Determinants of Democracy in The Muslim World

Determinants of Democracy in the Muslim World
Author(s): Fatima Z. Rahman

Source: Polity , October 2013, Vol. 45, No. 4, Behind the Curtain (October 2013), pp. 554-
579
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Polity · Volume 45, Number 4 · October 2013
© 2013 Northeastern Political Science Association 0032-3497/13
www.palgravejournals.com/polity/
Determinants of Democracy in the

Muslim World
Fatima Ζ. Rahman
Lake Forest College
This article, which examines the factors and processes that account for the negative
correlation between Muslim majority states and democratization, focuses on the
institutionalization of Islam in the state. I assess the effect of this factor along with
other determinants on regime type from 1990 to 2002 in the population of fifty-one
Muslim-majority states, using a multilevel mixed effects linear regression model and
path analysis. The analysis shows that although Islam is arguably the most con
spicuous factor characterizing this set of states, the institutionalization of Islam in the
state is not an impediment to democratization. Instead, factors particularly associated
with the Middle East and North Africa, as well as a communist legacy, delay mean
ingful democratic reform. The results of various regression models suggest that the
states in this region with a better propensity toward democratic change are Egypt,
Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen.
Polity (2013) 45,554-579. doi: 10.1057/pol.2013.18;
published online 9 September 2013
Keywords Islam and politics; democratization; Muslim world; Middle East; Shari'a
The recent events of the Arab Spring have reinvigorated the discussion on the
prospects of democracy in the Middle East. The extent to which the protests that
brought about the removal of entrenched executives in Tunisia and Egypt will also
lead to structural political reform and an eventual transition to and consolidation
of democracy remains uncertain, it is clear, however, that Islam's political role is
once again being hotly contested in countries that have historically been
characterized by an uneasy relationship between largely secular ruling regimes
and popular Islamic political forces. The reincarnation of once banned Islamist
parties, particularly the al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
and their successes in the recent elections have ignited a debate about the role that
Shari'a will play in the state and its implications for democratization and the rights
of religious minorities and women.
This article examines the factors and processes within the Muslim world that
have impeded progress toward more democratic forms of government, and
focuses on the effect of the institutionalization of Islam in the state (used

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Fatima Ζ. Rahman 555
interchangeably with state-institutionalized Islam, for brevity). Previous cross

national studies examining determinants of regime type have found that, ceteris
paribus, states with Muslim-majority populations are more autocratic than are
non-Muslim majority states.1 These studies have contributed to our under
standing of democratization by empirically confirming the claim that Muslim
majority states are resistant to democratization. However, these studies also exhibit
a limitation, which motivates this article. They employ a problematic variable
(the relative size of the Muslim population within a state) when assessing the
democratic implications of Islam. The problem is that the percentage of Muslims in
a state does not capture the effect of the different forms of state-institutionalized
Islam, which is the aspect of Islam that is thought to be consequential for
democratization.
I attempt to overcome this limitation by testing the effect on regime type in

Muslim-majority states of three different forms of state-institutionalized Islam:
(1) the adoption of Islam as the state religion, (2) the incorporation of Islamic
laws and policies, and (3) the presence of religious courts.2 I do this while
accounting for important cultural, regional, and economic variations, which are
also hypothesized to determine regime type and may account for the negative
correlation that is observed between majority Muslim states and democratization
in previous cross-national studies.3
Using data from the set of fifty-one Muslim-majority states from 1990 to 2002,
I gain some traction on how changes in these factors over time affect a Muslim
majority state's democratic trajectory, albeit over a very limited period of time due
to data constraints.41 find that state institutionalized Islam, in the form of state laws
and policies based on Islam, the adoption of Islam as the state religion, and the
presence of religious courts, are not significant impediments to democratization.
Rather, other factors prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
along with a communist legacy, which is possessed by the Muslim-majority states of
the Balkan Peninsula and Central Asia, delay democratic reform.
1. Manus I. Midlarksy, "Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the
Democratic Peace," International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 485-511; Robert J. Barro, "Determinants of
Democracy," Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999): 158-83; Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?" World Politics 53 (2001): 325-61; M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," World Politics
55 (2002): 4-37.
2. Regime type refers to the type of government in power. I measure regime type using Polity IV's
twenty-one point measure for regime authority, with a -10 indicating fully institutionalized autocracy and
10 indicating fully institutionalized democracy. See Ted R. Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Monty G. Marshall,
"Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010," Dataset version < p4v2010>
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, accessed October 2010.
3. Midlarksy, "Democracy and Islam;" Barro, "Determinants of Democracy," Fish, "Islam and
Authoritarianism."
4. At present, the data for the three major variables of interest are not available prior to 1990.

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556 DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
I then explore the reasons for these effects. I find that the suppression of civil
society and the absence of key "coordination goods" discourage sustained popular
mobilizations for regime change.5 In addition, in post-communist states, weak rule
of law enables autocratic regimes to disregard important democratic institutions,
constitutional checks on executive power, and open and inclusive political
participation.
In the remainder of the paper, I examine the mechanisms by which Islam is
often hypothesized to resist democratization. This section provides the rationale for
my focus on state-institutionalized Islam. I consider competing theories for the
Muslim world's poor record of democratic reform, test the claims, and discuss the
statistical results.
Islam
Western scholars often characterize Islam as an obstacle to democratization in
Muslim-majority states because of its holistic quality, which entails an overt

merging of religion and governance. While privatization of Islam is possible (as
exhibited in Turkey), the more common legacy of Islam, which developed over a
fourteen-hundred year history, is a comprehensive set of rules and injunctions that
govern nearly all aspects of life. Islam provides guidelines and laws that not only
govern the personal, spiritual aspects of life but also the functioning of society at
large. Consequently (argue scholars), Islam can obstruct democratization if it is
politically institutionalized.
State institutionalization generally takes three forms. The most prominent is the
incorporation of laws and policies based on Shari'a (the Islamic legal tradition)
into the state legal code.6 There are three main ways by which governance by
Shari'a law is considered detrimental to democracy. First, because divinely
inspired rules and regulations are considered inviolate, they cannot be altered by
an elected legislature. This undermines the principle of popular sovereignty.7
Second, Shari'a law reflects Islam's philosophical tradition that arguably prioritizes
the common good and the community over the individual. To attain an ideal
Islamic society, individuals are expected to serve different roles in society. As a
5. Bueno De Mesquita and George Downs, "Development and Democracy," Foreign Affairs 84 (2005):
77-86.
6. The term Shari'a can also be used to refer to God's laws as found within the Quran and Sunnah.
When Shari'a is used in this way, it is often contrasted with the term fiqh, which refers to Islamic laws that
are man-made but nonetheless based on interpretations and understanding of divine sources. However,
dating back to the tenth century, formal legal literature has often used the term Shari'a to refer to all Islamic
laws including man-made laws, or fiqh. See John L. Esposito, Oxford Dictionary of Islam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003). I choose to employ the term Shari'a in accordance with the broader usage.
7. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (London: Taylor & Francis, Inc, 1994); Bernard
Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 52-63.

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consequence, citizens may not be subject to the same treatment under the law
because Shari'a law prescribes different treatment of individuals in accordanc
with their different responsibilities. As a result, social and political rights and
criminal laws arguably favor Muslims over non-Muslims.8 Family laws likewis
arguably treat men and women unequally based on their complementing roles in
the family and society.9 The collectivist foundation of Shari'a law thus corrode
equal right to democratic participation and basic individual rights for all citizens
Third, the incorporation of Shari'a law into the legal code, because it requires a
acceptance of religious mandates, may foster a political culture that is more likely
to accept autocratic rule. According to some political-culture theorists, the beliefs
values, and norms associated with Western liberalism are a prerequisite for
democratization.10 Using this logic, an earlier generation of scholars contende
that Catholicism impeded democratization in Latin America. Purportedly, commu
nal traditions and habits of submission to authority fostered an obedience-oriente
political culture that prevented the emergence of liberal democracy.11 Shari'a law
some researchers contend, similarly fosters communal traditions. Most Muslim
treat declarations of Islamic ulema (or scholars on matters of Shari'a) as inviolable
and consider the current codification of Shari'a law, which is based on the
understanding of the six medieval jurists, as sacrosanct. Habituated to followin
religious figures and not subjecting their declarations to critical analysis and
interpretation, many Muslims (it is said) are culturally primed to obey and tolerat
autocratic regimes.
A second form of state institutionalized Islam is the presence of religious courts
Their presence is evidence of a state's commitment to implementing Shari'a (as
opposed to simply having it on the books). This reinforces the problems posed by
the incorporation of Shari'a into the legal code. In addition, religious courts subjec
non-Muslims to Islamic laws, which violates religious freedom. This occurs in Iran
Saudi Arabia, and most Gulf states, even though some states, such as Syria, hav
parallel courts for other religious traditions. This judicial puiralism, however,
problematic in its own right because it creates a classification of citizens based on
8. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Rudolph
Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2007).
9. Valentine M. Moghadam, "Women's Economic Participation in the Middle East: What Difference
has the Neoliberal Policy Turn Made?," Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 1 (2005): 110-46; Rebecc
Barlow, "Women's Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Contribution of Secular-Oriented Feminism
in Islam and Human Rights in Practice, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin MacQueen (New York
Routledge, 2008), 33-51.
10. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
11. Christian Smith, "The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism and Democratiza
tion in Latin America," Sociology of Religion 55 (1994): 119-43.

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religious affiliation; therefore, citizens of the state are not equal under the law
because they are subject to different laws and courts.
The third and final form of state institutionalized Islam is the establishment of
Islam as a state religion. While the simple establishment of a state religion, as in

England, may not be consequential for democracy, the combination of endorse
ment and subsidization may violate an ideal relationship between religion and
state in a democracy, one that Alfred Stepan has termed the "twin tolerations."12 In
this relationship, the state guarantees freedom of religion to all citizens, and
provides all religious entities an equal opportunity to participate in the democratic
process via political organizations and movements. The state, however, is not
permitted to favor one religion over others either constitutionally or in policy
making.13 Such violation of the twin-tolerations principle may occur in two ways.
First, a particular religion may receive exclusive access to policymaking because of
its privileged position as the state-sanctioned religion.14 This is the case in Saudi
Arabia, where Wahabi Islam exercises a dominant political voice in the state's
policies. Second, financial subsidization may allow the state religion to monopolize
the religious market by increasing the entry costs for other religious denomina
tions.15 This is the case in Egypt, where the government financially subsidizes Sunni
Islam, runs the religious endowment program (awqat), and provides Muslim
institutions (most notably mosques) with property to cany out Islamic or charitable
services, while other religious institutions such as Christian churches do not receive
government funding.16
Given these mechanisms by which the three forms of state institutionalized
Islam may undermine core aspects of democracy, one would expect that:
HI: Muslim-majority states that institutionalize Islam are more likely to be

autocratic.
However, there are additional factors, some unique to the Muslim world and some
globally pertinent but especially evident in the Muslim world, that could account
for the autocratic nature of many Muslim-majority states. Some of these factors are
economic.
12. Alfred Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,' " Journal of Democracy 11 (2000):
37-56.
13. Stepan defines this dynamic between religion and the state as the following: "Democratic
institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies.
Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate
public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time, individuals and religious
communities, consistent with our institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to
worship privately." See Stepan, "Twin Tolerations," 39.
14. Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, "Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: Clashing
Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?," American Sociological Review 72 (2007): 633-58.
15. See Stepan, "Twin Tolerations," 39.
16. See U.S. Department of State, Report on International Religious Freedom, 2009.

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Economic Development
Economic development is among the most robust institutional predictor

of democracy. According to one school of thought, economic development
produces a set of societal changes that bring about democratization.17 These
include the creation of a financially and politically independent middle clas
and a private sector that can pressure autocratic regimes. A middle class
moreover, renders a more even distribution of resources throughout society,
which in turn enables a larger portion of the citizenry to participate in politics.18
Economic development also expands the availability of formal education
which is linked to human empowerment, literacy, and the increased consump
tion of scientific information. These mechanisms allow individuals to think
more deeply about politics and to make decisions on the basis of analysis
(rather than blindly accepting the ideas promulgated by those in positions of
power). This in turn nurtures desires for self-government and makes mobiliza
tion against autocracy feasible.
A second school of thought is more cautious about the democratic conse
quences of economic development and contends that wealthy states that are
already democracies are likely to remain democracies. However, wealth alone
does not necessarily cause states that previously were not democracies to become
more democratic.19
Drawing on the views of the first school of thought, one would expect that:
H2: Muslim-majority states with higher levels of economic development are more
likely to be democratic.
Oil Dependency
One variation on the conventional economic-development argument involves

oil. Some scholars contend that states that depend heavily on revenues from oil
17. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1960); Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in
Reexamining Democracy, ed. Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), 93-139;
Ronald lnglehart, "Culture and Democracy" in Culture Matters, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P.
Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 80-97; lnglehart and Welzel, Modernization.
18. Larry Diamond, "Universal Democracy?: The Prospect Has Never Looked Better," Policy Reuiew
119 (2003); Mehran Kamrava, "Development and Democracy: The Muslim World in a Comparative
Perspective," in Modernization, Democracy, and Islam, ed. Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (Westport:
Praeger Publishers, 2005), 52-64.
19. Adam Przeworksi and Fernando Papaterra Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World
Politics 49 (1997): 155-83.

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and other natural resources are likely to be autocratic.20 Michael Ross, for
example, explicates three mechanisms by which natural-resource wealth sustains
autocracies.21 First, oil wealth allows autocratic governments to impose low taxes
while maintaining high levels of spending, which in turn diminishes the public's
demand for democracy22 Second, oil revenues allow regimes to spend lavishly on
internal security and use armed forces to suppress demands for democracy. Third,
although oil in one sense contributes to a nation's wealth, it also inhibits
industrialization and thereby the sorts of social changes—for example, the
development of a middle class and expansion of public education—that make
democratization more likely.23
However, more recently, a number of scholars have questioned the persuasive
ness of the oil-autocracy link. Thad Dunning, for example, argues that oil extraction
and production have both autocratic and democratic effects, which are contingent
on the level of income inequality in the remaining non-natural resource sector
of the national economy and on the degree of natural-resource dependency. Oil
can contribute to democratization in states with high levels of income inequality
and low natural-resource dependence.24 Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo
likewise argue that the apparent correlation between oil and autocracy disappears
after country specific conditions are controlled for.25 Jorgen Anderson and
Michael Ross, however, disagree with Haber and Menaldo. Anderson and Ross
contend that the autocratic effects of oil are evident once a longer time perspective
is adopted and if one focuses on events after 1979, when many states began to
nationalize their oil industries.26
20. Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory and Society
11 (1982): 265-83; Hazem Beblawi and Giacoma Luciani, "Introduction" in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem
Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987) 1-21; Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Depoliticisation
of a Rentier State: The Case of Pahlavi Iran," in The Rentier State, ed. Beblawi and Luciani, 211-27; Jill
Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); Kiren Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State,"
Comparative Politics 27 (1994): 1-25; Terty Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy;" Eva Bellin, "The
Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,"
Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 139-57; Benjamin Smith, "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the
Developing World, 1960-1999," American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 232-46.
21. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy."
22. Ibid, 332.
23. Ibid, 336-37.
24. Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
25. Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal
of the Resource Curse," American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 1-26.
26. Jorgen J. Anderson and Michael Ross, "Making the Resource Curse Disappear: A Re-Examination
of Haber and Menaldo's 'Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism,' " Unpublished Manuscript (2011),
at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Making%20the%20Resource%20Curse%20Disappear%
20-%20Andersen%20&%20Ross%20final.pdf, accessed June 30,2012.

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Even though there is an ongoing scholarly debate on the link between oil and
autocracy, let us assume in this study that the causal link is plausible. Then, one
would expect that:
H3: Muslim-majority states with oil dependent economies are more likely to be
autocratic.
Communist Legacy
According to some scholars, communist-party states leave anti-democratic legacies

that impede later transitions to democracy. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan point out
that among the obstacles is a weak civil society.27 During communist rule, all
organizations, unions, collectives, and associations are extensions of the state
rather than parts of a politically autonomous civil society. State subsidies deter
organizations from disconnecting themselves from the state because doing so
would entail forfeiting monetary benefits. Meanwhile, the severe repression of
religious organizations reduces their capacity to mobilize interests and foster
democratic norms.28 Linz and Stepan also note that unlike in the authoritarian
states of south Europe and Latin America, where political parties developed
underground, there was no comparable development of clandestine political
parties in post-communist states because of the aversion to the principle of the
party state.29 This problem is currently evident in Afghanistan, where suspicions
about political parties seem to have originated from the country's experience with
communism in the 1980s.30
Finally, several scholars have contended that the communist regimes' dismis
sive attitude toward rule of law (and constitutionalism more generally) tends to
persist.31 This is problematic because without the rule of law, regimes in power are
less likely to accept the people's right to sovereignty.32 Meanwhile, sham elections
will provide autocrats with a façade of legitimacy.33 Manipulated and irregular
27. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
28. Ibid., 245-46.
29. Ibid., 247.
30. Andrew Reynolds, Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 168.
31. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 248-49; Thomas Henry Rigby, "A Conceptual
Approach to Authority, Power, and Policy in the USSR" in Authority, Power, and Policy in the USSR, ed.
Thomas Henty Rigby, Leonard Schapiro, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980), 12.
32. Thomas Carothers, "The Rule of Law Revival," Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 95-106.
33. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 22-43; Fareed Zakaria,
The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
2003).

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elections serve the needs of those in power, instead of being methods to hold
rulers accountable.34
Despite this legacy, some post-communist states have democratized, including
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.35 Scholars have attributed these successes in democratization to such
factors as proximity to the West,36 rulers' desires to join the European Union,37 new
constitutional designs that emphasize a strong legislature rather than a strong
executive office,38 and experiences with rule of law and a functioning civil society
prior to the communist era.39 Such conditions have been largely absent in the
former communist-party states of Central Asia and the Southern Balkans. As a
result, transitions to democracy did not occur (e.g., in Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan).
Given the anti-democratic features of the communist legacy and that the
post-communist states of the Muslim world by and large do not possess the
factors that arguably mitigate the anti-democratic inheritance, one would expect
that:
H4: Former communist states are more likely to be autocratic.
Middle Eastern and North African States
Some scholars contend that countries in the MENA40 region share features that
make it especially difficult to remove entrenched autocratic regimes. This
34. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International
Security 20 (1995): 5-38; Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies
Go to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 273; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Why the Rule of Law Matters," Journal
of Democracy 15 (2004): 32^16; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy."
35. David R. Cameron, "Post-Communist Democracy: The Impact of the European Union," Post-Soviet
Affairs 23 (2007): 185-217; Steven Fish, "The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion," in Postcommunism and the
Theory of Democracy, ed. Richard D. Anderson Jr., M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Flanson, and Philip G.
Roeder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
36. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the
Postcommunist World," World Politics 53 (2000): 1-37.
37. Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Cameron, "Post-Communist Democracy."
38. M. Steven Fish, "The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion;" M. Steven Fish, "Stronger Legislatures,
Stronger Democracies," Journal of Democracy 17 (2006): 5-20.
39. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka, Post-Communist
Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); Herert Kitschelt, "Accounting for Outcomes of Post-Communist Regime Change: Causal
Depth or Shallowness in Rival Explanations," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1-5, 1999.
40. The Middle Eastern and North African states refer to the seventeen states located in the Middle East
and North Africa. It excludes the Palestinian territories, Djibouti, Comoros, Mauritania, Somalia, and
Sudan. I also have not included Turkey, which is excluded from both the World Bank and Freedom House
definitions of the region.

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argument is corroborated by prior research that finds that Arab Muslim-majorit

states, as opposed to non-Arab Muslim majority states, are "electoral under
achieves" given their level of economic development.41 Four conditions allegedl
make democratic change especially challenging.
The fist are the states' remarkably powerful coercive apparatuses, which are
used to repress movements for political reform.42 According to Eva Bellin, th
MENA states are especially effective in suppressing demands for democratization
because of their extensive coercive apparatuses funded partly through Western aid
(due to the West's strategic interest in oil and security in restraining the Islamis
threat).43 The security forces are fiercely loyal to their regimes because of
patrimonial hiring and appointment of military elites and personnel, so that clos
relatives and friends of the regime permeate the officer ranks.44 The governmen
reinforces kinship loyalty by showering security forces, especially the military, with
wealth and other institutional benefits so that officers see their own career
development and economic well-being as dependent on the longevity to the

existing political order.
A second condition that allegedly fosters autocracy in the MENA region is a
weak civil society. Indeed, some scholars argue that the creation of a vibrant civil
society is necessary for the emergence of democracy in the Middle East.45 This
claim is at least partially based on the past experiences of Latin America and
Eastern Europe, where the development of a civil society empowered everyday
people, fostered democratic norms, and created an environment in which social
movements could develop and demand socio-political reform. In contrast, civil
society associations in the Middle East are underdeveloped and lack sufficient
resources to prompt political change.46 Social organizations, instead, serve as an
additional arm of the state.47 States closely regulate and monitor social groups,
making democratization from below both risky and costly.48 Recent research
indicates that civic organizations and associations also buttress the existing regime
by providing clientelist networks that sustain the regime.49 Now and then, Middle
41. Alfred Stepan and Graeme Β. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More Than a 'Muslim' Electoral Gap," Journal
of Democracy 14 (2003): 30-44, at 33.
42. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritariansim."
43. Ibid., 143-44, 14349.
44. Ibid, 149.
45. Augustus Richard Norton, "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East," Middle East Journal
47 (1993): 205-16.
46. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism."
47. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," Comparative Politics
32 (2000): 43-61; Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," Journal of Democracy 13 (2002):
56-67.
48. Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control," 43.
49. Amaney Jamal, Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

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East regimes may strategically allow social groups to act independently; however,
if government leaders sense a challenge, they proceed to repeal those social
organizational freedoms, as was the case in Syria after the 2000-2001 Damascus
Spring.50
Related to an extensive security apparatus and a weak civil society is the explicit
restriction by the government of "coordination goods," such as free media, the legal
right to organize and peacefully protest, and higher education opportunities, which
are essential for political and social mobilization.51 Without free media and the right
to peacefully demonstrate, the costs of demonstrating rise, and the possibility of
exacting change through demonstrations decreases. The initial crackdowns in
Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring, as well as the ongoing attacks on anti
government forces in Syria, exhibit the use of this strategy in the region.
The fourth condition that allegedly fosters autocracy in the MENA region is the
patriarchical kinship structure that predates Islam and that is used by autocratic
political elites in a variety of ways to sustain and legitimize their power.52 Public
offices are filled by relatives of existing political elites, and state resources are
dispensed in accordance with kinship ties rather than neutral criteria.53 In
addition, to appease already mobilized, opposition factions, such as the Islamists
and Tribalists, the state perpetuates patriarchal traditions that often suppress the
rights of women.54
Together, these four conditions within the MENA region could explain the
inverse relationship between Muslim-majority states and democracy. One therefore
would expect that:
H5: MENA states are more likely to be autocratic.
Methodology
To assess the influence of state-institutionalized Islam along with the effects of the
other hypothesized determinants on regime type in the Muslim world, I have
50. Joshua Landis and Joe Pace, "The Syrian Opposition," The Washington Quarterly 30 (2007): 45-68;
Reynolds, Designing Democracy, 176.
51. de Mesquita and Downs, "Development and Democracy."
52. Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998); Haya Al-Mughni and Maty Ann Tétreault, "Citizenship, Gender and the Politics of
Quasi States," in Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2000), 237-60; Soraya Altorki, "The Concept and Practice of Citizenship in Saudi Arabia," in Gender
and Citizenship in the Middle East, ed. Joseph, 215-36; Valentine M. Moghadam, "Engendering Citizenship,
Feminizing Civil Society: The Case of the Middle East and North Africa," Women and Politics 25 (2003):
63-87.
53. Suad Joseph, "Civic Myths, Citizenship, and Gender in Lebanon," in Gender and Citizenship in the
Middle East, ed. Joseph, 107-136.
54. Al-Mughni and Tétreault, "Citizenship, Gender, and the Politics of Quasi States," 238-39.

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
employed a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model to test various

hypotheses seeking to explain the Muslim world's limited experience with
democracy. The model can be thought of as working at two levels simultaneously
to generate results. First, it estimates changes in regime type within states, using
generalized least-squares estimation. At the same time, the model estimates
changes in regime type between states, using restricted maximum-likelihood
estimation. The composite model thus estimates population-level effects of the
independent variables on regime type as well as a random intercept for each state,
which captures a state's unique regime trajectory that is not captured by the
independent variables. The model thereby distinguishes between the effect of the
independent variables in the model and the effect of omitted explanatory variables
that affect the regime trajectories of different states.
To use this method, there must be statistically significant within-state variation
of regime type and between-state variation of regime type. A likelihood-ratio test
was performed to make sure that the two variance components are significantly
different from zero. The tests revealed significant variation in both components.
Thus, although Muslim-majority states on the whole have resisted democratization
compared to other parts of the world, there is nonetheless sufficient variation
between these states and over time (see Table 1 for a categorization of Muslim
majority states by region).
To measure a state's Regime Type, which is the dependent variable, I used Polity
IV's twenty-one point measure for regime authority, with a -10 indicating a fully
institutionalized autocracy and a 10 indicating a fully institutionalized democ
racy.55 1 used three independent variables to measure the three forms of state
institutionalized Islam. The variable, Islamic Laws and Policies measures the extent
to which a state incorporates Islamic tenets into state policies and laws by counting
the total number of state laws and policies which are based on religious law.56 This
variable ranges from zero to thirty-two and is measured yearly.571 used this variable
to test the claim that the incorporation of Shari'a law in the state may inhibit
democratization. The second independent variable, Religious Courts,58 measures
the state's establishment of religious courts in its judicial system to exercise
jurisdiction over religious law. It captures the extent to which the state enforces
Islamic law and also permits an evaluation of the potential tension between
55. See Gurr, Jaggers, and Marshall "Polity IV Project."

56. I used The Religion and State Project's composite variable for "Specific Types of Religious
Legislation." See Jonathan Fox, "The Religion and State Project," version RAS_vl.2.2, http://www.
religionandstate.org, accessed October 2010.
57. Although about half of the states in the sample do not have within-state variation of religious law
over time, a likelihood-ratio test was performed to see if the within-state variation over time was statistically
significant from 0. The test's results indicate that the use of longitudinal analysis is still appropriate.
58. I used The Religion and State Project's dummy variable for the "presence of religious courts which
have jurisdiction over some matters of law." See Fox, "The Religion and State Project."

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
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54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
religious courts and democratic tenets, including the imposition of Islamic tenets
upon non-Muslims. The third independent variable, State Religion,59 measures the
state's establishment of Islam as the official state religion, which as mentioned
earlier can violate the liberal principle of "twin tolerations."
Besides the religious independent variables, the model considers a set of non
religious variables. The first, log GDP per capita, measures a state's level of
economic development.60 The second, log Oil Rents per capita, permits testing of
the hypothesis that oil fosters autocracy.61 Two dummy variables representing
regional and heritage claims are included in the model. MENA indicates a Middle
Eastern or North African state, and Communist indicates a state with a communist
legacy. Finally, the model estimates a coefficient for the effect of time on regime
type. This is indicated by Year.
Because of a relatively strong correlation among the three measures of state
institutionalized Islam, three separate models were run for each of the three
measures. All other independent variables, dealing with non-religious factors, are
included in every model because the various tests for potential multicollinearity
did not indicate a problem.
Results and Discussion
The results of the multilevel mixed-effects linear regression (see Table 2) con
sistently show that state-institutionalized Islam does not impact a state's propensity
for becoming more democratic.
The coefficient for State Religion not only is statistically insignificant, but has an
estimated effect of zero. In other words, states that establish Islam as the official,
state religion are not less democratic than those that do not.
The results of the models likewise show that the presence of Islamic Laws and
Policies likewise does not affect a state's propensity to democratize. Although the
coefficient is negative, it has no statistical or substantive effect. This statistical
finding is confirmed anecdotally because almost all of the Muslim majority states
provide both women and religious minorities the right to vote, and most states also
allow them to run for public office (Saudi Arabia being the major exception). Even
though some Islamic laws appear to discriminate against women and minorities,
they apparently do not deter political participation by these groups and, therefore,
do not affect the state's overall democratic trajectory.
59. I used The Religion and State Project's variable for whether a state has an established religion. See
Fox, "The Religion and State Project."
60. 1 use the World' Bank's measure for "GDP per capita (current U.S.$)." See World Bank, "World
Development Indicators," http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed October 2010.
61. The measure for "oil rents per capita" was provided by Michael L. Ross. See Michael L. Ross, "Oil,
Islam, and Women," American Political Science Review 102 (2008): 107-23.

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
Table 2
Regime Type as a Function of State Institutionalized Islam
and Other Determinants, 1990-2002
Dependent Variable is Polity IV Regime Authority Score, 21 Point Scale
1 2 3
GDP
GDP 0.365
per capita (log) 0.365
per capita (log) 0.362
0.362 0.200
0.200
(0.422) (0.421)
(0.422) (0.421) (0.424)
(0.424)
Oil
Oil rents
rents per
per capita -0.343*
(log) capita (log) -0.343* -0.324* -0.308*
-0.324* -0.308*
(0.151) (0.152)
(0.151) (0.152) (0.154)
(0.154)
MENA
MENA -7.307*** -6.732***
-7.307*** -6.882***
-6.732*** -6.882***
(1.517) (1.485)
(1.517) (1.485) (1.391)
(1.391)
Communist
Communist -5.962*** -6.967***
-5.962*** -6.967***
-6.961***
-6.961***
(1.828) (1.931)
(1.828) (1.931) (1.892)
(1.892)
Year
Year 0.100** 0.107**
0.100** 0.110***
0.107** 0.110***
(0.033) (0.034)
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
(0.033)
State
State religion 0.004
religion 0.004 — —
(1.420)
Islamic
Islamic laws andlaws -0.109
policies and policies — -0.109
— —
(0.106)
Religious
Religious courts -1.607
courts — — -1.607 — —
(1.407)
Adjusted
Adjusted R1 for
R1 for random random
effects effects
0.546 0.5460.557
0.557 0.559
0.559
(independent
(independent variables
variables
only) only)
Adjusted
Adjusted fi? for Z?2 for
full model full
(including model (including
0.820 0.820 0.820
0.820 0.818 0.818
country-specific
country-specific effects)
effects)
Observations
Observations 393
393 393
393 395
395
Log
Log restricted
restricted -938.043 -940.104
likelihood likelihood -938.043 -943.193
-940.104 -943.193
* significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, and *** significant at the 0.001 level,
respectively.
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are not generated for multilevel mixed effects' models because
standardization cannot occur both between and within groups.
Source: See text for derivation of variables and methods used.
Finally, the results of the models show that the presence (or absence) of religious
courts is largely inconsequential for regime type. This classification of citizens by
religion, while seemingly in violation of a normative principle of equality, does not
appear to affect democratic institutions in a state or political participation.62
62. To ensure that there is no interaction between Islamic laws and courts, a separate model was ru
that included an interaction term. However, along with no significant main effects of the two variab
there was also no interaction effect.

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
The absence of an effect of all three measures of state-institutionalized Islam on

regime type suggests that the incorporation of Islam into the state's political and
legal structure does not significantly influence a state's political trajectory.63
Although political disagreements may arise from the inclusion of Islam in the
public sphere, they seem not to have adverse consequences for the development
of electoral democracy and rights of political participation. These results refute the
popular belief that Islamic tradition must "modernize" (by experiencing a
reformation akin to that of Christianity) before any meaningful democratic reform
can take place in predominantly Muslim societies.64
While state-incorporation of Islam does not determine how likely a Muslim
majority state is to democratize, oil, the MENA region, and a communist legacy are
statistically strong predictors. The results of the models show a statistically
significant negative effect of oil rents on the subset of Muslim-majority states. This
has considerable implications for the future of democratization in the Muslim
world, because many of the natural-resource rich countries have Muslim-majority
populations. Ross, for example, finds that the variables measuring oil dependency
and Muslim states have a relatively high correlation of 0.44.65
Although a state's dependency on external oil rents seems to be a significant
impediment to democratization, its overall economic development does not seem
to be linked to regime type in Muslim-majority states. Although the sign is in the
expected direction, the coefficient is not statistically significant. This points to an
empirical shortcoming of the economic-development thesis and accords with
previous research on Muslim-majority states, which has revealed that many non
Arab Muslim-majority states have a much higher level of electoral democracy than
would be expected given their low level of economic development.66
Regional factors seem to explain the political landscape of the Muslim world
better than do levels of economic development. Muslim-majority states located
in the MENA region are more likely to be autocratic than are similar states
outside the region. A MENA state, on average, is anywhere from six to seven
points less democratic than the non-ΜΕΝΑ Muslim-majority state. The effect of
belonging to the MENA region alone can transform a state that would otherwise
have been defined as an "incoherent democracy," according to Polity IV criteria,
into a "coherent autocracy."67 The statistics suggest why some of the Muslim
63. I also combine the three indicators of state institutionalized islam into a single index and test them
in a fourth model with the other control variables. The results are robust. The coefficient for the index
variable is both statistically and substantively insignificant.
64. Abdou Filali-Ansaty, "Muslims and Democracy," Journal of Democracy 10 (1999): 18-31; Lewis,
"Islam and Liberal Democracy."
65. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" 339.
66. Stepan and Robertson, "An 'Arab' More than a 'Muslim' Gap."
67. Gurr and Jaggers categorize the regime authority spectrum into four groups. States with scores of
7 to 10 are defined as "coherent democracies." States with scores of 6 to 1 are defined as "incoherent

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
majority states in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have had better experiences wi
sustaining democratic reforms compared to their counterparts in the MENA
Combined with oil dependency, regionalism provides an explanation for th
disparity in levels of sustained reform between MENA and non-ΜΕΝΑ Musli
majority states.
In addition, Muslim-majority states with a communist legacy, which are mostl
located in Central Asia and the Balkan Peninsula, are also linked to higher levels o
autocracy. Once we control for the impact of other factors in the three models
post-communist states are anywhere from approximately six to seven points les
democratic than are their non-communist counterparts.
Finally, time seems to have a gradual, positive effect on democratization. The
results (again, based on limited data, from 1990 to 2002) suggest that some of th
negative effects on democratization of the regional, heritage, and economi
variables slowly deteriorate over time. We would expect, if all other factors rema
at the same average and mode levels, an increase in the likelihood of democratiz
tion of about one point per decade. While this is hardly evidence of an immedia
reversal in the prospects for democratization in Muslim-majority states, tim
nonetheless seems to be counteracting the perpetuation of autocracy.
To examine the robustness of the above findings, 1 tested three alternativ
model specifications that included variables for a monarchic regime, Britis
colonization, and French colonization. These variables proved not to be signif
cant: the results of the original models did not substantively change with th
inclusion of these additional variables.
Causal Mechanisms
The results of the linear mixed-effects regression models suggest that aside from oil
dependency, belonging to the MENA region, and having a communist heritag
increase the likelihood of autocracy. To better understand the mechanisms
causing the correlation, I have used structural-equation modeling (SEM) to tes
some hypothesized causal mechanisms. SEM can be used to obtain at least a
rudimentary understanding of causality because it permits the modeling of caus
mechanisms as mediating factors between the independent and dependent
variable. SEM not only estimates a direct effect between the independent and
dependent variable, but it also estimates an indirect effect between the indepe
dent and dependent variable by estimating the mediating effect of the hypoth
sized causal mechanism.
democracies." States with scores of 0 to -6 are defined as "incoherent autocracies." States with scores of
-7 to -10 are defined as "coherent autocracies." See Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's
Third Wave with the Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995): 469-82.

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An earlier section of this article ("Middle Eastern and North African States")
hypothesized that four conditions may account for the persistence of autocracy in
the MENA region: (1) the strength of the state's coercive apparatus, (2) a weak civil
society, (3) the absence of key coordination goods, and (4) a patriarchal kinship
structure.68 The section then summarized various mechanisms by which each
condition might promote autocracy.
In this section, I use the following four variables to measure the impact of each
condition. Coercive Apparatus (or state military expenditures as percentage of
GDP) reflects the proportion of state funds used to build a coercive security
apparatus.69 Civil Society measures the degree to which a state allows citizens to
freely form and participate in non-state associations and organizations. Measured
on a scale of zero to two, a zero represents severe government restrictions on the
freedom to associate, and to form and participate in non-state organizations, and a
two represents no government restrictions.70 Coordination Goods captures the
degree to which the state engages in censorship and restricts freedoms of press,
media, speech, and expression. Measured on a scale of zero to two, zero indicate
severe restrictions and two indicates no restrictions.71 Finally, Patriarchal Kinship
Structure measures the degree to which a state incorporates family laws based on
Shari'a. These laws largely privilege men and are considered a key part of the
patriarchal kinship structure because they represent a state's legalization of
patriarchal norms.72 The variable is measured on a scale of one to three. A one
represents no incorporation of Shari'a family law, and a three represents full
incorporation of Shari'a family law.73 (To guard against tautology, the variable
68. Another possible causal factor could be the interpretation of religion particular to MENA region.
Some scholars have argued that the Arab interpretation of Islam is more rigid and, therefore, less
conducive to democratization than are the more flexible interpretations found in regions where Islam was
later adopted. Although this argument has an intuitive appeal, the empirical evidence does not support it.
Variables for proximity to Mecca and an interaction term of Islamic Laws and Policies and MENA were
included in alternative models, and no significant relationship was found.
69. I used the World Bank's variable "military expenditure (% of GDP)," which is derived from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See World Bank, "World Development Indicators."
70. 1 used the variable " 'ASSN' Freedom of Assembly and Association" from the Cingranelli-Richards
(CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. See David Cingranelli and David Richards, "Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)
Human Rights Data Project," Dataset version 2010.08.15, http://www.humanrightsdata.org, accessed
October 2010.
71. I used the variable " 'SPEECH' Freedom of Speech" from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Dataset. See Cingranelli and Richards, "Human Rights."
72. Mounira Charrad, "Becoming a Citizen: Lineage Versus Individual in Tunisia and Morocco," in
Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, ed. Joseph, 70-87; Suad Joseph, "Civil Myths, Citizenship, and
Gender in Lebanon," Moghadam, "Women's Economic Participation."
73. I constructed this variable by individually coding each Muslim majority state's family code.
1 examined two issue areas to measure the degree to which a state integrates Shari'a into family law:
divorce and custody law. Each state receives a score of one, two, or three for each issue area. The two
scores are then indexed into a single continuous variable, measuring the degree of incorporation of Shari'a
family law in the state's legal code.

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
Figure 1
Path Analyses Testing Causal Conditions Linking the MENA Region to Autocracy
Coercive
Apparatus
Civil
Society
MENA
Coordination
Goods
Patriarchical
Kinship
Structure
Source: See text for derivation of variables and method used.

Note: p<0.05*, p<0.01 **, andp<0.001 *** standardized coefficients reported.
used to operationalize these causal conditions do not conceptually overlap with

Polity IV's measure of regime type.)
To estimate how much of MENA's negative effect on Regime Type is produced
by each of the hypothesized causal conditions, 1 have run a series of regression
models. The first model estimates the direct effect of MENA on Regime Type,
without the mediating effect of any of the causal conditions. The next four
models estimate a direct effect between MENA and Regime Type, while simul
taneously estimating an effect between MENA and one of the four hypothesized
causal conditions, and an effect between that hypothesized causal condition
and Regime Type.
If the causal condition is in fact accounting for part of the negative correlation
between MENA and Regime Type, then three criteria must be met. First, the effect of
MENA on the condition must be statistically significant. Second, the effect of the
condition on Regime Type must be statistically significant. Third, the direct effect
between MENA and Regime Type must decrease once the condition is introduced
as a mediating factor in the model.
Figure 1 presents the results of all five models. The first coefficient represents the
direct effect of MENA without the inclusion of any of the causal conditions. The
next four coefficients represent the direct effect as Coercive Apparatus, Civil Society,

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
Coordination Goods, and Patriarchical Kinship Structure are, respectively, intr

duced. Without accounting for any of the causal conditions, the direct effect of
MENA on Regime Type is -0.505.
The results of the model suggest that the coercive apparatus does not
consistently sustain autocracy in the MENA region, because only one of the three
requirements for causation is met. The significant effect of MENA on Coerciv
Apparatus (standardized coefficient of 0.359) suggests that a state belonging to the
MENA region will, on average, have a larger coercive apparatus than a non-MENA
Muslim state. However, the models results also indicate that strong internal security is
not significantly associated with democratization, as suggested by the insignifican
effect of Coercive Apparatus on Regime Type. Furthermore, the direct effect of MENA
on Regime Type changes only nominally (from -0.505 to -0.492).
While this statistical finding is contrary to what was expected, it is substantiated
by the recent events in Tunisia and Egypt. In both states, the predominant
branches of the coercive security apparatus did not crack down on the protestors
suggesting that in particular contexts, the ties of the coercive apparatus to th
ruling elites and/or the broader political system are not strong enough to guarante
the protection of the ruling elites. The Tunisian military did not have deep interests
in maintaining the existing political system because the military neither benefitte
economically from the Ben Ali regime nor had any personal ties to it. In the case o
Egypt, the rationale behind the military's decision not to crack down on protester
was probably quite different. Since the 1952 Free Officers Coup, the Egyptian
military had strong ties to the entrenched regime. Because of its invested interest in
maintaining the regime, the military opposed Mobarak (and not the protesters)
whose behavior was becoming a liability for the regime.
The other three causal conditions—involving civil society, coordination goods,
and kinship structures—explain, at least partially, some of the linkage between
MENA states and autocracy, because all three of the requirements suggesting
causation are met. Together, the three conditions account for about 55 percent of
the negative correlation between MENA states and democratization and jointly
provide insight as to why MENA states have had a more difficult time with
democracy compared to other Muslim-majority states.
The significant effect of MENA on Civil Society indicates that MENA states have
underdeveloped and repressed civil societies compared to non-ΜΕΝΑ Muslim
states. Civil Society, moreover, is positively linked to democratization, as indicated
by the significant and positive effect of 0.351. Once Civil Society is included as a
mediating factor, the direct effect of MENA changes from -0.505 to -0.391 (a drop
of about 23 percent).
Similarly, the significant negative effect of MENA on Coordination Goods
indicates greater government censorship of the media and the press in MENA
states than in non-ΜΕΝΑ Muslim states. Coordination Goods is positively linked t

54.151.172.125 on Mon, 12 Jul 2021 11:57:50 UTC
Table 3
MENA States: Relative Propensity Toward Democratic Reform Based on Random and
Country-Specific Effects (Fixed Effects)
High Medium Low
Egypt Algeria Bahrain

Jordan Iran Iraq
Tunisia Libya Kuwait
Yemen Morocco Oman
Syria Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Regime Type, indicating that free media is an important factor promoting

democracy. The direct effect of MENA on Regime Type drops about 16 percent
once this causal factor is included; therefore, we can infer that the restriction of
coordination goods by existing regimes is having at least some of its intended effect
of stifling efforts of opposition movements.
Finally, the patriarchical foundations of Arab society also seem to explain some
of the negative correlation, but only to a modest degree. The change in the direct
effect of MENA on Regime Type is only 6 percent, which suggests that while
autocratic rulers may use patriarchal traditions as a ploy to co-opt opposition
groups such as Islamists or Tribalists, the contribution of these traditions to the
perpetuation of an autocratic regime is not as great as the contribution of
restrictions on coordination goods or of a weak civil society.74
The results of the tests support what many area-study scholars have concluded
with other types of evidence. Students of the Middle East have repeatedly argued
that private media organizations, oppositions groups, and the private sector in
general are incapacitated because of censorship, state regulations and patronage,
and restrictions on association. Moreover, co-optation of key sectors of society has
been institutionalized through patriarchal kinship structures that dispense jobs,
funds, and welfare.75
74. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) for the model, with the three causal conditions, is 0.901. The CFI
is a good indicator of model fit because it performs well for relatively smaller sample sizes as well. The CFI
ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with greater values closer to 1, indicating a better fit.
75. Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991); Jason Brownlee,
"The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt," Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 6-14; Jillian Schwedler,
"Yemen's Aborted Opening," Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 48-55; Mohamed Talbi, "A Record of
Failure," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Larry Diamond, Mark F. Plattner, and Daniel
Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Laith Kubba, "The Awakening of Civil
Society," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East.

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Nonetheless, some states in the Middle East are more likely to become
democratic than others. Using models to predict exact transitions to democracy is
presumptuous, but models can support more general probabilistic claims. On the
basis of the predictions of the linear mixed-effects model, including the estimated
countiy-specific effects, I have clustered MENA states76 by their relative likelihood
of becoming more democratic. The groupings are presented in Table 3, under the
categories of high, medium, and low propensity.
The states in the "high propensity" category are Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and
Yemen. In all of these states, oil is scarce. This restricts the governments' ability
both to appease demands for democracy through high welfare spending, and to
cap economic grievances that may trigger dissent. In addition, these four states
(along with Lebanon) are the only countries in the MENA region whose civil
societies are somewhat open, as measured by the degree of freedom to associate
and assemble.77 While three of these four states experienced a rise in protests
during the Arab Spring, Jordan did not to the same degree. Thus while it may seem
surprising that Jordan is clustered with these other states, some might argue that
King Abdullah has attempted to implement political reforms that would increase
electoral openness and accountability, freedoms of the press, and rights for
women. These reform initiatives were blocked by entrenched political elites, many
of whom sit in the National Assembly.78 Perhaps over time, the widespread and
growing economic grievances in Jordan will reinvigorate reform efforts. (In
addition, the fact that the king's reform initiatives have been thwarted by the ruling
elites that make up much of the National Assembly suggests some diffusion of
power, however warped and limited.)
According to the predictions based on the model, most of the MENA states with
a medium propensity toward democratic reform currently receive lower oil rents
than do those states that make up most of the low-propensity group. The medium
propensity group includes Libya, Syria, and Iran. PrcKiemocracy movements face
far more repression in these states than they do in higher-propensity states.
This study has also identified the legacy of communist rule as a potentially
important factor influencing the development of democracy. As mentioned earlier,
communism can perpetuate autocracy by inhibiting the development of civil
society or by undermining rule of law.79 To confirm the importance of these
factors, I employ path analysis using previous indicators of weakness in civil
76. Due to data constraints, propensity toward reform could not be estimated for Lebanon.
77. See Cingranelli and Richards, "Human Rights."
78. Marwan Muashar, "A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier
System," The Carnegie Papers (May 2011): 1-32.
79. A third hypothesized mechanism is weak political institutions, such as political parties. However,
I did not test this mechanism because it corresponds very closely with the measure of the dependent
variable Regime Type and therefore would be tautological.

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Figure 2
Path Analyses Testing Causal Conditions Linking Post-Communist States to
Autocracy

Note: p<0.05*, p<0.01**, andp<0.001 *** standardized coefficients reported.
society and a new variable, Rule of Law, that measures the degree to which a state
has an independent judiciary on a scale of zero to two. A zero indicates a non
independent judiciary, and a two indicates an independent judiciary.80
Figure 2 displays the results of the three regressions. The hypothesized causal
mechanisms do not account for much of the correlation between communist
legacy and autocracy. Although a strong civil society is associated with a higher
level of democracy, the former communist states do not have significantly weaker
civil-society institutions than do their non-communist counterparts (as indicated by
the insignificant effect of Communist on Civil Society). Similarly, the inclusion of
Civil Society as a mediating factor does not cause a significant drop in the direct
effect of Communist on Regime Type.
The second hypothesized causal mechanism, weak rule of law, is valid. When it is
added as a mediating factor, the direct effect of Communist on Regime Type drops
from -0.161 to -118. This indicates about a 27 percent drop.81 This makes sense
80. i used the variable " 'INJUD' Independence of the Judiciary," from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)
Human Rights Dataset. See Cingranelli and Richards, "Human Rights."
81. The CFI for the model, with the causal mechanisms, is 0.970.

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because if members of a regime have learned to view themselves as above the law
they have less incentive to accept institutional checks on their power. Without an
acceptance of the law's supremacy and institutions that enforce it, the former
communist states will likely make little progress toward practicing open and fair
electoral competition that is "ex ante uncertain, ex post irreversible, and repeatable."82
Weak rule of law continues to impede democratization in the former commu
nist states of the Muslim world because they do not possess the factors, such a
proximity to the West and pre-communist experience with democracy, tha
some of the other post-communist states possess. This is especially true for th
Central Asian states where spatial factors that seem to have facilitated democr
tization in post-communist states abutting Western Europe, such as the diffusion
of nearby democratic ideas and the market incentives to join the European
Union, were absent.83
Islam and the State: Indonesia and Pakistan Compared
According to the results of the regression models, states are more likely to
democratize if they exist outside the MENA region and do not have a communist
legacy. In addition, the political institutionalization of Islam should not affect th
democratization of a regime.
Indonesia and Pakistan illustrate the relevance of these factors. Despite
their very different levels of institutionalized Islam, both countries have experi
enced periods of democratic rule, receiving at least a score of seven on Polity
IV's indicator of regime type. Pakistan ranked as a democracy from 1956 to
1957, 1973 to 1976, and 1988 to 1998. Indonesia ranked as a democracy from
2004 to 2010.
During these years of democratic practice, Pakistan's Constitution and legal

structure retained an Islamist character, while Indonesia's politics were largely
religiously neutral. Shortly after Pakistan obtained its independence, its political
leaders endorsed an "Objectives Resolution," which outlined the broad principles
that would inform the first Constitution. The Objectives Resolution became the
Constitution's preamble. It stated that Muslims would be able to live the public
sphere in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah.84 The 1956 Constitution
described Pakistan as an Islamic Republic and explicitly stated that no law could
violate the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. The 1962 Constitution retained the
Islamic provisions. The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan officially declared Islam the
82. Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworksi, "Classifying
Political Regimes," Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (1996): 3-36.
83. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the
Postcommunist World," World Politics 53 (2000): 1-37.
84. See Pakistan Constitution, Preamble.

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state religion and assigned to the state the responsibility of organizing particular
Muslim duties, such as zakat and auqaf, and of making Islamic education
compulsory.85 Between 1978 and 1985 (under the military dictatorship of Zia
ul-Haqq), Shari'a courts were created, and the country's penal code and economic
policies were amended so as to conform more strictly to classical Shari'a law.
Classical Shari'a was applied to issues of theft, fornication, adultery, and
alcohol through the promulgation of four ordinances: the Offense against
Property, the Offense of Zina, the Offense of Qazf, and the Prohibition
Ordinance. With the issuance of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order of 1984, the
evidentiary laws of classical Shari'a law became applicable for these sets of
crimes.86 After the end of the ul-Haqq military dictatorship, these laws
remained on the books for more than a decade, and only a few of these laws
have been reformed (most notably, the Women's Protection Bill, which was
passed in 2006).
Unlike the Pakistani Constitution, the Indonesian Constitution contains no
explicit reference to Islam and does not declare Islam to be the official state
religion. The Constitution describes belief in One God as one of the seven
principles that form the state's ideology, but the Constitution does not endorse
any particular religion. The major exception to the religiously neutral tone of
Indonesia's legal system involves family law, which addresses questions about
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. These laws are generally derived by the
Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam) in cases involving Muslims.
The jurisdiction of Shari'a courts is limited to these particular issues and to Muslim
parties.87 In addition, Muslims can choose to have their cases adjudicated in
secular district courts and under civil law. A second exception is that banking in
accordance with Shari'a is permitted, alongside interest-based banking.88 The
autonomous province of Aceh which is governed largely by Shari'a, is not subject
to the national legal system.
In short, Islamic institutions are far less incorporated in Indonesian law and
politics than in Pakistan's political order. Yet, despite the far greater degree to
which Islam is institutionalized in Pakistan, both countries have experienced
periods of democratic rule in recent years. They illustrate that democracy is
compatible with strikingly different levels of institutionalized Islam.
85. See Pakistan Constitution. Part II, Chapter. 2, Articles 31 (2)(a), 31(2)(c).
86. See Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. Chapter 2, "Of Witnesses."
87. Siti Musdah Mulia and Mark E. Cammack, "Toward a Just Marriage Law: Empowering Indonesian
Women through a Counter Legal Draft to the Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law," in Islamic Law in
Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions, ed. Michael R. Feener and Mark E. Cammack (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2007), 130-31; Rifyal Ka'bah, "Islamic Law in Court Decisions and Fatwa
Institutions in Indonesia," in Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia, ed. Feener and Cammack, 86.
88. Ka'bah, "Islamic Law," 86.

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Conclusion
Recent cross-national research has established that the Muslim world has lagged
behind the rest of the world in the establishment of democratic regimes. Empirical
evidence shows that states with a majority-Muslim population are, on average,
more autocratic than are non-majority Muslim states. Cross-nationally, this finding
is robust.
However, what causes majority-Muslim states to be more autocratic is less clear.

This paper tests the relevance of different forms of state institutionalized Islam, and
also considers some non-religious factors that specialists on Middle East politics
have been noticing. Finally, the paper discusses variation in propensity for
democracy among states within the MENA region.
Statistical analysis suggests that the incorporation of Islam in the state is not a
major impediment to democratic reform. This is arguably encouraging news
because recent survey data shows that most residents in Muslim societies desire
the incorporation of Islam in governance and want Shari'a to be a source of state
legislation.89 Therefore, it is likely that if and when Muslim-majority states achieve a
democratic transition, a public role for Islam will be retained (as has occurred in
Pakistan).
Several non-religious conditions account for much of the Muslim world's
democratic deficit. They include weak rule of law in post-communist states, oil
dependency, and the absence of "coordination goods,"90 including rights of
assembly and a free press.
A modestly optimistic finding is that the likelihood of democracy gradually
increases over time. Consequently, there seems to be a very slow but overall
positive movement toward democracy in Muslim-majority states. Within the MENA
region, the states with a higher-than-average propensity to achieve democracy are
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen. This is partially due to their lack of oil and to
the relative openness in their civil societies.
Fatima Z. Rahman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at Lake

Forest College. Her research interests include Islam and Politics, Middle East Politics,
and Democratization. Her article, "Gender Equality in Muslim-Majority States and
Shari'a Family Law: Is There a Link?" was published in the Australian Journal of
Political Science. The author may be reached at rahman@lakeforest.edu.
89. Dalia Mogahed, "Islam and Democracy," 2006 Gallup World Poll Special Report: Muslim World
(Princeton, The Gallup Organization): 1-3.
90. De Mesquita and Downs, "Development and Democracy."

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Determinants of Democracy in The Muslim World

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Determinants of Democracy in the Muslim World

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