DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

ESSAY TITLE
REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES

SUBJECT
TORTS

NAME OF THE FACULTY

MS. B.V.S SUNEETHA MADAM

NAME OF THE CANDIDATE- Jashaswee Mishra

ROLL NO. – 20LLB040
SEMESTER- 1st
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I, Jashaswee Mishra, hereby declare that this essay titled “remoteness to damages” submitted in
an original work. I have duly acknowledged all the sources from where the ideas and extracts
have been taken. In this project, I have tried to explain the subject matter and the importance,
presented the traces of origin and the evolution of the same with special reference to the
interpretation of case laws. I hope there are no issues and apologies for any inconsistencies. I am
very much grateful for the invaluable support and guidance of Suneetha madam, the essay would
have been incomplete without her guidance. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to her.

Thank you
Jashaswee Mishra
REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE

Starting point is the well-known idea that a line has to be drawn: any torturer or deal breaker is
unacceptably harsh to take absolute responsibility for all the effects. Of course, in the
circumstances of the individual case we should clearly abandon every effort to devise laws in
this field, and take the pragmatism of the judge into account what is "fair": just a matter of fact.
Of course, it cannot be replied with a mathematically correct calculation as to where the recovery
line should be drawn, and often the judges are very clear in drawing the line on the details of a
situation, so they consider it as a "fair" solution.
Distance of harm is an intriguing rule. When the harm is brought about by a wrong, there must
be liabilities. The inquiry is how much risk can be fixed, and what factor decides it. The guideline
of Remoteness of Damages is applicable to such cases. An occasion comprising a wrong can
establish of single outcome or may comprise of results for example arrangement of acts/wrongs.
The harm might be general or may be far off, or excessively distant.

Meaning

● In law, the harm should be immediate and the normal aftereffect of the result of the

demonstration of the respondent. Something else, the offended party won't succeed. This is
In jure non remota causased proxima spectatur (In law the prompt, not the far off reason for
any occasion that will be thought of). The explanation behind this is that the litigant is dared
to have proposed the characteristic outcomes, yet not the far off harm. It implies then that
the respondent's demonstration should be the Causa Causans or the general (close) cause.

● Novus actus interveniens: (new act mediating) The demonstration and the results are to be

associated straightforwardly and the litigant won't be subject for Novus actus interveniens
and the outcomes thereof.
“Scott v. Shepherd -D tossed a lit stunt into a group. It fell on X. who tossed it further, It fell on
Y who discarded it. It fell on P, detonated and blinded one eye. Held, D was obligated to P.
Despite the fact that X and Y had mediated, D's demonstration was the Causa Causans. The
litigant argued novus actus intreveniens however the court dismissed this protection1”.

“In Haynes v. Harwood, the unattended pony van of D began running as certain young men
had tossed stones at the pony. The cop who endeavored to stop the pony was harmed. Held D
at risk. The conflict that the tossing of stones was a mediating cause and thus D was not subject
was dismissed by the court2.

Outline
An individual is going driving on a street, he hits a young lady on the pathway, the young lady
tumbles on a bike breaks her finger, the bike man loses his equilibrium and gets before a fuel
big hauler, the big hauler to save the man on the bike guides left however sadly hits the railing
to a stream scaffold and falls into it, the lock of the fuel tank breaks and the oil slicks into the
waterway , the driver with the truck suffocates.

In the above case:

The young lady being hit is the immediate harm and it is the immediate harm brought about by
the demonstration of A, the harm caused to the cyclist is generally brought about by the falling
of the young lady and is far off to the demonstration of A, the harm caused to the transporter
and the deficiency of material(fuel and fuel tank) is far off to the demonstration of An and
general to the demonstration of the cyclist. Also, it is to be noticed that the responsibility to
carelessness is made on the presumption that the individual knows about the way that rash
driving can prompt fatalities. (in spite of the fact that the normal and the real outcomes probably
won't be the equivalent).

1
Scott v. Shepherd [1773] 2 WM B1 892
2
Haynes v. Harwood (1935) 1 K.B. 146.
Presently, the beginning stage of any standard of the distance of harm is the natural thought
that a line should be drawn some place. It would be unsatisfactorily brutal for each misdeed
feasor to be answerable for all the outcomes which he has caused.

Unquestionably, the subject of where to adhere to a meaningful boundary on recuperate

capacity of important misfortunes can't be replied by a numerically exact equation. Judges have
utilized their circumspection every once in a while, and in that interaction, two recipes have
been featured:

1. The trial of sensible prescience

2. The trial of certainty

Direct harm- Two tests to find out direct damage.

1. The test of reasonable foresight.

2. The test of directness.

The Test Of Reasonable Foresight

On the off chance that the results of an illegitimate demonstration could be predicted by a
sensible man, at that point they are not very far off. In the event that then again, a sensible man
couldn't have predicted the results, at that point they are excessively far off. Also, an individual
will be subject just for the outcomes which are not very distant for example which could be
anticipated.

The Test Of Directness

As indicated by the trial of straightforwardness, an individual is subject for all the immediate
outcomes of his illegitimate demonstration, if he could anticipate them; since results which
straightforwardly follow an unfair demonstration are not very distant.
The trial of sensible prescience implies that the risk of the respondent stretches out just to those
results, which might have been predicted by a sensible man. This hypothesis was dismissed in
1921, and the subsequent hypothesis was applied in re Polemis and Furnace Ltd case. For
this situation, D contracted P's vessel to convey a load which included petroleum. A few cases
were spilling and there were fumes of petroleum. D's workers while moving load carelessly
thumped at a board which fell scouring the wood and got touched off. Subsequently the whole
vessel burst into flames and was obliterated. Held, D was at risk. It was because of the
carelessness of D's workers that the fire had broken out and henceforth D was subject for all the
outcomes, despite the fact that those couldn't sensibly have been envisioned.

This hypothesis was dismissed in the Wagon Mound Case 1960; there is a re-visitation of the
old sensible prescience test. The Wagon Mound, an oil-big hauler vessel, was sanctioned by D
and had been moved at Sydney (Australia) harbor. A good way off of around 600 feet, P had a
wharf, where fixes of a boat were going on. Because of the carelessness of D's workers, oil spilt
from the cart Mound, spread over to the wharf where P was making some welding activities. P's
director halted his welding work, enquired D whether he could securely proceed with the
welding. D guaranteed no peril. P's director himself accepted that the oil was non-incendiary on
water, and kept welding work. After two days liquid metal from the cart Mound fell on cotton
squander, lighted and made an incredible harm the wharf and the hardware. The Privy Council
in England held that D (Wagon Mound) was not obligated.

The Court applied the trial of sensible prescience and dismissed the immediate principle
hypothesis. It overruled Re Polemis case. It said after the occasion a dolt is shrewd. However, it
isn't the knowing the past of a numb-skull; it is the prescience of a sensible man which alone
can decide duty.

What the sensible man should predict, compares with the normal soul of humankind and thus,
the trial of sensible anticipate capacity should be applied. Decided from this, it was held not at
risk. “This choice has been endorsed in a new case Hughes v. Ruler Advocate, 1963.
The term distance of harms alludes to the legitimate test utilized for choosing which sort of
misfortune brought about by the penetrate of agreement might be remunerated by an honor of
harms. It has been recognized from the term proportion of harms or measurement which alludes
to the strategy for surveying in cash the remuneration for a specific result or misfortune which
has been held to be not very remote3”.
Also that we've seen that perhaps the law declares an individual to be responsible for injury
suffered, which have been the direct effects of the conduct of that individual, one could wonder
3
Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963) AC 837
about the criteria by which the Systematic set of procedures which conduct is near which one is
far away.

To clear this up, we see dual vastness checks in the event of regular heritage:
 A measure of rational forethought;
 The measure for decisiveness.

However, factors weighed in assessing such cases will and should be decided by the judges: even
the principle of 'fairness' needs to be measured from a special point of view. Therefore, the
alternative policies that may be expressed in choosing the remoteness law would include those
that approach the issues from either the complainant or the defendant's viewpoint and those that
are, in any way, impartial to all sides. There can be defined different potential policies. The
extent of the claimant's injury must be taken into account in one method, which may differentiate
between harms to an individual, land, and economic interests. The criterion for compensation of
harm for physical injury will be lower if the claimant's responsibility for his physical dignity is,
for instance, rated as higher than his strictly economic interests. We can see that this distinction
has been used periodically for the remoteness of injury, but it has not been embraced as a
measure by itself.

Another principle may attach recoverable damages to the guilt of the defendant. It is a fair rule
(both in the tort and in contract) that an individual who is an intentional wrongdoer may be
handled differently than one who is merely negligent or inadvertent; and in consequence this is
followed in such actions, but not in the legal remedy? Instead of asking "why the complainant
should be able to reclaim?". In one way, economic claims are more neutral: they can question the
party is in a stronger position to support the losses resulting from the act of wrong—and which
party should carry out those losses, for example (either more efficiently or at all). This strategy
would also see whether choosing a certain remoteness rule would facilitate more favorable
policy targets. It is often argued that a statutory remoteness provision should be aimed at
facilitating successful disclosure by the parties in the agreement leading up to the contract of
details on future losses. However, a larger and more systematic solution is to look at the benefit
covered by the responsibility which the infringement has brought on. The retrievable harm is
inextricably related to the reason for intervention. This is a logical approach that assumes
coherence and integrity within the collection of laws covering a contractual infringement
allegation or a certain injury. It is clear that different methods and strategies should be combined;
but judges should start somewhere: it is not shocking that a "default" rule has been developed—a
rule to apply even where the wrong or the actual evidence (such as how the wrong was done or
larger (but definable) policy problems are identifiable). The default provision should be used to
reclaim any damages incurred by the claimant as a result of the violation of duty. Yet a different
stance was taken by the English courts. “In The Wagon Mound, Viscount Simonds held that an
individual was responsible for the possible repercussions of his act, subject only to requirements
that were not applicable at present. For more is too harsh a guideline, for less is to forget the
civilized order demands a basic level of behavior to be followed. In a situation where the
remoteness of negligence harm is debated, these terms were spoken, but they are general and
tend to convey the opinion that the default law is that remoteness is limited by the foreseeable
impact of one's conduct. The position is expressly based on a philosophical interpretation of the
rule of duties and begins with the position of the defendant: the defendant would usually be
restricted to what he may have foreseen. In recent years, there has been a trend to take this
normative stance strongly4”. The law in “Rylands v. Fletcher and defamation was introduced in
regard to nuisance whether public or private. To address the entire issue, before contrasting the
wrong of negligence and other wrongdoing it would be convenient to first focus on a certain
area, the rules of contract5”.

Thus, in The Heron the test for the remoteness of damages on contract lays out the limitations on
the liability of the claimant from what he or she may have considered before agreeing to the
contract. The next – and significant – issue concerns the degree of "foreseeability" or
"contemplation" An discussion of this problem will degenerate rapidly into a semantine exercise
that attempts to examine variations in the likelihood of outcomes. If we are asking the defendants
that "reasonably could have foreseen" a certain outcome could have been foreseen, how different
does this mean that the effect is "probable" "possible" "a real possibility" "liable to result" and
4
(1961) A.C. 388

5
Rylands v fletcher. KB.19.560
"in the defendant's contemplation" The House of Lords in "The Heron II" exercised this issue,
and it is obvious from the House that the test in contract is not equivalent to the test in either
language: the test in error is narrower in the sense that a higher possibility is needed by contract
rather than in incorrect.
The question, how predictable? cannot be distinguished from the question why we are using a
predictability-based test: the contents of a rule must conform with the rule regulation. Since the
purpose of the contractually remote rule is that, when settling the balance of the settlement with
the complainants, the defendant should only be responsible for the risks he has or might have had
in contemplation, it would be natural for the courts to consider the risks which the parties, but
especially the defendant, might have reasonably in mind in light of their failure. In fact, the
House of Lords did demand a realistic degree of foresight by the appellant, considering the
variety of the terminology used in The Heron II.
Some members of the House have made this argument and Lord Reid in particular. There was a
lot of speculation on the correct terminology to define the extent of contractual and wrongful
foresight. Lord Reid emphasized especially that a threshold for remoteness testing in contract is
too low for the term, "reasonably foreseeable". He opposed a portion of the Asquith L.J decision
in that regard. In the case of Victoria Laundry which referred to the contractual test as making a
"reasonably" recovery of damages.
Predictable as the consequence of the violation is liable." “This may be a difficult critique of
Asquith L.J., as it can be argued that his language conveyed a reasonable predictability in
context and it was not mentioned in his assertion that he found the contract and torture tests
similar6”.
He argued that a reasonable predictability based on the parties' knowledge (or at least the
defendant's knowledge at contract time) that, as a reasonable person, he will possibly result in a
grave probability or immediate risk, as a reasonable person. In this respect, in The Heron, House
of Lords was wrongly accused of using the terms "reasonably predictable" as too low a
possibility and thus confounding it with the test of tort: these two things were not determined in
1949 (when Asquith L.J. offered his opinion on Victoria Laundry – and when, strictly, the
research was different). This is why the House of Lords was wrongfully blamed by (in The

6
(1961) A.C. 388
Wagon Mound and the cases which followed it in establishing that a loose form of "reasonable
foreseeability" is the test in tort). In the other hand, in the Wagon Mound, the Privy Council
sowed the seeds of the matter that the House of Lords found it appropriate to resolve in the
Heron II, as Viscount Simonds, in giving the Board's decision, shared his belief that the rules of
contract and tort remoteness are the same. He hadn't even considered that in Victoria Laundry. It
was therefore natural that the tort and contract checking should be argued in the first case of
contract remoteness before the House of Lords following wrongfully developed incidents in the
Wagon Mound situations. The issue emerged from the development of the cases of injury, which
emphasized that the probability of failure in the tort test was comparatively minimal. “In The
Heron II, Lord Reid was perhaps especially sensitive in this respect, because it was him who
gave the Wagon Mound Privy Council's (No. 2), where he claimed that the issue was false
whether a fair man's mind might be at risk or not and would not be as far-fetched as possible.
The issue emerged from the development of the cases of injury, which emphasized that the
probability of failure in the tort test was comparatively minimal. In The Heron II, Lord Reid was
perhaps especially sensitive in this respect, because it was him who gave the Wagon Mound
Privy Council's (No. 2), where he claimed that the issue was false whether a fair man's mind
might be at risk or not and would not be as far-fetched as possible7”. This is the "default" law,
which has already been discussed above, and the Viscount Simonds' decision in the Wagon
Mound most specifically shows that Hadley v. Baxendale is liable "for the probable
consequences of his act" in his statement that there is a general concept in the tort and contract.
The House of Lords' thoughts in The Heron II are, however, especially relevant. They also
followed a methodology focused on the underlying purposes of this special field of law. The
opinion was in effect that the statutory remoteness test was set quite separately from the
misdemeanor test and that the test itself was separate, for various principal purposes arising from
the fundamental objectives of contract law. And the biggest distinction found by the House was
that the relationship between the parties is distinct from that between the parties concerned.

Since there were no fresh or unforeseen effects on the external source of threat, further research
is required to determine if the real harm suffered is foreseeable. If taken too far, thorough
classification might make predicting - bility a myth, if it exists.

7
Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1964) 1 Q.B. 518.
The courts have not yet worked out clearly how far the classification can go, although they are
aware that it must not go too far. The simplest classification of types of damage is
(a) Personal injury
(b) Economic damage solely &
(c) Land losses. The foresight of one form of injuries may not contribute to another's foresight.
However, this triple definition may simply be too naive for the nuanced concerns that may occur,
but these definitions have been touched by the courts.

In a case based on equal justice, the requirements for remoteness are always contrasted with
those applicable in error and so these criteria should be explained first. It has been recognized
that the claimant in a negligence lawsuit is responsible, after the cases of the Wagon Mound,
only for damages of a kind which were predictable as a result of his disregard less act.
Foreseeability also requires recovery for violation of contractual obligation, public and private
nuisance, and strict liability under the Rylands v Fletcher law. However, foresight does not
include blame for deception or jurisdiction for any other tort found therein. An intentional
torturer is still liable, without any remoteness constraint, for the intended consequences of his
deed, and is therefore responsible for the unintended consequences of his deed. The immediate
effects are the factual consequences of the defendant's violation of duty excluding properly
attributable consequences for another purpose. Thus, whether the interfering behavior of a third
entity or the intervening natural causes is responsible, a loss object would be too distant. The
argument can be inferred with only one step ahead of the moment at which intentionality is an
ingredient for damages, the primary criterion of remoteness is straightforwardness, and the other
criterion is predictability where motive is not a part of it. Perhaps this prejudice reflects deterrent
and moral considerations.

The recipient will first sue for the infringement of the trust and seek restitution for any harm that
they have incurred. A first form claim is equivalent to a claim for damages sustained in tort or
violation of contract. Second, the beneficiary will sue to manage the trust for the fulfillment of
the principal duties of the trustee. The argument may request an order to distribute, to put or to
move the property in a suitable investment situation. The court would normally have to review
the trust property by taking the trust accounts before issuing any of these orders. When the
trustee cannot justify legally what or half of the property is, he needs to balance the account with
funds taken from his own pocket. A second category of claim is equivalent to a specific contract
performance claim in the knowledge that special performance with reimbursement for faults in
the subject-matter will be provided. A second form of lawsuit applies to the fulfillment of an
obligation instead of the reparation of a loss as the word is applied to relief damages. The
remoteness requirements fundamentally concern a reduction of reclaimable damages and are
conceptually inapplicable to this argument. In comparison, an argument of the first sort attempts
to redress a loss in a pecuniary manner and it is also reasonable for the accused to inquire
whether the reparation is to be cut down when the loss has arisen unusually or spontaneously. If
payout is not conditioned by the remoteness requirement of any kind, it would enhance
unrestricted liability. This will be appalling and anomalous. “In contravention of trust cases the
wholesale omission of distance factors is typically referred to in Re Dawson in the Street J
decision. The trustee has misappropriated what was already meant by the beneficiaries in
Australia and an indicator of the date that currencies will have to be translated to judge 8”. Street
J's decision is less interesting in his conclusion that transferring the trustee's income, or property
which he has misleadingly derived from it, should take place at the judgment date than for its
broader discussion of the values of "defaulting trustee." Street J said that the duty of such a
trustee "is essentially to restitute the trust property." One of the elements of the duty to restitute
is that the provisions of common law on the remoteness of injury do not limit it.

“In the decision by the Court of Exchequer at Hadley v Baxendale, the rules on the distance
from liability in the deal are set out in the later proceedings. The mill of the claimant had stalled
in Hadley v Baxendale because of its failure on the crankshaft. In the required time, the
defendant carrier did not supply the broken crankshaft to the producer. The restart of the mill
was postponed. If the mill was begun without hesitation, the claimant sued to reclaim the money
he made. It refused the lawsuit because of an unfair delay in carrier distribution of the fractured
shaft to the third party in order to avoid the mill profits9”. The Court denied the claim.

This law was clearly and carefully framed and aimed at judges in juries:
8
1961.AC. 347
9
(1954) 1 W.L.R. 1047
Where two parties have entered into a contract that one of them has violated, the damages to be
paid to the other party as a consequence of such a breach of the contract may be considered to
have happened, legal, fair and reasonable, that is, contrary to normal course of events, as a result
of such infringement of the contract or as could fairly have existed in the contract itself. The
damages resulting from a breach of contract such that they reasonably consider would be the
amount of injury normally resulting from a breach of the contract were therefore completely
unknown, under such special circumstances. In particular, the plaintiff informed the defendant
about the particular circumstances in which the agreement was effectively concluded.

The claimants have a greater level of contemplation of the probability of the individual failure
than the applicable general principle in error with this general principle. Fair foresight is a
remoteness measure in the law of damage in the event of the contract a considerably higher
amount of foresight, i.e. a substantial possibility of a genuine failure happening, is appropriate.
As a result, losses are diminished more contractually than wrongfully.
“H Parsons v Ingham and Co. In H Parsons Ltd v Ltd., the defendant failed to detect the
adequate ventilation of the animal feed given to the appellant, resulting in the death of many pigs
from the claimants. The foregoing damages test was met when the complainant should have
considered that the pigs may have been severely ill10”.
The reason for this difference is that, first, by notifying the plaintiff of any loss arising from
special circumstances when making a contract, it is possible for the claimant to be liable to a
higher extent, and secondly, by increasing the infringement, the party may adopt measures to
protect itself from any loss that may result from consensus with the plaintiff.

The theory of general law notes that liabilities must be assigned until losses are incurred by a
crime. However, as many examples have demonstrated, it's not always an easy job to allocate
liabilities.
When a misdeed is done (torture) several effects may be endured. The results can have additional
implications. These 'impacts' will become a long line, and at times the issue of a defendant's
responsibility emerges. The question under discussion in this specific subject is "How long can

10
(1921) 3 K.B. 360
the responsibility of the defendant be expanded to cover the effects of the crime of the
defendant? ”
This entire idea of 'effects' would sound overwhelming to a first-time reader. So we will look at a
basic example to help us better understand the dilemma.
In the simplicity of this example, the defendant, who was a runner, strikes a footballer carelessly.
Moreover, the footballer was holding a bomb. And because of the defendant's incompetence, the
peat bomber collapses and the bomb explodes and the pea bomber dies. Now a nearby building is
shot and five people are killed by the blast. The fire damages the house and surrounding houses,
leading to another twenty deaths. In addition, the demolition of adjacent stores leads to financial
damages for shop owners.
Although this example is too far-fetched, it is not impossible to see that similar cases like this
particular domino effect can occur, and that their presence can cause legal problems.
In the case above, we can see how the defendant's misdemeanour can result in repercussions that
the defendant has neither expected nor previously understood. This raises questions for fault
assignment. While the Court held that a defendant was to be responsible for the pedestrian's
death, can the Court then punish the defendant for the death of the other 25 persons without a
hesitation?
In the “case of Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Lord Wright is also to a certain degree responsible
for the issue. The law cannot take into consideration something after an act of wrong; it treats
such subsequent matters as beyond the limits of its choosing, because it was the law's endless
authority to judge causes or consequences. The legislation needs to abstract those related
implications in the varied market network, not for sheer conceptual purposes, but only for
realistic reasons11”.
In order to resolve those queries, attorneys propose that the accused is merely liable for the
repercussions of the defendant's misdemeanor (and not remoteness).
Haynes v. Harwood
Thanks to their carelessness, the defendant's servants dumped a horse cart on a busy street in this
historically prominent event. There were kids and women on the street. Some children peelted
stones at the horses, which led to the horses bolting and putting the safety of the citizens on the

11
Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison – (1993) A.C. 448
road at risk. A policeman (the complainant here) sustained injury himself in order to stop horses
and rescape women and children.
One defense in an action brought by the appellant against the defendant was novus actus
interveniens (remoteness of consequences).
In the present case again, the Court ruled that novus actus interveniens was not a legitimate
defense and, as the cause of the injuries sustained by the complainant, the disregarding act of the
servants of the appellant was left by the horse van unattended.
“Lynch v. Nurdin - This scenario is to a certain degree close to the previous one. The defendant
here unattended on a street leaving his horse-cart. Some kids started to play the horse-cart. One
kid (the plaintiff) sits on the cart and the other starts the horse. The infant has also been injured
and an intervention has been taken. The defense of novus actus interiens was also requested in
this situation. Again, however, the Court held the plaintiff's injuries to be a close result of the
conduct by the appellant, and so the plaintiff was held responsible12”. According to this measure,
whether a fair man has expected the implications of a misdemeanor act, they are not too distant.
This remoteness test was advocated by Pollock. The defendant's "responsibility is only for the
consequences of a reasonable person under the circumstances of a wrongdoer, he said in Rigby c.
Hewitt and Greenland c. Chaplin's case13”.
Here, though, we have to note that the mitigation alone would not be adequate to claim that the
defendant does not predict the repercussions. by the defendant or not. This fair foresight measure
lost its reputation when the directness was checked. But it managed to recover the currency of
lawyers, as we can see later. The measure of directness demonstrates that a person is responsible
for all the straightforward consequences of his act, whether he or she could or could not have
expected them, because the consequences of a wrong act are not too far from each other.
Further, under this test he is responsible for all the immediate effects of his illegal act if the
defendant should expect any harm. It will be enough to see the Re Polemis case in order to
properly grasp this particular remoteness test.
This is the leading case in the test of directness, also referred to as the case of “Re Polemis. In
the judgment of the Courts of Appeal, the test of fair foresight was the appropriate test although
the Privy Council consequently confirmed the directness test14”.
12
Lynch v. Nurdin (1841) 1 Q.B. 29.
13
Greenland v. Chaplin – (1850) 5 Ex. 243
14
Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. – (1921) 3 K.B. 560
The relevant facts of the case were that the accused chartered a cargo ship. A amount of petrol or
benzene in tins was included in the freight. The tins were spilled and oil stored in the ship's hold.
Now a plane dropped into the hold and subsequently sparks were produced because of the
incompetence of the defendant's servants. The ship was absolutely destroyed by fire because of
these sparks.
The private council ruled that shipowners had the right to recover the damage in this case, since
the defendants had not been able to expect such loss. The defendant was deemed to have been
solely responsible for his incompetence as fire (and the resulting loss of the ship), which meant
that it was irrelevant whether or not the defendant had reasonably foreseen this.
“Scott v. Shepherd: A threw a lighted squib into a crowd, it fell upon X. X, in order to prevent
injury to himself, did the same thing and it fell upon Y and Y in his turn did the same thing and it
then fell on B, as a result of which B lost one of his eyes. A was held liable to B. His act was the
proximate cause of damage even though his act was farthest from the damage in so far as the acts
X and Y had intervened in between15”.

Remoteness of the damage refers to a situation that the injury must be of a probable kind. In the
event of liability lawsuits, if the complainant has proven that the contract specifies them an
obligation of confidentiality and is in violation of that responsibility that brings injury, they must
therefore show that the injury isn't too distant. Relative isolation of injury must also extend to
complaints underneath the Occupiers Liability Act and to claims for damages.

Remoteness of injury is also used as an external tool for regulating tortious liability. Not all loss
is going to be salvageable under the tort statute. Initially, the accused was responsible for any
damages which were a direct outcome of the violation of obligation by the offender.
There are several examples of the usage of remoteness of damage in Indian judiciary as well.
"No one should ever be charged with all the repercussions of his wrongdoing, since they are
unlimited. Only the immediate, normal and fair effects are those to be paid for" was indeed the
definition first and used developed by the English legal system in the foremost expert of Hadley
v Baxendale (1854). The idea was referred to as the 'Inaccessibility of Harm' hypothesis. This
was a very noble effort and an honorable achievement made by the Common law in 1854, and

15
Scott v. Shephard – 17 W.B1. 892
the idea that has grown is respected and used by researchers recommend the following and courts
all around the world. “Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act 187216” deal with the inaccessibility
of claims.
Through the ageing process and owing to the numerous cases which have appeared before the
judiciary all across the world, several remoteness measures of the harm sustained by the
complainant have been established which are more generously applied by the Torts Law than by
the Contract Law, where these remoteness assessments are used in a very stringent and succinct
fashion. Underneath the Tort Rule, there is a popular principle on the point "Injuria non remota
causa sed proxima spectatur" which, in law, is to be regarded as the immediate and not the
distant trigger of every case. Consequently, the same principle is applied in contract law, and it
follows that the penalties are determined or calculated based of the actual and possible effects of
the violation. To conclude, this aspect of remoteness of damage is important and thus significant
in understanding the liability, conduct and the impacts of negligence and breach of duty.

REFERENCES

 Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison [1993] AC 449.

 Scott v. Shepherd [1773] 2 WM B1 892.
 Haynes v. Harwood (1935) 1 K.B. 146.
 Lynch v. Nurdin (1841) 1 Q.B. 29.
 Rigby v. Hewitt (1850) 5 Ex. 240.
 Greenland v. Chaplin (1850) 5 Ex. 243.
 Re Polemis and Furness, Wilthy & Co. (1921) 3 K.B. 560.
 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engg. Co. Ltd. (1961)
A.C. 388.
 Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963) AC 837.
 Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1964) 1 Q.B. 518.
 S.C.M. (UK) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall & Sons (1971) 1 Q.B. 337.
 R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts (Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad, 24th
edn., 2017).

16
“section 73. Indian contract act 1872.