Book Reviews

Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein. Oxford
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University Press, 1996. Pp.240, 17 illus., 14 maps, biblio., index; £17.99. ISBN 0-19-
820497-3.

This is a thought-provoking book. Brian Bond, Professor of Military History at King's

College, London, takes as his theme the nature and creation of 'victory' in modern
war, tracing the changes in perception and reality from the 'Cabinet wars' of the
eighteenth century, through the Napoleonic period and its immediate aftermath, to the
total and limited conflicts of the last 80 years. The sub-title to the book is therefore
slightly misleading, in that Professor Bond begins with Frederick the Great rather than
Napoleon, but this is a minor criticism, perhaps excused by the publisher's wish to
provide unversed readers with a familiar context. It certainly does nothing to
undermine the value of the work, which lies primarily in its sustained central theme.
As the various chapters are read, a coherent and persuasive argument emerges,
centred on the development of war as an instrument of policy. Thus, having discussed
the survival of Prussia in the Seven Years War as unusual in the sense that Frederick's
ability to combine strategy and politics ran counter to the norm of limited, dynastic
conflicts, often fought for no more than border fortresses, Professor Bond moves on to
consider the reputation of Napoleon, arguging that, despite his great military victories
at Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena, he failed to gain full political advantage and, to a large
extent, engineered his own defeat. This leads into what is, arguably, one of the most
valuable chapters in the book, that on 'The Napoleonic Legacy', in which the
respective influences of Jomini and Clausewitz are considered. At a time when
Clausewitz is widely regarded as the 'father of modern strategy', not least by those in
both Britain and the United States who are responsible for the creation of military
doctrine, this chapter offers an excellent and succinct survey of modern scholarship on
his influence. A similar survey of the ideas of von Moltke allows Professor Bond to
bring the book into the twentieth century.
It is at this point that the book,- perhaps inevitably, shifts away from the impact of
battle to a firmer emphasis on the politico-strategic level of war. The author has to
cover an enormous amount once he comes on to the two World Wars and their
aftermath, and although the central theme is sustained, the final chapters are slightly
less satisfactory for that very reason. In a sense, they become surveys of global
conflict, followed by coverage of the 'nuclear age' post-1945. This does not
undermine their value - indeed, the points put forward in terms of the problems
inherent in pursuing 'victory' in total war are well made and apt - but, perhaps because
they are more familiar to most readers, they appear to have less to say that is
provocative or original. One advantage they do have, however, is that they reflect the
latest research in their respective fields, enhancing the innate usefulness of the book.
The Pursuit of Victory therefore works on two levels. First, it is an extremely
valuable overview of warfare since the mid-eighteenth century, essential to the reader
who wishes to gain insights into how conflict has changed during that time. Second, it
presents a well researched and resourced theme on the changing nature of 'victory',
introducing the reader to complex arguments in a straightforward way. It is those
arguments that make us think, and that should always be the aim of a scholarly work.
When, in addition, the book is well produced, with good illustrations and clear maps,
 BOOK REVIEWS 141

and - in this day and age - is not excessively expensive, it is a work to be

recommended to specialist and general readers alike.

JOHN PIMLOTT
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Dept of War Studies

RMA Sandhurst

David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-14. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1996. Pp. xi + 463, 7 figs, 10 tables; £48. ISBN 0-19-820208-3.

Rather as 'Gold, God or Glory' used to be a familiar cliche of examination questions

dealing with the phenomenon of the 'new imperialism' so those posed with regard to
the outbreak of war in 1914 tended to focus not only on that imperialism itself but also
on such possible causation factors as 'secret diplomacy', the alliance system and the
'arms race'. Almost inextricably included in the latter was the notion popularised by
A. J. P. Taylor of 'war by timetable'. Some of these concepts, of course, had been
products of the very earliest historiography of the Great War and, if Woodrow Wilson
could be said to have contributed 'secret diplomacy' to the equation, then it might
equally be argued that the memoirs of Lord Grey of Fallodon in 1925 imparted the idea
that the arms race had inevitably led to war.
It is this claim that David Stevenson tests in a comprehensive examination of
European armaments policies, drawing upon British, French, Austrian, German,
Belgian and Italian archives and making judicious use not only of statistical data but
also of the methodology of political scientists who have examined contemporary arms
races and crisis management. Although he is also at pains to examine the realities of
the existence of any 'military-industrial complex' among the European powers,
Stevenson is primarily concerned to investigate the relationship of armaments and
foreign policy.
His emphasis is upon armaments rather than arms since his focus is preparedness
for war among the eventual belligerents and his detailed analysis draws attention to the
significance not of arms purchases but of the increase in mobilisation speeds resulting
from such measures as the double tracking of railways and the proportion of
manpower under arms. Indeed, while previous attention has been given to naval
building, Stevenson is concerned with armies. Thus, the 'great acceleration' of
1912-13 had little to do with naval rivalries, the competition for first short-term
readiness and, then, medium-term preparedness being marked by significant military
legislation in Italy, France, Belgium and Germany between June and August 1913 and,
subsequently, in Austria-Hungary in March 1914 before the announcement of the
'Great Programme' in Russia on the very eve of war. Previously, there had been a
rough equivalence in armaments between 1904 and 1908, which had then begun to
break down under the impact of the Bosnian Crisis on the eastern powers and the
Second Moroccan Crisis on the western powers. Essentially, however, this is a
diplomatic history in which the significance of armaments policies lie as much in their
potential political leverage over external powers as in their defensive or deterrent
effect.
In this context, while this rapid augmentation of military preparedness owed most
to the Balkan Wars, Stevenson sees Russian military improvements and, especially, the
German inability in 1912 to distinguish easily between the Russian trial mobilisation
 142 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

and the real thing (when it had not been previously notified as was usual) as the trigger
for the shift in German armaments expenditure from navy to army. Moreover, trial
mobilisations in themselves were the most dangerous and unsettling new feature of
international pditics. However, in terms of the on-going debate on the German
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responsibility for war in August 1914, Stevenson inclines to the 'calculated risk'
interpretation of German policy, seeing the faster mobilisation times achievable as a
result of heightened armaments expenditure as enabling greater risks to be run.
Stevenson recognises that Conrad, Moltke and Falkenhayn- who emerges as pushing
mobilisation harder than Moltke - all perceived an opportunity in the July Crisis but
he is not convinced that any of them were in full control.
Stevenson's conclusion, therefore, is that increased armaments expenditure
persuaded both alliance systems that they could be victorious in 1914, and it can be
predicted, perhaps, that his neat summarising phrase echoing Trotsky - armaments
were 'the wheels and pistons of the locomotive of history, not the steam' - will appear
in many an undergraduate essay. Whether they will persevere with what is at times a
very dense text is another matter and it would be unfortunate if such formidable
scholarship was not fully assimilated, particularly the full coverage accorded lesser
players on the international scene such as Italy and Belgium. Certainly, however,
Stevenson's achievement will be readily appreciated by specialists in the period.

IAN F.W. BECKETT

Dept of History
University of Luton

Geoffrey Miller, Superior Force: The Conspiracy behind the Escape of the
Goeben and Breslau. Hull: The University of Hull Press, 1996. Pp.458, biblio., index,
£12.95 (paper). ISBN 0-85958-635-9.

In early August 1914 two German warships, the battlecruiser Goeben and the light
cruiser Breslau wriggled their way through British naval forces in the Mediterranean
and arrived at Constaninople. Their arrival was taken as evidence of general German
support for Turkey and in particular was seen as replacements for two Turkish
warships that were then being built in Britain and which had been controversially
commandeered by the Royal Navy as it prepared for battle with Germany's High Sea
Fleet. The Turkish government and people had been so infuriated by this act of British
betrayal that the arrival of the German warships proved to be decisive in persuading
the Turks to enter the war on the German side. The Russo-Turkish war in the
Caucasus, the Gallipoli campaign, the siege of Kut and the Palestine campaign
inexorably followed
The passage of these two warships, then, turned out to be a pivotal event in the
opening of the First World War, deeply fascinating for both its own sake and for its
tremendous consequences. Geoffrey Miller provides the most detailed and
authoritative account of the escape that is currently available. Support can be found in
its pages for the two grand competing theories of history - the cock-up and conspiracy
schools of thought.
The Royal Navy certainly failed to cover itself in its normal glory in this episode
and looked for explanations in the consequent courts martial of many of the main
participants. The problem was the Goeben was in fact rather more powerful than most
of the forces hunting it, even when they were in combination. It was far from clear
 BOOK REVIEWS 143

where the Germans were going [they might have been heading for the Adriatic).
Moreover the diplomatic/strategic situation was confused: neither Austria nor Turkey
were yet regarded as enemies and, if treated with care, might not become so.
In this difficult situation, as Miller convincingly shows, the opportunities for
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misread signals, failures to appreciate the intentions of superiors, subordinates and

other actors in the drama, the tendency to exercise caution, in view of the high stakes
resting on the game, were legion. Nor were the naval officers on the spot and their
authorities back in Admiralty the only culprits in this sorry story. Perhaps the best
illustration of the cock up school of history in the whole book is in fact the episode in
which one Admiralty clerk drafted out a declaration of war on Austria ready for
dispatch to the Fleet should it ever prove necessary and went off to have his tea. When
he returned, he discovered that his relief, thinking it was for real, had sent it off!
But Miller's book also provides much evidence of the alternative conspiracy theory
of history. Here the main culprit was the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos who, aided or
not, consciously or not, by the British Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Navy Admiral
Mark Kerr, deliberately withheld crucial information from the British and allowed the
Germans to be refuelled so that the ships could reach Constaninople and so that Turkey
would join the war on the German side. His assumption was that Turkey would lose and
that Greece would benefit from the consequent carve up of the Turkish empire. Certainly,
Miller makes a persuasive case of this fascinating hypothesis.
Overall, then, this book is a good read (though close attention has to be paid to
detail and to nuances of the argument) and it forms an interesting and significant
exploration of a complex but important episode in the early days of the First World
War at sea.
GEOFFREY TILL
JSCSC Bracknell

Carlo D'Este, A Genius For War: A Life of General George S. Patton. London:
HarperCollins, 1995. Pp.xiii + 977, 91 illus., 9 maps, bibijo, index; £25. ISBN 0-00-
215882-5.

On 8 January 1945, in cold of six degrees below zero, trucks carrying infantry of the
US 90th Division moved towards the Ardennes battlefront. Moving in the opposite
direction on the other side of the road were ambulances filled with wounded, eloquent
testimony to some of the bitterest fighting that US troops endured in North-West
Europe. Yet, when an open jeep joined the column and as the troops recognised its
occupant they leaned out of their trucks, cheering wildly; they were soldiers of the US
Third Army, in the jeep was their General, George S. Patton. 'It was', writes Carlo
D'Este, 'an incredible scene, wonderfully spontaneous', it is also one of the most
telling passages in his splendid biography of Patton, for soldiers heading towards
possible death or wounding are seldom moved to such shows of confidence and
affection for those who control their destiny - it is the spirit which wins battles, and
few have been the commanders who could so inspire ft.
Yet Patton has always been one of military history's most controversial and elusive
subjects, whose reputation, asserts Carlo D'Este,' ...has been perpetually tarnished by
the facade he himself created and the public effortlessly accepted: that he was a
swashbuckling, brash, profane, impetuous soldier who wore two ivory-handled
revolvers and loved war so much he was nicknamed "Old Blood and Guts'", a self-
invented personality which ' . . . nearly destroyed him and has severely distorted his place
 144 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

in history'. Through the pages of this painstakingly researched and most absorbing book,
which once taken up is hard to put down, Patton emerges as an immensely complex, but
often anguished man, perpetually haunted by the fear of failure, yet always driven by his
ambition to fulfill what the author describes as ' ... his lifelong dream of leading a
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conquering army in a great battle'. The great strength of this book is that, by extensive
reference to the Patton family papers, Carlo D'Este has succeeded in reconstructing
Patton's life in such detail as to provide a valuable insight into his character; indeed,
much is seen through the eyes of Patton and those close to him. Although his patrician
family background and being nurtured on stories of heroic military forebears were
undoubtedly influencing factors, Patton was convinced of his destiny to pursue a military
career from an early age, and whatever the odds. While this gave the young cadet of the
Virginia Military Institute and later West Point the determination and stamina to
overcome what are now recognised as the deeply demoralizing effects of dyslexia, and
to become an accomplished athlete and sportsman, Patton the man appears as egocentric
and often impossible to live with. Few readers will be able to resist the image of Patton
the junior cavalry officer jumping over chairs and tables to escape the sword-brandishing
wife he had provoked once too often.
The most intriguing and thought-provoking feature of this book, however, is the
opportunity it gives us to comprehend a very rare breed - those soldiers whose true
vocation is not so much soldiering, but war. Patton, as Carlo D'Este makes clear, took
no satisfaction in gratuitous death and destruction, neither was he a butcher; indeed, as
the author observes, no commander '... ever devoted more time to training his troops
to such a high standard that would save, not waste, their lives'. What Patton did
possess, and which is apparent both in his distinguished service with the American
Army's embryonic Tank Corps during World War I and in his generalship during
World War II, was a formidable intellectual understanding of war and what Carlo
D'Este identifies as '... that intangible, instinctive sense of what must be done in the
heat and chaos of battle' combined with a ' ... willingness to take risks and to make
crucial life-and-death decisions no one else would dare'. This was despite his
undoubted eccentricity and his alarming tendency to speak and act with little thought
for the consequences. Indeed, the extent to which Patton's value on the battlefield was
appreciated by Eisenhower and the Allied command may be seen in that, after slapping
two combat-fatigued soldiers during visits to military hospitals in Sicily in 1943 and
the consequent public outcry, he was not sent home in disgrace but retained for future
employment - a decision vindicated by his later performance as commander of Third
Army during the breakout from Normandy and, perhaps his finest hour, during the
crisis of the German Ardennes offensive in 1944-45.
What Patton has most to tell us about though is leadership. Whatever we may feel
about him, he certainly knew how to make his presence felt and the majority of those
who served under him responded positively to his unique and unorthodox style of
command; he knew how to train and prepare soldiers for the realities of combat and
he knew how to motivate them to fight. That those who possess such qualities are
liable to become an embarrassment in peacetime should not blind us to what they can
accomplish in war, 'Ask any soldier what his outfit was', observes Carlo D'Este, 'and
invariably he will reply, such and such a division or regiment. Ask anyone who served
in Third Army and he will answer "Third Army" or "I was with Patton".'

IAN GOODERSON
Dept of War Studies
King's College London
 BOOK REVIEWS 145
Stephen Robert Twigge, The Early Development of Guided Weapons in the United
Kingdom, 1940-60. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993.
Pp.248, 18 illus., biblio., index, £35. ISBN 3-7186-5297-8.
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It is a matter of debate as to how far the doctoral dissertation lends itself to immediate
conversion into a book. The standards required for a PhD degree are not necessarily
the same as those for published work. Blemishes that do not undermine the overall
worth of a thesis as a demonstration of the academic quality of the candidate may flaw
the same text as a contribution to the literature. More work is often required on a thesis
before publication to fill in gaps and smooth off rough edges. If this work is not done
then the young scholar is in some danger from his reviewers. One fears that this one
is.
The subject of Dr Twigge's work is an interesting and significant one, the
development of the first generation of Britain's guided weapons. His approach is
sound enough, combining a consideration of the interplay of technological, strategic
and political factors. This requires both mastery of a wide range of sources, primary
and secondary, and the ability to understand both technology and the policy process.
It is a considerable challenge and the author rises to it sufficiently to deserve his
doctorate. As a book, however, his work falls short of the mark in several ways.
The book's research base is patchy at best. Dr Twigge used some of the files of the
Cabinet, Ministry of Supply, Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence, but the
exploitation of these sources has been far from complete and there are no references
to Admiralty or War Office files in the footnotes. The range of secondary sources used
is also very limited. Both of these problems have adverse effects, especially when
more general policy matters are under discussion. One of the most notable cases of this
is when the author trots out the old and totally discredited claim that the Chiefs of Staff
adopted a ten-year 'no war' planning assumption in 1946. An examination of their
files would have demonstrated this was not the case. Moreover, this subject was
addressed directly in at least one article in a well known journal in the 1980s and to
make the exploded claim in a book published in 1993 based on a footnote citing a late
1960s source just will not do. Much archivally-based work has been carried out on
British defence policy over the last decade and a half but there is not much evidence
of it here and the gap is not made up for by original research; the strategic planning
chapter has just three PRO references out of 39.
Some of the other citation is a little odd also. The characteristics of the
Bloodhound surface-to-air missile seem to come from an American translation of a
Russian technical publication of 1963! Is this necessarily the best source? There is a
mass of technical and aviation literature describing in great detail the characteristics
and histories of most of weapons and their associated platforms that Dr Twigge is
covering, but the author has barely skimmed the available material. Chapter 2,
'Individual Projects', in particular, ought to have been reworked before publication to
make it more comprehensive and accurate. So ought the potentially very useful
glossary of projects at the end, for some dubious factual statements appear here,
notably that the naval missile codenamed Green Light was cancelled in 1955; the
many users of this weapon that became Sea Cat (a name which does not appear
anywhere) would have found that surprising.
This major error - Green Light/Sea Cat should have been considered in some
detail alongside the other systems covered - illustrates the fundamental problem of the
book rather well. The author saw a proposal to cancel Green Light in 1955 and admits
in his text that gaps in the documentary record make it hard to determine whether the
 146 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

proposal was accepted. He thought it was but it was not and one of the most widely-
used British missiles of the period resulted. A thorough knowledge of the secondary
literature would have prevented this serious faux pas being made.
There are good features about this book; when the author has seen the documents
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he constructs informative, interesting and helpful accounts of the organisation and

process of missile development in the 1940s and 1950s. His discussion of the often-
forgotten 1950 Global Strategy Paper and its temporary impact in giving defensive
missiles equal priority to nuclear weapons is interesting as it is the more general
material on programme management and the final conclusions. The author clearly has
considerable skills as a researcher and academic analyst of science and technology
policy. He has not done himself justice in this book, however and it must be used with
great care.
ERIC GROVE
University of Hull

Paul Cornish, British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany 1945-50.
London: Macmillan Press, and New York: St Martin's Press, 1996. Pp.xi + 211,
biblio, index; £40. ISBN 0-312-12960-20.

The Third Reich was defeated in May 1945 after a long, extremely expensive and
brutal war. The British were an important part of the Anti-Hitler coalition which in
spite of various internal problems eventually managed to achieve military victory.
They won the war, but the prize they paid for this victory in terms of economic
strength and global political influence was considerable. So it would have been absurd
to ask the political or military establishment in Great Britain, at the eve of the post-war
period, what their country might be capable and willing to contribute to the defence of
Germany.
The occupation of (the British zone of) Germany, although visualized by the
presence of armed forces, was mainly a civil affair: policing a defeated state and
preventing any anticipated revanchism (there was not any). The British military
doctrine of post-1945 rested on three pillars: defence of the UK, a firm stand in the
Middle East, and control of the sea lines of communication (SLOC).
The political and strategic situation changed, however, with unforeseen speed. The
Anti-Hitler coalition fell apart, and the East-West conflict developed into a menacing
Cold War. This dramatic change of the strategic landscape was deepened by rapid
developments in ultra-modern military technology. And it was, of course, also
influenced by budgetary considerations, an aspect the British military planners were
used to regard as bleak and depressing.
The author of this sobre and precise study presents a chronological account of
British military planning for the defence of Germany and Western Europe in the years
between the defeat of the Third Reich and the North Korean invasion of South Korea
in June 1950. These were difficult years for the victorious armed forces of the UK, for
the economic constraints made themselves painfully felt.
The book is composed of six chapters. The first chapter deals with the changing
threat perceptions of the British military. On the European theatre, the German threat
was slowly overshadowed by the emerging Soviet threat. It is only logical that the
'worst case' here would be an alliance between a recovering Germany and an
expansionist Soviet Union. In spite of this threat perception, the British were more
 BOOK REVIEWS 147

than reluctant to see their security interests (pillar one) in close relation to the defence
of the continent.
The second chapter analyses the consequences of the budgetary constraints on the
armed forces, one of them being the inter-service rivalry between the Navy and RAF
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on the one side and the Army on the other. The following chapter discusses the 'five
plus five, no war rule' which meant that in the next five years the danger of war would
be restricted and that it would slowly grow during the next five-year-period. This was
certainly not a rule, but a decision, mainly inspired by economic frustrations and an
attempt to cope with them without getting depressed. It seemed necessary to balance
the strategic and economic needs and to give this compromise some form of doctrinal
legitimation.
The next three chapters explore the development of British military planning in
three steps: 1945^*7; 1948 (the year of the Berlin crisis); 1949-50 (when the influence
of the Americans pushed Britain towards the continental security arena). The author
sums up: 'The debate was always uneven; the continental strategy was never a credible
alternative to the air orthodoxy... By the end of 1948 a wide gap had developed
between the growing political commitment to European defence... and the strategic
preferences of Britain's military' (pp. 165-6).
The main sources of this book are unpublished papers of the Public Record office,
among them minutes and memoranda of the Chiefs of Staff which provide a
fascinating insight into the motives and interests, perceptions and political manoeuvres
of the most important strategic experts in Britain. Dr Cornish is always very prudent
when he has to criticise opinions and actions of his protagonists. This does not mean,
however, that he refrains from harsh judgements when he deems them appropriate.
This account of an un-expected challenge for and the reluctant change of the
British military is a valuable contribution to the exploration of the early phase of the
Cold War.
WILFRIED VON BREDOW
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Philipps-Universität Marburg

Thanos P. Dokos, Negotiations for a CTBT 1958-1994: Analysis and Evaluation of

American Policy. Lanham, Maryland; University Press of America, 1995. Pp.298,
biblio., index, $39.50. ISBN 0-8191-9985-0.

Negotiations for a CTBT 1958-1994 is an extremely valuable addition to the history

of the very lengthy negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It
includes detailed analyses of the obstacles to an agreement and of the strong objections
of various domestic pressure groups within the USA.
No other nuclear arms control measure has caused so much controversy over so
long a period of time as the CTBT. A CTBT was first put on the international political
agenda by Jawaharlal Nehru, then the Prime Minister of India, as long ago as 1954,
soon after the United Kingdom became the third country to test nuclear weapons,
following the USA and the Soviet Union. France began nuclear testing in 1960 and
China in 1964.
The only other country definitely known to have conducted a nuclear test is India,
which exploded a nuclear device on 18 May 1974. Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan
are the other countries which have developed nuclear weapons, although South Africa
has dismantled its weapons. South Africa, possibly in collaboration with Israel, may
 148 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

have tested a nuclear device over the Indian Ocean in September 1979. The evidence
is inconclusive but tends to support those who believe that a nuclear test took place.
So far as we know, Pakistan has not yet tested a nuclear weapon.
Since the first nuclear weapon was exploded by the Americans on 26 July 1945 in
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the desert at Alamogordo, New Mexico, there have been about 2,050 nuclear
explosions. About 1,030 have been carried out by the USA; 715 by the Soviet Union;
209 by France; 45 by the UK; 43 by China; and one by India. The total explosive
power of these nuclear explosions is estimated to be the equivalent of that of about 510
million tonnes of TNT, equivalent to fewer than 40,000 Hiroshima atom bombs.
Five hundred and twenty-eight of these nuclear explosions were set off in the
atmosphere, with a total explosive power equivalent to that of about 30,000 Hiroshima
bombs. Exposure to the radiation from the radioactive fall-out from these atmospheric
nuclear explosions has already killed many people from cancer; eventually, it is
estimated, the death toll may rise to about 2 million people.
Given the consequences of continued nuclear testing, why was a CTBT so elusive?
Negotiations for a CTBT explains that part of the reason is that the impact over time
of a CTBT on the relative military power of the US and the former USSR was likely
to be both very significant and very hard to foresee accurately. The military
establishments were, therefore, unwilling to support a CTBT which they saw as a 'step
into the unknown and the incalculable*.
But perhaps a more important reason is the success of the American (and Soviet?)
nuclear-weapon laboratories in convincing nine American Presidents, from
Eisenhower to Bush inclusive, that without testing the nuclear-weapon testing teams
would split up and the USA would lose a irreplaceable national asset. Presidents
Johnson and Nixon were the most sympathetic to the nuclear-weapon scientists'
arguments; it took Clinton finally to overcome them. By then the Cold War was over,
which made it easier for Clinton to do so.
Negotiations for a CTBT is right to argue that a CTBT is now too late to stop
nuclear weapons spreading to new countries. In today's world, details about the design
of nuclear-fission weapons are available in the open literature. Countries which
operate nuclear-research or nuclear-power reactors, and most do, have bodies of
trained nuclear scientists and engineers which could be employed to design and
fabricate nuclear weapons. And nuclear-power reactors and large research reactors
could be used to produce the type of plutonium best suited for the most effective
nuclear weapons.
Today's nuclear scientists would be so confident that their designs of ordinary
nuclear weapons, modern versions of the bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, would work that they would not need to test them. But they would need to
test the much more complex thermonuclear weapons, so-called H-bombs. And so a
CTBT will not prevent the spread of ordinary nuclear weapons but will prevent new
countries developing thermonuclear weapons.
It will also prevent the existing nuclear-weapon powers developing and deploying
new types of nuclear weapon. But these powers already have such sophisticated
nuclear arsenals that they have no conceivable need for new types of nuclear weapons.
One reason for testing nuclear weapons is to check that they still work effectively.
A weapon is taken at random from the stockpile and exploded. When all nuclear tests
are banned, the military will eventually lose enough confidence in the reliability of
their nuclear weapons to be unwilling to make a pre-emptive nuclear strike, which
requires a very reliable nuclear force. This may turn out to be the most important
consequence of a CTBT.
 BOOK REVIEWS 149

But the main value of a CTBT for many non-nuclear-weapon powers is symbolic
and psychological, an indication that the major nuclear-weapon powers are willing to
fulfil their international obligations to end the nuclear arms race and make progress on
nuclear disarmament.
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Negotiations for a CTBT is the first comprehensive study of the CTBT

negotiations throughout the 37-year negotiating period. It is essential reading for all
interested in nuclear arms control issues.
FRANK BARNABY
Stockbridge, Hampshire

Ronnie E. Ford, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise. London and Portland,
Oregon: Frank Cass, 1995. Pp.xxi + 218, 8 illus., 8 maps, biblio., index; £28/$36
(cloth), £15/$19.50 (paper). ISBN 0-7146-4587-7 and -4189-8.

Ronnie E. Ford, a captain in the US Army, offers an analysis of the 1968 Tet
Offensive, utilising a significant amount of Communist Vietnamese sources. The
analysis begins with an outline of the Vietnamese concept of the 'General
Offensive/General Uprising'. According to that concept, the People's War would be
concluded by a General Offensive that would include sudden attacks on the cities. This
General Offensive would instigate a General Uprising (p. 10). Moreover, since the
presence of American ground troops in large numbers precluded the possibility of
military victory, the North Vietnamese aimed at the so-called decisive victory instead.
Thus, although military blows were important, actual military victory was not
necessary. The US, as France before it, would lose the war when its government and
people came to recognise that the war could not be won (pp.11, 48-9).
In June 1967, after a period of bitter internal struggling, the North Vietnamese
leadership translated those concepts into policy. Aware of the war-weariness of the
American people and anticipating that negotiations were forthcoming, Hanoi
formulated a two-pronged strategy: it would support a 'coalition' government in the
South, while simultaneously resorting to the General Offensive/General Uprising. This
would enable it to enter the phase of 'fighting while negotiating' from a position of
strength, and eventually gain the 'decisive victory' (pp.57-8, 70-1).
The campaign would start with attacks by North Vietnamese army units against
American targets along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Then, the Southern
revolutionaries (NLF) would launch the General Offensive, which would in turn
instigate the General Uprising. Finally, additional units of the North Vietnamese army
would cross the DMZ through gaps created during the first phase and bring about the
'decisive victory' (pp.93, 105-6).
Implementing the plan was a different story. Powerful American reaction foiled
the intended 'second wave' (Ch.6), whereas the Communist forces themselves were
badly co-ordinated. This lack of co-ordination was accentuated by General
Westmoreland's opposition to an extended truce during the Tet holidays, something
that made Hanoi hastily step up the day of the attack. Finally, Hanoi's order to the NLF
to continue its attacks long after the element of surprise had vanished had disastrous
consequences (Ch.7).
Although US intelligence knew that the enemy was preparing something big, the
large-scale affacks on the South Vietnamese cities came as a surprise to the Americans
(p. 194). According to Ford, 'the US was surprised at Tet because there was no fusion
of intelligence' (p. 186). Instead of a joint intelligence effort, which would
 150 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

simultaneously cover all the different aspects of the situation - military, political,
diplomatic - the various agencies were working in isolation, competing with each
other. Furthermore, US intelligence was hampered by sour relations with the South
Vietnamese (pp. 184—5) and political pressure to show progress in the war effort (Chs.
8, 9). Consequently, the Americans misinterpreted the meaning of the General
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Offensive/General Uprising, regarding it as "a one-blow effort", instead of the

potentially long process of continuous offensives that Hanoi envisaged (pp. 117—18).
Ironically, the NLF made the same mistake. Thus, both the NLF and the Americans
reacted with disbelief when first informed of Hanoi's decision to launch the General
Offensive (p.81); such a decision appeared nonsensical. Hence, the Americans were
surprised when that decision was implemented. The NLF, who had to implement it,
paid a heavier price (p. 118.).
The book is well researched and thickly footnoted. It is easily readable, though at
times repetitive. Its chief asset is the insights it provides into Hanoi's perspective of
the conflict. By showing that Westmoreland perceived the situation accurately and
took measures to counter the developing enemy initiative, Ford moves beyond the
simplistic notions of 'intelligence failure' and 'surprise despite warning' that abound
in the literature on surprise. After all, the actions that surprised the Americans were
largely detrimental to the Communists. Still, Ford could have shown the relation
between warning and response more clearly. For instance, Westmoreland's decision
to reinforce the Saigon area three weeks before the offensive, in response to
indications of forthcoming attack, is buried in a footnote on p. 112. Moreover, there is
a more general point about Tet: As Ford notes, the conditions of the Vietnam War were
such that the 'General Offensive/General Uprising, even if it failed, would improve
Hanoi's current position* (p.71). Hindsight vindicates this statement. In that case,
however, the obvious question is whether the Tet offensive was at all deferrable. This
issue needs exploration.
Overall, this is a useful book on an event that merits further study.

COSTAS KOLIOPOULOS
Dept of Politics and Int. Relations
Lancaster University

Mark Lorell, Troubled Partnership. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995.
Pp.xxvi + 452, biblio, index. NP (paper). ISBN 0-8330-2305-5

Troubled Partnership is an analysis of the development history of Japan's new FS-X

fighter aircraft. The book looks at the meaning of the programme for the infant
Japanese military-aircraft industry and at the lessons the project holds for future
Japanese-American weapons development programmes.
In the first four decades after her defeat in the Second World War, Japan was very
much the junior partner in her military alliance with the United States. The limitations
on Japans military industrial base both denied Japanese industry entry into a lucrative
export market and was a major element in Japan's military dependency upon the
United States. These factors, together with considerations of sovereignty and national
pride led certain sectors within Japanese industry and government to begin seeking
greater autonomy in defence production from the 1950s onwards.
In 1986 the US Department of Defente initially proposed a collaborative effort
 BOOK REVIEWS 151

with Japan in order to'pre-empt a Japanese effort to develop a national fighter. Yet
despite this, the programme evolved in such a way that the initial American concept
of a slightly-modified F-16 aircraft produced in Japan has given way to what is
essentially an all-new Japanese developed fighter aircraft.
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It is the largest cooperative international military aircraft development programme

in American history. Yet the aircraft will enable Japanese industry to enter the highly-
exclusive world club of developers of advanced fighter-aircraft systems. For Lorell
this has potentially long-term implications for the US military aerospace industry and
for US security policy.
Lorell argues that the United States committed five major policy errors during the
programme. First, the United States imposed cooperative development upon a
reluctant partner. Second, it failed to ensure that the programme was structured in such
a way as to allow greater American influence over the final design configuration and
the technological evolution of the aircraft. Third, the US side gravely underestimated
Japan's military research and development capabilities. Fourth, it did not formulate
and implement a single coordinated strategy toward collaboration with Japan that
harmonized both US military and economic objectives, and finally, US policy on
technology transfer was fundamentally flawed.
The FSX issue was problematic for both the American and Japanese governments,
impacting directly upon domestic politics in the two countries. Key players in the
Japanese security establishment were opposed to a collaborative project from the
outset. Those in industry and the Japanese defence research bureaus who had lobbied
hard for the development of a more autonomous defence production capability
resented the imposition of a collaborative programme by the Japanese government.
Moreover, soon after the signing of the agreement in early 1989 a bitter public debate
over the issue broke out in the United States. Opponents in Congress and the media
cited concerns over transfer of sensitive military technology, the impact on the trade
deficit, the need to maintain the international dominance of the US aircraft industry
and the potential loss of American jobs. The domestic debate, forced the Bush
administration to insist on modification to the agreement which caused great
resentment in the Japanese government. The eventual political requirement to ensure
a two-way technology flow had the effect of diverting US government attention away
from resisting Japanese efforts to turn the original 'modified -F-l 6' concept into the
preferred all-Japanese 'Rising Sun' fighter.
The other major US concern triggered by the project was the security policy
aspect. US officials opposed Japanese fighter development because they believed that
it would lead to a more fully capable and autonomous Japanese defence-industrial
base, which in turn could bolster a more independent Japanese security policy less
amenable to American influence. Concerns were also expressed about the effects on
regional stability if Japan's neighbours, such as Korea and China, became uneasy over
the emergence of a more capable and independent Japanese defence industry.
For Lorell, the FS-X experience demonstrates that such cooperative progress can
lead to a reduction of US influence over the security policies of important allies and
help establish competitors that may threaten the US defence-industrial base. US goals
in the political, military and economic interests are not served by helping competitors.
In particular, helping to build up the Japanese defence industry may trigger a regional
arms race as US forces in the region are cut back.
Although the detailed descriptions of the programmes development make this a
rather heavy read, this is an interesting study. From a non-American perpective some
of the author's concerns seem exaggerated, but they do reveal the complex balancing
 152 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

act that American security policy has become in the post-Cold War era.

MICHAEL SHEEHAN
Dept of Politics and Int. Relations
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University of Aberdeen

Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power:
Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996. Pp.xix + 271, 2 photos, 1 cartoon, 8 tables, select biblio., index; £35.
ISBN 0-521-46243-6.

What is international history? The editors of this volume see it as a welcome successor
to the now defunct practice of diplomatic history. The latter characteristically took the
form of (p. xi) 'rather turgid accounts of the minutiae of diplomacy' which 'were,
more often than not, based on the published volumes of despatches released by
European foreign ministries'. International history, by contrast, involves cross-
national comparison of state foreign policies, investigation of the processes by which
foreign offices and other departments of state produce policy, greater attention to the
role of personalities in these processes, and increased sensitivity to the strategic, social
and economic contexts within which these processes operate. A leading exponent of
this form is Zara Steiner, in whose honour this collection of essays on British foreign
policy has been produced by some of her friends and colleagues.
As is often the way with Festschriften, the chapters are linked only in so far as they
all reflect Zara Steiner's interests. In a diverse set of essays, chronologically arranged,
Chapters 1, 2 and 5 have in common a focus upon the mindsets of officials rather than
particular foreign policy issues. Valerie Cromwell enquires into the ethos of the
diplomatic service, as distinct from the home civil service, Keith Robbins investigates
the experience which senior Foreign Office ministers and officials had of 'abroad', and
Brian McKercher looks at the world views of Foreign Office staff between the wars.
Chapters 4 and 7 centre on ambassadors. Keith Neilson argues, with reference to the
pre-World War I era, that ambassadors, far from being puppets, could play an
important role in shaping foreign policy, and Donald Cameron Watt investigates the
extent to which leading ambassadors worked in tandem with Prime Minister
Chamberlain rather than the Foreign Office. Chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10 turn to foreign
policy issues. Erik Goldstein discusses the British approach to the Locarno Pact, while
Michael Dockrill looks at British-French relations during the 'Phoney War', with
especial emphasis on Foreign Office views. In Chapter 9, David Reynolds assesses
whether Churchill is guilty, as recently charged, of appeasing Roosevelt and Stalin
during the war. Finally, Geoffrey Warner charts the Soviet Union's progression from
pre-war villain to wartime ally to post-war enemy in British eyes. Chapter 3, Richard
Langhorne's examination of early experiences of arbitration in the international
system, is the odd one out in that it considers the system as a whole rather than the
British perspective on it.
The book will probably please Steiner. It is a handsomely produced volume, at
what sadly today probably counts as a reasonable price for a hardback, and it conforms
to the initial definition of international history advanced by the editors. The chapters
are for the most part well-written and easily read, and collectively illustrate the role of
individuals and institutions in the British foreign policy-making process. Possibly by
accident as much as by design, the different chapters do combine quite effectively to
 BOOK REVIEWS 153

convey a sense of the people, institutions and issues shaping British foreign policy in
the first half of this century.
Taken on its own terms, then, this is a useful and interesting book. My lingering
concern about it returns to my opening question. What is international history? The
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definition given by the editors is silent on some important questions. What, for
instance, is the relationship between international history and the fields of international
politics and history? Should international historians be involved in the theoretical
debates going on within history and international politics? What are the
methodological approaches and epistemological assumptions underpinning
international history, and should its practitioners be more reflexive about these? And
what is the purpose of international history? Such questions are not touched on in this
book. Nor, necessarily, should they have been if that was not the intention of the
editors. However, they will need to be addressed by international historians, for they
are being raised by others. One international politics specialist recently criticised the
sort of 'micro-international history represented in this volume on the grounds that
'there are decreasing returns from investing scarce academic resources into the
accumulation of knowledge about the details of relations between governments'.
'Archival mining', he argues, will not tell us more about inter-governmental relations
than we know already [Ken Booth, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski
(eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge University Press,
1996) p.335], Criticism such as this requires a robust defence on the part of
international historians. My concern is that their general reluctance to engage in
theoretical discussion means that this will not happen.
ALAN MACMILLAN
Dept of Int. Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, American Foreign Policy for the Post-
Superpower Age. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995. Pp.xi + 228, index; £24.95.
ISBN 1-56833-051-0.

This book, written by two veteran diplomats from New Zealand and Great Britain,
contains some useful advice for post-Cold War policy makers and scholars. Clarke and
Clad argue that too much American policy for the post-Cold War stems from warmed
over American Cold War policy. American foreign policy continues to press for
adoption of American values on a global scale. American presidents too quickly send
American forces to enforce those values, often without enough multilateral support.
Clarke and Clad argue that those values are a slim reed upon which to base American
post-Cold War foreign policy, particularly when it involves the use of military force.
They note that both Presidents Bush and Clinton received public accolades by
committing troops to far-flung places. But what, ask Clarke and Clad, have these
interventions produced? Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia remained mired in problems that
force cannot solve on its own. Moreover, public support for such missions is fickle,
and even a few casualties can torpedo a peace operation.
Moreover, according to the authors, US defense spending remains at about the
same levels as it was during the Eisenhower aministration though the Cold War has
clearly ended. Their explanation is that the defense budget is now driven more by 'the
crusading temperament of instinctive proactivity' (p.70) than by threat. Perhaps, but a
 154 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

better reason for persistently-high American military spending involves the political
and economic cost of cutting it too much, and a lack of political will to take on those
costs.
How to address American predominance in global involvement? One answer,
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according to Clarke and Clad, is more multilateralism and less American dominance
in regional issues. They single out as a negative example the American role in
challenging North Korea's nuclear program; a policy that elbowed the other regional
players into the background. They claim that ' ... locating the focus of policy in
Washington actually robbed the United States of maneuverability' (p.95). What Clarke
and Clad ignore, though, is that the agreement appears to have stopped North Korea's
nuclear program in its tracks, something that the regional powers were unable to do.
Bosnia is yet another case where American intervention appears to have dampened
conflict after considerable European intervention failed to do so.
Whether or not such actions are in American national interest is another question,
though. Clad and Clarke claim that statements of US interests are now so broad that
almost any intervention would fit them. So how should interests be defined so that the
US does not become over-commiffed? For Clad and Clarke, ' ... public opinion
matters. Mightily.' Perhaps, but American policy makers know that a sizable portion
of that opinion is not well grounded in knowledge, and thus vulnerable to biases and
effective persuasion.
Clad and Clarke contemplate the 'coming international structures', and pay
particular attention to the plight of Third World nations and the stresses on the existing
set of regional and international organizations. What they do not say as clearly is that
nation states once strengthened by Cold War politics (like Somalia) are now too
unimportant for anyone to prop up. They also examine the role of public consensus (or,
more accurately, the lack of one), recognizing that 'The information base does not look
good' (p. 134). It should thus not be surprising that American foreign policy making
remains largely of interest to a small elite that both understands the complexity of
issues, and probably holds a stake in them.
The authors offer some advice to remedy some of what they feel are recent
American foreign policy mistakes. They would like to see the National Security
Council eliminated (though they do not connect it to their criticisms of American
foreign policy). They urge more action to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. They
recommend more effort at truly multilateral US foreign policy. The difficulty, though,
with their advice, is that it rarely contains recipes for how such things could be done.
Thus in the end their prescriptions wind up sounding somewhat like campaign
speeches, long on things to do and vague on how they will be done. Still, Clarke and
Clad have thought carefully about the post-Cold War limits of American power, and
their cautions are worth a careful read.
DAVID S. SORENSON
US Air War College

Bruce Parrott (ed.), The International Politics of Eurasia, Volume 5: State Building
and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. [Series: The
International Politics of Eurasia]. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Pp.xiii + 336, 3 maps,
appendix, index; $59.95 (cloth); $22.95 (paper). ISBN 1-56324-360-1 and -361-X.

The publication of this book, and the series as a whole, is symptomatic of a process of
rethinking currently taking place among intellectuals interested in the former Soviet
 BOOK REVIEWS 155

Union. As such, the strength of the book lies in its ability to use broader theoretical
and political frameworks which help a critical understanding of the contemporary
situation.
The book attempts to explore the relationship between military power and attempts
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undertaken by the states of Russia and Eurasia at 'state-building'. It does so by

concentrating on the various influences that shape contemporary conceptions of
national security and actual military policies. These influences relate to the general
issue of state-building as they cover such factors as the development of national
identities, the differing paths of political and economic transition, and the impact of
the global political environment on domestic settings.
This collection of articles has a very solid analytical foundation as it does not take
for granted the political and socio-economic context in the states concerned, but
instead tries to acknowledge and identify the new and highly diversified array of
factors now in play. In addition, it does not make the mistake committed by many other
works of concentrating its attention on the Russian state, but spreads its investigation
across the 'post-Soviet states'.
The book is divided into four parts; the first three covering developments in Russia,
the Western newly- independent states and the Southern newly-independent states, with
the fourth part putting these case-studies into the general context of how current actions
have been received in the West and how these states are moving 'from the past to the
future'. This collaborative piece of work clearly succeeds in understanding the need to
redefine the whole concept of security, incorporating not just military but also social,
political and economic dimensions. By exploring issues across a broad range of states
the book furthermore manages to give some insight into the polities and what it
identifies as 'patterns' that are likely to emerge in these states. By doing so the book,
quite correctly, advances the argument that these policies and patterns will depend as
much upon interstate relations within Eurasia and relations between these states and
those outside the former Soviet space, as upon relations with Russia.
The style and structure of the book makes the exploration both interesting and
cohesive. Chapters by Tsypkin, Shakiema, Kuzio and Holoboff examine the various
debates over defining national interests and identifying security threats, thus
illustrating how differences between elite and mass opinions have effected actual
security policies.
While the chapter by Garthoff focuses on the 'institutional fate' of the various
sections of the Russia military establishment, this is comprehensively followed-up by
research from Kuzio, Brown and Aves on the results of different national actions
undertaken in an attempt to formulate appropriate responses to dealing with the former
Soviet conventional military forces still situated in the newly independent states.
One of the most interesting and effectively analysed themes is that of how the
states of Eurasia have dealt so far with the socio-economic and socio-political chaos
created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Chapters by Cooper, Krawciw,
Rozanov, Kuzio, Tsypkin and Aves tackle this broad area by focusing on issues such
as how policymakers can achieve an effective security policy with sufficient military
preparedness while at the same time taking into account domestic political and
economic stability. The issues identified are then put into the context of understanding
how these states create and use perceptions of themselves and other states to assess
real and potential threats. It is concluded by the writers that it is these perceptions that
are then translated into policies for managing security and military relations between
the states. By including a fourth part on the evolution of Western responses to
initiatives coming out of the region, the book again succeeds in producing a
 156 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

comprehensive overall view of a crucially important topic, in both a broad and yet
insightful way.
All in all, this book presents some interesting ideas and information which goes a
long way in generating a better understanding of events and reactions. It provides a
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welcome contribution to current academic debate about how to organise and manage
contemporary attempts at state-building and their relationship with military power.
Through the different styles of the contributing authors it combines forceful doses of
realism with an imaginative analysis of the varied trends it identifies within the
countries explored. If the other book in the series are of the same quality then the
whole collection should surely be a 'must' for an observer seriously interested in this
topic.
VIRGINIA CHARLES
Dept of Politics,
University of Exeter