Women's Rights and Publi Policy in Islam

Women's Rights and Public Policy in Islam: Report of a Conference Author(s): Gordon Means Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian
Survey, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Mar., 1987), pp. 340-354 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644808 . Accessed: 06/02/2013 11:58
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Wed, 6 Feb 2013 11:58:20 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ISLAM

Report of a Conference GordonMeans
Most of the Muslim world has experienced a long period of colonial domination during which nationalist movements were spawned. As states gained their independence, mostly in the post-World War II era, they inherited from colonial regimes legal systems and political institutions that were slightly modified to meet the demands of the early nationalist leaders, who were themselves often the products of the European-style educational system of the colonial era. Upon obtaining independence, most of the new Islamic states suffered from political instability and crises of legitimacy. The combination of westernized nationalist elites, fragile transplanted western institutions, and competitive political mobilization thrust religion into the center of the political arena. Islam represented the "primordial sentiments," the core values and the ideals of the masses, while westernized elites frequently became isolated from mass popular support. Many political elites ultimately turned to Islam as the most effective idiom to attract public support for their faltering regimes. The intense politicization of religion, particularly in Islamic countries, has led to severe disputes over basic principles of political organization, legitimacy, political institutions, and public policies. These conflicts are especially intense in the Muslim world because Islam is based on the ideal of a complete political and social system encompassing all aspects of social, political, economic, and religious life. Because of its claim to be a total system, Islam provides a basis for challenging the edifice of most of the institutions and the public policies of contemporary states within the Islamic world.
Gordon Means is Professor of Political Science, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. ? 1987 by The Regents of the University of California
340
GORDON MEANS
341
Most Muslims assume that there is only one Islam, consisting of one community that follows one set of absolute and universal laws for the governance of that community. In actual practice, Islam has divided into various sects, alternative schools of jurisprudence, and political systems that embrace widely divergent practices and policies. Throughout its history, Islam has made accommodation with diverse cultural traditions, in some cases absorbing pre-Islamic or non-Islamic principles and practices. The ideal of centralization and unity in Islam has been kept, while in practice decentralization and diversity has been the norm. Adjustment and accommodation have been facilitated by the Islamic principle of the unity of mosque and state. The Muslim ruler is enjoined to be the "protector of Islam" and thereby acquires the right to support and control Islamic institutions, and to interpret Islamic law authoritatively to adapt to local circumstances. The ideals of Islamic unity, universality, and centralized authority (under God) contrast with the reality of Islamic disunity, particularistic practices, and the decentralization of authority under diverse political regimes, each of which can and does claim that it speaks for God. Such regimes have one great advantage: they can use the power of the state under Islamic principles to make authoritative declarations (fatwa) interpreting Muslim law and doctrine, and enforce Islamic law and doctrine within their state. This gives the government and incumbent political elites greater power over the institutional structure of Islam, but counterelites also have the capacity to raise issues of orthodoxy and can challenge Muslim incumbents for failing to defend the interests of the Islamic community as defined by orthodox doctrines of Islamic purity. With modern mass communication, incumbent elites may have the powers of state enforcement, but they can no longer monopolize the debate. Much of the religious-ideological debate arises from the international Islamic revival movement that has been gaining momentum and has placed its imprint on politics and public policy. This movement is known under the broad term of dakwah-which translated literally means "call." It refers to the call made to Muslims to return to a "pure" Muslim faith and to strengthen the Islamic community-the ummah-against threats to its Islamic purity from corrupt and infidel sources. The Dakwah movement has two aspects to its demands: first, the reaffirmationof Islamic principles and faith by Muslims, and second, the mobilization of Islam against perceived external threats and challenges. In recent years, Muslim politicians and leaders have learned that, in politics, Islam is a two-edged sword. It can be used to provide mass support and legitimacy among Muslims. It can also be used almost as easily by opposition elites to undermine legitimacy and to facilitate revolutionary
342
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987
movements. This contest between the establishment and the antiestablishment Muslim elites is engaging much of the Muslim world. The debate is conducted in a religious idiom, with the trappings of piety and self-righteous justification. The references are to the Koran, the Sunnah,l and to established Muslim theologians, jurists, and polemicists. The audience is the masses of Muslims, most of whom have an intense affective orientation toward the rituals and symbols of Islam, but who also have difficulty understandingthe complex and esoteric theological and juridical issues raised by the Dakwah Movement. In this circumstance, Islamic states have tended to make concessions to claims of Islamic universalism and orthodoxy, without making too disruptive a break with local cultural practices. Islamic political leaders have had to learn the art of Islamic juridical disputation and the manipulation of Islamic symbolism to retain their legitimacy among the Muslim masses. The parametersof the debate have been narrowed by Islamic political currents that arise from outside any individual Islamic state. Furthermore, leaders are forced to grapple with those very issues raised by Islamic political polemicists who challenge existing public policies and the very legitimacy of contemporary regimes within the Muslim world. Because of the heightened debate over Islam and public policy generated by these Islamic religio-political movements, governments in Muslim countries have had to put more effort into justifying their policies in a Muslim idiom. In the name of Islam, some extremely contentious issues have been raised. For example, the argument has been made that political and civil rights should be granted only to the community of believers-the ummah. Some also argue that parliamentaryinstitutions and elected government are "un-Islamic" since such institutions were not present ill the first Muslim community under Muhammad and since ultimately all laws are derived from God, not man. A listing of the issues raised in the name of Islam would be a formidable task. One of the many important and controversial issues has been the role, status, and rights of women, which is the subject of this article.
The Basis of Conflictover Women's Rights

As in most other aspects of life, the Muslim ideal of unity and uniformity within the ummah confronts the reality of great diversity of practices and norms related to the role and status of contemporary Muslim women. In
1. The Sunnah are reports on the actions of Muhammad that are used as precedents for Muslim law. A Hadith is a single precedent or report.
GORDON MEANS
343
some countries, urbanization and industrial development have drastically changed the roles and economic opportunities for women. The growth of modern educational systems has enabled some women to attain higher degrees and thereby enter highly skilled and technical professions. The pace of social change within the Muslim world has increased the diversity of roles assumed by Muslim women. Despite these trends, some Islamic fundamentalists have argued for the enforcement of very restrictive roles and codes of behavior for women according to their interpretation of Islamic law. The dispute over the role and status of women has simmered for years in most Muslim countries; in Pakistan the issue eventually became entangled with a constitutional crisis in 1983 and 1984.2 Most Muslim states have sought to mute disputes over the status of women, while making certain concessions to the demands for symbolic conformity to Islamic behavioral norms. The key issues of improved status for women and the definition of women's rights, however, have usually been carefully avoided. Some Muslim women have become more vocal in demanding rights, while militant religious polemicists have also been quick to criticize governments for failure to abide by and enforce orthodox Islamic law and moral principles in regard to women. It is against this background that the Malaysian government in 1982 sponsored a pan-Islamic conference on "Muslim Women in Development." The official host of the conference was PERKIM,3 the government-sponsored dakwah organization whose leading patron is Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaysia and the "Father of Malaysia." The remainder of this article reports on this conference, which supposedly was convened to explore public policy issues related to Muslim women in the modern world.
Conference Organization The president of the Women's Committee of PERKIM, Laila Taib, approached King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and received from him a grant of M$500,000 (US$200,000) to hold a pan-Islamic conference on Muslim women. The Malaysian government and other sources granted additional money and support. A large administrative structure was established to
2. See J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women," Asian Survey, 25:8 (August 1985), pp. 863-880. 3. PERKIM is the abbreviation for the Islamic Welfare and Missionary Association of Malaysia. The cosponsor of the conference was the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of South East Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP).
344
organize the conference, with some 13 committees and several hundred people involved in some way with conference planning and arrangements. Invitations were extended to Islamic organizations in some 33 countries to send delegates or observers to the conference, which was scheduled for October 3-9, 1982, in Malaysia. Some 26 countries sent representativesor official observers, while a few additional countries were represented by individual and unofficial participants. All official delegates were women, but more than half of the invited participants who presented papers or reports were men. All delegates and invited participants received full travel costs, food, accommodation, and M$100 per day spending money in addition to receiving gifts of a briefcase, a prayer rug with a built-in compass, and other souvenirs of Malaysia. There were 260 delegates, 16 invited participants who presented papers or addresses, and about 30 invited discussants. There were also about 150 observers, including the press. The rules of the conference gave the chairman extraordinary powers to prevent any contentious political issue from being raised or debated without prior permission. The distribution of publications was similarly controlled. The organizers apparently feared that political disputes in the Muslim world might deflect the delegates from the central purpose of the conference. Various scholars and Muslims in public life were invited to present papers, which were to be followed by open discussion by discussants and by the delegates at large. A panel of "resource persons" sat alongside the head table. Included in this category were several Muslim legal authorities who could be called upon or who could intervene to enunciate Muslim law, doctrine, and theology. The rules of the conference not only gave the organizers full power over the proceedings, but also over the preparationof the conference report and the final conference recommendations. Malaysia's Paramount Ruler (head of state) opened the conference in the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Auditorium on October 3, 1982. The conference proceedings continued for seven days, with the main sessions and the presentation of papers being held at the Haj Complex near Subang Airport, where there are extensive facilities for those Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Each evening a banquet was held, after which some prominent public figure usually addressed the delegates. One evening, the Paramount Ruler hosted a banquet at the royal palace. On the fifth day, the delegates were divided into "workshop sessions" to draft proposals for the final report. The conference drafting committee met separately to discuss issues on the sixth day, and finally the conference closed with a speech and an official closing ceremony by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam. The conference proceedings and recom-
GORDON MEANS
345
mendations4 were supposed to be available within a few weeks, but they actually weren't available to delegates until about five months after the conference convened. Whether this was due to the controversial nature of the conference and its topics can only be a matter of speculation. Participants Most delegates were young women, usually in the 20-35 age bracket. Most were educated, at least through secondary school, and many were either enrolled in or had been to a university. Nearly all had a fair to good command of English, but only a small minority (perhaps less than 15%) had a working knowledge of Arabic. All proceedings were in English, although some prayers, greetings, and Koran readings were in Arabic. None of the delegates wore the chador or purdah (complete veil), less than half wore the tudong (mini-veil) head covering, a third wore a light head scarf, and about one-fifth wore no head covering. All delegates were conservatively dressed with a majority wearing longer skirts or more conservative flowing floor-length skirts. The paper presenters included a number of Malay academics from local universities, some internationally known Muslim professionals, both men and women, and some who appear frequently at international Muslim conferences. The Main Themes Rather than summarize all the papers and the discussion, I will present some overall impressions derived from my attendance at all the working sessions of the conference and two of the four workshop groups. I made tape recordings of many of the discussions as an aid to memory. Overall impressions involve far more than the formal papers and discussions, however, since the numerous breaks permitted individual discussion with many of the delegates on issues raised at the conference or on issues they wished to raise but had not had the opportunity in the formal proceedings. The presentations fall into three general categories: political speeches, technical or comparativestudies, and papers that raised issues of reform or policy within the Muslim community. The Paramount Ruler of Malaysia and Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam gave the main political speeches at the opening and closing ceremonies. The Paramount Ruler congratu4. For the published text, see Muslim Women in Development: Finial Report of the First Regional Conference for South East Asia and Pacific (Subang, Malaysia: Kompleks Jemaah Haji, 1982), pp. 88-94. For the organization and responsibilitiesof various officersand committees, see "Conference Guidelines: Muslim Women in Development' (Kuala Lumpur, 1982, mimeo).
346
lated the conference organizers, and presented a survey of the challenges facing the Muslim world. Stressing the need for economic development and for Muslim unity, he cautioned the delegates against following the lead of the women's liberation movement, which he said is based on individual selfishness and a confrontational style that lead to divisions-men versus women, labor versus management, and class conflict. Instead, he called on women to build Islamic unity and "to be a good neighbor to other communities."'5Departing from his preparedtext, he mentioned the atrocities in Lebanon and also called for the defeat and punishment of ''our enemies." Musa Hitam's closing speech was similar, stressing the importance of women to propagate the teachings of Islam, to instill "Muslim values," and to create solidarity. He asserted that Muslims were "under siege due to disunity of Muslims themselves and the atrocities and barbaric acts of the Israelis."6 It was up to women to instill obedience and loyalty to religion and society among the younger generation. Women had a responsibility to stop the "ugly tendency" among the young to be undisciplined and rebellious. Furthermore, he said, "the Muslim community should not condone the obsession with careers such that it led to the undoing of
homes."7
These political speeches sought to gain credit and legitimacy for government leaders by showing concern for women, but they were careful to define women's roles as being primarily homemakers and as having a primary responsibility for forging Muslim unity. There seemed to be little sympathy or awareness that the increasing role of women in the labor force might create real dilemmas between the demands for rapid economic development and the traditional roles of women confined to home and family. The delegates were polite in response to the political speeches, but almost no discussion followed. Delegates appeared to be more impressed by the elaborate ceremony and the status of the political figures than with the content of their message. About half the papers presented descriptive data comparing Muslim society with non-Muslim society-apparently in an effort to prove that "development" was needed. Frequently, such papers ended with a call for Muslim women to improve the ummah. Comparative studies on health, education, fertility, child care, income, and occupation constituted the bulk of such papers. A few papers described the operation of some new Muslim institution or service, such as preschools, perinatal health care, or
5. Muslim Women in Development:Finial Report. 6. Sunday Times (Malaysia), October 10, 1982, p. 2F. 7. Ibid.
GORDON MEANS
347
an Islamic hospital. These papers were all rather pedantic, and for the most part elicited very little discussion except for the issue of establishing creches and nurseries for the children of working or professional women. This theme generated spirited debate among some women and one or two of the male "resource persons" who opposed nurseries with the argument that women would be encouraged to abandon their duties within the home. Most of the public policy issues were raised and debated as a result of several papers explaining Islamic concepts of family, family laws, and the "Islamic view of women," including the paper and the address by Dr. Nafis Sadik, the assistant executive director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. As a medical doctor and a Muslim professional woman, she not only provided a role model of a modern woman professional, but she could also more than hold her own in any debate and discussion with those who advocated a restrictive and traditional role for Muslim women. Dr. Sadik was supported by Dr. Badria Al Awadi, also a woman, who is dean of the Faculty of Law and Sharia at Kuwait University. On matters of Islamic law and doctrine, those men who claimed to be lama (Muslim theological scholars) found it exceedingly difficult to make authoritative pronouncements when these two Muslim professional women presented alternative Islamic interpretations with such vigor and authority. Dr. Nafis Sadik's first paper reviewed the role and status of Muslim women. Her second presentation was an evening address, hosted by Dr. Siti Hasmah, the wife of Prime Minister Mahathir. In that address she reviewed the role of women internationally, reviewing the objectives and accomplishments of the U.N. Decade for Women, and the progress made around the world in removing aspects of discrimination against women. Her emphasis was clearly on women's issues rather than religious identity. There was nothing anti-religious or anti-Islamic in her statements, and she was prepared to answer her critics, but she tended to take a position congruent with the international women's movement. As a consequence, her talks elicited the most interest from the delegates, and the most interesting and spirited discussion among them. Rather than review the position of various participants, I will now summarize the discussion and positions taken on a number of the key substantive issues raised at the conference. Equality of women. No one disputed that Islam established the principle of equality for women and men. The dispute centered on what equality meant in practice and on the rules and institutions affecting the daily life of Muslim women. The first speech of the conference organizer, Laila Taib,
348
stressed the theme of equality under Islam for both men and women, citing the Koran extensively on this issue. Even the most conservative views expressed at the conference stated that the Koran provided the "first charter of rights" for women. From the discussion, it appeared that most of the delegates considered the principle of equality to be an unfulfilled promise of Islam. The conservatives were willing to concede the principle of "equality before Allah," and acknowledged that traditional women's roles in child rearing and the family should be given improved status to match that equality, but they also cautioned against any appreciable degree of change in the role of women outside the home. The dilemma is that Muslim women are entering the labor force in greater numbers and are contributing in a substantial measure to economic development, but the discussion left in doubt whether these trends were to be encouraged or condemned. These fundamental differences over the meaning of "equality" permeated nearly all the other policy issues raised at the conference. Family planning. Several participants asserted that it was the responsibility of Muslim women "to increase the ummah." At least one male speaker suggested that birth control, especially if it went beyond "spacing" of children for health reasons, was contrary to Islam. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir had announced a target population size for Malaysia of 80 million-five-and-a-half times the current population. Dr. Sadik pointed out that the increase in the ummah under Islam was expected from conversion-not uncontrolled birthrates. She warned that the Muslim community would always be weak and poverty-stricken if it was saddled with overly high birthrates and the burden of a population explosion. Some participants expressed concern over the population growth of non-Muslim communities. Most seemed to favor family "spacing" for health reasons, but were more ambiguous and divided over the issue of whether the rate of Muslim population growth should be slowed by government-sponsored programs of family planning. Marriage obligationsand the patriarchal system. A paper on family law in Islam, prepared by Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman, stimulated a spirited discussion on marriage obligations in Islam. The paper gave a long account of women's obligations and how to choose a wife, but little on the obligations of the husband, and nothing on how to choose a husband. Dr. Badria Al Awadi noted that most laws were written by men, and that most practices in Muslim societies were based on custom-not Islam. Several speakers challenged the notion that women were obligated to be subservient to male patriarchs, especially if they failed to acknowledge the reciprocal rights of women in marriage. Furthermore, international mi-
GORDON MEANS
349
gration and unstable marriages had forced an increasing number of Muslim women to become heads of households and therefore many women had to earn a livelihood outside the home. Under such circumstances, the authority of the woman had to be paramount. Many seemed to feel that in Muslim practice many of the obligations of males have not been adequately enforced and that patriarchical authority might be challenged if it violates fundamental principles of equity. Professor Farouki argued the contrary position with considerable passion:
Yesterday the conference considered Muslimwomenin development. Today,it is presented as a confrontation betweendevelopment andtradition.Thus,Muslim womenare now caughtin a hopelessdilemma:eitherthey remainMuslim, or they becomedeveloped and modern. We heardaboutthe firstbill of rights for womenin this century. But, our firstbill of rightsfor womenis the Koran. The Koranmust be respected and honoredin all our deliberations. We heard undesirable. aboutthe patriarchical systemas something It shouldbe repealed by a systemof cooperation.This is nice talk. The fact of cooperation does not preclude that somebody, one of the two, musttakeresponsibility, the patriarch. The socialsystemthat Islamrecognizes is the patriarchical system. Matriarchical systemsthat anthropologists of imagination.8 talk aboutare figments A delegate from Pakistan responded to Professor Farouki's comments as follows: "If the patriarch takes the wrong line, then it is the duty of the wife to object." She then cited examples from the Koran, and continued, "It is when and what is said, rather than who says it that makes it right."9 On some of these issues, the reaction of the delegates was hard to judge, but most delegates (who were all women) seemed to desire some more clear definition of and defense of women's rights within Islam, but without generating undue conflict or openly challenging male supremacy in the family or in political leadership. Polygamy, child marriage, and mixed marriage. The issue of polygamy generated more open manifestation of delegate response than any other issue. Dr. Badria Al Awadi and others pointed out that polygamy is by permission rather than a right. Certain conditions have to be met, and it is not an exclusive male right. All wives have to be treated equally, and the husband must be able to support all his wives. He cannot leave any wife emotionally starved. And she added emphatically, emotional equality is impossible! Thus, it is only out of necessity, when a woman will have no one to care for her, that polygamy can be justified. Others commented
8. From a tape recording of the session. 9. Ibid.
350
that a stable Muslim family is impossible so long as the threat of polygamy undermines the relationship. The enthusiastic response and the spontaneous applause of the delegates to these comments revealed a widespread concern over this issue. Specific proposals for reform were not forthcoming, beyond the general comments that women should be educated to know their rights so that they could be defended. One delegate raised the issue of child marriages by noting that Muhammad had married a nine-year-old girl. A medical view of that practice was requested. Dr. Sadik replied that there was no evidence that the marriage had been consummated. She asserted that the danger to mother and child of pregnancy is very high before the age of sixteen, thus leaving no doubt that child marriage practices should be prohibited in all circumstances. An Indonesian delegate observed that Muslim men could marry nonMuslim women, but the reverse was prohibited. She also asked about naming practices in religiously mixed marriages, but received no response on these questions. The issue of female circumcision was also raised, but the obvious embarrassmentabout the topic in mixed company caused the matter to be dropped. However, some informal discussion later took place over the practice in some Muslim societies that involves the rather crude mutilation of women as a technique of male control over the sexual activity of women. Again the issue was not raised for formal consideration. Womenin the laborforce and professions. The conference was divided and somewhat ambiguous about the growing trend of women to join the labor force and seek a professional life outside the home. Nearly all participants stressed the importance of education for women, but some questioned whether education should lead to increasing female participation in the professions. The role models of some of the Muslim women professionals at the conference were no doubt a source of inspiration to many delegates. Fadlullah Wilmot, an Australian convert to Islam who is director of information for RISEAP, asserted that "Islam does not preclude women from working. No! But, there should be no freedom to seek whatever job they like. Islam defines haram10jobs. A woman cannot take the kind of job which would expose her to the public gaze."11 A woman observer from an Arab embassy retorted in a stage whisper, "I can think of only two professions-being a telephone operator, and being a prostitute!" By their reactions, the delegates seemed to welcome the increasing economic and professional roles of women, but were also concerned about the
10. Hararn means "prohibited by Islamic Law." I1. From a tape recording of the session.
GORDON MEANS
351
possible effects on family life. An attempt by one male to secure the endorsement of the principle of veiling for women was quickly sidestepped without open debate. For most, that was a matter of personal conviction.
General Observations.
As a rule, the papers elicited very open discussion. Many of the men, and especially religious authorities, tended to cite the requirements of the Koran and the practices of the Hadith. Very few women challenged the Koran or the Hadith; instead, they used these sources to defend demands for more effective equality in practice. Some of the more outspoken women argued that what is practiced as Islam is not Islam, but rather custom and archaic cultural additions. They also appealed to higher principles to interpret the Koran, and argued that some of the detailed rules of Islam were appropriate for a former era and society but not for the present because "we know more today." The women noted that the administration of Muslim law is in the hands of males, most of whom do not understand the more fundamental principles of Islam and also are unable or unwilling to protect women's interests. Significantly, the emphasis given by women delegates to the ritual requirements of Islam helped them to legitimize their grievances on specific issues. In the conference, the western-educated and, in some cases, the European converts to Islam tended to take a prominent role in the discussion of issues, and in some of the leadership positions of the conference. Even so, there was ample opportunity for the expression of views by all delegates so that the proceedings were not dominated by any group. The conference provided the opportunity also for much male preaching and posturing, but some of the women participants also observed that in actual practice Islam has depended upon implementation in practical experience largely within the home, and largely by women. As one participant observed:
In fact, women in the Muslim world are deeply religious, and are committed to these spiritual values and traditions. I don't wish to polarize the group, but I think that some proper education needs to be undertaken for the male population-for example, alchoholism, women don't drink, it is the men who get drunk. Women don't abandon their children, but it is men in Islam who often abandon their wives and their children. [Clapping] My point is that all Islamic revival has focussed on the women. Instead, Islamic revival should focus on the rights of women, and on the need for the family and the community and all individuals to preserve Islamic values, not just women. I think both men and women have a role to play, and the movement back to religious values is much more needed for the male population than for the women. [Clapping] As soon as women are educated and know their rights, there certainly will be equality. I
352
betterbecausemen will have been am sure then that the nationwill progress and Islamicbeliefs.'2 broughtup betterthroughthe path of righteousness After the plenary sessions, the conference broke up into four workshops to draft proposals. There were several male "resource persons" assigned to each workshop group. In these sessions, one or two males would talk over half the time in an effort to persuade the delegates what resolutions they should support. The male domination of these sessions prompted several female delegates to leave as a sign of protest. In any event, the final resolutions to be formally supported by the conference were left to the organizers of the conference, who also selected the members of the drafting committee. Even without formal proposals on specific issues, this conference did represent an important step in the articulation of political consciousness among women in the Muslim world.
Conference Recommendations
13 contains a "Call for Action" and a series The "Conference Proceedings" of resolutions that were never discussed in draft form during the plenary sessions. Some proposals were made by individual paper presenters and some were discussed in draft form in the four workshop groups. However, the actual drafting of the recommendations appeared to rest with the conference organizers. In the "Call for Action" extensive quotes from the Koran and the Hadith are cited to determine Islamic principles on the role of women and to call upon women to "participate in development" and commit themselves to the uplift of the ummah. Among the resolutions passed was one calling for a women's division of the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council for Southeast Asia, and one condemning atrocities in Lebanon. Finally, the report recommended improved services for Muslim women in areas of literacy and education, family day care, and maternal and child health. Improved communication and an improved organizational structure for women were also recommended. The more contentious issues of changing existing legislation or defining women's rights were left either unmentioned, or to be resolved within the general framework of Islamic law. No mention was made of any internationalagencies or of principles enunciated by internationalbodies on the status of women. On all issues, the "Conference Proceedings" presents the image of complete unanimity among all the delegates.
12. From a tape recording of a discussion by Dr. Sadik. 13. Muslim Women in Development.Final Report.
GORDON MEANS
353
Conclusion
From the discussions at the plenary sessions and in informal discussions among delegates, it is possible to identify four basic positions on the status of women in Islam: First is the fundamentalist position, as representedby the writings of Maulana Al-Maudoodi of Pakistan, Maryam Jameelah of Pakistan, and the Ayatollah Khoumeini of Iran. Essentially, they propose purging Islamic society of all non-Muslim practices and instituting a strict regimen of isolation and segregation of women and a strict sexual division of roles and responsibilities. This involves, among other things, the compulsory veiling of women and their complete subjugationto their husbands within the tight structure of a patriarchal family. This position was not espoused at the conference but some speakers alluded to it. A second position is that Muslim women have a prime responsibility to "increase the ummah," to socialize the next generation of Muslims, and to contribute to Islamic unity. They should serve Islam, however, and not make any demands that are socially disruptive or challenge the social fabric of Islam. Their contributions to society and to the economy should be given more recognition, and they should be mobilized, with all other Muslims, to strengthen Islamic society through education and "participation in development." However, any articulation of women's rights or demands would be a threat to Islamic unity. The role of women is defined in Islam and not subject to modification. Those Muslim women who are dedicated to improvement of the ummah should be given more assistance and recognition in the performance of such roles. Above all, Islamic women should support Muslim political leaders. Essentially, this is the position taken by active incumbent politicians who tend to view Islamic women as a resource to be utilized for political mobilization, but not as a separately identifiable interest to be accommodated in public policy. A third position maintains that the ideals of Islam are not being achieved in practice, particularly in regard to the status of women. It seeks to identify those areas of public policy where the Islamic definition of women's rights is ignored or subverted. This group views Islam as a charter of unfulfilled rights and obligations and rejects the notion that Muslim laws must be interpreted and enforced exclusively by men. It insists on education and the provision of legal assistance to Muslim women, so that they are treated with the full rights defined for the status of women. Those who follow this line of argument give more attention to the general principle of the "equality of all believers in Islam" and treat the instances in Islamic law of gender role assignment and feminine inequality as being allowable exceptions when certain stringent conditions are present. For this group, which had the largest and most vocal element in the confer-
354
ence, Islam is the charter of rights for the improvement of the status of Muslim women. A fourth position accepts the argument about Islam being a charter of rights for Muslim women. But it also looks to the pronouncements of international organizations, and to the international women's movement for guidance and support. Its proponents view women's issues as transcending the boundaries of state, religion, or ethnicity. They make an appeal to Islam, especially on the fundamental principles of the equality of believers, and treat the practices of domination over and inequality of women in Islam as a cultural accretion that runs counter to the highest ideals of Islam. The appeals are made to international declarations and to fundamental principles that in broad outline can be found within the Islamic tradition. Those who take this position are more than willing to reinterpret the common assumptions about Islamic doctrine, and they are also willing to challenge the claims of the lama that they alone (along with the state religious authorities) have an exclusive right to interpret Islam. In effect this is the more individualistic (and Protestant) view of the obligations and rights of Muslim women. Of these four positions, this conference tended to reflect the second and the third perspectives. As a government-sponsoredconference, that is understandable. It is difficult and risky to predict whether Muslim attitudes toward the role of women will shift over the next decade or so. If a shift does occur, it is by no means clear whether it will be in the direction of the fourth position or the first. In any event, it appears certain that the issues of women's rights and the role of women in Islam will remain extremely important and contentious for decades into the future.

Women's Rights and Publi Policy in Islam

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Women's Rights and Publi Policy in Islam

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Women's Rights and Public Policy in Islam: Report of a Conference Author(s): Gordon Means Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian

WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ISLAM

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

The Basis of Conflictover Women's Rights

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987

You might also like