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Immovable magic - Pierre Bourdieu on gender and

power

Margaretha Jarvinen

To cite this article: Margaretha Jarvinen (1999) Immovable magic - Pierre Bourdieu
on gender and power, Nora: Nordic Journal of Women's Studies, 7:1, 6-19, DOI:
10.1080/08038749950167706

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NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
Immovable
magic ± Pierre
Bourdieu on
gender and
power
Margaretha JaÈ rvinen
Translated by Steven Sampson
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
M argaretha JaÈ rvinen, Pol. Dr., is associate professor
in the Departm ent of Sociology, University of
Copenhagen. She has written extensively on gender,
sociological theory, social marginalization,
prostitution, alcohol and drug problems. Her books
include: Of Vice and W omen. Shades of Prostitution
(1990), De nye hjemlù se. Kvinder, fattigdom , vold
(1993) and Det daÊrlige selskab. Misbrug, behandling,
omsorg (1998).
U niversity of Copenhagen, Department of Sociology,
LinneÂsgade 22, 1361 Kù benhavn. E-mail:
m argaretha.jarvinen@ sociology.ku.dk
#Scandinavian University Press
6 ISSN 0803-8740
ABSTRACT. The goal of the article is threefold. First,
the gender theoretical reasoning in Pierre Bourdieu’ s
sociology is reviewed and interpreted. Second,
Bourdieu’ s gender perspective is related to his most
important theoretical sources of inspiration, above all
Durkheim and Weber. Third, some critical remarks
about Bourdieu are presented. With his strong
emphasis on self-reproducing power mechanisms,
Bourdieu becomes nearly defeatist in his descriptions
of society’ s gender system. In his own strange way, he
seems to be a more convinced feminist than most of the
declared feminists who conduct gender research today.
Pierre Bourdieu ’ s La dominatio n masculin e
(1998) has been the object of considerabl e
attentio n in France. In the book, Bourdieu
demonstrate s that France ® nds itself to be far
from having achieve d equalit y between men and
women. Bourdieu ’ s message is that gender
inequalit y is partly invisibl e and that it is
maintaine d by a subtle power game in which the
participant s are both the dominan t and the
dominated . The book has been an impetus to a
discussio n in which Bourdieu is (once again)
categorize d as a kind of petri® ed power analyst
who sees inequality , injustic e and abuse of
power everywhere , a researche r who refuse s to
see change when change has in fact occurred .
The goal of this article is threefold . First, I
will attempt to explor e the gender theoretica l
reasonin g one ® nds in Bourdieu, not just in the
little volum e La dominatio n masculin e, but in
the entire corpus of his work. This means that I
will review his writings and very freely interpret
his often diffuse text passage s on gender
differentiation . Bourdieu has been accused of
not paying enough attentio n to gender in his
analyses of power and social differentiation , an
accusatio n which may seem absurd , as gender is
in fact an importan t theme in severa l of his
1
books. Second, I will relate Bourdieu ’ s gender
perspectiv e to (what seem to be) his most
importan t theoretica l sources of inspiration . As
is well known, Bourdieu is very industriou s
when it concern s applyin g sociology ’ s classics
to his own analyse s of power and differentiation .
In this article , I will simply cite certain points
where the inspiratio n of Durkheim and Weber is
centra l to his understandin g of gender-relate d
 2
power and powerlessness . Third, I will present
some critica l remarks about Bourdieu’ s
theoretica l reasonin g on gender . With his strong
emphasis on self-reproducin g power
mechanisms, Bourdieu becomes nearly defeatist
in his description s of society’ s gender and class
system . In his own strang e way, he seems to be a
more convince d feminist than most of the
declared feminists who conduct gender researc h
today.
One message in this article is that in
Bourdieu , despite the defeatism , we ® nd a very
applicabl e sociologica l alternativ e to the strong
text-analytica l vein which today streams
throug h social scienc e gender research . After
some years’ unilatera l focus on change,
re¯ exivity and playfulnes s in gender
constructions , there may be reason to make a
call for Bourdieu’ s ª structuralis t
constructivism º (more on this concep t below).
Category and hierarchy
The most quali® ed theoreticizatio n of gender
3
can be found in Bourdieu ’ s Algerian research .
I will therefor e devote considerabl e attentio n to
this part of his work. Bourdieu , who here ® nds
himself in the structuralis t period of his researc h
career , shows how Kabyle society contain s a
relativel y limited number of dualisti c concepts ,
each individuall y and in differen t combination s
structurin g people ’ s pattern s of thinkin g and
action . The most fundamenta l of these
dichotomie s is the gender distinction : ª The
divisio n of sexual labour , trans® gured in a
particula r form of the sexual divisio n of labour ,
is the basis of the divisio n of the world, the most
solidly establishe d of all collectiv e ± that is,
objectiv e ± illusions º (The Logic of Practice
4
1992, 144).
One of Bourdieu ’ s theoretica l source s of
inspiratio n on this point is Durkheim and
Mauss’ Primitive Classi® cation (1903/1963).
For Durkheim and Mauss, classi® cation is
always equivalen t to making a distinction :
categorizatio n imposes a distanc e between two
phenomen a that previousl y were not separate d
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
from each other. To classify , however, is not just
to divide into groups. To classify is to divide the
world accordin g to hierarchica l principles .
Certain categorie s are allocated status as
dominant , superordinate , primary, while others
are designate d dominated , subordinate ,
secondary . The human mode of conceivin g
categorie s is affectiv e rather than logical, say
Durkheim and Mauss. We divide the world into
sacred /profane, clean/unclean , friends/enemies,
positive/negative . The classi® cations are not a
result of objectiv e properties , intrinsic to the
phenomenon, which the human brain registers
and names. Rather, they are associate d with the
group’ s general life condition s and their entire
complex mythologica l worldview . Therefore ,
the distinction s also vary from society to
society . A phenomenon , which in one culture is
viewed as naturally homogenous , can in another
culture be conceive d as naturall y heterogeneou s
(ibid.).
Some of the dichotomie s that Bourdieu cites
most often in his texts on the Kabyle includ e
men/women, high/low, day/night and dry/wet.
The dichotomie s are constructe d so that the ® rst
link in each of them (man, high, day, dry) is
superio r to the other link (women, low, night,
wet). In Bourdieu’ s description , these dualistic
concepts structur e all of Kabyle social life,
including , for example, the forms of settlement.
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
The low, dark, humid part of the Kabyle house is
the women’ s domain, the part where small
children sleep, where sick and dying person s are
cared for, where the domestic animals are
housed . The high-lying , most valued part of the
house is the masculin e part, the part where
guests are received , where the light, lamp and
® replac e are found. In general the inside is the
woman’ s universe while the outside, and all
actions outwards, toward the ® eld, market,
public space, toward the open, wider world, are
the man’ s sphere . Thereby femininit y is linked
to the private, but also to the hidden , mystical,
secretive.
The contrast between public and private
recurs in the Kabyle views of the man’ s and
woman’ s bodies, respectively . The man’ s body
is considere d to be autonomous , self-suf ® cient 7
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7 and oriented toward public activity, while the
woman’ s body is associate d with private space,
or, in Bourdieu ’ s analogy, with ª the dark, damp
house, full of food, utensils and children , which
is entere d and left by the same inevitabl y soiled
openingº (Outline of a Theory of Practice 1982,
92). The male±female distinctio n is reproduce d
via men’ s and women’ s body movements and
gestures: the male body is connecte d with
authority , directness , activity , while the female
body is associate d with humility , shame,
passivity . During impregnatio n and pregnanc y
the woman is compared to passive , waiting
nature, like the ® eld which must be ploughe d
under and sown by man in order to give life. The
man is the subject, that which fertilizes , while
the woman is the object, that which is
impregnated.
The political ±mythologica l distinctio n
between public sphere/activit y and private life/
passivit y is also re¯ ected in Kabyle attitudes to
men’ s and women’ s work tasks. The man’ s
work is considere d superior , as that which
creates change and development , that which
bene® ts the entire group, while the woman’ s
work has the characte r of private, repetitiv e
routine . The continuit y and regularit y of the
women’ s work tasks, caring for children and
animals, attendin g to the sick and old, managin g
the household , make them secondar y in relation
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
to the man’ s discontinuous , outer-directe d and
thereb y more visible work tasks (La dominatio n
masculine 1998).
In this way, Bourdieu shows how gender
distinction s structur e social life, from the
intimate sphere to the public sphere , into a
complex pattern, where masculinit y is
associate d with activit y and meaningfulness ,
while femininity is equate d with passivity and
insigni® cance. The gender dimension thereby
exerts direct in¯ uence on the basic form of
capital in all struggles for distinctio n in Kabyle
society , namely honour . The Kabyle’ s strategi c
decision- making in question s of marriage
alliance, inheritance , purchase and sale of land,
productiv e investments, etc. is always made in
an effort to maintain or increase the family/
8 group reputation . The struggle for honou r is a
competitio n among men, a game in which
women can participat e as pieces, but not as
independen t players. The struggle implies
challenge s and responses , claims and
counterclai ms, which can only be exchange d
between equal players. Provocatio n in a power
game is not a uniforml y negative act; it is also a
signal about respect. The worst conceivabl e
thing for a man in Kabyle society is to be totally
without enemies, never to be challenge d by his
counterpart , since a man without enemies is an
unnotice d man, a passive man, and therefor e no
man at all, but ª an object, an animal or a
womanº (Outline of a Theory of Practice 1982,
11).
The social order in Bourdieu ’ s structuralis t
universe does not simply build upon distinction ,
clear lines of demarcation , but also on
ª reuni® cationº . In order for society to persist, in
order for life to continue , the contrasts must
meet: the masculine principl e must be joined
with the feminine (in marriage) and culture must
rework nature (by ploughing , sowing, harvest) .
The union of oppositions , however , does not
mean that the distinction s are dissolved ; on the
contrary . The cultivate d earth and the married
woman (Bourdie u thus draws a clear parallel
between these two) are proof of the
meaningfulnes s of the dichotomies, and of the
superiorit y of masculinity /culture to woman/
nature . Virginal nature must be conquere d and
ennobled in order for her/it to becom e fertile.
The man ª opensº nature and sows it; the
woman’ s body enters into a conditio n of
lethargic , subjectles s waiting for new life (ibid.,
138).
The union between masculinity and
femininity , however , gives rise to a new
distinction : that between the male-dominate d
woman (wife) and the women who stand outside
matrimonial control. To the latter categor y
belong partly the young women (untouche d
® eld), who do not constitut e a problem as long
as they stand under the protectio n of their natal
families. The male family members’ task is to
guarante e that the virginal ® eld is maintained
untouche d until it is transferre d to another man’ s
control . A proble m in this mythologica l gender

universe , however , is the status of elder
unmarried women and widows (fallow ® elds, in
Bourdieu ’ s terminology) . These ® nd themselve s
in a situatio n of ª dead nature º or nature which
can no longer be made fertile , no longer bear
fruit. They represen t earth outsid e human
in¯ uence, a sterile and primeval situatio n which
the man, the holy inseminator , can no longer
cultivate . Their sterilit y is the female principl e
left in its barrenness , an expressio n of ª the
female races’ objective , purely negative truthº
(op. cit., 128±9). In Kabyle languag e the term
ª womenkind º also means emptiness, the void,
the desert, ruin. Elderly, single women are
regarde d as possessin g real power (a power not
normally associate d with women), and this
power is derived from the interio r of nature.
They stand for the unpredictabl e and
inscrutable , for treachery , magic and evil. A
woman who is not dependen t on any man and
who has no child (to bind her to her own or a
man’ s kin) is a human jackal , a sneaky ,
unreliabl e being who does not follow the ¯ ock
and attack s when and where she wants (Outline
of a Theory of Practice 1982, 124ff; The Logic
of Practice 1992, 213ff) .
Bourdieu ’ s reasonin g can be used to place in
perspectiv e the negativ e attitudes toward
women’ s ageing that one ® nds in Kabyle society
and in numerou s other cultures. The fact that
male seniority represent s wisdom and authority ,
while female maturity represent s depreciatio n
and decline , is associate d with the gender
dichotomizatio n which position s men with
culture and women with nature. In a
sociocultura l universe where the man’ s task is to
conquer and inseminate the woman/nature, and
where femininity (aside from male control )
symbolize s dead nature, there exists no
legitimat e role for the single woman. She is
positione d in absolute oppositio n both to the
man, ª he who gives life to dead nature º , and to
the married woman, ª she who receives lifeº , and
thereb y represent s an anomaly , or even a threat
to the union of male±female and culture±nature .
After this review of Bourdieu ’ s structuralist -
inspired ideas on the gender dimensions as the
most important principle of distinctio n in
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
Kabyle society , I now turn to the description s of
gender differentiatio n in some of his other
5
texts.
Power and belief
A centra l concep t in several of Bourdieu ’ s
studies, and one that is probably very applicabl e
6
in gender research, is ª symbolic powerº . In
his article ª Symbolic powerº (1979) , one can
follow Bourdieu ’ s path in formulating this
concept. His ® rst source of inspiratio n is (again )
Durkheim , and his message that the system of
classi® cation is not universa l and
transcendental , but arbitrar y and group-speci ® c.
Symbolic power then is the same as power to
construc t reality , the ability to affect the
classi® cations. The symbolic constructio n
process tends to verify itself as natura l and self-
evident, inasmuch as it is backed up by ª logica l
conformismº (a Durkheimian concept which
describes homogeneit y in the perceptua l schema
of group participation) . A group’ s moral
integration , accordin g to the Durkheimians,
demands that the members agree upon the
centra l parameters in the group’ s symbolic
universe.
Another source of inspiratio n for the
symbolic power concep t Bourdieu ® nds in the
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
Marxist tradition ’ s theses on social ideologies ,
which serve the interests of the dominant
classes. The symbolic system, which appear s to
be the informatio n and communicatio n system ,
is in its very mechanism s a system of distinctio n
consolidatin g the privilege s of certain societal
categories . Symbolic power is the capacit y of
the dominant classes to force throug h their own
de® nition of reality in a way which makes
invisibl e the linkag e been the symbolic system
and the interests of the powerful (ª Symbolic
powerº 1979, 80). Symbolic power can operate
as such and be just as effectiv e as the most
ruthless forms of physica l and economi c force
only so long it is not recognize d as violence . A
key task of sociologica l research is to uncover
the transformativ e processe s which conver t
inequalit y to symbolic interaction , where those 9
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
10
who are controlle d contribut e to their own
subjugation.
The third source of inspiratio n in Bourdieu’ s
reasonin g about symbolic power is Weber’ s
basic thesis that all human hierarchie s are
ultimatel y anchored in a belief in the legitimac y
of the social order. For its optimal functionin g a
dominanc e relatio n require s that the
subordinate d part experienc e the relationshi p as
somehow self-evident , necessary , or bene® cial
(Weber 1978, 31). Genuine dominance thus
implies a minimum level of ª interest in
obedience º on the part of the victim . He/she
consider s a redistributio n of power as irrelevant ,
far-fetche d or directly terrifying . Tradition ,
emotiona l connection s and solidarit y can be
importan t guarantee s for a stable dominance
relationship , but they are not adequate in
themselves . The relatio n must therefore ,
accordin g to Weber (and Bourdieu) , be backed
up by an interpersona l bindin g legitimacy , a
kind of conviction , which cannot always be
verbalized , that the order which dominates is the
only conceivabl e order.
In this way, Bourdieu ’ s concep t of symbolic
power is based on the idea that no exercise of
power can operate in the long run without one or
anothe r form of magic (ª Symbolic powerº 1979,
187). Power must mask itself, assuming a
disguise which conceals its brutal arbitrar y
character . Symbolic power is always based upon
belief:
¼ [gentle violence] ¼ comes to operate
through belief and the pre-re¯ exive agreement
of the body and mind with the world ± whose
paradigmatic manifestation is masculine
domination. What is internalized, in my view,
are principles of vision and division of the
world which, being in agreement with the
objective structures of the world, create a sort
of infra-conscious ® t with the structures within
which agents evolve. (Bourdieu in Wacquant
1993b, 34.)
By ª beliefº Bourdieu here refers to a kind of
non-consciou s matrix of perception , evaluatio n
and practice, the toughnes s of the masculin e
dominanc e structure s being guarantee d by the
fact that the matrix has been embodied . The
body is the memory of the social world; the
gender distinction s are imprinted away from
human consciousnes s and can therefor e only
with dif® culty be reached and transformed .
Bourdieu speaks of our body ª hexisº ,
considerin g the constitutio n of the body, its
function s and its language . This hexis is divided
into some very clear-cu t gender categories :
ª girls and boys are socialize d into strictly
gender-speci ® c modes of walking, standing and
sitting , of talking, keepin g silent and listening ,
of laughin g and crying , eating and sleepingº
(John B. Thompson in Introductio n to
Bourdieu’ s Language and Symbolic Power
1991, 13). The hexis of men’ s and women’ s
bodies belongs to the symbolic domain, which
Bourdieu calls ª docta ignorantia º . The gender
distinction s are de® ned by schemes that do not
includ e knowledg e of their own historica l
creation . Hexis is not something a person has,
like opinions , which can eventuall y be replace d
if the situatio n demands it. Hexis is somethin g a
person is, and is therefor e very dif® cult to
change (The Logic of Practice 1992, 72).
To Bourdieu, a group’ s ª doxaº is the same as
the of® cial de® nition of reality , a de® nition
which excludes and represses other de® nitions.
Doxa is always laid down in one speci® c
perspective : that of the dominant group, but it is
also recognize d as an objectiv e truth by the
dominated . Here Bourdieu polemicizes against
all sorts of ª populisti c mythologies º accordin g
to which the represse d can simply revolt and
break free from the mechanism s that repress
them. Dominated groups, such as women, have
themselves been socialize d into the doxa, which
de® nes them as less worthy. The schemas for
perception , evaluatio n and practice that make
femininity equivalen t to subordination ,
passivit y and fragilit y are also the woman’ s own
schemas. A revolt against a repressiv e and
limiting femininit y therefore demands that we
distanc e ourselve s from our own though t
universe and from the mythologica l gender
construction s which are materialize d in our own
bodies (cf. Bourdieu in Wacquan t 1993b , 35).
Symbolic power is the result of ª social
alchemy º , where societal hierarchies , i.e.

historicall y arbitrar y social, economic and
politica l orders, are disguised and come to be
viewed as natural. Like magic, symbolic power
builds on a collectiv e denial of the world of
reality: ª the gentle, invisibl e form of violence ,
which is never recognize d as such¼ the
violence of credit, con® dence, obligation ,
personal loyalty , hospitality , gifts, gratitude ,
piety¼ º (Outline of a Theory of Practice 1982,
192). The alchemic transformatio n guarantee s
the continuit y of the hierarchies , which cause
the subordinate d to bow gently under a yoke
they do not even feel (Wacquan t in the
preface to Bourdieu ’ s State Nobility 1996,
xviii).
The alchemic gender distinctions , writes
Bourdieu , building upon Arnold van Gennep,
are create d via ª rites of passageº . The primary
functio n of ritual is not to separat e those who
have undergon e them (e.g. young men) from
those who have not yet undergon e them (boys) .
The function of rituals is to create a clear line of
demarcatio n between the rituals’ earlier,
existin g and coming participant s (men and
boys), and those who stand outside these rituals
(women and girls). The functio n of rituals is
thereb y to legitimate a basicall y arbitrar y line of
demarcatio n been men and women. Gender
rituals tend to make the least muscular, (in
everyda y language ) most effeminate men into
ª real menº and the tallest , strongest , most
masculin e women into ª real womenº .
Therefore , says Bourdieu , the rituals describe d
by van Gennep ought to be called rites of
legitimatio n rather than rites of passage. The
functio n of social magic is to create
discontinuity , a clear line of demarcation ,
institutin g man as man and woman as
woman (Languag e and Symbolic Power 1991,
117ff).
The legitimatin g gender rituals exert their
effect on two (interlinked ) levels. First, they
entail changes in the attitude s of the
environmen t to the person s who underg o them.
A man who has had his masculinit y con® rmed in
a rite of legitimation is met with a differen t type
of respect than person s (women) not admitted to
this ritual. Second, the rituals generat e a
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
transfor mation of the participants ’ own self-
image. The legitimatio n of gender af® liation
entails that there is no way back for the
participants . Masculinit y is both a privilege and
a duty; it is a comprehensiv e feature imprinte d
as the participants ’ true essenc e and meaning of
life. All accreditation , accordin g to Bourdieu ,
tends to con® rm itself. Attribute d propertie s
often take root among those on whom they are
imposed . Hence, the magic gender boundarie s
created via rituals not only functio n to exclud e
women from the masculine sphere , from power
and the public sphere . They also have the
functio n of maintainin g men in the
meaningfulnes s which belong s to them, to
preven t them from ª effeminizing º or
ª emasculating º themselves and the entire male
gender (ibid., 120±122).
The dualistic gender construction s made
natura l for both winners and losers create ª a
perfectl y closed worldº , a mythic±ritual system
dominated by masculin e values (Outline of a
Theory of Practice 1982, 167). This system is
complete as long, and only as long, as it
maintains the facade of naturalness . Calling into
questio n society’ s gender structur e has therefor e
always implied questionin g ª the biologicall y
givenº as opposed to ª the sociall y constructed º ,
and ª the ® eld of doxaº as opposed to ª the ® eld
of opinionº (ibid., 169±179). Feminists of all
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
times have attempted to push back the doxic
® eld, attack its ª self-evidences º and move them
into the discursiv e ® eld, to that which can be
questioned , discusse d and changed . The
defender s of the status quo, for their part, have
struggle d to maintain gender construction s as
natura l categories , via reference to biologica l
distinction s and/or psychic difference s related to
reproductiv e functions . The privilege d always
borrow the languag e of nature in attemptin g to
preserve their own rights, writes Bourdieu . And
if they do not succeed in legitimating the status
quo throug h referrin g to the naturall y given,
they attempt to do so throug h reference to the
well-bein g of the child, the survival of the
family, or generally , what is best for society
(Languag e and Symbolic Power 1991, 130±
131). 11
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
12
Embodiment and authority
Concrete illustration s of the concept s of
symbolic power and bodily hexis can be found
in many of Bourdieu’ s publications . Bourdieu
shows how the social alchem y ¯ exibly and
effectivel y enables women in Kabyle as well as
in French society to becom e their own
controller s and oppressors . He shows how
women, via collectiv e self-deceptio n and
various rites of legitimation, are kept away from
power and the public sphere , how they are
socialize d to make a virtue out of necessity and
to subordinat e themselves voluntaril y in a
gender game which they have no chance of
winning.
Gender- (and class-) determined forms of
bodily ª hexisº are analyzed by Bourdieu in
Distinction (1984). Here he describes how the
masculin e body is associate d with strength and
independence , with freedom , brutality and
insatiabl e need (for food, drink and sex), and he
also shows that this masculine practical bodily
philosoph y is especiall y expresse d in the
7
working class. The feminine body, in contrast,
is viewed as having approximatel y the same
need for food and drink as a child: small
portions, light food, healthy food, non-alcoholi c
drinks. Gormandizin g is not for women and
children, just as they are unsuited for tours de
force and boundary-transg ressing physicality .
The essence of the masculin e identit y (virility )
shows itself in men’ s way of eating: a
wholehearte d and lustful ingestio n of food and
liquids, sharpl y contraste d with women’ s
cautious pickin g and poking at the food, and
women’ s constan t awareness of the
consequence s of eating and drinkin g for
appearanc e and health (Distinction 1979, 190ff) .
The female body is to a very high degree a
ª body for othersº or an ª alienated bodyº , a body
which is objecti ® ed via other people’ s gazes and
discourses . Women’ s attitudes toward their own
bodies are often associate d with anxiety and
lack of desire, and by a constan t evaluatio n and
supervision . Women, especiall y lower-middl e
class women, constantl y regard themselves with
the (extremely critical) eye of others and can
therefor e never fully accept their own bodies.
The contrast to the middle classes’ alienate d
women, accordin g to Bourdieu , is the powerful
man, who is always seen to be the subjec t of his
own body, regardles s of how devian t his
physica l appearanc e may be from society ’ s
ideals of beauty and health . These men are their
own judges; they are their own ª othersº , hence,
freed from the judgmental criteria of their
surroundings . They have the power to presen t
their own positiv e self-imag e as the sole
legitimate image and to take from other person s
the right to objecti® cation . Prestige and
authority always have their own power of
attraction , a power which sets aside the normal
rules of the game on the sexual market (ibid.,
207±208).
A second type of example of symbolic power
and bodily hexis is found in Bourdieu ’ s ideas
about the gender-relate d right of public
expression . Here Bourdieu punches a hole in the
myth that men and women, in today’ s
ª democratic egalitaria n society º , have the same
opportunitie s to expres s themselves and be
heard in the public context. To speak in public
demands that one be authorize d to express
oneself , and (the invisible ) role list over who can
express themselves and who cannot is laid down
in full harmony with society ’ s power structures .
A competen t speaker is quite simply a certi® ed
speaker , and a certi® ed speaker has traditionall y
been and continue s to a great degree to be a male
speaker . The art of speaking , however , comes to
appear as a propert y emanatin g from within the
individual , because legitimatio n tends to
become embodied . Certi® cation shows itself in
the authorize d persons’ mode of moving,
standing , sitting and walking, and their
expression s and gestures . Or, in Bourdieu’ s
words: ª The strengt h of the ethos is that it is
morality made ¯ eshº (Sociolog y in Questio n
1995, 86). Conversely , the non-authorize d
person s have enormou s obstacles to overcom e
when they attempt to capture the public ’ s
attention . Compare the anxiety , insecurit y and
nervousnes s that many women experienc e in
public discussions . These experience s have real
social and historica l causes: women do not have

the same self-evident , embodied right to express
themselves in public as do men in equivalen t
socio-economi c positions . The authorizatio n
(among men) and non-authorizatio n (among
women), however , can achieve full effect only
as long as the behind-the-scene s power
mechanism s are made invisible . Charism a and
dignity must appear as individua l propertie s of
the speaker . That also (many) women perceiv e
men as the most ª naturalº speaker s is perhaps
the best evidence that the mythical ±ritual
masculin e system continue s to be intact.
Collectiv e self-deceptio n contribute s to
maintainin g a giganti c game of differentiatio n
and categorizatio n whereby people in certain
social categorie s seat themselves in the sphere
of power and others voluntaril y keep themselve s
away from it. The necessity becomes a virtue for
the excluded ; they perceive that power and
in¯ uence have no interest for them. ª Interestº
means to be a part of something , to have shares
in something , and it is precisely these shares that
those subordinate d lack (Raisons pratique s
1994). Hence, large sphere s of politica l and
economic life remain only for men. Political
positionin g is understoo d to demand a certain
measure of knowledg e and skills, but primarily
it demands citizen s who are entitled to political
in¯ uence.
One of the masculine-dominat ed games of
distinctio n on which Bourdieu has placed most
attentio n is the academic. Nothing, says
Bourdieu , resembles the struggl e for honou r
among the Kabyle more than the struggle s in the
intellectua l ® eld. In academic struggles , what
seems to be at stake (the questio n of the correc t
choice of theory or method, the questio n of how
the result should be interpreted ) conceal s
anothe r invisibl e game: the struggl e for honour .
Like in the Kabyle society , this is a struggle
primarily fought among men. Despite the fact
that women (in France and in the rest of the
western world) today constitut e a great
proportio n of universit y students, their
opportunitie s to pursue academic careers are
greatly limited, says Bourdieu . This is
associate d with several factors.
First, there exists an intricat e and opaqu e
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
connectio n between the academic faculties ’
status rank order and gender distributio n in these
areas. Where women are allowed in, power and
in¯ uence is let out. One can ask what occurs
® rst: are women allowed to enter ® elds where
status is alread y declining , or does the status
start to declin e after women have entere d the
area? The question can hardly be answered.
Bourdieu’ s message is simply that the system
develops new methods to reproduc e itself. The
once manifest eliminatio n of women (and
working-clas s youth) from the academic ® elds
has been replaced by latent ® ltering mechanisms
which cautiousl y but surely guarante e that
power goes to the ª heirsº (primarily men with
the correct family and school backgrounds) .
Formerly, the universit y world automaticall y
excluded ª the unsuitable º ; today they are
allowed in, simply so that they may slowly learn
that a universit y degree in itself is so no longer
an entry ticket into the cultural , ® nancia l and
politica l centre of France (La miseÁ re du monde
1993, 597ff) .
Second, the academi c world is to an extremel y
high degree a judgmental world, but a
judgmental world where classi® cation criteri a
are subtle. All participant s ® nd themselves
constantl y having their contribution s evaluated ,
and the judges come not from outside, but from
within the ® eld. A researcher ’ s performanc e is
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
scrutinize d by his/her colleagues , persons who in
one or anothe r respect, individuall y or
institutionally , can be proper competitors . It is
this characteristic , writes Bourdieu , which
makes academi c judgmen t so merciless.
Intellectua l struggles are a war of all against all, a
struggle where all are affected by all in the
establishmen t of worth and status, a struggl e for
symbolic life and symbolic death (Homo
academicus 1988, 19; ª Vive la criseº 1988, 778).
An academic evaluatio n always concern s the
evaluato r just as much as the person being
judged . It re¯ ects the evaluator ’ s interest /
indifferenc e and sympathy /antipath y for the
researc h area and the theoretica l and
methodologica l perspective s that the evaluate d
person represents . Judgment in the academic
world is always a kind of gatekeeping , where the 13
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7 gatekeepe r takes a positio n on whether the
aspiran t should be allowed in or not. A
gatekeepe r always operates, consciousl y or
unconsciously , on the basis of his own ideal
picture of what a new member of the academic
world should be. If one analyze s this ideal
picture carefully , the image invariabl y tends to
resemble the evaluato r himself, or rather the
rosiest versio n of the picture the evaluato r has of
himself. Since this ideal picture, for centuries , in
academic generatio n after academic generation ,
has been moulded on the image of a ª young
gifted man of bourgeoi s originsº , it is not easy
for the new groups of students/graduate s
(women, person s of working-clas s background ,
ethnic minorities) to live up to it.
In The State Nobility (1996) , Bourdieu
analyzes the classi® cation system that enters
into most types of academi c evaluation s of
individual s (students , teachers) as well as their
products (oral, written). As some of the most
frequentl y utilize d distinctions , he mentions
original/ordinary , exciting/boring, certain /
uncertain , noteworthy /insigni® cant and mature/
naõ È ve. When universit y teacher s classif y their
students accordin g to these (and other similar)
attributes , it can be seen that the classi® cation s
harmonizes with the students’ socio-economi c
backgrounds . Students (and their performances )
from the lowest social classes are described as
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
insecure, naõ È ve, uninterestin g or crude and
strange. Those from the lower middle class tend
to be designate d terms such as mediocre,
medium quality and decent, while attribute s
such as personal , self-assured , independent , and
of course brilliant, are reserved for students
(read: men) from the highest level of society
(The State Nobility 1996, 9±29). In the academic
® ltering game, women are often thought to be
placed in the middle categor y ± academica
mediocritas ± while the struggl e for the top
positions , the struggl e among ª the brilliant º ,
continue s primarily to be a struggle among men.
Hence, we can conclud e that Bourdieu ’ s
descriptio n of the functio n of legitimatin g rites
(cf. above) , distinguishin g between the rituals’
earlier, existin g and coming participants , and
14 person s who are not entitled to these rituals, ® ts
extremely well into the academic world’ s power
game. The rituals of evaluatio n that structur e
academic career s bind togethe r the judges and
the heirs in a reciproca l game of loyalty based
on views of individua l talent. To value oneself
in another (who resemble s oneself most) is a
good preconditio n for developmen t of esprit de
corps. Nepotism is not just a strateg y which
guarantee s that power continue s to be held by
one’ s own, but is also a way of retainin g the
group’ s doxa. Nepotism insures the academic
institution s against unpleasan t surprise s by
excludin g individuals /groups who could be
thought to add other values, other interests ,
other criteria to the ® eld. There exist few social
® elds so dependen t on belief as the academi c
® eld, writes Bourdieu. In academia , the rumour
of power is the same as power, the rumour about
quality the same as quality , and this system of
belief has dif® culty managing too many
dissident s (Homo academicu s 1988, 91, 153).
But why do the non-inheritor s tolerat e being
systematicall y discriminate d against in the
academic game? Because, writes Bourdieu , the
connectio n between an individual ’ s objectiv e
potentia l and his/her goals, dream s and hopes is
so strong that non-heir s typicall y exclud e
themselves from those sphere s in which they
would be exclude d anyway. Students from the
French province s are not intereste d in a Parisian
academic ® eld that is not intereste d in them.
Students from the working class (and women)
do not endeavou r to enter career paths which de
facto are reserve d for the heirs. The mental
structure s harmonize with the social structures .
This create s career pattern s where individual s in
retrospec t conclud e that they hoped for nothin g
they have not obtaine d and obtained nothin g
they did not hope for (Reproduction 1996, 207).
And the few exception s among the non-heir s
(women, persons from the working class) who
reach the top in the cultural , ® nancia l or political
elite have their own dif® culties to struggl e
against . They encounte r a ® eld where they must
forever attempt to prove their own worth:
ª before them stands a barrier as
insurmountable ¼ as the one that separate s an
in® nite series of nines followin g a decimal point

from unityº (The State Nobility 1996, 151).
Little wonder that non-inheritor s are often
classi® ed as diligent , capabl e and effective ,
rather than brilliant , and that career women are
labelle d as aggressiv e and dif® cult rather than
jovial and charismatic . Brilliance and joviality
are luxurie s that only the inheritor s (who do not
need to convince anyone of anything ) can
permit themselves .
Discussion
The critica l sociologica l discussio n of
Bourdieu ’ s work is very comprehensive . In
concludin g this article I will only take up two
points which have direct relevanc e for the
gender aspects discussed here. Both these
points, like almost all critiques of Bourdieu
generally , are connecte d to the static and
deterministic implication s of his analysis.
First, one can, as I have done in the ® rst part
of this article , cultivat e the structuralis t elements
in Bourdieu ’ s gender perspective . Bourdieu’ s
description s of the dualisti c gender
construction s in Kabylia can be seen as a kind of
ideal type, or caricatur e if you will, in analyses
of gender construction s in our own society.
Many reader s of Bourdieu will nod in agreement
with the Kabyle’ s notion s that men’ s work tasks
are primary, while the women’ s are ª invisible º
and ª meaningless º , and that women,
mythologicall y speaking , represen t nature, both
innocent , untouche d and threatening ,
uncontrolle d nature. And the Kabyle’ s struggle
for honou r certainl y resembles the power game
that takes place in both the academic and
politica l spheres, where men continu e to be
considere d the most natural ± or charismatic ,
intelligent , brillian t ± participants , and women
are often experience d as (and experienc e
themselves as) non-competen t players. At the
same time, the dualisti c gender structure s
Bourdieu describes appear to be static and self-
reproducing . Bourdieu has certainl y made
efforts to emancipat e himself from the ª vulgata º
of structuralism , i.e. the most rigid, abstract
forms of structuralism , which allow no room for
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
an active, choosin g subject . However, the
questio n is how well he has succeede d in this
task. His male and female agents appear to have
settled into a complex net of dominanc e and
subordination , which make emancipatio n and
change impossible . Despite Bourdieu ’ s attempts
to distance himself from all sorts of
essentialis m, he comes very close to an
understandin g which categoricall y equates
femininity with subordinatio n and masculinity
with dominance . The status of gender as the
primary dichotomy in the hierarchica l structure s
of all human thinkin g ± primary/secondary ,
clean/unclean , active/passive ± makes feminism
8
into a nearly hopeless project.
Bourdieu designate s his work as
ª constructivis t structuralism º or ª structuralis t
constructivism º (In Other Words 1994, 22). By
structuralis m he means that in the social world,
not just in the symbolic system, there exist
objectiv e structure s which are independen t of
the agent’ s consciousnes s and will. The concep t
of constructivis m he uses to captur e a kind of
social genesis: on the one hand, the productio n
of schemes for perception , evaluatio n and
practice which constitut e habits; on the other
9
hand, the productio n of the social structures .
The latter structure s Bourdieu describes as
socially constructed , objectiv e and independen t
of the agent’ s consciousnes s and will. It
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
therefor e becomes unclear what constitute s the
social genesis that lies behind the constitutio n of
the social structure s (e.g. class and gender) .
How have the ª objective º social structure s been
produce d which today form us as individua l men
and women, and how can these structure s be
change d if they ® nd themselve s apart from the
agent’ s consciousnes s and will?
Bourdieu ’ s constructivis m is in general
dif® cult to decipher . In parts of his texts one
® nds examples of radical gender constructivis t
thinking . For example , in the discussio n on rites
of passag e (cf. above) , he writes that the
functio n of social magic is to impose
discontinuit y on a continuou s variabl e (the
gender variable) . Masculinity and femininit y
here appear as constructe d throug h ritualize d
interaction ; ® liation to a gender is the result of 15
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
16
arbitrar y and group-speci ® c classi® catory
processes . In other Bourdieu texts, gender is
described almost transcendentally : masculinity
and femininit y are natura l (not naturalized )
categories , a kind of human primeval dichotom y
which structure s the social, but is not structure d
by it. Bourdieu ’ s labellin g of himself as a
constructivis t raises more question s than it
answers. Should the gender-speci ® c subjec t in
Bourdieu ’ s sociolog y (as with Foucault) be
viewed as an effect of (the masculine or
feminine ) ritualizatio n and embodimen t of
10
society ’ s power structures ? Or do gender -
speci® c identitie s have primary status in relation
to the practice forms which delineat e the body as
feminine /masculine? And associate d with this:
what does Bourdieu really mean by the concep t
of ª embodiment º ? Socially constructe d bodily
positions , gestures and verbal forms of practice
are certainl y key parts of our gender-speci ® c
habitus, but how do these relate to the cognitive
structure s which also enter into the habitus?
Bourdieu ’ s strong emphasis on the physica l
component s of habits (ª morality made ¯ eshº )
contribute s to the impressio n of a static,
deterministic gender system . What can
individua l agents do against a dominance
system that has created the body’ s entire hexis?
We cannot immediatel y change our ways of
walking, standin g and sitting , of talking , being
silent and listening , of laughin g and crying,
eating and sleeping , regardles s of how aware we
are of the gender constructions ’ doxic character .
Bourdieu places a very great burden of
explanatio n on his concept of habitus (this
applie s in the analyses of gender as well as
class). The concep t of habitu s (dispositions )
enters as an absolutel y decisiv e connectio n
between individuals ’ objectiv e positions in
society and their subjectiv e positionings (their
ª choicesº ). The habitu s concept must on the one
hand mediate between structur e and actor, and
11
on the other hand between body and subject .
Bourdieu ’ s structuralis t constructivism ,
however , points the habitu s concept in the
directio n of the ® rst link in both these
oppositiona l pairs, which means that the actor/
subject aspect remains hangin g in a theoretica l
vacuum . Habitus’ mediation between position s
and positioning s is conceive d exclusivel y as
going the one way: from structure s to ª choice º
(which no one really has, inasmuch as they are
controlle d by the structures) , never in the
revers e direction , back again: from choice
(without quotatio n marks) to structures .
Second, I will comment on Bourdieu ’ s main
thesis in the area of gender theory , his strong
emphasis on how the subordinat e groups in
society contribut e to their own oppression . The
thesis of symbolic power is in many respects a
logical result of what was said about the habitu s
concep t above. The objectiv e position s create ª a
perfectl y closed worldº , a mythic±ritual system
dominated by masculin e values, a system that
control s both female and male agents’
perceptions , thought s and actions. And how
could it be otherwise? The disposition s and the
positionings , as mentioned , are formed by the
positions , not the reverse . The doxic system
creates an almost complete harmony between
individuals ’ social condition s and (what they
experienc e as) their inner dream s and desires.
Here, too, one can questio n the determinism in
Bourdieu’ s thinking . Are women’ s perceptions ,
thought s and action s in fact so totally governe d
by the ª objective º masculin e power structure s
(whose genesi s fades away into the unknown )
that they continuall y reproduc e these structures ?
Is it true that the gender distinctio n has
embedde d itself beyon d the human
consciousnes s into a doxic system which is
nearly impossibl e to make explici t and
transfor m? And most importan t of all: does one
® nd in real life such an astoundin g harmony
between the agents’ positions , disposition s
(habitus) and positioning s (ª choice º ) which
Bourdieu’ s theories imply?
Some studies, which have attempted to test
Bourdieu’ s theories empirically , show that this
does not always occur. One example is Beverly
Skeggs’ (1997) study of British working-clas s
women. Skeggs analyzes the women’ s class and
gender identit y and their reaction s to society ’ s
categorizatio n processes . She shows great
individua l variation s between the interviewe d
persons’ habitu s and their objective (gender -

and class-related ) position s in society . The
women in Skeggs’ study did not unconditionall y
adapt to their class backgrounds . Many of them
revolte d against a traditiona l female working-
class identity . They would not be associate d
with ª the polyester class, overweigh t occupant s
of the slow track¼ the invisibl e pink-colla r
armyº (1997, 100). They did not quietly accept
their lot in life, but instead protested against
power and oppression . They made major
investments in appearance , dress, home
decoration , leisure time interests , etc.,
investments that Skeggs interpret s as attempts to
ª passº as middle-clas s women. Skeggs’
interview subject s also struggle d in order to pass
as ª women with styleº , respectabl e women, and
thereb y defende d themselves against being
labelle d vulgar , cheap, sexually available , all
attribute s which they experience d as attached to
working-clas s women. Throughou t the book, in
a polemic with Bourdieu, Skeggs emphasize s
the women’ s subjec t status, and their potential to
deviat e from and protest against the most
simplistic class and gender stereotypes .
What Bourdieu ’ s theorie s cannot explain, of
course , are all the cases where despite
everything , there is no overlap between
position s and dispositions . Belonging to a
speci® c class is not the same as having a speci® c
class identity . Belonging to a speci® c gender
does not mean that one unconditionall y adapts
to norms traditionall y connecte d with femininit y
or masculinity . We know that many people
(both women and men, from both dominan t and
dominatin g classes) , deviat e from the life
trajectorie s which Bourdieu ’ s theorie s stake out
for them. How is it possible? How can it occur
that certain women (and in fact, larger and larger
groups of women) against all odds, move into
the career paths traditionall y reserve d for the
male ª heirsº ? How is it possible for those
working-clas s people ± both female and male ±
who break out of the pattern , to acquir e the
cultura l capita l which, accordin g to Bourdieu’ s
theory of cumulative discrimination s (i.e.
someone who starts life with weak cultural
capital cannot acquir e school /universit y cultura l
capital) , they should be incapabl e of acquiring ?
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7
It is possibl e to explain this via referenc e to the
pattern breakers ’ unique intellectua l resources ,
their personal courag e or exceptiona l capacity to
struggle against society ’ s injustices . But does
this not lead us to subscrib e to the thesis of
individua l talent and personall y designed life
course, which Bourdieu so categoricall y rejects
in other contexts? What sociological
explanation s can we ® nd that the system, despite
everything , does not reproduc e itself
unconditionally?
Empirical approache s (such as that of Skeggs
above) on the positions-dispositio ns-positionin g
triad are also complicate d by the fact that the
distinctio n between position s and disposition s is
unclear in Bourdieu’ s works. This critiqu e has
previousl y been presente d against his concept of
class. Bourdieu de® nes the actors’ class
af® liation (or social positions ) on the basis of the
amount and compositio n of their economic and
cultural capital. At the same time, he utilize s
class af® liation to explai n variation s in cultura l
capital and cultura l activitie s between groups.
His de® nition of class is thereb y put in a
tautologica l relation to the phenomeno n of
12
culture. This argumen t can be transferre d to
Bourdieu’ s gender perceptive . On the one hand,
gender is an independen t variable: an objective
backgroun d structure that forms the individua l
actors’ habitus. On the other hand, gender is a
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
dependen t variable , a result of embodied
superordination /subordination , a produc t of
objectiv e backgroun d structure s (cf. The Logic
of Practice 1992, 95). This theoretica l lack of
clarity , I think, can explai n several of the
contradiction s one can ® nd in the feminist
literatur e on Bourdieu . Certain writers believ e
that Bourdieu analyze s gender as an objective ,
absolut e and unchangin g reality (an independen t
variable) . They therefor e accuse Bourdieu of
being an essentialist . Other writers believ e that
Bourdieu de® nes gender as a partial component ,
and a rather subordinat e one, in the individual ’ s
habitus. They accuse Bourdieu of being sexist.
And some writers combine both these
accusation s and believ e that Bourdieu both
exaggerate s and understate s the signi® cance of
gender (e.g. McCall 1992). 17
NORA no. 1 1999, Volume 7 For me, Bourdieu is a radical-feminis t thinke r
who has gradually becom e more and more
resolute (and perhaps unidimensional ) in his
critiqu e of masculine-dominat ed social
structures . One can especiall y regard La
dominatio n masculin e (1998) , which in this
article has had a secondar y place vis-aÁ -vis
Bourdieu ’ s other works, as a gender -political
book. Bourdieu ’ s gender theoretica l perspectiv e
(throug h his entire corpus) can be compared
with a camera lens, which focuse s sharpl y on
power and reproduction , and less sharpl y on
counterpowe r and development . We can be
disturbed about this, and join the army of
Bourdieu critics who accuse him of being a
kind of ª structura l chauvinist º who presse s
society ’ s macrosyste m down onto the agents
he studies. We can also choose to accept his
texts as the solid, albeit static, power analyse s
they are and hope that someone else will take
on the task of studyin g the dynamics and
individua l variation s of the gender system .
In a late modern sociology , where
individualizatio n and re¯ exivity are magic code
words and ª classº and ª gender º cannot be
written without quotatio n marks, it ought not be
dif® cult to ® nd researcher s willing to undertak e
this task.
Pierre Bourdieu on gender and power
NOTE S
1. One of the fem inists who criticizes Bourdieu is
the American sociologist Leslie M cCall
(1992). McCall sees Bourdieu’ s gender
theoretical reasoning as androcentric, and
claims that his investigations reproduce sexist
dichotomies. The causes of this depressing
characteristic are that Bourdieu does not treat
gender as a form of sym bolic capital, and that
(according to M cCall) he treats gender
differentiation as a ª universal and naturalº
phenomenon. I find McCall’ s critique of
Bourdieu unreasonable, alm ost inconceivable
on certain points, and believe that M cCall has
perhaps m isunderstood Bourdieu’ s concept of
capital.
2. Bourdieu’ s theoretical background is a
com plex m ixture of sociology and philosophy.
Bourdieu’ s philosophical sources of
18 inspiration are, as Loõ È c Wacquant (1998)
points out, relatively unknown in the Anglo-
Saxon world. G aston Bachelard, Georges
Canguilhem, Jean CavailleÂs and Alexandre
KoyreÂcontribute important elements to
Bourdieu’ s conceptual philosophical
background. The causes of m any
misinterpretations of Bourdieu lie expressly in
the ignorance of the philosophical tradition
which has formed his sociology, says
Wacquant (1998, 37).
3. From the original work The Algerians (1961)
through to the theoretical reinterpretation of
this w ork in The Logic of Practice (1992) and
La domination m asculine (1998), one can see a
development toward a m ore pessimistic
description of gender relations. While in The
Algerians Bourdieu gave some examples of
female solidarity and feminine ª counterpowerº
strategies, The Logic of Practice depicts a
nearly totally m ale-dominated universe ± cf.
Bridget Fow ler (1997), who regards this to be
Bourdieu’ s reaction to the feminist utopias he
had becom e acquainted with in the meantim e.
4. In The Logic of Practice (1992), Bourdieu’ s
description of K abyle male dominance is
almost a caricature, w hich has made certain
researchers point to the Kabyle as an ª ideal
typeº to be advantageously used in other
studies of masculine/fem inine taxonomies (cf.
for example Beate Krais 1993).
5. I am aware that all Bourdieu readers do not
find his analyses of the Kabyle principles of
distinction as interesting as I do. The m ost
vocal critic in the Swedish debate is probably
Axel van den Berg (1992) who thinks that
Bourdieu’ s work only ª demonstrates how
simple-m inded this type of structuralism in fact
isº . van den Berg considers that some of
Bourdieu’ s observations in K abyle society are
ª arbitrary, others specially manufactured, and
still others contradictory, im probable or simply
stupidº (1992, 33).
6. Indeed one can assert, as does Loõ È c Wacquant
(1993a), that Bourdieu’ s entire life’ s work
concerns revealing symbolic power, that is
ª veiled powerº , relations of dom ination/
subordination which appear as natural, power
form s disguised as charity, charisma,
meritocracy, all depending on which of
Bourdieu’ s empirical investigations we are
dealing with.
7. For a discussion of the relation between class
and gender in Distinction and some of
Bourdieu’ s other w orks, see Annick Prieur
(1998).
8. Toril M oi (1991) asserts that Bourdieu’ s
reasoning on gender is not really in agreement

with the factual changes in gender relations in
recent decades. Bourdieu attem pts in a certain
manner to deal w ith this in La Domination
Masculine (1998), but in m y opinion the
problem rem ains. Bourdieu’ s social analytical
barometer seem s to have remained at a point
which, in some respects at least, better
describes the situation of the 1950s and 1960s
than the situation today.
9. Bourdieu (1994) himself cites the book
Academic Discourse (1994) as a work w hich
can be view ed as constructivist, and
Reproduction (1996) as a w ork often classified
as (or rather, accused of being) structuralist.
Personally I find it very difficult to see a
decisive theoretical difference between the two
books.
10. For a comparison of Bourdieu’ s treatment of
subjectivity with that of Foucault, see Cronin
(1996).
11. Compare Chris Shilling (1991) for a more
detailed discussion of this.
12. Compare David Gartm an (1991) for a m ore
detailed discussion of this point.
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