Farlin 1

Christian Farlin

Professor Schuler

LAS POL 204

01 May 2022

Evaluating Japan’s Democratic Regime

Japan is a unique democracy within the world due to the nature of its transitions. The Pri-

mordial Culture Theory asserts that, because Japan has had a long history of Emperor-lead autoc-

racies, then the nation should always be compatible for autocratic regimes and incompatible for

any variation of democratic regimes. However, Japan has been ranked as one of the strongest

world democracies since the nation fully transitioned to a Parliamentary Democracy in 1952.

This associated phenomenon leads to key questions: Why is Japan a democracy; how was its de-

mocratization process different from other democracies; and to what extent is Japan defined as a

democracy? My theory is that Japan experienced two democratization events as a byproduct of

economic focus, proven by a coalition of democracy indexes, historical trends, and theories,

which both answer these questions and refute the validity of other possible arguments. The two

primary overarching factors that caused Japan to transition to democracy is the Economic Mod-

ernization Theory and Japan’s unique colonial history, which are both the centerpieces of my fal-

sifiable theory. Japan’s democratization is characterized by two key events: The Meiji Restora-

tion and The United States’ occupation of Japan after the conclusion of World War II.

The Meiji Restoration was a nationwide unification in response to “the efforts by

Western powers to ‘open’ Japan, beginning in the 1850s after more than two centuries of near

isolation, and the fear that Japan” could be relegated to subservient colonialism under imperialist
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America (Britannica). The Meiji restoration replaced the feudal Shogun militaristic fiefdom

regime with a united Japan consisting of a bicameral parliamentary system, an emperor, and a

constitution. This new constitutional parliamentary Japan unified to protect the nation from

imperialist European powers—who had already colonized Africa, some of the Middle East and

Latin America, and parts of South Asia. Unified Japan quickly industrialized and became one of

the prevalent world powers in a matter of decades. Japan’s triumphant victory over the world

power Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) proved that the nation was able to

successfully transition from a collection of conflicting fiefdoms to a united State with democratic

foundations.

Japan initiated its second and final step toward democratization in the aftermath of World

War II. Japan’s purpose in establishing a Parliamentary Democracy was for economic growth,

which rejects the theory that colonies embrace democracy in response to an encroaching colonial

power.

Democratic Nations and Their Time Under Colonial Rule

Democratic Nations Time as a Colony (Years) Colonizer Years As a Colony
The United States 176 Great Britain 1607-1783
India 181 Great Britain 1752-1933
Japan 0 N/A None. Autonomous.
Canada 485 Great Britain and France 1497-1763 (France), 1763-1982 (Great Britain)
Australia 113 Great Britain 1788-1901
Brazil 308 Portugal 1500-1808
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Democratic Nations and Their Time Under Colonial

Rule
600

485
500
Time Under Colonial Rule (Years)

400

308
300

200 176 181

113
100

0
0
The United States India Japan Canada Australia Brazil
Democratic Nations

Many predominant democracies--such as The United States and India—quickly established

democracies after escaping colonial rule and colonial status. To clarify, while The United States

itself was never an individual colony, its inaugural thirteen states were former colonies that

banded together to fight for their collective independence. On the other hand, Japan is an

intentional outlier, as it is the sole world power that transitioned to democracy without the

intention of breaking a colonial power’s hold over them. Japan’s transition to democracy was

initiated after the conclusion of World War II, where The United States occupied Japan to

rebuild the former foe’s economy and government, as Emperor Hirohito’s actions during World

War II represented a deviation between the will of the hereditary ruler and his citizenry.

Therefore, Japan did not democratize to escape a monarchical leader or a distant ruling state—

whereas The United States, India, and Australia all established their respective independences to

cast off Great Britain’s figurative yoke. Japan’s democratization process is unique by which the
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nation democratized to modernize rather than to establish independence—as Japan was never

ruled by a foreign power and has thus always existed as a sovereign nation.

History has proved that Japan is a democracy. Additionally, the Democracy and

Dictatorship, Polity IV, and Freedom House metrics can scientifically verify and “prove” that

Japan is a democracy. The minimalist binary Democracy and Dictatorship metric contains four

prerequisites that a nation must fulfill to qualify as democratic. The first rule is that the chief

executive must be either directly or indirectly elected. Japan employs a parallel electoral system

—which is partially proportional representation and partially single-member-district—that

allows all Japanese citizens to vote for Parliamentary representatives. Normally, the

Parliamentary representatives tell their constituents that they will vote for a specific prime

minister candidate if they are elected. Next, once all Parliamentary legislators are elected, they

select a Prime Minister. Lastly, the citizens indirectly elect their chief executive, as they elect the

representatives that select the chief executive. The second rule is that the nation’s legislature is

directly elected. Members of the Japanese Parliament, which is the legislative branch in the

Japanese Regime, are directly elected by eligible constituents at least every four years. The third

rule is that there must be more than one party that has a chance to win the election. For example,

The United States has two major parties that have fair and equal chances to win elections: The

Democrat and Republican Parties. Japan has multiple parties that have influence within

Parliament, which include the Liberal Democratic Party, the Constitutional Democratic Party,

and the Japan Restoration Party (Schuler). The fourth and final rule stipulates that, in addition to

allowing multiple parties to compete in elections, the nation must have alternation. Alternation

means that governmental power has switched between different parties, and thus that the ousted

power peacefully transitions power to the elected party at the conclusion of a free and fair
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election. Political Scientists had been concerned that Japan failed this fourth requirement because

the Liberal Democratic Party had never lost an election from 1952 to 1993. However, the Liberal

Democratic Party’s defeat in the 1993 election and peaceful transition of power proved

otherwise. The same actions were observed in 2009, when Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party lost

the 2009 election and peacefully transitioned power to the new administration. Japanese voters

simply preferred the Liberal Democratic Party more often over other parties. Therefore, Japan

does not deny its citizenry fair representation, and has not refused to revoke governmental power

after losing an election.

A fifth rule that is not apart of the Democracy and Dictatorship metric yet is still an

essential requirement for a democratic nation, is that the nation must have free, fair, and frequent

elections. The terminology of “free and fair” is always associated with democratic electoral

systems. First, a free election means that all eligible citizens can vote—meaning that there is no

voter discrimination or disenfranchisement. A “fair” election is one that is bereft of corruption,

with the mechanisms of the election being clearly observable to the electorate and the competing

parties. If a party rigs the election or meddles with the voting process to illegally ensure their

victory, then the election is neither free nor fair, as it prevents the election from representing the

will of the electorate. Finally, elections must be held frequently, which gives the electorate the

opportunity to introduce alternation to their government. Frequent elections accurately describe

the changing wants and needs of the electorate, with changing perspectives commonly yielding

in new administrations that are comprised of new partisan representatives. Frequent elections

also act as a check on the existing administration, as elected officials have to consider re-

election. If a nation had elections once every twenty years, officials could engage in corruption

or ignore their constituents because they wouldn’t be removed from power for a long period of
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time. This unofficial fifth rule is arguably a combination of the first and fourth rules of the

Democracy and Dictatorship measures, yet is an essential rule for scientists to prove due to its

dual conclusion: it proves whether a nation is democratic and whether the electorate system

produces administrations that are both representative of the electorate’s will and have checks

against governmental corruption. Usually, elected officials will not engage in corruption if they

plan to run for re-election next year because the electorate will vote them out of office. Japan’s

democratic government combines the Parliamentary system of England and the bicameralism of

the United States into a unique electoral system that regulates the Japanese Diet, which is their

National Parliament. In Japan’s House of Representatives, or the lower house of the “Diet”,

members are elected to four-year terms. Out of the five hundred members, three hundred are

elected from single-member districts, and two hundred from eleven proportional representation

blocs (Columbia). In Japan’s House of Councillors, or the upper house of the Diet, the two

hundred and fifty-two members are elected to six-year terms, with half of the seats being up for

election every three years. The members are elected from single-member, multi-member, and

proportional representation districts. Japan has free, fair, and frequent elections, and thus fulfills

this fifth requirement for democracy.

The Polity IV and Freedom House Metrics both designate Japan as a strong, stable

democracy. The Polity IV measure includes five individual metrics: competition for

governmental seats, the possibility of any citizen becoming the leader, stable parties representing

electorate interests, ability for multiple parties to compete, and checks and balances on the

executive. Each nation is then evaluated by these five metrics and given a Democracy and an

Autocracy score. The Democracy score can range from zero to positive ten, with the Autocracy

score ranging from zero to a negative ten. The nation’s final score is the Democracy score
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subtracted from the Autocracy score. Since 1952--when Japan fully became a Parliamentary

Democracy after The United States’ occupation—Japan has received a Polity IV score of

positive ten each year. Thus, the Polity IV metric consistently designates Japan as a stable

democracy. On the other hand, the Freedom House metric scores nations based upon dozens of

factors, which primarily evaluate a nation on its handling of two types of rights: the civil liberties

and the political liberties that the nation’s citizenry have. In 2021, Japan received a Freedom

House score of 96/100, with 40/40 in political rights and 56/60 in Civil Liberties. The

effectiveness of these two metrics is optimized when used together, because Polity IV analyses

governmental institutions, whereas Freedom House analyzes the results of having a set of

institutions. Thus, Polity IV and Freedom House designate Japan as a strong, stable democracy

with fair institutions that uphold the political and civil rights of the electorate.

The Fragile State Index is an additional reliable metric used to determine if a Nation is

stable. The Fragile State Index employs twelve individual metrics to assign a nation a score

between one and one hundred and seventy-nine. The nation with the score of one is the least

stable, and the most stable nation is one hundred and seventy-nine. Japan is ranked one hundred

and sixty-one, meaning that Japan has a stable Democratic regime due to citizen

enfranchisement, fair and frequent elections, sustainable political parties, economic growth, and

the upholding of trade agreements.

Comparing the Polity IV (as of 2018) and Freedom House (as of 2022) Scores of Prominent Democracies
Nation Polity IV Score Freedom House (Political Rights) Freedom House (Civil Liberties) Freedom House Total
The United States 8 32/40 51/60 83/100 (Free)
India (No Kashmir) 9 33/40 33/60 66/100 (Partly Free)
Japan 10 40/40 56/60 96/100 (Free)
Canada 10 40/40 58/60 98/100 (Free)
Australia 10 39/40 56/60 95/100 (Free)
Brazil 8 31/40 42/60 73/100 (Free)
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After considering Japan’s unique colonial history and high metric scores, it is imperative

to compare Japan’s metrics with those of prominent Democracies to prove that Japan’s

unorthodox history did not impede its democratic institutions and implementation. Whereas the

other recorded democracies democratized to remove their colonial status in favor of sovereignty,

Japan democratized because their economic development needed Japanese investment into

domestic industry to both sustain current economic development and to produce enough capital

goods to ensure that Japan would enjoy steady economic improvement. In return for investment,

Japanese citizens required greater participation and representation within Japan’s government for

their monetary and labor contributions—which is why Japan first transitioned from a

decentralized monarchy to a monarchy with limited Democratic elements, and later from a

monarchy to a fully-fledged Parliamentary Democracy with an Emperor as the ceremonial head

of state. However, whereas the other prominent democracies democratized due to economic

growth and colonial subjugation, Japan democratized twice and strengthened its democratic

foundations due to economic and invasive threats from Western Imperialists.

The overarching theory that best explains the reasoning behind both of Japan’s transitions

alongside the stability of Japan is the Economic Modernization Theory. The Economic

Modernization Theory stipulates that the transition to and upholding of democracy is a result of a

nation’s continued economic growth (Clark). Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan was divided

into feudal fiefdoms ruled by Daimyo—the domanial lords. The fiefdoms, or domains, were

constantly competing for territory and resources. Resources were territory and farmland, which

are immobile assets because the citizens cannot hide them from the State’s taxation. The

daimyos efficiently controlled their domains because they were able to tax and reap resources

from the citizenry’s immobile assets. However, the Meiji Restoration caused an industrial
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revolution that swept through Japan—replacing territorial assets with monetary assets. Large

amounts of formerly agricultural land transitioned to factories, shipyards, and markets.

Instead of being preyed upon by the daimyo, citizens could engage in industrial work and

receive wages—their mobile assets. To continue the economic growth jumpstarted by the

industrial revolution, the Meiji Emperor needed his subjects to invest in Japan’s industries. If the

Emperor heavily taxed or stole assets from the subjects, then the subjects would simply invest

their assets into foreign industries—which could cause foreign companies from the feared

imperialist nations to gradually overtake domestic Japanese markets and therefore cause Japan to

become reliant on foreign companies. A united Japan must be independent of foreign industries,

as they provide gateways for foreign countries to play bigger roles in domestic Japanese politics.

Additionally, the economic growth that helped Japan lay its democratic foundations

would stagnate without citizen participation. Consumption would decrease due to high taxes, and

cheaper foreign jobs and products would become preferred substitutes. The “predatory state”

(Clark) had to reach an equilibrium point with its citizenry. If the State overtaxed the citizenry,

the resulting lack of revenue alongside a stalled economy would cause the State to decline. A

weak, declining state would be primed for foreign imperialists to take over the nation and create

a new colony. Therefore, to uphold the funding for defense and industrial funding, the State had

to curb its urges to appropriate the wealth of its citizenry for itself. However, if the State rejected

any form of taxation, the national government would be unable to act on policy—which could

cause Japan to revert into a multitude of local governments that oversaw domains. Ultimately, a

fair tax rate would cause the economy to grow, as citizens had enough leftover funds to both

invest in Japanese industry and consume products created by domestic companies. In return for

taxation, the citizenry would demand representation and the need to retain its civil rights. Thus,
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the Meiji Restoration is Japan’s first shift toward democracy as it resulted in a strong economy, a

unified nation, and a civil central government overseen by the Japanese Emperor.

Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (Economy) Annual Growth, 1961-2021

( Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/JPN/japan/gdp-growth-rate )

Japan’s economic growth has lessened in recent years, which can be typical of relatively

old democratic nations. When an underdeveloped nation transitions from an autocracy to a

democracy, they tend to experience unsustainably high percentages of economic growth to

“catch up” in development. Japan is a strong example of this theory because it experienced high

economic growth in the early years of its democracy. However, its contemporary economic

growth per year rarely grows because the nation eventually hits a theoretical ceiling. To cause an
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increase in economic growth, Japan would need to acquire more land capital, increase the scale

of industrial operations, and establish more trade relations.

An important foil to the Economic Modernization Theory is the Natural Resource Curse,

which is a possible alternative to the Economic Modernization Theory in explaining Japan’s

Regime. The Natural Resource Curse stipulates that the State can be independent of citizen

revenue to function by relying on natural immobile resources, such as oil or diamonds (Clark).

Thus, a possible argument could be that Japan avoided their democratic transition until World

War II because the emperor was able to appropriate enough revenue from its expanding economy

to stay in power—with the concept of the regime remaining as a stable autocracy supporting the

conclusion of the Survival Theory.

However, Japan’s war against China in the 1930s, and alliance with the Axis Powers in

World War II refute the validity of the Japanese Natural Resource Theory. In the 1930s, Japan’s

rapidly growing economy began to stagnate for two reasons: Japan’s isolationist policy and its

lack of natural resources. Two key resources normally needed for economic growth and the

expansion of industry are rubber and oil. Japan primarily avoided trade with other nations to

avoid westernization by European nations. Westernization is a cultural successor to imperialism,

where a foreign nation influences another nation through economic activity, such as trades,

imports, and sanctions. The “other nation” would then have to have a considerable percentage of

governmental legislation and policy centered around foreign trade at the expense of domestic

output. Japan realized that foreign nations could influence both Japanese citizens and the

Japanese State through trade, and instead choose to bolster Japanese industry. A consequence of

Japan’s rejection of international trade is that they were unable to obtain additional resources

needed for continued economic growth and industrial development once their natural resources
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were exhausted. Japan was also amid its own Great Depression and needed additional resources

to jumpstart its economy. As a result, Japan invaded China in order to obtain China’s abundance

of natural resources, especially oil and rubber. Next, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and waged war

against The United States and the Allies in response to The United States placing embargos on

oil and rubber exports to Japan, as the same materials that helped create factories and jobs were

being used in Japan to manufacture weapons, vehicles, and defenses. Japan hoped to expand its

sphere of influence to acquire more resources and later realized that they could expand into the

Pacific if The United States was weakened. Thus, Japan’s involvement in both China and World

War II was precisely due to the nation’s lack of resources. A nation cannot be an example of the

Natural Resource Curse if it lacks suitable natural resources.

Another group of theories that work in tangent to explain how Japan can maintain a

powerful stable Parliamentary Democracy includes the Cultural Value Theory, the Congruency

Theory, the Civic Culture Theory, and the East Asian Values Theory. The Cultural Value Theory

stipulates that ethnically and religiously homogeneous populations ensure a stable democracy

due to the lack of differences that the population experiences (Clark). The Cultural Value Theory

and the Congruency Theory work in tandem, as The Congruency Theory stipulates that a

nation’s political institutions work better when they are congruent, or in agreement with, that

nation’s cultural norms (Clark). Japan’s emphasis on efficient government and communal values

while upholding the civic and political rights of the individual is why Japan was able to sustain

autocracies and democracies. Additionally, Japan’s population is almost exclusively Confucian

and Japanese, which allows Japan to avoid the clash of cultural, religious, and ethnic ideologies

that cause the unstable governments and intranational warfare seen in the Middle East and

Africa. Confucianism is arguably a secular religion, as it emphasizes governmental respect and

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prioritizes the advancement of science and education (Clark). A unified citizenry can

consistently produce stable, efficient governments free from the impediments of clashing beliefs.

Instead of concerning itself with religious or ethnic unrest amongst its population, Japanese

administrations are instead able to focus on legislation and policy that will advance the nation

economically, infrastructurally, and militaristically. One theory that explains the results of the

Cultural Value Theory is the East Asian Value Theory, which claims that East Asian nations

alongside their civilians prioritize efficient virtuous governments and a unified trusting society

over the wants and needs of the individual. Japan’s ethnic and ideological homogeneity,

alongside the Confucianism-inspired prioritization of efficient governance and communal

satisfaction, allow the Japanese Government to represent the needs of the community while

advancing the nation economically and politically.

A counterargument propositioned by proponents of the Primordial Culture Theory, where

a nation’s culture and attitude are unchangeable (Clark), is that Japan should be inclined toward

autocracy due to a perceived subservient culture. However, Japan transitioned from a divided

state to a democratized autocracy in the Meiji Restoration, then from a democratized autocracy

to a full parliamentary democracy in the aftermath of World War II. Additionally, proponents of

this theory would argue that the Japanese’ subservient civic culture is why Japan transitioned to a

western democracy during the occupation of The United States. If the United States’ presence

was the case, then the Meiji Restoration would have failed, or the subsequent coup d’état and

insurgency attempts would have failed. Also, the purpose of the occupation of United States

soldiers in the aftermath of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings was to prevent

another militaristic dictator to quickly gain power and throw Japan back into the war. Japanese

citizens were largely content with the reign of the emperors due to their civilian government;
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however, the civilian officials were replaced with military officers during the Second Sino-

Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II (1940-1945). As a result, Japan welcomed the

opportunity to democratize after the costly conflict. If the Japanese were truly discontent with

their democratization, then they could have simply reverted to their broadened autocracy after

The United States left. However, Japan became an example of the Economic Modernization

Theory by transitioning to and upholding a strong stable democracy—which coincided with

unprecedented levels of economic growth. Also, if Japan’s culture was supposed to be

unmalleable, then the transition to democracy would have never stayed true.

Critics may additionally counter argue that Japan falls under the Civic Culture Theory

instead of the Cultural Value Theory. Civic Culture Theory asserts that secular cultures

characterized by high self-expression led to democracy (Clark). The theory aligns with the

Economic Modernization Theory, as it stipulates that the higher the median income, the more

secular the values, and the more emphasis on self-expression lead to an increased desire for

democracy (Clark). However, both of Japan’s transitions to democracy were for national defense

and for economic growth.

Japan is an anomaly if perceived through two widespread theories: The Great Leader

Theory and the Welfare State Theory. The Great Leader Argument asserts that nations

experience new eras of change under particularly influential leaders, such as Mao Zedong’s

China, Joseph Stalin’s Russia, and Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany (Clark). Although Japan

experienced democratization after Emperor Hirohito impelled Japan into war, Japan’s

democratization was not caused by any one particularly influential leader.

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( Source: https://d2l.arizona.edu/d2l/le/content/1129606/viewContent/12240271/View )

The Welfare State Theory stipulates that stronger democracies yield larger welfare

states, or the larger the percentage of annual government spending applied to entitlement

programs—programs that provide monetary assistance to the poor (Clark). Despite being one of

the world’s strongest democracies, Japan has a relatively small welfare state. Compared to other

strong democracies, such as France and New Zealand, Japan spent on average between 30 and 40

percent less on its welfare state. This is likely due to Japan’s cultural and societal themes of

political and monetary independence. Generally, “the Japanese people would decide to scale

down the welfare state, reduc[e] its burden and cost, and, particularly, the weight of its legacy on

future generations” (Harner). Japan’s attitude toward the welfare state is similar to The United

States’ Republican Party, as both entities believe that individuals should largely provide for

themselves without government aid. Additionally, support for Japan’s welfare state wanes when

it runs at a deficit. The Welfare State cannot be taxed, the people within the programs cannot be
 Farlin 16

taxed, and the ability to make any sort of revenue to recoup costs is nonexistent. Thus, Japan’s

current State is an anomaly with regards to both the Great Leaders Theory and the Welfare State

Theory because Japan’s history of transitions and state spending follow neither trend.

A critic may argue that my essay glides over my generalized inferences of national

sovereignty and democratization and thus questions if Japan is truly an anomaly in this sense.

Are there other nations that have both always retained their sovereignty and democratized? I

propose an empirical, falsifiable method to test this challenge to my theory: I will assemble

nations that have never been colonized and compare their level of democracy through established

metrics and their economic prosperity through their GDPs and GDP per capita values. Since I

argue that Japan democratized due to economic pressures to industrialize, the Economic

Modernization Theory will be used to determine if each nation has the propensity to transition to

democracy due to their economic conditions.

Comparing Sovereign Nations Via Economic and Political Metrics
(2021 For Economic Unless Otherwise Noted; 2022 For Freedom House, 2018 For Polity IV)
Nation GDP (USD) GDP Per Capita (USD) Polity IV (2018) Freedom House (Political Rights) Freedom House (Civil Liberties) Freedom House Total
Japan 5.182 trillion 32366.48 10 (Democatic) 40/40 56/60 96/100 (Free)
China 17.7 trillion 10430.73 (12/2020) -7 (Autocracy) -2/40 Nov-60 9/100 (Not Free)
Thailand 501.79 billion (12/2020) 6199.19 -3 (Autocracy) 5/40 24/60 29/60 (Not Free)
Afghanistan 19.81 billion (12/2020) 553.49 (2020) -1 (Autocracy) 1/40 9/60 10/100 (Not Free)
Iran 191.72 billion (2020) 4802.05 (2020) -7 (Autocracy) 4/40 10/60 14/100 (Not Free)

As noted above, I selected some of the most prominent nations that have always been

sovereign. A key difference between Japan and the rest of the researched nations is that Japan is

the sole democracy, which is entirely uncoincidental. China possesses a high GDP due to its

position as the most prioritized trade partner throughout most of the world due to its large, cheap

labor forces and government-sponsored industry. China has been controlled by the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) since the 1950s, and Thailand has been besieged by military coups,

military juntas, and failed attempts at democratization. Afghanistan and Iran suffer from the

Natural Resource Curse, as their abundance of oil allows their governments to survive without
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citizen taxation and thus continue to centralize their autocratic power. Afghanistan and Iran’s

autocracies are supported by the Economic Modernization Theory—as their lack of economic

expansion decreases the possibility of democratic transitions. Therefore, Japan is the sole

sovereign nation of my research that Democratized. China is an anomaly when considering the

Economic Modernization Theory, as it is both heavily autocratic and economically prosperous.

China is therefore unlikely to transition to democracy since it faces neither economical nor

international pressure to do so. Therefore, the critic’s argued trends that all sovereign nations

should become democratic, and that Japan is not the only anomaly in colonial history are both

erroneous, and my empirical evidence proves that sovereign nations tend to remain autocratic

due to either centralized power or the Natural Resource Curse. My proposed test would be a

more complex version of what I presented above.

My overarching theory, which contains the historical, institutional, economical, culture,

societal, and religious arguments presented above, proves Japan is a strong democracy whose

transition largely followed the series of events predicted by the Economic Modernization Theory

and emphasized by its unique colonial history. Japan democratized over two events—The Meiji

Restoration of 1868 and the establishment of a Parliamentary Democracy in 1952—primarily as

a response to foreign and economic threats. Japan’s transitions follow The Economic

Modernization Theory. The events before and after each of Japan’s transitions toward

democratization are historically accurate, as Japan democratized to shield itself from foreign

influence, and not to shed foreign oversight as a colony. Finally, the Democracy and

Dictatorship, Polity IV, and Freedom House metrics each reveal that Japan is a strong, stable

democracy. The included economic and cultural theories, such as the Economic Modernization

Theory and Trio of Cultural Theories, are supported and validated by Japan’s democratic
 Farlin 18

transitions. On the other hand, The Natural Resource Curse, The East Asian Values Theory, and

the Primordial Culture Theory were all disproved by Japan’s democratic transitions. Therefore,

the presented historical, economic, religious, and cultural theories answer my questions

concerning how Japan can maintain a stable, balanced, efficient parliamentary democracy.

Additionally, the presented theories and data prove my theory that Japan had two democratic

transitions as responses to foreign threats and economic pressures.

 Farlin 19

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Works Cited for Level of Democracy Table

Freedom House. “Freedom House: Expanding Freedom and Democracy”. Freedomhouse.org.

https://freedomhouse.org/ Accessed 01 May 2022.

 Farlin 21

Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2019. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime

Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. DemocracyData.

https://xmarquez.github.io/democracyData/reference/polityIV.html Accessed 01 May 2022.

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Freedom House. “Freedom House: Expanding Freedom and Democracy”. Freedomhouse.org.

https://freedomhouse.org/ Accessed 01 May 2022.

Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2019. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime

Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. DemocracyData.

https://xmarquez.github.io/democracyData/reference/polityIV.html Accessed 01 May 2022.

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Zhou, Qian. “China’s Most Productive Provinces and Cities as per 2021 GDP Statistics”. China-

briefing.com. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-2021-gdp-performance-a-look-at-

major-provinces-and-cities/ Published 07 February 2022. Accessed 01 May 2022.