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The Reception of John Dewey in The Context of Contemporary Educational Reform A German-American Comparison11
The Reception of John Dewey in The Context of Contemporary Educational Reform A German-American Comparison11
Johannes Bellmann
To cite this article: Johannes Bellmann (2006) The Reception of John Dewey in the
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Context of Contemporary Educational Reform — A German-American Comparison ,
Studies in Educational Policy and Educational Philosophy, 2006:1, 26854, DOI:
10.1080/16522729.2006.11803915
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Johannes Bellmann
Pädagogische Hochschule Freiburg
Germany
To say that there are immense controversies about how to interpret John
Dewey’s philosophy of education is no news. Even the Dewey experts these
days have a hard time keeping up with the vast literature that has emerged
and is still emerging in this field of scholarship. These controversies on
interpretation manifest themselves not only within national research
traditions but also within one and the same school of education. For
instance, I have been told that two distinguished philosophers of education
at Stanford University, Denis Phillips and Elliot Eisner, once decided to co-
teach a class on John Dewey. Right from the beginning, their opposing
views on Dewey became apparent. Denis Phillips focussed mainly on
Dewey’s falsificationism which, for him, was basically in line with Popper’s
philosophy of science and scientific method (Phillips 1992). Elliot Eisner on
the other hand focussed on Dewey’s later aesthetics, claiming that the arts
provide the kind of ideal that American education needs now more than ever
(Eisner 2002). Obviously, their interpretations of Dewey could not easily be
reconciled. In fact, their dispute escalated and the two Dewey experts ended
up yelling at each other in front of the class.
In this paper however I will not spend a great deal of time dealing in general
with different interpretations of John Dewey’s philosophy of education.
What I would like to show is how Dewey and Deweyan pragmatism are
used in the present-day debate on contemporary educational reform. The
German-American comparison in the following will show that Dewey is
appropriated in different – even opposing – ways to both legitimise and
delegitimise recent reform policies.
In the United States, the “Revival of Pragmatism” means above all the
rediscovery of a “public philosophy” (cf. Joas 1998: 192), that is, a
philosophy oriented towards public opinion and democracy that had been
pushed into the background by orthodox analytical philosophy. In the
German-speaking discourse, the “Renaissance of Pragmatism” means,
among other things, the rediscovery of a pragmatic or, at least, proto-
pragmatic intellectual tradition of one’s own. The prominent neo-pragmatist
Robert Brandom (2000) built a very welcome bridge for German-speaking
protagonists of the philosophical reception of pragmatism. Classical
American pragmatism, says Brandom, was only the special case of a more
comprehensive older intellectual movement. The precedence of action over
consciousness is seen as the common characteristic of this comprehensive
pragmatism, or, formulated differently, the precedence of “knowing how”
over “knowing that”. Understood in this way, the line of tradition in this
comprehensive pragmatism can also include, for example, Hegel (cf.
Gimmler 2000) and Heidegger (cf. Gethmann 1987). In spite of the
prevailing polemical dismissal of American pragmatism in German
philosophy during the early 20th century, one can nonetheless, in retrospect,
discover more concurrence in the shift from the problems of consciousness
to the problems of action than the contemporary debates suggest. Thus, the
recent occupation with classical American pragmatism has led to an altered
view of European intellectual traditions in Germany, too.
This is also true for one of the most important protagonists of the more
recent reception of pragmatism in Germany, the sociologist Hans Joas from
Free University Berlin. To Joas, pragmatism is more than the indirect path
to the re-appropriation of European intellectual traditions. It is, above all, a
kind of critical corrective of these traditions. Joas outlines the mixed
intellectual situation in the Federal Republic of Germany around 1980, a
period when, he writes, “I suddenly fell in love with American pragmatism”
(1998: 198). The situation was marked by hermeneutics and philosophy of
life, Marxism and critical theory, as well as by the empirical shift in the
social sciences. “I felt attracted by all three of them”, Joas declares, “and
simultaneously repelled” (191). Through the help of pragmatism Joas could
separate what was valuable in his own tradition from what was worthless or
even dangerous. “Pragmatism immediately enabled me,” he writes, “to
accept what was reasonable in the three traditions I have mentioned without
accepting their dangerous implications” (191). In the pragmatic reformu-
lation, basic understandings of hermeneutics and a philosophy of life can be
retained without falling into irrational or chauvinistic tendencies.
Analogously, social-philosophical understandings in Marxism and critical
theory can be retained without having to yield to antidemocratic or elitist
tendencies. Finally, according to Joas, even the empirical shift in the social
sciences can be carried out, as long as one does not consider science in a
scientistic manner, but rather pragmatically, as a public instrument for
solving problems. “Pragmatism in all three respects thus could appear as the
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Oelkers also makes reference to the few cases of a more benevolent and
more thorough reception. Names that are mentioned include Erich Hylla,
Werner Correll and Fritz Bohnsack, all of whom, he claims, rendered a great
service to the reception of Dewey in Germany. It is interesting to note in this
connection the reference to why these receptions have not produced a
lasting response in the German-speaking educational discourse. According
to Oelkers, the appropriate environment was not available to these authors
and their advocates were too weak (cf. ibid.: 491, note 4; ibid.: 492). This
reference, not elaborated upon further, reveals a consciousness that recap-
tions are dependent upon a sounding board in the relevant discursive context
of the reception. The systematic quality of a reception alone does not yet
decide its success in the scientific community.
I would like to take up Oelkers’ remark and apply it to the present upswing
in Dewey’s popularity in Germany. While the former German Dewey
scholars may have lacked the environment for a lasting resonance, the
circumstances of the Dewey reception appear in the meantime to have
changed fundamentally. Oelkers himself does not discuss these new circum-
stances, which are presently appearing to create a more favourable environ-
ment for his reception of Dewey.
This thesis of the “break with tradition” now becomes a kind of guiding
perspective for the reception of Dewey. In more recent works, too, Dewey’s
break with traditional educational theory is at the centre of focus: “Dewey
grappled with these theories not merely to attack their application, but rather
to break up the whole block of tradition. Without distance to Herbart,
Pestalozzi, and Fröbel, a modern educational theory, one that accords with
modern society, could not be established at all. So, all three theories had to
be refuted, and this without the least compromise” (Oelkers 2000: 290).
Oelkers adopts not only this rhetoric, but also the discursive strategies with
which Dewey and his contemporaries attempted to dissociate themselves
from tradition. This is illustrated by an example from a lecture delivered by
Oelkers in 2004 (cf. Oelkers 2004). The comparison of traditional and
pragmatic educational theory discussed and carried out in the lecture can be
represented schematically approximately as follows:
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Oelkers takes over some of these discursive strategies from Dewey and
some from other sympathisers and protagonists of the progressive move-
ment. Especially Ella Flagg Young (1845-1918) and Nicholas Murray
Butler (1862-1947) attempted with the aid of such dichotomising judge-
ments to distinguish the new education from the old, whereby the old
education, for them, was at the same time European education. What is inte-
resting now is what happens when these strategies of distinction are carried
over into a contemporary discursive context.
Also in the study written by Franz Weinert for the OECD, “Concepts of
Competence”, which was taken as a conceptual basis for PISA, one finds
again and again the explicit reference to the “pragmatic” character of the
developed model of competence (cf. Weinert 1999: 15f.). Competence is
measured in performance, that is, in the actual coping with concrete tasks.
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protagonist of the progressives, who for a long time sabotaged the develop-
pment of standards for academic achievement. Ravitch illustrates the
distance Dewey maintained in regard to standards by citing his much-read
and influential volume on Schools of Tomorrow, in which Dewey, together
with his daughter Evelyn, offered portraits of progressives schools that were
regarded as models to follow. It is especially the “organic school” of
Marietta Pierce Johnson, mentioned in positive terms in Dewey’s book, that
stands, in Ravitch’s view, in blatant contrast to the declared goals of
contemporary educational reform. “The organic school,” Ravitch writes,
“featured a completely natural education, free of rewards, punishments,
tests, grades, promotions, prohibitions, commands, and other pressures. It
emphasised freedom, self-initiative, and spontaneity. Formal studies such as
reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic were delayed as long as possible;
Johnson would have preferred to wait until children were ten but acceded to
parents’ demands to begin teaching these skills at eight. She believed that if
children waited to read until they were ready, they would be as adept as
those who started earlier” (Ravitch 2000: 175). Even if one takes into
account Dewey’s careful critique of the progressive movement, expressed in
later texts such as Experience and Education (cf. LW 13), doubts remain as
to whether Dewey’s pragmatism in fact can be considered “the philosophy
of PISA”. When Dewey presented those mostly private and independent
progressive schools as “the schools of tomorrow”, it was a kind of wishful
thinking on his part, not a serious prognosis. Under today’s conditions of
output orientation, with standards and high-stakes testing, progressive
schools like those favoured by Dewey would soon vanish from the scene.
The first is the National Center for Restructuring Education, Schools and
Teachers, NCREST. At a conference at Teachers College, Columbia
University, in 1992, the front line was drawn quite clearly. First of all, the
conference pointed out “the need to restructure schools along the line of the
democratic and egalitarian community envisioned by Dewey almost a
century earlier”. Then “a stark contrast” was noted “between the rhetoric of
Washington-based reform with its emphasis on assessment, accountability
and excellence, and the conference’s concern with progressive principles
and practices such as equity, democracy, integrated curriculum, authentic
assessment and cooperative learning” (Sadovnik/Semel 1998: 147).
that its ethos is that of the bank. It expresses no shared conception of a good
education beyond the idea that higher test scores are better. There is no
consensus and little discussion as to what ends higher scores serve beyond
economic aspirations. Hence standards-based reform tends to instrument-
talize education and privatize individual goals. It makes competition for
scarce commodities, jobs, and further education the heart of the enterprise of
learning” (Strike 2004: 228).
The third and last example of the contemporary reform discourse in the U.
S. is from a panel discussion on “Humanistic Education” at the Boston
Research Center held in 2002. Controversial instruments of the current
reform era, such as standards, high-stakes testing and accountability, were
discussed by the panel. Larry Hickman, director of the Center for Dewey
Studies, and Nel Noddings, well-known philosopher of education and
former Stanford faculty, repeatedly underpinned their critique of these re-
form instruments by using Deweyan arguments. Dewey was treated as if he
was a contemporary who could comment directly on present-day issues. “If
he were here today”, Hickman said, “I would expect he would also reject
‘teaching to the test’” (BRC 2002). “Dewey would not approve of the
federal government taking over education”, he continued. “He would say
that ‘national education’ would come when we begin to trust our experience
in the classroom and when we begin to trust teachers to do the kind of job
that works at the personal level” (ibid.). Noddings also made himself a
mouthpiece for Dewey, declaring, “He never meant a national curriculum,
national standards, or high-stakes testing”. While Dewey advocated
“common commitments and common values”, he would be opposed to the
“uniformity and coercion we see in schools today”. (ibid.)
In scattered comments like this one on literacy and basic skills, Dewey
emphasises again and again their merely instrumental character in an
individual biography. Against this theoretical background, it is under-
standable that throughout his life, Dewey took a critical view of standards
and the standardisations widespread in educational reality.
This becomes clear for example in the article “The Classroom Teacher”
from 1922. In order to do justice to the individuality of the learner’s
biography, Dewey writes, the pedagogical work of the teacher requires
“truly artistic standards” (MW 15: 180): “When we come to dealing with
living things, especially living characters that vary as human individuals do,
and attempt to modify their individual dispositions, develop their individual
powers, counteract their individual interests, we have to deal with them in
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an artistic way, a way which requires sympathy and interest to make all of
the needed adjustments to the particular emergencies of the act” (ibid.). The
grammar of schooling, that is, the institutionalised form of instruction in
school classes, on the other hand, forces a kind of standardisation, “which is
unfavorable to the development of the teacher’s individuality and to the
teacher’s cooperating in the development of the pupil’s individuality” (ibid.:
181). The system of standardised tests and measurements of academic
achievement, correspondingly, also receives sharp criticism. It leads, Dewey
writes, to a form of relationship between teachers and pupils in which the
fulfilment of “external standards” (ibid.: 188) is of more interest that the
prerequisites and possibilities of an individual learning history. This
relationship, oriented towards the duty to be accountable to external guide-
lines, says Dewey, repeats itself in the relationship between teachers and the
school administration (cf. ibid.): “The way business is done influences
unconsciously all our ideas” (ibid.: 187).
Conclusions
What do we learn from Dewey’s invectives against the procedures of
measurement and standardisation as quoted above? One of the first answers
to this question is that they do not necessarily speak for Dewey and against
contemporary educational reform. One can also regard them as documents
of a naïve philosophy of progressive education that never developed suffi-
cient theoretical instruments for defining the office of mass schooling as a
modern institution. Nonetheless, the quotations show that using Dewey as
an authority for contemporary educational reform is hardly a tenable
strategy.
There is no doubt that John Dewey‘s ideas did indeed travel most
extensively. Hence, according to a world cultural perspective, this suggests
the conclusion that Dewey’s philosophy of education must have both a
universalistic and a rationalising quality. And indeed, there are two
prominent concepts throughout his philosophy, namely democracy and
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The problem is that there are many different concepts of justice and
rationality. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy differentiates at least
six notions of justice. It is even worse with rationality. In a handbook article
about types of rationality, for example, the authors differentiate no less than
21 concepts (Lenk/Spinner 1989). The claim that those educational ideas
and reforms that appeal to justice and rationality travel most extensively is
hard to either verify or falsify unless you define exactly what reference
model is meant by the terms.
Contemporary reform policies like the No Child Left Behind Act, for
instance, also strongly appeal to rationality and justice, but their under-
standing of these concepts and their way of reconciling both seem to differ
considerably from what we find in Dewey.
References
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Belmann, Johannes 2006:
The Reception of John Dewey in the Context of Contemporary Educational Reform
– A German-American Comparison
I Studies in Educational Policy and Educational Philosophy:
E-tidskrift, 2006:1 <http://www.upi.artisan.se>
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