Received: 24 May 2023 Revised: 14 August 2023 Accepted: 31 August 2023 IET Communications

DOI: 10.1049/cmu2.12680

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Resource and trajectory optimization for secure communication in

RIS assisted UAV-MEC system

Shihao Liu1 Yangchao Huang1 Hang Hu1 Jiangbo Si2 Guobing Cheng1
Tao Huang1 Xiaoliang Hu1

1
Information and Navigation College, AF Engineer Abstract
University, Xi’an, China
The combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and mobile edge computing (MEC)
2
School of Telecommunications Engineering, Xidian is considered as a promising approach to tackle soaring computing requirements. The
University, Xi’an, China
broadcast nature of air-to-ground (A2G) links makes UAV communications vulnerable to
eavesdroppers, so secure UAV communications remain an open question. This paper pro-
Correspondence
Hang Hu, Information and Navigation College, AF poses a secure communication scheme for reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS)-assisted
Engineer University, Fenghao Road No.1, Xi’an, UAV-MEC systems, in which the RIS assists the user in offloading data to the legitimate
China.
UAV, and the legitimate UAV provides computing services to the user. To fully expand
Email: xd_huhang@126.com
the security computing capacity of the system, the communication link is improved by
Funding information introducing RIS, and the jammer interferes with the eavesdropper. The secure computing
National Natural Science Foundation of China, capability of the system is maximized by optimizing communication resources and trajec-
Grant/Award Number: 61901509 tories. Since the proposed problem is non-convex, successive convex approximation (SCA)
technique and block coordinate descent (BCD) technique is combined to solve the prob-
lem. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme in this paper can effectively
improve the system secure computing bits compared with the benchmark scheme.

1 INTRODUCTION Due to the importance of secure UAV communication, the

With the development of the Internet of Things (IoT), IoT
is expected to outstanding computing needs [1]. However,
IoT devices with limited computing power and limited power
supply are shying away from this demand. The problem of
constrained IoT resources can be alleviated by introducing an
edge computing paradigm, due to the fact that IoT computa-
tional tasks can be offloaded to edge computing servers for
computation [2]. However, the deployment of edge comput-
ing servers is an extremely difficult task in extreme situations,
such as rural areas, disaster areas, and scenarios where user
locations change dynamically. Fortunately, UAVs can provide
flexible and efficient communication services due to their
mobility and A2G links [3, 4]. While the combination of
UAVs and edge computing can solve the deployment prob-
lem of edge computing servers, the broadcast nature of A2G
links introduces the problem of secure communication for
UAVs [5].
investigation of secure UAV communication has received suffi-
cient attention [6–10]. In [6], Xu et al. investigated minimizing
the energy consumption of users and UAVs in a UAV-assisted
edge computing system while satisfying constraints on latency
and secrecy offload rate. In [7], Zhang et al. studied UAV uplink
and downlink communication to maximize the secrecy rate by
optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and transmit power. In [8],
Zhou et al. optimize user pairing, UAV trajectory, and trans-
mit power to maximize the minimum secrecy rate. In [9], Chen
et al. use a game-theoretic approach to study the issues of
computing resource allocation. In [10], Wang et al. introduced
beamforming techniques to enhance user task offloading. By
jointly optimizing beamforming, offloading rate and time allo-
cation of transmit signals, the total system energy consumption
is minimized under the time delay constraint.
For secure communication issues in UAV-assisted edge com-
puting, a task offloading design can be used to improve security
[11–16]. In [11], the authors investigated the multi-UAV-assisted

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© 2023 The Authors. IET Communications published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Institution of Engineering and Technology.

IET Commun. 2023;1–12. wileyonlinelibrary.com/iet-com 1

2 LIU ET AL.
edge computing systems to improve the system’s security by
optimizing task offloading for ground users. Han et al. [12]
improved the secure computing capability of the system by opti-
mizing the deployment of the UAV and task offloading. In [13],
Tong et al. studied the impact of various eavesdroppers on the
security performance of the system and analyzed the optimal
solution under different types of eavesdroppers. The condi-
tions of three offloading schemes are analyzed from the physical
point of view, that is, zero offloading, partial offloading, and
full offloading. In [14], Fatima et al. summarized various net-
work architectures for UAV-assisted MEC from the perspective
of computational offloading and discussed the security of the
system. In [15], the UAV data is divided into locally computed
data and offloaded data. The total energy consumption of the
system is minimized by optimizing the task offloading and com-
munication resources under energy consumption and secrecy
rate constraints. In [16], an edge computing security system for
UAV-assisted multiple ground users is investigated to minimize
the energy consumption of the UAV by jointly optimizing the
computing task allocation, the transmitting power of ground
devices and the UAV trajectory with the constraint of offloading
secrecy rate.
In UAV-assisted edge computing systems, security can be sig-
nificantly improved by introducing artificial noise (AN) [17–22].
In [17], Xu et al. divided the transmitted power of the UAV
into two parts, that is, offloading power and AN, in order to
enhance the security performance of the system. With resource
constraints, Xu et al. jointly optimized the UAV trajectory
and transmission power to maximize security capacity. In [18],
Xu et al. introduced a UAV for suppressing eavesdroppers to
enhance the security of the system. Unlike the case of [18]
where the eavesdropper information is known, the authors of
[19] maximize the minimum secure computational bits of the
system by optimizing the trajectory of the UAV and the trans-
mit power of the AN in unknown locations and the number
of eavesdroppers. In [20], Lu et al. studied a dual UAV sys-
tem in which a legitimate UAV provides computing services
and a jammer emits AN to disrupt the eavesdropping UAV
to improve system security. In contrast to [20], in [21], the
authors studied the case where the eavesdropper’s information
is unknown by optimizing the UAV’s trajectory, communication
resources and computational resources to maximize the min-
imum secure computing bits. In [22], Zhou et al. considered
the existence of multiple eavesdropping UAVs with unknown
information and improved the system security by introducing
full-duplex UAV to assist non-offloading users in interfering
with the eavesdroppers.
Although introducing AN can improve security perfor-
mance, it does not cope well with mobile eavesdroppers due
to the limitations of fixed devices. RIS has gained a lot of
attention because it enables to improve the signal transmission
environment by changing the phase shift and/or amplitude
of the reflecting elements [23]. Literature [24] investigated the
mitigation of co-channel interference by using RIS in UAVs
operating in a cellular network. Literature [25] investigated RIS-
assisted target sensing in cellular networks. RIS enhances the
secrecy capability of the system because it is able to intelligently
adjust the communication channel to reduce the signal-to-noise
(SNR) ratio at the eavesdropper [26]. In [27], Liu et al. studied
the RIS-assisted UAV downlink communication system. The
downlink throughput is maximized by optimizing the UAV
trajectory, RIS phase shift, and power allocation. In [28], Hua
et al. studied the RIS-assisted UAV symbiotic communication
system. RIS was introduced to enhance the information trans-
mission capability while RIS transmitted the information. In
[29], Pang et al. investigated RIS-assisted UAV secure com-
munication under the presence of ground eavesdroppers. The
average secrecy rate of the system is maximized by jointly opti-
mizing the UAV trajectory, beamforming, and RIS phase shift.
In [30], Xu et al. maximized the minimum secure computing
capacity by jointly optimizing UAV beamforming, RIS passive
beamforming, communication resources, and UAV trajectories.
In [31], Li et al. investigated maximizing the minimum secrecy
rate by jointly designing the UAV trajectory, RIS passive beam-
forming, and transmitted power under the condition that the
eavesdropped channel state information (CSI) is unknown.
The secure computing system for RIS-assisted UAV-MEC
has received much attention. However, the scenario of the
eavesdropper movement has not been sufficiently investigated.
To improve the communication security, AN is introduced to
disrupt the eavesdropper or communication techniques such
as beamforming are used to degrade the SNR at the eaves-
dropper’s side [19, 29]. Based on the AN technique, RIS is
introduced to assist the secure computing system in order to
enhance the secure computing capability of the system. Since
most of the works assume that the eavesdropper is located
on the ground, the security of RIS-assisted UAV downlink is
fully investigated. For example, in the literature [32], down-
link secure communication for a single ground eavesdropper
scenario is studied. In literature [33], a secure communication
scenario for downlinks with multiple ground eavesdroppers is
studied.
Based on the above literature, in this paper, the flying
eavesdropper scenario is investigated in practical situations.
We investigated the dual UAV secure communication scenario,
where the UAV providing edge computing services to the user
is denoted as a legitimate UAV, and the UAV wiretapping the
offloaded data of the user is denoted as an eavesdropping UAV.
The jammer in the system disturbs the eavesdropping UAV by
sending friendly AN. The introduction of RIS in communica-
tion scenarios enhances the communication link of legitimate
UAVs and also increases the interference of AN to eavesdrop-
ping UAVs. In this paper, the secure computation bits of the
system are maximized by jointly optimizing the phase shift of
the RIS, the time slot length, the transmit power, the local
computation bits, and the trajectory of the legitimate UAV. It
is worth noting that, since the eavesdropping UAV is mobile,
the legitimate UAV’s trajectory should be optimized under anti-
collision conditions. The major contributions of this paper are
as follows.
∙ A RIS-assisted secure communication system for uplink edge
computing is constructed, where jammers are used to dis-
rupt eavesdroppers. The frame length, transmit power, local
LIU ET AL. 3

the RIS is noted as  = {1, 2, … , K }. The phase shift of the ele-

ments is dynamically adjusted by the RIS controller. We assume
that the CSI is known and that UAV_L is able to obtain the loca-
tion information of UAV_E through a mounted optical camera
or synthetic aperture radar [7, 34, 35]. The reflection coefficient
matrix of RIS is 𝚯m [n] = diag(e j 𝜃1 [n] , … .., e j 𝜃K [n] ) when user m
m m

transmits a signal in time slot n, where 0 ≤ 𝜃km [n] < 2𝜋, ∀m, k, n.
The location of the RIS is wr = (xr , yr ) and the altitude is fixed
at Hr . The coordinates of the ground user m are denoted as
wm = (xm , ym ), ∀n. The coordinates of the GJ are denoted as
wJ = (xJ , yJ ). The position of the UAV_L at time slot n is
denoted as q[n] = (x[n], y[n]), ∀n, and the altitude of the UAV_L
is known as H . The position of the UAV_E at time slot n
is denoted as qe [n] = (xe [n], ye [n]), ∀n ,and the altitude of the
UAV_E is known as He . The mobility constraint for the UAV_L
is formulated as:
FIGURE 1 RIS-assisted UAV-MEC system.
2
‖q[n + 1] − q[n]‖ ≤ (ΔVmax )2 , n = 1, 2, … , N − 1, (1)

computational data allocation, legal UAV trajectory and RIS q[1] = qI , (2)
phase shift are optimized to maximize secure computing bits.
∙ The proposed non-convex problem is transformed into the
q[N ] = qF , (3)
following subproblems: frame length optimization, transmit
power optimization, local computational data allocation opti- where Vmax is the maximum flight speed of the UAV_L. To
mization, legitimate UAV trajectory optimization and RIS ensure that UAV_L and UAV_E do not collide, the constraint
phase shift optimization. Then the original nonconvex prob- on the distance between UAVs is expressed as
lem is solved iteratively using the BCD algorithm for the
suboptimal solution, where the nonconvex subproblem is 22
‖q[n] − qe [n]‖ ≥ dmin , ∀n, (4)
solved using the SCA technique.
∙ Simulation results demonstrate that the secure capability where dmin is the minimum secure distance between UAVs.
of our proposed scheme outperforms other benchmark
schemes.
2.2 Communication model
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM At time slot n, the channels from user m to the UAV_L, user
FORMULATION m to the RIS, RIS to the UAV_L, GJ to the RIS, user m to the
UAV_E, RIS to the UAV_E, and GJ to the UAV_E are repre-
2.1 System model sented as hmu [n] ∈ ℂ, hmr ∈ ℂK ×1 , hru ∈ ℂK ×1 , hJr [n] ∈ ℂK ×1 ,
hme [n] ∈ ℂ, hre ∈ ℂK ×1 and hJe [n] ∈ ℂ, respectively. Due to the
Figure 1 shows the RIS-assisted UAV-MEC secure comput- height of the UAV and RIS, the channel state of the UAV-RIS
ing system, where UAV_L is a legitimate UAV equipped with is assumed to be a link-of-sight (LoS) channel, then hru [n] and
an edge computing server to provide computing services to hre [n] can be expressed as follows, respectively [36].
ground users, UAV_E acts as a potential eavesdropper in the
system to wiretap the user’s offloading information, GJ is a hru [n] = 𝛽0 dru−1 [n]h̄ LoS
1∕2
ru [n], (5)
friendly jammer that interferes with UAV_E by emitting AN,
and RIS is used to improve the channel gain from the user to
hre [n] = 𝛽0 dre−1 [n]h̄ LoS
1∕2
the UAV_L. Ground users with limited energy and computa- re [n], (6)
tional resources, denoted by set  = {1, 2 … M }, offload data
where 𝛽0 is the√ channel power gain at unit dis-
to UAV_L for computation utilizing a Time Division Multiple
2
Access (TDMA) strategy. The UAV_L provides computational tance; dru [n] = ‖q[n] − wr ‖ + (H − Hr )2 ,dre [n] =
√
services to the user from the initial point qI = (xI , yI )to the 2
final point qF = (xF , yF ) in a given period T . To simplify the ‖qe [n] − wr ‖ + (He − Hr )2 are the distances from UAV_L
problem, the period T is discretized into N time slots and the to RIS and UAV_E to RIS at time slot n, respectively; h̄ LoS
ru [n]
set of time slots is denoted as N = {1, 2 … N },where the time can be expressed as
duration of each time slot is Δ = T ∕N . We assume that a RIS [ ]T
2𝜋 2𝜋
consisting of a uniform linear array (ULA) of K elements is − j d 𝜂ru [n] − j (K −1)d 𝜂ru [n]
h̄ LoS
ru [n] = 1, e 𝜆 , … ., e 𝜆 , (7)
placed on the surface of the building, and the set of elements of
4 LIU ET AL.

and 𝜂ru [n] = (xr − xu [n])∕dru [n] denotes the cosine of the angle RIS; 𝜂Jr = (xJ − xr )∕dJr is the cosine of the AoA of signal from
of deviation of signal (AoD) from the IRS to the UAV_L; the jammer to the RIS. GJ sends friendly AN. For legitimate
h̄ LoS
re [n] can be expressed UAV, friendly AN can be canceled at the receiving side. Eaves-
dropping UAV is confused by friendly AN. When the mth user
[ ]T
2𝜋
− j d 𝜂re [n]
2𝜋
− j (K −1)d 𝜂re [n] communicates with UAV_L at the nth time slot, the signal-
h̄ LoS
re [n] = 1, e 𝜆 , … ., e 𝜆 , (8) to-noise ratio (SNR) and the signal-to-interference-noise ratio
(SINR) at UAV_L and UAV_E are expressed as
and 𝜂re [n] = (xr − xe [n])∕dre [n] denotes the cosine of the AoD
| |2
of signal from the RIS to the UAV_E; d denotes the element pm [n]|hmu [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hru [n]|
separation of RIS; 𝜆 denotes the wavelength of the carrier wave. 𝛾m [n] = | | , (16)
We assume that the direct link from the ground user to 𝜎2
the UAV is blocked, thus the direct link channel models are | ( )H |2
formulated as follows, respectively [37]. pm [n]|hme [n] + hmr [n] 𝚯m [n]hre [n]|
𝛾m,e [n] = | | , (17)
√ | ( ) H |2
hme [n] = 𝛽0 (dme [n])−𝛼0 h̄ me [n], 𝜎2 + PJ |hJe [n] + hJr [n] 𝚯m [n]hre [n]|
(9) | |
√ where pm [n] is the transmit power of the mth user in time slot
hmu [n] = 𝛽0 (dmu [n])−𝛼0 h̄ mu [n], (10) n,and PJ is the power of the jammer to transmit AN. When user
m transmits a signal in time slot n, the communication rates
√
that can be achieved by UAV_L and UAV_E are expressed as,
hJe [n] = 𝛽0 (dJe [n])−𝛼0 h̄ Je [n], (11)
respectively

√ 𝛼0 is the A2G path loss exponent;

where √dme [n] = Rm [n] = Blog2 (1 + 𝛾m [n]), (18)
2 2
‖qe [n] − wm ‖ + He , dmu [n] = ‖qu [n] − wm ‖ + H 2
2
√
2
and dJe [n] = ‖qe [n] − wJ ‖ + He2 denote the distance from Rme [n] = Blog2 (1 + 𝛾m,e [n]), (19)
user m to UAV_E, user m to UAV_L and jammer to UAV_E
where B is the system bandwidth. The secure communication
at time slot n, respectively. h̄ me [n], h̄ mu [n] and h̄ Je [n] denote zero-
rate that can be achieved by user m at time slot n is expressed
mean and unit-variance circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
as
(CSCG) random variable, respectively.
The ground-to-RIS channel is modeled as a Rician fad- Rmsec [n] = (Rm [n] − Rme [n])+ , (20)
ing channel due to the complex electromagnetic environment
caused by reflections from buildings [36]. The user-RIS Δ
and jammer-RIS channel models are formulated as follows, where (x)+ = max{0, x}.
respectively.
√
hmr [n] = 𝛽0 dmr −𝛼 ̄
hmr [n], (12) 2.3 TDMA model
√ The user communicates with the UAV_L using the TDMA
hJr [n] = 𝛽0 dJr−𝛼 h̄ Jr [n], (13) scheme. Defining 𝜏m [n] as the proportion of time allocated for
√ the mth user to communicate with the UAV_L in time slot n, we
where
2
dJr = ‖wr − wJ ‖ + Hr2 and dmr = have
√
2
‖wr − wm ‖ + Hr2 are the distance from the jammer to the ∑
M
𝜏m [n] ≤ 1, ∀n, (21)
RIS and the distance from the user m to the RIS, respectively; m=1
h̄ mr [n] is formulated as
0 ≤ 𝜏m [n] ≤ 1, ∀m, n. (22)
√ √
𝛽GR 1
h̄ mr [n] = mr [n] +
hLoS hNLoS
mr [n]. (14)
1 + 𝛽GR 1 + 𝛽GR 2.4 Edge computing model
h̄ Jr [n] is formulated as
In this paper, a partial offloading scheme is considered, where
√ √ a part of the user’s data is remembered to be computed locally
𝛽GR 1 and another part is offloaded to UAV_L for computation. Let
h̄ Jr [n] = hLoS [n] + hNLoS [n], (15)
1 + 𝛽GR Jr 1 + 𝛽GR Jr lmloc [n] denote the local computation data of the mth user in the
nth time slot. Let Fmmax and Fuav
max
denote the CPU frequency of
and 𝛽GR is the Rician factor; 𝜂mr = (xm − xr )∕dmr is the cosine the user m and the UAV_L, respectively. Cm is the CPU cycles
of the angle of arrival (AoA) of signal from the user m to the for user m to compute 1 bit. For users with limited computing
LIU ET AL. 5

capacity, locally calculated data needs to satisfy q[N ] = qF , (30e)

lmloc [n]Cm
≤ Δ, ∀m, n. (23) 0 ≤ 𝜃km [n] < 2𝜋, ∀k, m, n, (30f)
Fmmax
Due to the limited computing capacity of UAV_L, the user m lmloc [n]Cm
offloading data to a UAV_L needs to satisfy ≤ Δ, ∀m, n, (30g)
Fmmax
Cm Rmsec [n]Δ𝜏m [n] Cm Rmsec [n]Δ𝜏m [n]
max ≤ Δ𝜏m [n], ∀m, n. (24) max ≤ Δ𝜏m [n], ∀m, n, (30h)
Fuav Fuav
Defining Qm [n] as the basic computation requirement of user lmloc [n] + 𝜏m [n]ΔRmsec [n] ≥ Qm [n], ∀m, n, (30i)
m in time slot n, we have
N ⎛ ( )3 ⎞
1 ∑ ⎜ 𝜅m Cm lm [n]
loc
lmloc [n] + 𝜏m [n]ΔRmsec [n] ≥ Qm [n], ∀m, n. (25) ⎟ ≤ P̄m , ∀m, (30j)
+ 𝜏 [n]Δp [n]
T n=1 ⎜ Δ2 m m
⎟
The calculated energy consumption of user m is expressed as ⎝ ⎠
0 < pm [n] ≤ Pmmax , ∀m, n, (30k)
3
𝜅m (Cm lmloc [n])
Em [n] = , ∀m, n, (26) ∑
M
Δ2 𝜏m ≤ 1, ∀n, (30l)
where 𝜅m denotes the effective capacitance coefficient of the m=1

mth user with relation to the CPU architecture. Due to the 0 ≤ 𝜏m [n] ≤ 1, ∀m, n, (30m)
energy constraint of the user, the power constraint of the user
m is expressed as

N ⎛ ( )3 ⎞
1 ∑ ⎜ 𝜅m Cm lm [n]
loc
⎟ ≤ P̄m , ∀m, where {q[n]} is the trajectory of UAV_L; {lmloc [n]} is the local com-
+ 𝜏 [n]Δp [n] (27)
T n=1 ⎜ Δ2 m m
⎟ putational data allocation; {𝜃km [n]} is the phase shift of the RIS;
⎝ ⎠
{pm [n]} is the transmit power of the user; 𝜏m [n] is frame length
where P̄m denotes the maximum average power consumption of allocation. Constraint (30 b) denotes the speed constraint of
user m. Defining pm [n] as the transmit power of user m in time the UAV_L. The constraint (30 c) ensures a minimum distance
slot n, we have between the UAVs. Constraints (30 d) and (30 e) denote the ini-
tial point and final point fixation of the UAV_L. Constraint (30
0 < pm [n] ≤ Pmmax , (28) f) indicates the range of the phase shift of each element of the
RIS. Constraint (30 g) ensures that the local computational data
where Pmmax denotes the maximum transmit power of user m. allocation per user does not exceed the user’s computational
Then the secure computing bits of the system are defined as capacity. Constraint (30 h) ensures that the data offloaded by
the user does not exceed the computing capacity of the UAV_L.
∑
M ∑
N ∑
M ∑
N
Constraint (30 i) ensures that each user meets basic computa-
Rsec = Rmsec [n]Δ𝜏m [n]+ lmloc [n]. (29) tion requirement. The constraint (30 j) indicates that the user’s
m=1 n=1 m=1 n=1
energy consumption is limited. Constraint (30 k) indicates that
In this paper, we aim to improve the secure capability of the transmit power of the user is limited. Constraints (30 l) and
the system by maximizing the secure computing bits. Under (30 m) indicate that all users transmit data sequentially within
the constraint of limited energy and computational resources, a time slot. The problem is nonconvex due to the presence of
secure computing bits are maximized by optimizing the frame nonconvex objective function and nonconvex constraints.
length, user transmit power, RIS phase shift, and UAV_L
trajectory. Thus the problem can be formulated as
3 SOLUTIONS OF THE FORMULATED
(P1) ∶ max Rsec , (30a) PROBLEMS
{q[n],lmloc [n],𝜃km [n],pm [n],𝜏m [n]}

2 In this section, we use the BCD algorithm for

s. t. ‖q[n + 1] − q[n]‖ ≤ (ΔVmax )2 , n = 1, 2, … , N − 1, the nonconvex problem with variable block  =
(30b) {𝜏m [n], lmloc [n], 𝜃km [n], pm [n], q[n]} to decouple the original prob-
‖q[n] − qe [n]‖2 ≥ d 2 , ∀n, (30c) lem into five subproblems. The subproblems are frame length
‖ ‖ min
optimization, local computational data allocation optimiza-
tion, RIS phase design, and power and UAV_L trajectory
q[1] = qI , (30d) optimization using SCA techniques.
6 LIU ET AL.

3.1 Optimizing {𝜽km [n]} with fixed 3.4 Optimizing {pm [n]} with fixed
m
 ∖{𝜽k [n]}  ∖{pm [n]}

In designing the RIS phase shift, the maximum communica- Introducing the auxiliary variables s1,m [n] ,s2,m [n] when given
tion rate problem is replaced by the secure rate maximization {q[n], 𝜃km [n], lmloc [n], 𝜏m [n]} , the problem P1 is transformed as
problem to simplify the original problem [35].
There exists the triangle inequality |hmu [n] + hH mr [n] ∑
N ∑
M
( )
𝚯m [n]hru [n]| (P4) ∶ max B(s1,m [n] − s2,m [n])Δ𝜏m [n] + lmloc [n] ,
{}
(a) n=1 m=1
≤ |hmu [n]|+ |hH
mr [n]𝚯m [n]hru [n]|.
When (a) takes the equal (34a)
sign, the UAV_L can obtain the maximum SNR. This means
s. t.s1,m [n] ≤
that the maximum communication rate of the UAV_L can be
achieved when the direct link signal phase and the reflected ⎛ | ( )H |2 ⎞
signal phase are equal [38]. Then we have ⎜ p [n] |
m | muh [n] + h mr [n] 𝚯 m [n]h ru | ⎟
[n] |
log2 ⎜1 + | | ⎟, (34b)
( ) ⎜ 𝜎2 ⎟
𝜃k [n] = arg(hmu [n]) − arg hH ⎜ ⎟
mr,k [n] − arg(hru,k [n]), (31) ⎝ ⎠
∀m, n
Δ
where arg(x) = arccos(Re(x)∕‖x‖); hH
mr,k [n] and hru,k [n] are the s2,m [n] ≥
kth elements of the complex vector hHmr [n] and the complex
vector hru [n], respectively. ⎛ | |2 ⎞
⎜ pm [n]|hme [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hre [n]| ⎟
log2 ⎜1 + | | ,
2⎟
(34c)
⎜ 𝜎 2 + P ||h [n] + (h [n])H 𝚯 [n]h [n]|| ⎟
3.2 Optimizing {𝝉m [n]} with fixed  ∖{𝝉m [n]} ⎝ J | Je Jr m re | ⎠
∀m, n
Given {q[n], 𝜃km [n], lmloc [n], pm [n]} , the problem P1 can be
transformed as (30i ), 30(k), (34d)
( ) where  = {s1,m [n], s2,m [n], ∖{pm [n]}}. The (⋅)+ operation is
∑
M ∑
N ∑
M ∑
N
(P2) ∶ max Rmsec [n]Δ𝜏m [n]+ lmloc [n] , ignored in this paper. Rmsec [n] is guaranteed to be larger than zero
{𝜏m [n]} due to the friendly AN power PJ > 0 and the (30 k) constraint.
m=1 n=1 m=1 n=1
(32a) Although the objective function is made convex by introducing
auxiliary variables, the constraints (34 b), (34 c) are nonconvex,
s. t. (30i ), (30 j ), (30l ), (30m). (32b) so the problem is still difficult to solve. Therefore SCA technol-
ogy was introduced to solve the problem. Applying a first-order
(l )
Since the objective function is affine and the constraint 32(b) Taylor expansion to s1,m [n] at pm [n], (34 b) can be transformed
is convex, P2 is a convex problem, which can be solved by the as (35), shown at the bottom of the next page.
CVX toolbox.
⎛ (l ) | |2 ⎞
⎜ pm [n]|hmu [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hru [n]| ⎟
s1,m [n] ≤ log2 ⎜1 + | |
⎟
3.3 Optimizing {lmloc [n]} with fixed ⎜ 𝜎 2
⎟
 ∖{lmloc [n]} ⎝ ⎠

| |2 (l )
Given {q[n], 𝜃km [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]}, the problem P1 can be trans- |hmu [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hru [n]| (pm [n] − pm [n])
+ | | ,
formed as ( (l ) | ( )H |2 )
ln 2 𝜎2 + pm [n]|hmu [n] + hmr [n] 𝚯m [n]hru [n]|
| |
( ) (35)
∑
M ∑
N ∑
M ∑
N
(l )
(P3) ∶ max Rmsec [n]Δ𝜏m [n]+ lmloc [n] , where pm [n] denotes the transmit power of the mth user in
{lmloc [n]} m=1 n=1 m=1 n=1 the l th iteration at the nth time slot. Similarly, applying a first-
(33a) (l )
order Taylor expansion for s2,m [n] at point pm [n], (34 c) can be
transformed as (36), shown at the bottom of the next page.
s. t. (30g), (30i ), (30 j ). (33b)
s2,m [n] ≥ log2
Since the objective function and constraints are affine, P3 is ( (l ) | |2 ( 2)
a convex problem, which is solved by the CVX toolbox. 1 + pm [n]|hme [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hre [n]| ∕ 𝜎2 + PJ |HJr [n]|
| |
LIU ET AL. 7

( )
| |2 (l ) transmission rate RmL [n] can be expressed as [38]
|hme [n] + (hmr [n]) 𝚯m [n]hre [n]| pm [n] − pm [n]
H
1 | |
+
ln 2 ( | ( )H |2 )
𝜎2 + PJ ||HJr [n]|| + pm [n]|hme [n] + hmr [n] 𝚯m [n]hre [n]| | |2
2 (l )
| | ⎛ | Am [n] Bm [n]| ⎞
Rm [n] = log2 ⎜1 + 𝜇m [n]|| 𝛼 +
| ⎟
where HJr [n] = hJe [n] + (hJr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hre [n]. (36) ⎜ | (d [n]) 2 dru [n] || ⎟
⎝ | mu | ⎠
⎛ ⎛ A2 [n] Bm [n] 2Am [n]Bm [n]⎞⎞ (40)
2
≥ log2 ⎜1 + 𝜇m [n]⎜ ⎟⎟
m
Thus P4 can be reformulated as + +
⎜ ⎜ (vm [n])𝛼 (u[n])2 𝛼
⎟⎟
⎝ ⎝ u[n](vm [n]) 2 ⎠⎠
∑
N ∑
M = RmL [n]
(P4.1) ∶ max (B(s1,m [n] − s2,m [n])Δ𝜏m [n])
{}
n=1 m=1
pm [n] (l )
∑
N ∑
M where 𝜇m [n] = . {vm [n]} and {u (l ) [n]} are defined as the
𝜎2
+ ((lmloc [n])), (37a) values of the l th iteration of the variables {vm [n]} and {u[n]},
n=1 m=1 respectively. Applying the first-order Taylor expansion to RmL [n]
(l )
s. t.(30i ), 30(k), (35), (36). (37b) at (vm [n], u (l ) [n]), we have

(l )
Since the objective function and constraints of P4.1 are (l ) Ym [n] ( (l ) )
affine, the problem is convex, and CVX is used to solve RmL [n] ≥ log2 Xm [n] + (l )
vm [n] − vm [n]
the problem. Xm [n] ln 2
(l ) (41)
Zm [n] ( )
+ (l ) |u[n] − u (l ) [n]|
| |
Xm [n] ln 2
3.5 Optimizing {q[n]} with fixed  ∖{q[n]}
where
Given {𝜃k [n], lmloc [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]} , introducing the variable
s1,m [n] ,the problem P1 can be transformed as (l )
Xm [n] = 1

∑
N ∑
M
( ) ⎛ 2 ( )2 ⎞
(P5) ∶ max (Bs1,m [n] − Rme [n])Δ𝜏m [n] + lmloc [n] , ⎜ (Am [n]) Bm [n] 2Am [n]Bm [n] ⎟ (42)
+𝜇m [n]⎜ 𝛼+ ( (l ) )2 + (
{} (
) (l ) ) 𝛼∕2 ⎟
n=1 m=1
⎜ (vm(l ) [n]) u [n] u (l ) [n] vm [n] ⎟
(38a) ⎝ ⎠
s. t.s1,m [n] ≤ ⎛ 2 ⎞
(l ) ⎜ 𝛼(Am [n]) 𝛼Am [n]Bm [n] ⎟
Ym [n] = −𝜇m [n]⎜ ( )𝛼+1 + ( ( ) ⎟
⎛ | |2 ⎞ ) (l ) ( 𝛼∕2+1 )
⎜ pm [n]|hmu [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hru [n]| ⎟ ⎜ v (l ) [n] (l ) ⎟
log2 ⎜1 + | | , ∀m, n, ⎝ m u [n] vm [n] ⎠
⎟
⎜ 𝜎 2
⎟ (43)
⎝ ⎠
(38b) and
(30b), (30c ), (30d ), (30e), (30h), (30i ), (38c)
⎛ 2 ⎞
(l ) ⎜ 2(Bm ) 2Am [n]Bm [n] ⎟
where  = {s1,m [n], s2,m [n], q[n]}. Although the objective func- Zm [n] = −𝜇m [n]⎜ + ( )𝛼∕2 ⎟ (44)
( (l ) )3 ( )
⎜ um 2 (l )
u (l ) [n] vm [n] ⎟
tion is made convex by introducing auxiliary variables, the ⎝ ⎠
constraint is highly nonconvex and problem P5 is still difficult
to solve. Therefore, we use the SCA technique for the con- The constraint on the variable vm [n] can be reformulated as
straint. With the RIS phase shift obeying Equation (31), we have
( )2
(l ) (l )
−(vm [n])2 ≤ vm [n] − 2vm [n]vm [n]
| | ( )2 (45)
| | | Am [n] Bm [n]|
|hmu [n] + (hmr [n])H 𝚯m [n]hru [n]| = || | (39) (l ) (l )
+ ⇒ −(dmu [n])2 ≤ vm [n] − 2vm [n]vm [n]
| | | 𝛼
dru [n] ||
| mu
(d [n]) 2 |
Similarly, the constraint on the variable u[n] is reformulated as
√ √ ∑K
where Am [n] = 𝛽0 |h̄ mu [n]| and Bm [n] = 𝛽0 |hmr,i [n]|. ( )2 ( )2
i=1 − u[n] ≤ u (l ) [n] − 2u[n]u (l ) [n]
Introducing the variables {vm [n]}, {u[n]} where the constrains ( )2 ( )2 (46)
vm [n] ≥ dmu [n], u[n] ≥ dru [n] are satisfied, the lower bound on the ⇒ − dru [n] ≤ u (l ) [n] − 2u[n]u (l ) [n]
8 LIU ET AL.

ALGORITHM 1 Communication Resource And Trajectory Joint and (48) must obey the following constraints:
Optimization (CRTJO) Algorithm
m,(l ) (l ) loc,(l ) (l )
( )
1: Initialization:Given {q(l ) [n], 𝜃k [n], 𝜏m [n], lm [n], pm [n]}, set l = 0 Fo 𝜃km,r [n], lmloc,r [n], 𝜏mr [n], prm [n], qr [n]
and iteration precision 𝜉 = 10−3 .
(31 ) ( )
2: Repeat ≤ Fo 𝜃km,r+1 [n], lmloc,r [n], 𝜏mr [n], prm [n], qr [n]
loc,(l ) (l ) (l )
Given {q(l ) [n], lm [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]}, obtain the RIS phase shift
(32 ) ( )
3:
m,(l +1)
{𝜃k [n]} via (31). ≤ Fo 𝜃km,r+1 [n], lmloc,r+1 [n], 𝜏mr [n], prm [n], qr [n]
m,(l +1)
.
loc,(l ) (l )
4: Given {q(l ) [n], 𝜃k [n], lm [n], pm [n]}, solve P2 to obtain the frame (33 ) ( ) (49)
(l +1) m,r+1 loc,r+1
length {𝜏m [n]}. ≤ Fo 𝜃k [n], lm [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n], q [n]
r+1 r r
m,(l +1) (l +1)
(37 ) ( )
(l )
5: Given {q(l ) [n], 𝜃k [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]}, solve P3 to obtain the local
computational data allocation {lm
loc,(l +1)
[n]}. ≤ Fo 𝜃km,r+1 [n], lmloc,r+1 [n], 𝜏mr+1 [n], pr+1 r
m [n], q [n]
(48 ) ( )
m,(l +1) loc,(l +1) (l +1)
6: Given {q(l ) [n], 𝜃k [n], lm [n], 𝜏m [n]}, solve P4.1 to obtain the
user transmit power {pm [n]}.
(l +1) ≤ Fo 𝜃km,r+1 [n], lmloc,r+1 [n], 𝜏mr+1 [n], pr+1 m [n], q r+1 [n]

m,(l +1) loc,(l +1) (l +1) (l +1)

7: Given {𝜃k [n], lm [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]}, solve P5.1 to obtain
the trajectory of UAV_L q (l +1) [n]. Based on the above analysis, it can be seen that Problem
8: l = l + 1. (30) has non-decreasing and finite values for each iteration
9: Until: The increase of the target value is lower than the iteration
in the CRTJO algorithm. Therefore, the proposed algorithm
precision 𝜉 or l exceeds the maximum number of iterations. is convergent. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge
10: Output: 𝜃km [n], q[n], lmloc [n], 𝜏m [n], pm [n]
to the global maximum value in subsequent simulations. The
complexity of subproblems 2 and 3 is O(MN ), and the com-
plexity of subproblems 4 and 5 is O(L1 (3NM )3.5 log(𝜉 −1 )),
O(L2 (2N (M + 1))3.5 log(𝜉 −1 )), respectively, where L1 and L2
Applying the Taylor first-order expansion to the constraint are the maximum number of iterations of subproblem 4 and
(30 c), we have subproblem 5. In total, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is
( )( ) O((2MN + L1 (3NM )3.5 + L2 (2N (M + 1))3.5 ) log(𝜉 −1 )) [21].
‖q(l ) [n] − qe [n]‖2 + 2 q[n] − q(l ) [n] q(l ) [n] − qe [n] T ≥ d 2
‖ ‖ min
(47)
where q(l ) [n] is the trajectory of UAV_L at the l th iteration. The 4 NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION
problem of trajectory optimization is reformulated as RESULTS
∑
N ∑
M In this section, the simulation results are presented to vali-
(P5.1) ∶ max (B(s1,m [n] − Rme [n])Δ𝜏m [n]) date the performance of the proposed strategy. We consider
{vm [n],u[n],}
n=1 m=1
the region of 400 × 100m2 where the user is placed in W1 =
∑
N ∑
M
(( loc )) [−130, 40], W2 = [0, 40] and W3 = [150, 40], respectively. GJ is
+ lm [n] (48a) fixed at [−100, 50],and UAV_E flies in a straight line with con-
n=1 m=1 stant speed from the initial position of [−200, 70], to the final
position of [200, 35].UAV_L flies from the initial position of
s. t.(30b), (30c ), (30d ), (30e), (30h), (30i ), (41), (45), (46), (47)
qI = [−200, 0] to the final point of qF = [200, 0] with the max-
(48b)
imum speed of Vmax = 15m∕s. The specific parameter settings
Since the objective function and constraints of the problem are shown in Table 1.
are convex, the problem is convex and can be solved using CVX. To illustrate the advantages of the CRTJO scheme, we
compare it with the following schemes.
CRTJO/NRIS scheme[20]: The frame length, trans-
3.6 Overall algorithm mit power, local computational data allocation and UAV_L
trajectory are jointly optimized without RIS.
We use the BCD algorithm to obtain a suboptimal solution CRTJO/FFL scheme: The UAV’s trajectory, transmit
to the problem P1 iteratively. The details of the algorithm are power, local computational data allocation and RIS phase shift
shown in Algorithm 1. We firstly initialize the UAV_L trajec- are jointly optimized with fixed frame length.
(0) CRTJO/SLT scheme: The frame length, transmit power,
tory {q(0) [n]}, the frame length {𝜏m [n]}, local computational
loc,(0) (0) local computational data allocation and RIS phase shift are
data allocation {lm [n]} and the transmit power {pm [n]} to jointly optimized with straight line trajectory.
m,(1)
obtain the phase shift {𝜃k [n]} of the RIS. For the non-convex Figure 2 shows the convergence of the CRTJO scheme with
subproblem of power and trajectory optimization, the SCA different values of Pmax and K for T = 30 s, where the CRTJO
technique is used to iteratively solve the problem. We define scheme achieves quick convergence. It can be seen that as the
Fo (qr [n], lmloc,r [n], 𝜃km,r [n], prm [n], 𝜏mr [n]) as the objective value of values of Pmax and K increase, the secure computing bits of the
(30). According to literatures [35] and [39], (31), (32), (33), (37) system also increases.
LIU ET AL. 9

TABLE 1 Simulation parameters.

Parameters Value Parameters Value

Wr [0,0] Δ 1s
He 100 m Vmax 15 m/s
H 100 m Qm 1 Mbit
dmin 1m Hr 20 m
B 1MHz d 𝜆∕2
max
Fuav 10 GHz 𝛼, 𝛼0 3.6,2
Fmmax 1GHz 𝛽GR 20 dB
PJ −10 dB 𝜎2 −115 dBm
𝛽0 −30 dB P̄m 1W
𝜅m 10−27 Cm 103 cycles/bit

FIGURE 2 Convergence of the CRTJO scheme with different value of

Pmax and K .
FIGURE 3 Comparison of UAV_L and UAV_E trajectory with different
value of Qm .

Figure 3 compares the UAV trajectories of the proposed

scheme and the benchmark scheme for different compu-
tation requirement Qm , where the trajectory of UAV_E is
pre-determined. From Figure 3a, we can find that the existence
of RIS affects the trajectory of UAV_L by comparing CRTJO
and CRTJO/NRIS, and the frame length also has a signifi-
cant effect on the trajectory of UAV_L by comparing CRTJ
and CRTJO/FFL. By comparing Figures 3a and 3b, we find
that the basic computation requirement Qm has a significant
impact on the trajectory of UAV_L. Obviously, the trajectory
of UAV_L under the CRTJO/NRIS scheme is vulnerable to the
basic computation requirement because RIS is not used. The
reason is that when the basic computation requirement of the
user increases, the UAV of the CRTJ/NRIS scheme improves
the channel quality by moving its position. Due to the introduc-
tion of RIS to improve the channel gain, The CRTJO scheme is
slightly affected by Qm compared to the CRTJO/NRIS scheme.
The CRTJO/FFL scheme increases the minimum secure com-
puting bits for a user because each user is assigned an equal
frame length. The trajectory of UAV_L does not change when
the basic computing requirement is lower than the minimum
secure computing bits that the user can obtain. Due to the chan-
nel enhancement of the RIS, the security of the system can be
enhanced when the UAV is flying between the user and the IRS.
Figure 4 compares the secure computing bits of each user
in slot n with different value of Qm at Pmax = 0.2W , T = 30s
and K = 30. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the minimum
secure computing bits of each user increases as the basic compu-
tation requirement Qm increases in the CRTJO scheme. UAV_L
passes through user 1, user 2 and user 3 in order from the initial
point to the final point. When UAV_L approaches user m, the
communication resources are inclined to user m to improve the
secure computing bits. The secure computing capacity of user m
is significantly higher than other users because UAV_L has the
best channel quality with user m. When the channel quality of
user m is no longer optimal, the secure computation bits of user
m decrease significantly. As the basic computation requirement
Qm increases, UAV_L needs to consume more communication
10
FIGURE 4 Comparison of the secure computing bits of each user in slot
n with different value of Qm .
FIGURE 5 The impact of K on the secure computing bits with different
value of Pmax .
resources to meet the increased computation requirements of
each user, which leads to a reduction of secure computing bits
for user m. Due to the existence of UAV_E, user 2 satisfies
only the basic computation requirements in period T . When
the user is near the eavesdropping UAV, a small amount of
communication resources is allocated to the user to satisfy the
basic computing requirements as the user is more vulnerable to
the eavesdropper.
Figure 5 shows the variation of secure computing bits with
the number of RIS elements in CRTJO and CRTJO/FFL
schemes for different values of Pmax . In Figure 5, it can be
obviously seen that the CRTJO scheme achieves a significant
advantage. It is because UAV_L gets a longer time to receive
offload information from the best users when the CRTJO
scheme optimizes the frame length. When the number of RIS
elements increases, UAV_L achieves enhanced channel quality
to receive offload information. According to the results, the
LIU ET AL.
FIGURE 6 The impact of Qm on the secure computing bits with different
value of Pmax and K .
proposed scheme is valid for all sizes of RIS. The introduc-
tion of RIS is beneficial to the secure transmission performance
of UAV.
To illustrate the impact of the basic computation requirement
Qm on the system performance, Figure 6 shows the secure com-
puting bits versus Qm with different values of Pmax and K . From
Figure 6, it can be found that when Qm is small, that is, less than
1 Mbit, the secure computing bits of the system decrease slowly.
This is because the CPU frequency of each user is 1GHz, which
can satisfy the basic computation requirement. However, when
Qm continues to increase, the user will increase the amount
of data offloaded to UAV_L to satisfy the basic computation
requirements due to the limited local computation frequency. As
the amount of data offloaded to the UAV_L increases, UAV_E
achieves more opportunities to wiretap information. Thus, the
secure computing capability of the system is degraded. Secure
computing bits are reduced because UAV_L needs to consume
more communication resources to satisfy the basic computation
requirements of each user. Equipping more reflective elements
in the RIS is beneficial for enhancing the security of the system.
Figure 7 shows the superiority of the proposed scheme
by comparing the proposed scheme with three benchmark
schemes, where the parameters are set to Pmax = 0.2 W , Qm = 1
Mbit and K = 30. As seen in Figure 7, the CRTJO scheme
outperforms the three benchmark schemes in secure comput-
ing bits. This is because the CRTJO scheme jointly optimizes
the communication resources and trajectories. When the period
T increases, UAV_L gets more time to receive the informa-
tion offloaded by the user. Therefore, the introduction of RIS
and trajectory optimization of UAV play an important role in
secure communication.
Figure 8 shows the efficiency of the proposed scheme by
comparing the CRTJO scheme with the three benchmark
schemes, where the parameters are set to K = 30, Qm = 1 Mbit
and T = 30. From Figure 8, it can be seen that the CRTJO
scheme outperforms the benchmark scheme in terms of secure
computing bits for the same Pmax . Therefore, this result
LIU ET AL.
FIGURE 7 The impact of T on the secure computing bits with different
strategies.
FIGURE 8 The impact of Pmax on the secure computing bits with
different strategies.
motivates us to introduce RIS to improve the security
performance when the user transmission power is limited.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a secure communication strategy in
the RIS-assisted UAV-MEC system, where UAV_L calculates
the offloaded data and RIS improves the communication qual-
ity of the uplink. The combination of jammer and RIS can
improve the system’s secure computing bits. Secure comput-
ing bits are maximized by optimizing the frame length, transmit
power, local computational data allocation, UAV_L trajectory,
and RIS phase shift. The optimization problem is noncon-
vex, thus it is solved by combining the BCD algorithm and
the SCA algorithm. The simulation results show that the pro-
posed scheme achieves better performance than the benchmark
schemes.
11
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
shihao liu: Conceptualization, methodology, software, writ-
ing - original draft. Yangchao Huang: Investigation, resources,
software, supervision. Hang Hu: Conceptualization, funding
acquisition, resources, writing - review and editing. Jiangbo
Si: Supervision, validation, visualization. Guobing Cheng: For-
mal analysis, supervision. Tao Huang: Resources, visualization.
Xiaoliang Hu: Validation, visualization.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China under Grant 61901509.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT
The authors have declared no conflict of interest.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Research data are not shared.
ORCID
Shihao Liu https://orcid.org/0009-0006-9292-9846
Hang Hu https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5391-010X
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How to cite this article: Liu, S., Huang, Y., Hu, H., Si,
J., Cheng, G., Huang, T., Hu, X.: Resource and trajectory
optimization for secure communication in RIS assisted
UAV-MEC system. IET Commun. 1–12 (2023).
https://doi.org/10.1049/cmu2.12680