ESTRADA, vs CASEDA

G.R. No. L-1560

Facts:
On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer,
because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the
first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13,
1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for
plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at
the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge
Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court
correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by
plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The
requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act,
which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided
that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval."
Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14
of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This
Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval."

Issue:
Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth
Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.

Held:
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot
be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be
computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October
15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the
Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute
had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form
had been adopted in its stead.
Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusement
Board
Facts:
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the
basic law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine
Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand
Derby Race of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays.
However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12
Sundays, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these
additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals
and entities by six.
Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to
the President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week
besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays.
(2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated
in the House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502.

Held:
(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24
Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely
permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502
was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days
for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it
did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which
the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing
and determination by GAB.
(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would
indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of
Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely
devoid of any such indication.
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an
ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of
the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in
such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only
to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used
sufficiently expresses that meaning.
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular
sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional
sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would
not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically
authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes
races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the
conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to
be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.
DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON. RECARELO
CASTILLO, Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon. Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur
respondents
FACTS:
Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such
act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and
selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the
municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the
government.
As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in
consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by
Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the
Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor
saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in
accordance with the Sec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.

ISSUES:
WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos
under RA 5185

HELD / RATIONALE:
No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner,
Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with
preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as
the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days
after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives
power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by
the Decentralization Act of 1967.

The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by Governor of
the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different
political persuasion.

The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by
Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.

*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended / repealed Sec.
2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicnicla gorvernor, if the charge
against a munucupola officaial was municipal official was one affecting his official integrity,
could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which
provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order
preventive suspension.
Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm

Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in
Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos
will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his
contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry
of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that
the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed
another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an
allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex
project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210.
Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to
$231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the
amount paid to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a)
of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including
money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of
Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC
dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint
filed by Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent
filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691
and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor
and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-
employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter
had clear jurisdiction over the same.