of New Zealand;

. That . . . [it] . . . should pursue excellence in all its activities;
. That in carrying out its activities . . . [it] . . . should comply with any applicable
ethical standards;
. That . . . [it] . . . should promote and facilitate the application of:
 the results of research; and
 technological developments;
. That . . . [it] . . . should be a good employer;
. That . . . [it] . . . should be an organisation that exhibits a sense of social
responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in which it
operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage those interests
when able to do so.
 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 149

The CRI Act also requires a CRI to ‘operate in a financially responsible manner so
as to maintain its financial viability’5. The Act goes on to spell out measures of
financial viability, including delivering ‘an adequate rate of return on shareholders’
funds’, whether or not it is required to pay dividends to the Crown, and operating as
a ‘successful going concern’ in accounting terms. The Act also includes criteria
around the meaning of ‘good employer’.
There is another form of government-owned company in New Zealand, referred
to as a ‘State-Owned Enterprise’ (SOE). SOEs include power companies and
Television NZ. Unlike a SOE, which is required to operate in a manner that
enhances commercial returns to government, a CRI is charged with operating for the
benefit of NZ. A review of the CRI model has recently been undertaken as part of a
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restructuring of government science and research6. A number of important changes

to the operating arrangements for CRIs are in the process of being implemented, but
for the most part that detail does not need to be discussed in this paper.
This rather detailed introduction has been given because it provides the
background to explain the strengths and weakness, and the unique features of the
NZ forensic science service delivery model, which is distinctly different from that
used in most jurisdictions internationally.

ESR service delivery model

ESR began operations with a disparate collection of responsibilities, organisational
cultures and practices based at a number of physical sites, reflecting the varied
origins of its parts; and servicing mainly government clients. According to one
source, there was doubt at a high level about whether ESR would survive as a viable
CRI7. The years immediately following establishment were marked by a significant
amount of restructuring, reorganisation and consolidation of activities and sites. In
the forensic disciplines, it became apparent that separate full service regional
laboratories, operating in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch for historical
reasons, could not be sustained. This was because of the increasing cost of
instrumentation required to deliver services to international best practice standards
and because of the cost of expertise maintenance and accreditation overheads. In
1997, following a review process, a radical restructuring of forensic science services
was undertaken in NZ. ‘Forensic Service Centres’ in Auckland, Wellington and
Christchurch became bases for scene examination and evidence recovery specialists.
Service Centre scientists and technicians work with police at serious crime scenes,
provide consultancy and training services, are the first point of contact for law
enforcement agency clients and case-manage major investigations. They undertake
preliminary screening on submitted items and, in turn, refer selected items and
samples to specialised analytical laboratories and re-integrate the results into the
context of the full investigation. There are various models internationally in regard
to the extent to which case managers incorporate the findings of specialised
analytical laboratory work (such as DNA evidence) into their statement or include
the conclusion but refer to the accompanying specialist statement for the detail. ESR
largely follows the later course for more complex evidence.
At this time the forensic analytical laboratories were consolidated so that there
was only one laboratory providing a national service in each main forensic discipline.
Toxicology, blood alcohol testing and breath alcohol calibration services in
Wellington; and Biology/DNA, Physical Evidence, Drugs and Clandestine
 150 K. Bedford

Laboratory investigations in Auckland. ESR Forensic Service Centre scientists and

technicians have a minimum academic qualification of an honours degree, plus
significant training. Police employ ‘scenes of crime officers’ (SOCOs) and crime scene
attendants who gather evidence at less serious crime scenes.
A forensic science laboratory is moulded by the environment in which it develops
and this invariably reflects historical factors. It is very rare for a forensic science
service to be established where planning started with a ‘blank page’, although in a
very few cases, arguably such as the Forensic Science Centre in Adelaide, South
Australia, a fresh start was possible when it became apparent that a previous system
or mixture of systems was no longer adequate. The formation of ESR as a CRI and
the very significant restructuring of the service delivery model that followed were,
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nevertheless, built on a heritage that had been established over a span of more than
100 years and continued to influence values and procedures. At the time when it was
introduced, the ESR financial and organisational structure was internationally an
extreme outlier, although it could be argued that developments since in other
jurisdictions, such as the evolution of a forensic services ‘market’ and the
restructuring of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in the UK, have since matched
or gone even further than the situation in NZ.
Before analysing this model further, it should be noted that police in NZ retain
responsibility for fingerprint services, for document examination and for an
electronic crime laboratory, dealing particularly with what can be described as
‘computer forensics’.
So, how does the CRI model in NZ and the service delivery model adopted by
ESR work out in practice? The analysis that follows is broken down under a number
of headings.

Management and governance

. Compared with a traditional public service organisational structure, decision-
making is simplified and direct. The General Manager Forensic has the
authority and accountability to make business decisions and reports directly to
the CRI CEO who signs off on matters such as approval to recruit additional
staff. The General Manager is accountable for the financial performance of the
Forensic Business Group. He approves travel locally and to Australia and the
Pacific. He oversees the capex programme for scientific instrument and
equipment for the Forensic Business Group. Typically the capex spend is
around $0.8 million a year, largely driven off the depreciation provision on the
balance sheet. Having worked in a traditional public service environment and
under this model, the author would now find a traditional public service
environment stiflingly bureaucratic and ponderous in decision-making. As the
business management mantra puts it: ‘let managers manage’.
. This short distance to decision-makers facilitates business agility. ESR is a
relatively small organisation of less than 400 people. Although decisions with
wider consequences, such as exiting an unprofitable field of business activity,
may require external consultation with stakeholders, management decisions
can be made quickly without having to seek approval externally from a public
service hierarchy or from treasury.
. Governance, as opposed to management, is the role of the Board of Directors,
as with a typical public company. Board members are appointed by
 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 151

government through a process that reflects current political policies and

priorities. It could be argued that a weakness of this arrangement is that
directors may have strong business expertise but limited science experience or
justice sector experience.
. Many Australian jurisdictions have a Board of Reference or similar body
associated with the forensic science provider that reflects the perspectives of the
diverse range of end-users and stakeholders in the wider justice system. An
advisory Board or Board of Reference of this nature is not yet in place for ESR
although it has been discussed, and would be an advantage.
. Although the CRI Act puts Ministers and politicians at arm’s length from ESR
management decisions, and limits the way that Ministerial directions may be
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given, it would be naive to imagine that ESR could be immune from political
sensitivities. It is part of the role of the Board to act as an interface between
management and the Shareholding Ministers. A unit of Treasury monitors
CRI financial performance and a Ministry (formerly the Ministry of Research,
Science and Technology, currently in the process of being re-constituted into a
new Ministry of Science and Innovation) is responsible for exercising oversight
of science directions and performance.

Commercial principles
. The NZ CRI commercial business model is at best ‘pseudo-commercial’ as far
as ESR is concerned, given what is essentially a single provider/single
purchaser environment; in economists’ jargon, a monopoly/monopsony
situation. The author is not convinced that a true ‘free market’ is desirable
or even appropriate for the provision of forensic science services. Professor
Alan Jamieson has recently made some telling points in a commentary on
developments in the UK8, highlighting issues with a ‘market’ in forensic
science delivery including:
. The difficulty of measuring ‘value for money’ in forensic science.
. The complexities of a commercial model for the delivery of forensic
science services, including but not limited to, the possible lack of
alignment of interests between the purchaser of those services (police)
and other end-users or stake-holders in the criminal justice system.
. The importance of and difficulties with funding underpinning forensic
research and development.
. Difficulties in measuring the comparative ‘quality’ of services and the
return on the investment in quality under commercial pressures.
. The restructuring that established ESR as a CRI in 1992 represented a radical
change to a user-pays commercial model. Initially, funding to ESR was
guaranteed under a transitional, bulk-funding arrangement, but as the full
impact of the new model began to be felt, police became critical and distrustful
of the changed operating environment, and relationships between the two
organisations became strained. Contributing to this tension was the contrast
between the perceived high cost of purchasing forensic services externally
compared to in-house police services, such as fingerprints that were available
‘free’. Shortly after taking up his role, the new ESR General Manager Forensic
at the time, Wayne Chisnall, arranged for a study to be undertaken by an
independent economics research organisation, jointly funded by ESR and
 152 K. Bedford

police. This was intended to provide an independent audit of the commercial

basis for the arrangement, to satisfy police that the charging regime was fair and
appropriate. This study, undertaken by Business and Economic Research Ltd.
(BERL) and entitled ‘Sustainable forensics for New Zealand’, completed in 1998,
provided the basis for moving forward. From that low-point, the contractual
relationship with police has evolved into the current five-year Service Level
Agreement, recognising ESR as ‘sole source provider’ of forensic science services
to police under guidelines promulgated by the Office of the Auditor General and
the Ministry of Economic Development. The relationship has strengthened and
matured to one of mutual respect and trust in a spirit of partnership in delivering
improved outcomes for the criminal justice system in NZ.
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. It is worthwhile noting that across this period annual revenue from the
provision of core forensic services grew from a static $7 million (Financial
Year 1996–7) to over $20 million (Financial Year 2009–10).
. The current Agreement is based on a ‘fee for service’ billing model. That is,
every ‘product’ or service has a price, whether a DNA test, a screening
procedure, a drug identification etc. Most prices are unit prices; some are time-
based (an hourly rate applies). This places a heavy accounting overhead on the
organisation and requires a sophisticated laboratory information management
system and financial management system. It means that ESR needs to have a
very good idea of the true cost of all activities undertaken and the impact on
fixed costs and variable costs of fluctuations in volume. This transparency also
makes funding activities requiring internal investment, including casework
method development, survey work, operational research and staff professional
development, the subject of more explicit decision-making. This could be
viewed as both positive and negative.
. The billing model was sought by police to provide transparency in what was
being purchased and to enable budgeting of case expenditure. Approval for
undertaking work is required and there is often close liaison between the officer
in charge and the ESR case manager on the likely benefits of undertaking
particular analyses. This drives a ‘cost/benefit’ approach to casework decisions
that can be both positive and negative. There is a generally healthy tension
around decisions concerning the submission of items and the commissioning of
work. No ‘triaging’ system is required at ESR to prioritise work. Police
internal checks generally ensure that work that is requested is justified and
there are no backlogs at ESR. The flipside is that it could be argued that not all
the work that could be justified is necessarily submitted.
. This approach raises issues of cost versus perception of value. Products or
services that require high levels of expertise and are labour-intensive, hence
high-cost, such as certain physical evidence sub-disciplines, but which are
perceived to be of lesser evidential value because they do not have the
discriminating power of, say DNA, may become less-utilised, meaning costs of
expertise maintenance are spread across a reduced volume of work, risking
generating a vicious cycle of pricing increases.

Confronting challenges in a commercial environment

. The ESR Forensic Business Group has passed through a number of major
challenges during the CRI era, including a turbulent period at the end of the
 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 153

1990s and early 2000s, largely involving DNA controversies arising from
specific cases, involving a contentious mixed result, a contamination event that
did not lead to an incorrect prosecution and a probable false exclusion.
Nevertheless, these cases led to high-level inquiries into ‘anomalous results’
and ‘ESR reporting protocols’. Ultimately these challenges provided the
impetus to develop a state-of-the-art national DNA facility. Since the CRI Act
does not provide for direct government funding for such capital investments.
the way forward required hammering out financial understandings with police
and justice sector stakeholders (around pricing and future volumes) that
enabled ESR to take up commercial borrowings to make the investment
necessary to build the new national DNA facility, opened in 2002.
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. Another period of stress developed around responding to the explosion in the

number of methamphetamine clandestine laboratories in NZ in the early
2000s. The rapid proliferation of such laboratories outstripped ESR’s ability to
resource additional capacity-building to cope effectively. Ministerial-level
discussions were required before understandings were achieved (around pricing
and funding available through the police) to support the rapid build-up of
additional skilled clan lab investigating chemists, the renovation and expansion
of laboratories and purchase of additional instruments.
. As was indicated earlier, no ‘triaging’ system is required at ESR to prioritise
work and there are no backlogs, because, in principle, there is a direct
relationship between workload and revenue stream. However, this holds true
only between limits. At extremes, for example when volumes fall to extremely
low levels, the fixed price component can make a product or service
uneconomic or unrealistic in price and when conditions change very rapidly,
the system may not generate sufficient surplus revenue to be able to build
capacity quickly enough.
. The government has always required CRIs to make a return on equity as
financial discipline and a measure of financial performance. In general, the
Crown has not required CRIs to pay a dividend, but has allowed CRIs to
retain a surplus as retained earnings, to reinvest in building up science
capability and capacity for the benefit of the country. The Shareholding
Ministers’ annual instructions to each CRI are provided in a letter of
expectations. The contents of these letters are made public in part (in the
interests of transparency) and in part are commercial-in-confidence. The recent
CRI Taskforce review emphasised that greater rigor is expected around
assessing the outcome or return on investment in science and research,
although where a choice is to be made, greater benefit to the performance of
the country as a whole is to be favoured over decisions that would benefit the
financial performance of the individual CRI6.
. The commercial balance sheet provides for reinvestment on the basis of
depreciation and also from retained earnings, depending on government
dividend policy.

Historical legacy
. It was pointed out earlier that, however radical the processes that led to the
formation of the CRI model and the service delivery model that ESR
developed, these did not arise in a vacuum. A heritage of more than 100 years
 154 K. Bedford

of forensic science and an organisational culture around its delivery had

developed within DSIR Chemistry and its predecessor organisations. A strong
positive aspect of that culture was valuing ‘science excellence’. The author
would have serious concerns about a forensic science provider organisation in
which the commercial drivers dominated the value of the science.

Commitment to underpinning science and research

. ESR is a science and research organisation as well as a science service delivery
organisation. There is strong support for the importance of science and
research underpinning forensic science service delivery. Yet it has to be
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admitted that ESR has struggled within the contestable S&R funding
environment in NZ to win substantial funding to support forensic research
activities. In recent years ‘Capability Funding’ has been available through the
CRI system to be applied to Forensic Research at a level of a little over $2
million per year, a little over 10% of the revenue generated through forensic
service delivery. Although ESR has discretion in how this ‘Capability Funding’
is invested internally, the allocation process tends to favour capability building,
often with a view to generating new revenue, rather than operational research
or technique improvements. This support framework is currently being revised
as a consequence of the recent CRI review6.
. One of the frustrations has been the difficulty of getting S&R funding bodies to
understand the difference between ‘police science’ and forensic science to
support the criminal justice system. There seems to be an almost automatic
reaction that because there is an apparent end-user, police should pay for
forensic science research. This is analogous to saying that hospitals as the end-
users, should pay for medical research.
. Police stepped in to assist with filling the gap in support for operational
research. They have provided research funding of approximately $300,000 per
annum for mutually-agreed operational research projects, directly related to
casework issues or technique improvements. This was a significant step in
partnership-building. Regrettably, this provision is currently suspended due to
police budgetary constraints.
. A significant development supporting the expansion of forensic S&R activities
is the blossoming of the University of Auckland Post-graduate Programme in
Forensic Science. This was commenced in 1996 and now encompasses one-year
Postgraduate Diploma courses up to PhD students. Up to half the teaching
content is provided by ESR staff and many Masters and PhD students
undertake their project research within ESR. Because ESR gets very significant
input into the choice and design of student research projects these can be
aligned with operational priorities and casework issues.

Independence
. The CRI Act clearly sets out principles of operation, including keeping
political influence at arms length.
. There is historical and legislative basis for independence from police.
. That said, since ESR is dependent in the forensic area on generating revenue
that is overwhelmingly from police, it can be argued that ESR is no more
 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 155

insulated from police pressures than a police laboratory would be. Certainly
one outspoken criminal lawyer in NZ has alleged that some ESR staff are
‘Police in white coats’.
. A consequence of the CRI structure is that there is no direct government
support for forensic science infrastructure. In most countries, DNA Databank
operations such as CrimTrac in Australia are directly supported with central
government funding. In NZ, the costs of running the National DNA Databank
and of a programme of continuing development of services are a component of
the charge to police of every sample submitted for DNA testing. For a ‘person
sample’, for example, the cost of generating a DNA profile is less than half the
price charged to police. The rest goes on Databank administration and
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reporting, infrastructure costs and ‘added-value’ Databank intelligence

functions. Whilst ESR envies the support available in other jurisdictions,
this approach certainly drives efficiency and effectiveness, and to the best of
our knowledge the link rates obtained from the NZ DNA Databank are the
highest in the world.

Forensic science developments in New Zealand

Given the above environment what has ESR been able to achieve and why?

The CRI structure, the organisation of forensic science in NZ and the one-to-one
relationship with the police fosters agility and responsiveness to forensic science
advances and opportunities for improvement. This has enabled the introduction of
innovative or leading-edge techniques including LCN (low template) DNA;
enhanced anti-contamination procedures from the crime scene through all steps in
evidence and sample handling and processing; familial searches; leading-edge
evidence interpretation approaches; laser-microdissection processing of sexual
assault samples and the imminent implementation of messenger RNA (mRNA)
analysis to determine the origin of detected DNA.
The focus on value for money and cost/benefit in a pseudo-commercial
environment may in certain respects be a ‘mixed blessing’ but it has led to
collaborative projects with NZ Police on improving the effectiveness of forensic
science (the ‘attrition model’) and initiatives to add value to the forensic science
services delivered. For example, somewhat along the lines of the SWIM model in the
UK, ESR has worked with police in a pilot in one Police District to routinely deliver
volume crime DNA results in five days, with impressive results in terms of improved
justice outcomes.

Conclusions
Is the CRI model perfect? No. Is the ESR service delivery model perfect? No.

However, on the basis of having worked in both the traditional public service
forensic science environment and the ESR model, the author has drawn some
conclusions. The strengths of the ESR model include that the laboratory is greatly
empowered and backlogs are essentially non-existent. Negatives include the
downside of the commercial drivers, such as the pressure on investment in
‘expensive’ activities, such as quality management and research and in the perception
 156 K. Bedford

of competition between police in-house services, such as fingerprints and ‘expensive’

forensic science services. Readers may consider, given the legacy and particular
circumstances of their own jurisdictions, whether a system change could be
worthwhile or feasible. No system is perfect. For ESR in New Zealand, the
strengths of the existing model can only be maintained and the negatives minimised
if the service provider organisation, police management and the people directly
involved are committed to making it work. The key is the people. To conclude with a
powerful Maori saying:

He aha te mea nui o te ao – Maku e ki atu:

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He tangata
He tangata
He tangata

What is the greatest treasure?

It is people
It is people
It is people

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