Republic vs NLRC

G.R. No. 174747

March 09, 2016
Facts:
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, a corporation engaged in milling
and producing sugar, had been incurring heavy losses. It obtained loans from
Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine National Bank, secured by its assets and
properties. Subsequently, the Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests
over Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's loans to the government through
Asset Privatization Trust, a government entity created 1986 for the purpose of
conserving, provisionally managing, and disposing of assets that have been identified
for privatization or disposition.

The Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government

properties for privatization, decided to sell the assets and properties of Bicolandia
Sugar Development Corporation. It issued a Notice of Termination to Bicolandia
Sugar Development Corporation's employees, advising them that their services would
be terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP/BISUDECO Chapter, the exclusive
bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation, received the
Notice under protest.
After the employees' dismissal from service, Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation's assets and properties were sold to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers
Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill.

As a result, several members of the NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter filed a

complaint charging Asset Privatization Trust, Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation, Philippine Sugar Corporation, and Bicol Agro- Industrial Producers
Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill with unfair labor practice, union
busting, and claims for labor standard benefits.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint and ruled that there was no union
busting. However, the Labor Arbiter found that although Asset Privatization Trust
previously released funds for separation benefits for 1992, Emata, et. al. refused to
receive their checks "on account of their protested dismissal." Their refusal to receive
their checks was premised on their Complaint that Asset Privatization Trust's sale of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation violated their Collective Bargaining
Agreement and was a method of union busting. While the Labor Arbiter
acknowledged that Emata, et al.'s entitlement to these benefits had already prescribed
under Article 291 of the Labor Code, he nevertheless ordered Asset Privatization Trust
to pay Emata, et al. their benefits since their co-complainants were able to claim their
checks.

Asset Privatization Trust deposited with the National Labor Relations

Commission a Cashier's Check in the amount of P116,182.20. It filed a Notice of
Partial Appeal, together with a Memorandum of Partial Appeal, before the NLRC.
Under Executive Order No. 323 dated December 6, 2000, Asset Privatization Trust
was succeeded by Privatization and Management Office.

The NLRC dismissed the Partial Appeal for failure to perfect the appeal within
the statutory period of appeal. Privatization and Management Office moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Privatization and Management Office filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which was denied. The CA ruled that the
grant of separation pay to Emata, et al. was anchored on the finding that Privatization
and Management Office had already granted the same benefits to the other
complainants in the labor case. Privatization and Management Office moved for
reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents' (Emata, et al.) separation benefits may be
released to them without filing a separate money claim before the Commission on
Audit.

Ruling:
Yes. This case is unique, however, in that though private respondents' separation
benefits were already released by petitioner, they refused to collect their checks
"on account of their protested dismissal." Their refusal to receive their checks was
premised on their Complaint that petitioner's sale of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation violated their Collective Bargaining Agreement and was a method of
union busting. It was not because of negligence or malice. It was because of their
honest belief that their rights as laborers were violated and the grant of separation
benefits would not be enough compensation for it. While private respondents'
allegations have not been properly substantiated, it would be unjust to deprive them of
their rightful claim to their separation benefits.

Moreover, private respondents' co-complainants were able to collect their checks

for their separation benefits during the pendency of the Complaint without having to
go through the Commission on Audit.

Under Section 26 of the State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit has
jurisdiction over the settlement of debts and claims "of any sort" against government.
The purpose of requiring a separate process with the Commission on Audit for money
claims against government is under the principle that public funds may only be
released upon proper appropriation and disbursement. Money claims against
government include money judgments by courts, which must be brought before the
Commission on Audit before it can be satisfied.

In Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency v. University of the Philippines,

the Court reimbursed to the University of the Philippines its funds that were garnished
upon orders of the National Labor Relations Commission for the satisfaction of a
judgment award. The reimbursement was on the ground that the money claim must
first be filed before the Commission on Audit.

The situation in this case, however, is different from these previous cases.
Petitioner's Board of trustees already issued the Resolution for the release of funds to
pay separation benefits to terminated employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation. Private respondents' checks were released by petitioner to the Arbitration
Branch of the Labor Arbiter in 1992. Under these circumstances, it is presumed that
the funds to be used for private respondents' separation benefits have already been
appropriated and disbursed. This would account for why private respondents' co-
complainants were able to claim their checks without need of filing a separate claim
before the Commission on Audit.

In this instance, private respondents' separation benefits may be released to them

without filing a separate money claim before the Commission on Audit. It would be
unjust and a violation of private respondents' right to equal protection if they were not
allowed to claim, under the same conditions as their fellow workers, what is rightfully
due to them.
 Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 238671
June 2, 2020
Facts:
Petitioner TSN won the contract award for the construction of the New Iloilo
Airport. As project proponent, respondent Department of Transportation (DOTr)
entered into a contract agreement with TSJV on March 15, 2004, pertaining to the
construction. Following the project's completion and delivery, it turned out that some
TSJV billings had been left unpaid. After TSJV's initial effort to collect failed, it filed
with the CIAC a Request for Arbitration and Complaint. Under its final award, the
CIAC granted several items of claim.

Following the finality of the CIAC's Final Award, TSJV moved for its execution.
The DOTr opposed on ground that the funds sought to be levied
were public in character. The CIAC granted the motion for execution and directed the
Clerk of Court and the Ex Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City to
implement the writ
of execution.

The Ex Officio Sheriff thereafter served a demand to satisfy the arbitral award on
the DOTr and issued notices of garnishment to the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The DOTr later on advised TSJV in
writing that the arbitral award should be referred to the COA
as condition sine qua non for payment. Meanwhile, the DBP, PVB, and PNB
separately informed the Sheriff that they did not hold funds or properties in the
DOTr's name. On the other hand, the LBP advised that claimant TSJV must first seek
the COA's approval for payment of the arbitral award.

Again, after its initial effort to execute failed, TSN subsequently filed with the
COA a petition for enforcement and payment of the arbitral award. The COA
approved payment but only to the extent of Php104,661,421.35 or less than half of the
total award. Asserting its primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities, the COA claimed to have reviewed the evidence, on
the basis of which it found that only Claim No. 4 was in accord with law and the
rules.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in disturbing the immutable and final arbitral award in its favor.

Ruling:
Yes. First off, there is nothing in the Constitution, laws, or even the COA rules
expressly granting the COA original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due
from or owing to the government. For one, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by
RA 7691 vests jurisdiction over money claims in the first and second level courts.

To repeat, the COA's original jurisdiction is actually limited to liquidated claims

and quantum meruit cases. Once judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal over a
money claim involving the State, it may only be set aside or modified through the
proper mode of
appeal. It is elementary that the right to appeal is statutory. There is no constitutional
nor statutory provision giving the COA review powers akin to an appellate body such
as the power to modify or set aside a judgment of a court or other tribunal on errors of
fact or law.

To recapitulate, the final and executory arbitral award in this case was validly
issued by the CIAC in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the construction dispute
between TSJV and the DOTr. These parties voluntarily submitted themselves to the
arbitration proceedings below. In the end, both parties accepted the CIAC's modified
final award and neither one nor the other sought a review thereof with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. As it was, the CIAC's final award is conclusive and binding on
all the factual and legal issues taken up therein and bars their re-litigation in any
subsequent proceeding between the parties.

To be sure, when the COA disallowed more than half of the arbitral award here,
it did not raise any jurisdictional grounds nor invoke any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments. What the COA did was reweigh the
evidence on record and point out purported errors of fact and law in the arbitral
award. This is certainly beyond the COA's constitutional mandate to audit and review
the enforcement of money claims against the government. It is also contrary to
jurisprudentially defined limitations to its audit powers. To accept the COA's theory
that it has absolute discretion to disregard final and executory judgments rendered by
courts and other adjudicative bodies in valid exercise of their jurisdiction would
wreak havoc on the efficient and orderly administration of justice.

The COA's grave abuse of discretion here lies in its apparent overestimation of
its audit review powers in connection with final money claims properly litigated and
finally determined in another forum, leading it to transgress long standing legal
principles and case doctrine.
 Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 207132
December 6, 2016
Facts:
On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2001
(AO 5-01) which directed the decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among
the several clinics who are members of GAMCA.

AO 5-0 was issued to comply with the Gulf Cooperative countries (GCC) States'
requirement that only GCC-accredited medical clinics/hospitals' examination results
will be honored by the GCC States' respective embassies. It required an OFW
applicant to first go to a GAMCA center which, in turn will refer the applicant to a
GAMCA clinic or hospital.

Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of 2002 holding in abeyance
the implementation of the referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its directive
suspending the referral decking system in AO No. 159! Series of 2004.

In 2004, the DOH issued AO No. 167, Series of 2004 repealing A0 5-01,
reasoning that the referral decking system did not guarantee the migrant workers' right
to safe and quality health service.

GAMCA questioned the DOH's Memorandum No. 2008-0210 before the Office
of the President. In a decision dated January 14, 2010, the OP nullified Memorandum
No. 2008-0210.

On August 3. 2010! the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 8042, as

amended by RA No. 10022 took effect.

Pursuant to Section 16 Of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its August 23, 2010
letter-order, directed GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the referral
decking system and to wrap up their operations within three 3 days from receipt
thereof. GAMCA received its copy of the August 23, 2010 letter- order on August 25,
2010.

On August 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the RTC of Pasig City a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (GAMCA's petition). It assailed: (1) the DOH's August
23, 2010 letter-order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion; and (2) paragraphs
c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No. 10022, as well as Section 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of
the IRR, as unconstitutional
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 10022 is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:
YES. The State's police power is vast and plenary and the operation of a
business, especially one that is imbued with public interest (such as healthcare
services), falls within the scope of governmental exercise of police power through
regulation.

As defined, police power includes (1) the imposition of restraint on liberty or

property, (2) in order to foster the common good. The exercise of police power
involves the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."

By its very nature, the exercise of the State's police power limits individual rights
and liberties, and subjects them to the "far more overriding demands and requirements
of the greater number." Though vast and plenary, this State power also carries
limitations, specifically, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, the advancement of
the public good.

To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise of police power must

satisfy the "valid object and valid means" method of analysis: first, the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires
interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the
objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of

RA No. 10022. The prohibition against the referral decking system is consistent with
the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Public interest demands State interference
on health matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate public concern.

We note that RA No. 10022 expressly reflects the declared State policies to
"uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in the country or overseas, in general, and
Filipino migrant workers," and to "afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate
and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers." The
prohibition against the referral decking system in Section 16 of RA No. 10022 is an
expression and implementation of these state policies.
 Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189185
August 16, 2016
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series
of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City.

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance and took effect on March
23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer. Pursuant to Section
5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three
months thereafter.

PBGEA, et al., filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted
to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional.

PBGEA, et al. appealed, and applied for injunctive relief from the CA. On
January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.

The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates due process and equal protection
clause on the constitution.

Ruling:
Yes. In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The
first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second,
to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
 The Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause for being unreasonable and
oppressive. In order to declare one as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also
comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.

Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets

the effectiveness of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. The
impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of
pesticide application within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast
area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying
alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography
and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and
other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the
three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse
of police power.

Equal protection neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or

things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In
other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
equally applicable to all members of the class. The total ban on aerial spraying runs
afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify which substances
are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be
made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the
public health, livelihood and the environment.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9,

2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Lagman v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 231658
July 4, 2017
Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao
has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time.

In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place
on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law
and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the
control of the lawless groups.

President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently conducting

legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion,
public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao
until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled."

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 390 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance
with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
compelling reason to revoke the same".

The petitioners petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning the factual
basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with
President Duterte.

Issue:
Whether or not there were sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216.
Ruling:
YES. The President, with the facts available to him, deduced that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative. This is sufficient to satisfy the
standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.

The factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or suspension of writ of
habeas corpus are "(1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power". Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the
President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion

The Court held that a review of the facts leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof.