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India and Pakistan: A clash of civilizations?

Denise Groves

To cite this article: Denise Groves (1998) India and Pakistan: A clash of civilizations?, The
Washington Quarterly, 21:4, 17-20, DOI: 10.1080/01636609809550348

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Denise Groves

India and Pakistan:

A Clash of Civilizations?

Lin 1993 Samuel Huntington contributed a boldly simplistic para-

digm to the ever-growing debate about security in the post-Cold War world.
Ominously titled "The Clash of Civilizations," Huntington's essay (and sub-
sequent book) argued that the international system would no longer be di-
vided into two camps based on ideology or politics. Instead, it would be
fractured along civilizational lines. "The fundamental source of conflict in
the new world," he predicted, "will be cultural."
Five years later, as India and Pakistan's reckless forays into the nuclear
realm shock the world, Huntington's dire prediction seems to be coming
true. He would no doubt point to the recent nuclear adventures of India
and Pakistan as support for his claim that post-Cold War conflict will be
cultural in nature. After all, it was the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a
Hindu nationalist party, that chose to abandon the decades-old policy of im-
plied nuclear strength in favor of a more conspicuous demonstration. The
facts that the first nuclear exercise was overwhelmingly supported by Indi-
ans and that Pakistan's knee-jerk reaction was equally popular appear to be
symptoms of the larger disease that Huntington diagnosed.
There can be no doubt that tensions are running dangerously high on the
subcontinent, especially along the disputed Kashmiri border. But in light of
this stare-down by two great nations across a nuclear threshold, recent de-
velopments overwhelmingly prove that the clash of civilizations as described
by Huntington is only one facet of a highly complicated, interrelated, and
diverse international reality.
On further inspection, the origins of the current Indo-Pakistani dispute

Denise Groves is a graduate student at Georgetown University, enrolled in the

National Security Studies Program. She currently works at the Institute for Interna-
tional Economics.

Copyright © 1998 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 21:4 pp. 17-20.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 1998 17
 I Denise Groves

can actually be seen to be more political and economic than cultural in na-
ture. Deprived despite its size of a seat on the UN Security Council, ob-
scured by China to the north and financial troubles to the east, and, most
important, incapable (at least so far) of achieving its own economic miracle,
India's current government saw storming the elite nuclear club as a sure-fire
way to assert the potency of the Indian state.
The economic costs of the tests were
weighed by the Indian government, but it
I he real issue is "the apparently concluded that these costs were
Haves versus the ultimately outweighed by the political pres-
tige of nuclear might.
Have Nots"; culture
Huntington belittles the economic issue,
is merely a sideshow. though, by claiming that economic coopera-
tion and success are only possible when the
cultures are related. Yet as Fouad Ajami has
put it: "States will consort with any civiliza-
tion[,] however alien, as long as the price is right and the goods are ready."
This is because economic prosperity and security, rather than cultural integ-
rity, are most at stake in international relations. Huntington paints a por-
trait of "the West versus the Rest," but the real truth is closer to "the Haves
versus the Have Nots," in which culture is merely a sideshow.
In the current strife between India and Pakistan, culture was at least ini-
tially immaterial: national pride and prestige were at stake. Unable to lay
claim by political or economic means to what it believes is its rightful place
in the international system, India made its presence known in the loudest
possible voice. The Indian Prime Minister emphasized this when he claimed
that nuclear weaponry "is India's due, the right of one-sixth of mankind."
Contrary to what Huntington would have us believe, the Pakistani reaction
was an effort not to defend its Muslim heritage in the face of a Hindu
threat, but simply to reaffirm its national security.
Huntington is adamant, however, that culture is now more important to
the state than economic or military concerns and is actually becoming the
crux of state actions. It is true that cultural sovereignty is the justification
used by many nations to defend their human rights practices or domestic
politics. Culture is also a rallying point for politicians, as was the case with
the BJP and the bomb. Yet, the socioeconomic link is unmistakable: the
tests were performed just a few short weeks before the ruling party was due
to unveil its domestic economic package to a parliament whose support is
tenuous at best and to a country where poverty remains rampant.
Huntington's cultural explanations for the respect accorded various
norms also turn out to depend heavily on economics. When he claims, for

18 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 1998

 India and Pakistan |

example, that Western liberal concepts such as "human rights," "equality,"

and "liberty" find little or no audience in non-Western cultures, he is merely
restating a truism: that many non-Western states are members of the Have
Nots club and are likely to be more concerned with feeding themselves than
with enlightened political philosophy. The evidence is clear that, in ad-
vanced societies, Western ideas of democracy or free markets or even non-
proliferation can be adopted, conformed, and fashioned to fit within the
cultural confines of non-Western civilizations.
As a result, purely cultural tensions—assuming for the sake of argument
that norms such as democracy and nonproliferation are only legitimate in a
Western context—will not spark global conflict. No country will march into
Beijing or Baghdad and explicitly impose a democratic form of government.
Nor will the opening of yet another McDonald's in Shanghai prompt a stu-
dent revolution. Instead, the economics, politics, and security interests of
the relationship—significantly more tangible concepts than culture—will
prove to be the much more precarious issues.
Huntington may be correct when he argues that cultural integrity is a le-
gitimate cause for contention; the long-running conflict between India and
Pakistan does, after all, have a religious element. But security interests can
be tremendously intricate, and putting the emphasis solely on culture is pre-
mature. One need only look at another troublesome country in the region:
China. Chinese officials realize that increased trade and interaction with
foreigners can degrade society and ultimately undermine their power base,
but they pursue them nevertheless in the interests of economic develop-
ment. Beijing has had to overcome some of its reluctance to fully liberalize
markets and to grant even rudimentary political rights to citizens. These
concessions were necessary because much more is at stake than cultural val-
ues: namely, economic and social prosperity. The cultural conflict in this
case is real, but Huntington must acknowledge that several more issues are
involved that complicate regional and world politics.
What does all this imply for the U.S. response to the South Asian crisis?
Huntington singles out several long- and short-term policy implications for
the West. The West should, among other things, support groups that are
"sympathetic to Western values and interests" and strengthen international
institutions that "reflect and legitimate" those values and interests, includ-
ing arms control. In the long term, it must appreciate and "accommodate"
the power pursuits of non-Western states while managing the modernization
process. To do this, and at the same time allay any threats to its security, the
West must understand the basic religious and philosophical assumptions un-
derlying other civilizations.
This strategy seems sane enough, perhaps even wise. However, if the per-

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 1998 19

 I Denise Groves

ception that the West is trying to impose its culture on non-Western states is
one of the primary sources of antagonism today, as Huntington contends,
then his policy prescriptions contradict his analysis: even while noting that
the "paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between 'the West
and the Rest'," he advocates the perpetuation of Western dominance of the
"world community." If Huntington's astute as-
sessment of the West's intentions is accu-
Purely cultural rate—that it is, in effect "using international
institutions, military power and economic re-
tensions will not sources to run the world in ways that will
spark global conflict. maintain Western pre-dominance, protect
Western interests and promote Western politi-
cal and economic values"—then further in-
doctrination of international institutions and
non-Western sympathizers will only exacerbate what Huntington claims to
be a provocation of conflict between civilizations.
This perception is supposedly one of the reasons that U.S. intelligence se-
riously failed to anticipate the Indian tests. By expecting Indian politicians
to behave like Western politicians and by failing to appreciate the frustrat-
ing position of the world's second largest nation, American officials allowed
themselves to become mired in Huntington's one-dimensional vision.
Rather than expecting states to behave in the manner of affluent, modern,
and Western states, and rather than merely understanding the "basic reli-
gious and philosophical assumptions" of non-Western states, policymakers
concerned with protecting Western interests need to show a much more
acute awareness of the nature of conflict. Even Huntington should realize
that in a world as capricious as ours, international conflict cannot be
blamed on only one well-intentioned actor in the elaborate drama of inter-
national relations.

HjTjlj THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 1998