4.

Language, Thought, and Culture

As far back as 1836, Wilhelm von Humboldt, in Linguistic

Variability and Intellectual Development, looked at language as a
tool man uses to represent ideas in sentences. His work
prefigured the emphasis on the relationship between language and
thought later developed by Ed-ward Sapir in Language (1921) and
popularized by Benjamin Lee Whorf. The so-called Sapir Whorf
hypothesis that language shapes reality is probably one of the
most controversial hypotheses in linguistic anthropology and
psycholinguistics. In the following article, Peter Woolfson
examines the limitations and potentialities of Whorf's linguistic
relativity hypothesis. Woolfson is professor of anthropology at
the University of Vermont.
PSYCHOLINGUISTS and linguistic anthropologists share a common
concern with the relationship between language and thought.
Several questions have been raised about this relationship, but
the dominant one can be stated very simply: does the language we
speak determine the way we think? One well-known attempt to
answer the question is the linguistic relativity hypothesis (also
called the Sapir Whorf hypothesis of the Whorfian hypothesis). In
essence, the hypothesis suggests that a given language,
especially in its grammar, provides its speakers with habitual
grooves of expression which predispose these speakers to see the
world in ready made patterns. Since grammars vary from language
to language, it is likely that the habitual patterns of thought
vary from language to language. If so, the world view of a
speaker of a particular language will be different from the world
view of a speaker of a different language. Although the
hypothesis should remember that it concentrates on habitual
patterns; and habitual is, seems to affirm the view that language
patterns may be ignored or circumvented. What is necessary is
that we become aware of these patterns by conscious
introspection, scientific study, or cross-cultural comparison.
Why are habitual patterns of expression so important?
We all have approximately the same set of physical organs for
perceiving reality-eyes to see, ears to hear, noses to smell,
tongues to taste, and skins to feel. Reality should be the same
for us all. Our nervous systems, however, are being bombarded by
a continual flow of sensations of different kinds, intensities,
and durations. It is obvious that all of these sensations do not
reach our consciousness; some kind of filtering system reduces
them to manageable proportions. The Whorfian hypothesis suggests
that the filtering system is one’s language. Our language, in
effect, provides us with a special pair of glasses thet heightens
certain perceptions and dims others. Thus, while all sensations
are received by the nervous system, only some are brought to the
level of consciousness. One of whorf’s classic examples, snow,
illustrates the role of language in this process :
We have the same world for falling snow, snow on the ground,
snow packed hard like ice, slushy snow, wind-driven flying
snow-what ever the situation may be. To an Eskimo, this all-
inclusive word would be almost unthinkable; he would say that
falling snow, slushy snow, and so on, are sensually and
operationally different words for them and for other kinds of
snow. The Aztecs go even farther than we in the opposite
directions with “cold”, “ice”, and “snow” all represented by
the same basic word……
Although Whorf demonstrated that different languages use words
differently to classify reality, he also indicated by his
techniques of illustration that these concepts can be expressed,
in a language that lacks them, by other means. Thus, the
different types of snow may be described by adjectival words and
phrases. Using these alternatives in English grammar, he makes it
possible for us to visualize the different types of snow and to
perceice the differences among them. Because the differences are
specifically labeled, we become conscious of them. The important
point to remember is that we are not habitually conscious of
these distintions. But it if becomes necessary for us to perceive
these dictinctions, as a skier might with snow, then they would
become conscious, and the vocabulary of descriptive items would
follow. In the case of the skier, he borrows his terms for snow
from the more specialized vocabulary of the Austrians.
Snow, however, is an example of a worf with obvious
culturan and environmental emphases. In many instances the
relationship between cultural emphasis and vocabulary is much
less apparent. For example, Americas are a mobile people and
transportation plays an extremely important role curturally in
our society. And yet we use the word go whether we are going by
foot, car, train, or plane. Germans, on the other hand, use gehem
when they go by foot, and fahren when they go by vehicle. The
Navaho, according to Kluckholn and Leighton, make an even more
complex set of distinctious :
 When a Navaho says that he went somewhere he never fails to
specify whether it was afoot, astride, by wagon, auto, train,
or air plane. This is done partly by using different verb
stems which indicate whether the traveler moved under his own
steams or was transported, partly by naming the actual means….
Moreover the Navaho language insists upon another type of
splitting of the generic idea of “going” to which German is as
indifferent as English. The Navaho always differentiates
between starting to to, going along, arriving at, returning
from a point….

And so, although transportation is a major cultural emphasis in

American society, our word go is certainly considerably less
precise than the terms used by the Navaho for this activity: It
becomes apparent, them, that even when an activity has
considerable cultural emphasis, certain perceptions may be
heightened by the language while others may remain dim.
Does having separate words for different aspects of a
thing or an event really make a difference in our consciousness,
our awareness? For example, we commonly make distinctions between
the colors purple, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red. If we
have special interests like painting or dres designing, we may
have a much wider vocabulary which includes distinctions between
shade such as “cerise” , “burgundy”, or “magenta”. These
dictinctions, however, are not part of the ordinary vocabulary of
the American male, for instance. Investigatons show that other
languages are more restricted in their color vocabulary than
English. The shona of Rhodesia have only three major terms:
cipswuka (orange,red,purple and some blue); citema(blue and some
green); and cicena(green and yellow). The bassa of Liberia have
only two major color terms: hui which represents purple,blue,and
green: and ziza which represents ellow,orange,and red. In one
sense, these more restricted vocabularies do not affect
consciousness. If the speakers Woolsfson: Language,Tought,and
Culture

Of one of these languages finds it necessary to make color

distinctions not indicated by his color terms, he can still
express the distinction by using the objects in the environment
—“that’s leaf citema” or “that’s sky citema,” for example. On the
other hand, psycholinguists like Lantz, Brown, and Lenneberg have
shown that having a number of terms for color distinctions is
particularly useful for remembering color that have been seen at
an earlier time. The more color terms the subjects in these
experiments had, the better their memories were for sorting out
the colors they had seen. These examples show that there is a
relationship between vocabulary, cultural emphasis, and habitual
consciousness.
But does the language of a speaker provide him with a
structure for seeing the word in ready-made patterns? In other
word, is the Whorfian hypothesis valid? It should be obvious that
the Whorfian hypothesis is just that, a hypothesis: an idea to be
tested, an informed guess. In spite of numerous attempts at
verification, it has never been satisfactorily proved or
disproved. But it remains plausible. For example, the grammatical
categories of singular and plural are important ones in English
grammar, so important that they are expressed redundantly:
One boy goes outside
Two boys go outside
Plurality, in these exsamples, is reiteraded by the use of a
number word a noun suffix, and a specific verbal form. Singural
and plural are categories that can hardly be ignored. A speaker
of English finds it natural to devide his universe into things
that are either singular or plural. To a speaker of Taos, an
American Indian language, however, this view would represent a
gross oversimplification. According to Trager :
…. In the Taos linguistic universe there is no such simple
distinction: some thing are indeed unitary, and others are
multiple, but some unitary things can be multiple only in
sets, while others are multiple as aggregates: moreover, a set
can be unitary, if it is inanimate, or it can be multiple—but
then only if it is animate….
Thus, the Taos Indian classifies the object in his universe
differently from a nativer speaker of English. The Whorfian
hypothesis suggests that because of this difference in
classification, the Taos Indian actually sees the world
differently from a native speaker of English.
The apparent relationship between grammar and world view
can be seen in the basic types of sentence structures. Probably
the most typical kind of sentence in English in the declarative
sentence made up of a subject,verb,and direct objrct and
associated with our conceptual focus of an actor, an action, an
the object of an action. For example the answer to the question
“What happened” could be either.
John dropped the
ball
Subject verb
direct object
Actor action
object of action
or
The car hit
the bridge
Subject verb
direct object
Actor action
object of action
This sentence form is so common in English that we use the form
metaphorically without being the least bit conscious of imposing
the form “actor,action,object of action” where it does not
literally apply. As a result, English commonly produces sentences
such as:
Communism threatens southeast
Asia
Subject verb
Direct object
Actor action
Object of action
Northern Chinese, however, does not ordinarilyuse this kind of
sentence structure. If one asked a speaker of Chinese the
equivalent of the question ”what happened” he would probably get
the answer in the form of topic and comment. In other words,
where the American would say, “john dropped the ball,” the
Chinese would say, “Ball-particle(type of object)-dropping.” It
is not necessary for the Chinese to in dicate the actor or the
time of the action. Speaker of English, in contrast, specify
whether the action was in the past or not. However, they do have
a sentence form where the actor is not specified: subject and
passive verb: “The ball was dropped.” Neverthelless’ many speaker
of English feel uneasy about this contrustion ; it does not
appear complate. Since only two of the three habitual components
are present, they feel compelled to ask, “Dropped by whom?” In
short, Americans and Chinese have different basic sentence
structures which focus on different aspects of a situation.
In order to deal systematically with the question of the
validity of the Whorfian hypothesis, it is necessary to ask
several other questions. First, is thought possible withoub
speech? If it is, then at least some perceptions are possible
without the mediation of language. Studies of animal behavior
suggest some answer. W. H. Thorpe, an ethologist, maintains that
all animals perceive-that is, anticipate and recognize.
He writes, "Some essential ability to deal with events in time as
in fare is, by definition, to be expected throughout the world of
living longs For example, when a cat runs up a tree after seeing
a dog, he lubits this ability. The cat sees the dog (perception);
it identifies the gas dangerous (cognition); it foresees trouble
(anticipation); it ckly checks its environment (evaluation); and
it runs up the the (solution). The cat does ncarest all this
without the aid of language, and therefore it seems reasonable to
assume that we are capable of some Processes of thought without
the mediation of language.
Second, are the grammars of various languages
really different? Dostall languages possess features in common?
Is there not a universal Frammar, a general grammar of human
languages? Are not the differ es between languages, in reality,
superficial, of little consequence m sletermining man's
perceptions of reality? Let us look at the kinds of Language
universals that have been identified by Charles Hockett and
Jonepli Greenberg. Hockett outlines thirteen design features of
lan Page, such as semanticity (shared associations),
arbitrariness (non- sucity), and productivity (of (open-
endedness). Greenberg discusses such universals as multi-
modality: indicative mode (statement) and perative mode
(command), for example. There are, to be sure, very al and
general, universal statements about language that can be male to
which no exceptions can be found. However, it is equally for that
the grammars of the languages of the world show considerable
yandy in the devices they employ to classify reality. It is this
level of elavafication, dissection, and organization, the level
of diversity rather than universality, with which Whorf's
linguistic relativity hypothesis is concerned.
Third, what effect does culture-leaned and
shared behavior pat-tems-have on the way we perceive the world?
Although language is ourprincipal means of transmitting culture
from generation to generation,hmouch of our learning, especially
while we are young, takes place withoutexplicit verbalizations:
that is, much of our behavior is learned informally through
observation and imitation. All kinds of sensory data mayI used to
recognize, classify, anticipate, and evaluate experiences.
Forexample, a child whose first experiences of life take place
within angle roomed structure such as an igloo, tipi, or tent
develops a sense ofteality which is quite different from the
child whose early experiencesjake place in a multi-partitioned
structure in which his own place, thenursery, is safely insulated
from the adult experiences around him. The different
settings,tionship to others, to events, and to things. Thus
culture provides many avenues for developing our perception of
reality.
In spite of these questions, social scientists
have attempted to devise tests for verifying the Whorfian
hypothesis. One major consideration in such testing has been the
nature of Whorf's evidence. Frequently, he named a grammatical
device in one language and a different device fof handling a
similar situation in another language, and assumed that the
difference demonstrated a difference in perception. This
assumption is not necessarily valid. For example, French
classifies all nouns as either masculine or feminine-le soleil,
"the sun," is masculine, but la lune, "the moon," is feminine.
Despite this classification, the Frenchman does not actually
perceive these gender distinctions as real; they are simply
grammatical devices. Whatever relationships these classifications
once had with reality are now very remote
In an attempt to provide a more defensible way
of verifying the hypothesis, social scientists began to look for
non verbal behavioral con comitants for linguistic categories.
One test, given by John Carroll, involved showing English and
Hopi subjects three pictures from which they were to select the
two that they felt were most alike. The pictures were based on
differences in the way objects are handled. For example, one
series of pictures showed three men, one unloading a carton of
fruit, one spilling milk, and one dropping a coin. English
subjects most often grouped the accidental actions, tions,
whereas the Hopi grouped the first two because words in their
language for these actions are similar.
Another expenment, conducted by Joseplı Casagrande,
involved Navaho and English-speaking children:
Navaho and English-speaking children were presented with two ob
jects which differed from each other in both form and color,
for example, a blue stick and a yellow rope They were then
shown a third object which matched one of the ongmal objects in
color and the other in form, for example, a blue tope. They
were asked to select one of the two original objects which best
matched this third object. A number of such sets were used and
the results confirmed the hypothesis Navalho children, in the
example cited above, se leeted the yellow rope, whereas English
speaking children selected the blue stick.
When middle class English speaking children in
metropolitan Bos ton were given the same test, however, there
were unexpected results. They made choices similar to those of
the Navaho children. Apparently, the Boston children were
accustomed to having "creative" toys to play with, toys that
involve the child in manipulating objects. Certainly the results
achieved in Boston weaken the conclusiveness of the original
speriment. An additional problem with the validity of these tests
is that they are designed to show relationships between language
and be-luviot on a relatively concrete level, and the selection
of a yellow rope a blue stick hardly qualifies as an example of
philosophical orienta lion In reality, the Whorfian hypothesis
has most relevance in the ucas that are most difficult to pin
down: philosophy, religion, ethics, al values. Behavioral
concomitants on this level are difficult to find and test
Another difficulty in testing the Whorfian hypothesis
is that of controlling variables. Ideally, tests should be
conducted on subjects lune backgrounds include a unilingual
unicultural environment. Un fortunately, the kind of geographic
and cultural isolation necessary for this kind of environment is
very rare. The modern world is one that fosters cultures which
are multilingual and languages which are multi- cultural
In the final analysis, Whorf's linguistic relativity
hypothesis will probably remain only a hypothesis But this does
not mean that we should abandon it as a useful tool. On the
contrary, by comparing pat- terms of grammatical usage-becoming
conscious of them, studying them, and evaluating them-we will
gain insights into the categories on language forces us to pay
attention to, the ideas that are easy for us to express, and the
ideas that are difficult to voice. We can, as Whorf pat it, turn
background into foreground. Thus, both science and man are
served.