Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Author(s): M. A. K. Halliday
Source: American Anthropologist , Sep., 1976, New Series, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp.
570-584
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
American Anthropological Association and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to American Anthropologist
M. A. K. HALLIDAY
University of Sydney
At certain times and places we come across special forms of language generated
some kind of anti-society; these we may call "anti-languages." An anti-language
serves to create and maintain social structure through conversation, just as an
everyday language does; but the social structure is of a particular kind, in which
certain elements are strongly foregrounded. This gives to the anti-language a special
character in which metaphorical modes of expression are the norm; patterns of this
kind appear at all levels, phonological, lexicogrammatical, and semantic. The study
of anti-languages offers further insights into the relation between language and
social structure, and into the way in which text functions in the realization of social
contexts.
The essence of the second life consists in a secular stratification which can be reduced to
the division of the inmates into "people" and "suckers.". . . The people are indepen
and they have power over the suckers. Everyday second life is strongly ritualized
body of these rituals are called grypserka (from grypa-a slang word designatin
smuggled secretly to or from a prison); S. Malkowski defined this as "the inmates'
language and its grammar." In this language, certain ... words. . . are insulting and
noxious either to the speaker or to one to whom they are addressed [1973:7 ].
The language comes to the investigator's attention in the context of the familiar twin
themes of ritual insult and secrecy. But Podg6recki's discussion of the "second life" shows
that it is much more than a way of passing the time. It is the acting out of a distinct social
structure; and this social structure is, in turn, the bearer of an alternative social reality.
On closer scrutiny, the Polish investigators found that the division into people and suck-
ers was only the principal division in a more elaborate social hierarchy. There were two
classes of "people" and three of "suckers," with some degree of mobility among them,
though anyone who had once reached the highest or lowest category stayed there. There
were a number of other variables, based on age, provenance (urban/rural), type of offense,
and prison standing (first offender/old lag); and the place of an individual in the social
structure was a function of his status in respect of each of these hierarchies. Account was
also taken of his status in the free underworld, which, along with other factors, suggested
that "second life" was not a product of the prison, or of prison conditions, but was im-
ported from the criminal subculture outside. Nevertheless,
... the incarcerated create in their own social system a unique stratification which is
based on the caste principle. The caste adherence in the case of "second life" is based not
on a given social background or physical features, but is predominantly determined by a
unique link with magical rules which are not functional for the social system in which
they operate. The only function which these rules have is to sustain the caste system
[1973:14].
Comparative data from American sources quoted by Podg6recki show the existence o
similar form of social organization in correctional institutions in the United States, differ
mainly in that each of the two anti-societies appears as a distorted reflection of the structu
of the particular society from which it derives.
Podg6recki cites explanations of the "second life" as resulting from conditions of isola
tion, or from the need to regulate sexual behavior, and rejects them as inadequate. H
suggests instead that it arises from the need to maintain inner solidarity under pressure,
that this is achieved through an accumulation of punishments and rewards:
free (+)
people (+)
peopincarcerated (-)
suckers (-)
ANTI-SOCIETY SOCIETY
In a world in which there are no real things, a man is reduced to the status of a thing..
The establishment of a reverse world (in which reducing others to things becomes a
source of gratification by transforming a punitive situation into a rewarding one) can also
be seen as a desperate attempt to rescue and reintegrate the self in the face of the
cumulative oppression which threatens to disintegrate it. Thus "second life". . . can be
interpreted as a defence and a means of reconstruction, to which the self resorts just
before total disruption by means of mutually enhancing oppressive forces [1973:24 ].
The "second life" is a reconstruction of the individual and society. It provides an alterna-
tive social structure, with its systems of values, of sanctions, of rewards and punishments
and this becomes the source of an alternative identity for its members, through the patterns
of acceptance and gratification. In other words, the "second life" is an alternative reality.
It is in this light that we can best appreciate the function of the "second-life" anti
language, the grypserka. The grypserka serves to create and maintain this alternative reality
The most important vehicle of reality-maintenance is conversation. One may view the
individual's everyday life in terms of the working away of a conversational apparatus that
ongoingly maintains, modifies and reconstructs his subjective reality. Conversation means
mainly, of course, that people speak with one another. This does not deny the rich aura
of non-verbal communication that surrounds speech. Nevertheless speech retains a privi-
leged position in the total conversational apparatus. It is important to stress, however,
that the greater part of reality-maintenance in conversation is implicit, not explicit. Most
conversation does not in so many words define the nature of the world. Rather, it takes
place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted. Thus an
exchange such as, "Well, it's time for me to get to the station," and "Fine, darling, have a
good day at the office," implies an entire world within which these apparently simple
propositions make sense. By virtue of this implication the exchange confirms the subjec-
tive reality of this world.
If this is understood, one will readily see that the great part, if not all, of everyday
conversation maintains subjective reality. Indeed, its massivity is achieved by the
accumulation and consistency of casual conversation-conversation that can afford to
be casual precisely because it refers to the routine of a taken-for-granted world. The loss
of casualness signals a break in the routines and, at least potentially, a threat to the
taken-for-granted reality. Thus one may imagine the effect on casualness of an exchange
like this: "Well, it's time for me to get to the station." "Fine, darling, don't forget to take
along your gun."
At the same time that the conversational apparatus ongoingly maintains reality, it on-
goingly modifies it. Items are dropped and added, weakening some sectors of what is still
being taken for granted and reinforcing others. Thus the subjective reality of something
that is never talked about comes to be shaky. It is one thing to engage in an embarrassing
sexual act. It is quite another to talk about it beforehand or afterwards. Conversely,
conversation gives firm contours to items previously apprehended in a fleeting and un-
clear manner. One may have doubts about one's religion: these doubts become real in a
quite different way as one discusses them. One then "talks oneself into" these doubts:
they are objectified as reality within one's own consciousness. Generally speaking, the
conversational apparatus maintains reality by "talking through" various elements of ex-
perience and allocating them a definite place in the real world.
This reality-generating potency of conversation is already given in the fact of linguistic
objectification. We have seen how language objectifies the world, transforming the panta
rhei of experience into a cohesive order. In the establishment of this order language
realizes a world, in the double sense of apprehending and producing it. Conversation is
the actualizing of this realizing efficacy of language in the face-to-face situation of indi-
vidual existence. In conversation the objectifications of language become objects of indi-
vidual consciousness. Thus the fundamental reality-maintaining fact is the continuing use
of the same language to objectify unfolding biographical experience. In the widest sense,
all who employ this same language are reality-maintaining others. The significance of this
can be further differentiated in terms of what is meant by a "common language" --from
the group-idiosyncratic language of primary groups to regional or class dialects to the
national community that defines itself in terms of language [1966:172-173].
pancabaj one who leaves victim at cross- panca (five), bij (expert)
roads after a snatch
The phenomenon of metaphor itself is, of course, not an "anti-linguistic" one; metaphor
is a feature of languages, not just anti-languages (although one could express the same point
another way by saying that metaphor constitutes the element of anti-language that is present
in all languages). Much of everyday language is metaphorical in origin, though the origins are
often forgotten, or unknown. What distinguishes an anti-language is that it is itself a meta-
phorical entity, and hence metaphorical modes of expression are the norm; we should expect
metaphorical compounding, metatheses, rhyming alternations, and the like to be among its
regular patterns of realization.
We know much less about its modes of meaning, its semantic styles. Harman gives a
dialogue in Elizabethan anti-language, but it is almost certainly one he has made up himself
to illustrate the use of the words in his glossary (1567:148-150). Mallik includes no dialogue,
although he does quote a number of complete sentences, which are very helpful
(1972:83-84, 109-110). It is not at all easy to record spontaneous conversation (especially in
an anti-language!). But, as Berger and Luckmann rightly point out, the reality-generating
power of language lies in conversation; furthermore it is cumulative, and depends for its
effectiveness on continuous reinforcement in interaction. To be able to interpret the real
significance of an anti-language, we need to have access to its conversational patterns: texts
will have to be collected, and edited, and subjected to an exegesis that relates them to the
semantic system and the social context. Only in this way can we hope to gain insight into
the characterology (to use a Prague School term) of an anti-language--the meaning styles and
coding orientations that embody its characteristic counter-cultural version of the social
system.
Meanwhile, the easiest way in to an anti-language is probably through another class of
languages that we could call "music-hall languages" (or, in American, "vaudeville lan-
guages"). It is worth speculating (but speculation is no substitute for finding out) whether
Gobbledygook-in its original sense as a "secret language" of Victorian working-class humor,
not its metaphorical sense as the language of bureaucrats-is, in origin, a descendant of the
Elizabethan anti-language, with its teeth drawn once the social conditions in which the
anti-language emerged and flourished had ceased to exist. Gobbledygook has some distinc-
tively anti-language features: one brief example, erectify a luxurimole flackoblots (erect a
But when we reach this point, it is high time to ask: why the interest in anti-languages?
They are entertaining; but have they any importance, or are they just collectors' pieces? I
think if we take them seriously-though not solemnly!-there are two ways in which anti-
languages are of significance for the understanding of the social semiotic.
(1) In the first place, the phenomenon of the anti-language throws light on the difficult
concept of social dialect, by providing an opposite pole, the second of two idealized ex-
tremes to which we can relate the facts as we actually find them.
Let us postulate an ideally homogeneous society, with no division of labor, or at least no
form of social hierarchy, whose members (therefore) speak an ideally homogeneous lan-
guage, without dialectal variation. There probably never has been such a human group, but
that does not matter; this is an ideal construct serving as a thesis for deductive argument. At
the other end of the scale, we postulate an ideally dichotomized society, consisting of two
distinct and mutually hostile groups, society and anti-society; the members of these speak
two totally distinct tongues, a language and an anti-language. Again, there has probably
never been such a thing- it reminds us of the Eloi and the Morlocks imagined by H. G. Wells
in The Time Machine. But it serves as the antithesis, the idealized opposite pole.
What we do find in real life are types of sociolinguistic order that are interpretable as
lying somewhere along this cline. The distinction between standard and nonstandard dialects
is one of language versus anti-language, although taking a relatively benign and moderate
form. Popular usage opposes dialect, as "anti-," to (standard) language, as the established
norm. A nonstandard dialect that is consciously used for strategic purposes, defensively to
maintain a particular social reality or offensively for resistance and protest, lies further in the
direction of an anti-language; this is what we know as a "ghetto language" (cf. Kochman's
[1972] account of Black English in the United States).
Social dialects are not necessarily associated with caste or class; they may be religious,
generational, sexual, economic (urban/rural), and perhaps other things too. What distin-
guishes them is their hierarchical character. The social function of dialect variation is to
express, symbolize, and maintain the social order; and the social order is an essentially
hierarchic one. An anti-language is, at one and the same time, both the limiting case of a
"language"
dominant
anguage
"ostandard"
IIDEALIZED THESIS
IDEALIZED
ANTITHESIS "language"
social "language
ANTITHESIS social dialectal [homogeneous
(sociolinguistic dialects va iatio sociolinguistic
order split into two] order]
"non-standard"
ghetto
language
"anti-language"
social dialect (and hence is the realization of one component in the hierarchy of a wider
social order that includes both society and anti-society), and a language (and hence the
realization of a social order that is constituted by the anti-society itself); in the latter role, it
embodies its own hierarchy, and so displays internal variation of a systematic kind-Mallik,
for example, refers to the different groups existing within the anti-society, each with its own
social status and each having its own distinctive speech forms (1972:28-29).
The perspective of the anti-language is one in which we can clearly see the meaning of
variability in language: in brief, the function of alternative language is to create alternative
reality. A social dialect is the embodiment of a mildly but distinctly different world view-
one which is therefore potentially threatening, if it does not coincide with one's own. This is
undoubtedly the explanation of the violent attitudes to nonstandard speech commonly held
by speakers of a standard dialect: the conscious motif of "I don't like their vowels" sym-
bolizes an underlying motif of "I don't like their values." The significance for the social
semiotic, of the kind of variation in the linguistic system that we call social dialect, becomes
very much clearer when we take into account the nature and functions of anti-languages.
(2) In the second place, there is anti-language as text. A central problem for linguistics
is that of relating text to system, and of relating modes of text description that are applica-
ble to conversation (Mitchell 1957; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) to a theory of the
linguistic system. I have suggested elsewhere (1975, n.d.) that this can be usefully ap-
proached through a functional interpretation of the semantic system, an interpretation in
terms of its major functional components which are relatable (i) to the text, as an ongoing
process of selection in meaning; (ii) to the linguistic system; and (iii) to the situation, as a
semiotic construct derivable from the "social semiotic" (the culture considered as an infor-
mation system). It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop this further here; but one
point may be made which emerges specifically with reference to the description of anti-
languages.
Conversation, as Berger and Luckmann point out, depends for its reality-generating power
on being casual; that is to say, it typically makes use of highly coded areas of the system to
produce text that is congruent-though once coding and congruence have been established as
the norm, it can tolerate and indeed thrives on a reasonable quantity of matter that is
incongruent or uncoded. "Uncoded" means "not (yet) fully incorporated into the system";
"incongruent" means "not expressed through the most typical (and highly coded) form of
representation"; and both concepts are of a more or less kind, not all or nothing. Now,
certain types of social context typically engender text in which the coding process, and the
congruence relation, tend to be foregrounded and brought under attention. An example is
the language of young children (and of others interacting with them), since children are
simultaneously both interacting and constructing the system that underlies the text.
REFERENCES CITED
Halliday, M. A. K.
1975 Language as Social Semiotic: Towards a General Sociolinguistic Theory. In The
First LACUS Forum. Adam Makkai and Valerie Becker Makkai, eds. Columbia, South
Carolina: Hornbeam Press.
n.d. Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts. In Grammars and Descriptions. T. A.
van Dijk and J. Pet6fi, eds. Berlin: de Gruyter (in press).
Harman, Thomas
1567 A Caveat or Warening for Commen Cursetories vulgarely called Vagabones.
London: Wylliam Gryffith. (A Caveat for Common Cursitors. In Cony-Catchers and
Bawdy Baskets: An Anthology of Elizabethan Low Life. Gtmini Salgado, ed. Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1972.)
Kochman, Thomas
1972 Rappin' and Stylin' Out: Communication in Urban Black America. Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press.
Labov, William
1969 Contraction, Deletion and Inherent Variability of the English Copula. Language
45:715-762.
LIvi-Strauss, Claude
1966 The Savage Mind. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Mallik, Bhaktiprasad
1972 Language of the Underworld of West Bengal. Research Series No. 76. Calcutta:
Sanskrit College.
Milligan, Spike
1973 More Goon Show Scripts: Written and Selected by Spike Milligan, with a Fore-
word by H.R.H. The Prince of Wales. London: Sphere Books.
Mitchell, T. F.
1957 The Language of Buying and Selling in Cyrenaica: A Situational Statement.
Hesperis 26:31-71.
Podg6recki, Adam
1973 "Second Life" and Its Implications. Mimeograph.
Sacks, Harvey, E. Schegloff, and G. Jefferson
1974 A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking in Conversation. Lan-
guage 50:696-735.
Sankoff, Gillian
1974 A Quantitative Paradigm for the Study of Communicative Competence. In
Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking. Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer, eds.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.