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To Deceive Lie and Omit Developmental Contextual and Educational Factors Enga Ar Mentir y Omitir Factores Evolutivos Contextuales y Educativos
To Deceive Lie and Omit Developmental Contextual and Educational Factors Enga Ar Mentir y Omitir Factores Evolutivos Contextuales y Educativos
Infancia y Aprendizaje
To cite this article: Maria-José D. Martins & Ana-Margarida Veiga-Simão (2023) To deceive, lie
and omit: developmental, contextual and educational factors (Engañar, mentir y omitir: factores
evolutivos, contextuales y educativos), Journal for the Study of Education and Development, 46:3,
678-706, DOI: 10.1080/02103702.2023.2208426
circumstantial reasons). They found evidence that only false assertions are lies because
when the intention of deception fails due to circumstantial events that turn it true,
people classify it as a failure of the intention to lie and not exactly a lie.
With reference to the concept of a ‘lie’, Piaget (1985) proposed three stages of lies,
associated with three phases of moral reasoning that reflect three concepts of the verb
‘to lie’. In the first stage, the child confounds lies with mistakes or errors and considers
lying as something bad and ugly (associated with other characteristics of moral hetero
nomy, like respect for authority as the motive of moral evaluations, where the punish
ment is a criterion for the gravity of lying). In the second stage, lies are seen as false
statements that do not correspond to facts or reality (they are not true statements);
however, children do not yet consider the intentionality of the act. This is a transitional
stage from moral heteronomy to moral autonomy that usually occurs around the age of
nine or 10. In the third stage, the child realizes that lying entails not just false
statements but also the intention of deceiving the other person (phase associated with
other characteristics of moral autonomy, like following the principle of reciprocity in
moral evaluations).
Therefore, we can differentiate between omission, lying and deception: omission is
not telling important information to the recipient, lying is making false statements, and
deception is the dishonest intention to guide the other through false statements.
Further, we can consider different phases in the lying behaviour and assume that the
most complete and complex definition of lying is the one that suggests that it entails
false statements (or pretending without language) made with the intention to deceive
another in the process of verbal and non-verbal communication.
expressed by children. In contrast, prosocial lies tend to appear later, around the
beginning of the school years (Evans & Lee, 2013; Harvey et al., 2017; Lee, 2013;
Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar et al., 2019, 2017; Thijssen et al., 2017; Williams
et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2003).
Bussey (1999), in a study with children who were aged four, eight and 11 years,
found that all children thought it was better to tell true statements than false statements.
However, older children categorized antisocial lies as worse than other types of lies, and
compared to younger children, they also anticipated more social disapproval for those
types of lies.
Lavoie, Leduc, et al. (2017), in a study with children aged three to 14 years old, tried
to map spontaneous lie-telling behaviour through development, based on parents’
reports, and identified three types of liars: occasional liars (those who tell few lies in
whatever category), instrumental liars (those who lie mainly for self-benefit) and anti-
social liars (those who lie to avoid punishment or to blame others; this was the smallest
group). The authors concluded that a majority of children were occasional liars, older
children were more likely to belong to the occasional liar group, younger children with
a high level of theory of mind (ability to attribute mental states, like beliefs, intents,
desires and knowledge, to oneself and others) were equally likely to be occasional or
instrumental liars, while older children with a low level of theory of mind were the ones
that were more likely to belong to the group of antisocial liars. Thus, the authors
concluded that children use lying as a social strategy, that this behaviour follows
a developmental pattern (children lie more to conceal a transgression and adolescents
tell more polite lies than children) and that it is associated with the children’s level of
theory of mind (Lavoie, Leduc, et al., 2017).
Bussey and Grimbeek (2000), in a study with children aged four, seven and 10 years
old, aimed to establish the minimum competence required for testifying in court. They
evaluated children’s ability to categorize true and false statements (defined as including
three elements, such as factuality, belief and intent). The authors found that all the older
children and a majority of the four-year-olds could differentiate between true and false
statements. The children also rated the true statements more positively than the lies;
however, the youngest rated them lower than the oldest children. The authors con
cluded that these findings have significant implications for the legal system by demon
strating that children are sufficiently competent to participate in the legal system, as
long as they can testify with no pressure from the perpetrators (Bussey & Grimbeek,
2000).
Williams et al. (2016), in an experimental study with very young children, aged two
to five years, tried to understand the emergence of the ability to lie and the capacity to
differentiate truth-telling from lie-telling from the perspective of child development.
They also hypothesized that children with greater inhibitory control skills (ability to
control one’s thoughts or behaviour) and more planning capacities (capacity to
formulate a series of steps designed to achieve a goal or solve a problem) will be
more likely to lie. Children faced a temptation paradigm, where they could transgress
the experimenter’s orders and, after some time, confess or tell a lie regarding what
they had done in the absence of the experimenter. The authors found that most of the
children were honest and confessed their transgressions; however, approximately one-
third of them lied to conceal their actions, suggesting that the ability to lie emerges in
682 M.-J. D. Martins and A.-M. Veiga-Simão
pre-schoolers although is not a generalized behaviour at his age. The authors also
found that children who lied had better inhibitory control and planning abilities than
the confessors, that the majority of children were able to identify and differentiate
truths from lies (however, not at a high rate), that there was an association between
the emergence of lie-telling behaviour and their capability to identify lies and that
there was some evidence that children’s lies already involved some intentionality
(Williams et al., 2016).
Talwar et al. (2019) tried to distinguish different pathways for what they labelled
adaptative and maladaptive lying in relation to cognitive, social and parental influences.
For this purpose, the authors conducted a longitudinal study with 127 children aged
three to six years old, who were examined a second time at five and eight years old.
They tried to understand lie-telling behaviour in four motivational contexts (two
prosocial and two antisocial contexts) across development. The authors found that
the antisocial lies were more frequent in the first examination (when the children were
younger), while prosocial lies were most common in the second examination (when the
children were older). Further, they found that the individuals’ tendency to tell lies in the
first examination remained in the second examination (the tendency to speak antisocial
lies was stronger, although it included a small percentage of the children). However, the
data also suggested that the children’s choice to tell a specific type of lie may change
developmentally across motivational contexts. They did not find any cognitive or social
predictors of lie-telling behaviour in this study. The authors concluded that the long
itudinal study added value to the comprehension of lying behaviour by confirming the
tendency of preschool-aged children to tell antisocial lies and of school-going children
to begin to tell prosocial lies; however, they could not confirm the associations between
social and cognitive abilities and lying behaviour, which was found in previous cross-
sectional studies (Talwar et al., 2019).
When examining the frequency and proficiency of the act of lying throughout
a person’s life with participants between six and 77 years old, Debey et al. (2015)
found that the frequency and proficiency of lying behaviour increases from infancy
through young adulthood and then decreases throughout adulthood. This means that
the pattern of lying behaviour follows an inverted U-pattern similar to other types of
behaviour, like aggression, where inhibitory control plays a role. This suggests that lying
could be associated with other antisocial behaviour and probably is a type of antisocial
behaviour by itself; it breaks the recipient’s confidence regarding the liar and affects the
harmony of social interactions.
Researchers have tried to study the emergence of lying as a behaviour and the
evolution of the understanding of the concept of lying. Lavoie, Nagar, et al. (2017), in
a study aimed to evaluate how children between the ages of eight and 15 understand
lies, found that younger children define lies as mistakes and concealing misdeeds, while
older children define lies as the opposite of reality and can clearly distinguish between
a lie and a mistake. They also found that a child’s reasoning about lying begins with
a moral assertion that lying is never tolerable and evolves into the concession that lying
is a common social behaviour that can be acceptable in some situations. Another study
(Martins et al., 2022), about the comprehension of the concept of a lie, studied children
aged six to 10 years old who attended one of the first four grades in primary school.
They found that most children defined lies as false statements; however, a quarter from
To deceive, lie and omit / Engañar, mentir y omitir 683
the first grade did not yet know how to define a lie or to define it as bad or as a mistake,
and only a few of the fourth-graders included the intention of deception in their
definitions of lying. However, when they had to rate two stories that included lying
to the mother about scores in school or an exaggeration (they say they saw a dog as big
as an elephant), almost all of them rated the lie about scores in school to the mother as
worse than the exaggeration, and only a few (less than 10%) from the first grade rated
the exaggeration as worse than the lie to the mother. This study also found that a large
majority of children considered lying as something that should never be done; however,
immediately after this consideration, almost half of them admitted to lying if their
mother or father requested it. For those who admitted to lying, obedience was the main
motive for that behaviour, while a few from the fourth grade gave prosocial motives.
For those who did not admit to lying at the request of a parent, the rule that one should
never lie was the main motive (Martins et al., 2022). Other studies found that the actual
behaviour of children and adolescents influences their judgement of others’ honesty, in
the sense that compared to children who did not lie or cheat, children who lied and
cheated were more likely to evaluate others as dishonest (Evans & Lee, 2014).
Piaget (1985) proposed a developmental trend in the moral reasoning of a child from
moral anomy (which characterizes the child under four years old), through moral
heteronomy (typical of the mind of the child from four to eight years old), to moral
autonomy (which begins to arise at around nine to 10 years old), with a transition
period between these two stages (at about eight years old). Piaget proposed the three
stages of the lying concept described above and considered that they are parallel to
those of other moral dimensions following the developmental pattern: anomy —
heteronomy — transition — autonomy (Piaget, 1985; Tappan et al., 1987). More
recently, some authors have suggested that moral behaviour arises early in develop
ment; it is associated with the development of empathy around the age of three
(Smetana, 2018; Smetana et al., 2018).
Peterson et al. (1983) conducted a study that included children aged five, eight,
nine and 10 and a group of adults, using the theoretical Piagetian approach. In
place of verbal cues, they used videotaped stories, whose characters were children,
to test whether the different age groups differentiated deliberate lies from uninten
tional untrue statements. The results revealed that the definition of lying changed
gradually over the age range and that children’s utilization of intentions in deter
mining a lie increased in complexity with development. The adults were more
lenient than children in their moral evaluation of the statements, as predicted by
Piaget (1985). However, in contrast to Piaget, they found that even younger
children rated exaggerations as better than self-interested lies. All age groups
rated a guess that did no harm as better than one that causes trouble, and they
all judged self-motivated lies to be worse than unintentional false statements, such
as white or tricky lies. Older children tended to justify the prohibition against lying
in terms of trust and fairness, while younger ones invoked authority’s punitive
sanctions (Peterson et al., 1983).
684 M.-J. D. Martins and A.-M. Veiga-Simão
(according to themselves and their parents) than those without externalized behaviour
but have less ability to tell them. They also found that children with externalizing
problems who told personal gain lies were also more probable to rate tattle truths more
positively than other children. In addition, they found that children with higher theory
of mind were less likely to lie for personal gain, contrarily to other cited studies above.
These results suggest that children with externalizing behaviour may differ in their lie-
telling behaviour both in the types of lies they will tell and in their skills at lying (Talwar
& Lavoie, 2022).
The fact the antisocial motives for lying are strongly associated with cognitive load
(demanding cognitive resources) is emphasized by Walczyk et al. (2014). Those motives
can be instrumental (to obtain rewards, power), to avoid punishment, to protect the self
from confrontation or embarrassment, to improve self-presentation, to hurt others
(because of vengeance), to change interpersonal relations (to increase, maintain or
terminate a relation) and to mobilize other cognitive and emotional resources beyond
theory of mind.
(2017), for example, did not find any differences in the levels of abstraction between
true and false intentions in adults. Hence, it can be surmised that, in young children,
cognitive ability can be crucial to be able to lie and differentiate truth-telling from lie-
telling; however, at a certain point of development, differences in cognitive ability are
no longer indicative of the ability to differentiate between who will or will not lie
(Crossman & Talwar, 2021; Lee & Imuta, 2021). This means that lying requires several
cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities, namely, a reasonable capacity for understanding
others’ perspectives. However, personal motivation for lying and social context will
probably be a better determinant of the choice between telling the truth or lying,
especially in terms of the type, frequency and purpose of lie-telling behaviour. This
also suggests that lie-telling behaviour may be strongly linked with moral development
and moral understanding (Lim et al., 2020; Piaget, 1985).
The links between lying and either moral reasoning or moral behaviour have been
emphasized in the research by many authors (Lim et al., 2020; Popliger et al., 2011;
Turri & Turri, 2015; Xu et al., 2010), although not always conclusive or exhibiting
strong relations. This can occur because responsibility, as a possible variable influencing
lying behaviour, has been poorly explored in literature about lying and honesty. In fact,
responsibility by our own decisions, in terms of balancing the consequences and
benefits of our acts on others, could mediate lying behaviour and determine different
options in prosocial or antisocial lying contexts.
Martins et al. (2022), in a study with children aged six to 10 years old, reported that
the phases of lying comprehension are parallel to phases of moral reasoning, as
conceptualized by Piaget, when children evaluate different types of lies. This means
that when the child has the triadic concept of lying, they also consider an exaggeration
of reality as less serious than a lie made with the intent to deceive; although, this notion
arises earlier than predicted by Piaget (1985).
The interaction of factors like age, cognitive empathy (defined as competence to
predict and explain the emotions of others), theory of mind and culture were tested in
a study by Lim et al. (2020) with Australian and Singaporean children aged six to 12
years old. The children were questioned about their thoughts on the nature of prosocial
or selfish lies. This meant that they had to analyse who was the naughtier character of
different stories where both types of lies were told. This study tried to measure the
intention sensitivity: a composed variable that includes and assesses, simultaneously,
greater approval of prosocial lies compared with self-serving lies. Lim et al. (2020)
found that the theory of mind was not related to intention sensitivity, and that
compared with cognitive empathy and a collectivistic culture, age had a minor relation
with it. Further, it was seen that cognitive empathy and collectivist culture (assuming
that Singapore was a collectivist culture as opposed to the individualist culture of urban
Australia) were both the more predictive of intention sensitivity, which means that
those individuals from the collectivistic culture and with more cognitive empathy
approve prosocial lies and condemn selfish lies (Lim et al., 2020).
The theoretical approach of moral identity was proposed by Blasi (1980) to fill the
gap between moral reasoning and moral action. Moral identity is organized around
a cluster of moral traits that reflect the degree to which being moral is important to the
self. The belief in our moral integrity is so central to understanding our self that
sometimes we shield using mechanisms of moral disengagement (e.g., euphemistic
To deceive, lie and omit / Engañar, mentir y omitir 687
Cherry Tree (A story based on a myth about George Washington as a child, where he
received a hatchet as a gift and damaged his father’s cherry tree. When his father saw it
and confronted him, he decided to tell the truth and was praised by his father, or, as in
the alternative version, was punished). The results revealed that the traditional version
of the story of George Washington and the Cherry Tree was the one that was more
efficacious to promote honesty in children because this story highlighted the positive
consequences of honesty, while the others emphasized the negative consequences of
dishonesty.
Talwar et al. (2016) designed and implemented research with children aged four to
seven years old that aimed to identify the variables associated with promoting honesty
thorough story-telling and to understand the relationship between moral development
and honesty in situations where children were requested to lie to conceal
a transgression by another person. In this research, the authors used three types of
stories that were read to children: a positive story that emphasized the benefits and
positive outcomes of telling the truth, that is, being honest (George Washington and the
Cherry Tree); a negative story showing the negative consequences of telling lies (The
Boy who Cried Wolf); and a neutral story without any relation to telling lies or truths
(The Tortoise and the Hare). Talwar et al. (2016) concluded that the positive story
contributed more to promoting honesty. The expectation of punishment in the negative
story or the events of the neutral story did not promote truth-telling behaviour in any
of the participating children, irrespective of their age.
These results have interesting educational implications that emphasize the effect of
positive outcomes of honesty in contrast with the negative outcomes of telling lies. They
further revealed that the positive story was more efficient even in contexts where there
is potential pressure from adults to hide important information or to request children
to tell lies, despite, ironically, the story of George Washington and the cherry tree being
based on historical myth (Talwar et al., 2016). Moreover, this perspective is anchored in
a character education approach and does not consider the question of responsibility of
choice.
In respect to other strategies of promoting honesty, beyond storytelling, Ma et al.
(2018) achieved promoting honesty on five-year-old children through observational
learning. In an experimental paradigm where children observed others being praised by
confessing to cheating in a game, they showed themselves to be more honest than other
children that were not praised for doing it.
Ding et al. (2015), in a study based on an experimental design, showed that training
children aged three years old, who did not previously lie, with tasks of theory of mind
promoted not only their theory of mind ability but also their lying behaviour (compar
ing scores with either the pre-test or control group). The authors concluded that the
theory of mind had a causal role in the emergence of several social competencies in
children, including both positive social competences like prosocial behaviour and
deceptive behaviour. This can be because the theory of mind training makes children
who usually do not lie begin to do it, giving them new competencies and not necessarily
more responsibilities for their acts (Ding et al., 2015).
Therefore, the simple promotion of cognitive abilities, social competencies or just
honesty are incomplete perspectives while dealing with lying behaviour, and the
To deceive, lie and omit / Engañar, mentir y omitir 689
sarcasmos. Sin embargo, Vrij (2008) señala que mentir no requiere necesariamente el uso
de palabras. Por ejemplo, cuando un atleta simula una lesión, está mintiendo sin utilizar el
lenguaje. La omisión de una información importante o central también puede
considerarse una mentira debido a las posibles consecuencias que la falta de esa
información puede tener para el receptor. En un experimento con adultos, Turri y Turri
(2015) trataron de comprobar si mentir requería necesariamente la intención de engañar,
como defienden la mayoría de los autores. Comprobaron si una afirmación deshonesta
(pronunciada con la intención de engañar) sería considerada una mentira incluso si al
final resultase verdadera (por razones circunstanciales). Los autores hallaron evidencias
en el sentido de que sólo las afirmaciones falsas se consideran mentiras porque cuando la
intención de engañar fracasa por razones circunstanciales que la hacen ser verdad, las
personas lo clasifican como un fracaso de la intención de mentir y no exactamente una
mentira.
Por lo que se refiere al concepto de ‘mentira’, Piaget (1985) propuso tres estadios de
la mentira, relacionados con tres fases de razonamiento moral, que a su vez reflejan tres
acepciones del verbo ‘mentir’. En una primera fase, el niño confunde las mentiras con
errores o fallos y considera la mentira como algo malo y desagradable (relacionado con
otras características de la heteronomía moral, como el respeto a la autoridad debido
a las evaluaciones morales, donde el castigo es un criterio de la gravedad de la mentira).
En un segundo estadio, las mentiras se interpretan como enunciados falsos que no se
corresponden con la realidad o con los hechos (no son verdaderos). Sin embargo, los
niños todavía no tienen en cuenta la intencionalidad de los actos. Se trata de una fase de
transición de heteronomía moral a autonomía moral, que suele ocurrir en torno a los
nueve o 10 años. En la tercera fase, el niño (o la niña) se da cuenta de que mentir
implica no solo afirmaciones falsas sino también la intención de engañar a la otra
persona (una fase asociada con otras características de la autonomía moral, como
cumplir el principio de reciprocidad en las evaluaciones morales).
Por tanto, podemos diferenciar entre omisión, mentira y engaño: la omisión consiste
en no facilitar una información importante al receptor, mentir es emitir enunciados
falsos y engaño es la intención deshonesta de influir en otra persona a través de
enunciados falsos. Asimismo, podemos considerar distintas fases en el comportamiento
relacionado con la mentira y asumir que la definición más completa y compleja del acto
de mentir es la que sugiere la implicación de enunciados falsos (o de fingir sin palabras)
con la intención de engañar a otra persona en un proceso de comunicación verbal y no
verbal.
Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Vrij, 2008). Las mentiras antisociales y prosociales parecen
estar relacionadas con distintos tipos de expresiones faciales no verbales en los niños de
entre seis y 11 años, que parecen expresar mayor entusiasmo cuando dicen mentiras
prosociales que antisociales (Zanette et al., 2016).
Warneken y Orlins (2015a, 2015b) señalaron la dificultad de esta clasificación en
términos de atribución de categorías. Por ejemplo, podría haber casos en los que el
receptor reconociese una verdad piadosa y eso le hiriese, o situaciones en las que surgen
las llamadas mentiras prosociales, en las que los niños protegen a sus padres y, por lo
tanto, se protegen también a sí mismos al mismo tiempo. Así pues, los autores
añadieron la categoría ‘mentiras azules’ (blue lies) en la que incluyeron todas estas
mentiras con las que se trata de proteger a los miembros del grupo al que pertenece la
persona que miente.
La aparición de comportamientos relacionados con la mentira parece ocurrir en una
fase temprana del desarrollo. Existe amplia evidencia de que las mentiras antisociales
son el primer tipo de mentiras que hacen aparición durante el desarrollo infantil.
Comienzan en la etapa preescolar, aproximadamente entre los dos y los tres años. La
razón principal suele ser ocultar una travesura y coincide con las primeras mentiras
expresadas por los niños. Por el contrario, las mentiras prosociales suelen aparecer más
tarde, en torno al inicio de la etapa escolar (Evans & Lee, 2013; Harvey et al., 2017; Lee,
2013; Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar et al., 2019, 2017; Thijssen et al., 2017;
Williams et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2003).
En un estudio con niños de cuatro, ocho y 11 años, Bussey (1999) observó que todos
los niños pensaban que era mejor emitir enunciados verdaderos que falsos. Sin
embargo, los niños de mayor edad categorizaron las mentiras antisociales como peores
que otros tipos de mentiras y, en comparación con los de menor edad, también
anticiparon mayor desaprobación social para ese tipo de mentiras.
En un estudio con niños de entre tres y 14 años, Lavoie, Leduc, et al. (2017) trataron
de cartografiar la producción espontánea de mentiras durante el desarrollo, basándose
en informes parentales, e identificaron tres tipos de comportamientos: el mentiroso
ocasional (que dice pocas mentiras en cualquier categoría), el mentiroso instrumental
(que miente principalmente en beneficio propio) y el mentiroso antisocial (que miente
para evitar el castigo o para culpar a otros); este último fue el grupo más reducido. Los
autores concluyeron que la mayoría de los niños eran mentirosos ocasionales; los de
mayor edad tendían a pertenecer a este primer grupo, como los niños de menor edad
con alto nivel de teoría de la mente (la capacidad de atribuir estados mentales tales
como creencias, intenciones, deseos y conocimientos a sí mismo y a otras personas),
también más propensos al comportamiento del mentiroso ocasional o instrumental,
mientras que los niños de mayor edad con bajo nivel de teoría de la mente eran los más
tendentes a pertenecer al grupo del mentiroso antisocial. Por tanto, los autores con
cluyeron que los niños utilizan la mentira a modo de estrategia social y que este
comportamiento sigue un patrón evolutivo (los niños mienten más para ocultar una
transgresión y los adolescentes dicen más mentiras amables que los niños) y está
asociado con el nivel de teoría de la mente del niño (Lavoie, Leduc, et al., 2017).
En un estudio con niños de cuatro, siete y 10 años, Bussey y Grimbeek (2000)
trataron de establecer la competencia mínima requerida para testificar ante un tribunal.
Evaluaron la habilidad de los niños para categorizar los enunciados como verdaderos
694 M.-J. D. Martins and A.-M. Veiga-Simão
o falsos (en función de tres elementos: facticidad, creencia e intención). Los autores
hallaron que todos los niños de mayor edad y la mayoría de los de cuatro años eran
capaces de diferenciar entre las afirmaciones verdaderas y las falsas. Los niños también
valoraron más positivamente las afirmaciones verdaderas que las mentiras; sin embargo,
los más jóvenes lo hicieron en menor medida que los mayores. Los autores concluyeron
que estos resultados tienen implicaciones significativas para el sistema legal, al demos
trar que los niños son suficientemente competentes para participar en el sistema legal,
siempre que puedan testificar sin presiones por parte de los acusados (Bussey &
Grimbeek, 2000).
Y en un estudio experimental con niños de muy corta edad, de dos a cinco años
Williams et al. (2016) trataron de estudiar la emergencia de la habilidad de mentir y la
capacidad de diferenciar la verdad de la mentira desde la perspectiva del desarrollo
infantil. También hipotetizaron que los niños con mayor nivel de habilidad de control
inhibitorio (la capacidad de controlar el propio pensamiento y comportamiento) y mayor
capacidad de planificación (la capacidad de formular una serie de pasos dirigidos
a conseguir un objetivo o resolver un problema) tendrían mayor predisposición
a mentir. Los niños se enfrentaron a un paradigma de tentación en el que podían
transgredir las órdenes de los experimentadores y, tras algún tiempo, confesar la
transgresión o mentir sobre lo que habían hecho en la ausencia del experimentador.
Los autores hallaron que la mayoría de los niños actuaron con honestidad y confesaron su
transgresión. Sin embargo, aproximadamente un tercio de ellos trató de ocultar sus
acciones, lo que sugiere que la habilidad de mentir surge ya en la edad preescolar, pese
a que no constituye un comportamiento generalizado a esta edad. Los autores también
observaron que los niños que mentían tenían mejor control inhibitorio y habilidades de
planificación que los que confesaban su transgresión, y que la mayoría de los niños eran
capaces de identificar y diferenciar entre verdades y mentiras (si bien no en un índice muy
elevado). También hallaron una relación entre la emergencia de la mentira y su capacidad
de identificarla, así como alguna evidencia de que las mentiras de los niños integraban
cierto grado de intencionalidad (Williams et al., 2016).
Talwar et al. (2019) trataron de identificar distintas trayectorias para lo que denomi
naron mentiras adaptativas y desadaptativas (o disfuncionales) en relación con deter
minadas influencias cognitivas, sociales y parentales. Para ello, los autores llevaron
a cabo un estudio longitudinal con 127 niños y niñas de entre tres y seis años que
fueron sometidos a pruebas al principio del estudio y de nuevo a los cinco y ocho años.
Su objetivo era comprender los comportamientos relacionados con la mentira en cuatro
contextos motivacionales (dos prosociales y dos antisociales) durante el desarrollo. Los
autores hallaron que las mentiras antisociales eran más frecuentes en la primera prueba
(cuando los niños eran más jóvenes), mientras que las prosociales eran más habituales
en la segunda prueba (cuando los niños eran algo mayores). Asimismo, observaron que
la tendencia individual a decir mentiras en la primera prueba permanecía en la segunda
(la tendencia a decir mentiras antisociales era mayor, aunque incluía un porcentaje
menor de niños). Sin embargo, los datos también sugieren que la decisión infantil de
decir un tipo de mentira puede cambiar durante el desarrollo y en los distintos
contextos motivacionales. Los autores no identificaron ningún predictor cognitivo
o social del comportamiento relacionado con las mentiras en su estudio. Los autores
concluyeron que el estudio longitudinal contribuía en cierto modo a la comprensión de
To deceive, lie and omit / Engañar, mentir y omitir 695
honestidad de los demás, en el sentido de que, comparados con los niños que no
mienten o engañan, los niños que mienten y engañan son más proclives a evaluar
a los demás como deshonestos (Evans & Lee, 2014).
Piaget (1985) propuso una tendencia evolutiva en el razonamiento moral infantil
desde la anomia moral (que caracteriza a los niños menores de cuatro años), hacia la
heteronomía moral (típica del pensamiento infantil entre cuatro y ocho años) y la
autonomía moral (que comienza en torno a los nueve o 10 años), con un periodo de
transición entre estos dos estadios (alrededor de los ocho años). Piaget propuso los tres
estadios del concepto mentira descritos anteriormente y los consideró paralelos a los de
otras dimensiones morales que siguen el patrón evolutivo: anomia — heteronomía —
transición — autonomía (Piaget, 1985; Tappan et al., 1987). Más recientemente, algunos
autores han sugerido que el comportamiento moral surge temprano en el desarrollo. Se
relaciona con el desarrollo de la empatía en torno a los tres años (Smetana, 2018;
Smetana et al., 2018).
Peterson et al. (1983) llevaron a cabo un estudio con niños de cinco, ocho, nueve
y 11 años, así como un grupo de adultos, adoptando el enfoque teórico piagetiano. En
lugar de indicaciones verbales, los autores utilizaron historias grabadas en vídeo, cuyos
personajes eran niños, para probar si los distintos grupos de edad diferenciaban las
mentiras deliberadas de los enunciados falsos no intencionados. Los resultados reve
laron que la definición de mentira cambiaba gradualmente en función de la edad y el
uso infantil de la intención para determinar una mentira aumentaba en complejidad
con el desarrollo. Los adultos eran más indulgentes que los niños en su evaluación
moral de los enunciados, como predijo Piaget (1985). Sin embargo, a diferencia de ese
autor, los investigadores observaron que incluso los niños más jóvenes evaluaron las
exageraciones más positivamente que las mentiras por interés propio. Todos los grupos
etarios valoraron una suposición inocua de forma más positiva que una que causaba
problemas, y todos ellos juzgaron las mentiras por interés propio peor que las afirma
ciones falsas no intencionadas, como las mentiras piadosas o los engaños inofensivos.
Los niños de mayor edad tendían a justificar la prohibición de mentir en términos de
confianza y justicia, mientras que los más jóvenes invocaron las sanciones punitivas de
la autoridad (Peterson et al., 1983).
Tanto Doyle y Bussey (2018) como Lavoie et al. (2018) han estudiado la relación
entre el acto de mentir y los comportamientos antisociales abiertos y encubiertos.
Lavoie et al. (2018), en un estudio con niños de cuatro a 14 años, observaron que los
problemas conductuales infantiles estaban relacionados con la frecuencia de las men
tiras (declaradas por los padres) y que los estilos de crianza moderaban este efecto.
También descubrieron que los niños con mayor nivel de problemas conductuales
mentían con mayor frecuencia tanto a personas conocidas (padres) como desconocidas
(investigadores).
Doyle y Bussey (2018) observaron que los niños de primaria con mayor tenden
cia a la desconexión moral (un mecanismo que elimina el autocontrol regulatorio
para justificar acciones que perjudican a otras personas mediante la difusión y el
desplazamiento de la responsabilidad, tergiversando o ignorando los efectos perju
diciales infligidos en los demás y vilificando a los receptores del maltrato
culpándolos y deshumanizándolos) eran los más tendentes a anticipar que una
persona en una viñeta sería la que emitiría afirmaciones y negaciones falsas pre
paradas. La desconexión moral es un mecanismo propuesto inicialmente por
Bandura (2002) para explicar un comportamiento agresivo inhumano que una
persona normal no realizaría normalmente según sus estándares morales, excepto
en una situación en la que esta persona pueda escudarse tras este tipo de
mecanismos.
Al analizar las asociaciones entre el acto de mentir y la teoría de la mente (la
capacidad de comprender otros estados mentales) y con la función ejecutiva (la
capacidad de dirigir un comportamiento consciente orientado a las metas) en un
estudio longitudinal con niños de tres y cuatro años, Zhao et al. (2021) identificaron
un fuerte vínculo entre los tres comportamientos y hallaron evidencia de que la teoría
de la mente, junto a la función ejecutiva, fomentan el desarrollo de la mentira en la
infancia, como ya se había observado en algunos estudios previos (Sotillo & Rivière,
2001). En un metaanálisis sobre la teoría de la mente y la capacidad de mentir de los
niños entre dos y 14 años, Lee y Imuta (2021) observaron que la teoría de la mente se
relacionaba positivamente con todas las facetas de la mentira, pero el vínculo más fuerte
era con el mantenimiento de esta y el más débil, con la producción espontánea de la
primera mentira, lo que sugiere que esta última podría estar relacionada con ciertos
aspectos relacionados con la elección y la responsabilidad, más allá de las meras
capacidades cognitivas.
Talwar y Lavoie (2022) exploraron las relaciones entre la mentira antisocial (mentir
en beneficio propio) en niños entre seis y 11 años, con o sin externalización de
problemas conductuales y la teoría de la mente en un paradigma experimental. Los
autores observaron que los niños con externalización de problemas conductuales
decían más mentiras (según ellos mismos y sus padres) que los que no exhibían
comportamientos problemáticos, pero mostraban menor habilidad en ellas. También
observaron que los niños que externalizaban esos problemas conductuales y que decían
mentiras en beneficio propio, también eran más proclives a valorar los chismes veraces
de forma más positiva que otros niños. Además, observaron que los niños con un
nivel más elevado de teoría de la mente eran menos tendentes a mentir en beneficio
propio, a diferencia de otros estudios que hemos citado anteriormente. Estos resultados
sugieren que los niños que externalizan comportamientos pueden diferir en sus
698 M.-J. D. Martins and A.-M. Veiga-Simão
y conflictos reales, podría ser una mejor manera de prevenir la mentira antisocial. Y un
enfoque que articule consideraciones cognitivas sobre la justicia junto con el fomento de
emociones morales (como la empatía, el remordimiento o la culpa y, especialmente, el
orgullo moral) en las diversas oportunidades de la vida cotidiana y en el contexto de
comunidades justas, podría ser más eficaz a la hora de prevenir la mentira antisocial que
el mero fomento de la honestidad. También sería interesante estudiar cómo las denomi
nadas emociones morales (orgullo moral, remordimiento, empatía cognitiva y afectiva,
así como la responsabilidad de los propios actos) pueden inhibir la mentira y en qué
grado, como ocurre con otras conductas antisociales (Tangney et al., 2007). Los enfoques
educativos podrían explorar también cómo fomentar unos estándares morales más
elevados, especialmente en los niños de mayor edad, durante la adolescencia y primera
juventud, así como el acceso a su impacto en la reducción de la mentira antisocial,
Concluimos con la idea de que, en la actualidad, probablemente sea más importante
educar para la responsabilidad (incluyendo la honestidad como un componente de
esta). Es necesario llevar a cabo investigaciones que pongan de relieve los resultados de
este enfoque con el comportamiento infantil relacionado con la mentira, especialmente
el relacionado con la mentira antisocial y en interés propio. La responsabilidad también
se reconoce como un aspecto importante de la educación ciudadana en las sociedades
democráticas (EURYDICE, 2017; UNESCO, 2015).
Futuras investigaciones deberían explorar estrategias educativas que fomenten la
prevención de las mentiras en interés propio, y que mejoren nuestro conocimiento
del papel de la empatía y el orgullo moral en las mentiras prosociales. En particular, la
investigación debería incrementar nuestro conocimiento sobre la autoconsciencia
y nuestra capacidad de comprender y sentir el impacto que nuestras acciones ejercen
en los demás, así como los tipos y frecuencia de las mentiras. Por último, futuras
investigaciones deberían explorar el papel del orgullo moral y los estándares morales en
la prevención de la mentira egoísta y en interés propio, así como el papel que
desempeña la desconexión moral en la mentira, tanto egoísta como prosocial.
Acknowledgements / Agradecimientos
This work received Portuguese national funding from FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a
Tecnologia, IP, through the Research Center for Psychological Science of the Faculty of
Psychology, University of Lisbon, Portugal (UIDB/04527/2020; UIDP/04527/2020). / Este trabajo
ha recibido financiación del organismo nacional FCT, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, IP,
a través del Centro para la Investigación en Psicología de la Facultad de Psicología, Universidad de
Lisboa, Portugal (UIDB/04527/2020; UIDP/04527/2020).
ORCID
Maria-José D. Martins http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9517-7703
Ana-Margarida Veiga-Simão http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-5573
704 M.-J. D. Martins and A.-M. Veiga-Simão
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