CAMPUS LAW CENTRE

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF

MOOL CHAND …………….APPELLANT

vs.

BALDEV ………………….RESPONDENT

SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES

OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INIDA

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

SUBMITTED TO MS. VANDANA MALHOTRA

NAME: AFAJAL BHAIJAAN

EXAM ROLL NO.: 19309806428

COLLEGE ROLL NO: 191115

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. NO. TABLE OF PG.

CONTENTS NO.
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6-7

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 8

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 10-15

8. PRAYER 16

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LIST OF ABBEREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Section

b/w Between

Can’t Cannot

CONT. Constitution

Govt. Government

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honorable

IND India

SC Schedule Caste

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec. Section

ST Schedule Tribe

u/s Under Section

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

S. NO. CASES CITATIONS PG.

1 Pritam Singh v. The State AIR 1950 SC 169

2 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 4618
3 Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri AIR 2005 SC 15
4 Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2000) 6 SCC 359
5 CBI, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao
2012 (4) R.C.R.
(Criminal)
6 Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2008 Cr.L.J. 350 SC

7 Tirpati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 2351
8 Chikkappa & Ors. v. State By Sub-Inspector of Police 2002 Cr. L.J 518
9 Y. Vasudeva Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & 2005 Cri. L.J 377
Anr.
10 Alka A. Mishra v. J.P. Shoke 2003 Cr. L.J 1333
11 Smt. K. Padma Reddy vs. Station House Officer, 2004 CriLJ 503
Bellampalli & Ors
12 Pardeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. CSR No.1354 of
2019
13 Mahesh Sakharam Patole v. The State of Maharashtra Cri. appeal 1318 of
2009 in Bombay
Court
14 K. Neelaveni v. State Rep. By Insp. Of Police & Ors SLP(Cr.L)3562OF20
09

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court is being filed by the petitioner under the
provision that corresponds to article – 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The respondent
respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble court.

The Article is reproduced hereunder:

Article 136 – Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India

(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mool Chand, an elected Ward Member representing Ward No. 9 in Rajpura town, is a
member of the Schedule Caste community, occupying a reserved seat. Baldev, who
presides over the body, holds a position in the General Category.

Chronology of Events:

2. On December 4, 2019, Baldev invited Mool Chand for a meeting scheduled at 11:00
AM in his chamber, conveyed through WhatsApp. Mool Chand, due to his busy
schedule, read the message at 11:30 AM, causing a delay in his response.

3. Mool Chand contacted Baldev to notify him of his impending arrival., but Baldev,
frustrated by the delay, expressed his displeasure and made comments based on Mool
Chand's caste. A clerk was present in the chamber during this exchange.

4. Despite the verbal confrontation, Mool Chand proceeded to the Municipality to attend
the meeting. Upon entering Baldev's chamber, tensions escalated as Baldev voiced his
frustration and subjected Mool Chand to further caste-based comments. Notably, at
this time, there were no person present within the chamber.

5. Disturbed by the incident, Mool Chand filed an FIR against Baldev at the local police
station.

6. Subsequently, the trial court, after a preliminary examination, decided to frame

charges against Baldev under Section 3(1)(r) & (s) of the Schedule Caste and
Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, citing a prima facie case.

7. Baldev challenged the charges in the Allahabad High Court, which ruled that casteist
remarks made telephonically or in the absence of a third party do not constitute an
offense under the Act. The High Court's interpretation hinged on the absence of
remarks made "at a place within public view," thus supporting Baldev's argument.

8. On April 6, 2020, the High Court quashed the charges and declined certification for
an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134A of the Constitution of India.

9. Mool Chand, unsatisfied with the High Court's decision, filed a Special Leave Petition
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which was admitted for hearing.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1.

THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HON‘BLE

COURT.

ISSUE 2.

WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER S-3(1)(r) & (s) OF SC OR ST (PREVENTION OF

ATROCITY ACT,1988 )HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.

ISSUE 3.

WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT IN QUASHING THE FRAMING OF

CHARGES IS CORRECT.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the Special Leave Petition filed under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950, is not maintainable. The grounds for its non-
maintainability stem from the absence of "exceptional and special circumstances" or
"substantial and grave injustice" warranting the exercise of this discretionary authority vested
in the Supreme Court of India. The Court, in its wisdom, may opt to decline such leave. It is
imperative to acknowledge that the right to seek a Special Leave Appeal under Article 136
cannot be asserted as an inherent entitlement. This Court had laid down the test which says if
the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a
mere question of applying those principles, the question would not be a substantial question
of law. The present case doesn‘t even involve such substantial question of law.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER S-3(1)(r) & (s) OF SC OR ST

(PREVENTION OF ATROCITY ACT,1988 )HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.

The Counsel respectfully submits before this Hon'ble Court, it is our contention that the
respondent has not committed the offense under Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC and ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against the petitioner. The essential elements of this
section have not been satisfied. To establish this offense, it is imperative that the accused is
aware of the victim's belonging to the SC/ST caste and that the accused intentionally insults,
intimidates, or humiliates the victim at a place within public view.

In the absence of any member of the public who has either witnessed the incident or heard the
remarks in question, even if the place is considered a 'public place' or a place 'visible to the
public,' it would not fulfil the requirements outlined in Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act.

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ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT IN QUASHING THE

FRAMING OF CHARGES IS CORRECT.

Respectfully, it is submitted that during the Section 227 proceeding, the Judge's responsibility
lies in a meticulous examination of the evidence to determine whether there exists substantial
justification for initiating legal proceedings against the accused. In simpler terms, the
sufficiency of the basis encompasses an evaluation of the evidence provided by the police or
the documents presented to the court, which, on initial scrutiny, indicate the presence of
suspicious circumstances warranting the formulation of charges against the accused. The
High Court's decision to quash the framing of charges is legally sound because the essential
elements of the offense have not been satisfied. In accordance with established legal
precedents, a prima facie case must be discerned in the court's opinion. Since all the
necessary ingredients of the offense are not met, a prima facie case is not established.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT?

1. In presenting the case before this Hon'ble Court, the counsel respectfully submit that the
Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950, should
not be entertained. Our argument for its non-maintainability is anchored in the absence of
"exceptional and special circumstances" or "substantial and grave injustice," which are
prerequisites for the exercise of the discretionary authority vested in the Supreme Court
of India. It is essential to recognize that the right to seek a Special Leave Appeal under
Article 136 is not an inherent entitlement but a privilege extended by this Court.

2. Furthermore, this argument gains support from the precedent set by this Hon'ble Court,
which has established a test for substantial questions of law. If the general principles
governing a question are well settled and the matter involves merely the application of
those principles, it does not constitute a substantial question of law. The present case,
when assessed against this test, lacks a substantial question of law, thereby strengthening
our contention that the Special Leave Petition is not maintainable.

3. In Pritam Singh v. The State1, the Supreme Court held that the power under Article 136
is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only. In concluding the discussion on
Article 136 in the same case, it was held the by the Supreme Court that ―Generally
speaking, this court will not grant Special Leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and
special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the
case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against.‖

1
AIR 1950 SC 169

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4. It was held in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India2, that the powers under Article 136 should
be exercised with caution and in accordance with law and set legal principles. The Court
observed that the Court is not bound to interfere even if there is error of law in the
impugned order. It is humbly submitted to this Hon‘ble Court that there was no error in
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in quashing the order of framing of charges
made by the trial court as there was no offence that has been committed. It is also
submitted to this Hon‘ble Court that there is no pressing matter or question of law, for
which, the intervention of this Court would be necessary, i.e. there is no necessity to
invoke the jurisdiction conferred upon this Hon‘ble Court under Article 136. Even if it
might involve question of Law but not ‗substantial‘ question of law. The present case
doesn‘t involve such ‗substantial‘ question even if we assume that it involves question of
law.

5. In the case of Tirpati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar3, the Court observed
that Article 136 of the Constitution is an 'extraordinary jurisdiction' vested in the Supreme
Court. This jurisdiction comes with implicit trust and faith, requiring extraordinary care
and caution in its exercise. It's important to note that Article 136 does not confer an
inherent right of appeal to the party but instead vests discretion in the Supreme Court.
This discretion is meant to be exercised in the pursuit of justice, fulfilling the call of duty,
and rectifying instances of injustice

6. In Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another4, it was held that a
petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons. The
question raised by the appellant for consideration by this Court being not fit for
consideration or deserving being dealt with by the Apex Court; it is humbly submitted
that there is no ground for invoking this Hon‘ble Court‘s jurisdiction under Article
136.

2
AIR 2004 SC 4618 and also cited in Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri, AIR 2005 SC
15
3
AIR 2004 SC 2351
4
(2000) 6 SCC 359

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7. Considering the numerous cases cited, it is evident that the present Special Leave Petition
(SLP) lacks maintainability. A prima facie case has not been established since the
essential elements of Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, have not been satisfied. The alleged offense did not occur in a public view.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE OFFENCE UNDER S-3(1)(r) & (s) OF SC OR ST

(PREVENTION OF ATROCITY ACT,1988 )HAVE BEEN COMMITTED?

8. The counsel respectfully submits before this Hon'ble Court that the respondent has not
committed an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC and ST (Prevention of
Atrocity) Act, 1989, as the essential elements of this section are not satisfied.
As in the case of Chikkappa & Ors. v. State By Sub-Inspector of Police5, it is
established that it must be prima facie shown that the accused is not a member of SC or
ST, and his humiliation by way of intentional insult or intimidation was conducted in a
place within public view. If the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) are not fulfilled,
then there is no offence under Section 3(1)(x) {now 3(1)(r)} of the Act.

9. The essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) are as follows:

1) There should be intentional insult or intimidation by a person who is not a member of
SC or ST.
2) The insult must be with an intent to humiliate the member of SC or ST. As the intent to
humiliate is necessary, it follows that the accused must have knowledge or awareness that
the victim belongs to the SC or ST. This can be inferred even from a long association.
3) The incident must occur in any place within the public view. There can't be any dispute
that the offence can be committed at any place, whether it is a private place or a "public
view," as long as it is within the "public view." The requirement of "public view" can be
satisfied even in a private place where the public is present.

10. The term "public view" means that the public should be able to witness the offence
committed under this act. The dictionary meaning of the word "public" is "open to the
people as a whole," and the dictionary meaning of the word "view" is vision or sight from
5
2002 Cr. L.J 518

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a particular position. Reading these two meanings together in the context of the words
"public view," it only means that the public should have viewed the incident irrespective
of the place where the offence is committed, whether it may be a private place or a public
place.

11. In Y. Vasudeva Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. 6, the Court held that
the phrase "in a place within the public view" may be taken as a place where ordinarily
the public visits for some purpose or other than with uninterrupted regularity though not
continuously. Any place where a Government office is located, any market, a place of
public entertainment, and the like, where people are expected to go and are invited, is a
place "within the public view." An office or an office room where the head of the office
sits is also a place within the public view, but the private antechamber of such officer
cannot be treated as a place within the public view because except the personal servants
of the officer, nobody can enter the private chambers.

12. In Smt. K. Padma Reddy vs. Station House Officer, Bellampalli & Ors.7, the main
ground of attack advanced by the petitioner was that mere utterances in the name of the
caste by themselves would not attract the provisions of the act or the rules made
thereunder, unless such utterances were made in any place within public view. In the
complaint, the respondent has categorically stated that the scene of offence, was the
Chambers of the Municipal Commissioner and there is no allegation to the effect that
such utterance was made ‗within public view‘. Once this basic ingredient is lacking, the
offence cannot be said to have been committed by the writ petitioner. In the decision
referred to above, this Court dealt with this aspect extensively and held that any of the
comment or utterance made at a private place not being a placed within public view does
not attract the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder.

13. In Pardeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr.8, it was held that the use of casteist
words in a phone call, away from public view, does not constitute an offence under
Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

6
2005 Cri. L.J 377 and also cited in Alka A. Mishra v. J.P. Shoke, 2003 Cr. L.J 1333
7
2004 CriLJ 503
8
CSR No.1354 of 2019

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14. In Mahesh Sakharam Patole v. The State of Maharashtra9, the expression "within
public view" will have to be read to mean that the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the
Act should take place in view of the "public." If no members of the public have either
seen the incident or heard the remarks, then even if the place is a "public place" or a place
"visible to the public," it would not attract the ingredients of the offence under Section
3(1)(x) of the Act.

15. In consideration of the numerous legal precedents cited, it is imperative to analyze the
two specific instances in the present case. Firstly, the respondent made caste-related
remarks during a telephonic conversation, while a clerk was present in the chamber.
Secondly, the respondent verbally abused the appellant based on his caste, stating, "get
lost from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the streets." Importantly, there were
no other individuals present in the room during these incidents.

16. For clarity and convenience, let's begin by examining the second instance. In this case,
the words uttered, particularly "I will make you clean the streets," were not inherently
casteist remarks or abuses. Instead, these words were uttered in the context of a meeting
called to discuss issues related to cleanliness in the appellant's ward, which, regrettably,
the appellant did not attend. Therefore, considering the appellant's absence from the
meeting, it can be argued that the respondent used these words in frustration and
dissatisfaction with the appellant's behavior, rather than as caste-based insults.
Furthermore, it is crucial to note that there was no third-party witnesses present during
this incident, and consequently, it did not occur within the purview of public view.
Turning to the first instance involving the telephonic call, it is pertinent to acknowledge
that this conversation did not take place within a setting that could be considered "public
view." As the dialogue occurred over the phone, it inherently lacked a public audience.

17. Moreover, the question of whether the presence or absence of a third party can determine
the existence of public view needs careful consideration. Existing legal judgments,
including the case of Asmathunnisar, emphasize that the public must witness the insulted

9
Criminal appeal 1318 of 2009 in Bombay Court

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person, which necessitates the presence of the individual being insulted. In this particular
case, the appellant was not physically present in a location where the public could witness
the insult.
Hence, any remarks made during the telephonic call cannot reasonably be construed as
occurring within public view. Consequently, it is contended that the essential elements
required to establish an offence have not been met, and therefore, there is no basis for
prosecuting the respondent in this matter.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT IN QUASHING THE

FRAMING OF CHARGES IS CORRECT?

18. In the matter at hand, it is respectfully submitted that the High Court's decision to quash
the order of charges framed by the trial court was entirely justified. This decision was
grounded in the fact that the alleged casteist remarks, whether made telephonically or in
the absence of a third party, did not constitute an offense under Sections 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the Act. This is primarily because the crucial element of the remarks being
made "at a place within public view" was not satisfied as mandated by these provisions.

19. Framing of charges in criminal proceedings is governed by Sections 227 and 228 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution
in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the
Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence which—
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the
accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 3[or any
other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the

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Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class,
on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in
accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the
accused.
(1) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge
shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he
pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.

20. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao10, it

was firmly established that at the Section 227 stage, the judge's task is to sift and weigh
the evidence to determine whether a prima facie case against the accused is evident. The
judge is not bound by the conclusions of the investigating agency and should evaluate the
material on record objectively.

21. Moreover, in the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh11, it was
unequivocally emphasized that when the basic ingredients of an offense are absent in the
complaint, it is unjustified to compel the accused to go through the rigmarole of a
criminal trial. This principle is crucial in ensuring that the criminal justice system is not
abused.

22. The decision of the Allahabad High Court to quash the framing of charges is legally
sound because the essential ingredients of the offense were not fulfilled, as explained
above. Therefore, the framing of charges should be quashed, in accordance with
established precedents, which mandate the presence of a prima facie case. As all the
essential elements of the offense were not met in this case, a prima facie case was not
established. Consequently, there is no basis for prosecuting the respondent, and he should
not be subjected to the exhaustive process of a criminal trial.

10
2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal
11
2008 Cr.L.J. 350 SC

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23. Furthermore, in the case of K. Neelaveni v. State Rep. By Insp. Of Police & Ors 12, it
was held that the magistrate should be prima facie satisfied that the facts disclosed in the
report constitute an offense. Thus, the magistrate is not bound by the conclusions of the
investigating agency.

24. The Counsel submits that the decision of the Allahabad High Court to quash the framing
of charges was justified because the essential ingredients of the offense were not met, as
explained above. Therefore, as no prima facie case was established, prosecution against
the respondent should not proceed, ensuring that the principles of justice and the rule of
law are upheld.

12
SLP (Cr. L) 3562 OF 2009

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PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, cases cited, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is humbly prayed and implored before this Hon‘ble Supreme Court: -

1. To dismiss the special leave petition filed by the Appellant.

2. Uphold the order of Hon‘ble High Court quashing the framing of charges.

And/Or

To pass any other relief that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant in favor of the
Respondent in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience, all of which is respectfully
submitted.

And for this act of kindness the Respondents as are duty bound shall ever pray.

PLACE : S/D

DATE : (COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT)

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