Ontology and Method in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Cuares B. DANIELS AND JOHN DavIsSON UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA We shall in the following put forward an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian views concerning ontology and method. On certain points, however, our “interpretation” becomes more an exercise in educated guessing in that we can find no textual authority for what we say; but we nonetheless believe that it is reasonable to suppose that someone with Wittgenstein’s views might have come down on the side of these issues that we have. Where we can find textual support for one of our points, or where one of our points can be seen to explicate a somewhat dark passage in the text, we indicate this by placing the number of the passage in parentheses after the point.! I. Introduction Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is primarily an essay in ontology in the classical tradition. It is also an unstinting advocacy of a certain ontological method, namely, that of showing the fundamental categories of being through a language that mirrors the world. And, more remarkably, it is written in full consciousness that what it says is incompatible with its ontology and methodology. For the Tractarian Wittgenstein, there are two fundamental ontological categories, the category of objects and the category of facts. These categories of being are radically disjoint. No object can be a fact, no fact an object (2.01, 2.02). It is in his unstinting insistence on the disjointedness of his two categories of being that Wittgenstein differs so much from most other ontologists. There is, in the pursuit of ontology, a manifest tendency to make use of an arsenal of quite special ontological predicates—for instance, ‘being an object’, ‘being a property’, ‘being a set’, ‘being a member of’, ‘being a fact’, etc. But it is seldom discussed why 233234 nots these predicates are singled out, rather than, say, ‘being a witch’ or ‘being a brother of’. In doing ontology this way, the philosopher has already almost certainly been tempted part way down the path to ontological commitment. He countenances individuals, i.e., things that can be referred to, and furthermore seems to want to imply that this is a category of being under which everything falls, an ultimate ontological genus. Moreover, he may tend to believe that these predicates represent properties, i.e., things that can be attrib- uted. Here, then, is a further ontological move. A decision on the question of whether everything that can be referred to can be attributed represents yet another ontological step. This step is usually made with a negative answer, but the answer is rarely supported with much of a reason. Does ‘is a member of’ represent anything real ? If so, our philosopher believes in relations too. Wittgenstein’s ontological undertaking is radically different. His two categories of being are truly disjoint. One can talk about, refer to, name objects; one can picture, describe, state facts. One cannot picture, describe, or state objects, and one cannot talk about, refer to, or name facts (3.221, 3.144). Wittgenstein is deadly serious here—to the point of realizing, indeed admitting that much of his own book is an attempt to do what on his own view cannot be done. For Wittgenstein, there is no ultimate genus that collects both facts and objects into it (4.1241). Very often in ordinary conversation we seem to be doing what Wittgenstein holds we cannot do. We seem to be referring to facts and stating objects. “The fact that John is an invalid won’t make things any easier’, we hear people say. Don’t these people seem to be referring to facts? And at times people will even make some such statement as ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ (when they have, for instance, been told to state who wrote the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus). To someone this might sound like stating an object. But the locutions of ordinary language are not always the best touchstones to the true nature of reality (3.323, 4.002). Substantives that state objects (or facts) are just as misleading as substantives that refer to facts. This is why Wittgenstein takes such an interest in a perspicu- ous language. The propositions of a perspicuous language are constructed so as to display the ontological structure of the world. In a truly perspicuous language, it will be impossible to form a sentence that gives rise to the sort of misleading impressions that we are led to by the constructions of ordinary languages, where substantive phrases such as ‘the fact that...’, ‘the property of...’,ONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 235 etc., give the impression that facts and properties are individuals that can be talked about (3.325). In a perspicuous language, the categories of being will be displayed in its structure, will show through its syntax (4.04, 4.121). But it also turns out, given the Tractarian ontology, that a book like the Tractatus cannot be written in such a language, because in the Tractatus Wittgenstein “talks about” “the relation between language and the world”, i.e., treats assertions and facts as objects that could be referred to and stand in relations. Yet if we had a perspicuous language, on the other hand, a book like the Tractatus would be unnecessary, since no false impressions due to grammar would give rise to mistakes in ontology. And it is here that much of the basis of Wittgenstein’s “mysticism” lies. We can easily understand why Wittgenstein says ‘My propo- sitions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them’ (6.54) IL. Objects In a perspicuous representation of a thought, each object is referred to by one and only one name (3.2, 5.53). If a perspicuous language is to mirror reality, each object in reality must have a counterpart, a name, in the language. If some object fails to have a linguistic counterpart, we can’t say anything about it (4.0311, 4.0312). If some object has more than one linguistic counterpart, the language is poetic, in a somewhat poetic sense: The question then arises, given a thought, as to how one will put it into words (3.3411). We have our eye on words and have to make a choice between different ways of saying the same thing. The poet thrives on the possibilities that alternate modes of expressing the same thing bring. But a perspicuous language is not constructed for poetry. Rather it is constructed in such a way as to allow reality to be described completely in the simplest possible terms, with the least redundancy. And one-name-one-object provides one part of the minimum necessary. An atomic fact is a combination of objects (2.01). So in a perspicuous language, the true atomic proposition that states it will contain one name for each of these objects. Since an atomic fact is a combination of objects, we can conclude that there must be at least two objects in an atomic fact. So in a perspicuous language, an atomic proposition cannot be236 nods composed of just one name. One way to guarantee this is to hold that objects are of different types or forms: an atomic proposition will be at least a pair of names ‘ab’ such that ‘a’ is drawn from one set of names (the names of one type of object) and ‘8’ from another disjoint set of names (the names of another type of object) (2.0233, 2.021 and 2.025, 4.122). Then ‘aa’ cannot turn up in an atomic proposition of a perspicuous language and be exhaustive of the names in the proposition. 2.0131 and 2.0251 suggest the following model. An atomic proposition is a string composed of at least seven names ‘abcdefg’: ‘@ being the name of a moment in time; ‘8’, ‘c’, and ‘d’ being names of indices on the X, Y, and Z dimensions of space, respec- tively; and ‘e’, ‘f’, and ‘g’ being names of a hue, a brilliance, and a saturation (of color), respectively. ‘The visual world is here re- presented as seven dimensional, the dimensions (forms) being those of time, space, and color. The model fails owing to Wittgenstein’s demand for the independence of atomic facts (2.062). If it is a fact that a certain spatial point has a certain hue at a certain time, we can infer that it is not a fact that it has another hue at that time (6.3751). If a model like this is adopted, however—one that does satisfy the independence requirement—it is easy to give a classical seman- tics for it. Say the world is seven dimensional. The set of possible atomic facts is the set of seventuples, S, ic. dx Bx Cx Dx E x F x G, such that A is the set of indices of one dimension, B another, etc. A possible world, W, is a subset (perhaps empty) of S. Where ‘abcdefg’ is a sentence of a perspicuous language and 0, is what ‘a’ designates, 0, what ‘b’ designates, etc., ‘abcdefg’ is true in W if and only if (0, 0, 0 04, % 9;, 0, « W. But Wittgenstein would not countenance this sort of semantics—at least if ‘{o,, 0p, 9 Og %) 97, 9,>’ is taken as representing a fact—because in it reference is made to a fact, i.e., to what makes a proposition true or false. Objects, whatever they are, are simple, not complex. What is complex might fall apart, be destroyed, not exist. But the dual possibilities of existence-non-existence, combination—-non-combi- nation, integration-segregation, linkage-severance, concatenation— non-concatenation pertain to the dual possibilities in propositions: truth and falsehood. Objects are what contribute, through their names, to the stability of a proposition irrespective of the vagaries of truth-value. Objects furnish and, indeed, are meanings (3.203). This forms the basis of one of Wittgenstein’s complaintsONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 237 about Frege. For Frege, a proposition has a different meaning? when it is true than when it is false (3.143). To know what it means, we have to know its truth-value. For Wittgenstein, propositions picture, they don’t name or designate at all. Wittgenstein objects to Russell on similar grounds: that ‘Fu’ serves both as a name and as a proposition (3.333). What is attractive in the seven dimensional model presented above is that moments, points in space, and, say, redness aren’t things one finds it easy to imagine destroyed—unlike chairs. Redness is timeless (as well as colorless), just as this moment is timeless (as well as colorless) (2.0232). The modern (or perhaps Meinongian) view of construing the denotata of names as possibilia rather than as the more fragile existentialia is more in line with the view of the Tractatus. There are also some hints that items like space-time points, masses, and the “properties” of whatever particles or items physicists discuss might be the ultimate objects (6.341-6.343). But it is not an ontologist’s job to point objects out; it is to show their categorial status and what contribution they make to reality by showing the form of a proposition in a perspicuous language (6.342). III. Properties For Wittgenstein, properties are analyzable and hence do not form a separate category of being. Strictly speaking, it is the material or external properties that are analyzable. But for Wittgenstein, formal, essential, or internal “properties” are not properties at all (4.126). Rather, they pertain to the form of the world and show through the propositions of a perspicuous language. They cannot be represented by particular symbols in it (4.122- 4.1274). How, then, is the reduction of properties accomplished ? Let us suppose that the world has three dimensions, A, B, and C, and that we have a perspicuous language in which the name of an object in the A dimension is an indexed ‘a’, the name of an object in the B dimension is an indexed ‘b’, and the name of an object in the C dimension is an indexed ‘c’. An atomic proposition, then, is of the form ‘...a,j¢,...’. We can get a propositional form by substi- tuting a variable for one of the names in an atomic proposition, e.g., ‘...d3b,x...’. Such a propositional form represents a material property (2.0231, 3.31-3.315). Wittgenstein will abbreviate: this to ‘fx’, where ‘f’ indicates what remains constant when various238 nots appropriate names are plugged into the ‘x’ place. We might say, then, that c, and c, share the same property, f, when ‘fc,’ and ‘fc,’ are both true. But such talk of “properties” is just a facon de parler. But there is no need to start out with an atomic proposition. One can construct propositional forms from molecular propositions, CBs ‘endsdyC gee. & ...AgbyCy...” might become ‘...a5b,¥... & ...yow...”. The latter would represent a four-term relation. It might be abbreviated ‘g(x,y,2,20)’. Under the dimensional interpretation, not just any name can be substituted for any variable in a propositional form, in view of the fact that each dimension must be represented in what results, if correct syntax is to be preserved. So we would do well to use a different disjoint set of variables for each different dimension of the world. It is easy to see, on this account of what properties are, that two different objects might have all their properties in common. Suppose that for all propositional forms of one variable ‘x’ where ‘x’ ranges over the objects of the A dimension, it turned out that any such propositional form became a true proposition when ‘a,’ was substituted for ‘x’ if and only if it became a true proposition when ‘a,’ was substituted for ‘x’. The objects designated by ‘a,’ and ‘a,’ would then share all their (material) properties. The objects designated by ‘a,’ and ‘a,’ don’t differ in material properties at all. But they are different. They have different names in a perspicuous language. We can see why Wittgenstein might say If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different. Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them. For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since if I do it will be distinguished after all. (2.0233-2.02331.) In the middle sentence, we read Wittgenstein as meaning .there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them by a property in which it differs from the others. For if there is no such property, I cannot distinguish it by such a property...ONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 239 ‘The reader is forewarned that ‘y = a,’ does not represent a property. There is no propositional form with two variables that we can abbreviate to ‘g(x,y’, where ‘g’ behaves like a representative of the identity “relation”. Indeed, for Wittgenstein, identity is not a relation (4.24i—-4.243, 5.5301-5.534). IV. Facts Just as each different object is mirrored in a perspicuous language by one and only one name, so each possible fact finds its representative in one and only one proposition (5.512-5.5151). The artificial languages to be found in logic textbooks are not perspicuous languages. They are poetic, in that they provide many ways of saying the same thing, e.g., ‘p’, ‘p & p’, ‘~ ~ p’, ‘p V (q & ~ q)’, etc. The addition of ‘~ ~’ to ‘p’ is not to be construed as an addition of some clement of meaning. ‘~’, ‘&’, ‘V’, etc., are not names (4.0312). Logical “objects” are not objects (4.41). A proposition is a concatenation of names, but it is not a mere concatenation of names like a list (3.141). That is why we have been careful to represent atomic propositions as ‘...0;bj¢,...’. The dots show that something is missing, namely, what turns a mere concatenation of names into a proposition of a perspicuous lan- guage. Wittgenstein’s notation is ambiguous in a crucial respect. He uses the letters ‘p’, ‘g’, and ‘r’ to indicate propositions (4.24). He also describes the matrix: as a propositional sign (4.442). One is led to believe that by taking off the quotation marks, one gets a proposition or at least a propo- sitional form. Yet what do the ‘p’ and ‘g’ in this propositional sign indicate ? Propositions ? In short, is ‘p’ a propositional sign, or is, say, 3240 nots a propositional sign? We take it to be the latter. Indeed, this notation gives a clue as to how to construct a perspicuous language. If is written in the alternate way that Wittgenstein suggests in 4.442, with a slight modification, ic., as “(TF)(TF)(p))’—where the “(FY immediately before the ‘(p)’ represent the truth-possibilities which are represented below the ‘p’ in the matrix, and the ‘(TF)’ in the initial segment represent, respectively, agreement and disagreement with these truth-possibilities—we can see that there are only four different propositions we can write this way, i.e., (TT)(TE\(p)) (TE)(TF)(p)) (FT)((TF)(P)) (FF)(TF\(P)) This is a start toward a perspicuous language, because all we have is four propositions concerning three possible, and one not so possible, facts. There is no redundancy. And if the world is, say, three dimensional, and we substitute ‘a,b,c,’ for ‘p’, we get, in ((TF)((‘TF)(a,b5¢,))’, a candidate for an atomic proposition. In the more common notations of logic texts, this would be repre- sented in many ways, as ‘p’, ‘p Vp’, ‘p&p’, ‘~~’, etc. But when we consider other atomic propositions, we see that a bit of poetry still lingers in our language, for (‘TF TF)((TFTF)(p), (TTFF)(9))’ says precisely the same thing as ‘(TF)((TF)(p))’. To drive out this last vestige of redundancy, let us begin by assuming that there is a finite number of objects and give each a name of its own. Then there will be a finite number, n, of permissible concatenations of these names, lists in which the name of one andONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 241 only one object of any single dimension appears and in which all dimensions are represented. Let ‘p,’, ‘Ps’, --» ‘Pn’ go short for these lists. ‘Then the general form of a proposition is: (X,Xqu.Xy)(‘TFTF...TE)(p,), (TTFF...FF)(. (TTT FF)(p,)), where X; is a'T or an F, and there are 2" 'T’s and/or F’s imme- diately preceding each p,. When the al string of 'T’s and F’s exactly matches one of the strings that immediately precedes a p,, we have an atomic proposition; when it fails to do so, we have a molecular proposition. 22" is the number of propositions. There is only one true propo- sition in which one and only one T appears in the initial string. ‘That proposition can be called ‘the world proposition’.‘ It is a true proposition from which all true propositions and only true propo- sitions follow. In this sense it represents the world—all that is the case (1). In a perspicuous language, one can see immediately when one proposition follows from a set of propositions. If whenever all the propositions in the set have a T in their initial strings, a particular proposition has a T in its initial string, then that proposition follows from the set (5.11). There is only one tautology, namely the proposition in which the initial string is composed only of 'T’s. This proposition is true no matter what circumstances obtain. It is also easy to see why Wittgenstein says, ‘If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given’ (2.0124). In the general form of a proposition, all objects are indeed given, i.e., all permissible lists of their names appear; and all possible ways of agreeing or disagreeing with the truth-possibilities show clearly. The case in which there are denumerably infinitely many objects is also straightforward. We begin by giving each object its own name. Let us assume that there are finitely many forms of objects; so there will be denumerably infinitely many permissible concatenations of names. Let ‘p,’, ‘p,’, ..-, go short for these lists. ‘Then the general form of a proposition is: (——4)X..--)((——A1 Ab.) Pa)( 42 Ab---)(Ba))- ‘The ‘——’ represents the real line from zero to one inclusive. ‘To each point on the line immediately preceding each p; is assigned 1 or 0, whichever is the ith term in the binary decimal expansion associated with that point. ‘0000...’ is associated with zero;242 nots “1111...” is associated with one. In other cases where two decimal expansions are associated with a point, we do the following: the decimal expansion with a finite number of 1’s is associated with the point. The remaining decimal expansions, those without a finite number of |’s, are ordered alphabetically and become A,, Ay... - The series, A‘Ai..., is such that Ai is the ith member of A,. Finally, with respect to the initial (——X,X,...), a 1 or a0 is arbitrarily associated with each point on the line and each X;. Instead of associating a 1 or a 0 with each point on the line and each X;, we might think of each point on the line as being either black or red and each X; a black or red dot. The world proposition would be the one true proposition in which only one black point appeared in the initial section of the proposition. Wittgenstein’s own rendering of the general form of a propo- sition, i.e., [p, &, N(2)] (6), is unclear. In line with what he says in 5.2522, p is the first member of a series, @ is an arbitrarily selected nth member, and N(é) is the (n + 1)st member. The bar over a variable indicates that it is representative of all its values (5.501). Hence, ‘B” represents all elementary propositions (4.24). ‘N? represents the operation of joint denial. But on this interpretation, ‘[f, Z, N(2J’ fails to represent all propositions. Suppose that there are just two permissible con- catenations of names, represented by ‘p’ and ‘q’. Then we have the two elementary propositions: (TFTF)((TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(@)) (TTEF)((TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(q)). So ‘p’ will represent these two propositions, and these will be the first member of our series. Applying the operation of joint denial to these gives us: (FFFT)(TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(Q)). If we now take this proposition to be the second member of the series, a third application of the operation will produce: (TTTF)(TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(@)). It is obvious that from here on out the series will switch back and forth between the last two propositions, and not all propositions will be generated. If, on the other hand, we take the second member of the series to be all the propositions produced together with all the propositionsONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 243 of earlier members, i.e., the first three listed above, the second application will yield: (FFFF)(TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(q)), and further applications of joint denial will get us nothing new. The one interpretation that does seem to succeed is this: Contrary to what Wittgenstein says, we treat ‘p’ as representing the power set (less the null set) of the set of elementary propositions. The first application of the operation of joint denial will be to each member of p, producing: (FTFT)(TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(4)) (FFTT)((TFTF)(p)(TTFF)(g)) (FFFT)((TFTF)(p)(TTFF)(q))- Yet we cannot consider the second member of the series to be just the power set of the set of these three propositions, otherwise all propositions will not be forthcoming. Rather, the second member of the series must be considered to be the power set of the set of all propositions that appear thus far. Each member of the series ‘carries along’ all propositions formed previous to it. But when [B, &, N@@)] is interpreted this way, it does serve as the general form of a proposition. V. Generality Joint denial is not meant in the Tractatus to be an operation that is limited to taking a finite set of propositions into a propo- sition. In 5.502 Wittgenstein writes ‘So instead of “(-----T) ....)” [the finite joint denial], I write “N(2)”, This form of words permits two interpretations. It might be taken as a stipu- lation, a definition; and that is the way it is often read. But what Wittgenstein wants to say, we believe, is that for his purposes the operation that takes a finite set of propositions, denies them, and conjoins them into one proposition, i.e., the operation he symbolizes “(-----T)G,....)’, is not sufficient; one needs a stronger operation, the operation he symbolizes ‘N(é)’, i.e., infinite joint denial. On reading 5.502, the emphasis must be laid heavily on the word ‘instead’, as in ‘So instead of cornstarch, I use waterchestnut flour’. Otherwise, how is one to interpret what Wittgenstein says two pages later in 5.52 and 5.521, ‘If € has as its values all the values of a function fx for all values of x, then N(2) = ~ (Ax).fx. I dissociate the concept ail from truth-functions. Frege and Russell introduced244 nots generality in association with logical product or logical sum. This made it difficult to understand the propositions “(ax).fx” and “(x).fx”, in which both ideas are embedded.’ ? It is also worthwhile noting that the introduction of the generality sign in this way signals a move to poetry, for with it we say in a different way something that already could be said without it in a perspicuous notation. As Wittgenstein says, ‘What is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it indicates a logical prototype [by the variable], and secondly, that it gives prominence to constants [by the predicate-sign].’ (5.522) If, for instance, there are two permissible concatenations of names ‘ab, and ‘ab,’, then we have the following definitions: ‘(FFFT)(TFTF)(ab,),(TTFF)(ab,))" a) ‘~ (&x)(axy (ETFT)(TFTF)(ab,),(TTFF\(ab,)) =a, “~ (3x)(2b,)’ It should also by now be clear that the question, ‘But is that all the facts ?’, is meaningless under a Wittgensteinian ontology. There is no such property as being a fact (4.1272), and facts are not among the items that can be captured by the individual quantifier. VI. Logic and Mathematics In the perspicuous language developed earlier, the truth-values of two propositions were visible from the symbols alone: the proposition in which the initial section contained all T’s and the proposition in which it contained all F’s. The first showed itself to be true whatever the circumstances, the second false whatever the circumstances. These can be said to be the two propositions of logic. In the other propositions it was clear, because both T’s and F’s appeared in their initial sections, that both truth and falsehood were possibilities. But the two propositions lack content in this sense. Wittgenstein thinks of them as limiting cases, not being full-blown truths and falsehoods (4.46-4.4661). Logic also deals with implication and other “relations”. We use scare-quotes here because for Wittgenstein there are no relations between facts, and consequently these will not be re- presented in a perspicuous notation. He also calls these logical “relations” operations (5.131, 5.2-5.2341) or rules (5.512). Logic, in the sense in which it deals with implication, joint denial, etc., is not dealing with anything real (5.4-5.44). An operation or rule is, for Wittgenstein, the generability of one proposition from one or more propositions (5.25). As we haveONTOLOGY AND METHOD IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 245 seen, in a perspicuous language what implies is what shows forth perfectly clearly. More generally, in such a language the similarities and differences between propositions is on the surface; what is generable from a given proposition is already clear in the propo- sition itself (5.442). A perspicuous language needs no primitive logical signs apart from the general form of ‘a proposition (5.45- 5.451). In the general form of a proposition, everything is given at once (5.515-5.5151). For Wittgenstein, an operation or rule is what from one or more propositions singles out a proposition, perhaps a different one. Operations give rise to series when a proper base of one or more propositions is given. As we have seen, however, there is no need to have operation signs in a language, indeed certainly not in a perspicuous language. Let ‘x’ go short for a proposition in a perspicuous language. Let us consider an operation that gives rise to the series [n, é, €]. Now let us indulge ourselves in poetry by framing a definition, ‘nw’ =, ‘O(n)’. Our series begins to take on a more interesting look: [n, &, O()], or at least our notation does. Yet we can say nothing about reality that we couldn’t say before. Numbers, says Wittgenstein, are exponents of operations (6.021). We shall not find signs for numbers in a perspicuous language. One reason for this is, of course, that we shall not find signs for operations in a perspicuous language. Because operations take propositions into propositions, there seems to be no limit to their applications; and it is these applications that have number. Hence there are no privileged numbers (5.453). Equations in a language signal poetry—for ‘=’ is the sign for creating a poetic language, at least as Wittgenstein uses it (4.241-4.243, 5.534). ‘a = b’ says nothing whatsoever about the world. Just as there are no logical “objects” referred to by operation signs, so there are no mathematical “objects” referred to by numerals. Indeed, even if one does decide to write operation signs into a language, one can still omit exponent signs (and thus numerals) by writing all the operations out in full. Much of what so exercises Wittgenstein in his later writings can be seen to originate in difficulties that he finds in his Tractarian views concerning logic and mathematics. For example, in the propositions of a perspicuous language, everything is said to be on the surface, given at once. In fact, however, many of the “internal relations” among these propositions are not all that clear. It is simply not immediately obvious that joint denial does serve to246 nots generate all propositions from the set of elementary propositions— even in the case in which there are assumed to be but two elemen- tary propositions. This takes showing, some sort of proof. And here we come face to face with some difficulties already: (1) What is shown in cases like this does not have the form of a proposition in a perspicuous language; yet it does have content, for otherwise it would be obvious enough not to need proof. Nor does it seem to be translatable into any proposition in a perspicuous language, not, that is, without losing its content. In this sense, operation signs are like token reflexives, for the content introduced into propositions by token reflexives does not seem to be easily translatable away either. What is this thing that is proved when it is proved that joint denial does serve to generate all propositions out of the set of elementary propositions? Is it a proposition? In his later writings, Wittgenstein toys with a number of answers to this question. It is a command. It is a rule. It is a construction without application. It is like a position in a game. (2) We prove that certain propositions have certain “formal properties” by appealing to other “formal properties”. In the case above, we start with the set of elementary propositions. Being elementary is a “formal property” that some propositions have and others do not. Suppose that to someone it isn’t obvious that (TFTF)((TFTF)(p),(TTFF)(q)) is an elementary proposition, just as it is not obvious to us that joint denial does serve to generate all propositions from the set of elementary propositions. He’ll require proof. Is the notion of proof an epistemological one ? Is a proof just a way of convincing someone who ‘‘can’t see it”? If not, why do we prove things ? If proofs are just there for the discovering, what is their ontological status ? (Where are they for the discovering ?) We believe that difficulties like these led Wittgenstein to give up the perspicuous language methodology and adopt instead the view that no language mirrors reality better or worse than any other. It is still language that gives philosophers problems, that misleads them, but what will put them straight again is not a translation into a different, more perspicuous language, but a broader and clearer view of the original language itself. In a sense, all languages are perspicuous when seen clearly against the back- ground of the various uses to which they are put. The problem is less one of seeing through a disguise than it is of seeing all the sides. It is less a job for a magnifying glass and more one of stepping far enough back to see what a thing looks like. The new method is to step back and get rid of the false impressions that too narrow aPRAGMATICALLY NECESSARY STATEMENTS 247 view gives. With the adoption of this new method, the importance of ontology for Wittgenstein lessens. All philosophical problems, not merely ontological ones, are amenable to the new kind of linguistic cure. Notes ' The quotations herein are taken from the Pears and McGuinness translation of the Tractatus. ? We here use ‘meaning’ in Wittgenstein’s sense, not in Frege's. ® This ambiguity has been noticed also by Roger Dexter. * We adopt this phrase from Nino Cocchiarella, in whose ontology a similar ‘world proposition’ plays a role. 5 With respect to token reflexives, see Hector-Neri Castafieda, “Indicators and Quasi-Indicators”, American Philosophical Quarterly (1967), and Charles B. Daniels, “Reference and Singular Referring Terms”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972). Pragmatically Necessary Statements GranaM NERLICH UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY A robust idea of necessary statements has been nurtured in many traditions in philosophy. The distinction between necessary and non-necessary statements favoured by classical empiricism is several shades more pallid than that favoured by classical ration- alism. But both ideas count as strong since they agree at least in this: the distinction is an absolute one, dividing statements exhaustively into exclusive classes. Now, however, these classical ideas of necessary statements have come upon lean times and are in wide disfavour. True, W. V. Quine allows that some statements are, at any rate, more necessary than others, thus giving the idea of necessary statements a foot in the door. But this apparent opening affords no real entry. It merely enables Quine to hold off the main substance of the classical idea more effectively. Quine’s “distinc- tion” (it is intended as a hollow one) is pragmatic, for it makes a statement more (or less) necessary if it is more (or less) useful in