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Environment and Planning A

Uncharted waters: 2016, Vol. 48(7) 1354–1373
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configurations for urban DOI: 10.1177/0308518X16640529

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service delivery in India

Priyam Das
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA

Abstract
Decentralization reconfigures urban water governance by transferring responsibilities for
service delivery to local institutions and expanding the role for non-state actors. Consequently,
community-managed water supply projects exemplify a proliferation of participatory
arrangements—typically those that promise capacity building in low-income communities to
enable them to partner with the state in delivering basic services. Drawing on a cross-case
analysis of how three such projects unfolded on the ground in India, I examine the
coproduction of water supply—a manifestation of the shift in water governance. The findings
delineate its role in (re)shaping local-level state-community relations and underscore implications
for urban service delivery.

Keywords
Water supply, urban, India, coproduction, community

Introduction
Sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation for the urban poor remains an
elusive goal mired in challenges despite considerable advancement in knowledge. Even as
debates surrounding the public–private dichotomy in service provision continue, the failure
of both the state and the market to provide equitable access to water has called for
modalities of ‘‘governing-in-common’’ that are beyond them (Swyngedouw, 2013). The
last few decades have seen an upsurge of participatory water supply projects. The Water
and Sanitation Program (WSP, 2009) states that ‘‘giving the poor the opportunity to
participate in the planning and design can make the difference between success and failure
of an initiative’’ (10). International development organizations champion participation
through community-based organizations (CBOs) as it presents an optimistic picture of
self-management and empowerment (Zerah, 2009: 867). Partnerships between local

Corresponding author:
Priyam Das, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Saunders 109, 2424 Maile Way,
Honolulu HI 96822, USA.
Email: priyam@hawaii.edu
Das 1355

governments and CBOs for improved services are often celebrated for their innovative
approaches such as in the Orangi Pilot Project and the Baan Mankong Program. Such
projects seek to alter the patronage-based relationship of the urban poor with local
government authorities signaling a shift toward a more transparent and accountable one
(Satterthwaite et al., 2005: 22). They also highlight the pivotal role of intermediary
organizations1 such as NGOs that are attuned to ground realities and are generally
trusted by the communities they work in, particularly where government agencies lack
expertise in community development. Besides providing technical assistance and training,
NGOs connect communities to public resources and networks of infrastructure and services
(Lee, 1998), facilitate the formation of CBOs to mobilize households to participate (Das and
Takahashi, 2009; Narayan, 1995) or even negotiate the terms of such projects (Baruah,
2007).
Studies that have looked at outcomes of participatory water supply projects (Isham et al.,
1995; Narayan, 1995; Prokopy, 2005; Sara and Katz, 1998) and factors that promote their
sustainability (Madrigal et al., 2011; Marks and Davis, 2012) abound. There is also a
growing body of critical theoretical and empirical literature that addresses the changing
geometry of social power around water infrastructure (see, for instance, Bakker, 2010;
Birkenholtz, 2010; Sultana and Loftus, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2004). However, few have
scrutinized the process of how low-income communities engage with the state to engender
change in their relations in addition to improvements in basic services (see, for instance,
Mitlin, 2008). This study speaks to this lacuna in our understanding. Drawing on evidence
from a cross-case analysis of community-managed water supply for the urban poor in
Madhya Pradesh, India, it explores how, in the context of decentralization, coproducing
water supply (re)shapes relations between local government and low-income communities
and what this means for new configurations of urban service delivery. Does coproduction
encourage change in democratic practices besides enhancing access to services? How does the
absence of a formal intermediary organization to facilitate interactions between the
associated actors play out?
I argue that coproducing water supply can recast the relationship between local government
and low-income communities. This depends, to a large extent, on the motivations that coalesce
around the partnership, allowing it to evolve despite pressures that discourage the partners
from entering the collaborative space. A closer scrutiny of the partnership therefore provides a
relevant entry point to an empirically grounded understanding of (a) decentralization as it
unfolds on the ground and (b) motivations that are central to the coproduction of basic
services. This is particularly salient in the Indian context where, in many cases, existing
relations between the state and low-income communities remain tenuous; disadvantaged
groups face eviction and resettlement and, in recent years, have had to compete with the
burgeoning middle class for basic services.2 Moreover, a comparison of the practices,
processes and outcomes in the three cases illuminates key features of community
participation and what they tell us about such configurations. The remaining sections of the
article include a brief review of the relevant literature followed by an outline of my research
method. I then sketch the three community-managed water supply projects and discuss the
findings from my analysis. I conclude with key insights the findings offer.

Enabling new forms of participation in water service delivery

Meeting the goals of decentralization—improving local democracy, efficiency, equity, and
effectiveness in service delivery—requires strengthening of local government capacity
and collaboration with non-state actors to accompany the transfer of power and
1356 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

resources. This has, in many ways, helped assert the legitimacy of community participation.
With the institutionalization of participation, the role of intermediary organizations such as
NGOs and CBOs has gained currency in development circles. Literature on social capital
highlights the benefits of partnerships between such organizations and local government
agencies (Evans, 1996; Krishna, 2003). NGOs have functioned as intermediaries between
public utilities and the poor, helping to fill the void in service provision through
decentralized services particularly in areas that are beyond the reach of conventional
systems, engaging communities by using their labor to build water points, and training
them in the operation and maintenance (O&M) of water infrastructure (Baruah, 2007;
Weitz and Franceys, 2002). They also play a key role in linking CBOs to higher decision-
making structures, act as watchdogs vis-à-vis the state, and help create opportunities for
alliances to put pressure on the state. CBOs are typically volunteer-driven and spatially tied
to a particular community. They articulate the needs and priorities of low-income
communities vis-à-vis the implementing agencies, organize contributions, and monitor
implementation and outcomes (de Wit and Berner, 2009: 928) and their role can be
deepening—organizing citizens to act collectively in support of a particular project and
mobilize resources—or stretching—acting as contractors or extension agencies that
perform a service for a fee (Krishna, 2003: 367). In some cases, they unite with NGOs
and lobby for shelter, services, and political representation (Batliwala, 2002). CBO-led
efforts such as the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi (OPP) (Hasan, 2006), Baan Mankong
in Bangkok (Archer, 2012), and tenants’ cooperatives for slum redevelopment in Mumbai
(Mukhija, 2006) have been quite successful. Federations like the Slum Dwellers International
(SDI) and the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA) have transformed CBOs into
effective development stakeholders through innovative strategies (Satterthwaite and Mitlin,
2014) such as ‘‘precedent setting’’ to negotiate support and turn their experiments into sites
for policy interventions allowing them to explore new designs for partnerships (Appadurai,
2001: 23). However, such organizations are not benign (de Wit and Berner, 2009) and despite
their axiomatic role as a positive agent, their contributions can differ spatially and
temporally (Mercer, 2002: 6). Their contractual obligations demand efficiency that can
sometimes dilute the transformative agenda and they simply become agents of the state
(Zerah, 2009). Moreover, although participatory projects are often designed based on the
potential for grassroots-led development, the urban poor endure conditions of scarcity and
competition, which can compel them to rely on vertical relations of patronage, hindering
horizontal mobilization (deWit and Berner, 2009) despite providing some access
opportunities (Benjamin, 2000: 44). Other divisions such as income, religion, caste,
gender, political affiliation, and owner-tenant conflicts also characterize resource-
constrained neighborhoods making reciprocal relations and collective action more likely
to occur within subgroups than at the community level (deWit and Berner, 2009). There
is, therefore, a conceptual tension in reifying CBOs for promoting participatory development
on the one hand and segmentation on the other.
A concurrent trend in the water sector is the commercialization of service delivery
(Bayliss, 2002; Gilbert, 2007) modeled on the principles of New Public Management.
Reforms therefore aim to promote efficiency through organizational restructuring and the
introduction of market mechanisms to deliver services and involve decentralized
management instead of monolithic bureaucracies; performance management schemes; and
contracting out services to non-state actors (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Commercialization,
however, rarely tends to focus on issues of poverty and social justice (Jaglin, 2002). Public–
private partnerships that rest on the assumption that full cost recovery can usher in efficient
water use have produced outcomes differentiated by spatial location and social class with the
Das 1357

poor and disenfranchised being most negatively impacted (Birkenholtz, 2010).3

Institutionalizing participation often serves to embed market-oriented reforms in
municipal governance (Coelho et al., 2011: 9), viewing citizens as consumers of services
rather than partners in decision-making (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001). While devolving
responsibility to users can be a source of community pride, it can also condone government
inaction by creating a two-tier system where affluent neighborhoods receive government
subsidized water while the poor are left to mobilize their labor to build expensive systems
that they cannot afford to operate on their own (Bakker, 2010; Jaglin, 2002). Moreover,
decentralization strategies tend to focus on building the technical capacity of local
governments rather than on how they interact with their constituents (Heller, 2001;
Krishna, 2003). Such instrumental approaches to participation cloak the complexity of
relations among associated actors. It is instructive to recognize the situated nature of
participation, influenced by the historical and structural processes within which it is
embedded (Connelly, 2010), to fully grasp the prospects of democratic engagement
through participation. Contextual factors shape participatory processes and existing
participatory traditions interact with, and can even reproduce, socio-spatial inequalities in
low-income neighborhoods (Lombard, 2013).
Coproduction4 provides a platform for wider civic engagement by the urban poor by
reaching out beyond traditional participation (Bovaird, 2007; Joshi and Moore, 2004;
Mitlin, 2008; Whitaker, 1980). While institutionalized coproduction, which depends on
governance (failure of government to provide services) and logistical drivers (difficulty of
providing services due to, for instance, a large number of clients, lack of information,
personnel/authority), can help fulfill core state functions where conventional public
provision is under stress (Joshi and Moore, 2004), grassroots’ self-organized coproduction
goes beyond securing access to basic services to initiating substantive engagement with the
political system aligned with broader goals of control/redistribution of state resources
(Mitlin, 2008). However, the limitations of coproduction—differences in values,
differential levels of power, and incentives among coproducers—mean that the importance
of state regulation cannot be discounted (Bovaird, 2007; Joshi and Moore, 2004), although
state-sponsored coproduction may be limited in its reach with the state continuing to hold
power and viewing grassroots organizations as a threat rather than an opportunity. In some
cases, however, such organizations are able to draw a positive response from the state
encouraging them to be more willing to negotiate and change by providing alternatives to
conventional systems of service delivery (Mitlin, 2008). A review of the literature signals the
need for a more empirically grounded understanding of the outcomes of decentralization
that pays particular attention to the multiple complexities that characterize associated actors
and how these might affect collaborative efforts for improved water governance.

Research method
Combining data from interviews and observations, a household survey administered in
Gwalior, Indore, and Jabalpur, and archival research (urban policy documents, project
reports, proceedings of workshops, local media reports) during fieldwork (2007–2008 and
2011), this study critically examined how coproduction of water unfolded on the ground. My
sampling frame comprised of nine informal settlements in these cities. I conducted in-depth
interviews with CBO members, local government officials, intermediaries, and residents.
During a follow-up field trip to Indore and Gwalior in 2011, I facilitated two focus group
discussions (with six to eight committee members) and interviewed key informants. These
centered on the status of water supply for the urban poor, the project, and relationships
1358 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

among the constellation of actors in the project and were in the local language (Hindi), each
typically lasting an hour. Data from a household survey using stratified random sampling
(n ¼ 322) supported the qualitative component of the research design allowing comparison
among the cases. The survey included questions about demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of the household; collective activities at the community level; effectiveness of
the project; relationship among actors; women’s participation; and residential history and
housing. Frequent visits to the project sites involved observing partnership meetings and
collective activities, and monitoring local conditions. Video recordings of community and
committee meetings included details about their settings, who attended, who initiated
communication, and the content of the communications. The key reasons for purposefully
selecting the cases for this study were (a) they were located in small urban centers instead of
larger cities in the same geographical region in India with cultural, socio-economic, and
political similarities, (b) they had a unique institutional arrangement—a partnership
between the respective local government and low-income communities without a formal
intermediary organization, and (c) they shared the same project blueprint offering a sound
basis for comparison.

The community managed water supply scheme (CMWSS)

Post-decentralization local governments in India were charged with the responsibility of
delivering basic services. The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) of 1992 outlines
the functions (planning, regulation, and development) of local government and envisages
citizen participation at all levels. However, despite amending the Municipal Acts to conform
to the CAA, devolution by state governments has been lethargic and, in many cases, the
reallocation of roles and responsibilities and related financial resources has not crystallized
(Savage and Dasgupta, 2006). In Madhya Pradesh, the Municipal Act directed the Public
Health Engineering Department to transfer assets in the water supply sector to the respective
municipal corporations for O&M. However, financial decentralization has lagged behind
administrative decentralization and municipal corporations have been overwhelmed by their
responsibilities to extend basic services. The problem of water supply is more acute in
informal settlements in these cities where a high percentage of households (67% to 95%)
lack access to water within premises (UN-Habitat, 2005). It is within this context that the
projects selected for this study were initiated through the Water for Asian Cities (WAC)
Program, a collaborative of the UN-Habitat, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the
Government of India (GoI). WAC sought to improve infrastructure and municipal services
in the main cities of Madhya Pradesh to address the water- and sanitation-related MDGs
and encourage the poor to voice their needs and engage in dialogue with local governments
(UN-Habitat, 2005).
The CMWSS, which constitute the pro-poor component of the WAC Program, was
implemented in Gwalior, Indore, and Jabalpur. The projects involved participatory
planning with the goal of integrating improvements in basic services with citywide
infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 2005). The UN-Habitat, along with the respective local
governments, created a revolving fund, which the Community Water and Sanitation
Committees (CWASCs), registered under the Madhya Pradesh Society Registration Act
of 1973, could borrow and were expected to repay in installments, typically in three to five
years. They were generally democratically elected with efforts to include members from
each informal settlement that received the project. The CWASCs were responsible for
planning, designing, executing, and managing the water supply system. The local
government provided technical assistance and consultation when needed. It was also
Das 1359

responsible for providing water at a bulk rate and installing a water meter to monitor
consumption. The costs recovered from the households went toward loan repayment and
payment for bulk water supply. Connection charges, often considered a hurdle for the
poor, were replaced with service charges (capital costs and user charges) payable in easy
installments, depending on a household’s ability to pay. Besides selecting the water supply
technology and level of service (based on technical feasibility, affordability, user
preference, and willingness to accept the technology), households also had the option of
weekly or fortnightly payments. At least, a third of the committee members had to be
women (UN-Habitat, 2005). In the following section, I present a snapshot of the projects
at the case study sites.

A tale of three cities: The CMWSS in Gwalior, Indore, and Jabalpur

Gwalior has a population of about one million (GoI, 2011). The city supports a growing
service sector owing to its tourism industry. It relies on the Tighra Dam and groundwater
sources for its water supply. However, its aging distribution network results in high levels of
non-revenue water. Residents receive water for about an hour everyday and water pressure is
low. Three notified slums5 located about 5 km from the city center were selected to receive
the CMWSS. Households in these settlements reported an average length of residence of
about 12 years. Prior to the project, they depended on public standpipes that supplied water
between 2 and 4 a.m.. About 6000 households were living below the poverty line6 of which
1500 lacked access to water supply. These were located on hillside slopes and reported
having to purchase water from households at the bottom of the hill for Rs. 100 per
month (municipal supply is a flat charge of Rs. 60–Rs. 80).
Indore is the largest city in Madhya Pradesh with a population of 2.1 million (GoI, 2011).
It is the state’s commercial center and a major draw for migrants from across the country,
making it culturally and linguistically diverse. At the same time, this has contributed to the
growth of informal settlements7 putting the city’s infrastructure under duress. The city has a
limited amount of available raw water and its water supply involves transporting water over
70 km from the Narmada River. A high level of non-revenue water is compounded by a
dilapidated distribution system and residents receive only one to two hours of water supply
every other day. The city relies heavily on groundwater sources and water tankers to
augment supply. However, groundwater overdraft has diminished supply resulting in
efforts to recharge groundwater through water harvesting programs (UN-Habitat, 2005).
Five notified slums were selected to receive the CMWSS. They had about 1200 households
living below the poverty line. Households reported an average length of residence of about
nine years. They depended on private tube well owners for their water needs and typically
purchased water from tankers of the municipal corporation or from private vendors during
the summer months.
Jabalpur has a population of one million (GoI, 2011) and is the state’s key trading and
industrial center. Despite having a reliable source of water in the Narmada River, the current
water supply in Jabalpur is limited to two to three hours every day and is unreliable. This can
be attributed to a deficient infrastructure and poor management (UN-Habitat, 2005). The
notified slum selected to receive the project had about 1200 households living below the
poverty line. Households reported an average length of residence of about 32 years. They
depended on free water from three tube wells owned by the Jabalpur Municipal
Corporation. Prior to the project, there were no household connections and residents
queued up for hours every morning to collect water from the tube wells. Disputes over
water were common and often involved the police. Although groundwater in Jabalpur
1360 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

contains fluoride, residents depended on tube wells given the lack of safe and affordable
alternate sources.
The CMWSS projects were unique in their partnership between local governments and
low-income communities without an intermediary organization unlike most externally
funded projects that bring in local NGOs to mobilize communities. UN-Habitat officials
were optimistic that eliminating intermediaries from the partnership would not only build
the government’s capacity to engage directly with low-income communities but also assuage
their inherently tense relationship.
In Gwalior, interactions between the municipal corporation and the CWASC were
minimal. This was hardly unexpected since relations between the two had been tense even
prior to the project and there was no official intermediary organization as facilitator. The
CWASC felt restrained by its lack of capacity. The municipal corporation, on the other
hand, relied heavily on support from community officers or NGO representatives working
on other projects to help mobilize communities, mostly on an ad hoc basis. For instance,
they had appointed a community development officer to facilitate community participation.
However, after just two months, the officer resigned on grounds of inadequate resources.
There were also discrepancies in how project outcomes were perceived by the two partners.
While the municipal corporation was quick to confirm that the project was a resounding
success and was being considered for an award, the CWASC believed otherwise. During
committee meetings, their frustration with efforts to get the municipal corporation to be
responsive became apparent. Relations deteriorated when the municipal corporation began
implementing a sewerage project based on the same cost recovery model. Committee
members complained that although they were expected to bear the responsibility of
managing the sewerage system once it was implemented, they had not been privy to its
planning. According to a committee member,

The work has started in the area. . .the contractors are working but the members of the
CWASC who collect monthly payments are not ready to take on the sewerage scheme
so then. . .how can I sign the contract? They are saying that it is a Rs.25 lakhs project
of which Rs.12.5 lakhs will be paid by the Nagar Nigam [municipal corporation] and
Rs.12.5 lakhs will be paid by the community. This means the CWASC has to collect the
money from the community but if they are not involved in the project. . .then they will not be
willing to pay.
I have the support of 14 committee members who do not think that it is a good idea to take on
this project. It is not like I want to deliberately stop the project. . .but if others don’t want to take
on the responsibility then. . .what can I say?

There were other hurdles that took a toll on the partnership, affecting coproduction. The
weak economic status of the project settlements in Gwalior drove a wedge into their already
fractured relationship with the government (Table 1). Households that had connected to the
project were unable to make regular monthly payments and the CWASC soon found itself
strapped for revenue to operate and maintain the system. Even after a year of operation,
they had not been able to achieve the target number of households. They had requested the
municipal corporation to disconnect households with municipal supply for nonpayment, so
that those households could connect to the project. However, they were unable to encourage
uptake and households, particularly those at the bottom of the hill who had municipal
supply, were reluctant to give up their existing connection because the project was new
and they perceived it to be unreliable. Moreover, as pointed out by residents, the existing
municipal connections were providing water free of cost since there had been no proper
collection of payments for years.8 A committee member stated,
Das 1361

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample.

Gwalior Indore Jabalpur

Total population of project settlements 3500 8500 7000

Number of households surveyed (N) 101 121 100
Average household size (members) 5.90 5.18 5.87
Literacy rate (%) 34 77 71
Average length of residence in the settlement (years) 12 9 31
Caste (% of households)
Scheduled castes 16 17 14
Scheduled tribes 0 26 43
Religion
Hindu 17 99 96
Muslim 83 0.8 3
Average monthly household expenditure on food items
in Indian rupees 1223 3230 2320
in US$ 25 67 48
Average monthly household expenditure on non-food items
in Indian rupees 257 1749 1936
in US$ 5 36 40
Households with 40 liters per capita per day of water (%) 44 56 40
Households with access to toilets (%) 36 79 36
Households who reported that. . .
providing water and sanitation services
is the responsibility of the government 92 13 67
is the responsibility of the CWASC 7 86 31
for water supply problems they complain to
government agency 93 5 61
the CWASC 4 95 35
they generally trust
government officials 21 71 31
NGOs/non-state external agencies 23 74 50

Source: Field survey (2007–2008).

CWASC: Community Water and Sanitation Committee.

I have requested the Nagar Nigam [municipal corporation] to put pressure on the households
that have not paid. Right now. . .the Nagar Nigam is not doing anything. . .it is not collecting
payment. . .it doesn’t have any sanctions for non-payment nor does it disconnect households.
For instance. . .even my connection. . .if they disconnect one household. . .then at least a few
households will be afraid. Now. . .when the committee members go to collect money. . .people
just send them away.

Residents also highlighted how easy it was for such households to pay off municipal bill
collection staff to avoid disconnection and that they were, therefore, less likely to be
interested in the project. In fact, some viewed the project as a potential threat to their
additional income from small-scale reselling of municipal water to those without
connections who had to collect water from the public hand pump at 4 a.m.. The
municipal corporation, instead of disconnecting households, simply turned over its
existing connections (approximately 300) to the CWASC for management, increasing
pressure on them as one member pointed out,
1362 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

The problem with the number of connections is that we have very little support from the Nagar
Nigam. . .then. . .they say that the committee is not doing its work properly. We do not want to
force the project on people. . .we would like the work to be done with consensus. . .only then the
work is good.

According to the committee, the municipal corporation was unable to recover even 25%
of the costs of municipal water supply although they employed staff for bill collection.
Turning over connections to the committee was therefore beneficial to them. However,
the committee highlighted its challenges in providing water and gaining people’s trust,

If we do not provide water everyday. . .then we will be reprimanded. . .and people will not come
forward to take connections. . .thinking that the system is always failing. . .so. . .we work very
hard. . .
Right now we don’t even have an electricity connection. . .so. . .this project would not have
started but. . .we took a risk and we connect on our own [illegal tapping into power supply]
just to supply water to the people. . .and. . .also. . .then there would be an electricity bill to pay
[once they have electricity to run the motor to pump water]. . .and we don’t even have enough
connections.

The internal dynamics of the CWASC also posed significant barriers. Relations among
members were often contentious. Their differences were mostly prompted by concerns
over remuneration and the commitment of committee members. The project required
committee members to volunteer their services for management and hire personnel for
O&M. However, some members were taking on the responsibilities of O&M personnel
and drawing a salary. Those who came forward to participate in the project were mostly
unemployed. Others were wage laborers who believed that the project would offer them job
security. They perceived it to be a government project and government jobs were highly
coveted. Commitment of time by committee members also tended to vary. For instance,
some members of the executive committee were involved voluntarily. However, others
pointed out that they had alternative avenues of employment and were, therefore, unable
to commit to the project. There were also those who had been included in the CWASC in an
effort to represent all three communities but who did not participate. According to a
committee member,

The commissioner sahib asked who wanted to be on the committee and they raised their hands so
they were nominated but later on they did not support us. We are thinking of asking them to
resign since they do not assist us with any work.
The more active members were engaged in the project full time and depended solely on it for
their monthly income. Consequently, they were dissatisfied with the level of involvement of
committee members and felt that their remuneration was not commensurate with their
responsibilities. They were finding it increasingly difficult to balance CWASC
responsibilities with their livelihood needs. They emphasized that residents would not be
willing to pay for a system that was unreliable. They, therefore, shouldered responsibility for
maintaining the system and did not want the CWASC to fall out of favor. However, their
commitment to the project was contingent upon being able to earn sufficient income to
support their families. Some members of the executive committee, on the other hand,
reiterated that the CWASC was not a vehicle for employment and was meant to be social
service. They stressed that cost recovery for the project was so low that they barely managed
to meet its O&M expenses let alone provide remuneration. The quality of leadership of the
committee was, therefore, weakened by the divisiveness among members. Disagreements
Das 1363

were frequent and often drove members to the brink of resignation. This further
compromised the stability of the CWASC and affected the management of the project.
The community in Jabalpur, like those in Gwalior, did not share good relations with the
local government. Residents routinely complained that they had not received any project in
the past and that government officials only visited when there was a political agenda to
promote. The municipal corporation’s insouciance meant that direct interaction between the
partners was almost nonexistent. The CWASC had weak capacity. However, they were able
to function collectively with the help of an intermediary who acted from outside. The strong
leadership qualities of the intermediary compensated, to some extent, for their weak
capacity. The intermediary, a medical doctor who was also a social worker, was their
conduit to the decision-making structure. He was well known in the community as a
benefactor. At the same time, he had cultivated good relations with the municipal
corporation. UN-Habitat officials had sought his help to canvass support for the project.
After organizing several community meetings, he was able to constitute a committee and the
project commenced. He had handpicked the CWASC members and trained them to manage
the system. Throughout the project, he played a crucial role—building the capacity of the
CWASC, leading decision-making and acting as their liaison. He had helped the committee
set up a computerized billing system and was in favor of contracting out accounting services.
He had even registered a women’s group within the committee called Sparsh, which would be
responsible for managing water, sanitation, and livelihoods related activities. According to
him, 225 women had signed up for membership in the group and he deemed the CMWSS to
be a success,

Now when we talk about the success of this project. . .you can assess its success from the fact that
where the Nagar Nigam [municipal corporation] was not getting any money. . .water was free of
cost. . .we are now getting almost 50% cost recovery which is an indicator of our success.
While the CWASC in Jabalpur was able to recover some of the O&M costs, it was unable to
achieve the target number of connections since some households continued to collect water free
of cost from public tube wells. They had requested the municipal corporation to discontinue
the tube wells to help increase connections. This would also result in operating cost savings for
the government. However, the government remained indifferent to their request.
Project performance came to hinge on the local government’s relationship with the
intermediary. The municipal commissioner stated that the local government was
supportive of partnerships where the community managed projects because such projects
limited their role to being the facilitator. They were only responsible for providing bulk
water and technical support when necessary. Moreover, they had to deal with only one
entity—the committee or the community officer or an individual such as the social
worker. According to him, the conventional model is far more demanding for the local
government as it involves receiving and reviewing applications from individual
households, providing connections, and collecting payments. The initial outcomes of the
CMWSS had made them optimistic and they had initiated their own project in another
informal settlement in Jabalpur based on the cost recovery model, providing water supply
at competitive rates.9 However, the intermediary’s statement below is indicative of their level
of engagement in the CMWSS,

No. . .there were no training sessions. . .when the project started we did not even realize that we
would have to do. . .accounting. . .managing. . .billing and coordinating a committee. . .no one
knew that. . .but because I had a personal interest in this project. . .I have maintained proper
accounts and billing records. . .cashbook register. . .so you can’t leave this to the community
1364 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

without a coordinator. . .the community. . .which does not even know what these things are
for. . .can you leave accounting to them?

In Indore, when the project was proposed, the municipal corporation was not enthusiastic
about participating,10 so the District Urban Development Agency (DUDA)11 replaced the
municipal corporation in the partnership. During an interview, the DUDA community officer
pointed out that although DUDA staff had been assigned to the project, she had been
instrumental in its success. According to her, working with NGOs can be difficult,
especially when there are ideological differences. When asked about the advantages of
working directly with the community, she stressed that in a system that is a thicket of red
tape, files move quickly when fewer people are involved. For instance, if a financial decision
had to be made about the project, the CWASC contacted her and she took the matter directly
to the project officer who contacted the sub-district magistrate who then spoke to the collector.
The project had got her recognition feeding her motivation and she stated,

There has been much change from before. . .even though we trained them [the CWASC] for only
three days. . .we motivate them on a daily basis. Earlier they were afraid to come forward and
talk. . .and today they can talk directly with the collector. . .on their own!
My role is already diminished. I used to go there [project settlements] at least three times a week
but now I go there only once a week. . .so they are managing. My goal is that. . .whenever they
need me I should be there.

The CWASC in Indore was also invested in the partnership. It comprised mostly of women
(14 out of 17 members) who had coalesced around the project and were determined to run it
(Das, 2014). Relations among CWASC members were cordial and the executive members
aggressively trained other members in accounting and bookkeeping. The women had
endured much hardship collecting water for their households and to them this was an
opportunity to build a lasting relationship with the government, so that they could
continue to receive services. The committee had since leveraged their position in the
partnership to improve roads in their neighborhood. The women on the committee were
experienced. A few had undergone training with international NGOs on prior projects. This
served them well in the partnership (Das, 2014).
The CWASC was focused on ensuring project sustainability. Initial outcomes of the project
were encouraging and motivated government officials to interact directly with the poor
communities. They began to visit project sites more frequently and their presence, in turn,
made the project credible to the communities. The community officer worked closely with the
committee and advised them to modify project guidelines during implementation. One of the
goals of the project was to have a pro-poor payment plan. This allowed households to pay
their connection charges in up to five installments. However, given the history of nonpayment,
the community officer was concerned that once households started receiving water supply, they
would begin to default. She, therefore, suggested that the CWASC limit installments to one or
two and collect them at the beginning of the project. Although the decision was not looked
upon favorably at the time, the residents were able to arrive at a consensus to pay in one
installment. Soon the committee started recovering costs, which caught the local government’s
attention. However, it is important to note that they did not share a good relationship with the
municipal corporation. As one committee member commented,

A few days ago we were called for a meeting at the Nagar Nigam [municipal corporation] and
they told us that we should hand over the project to them now since we could not run it. We told
them that we could run the project ourselves. . .and. . .we also pointed out that if they thought
Das 1365

that they could run the project and get us water then why had they not done so in so many years?
What were they doing when people had to walk 5 kilometers just to collect water? Even their
tanker was not regular and we could not get enough water.
The Nagar Nigam had initially decided to charge Rs.12 per 1000 kiloliter for bulk water. . .so we
took the bill to the collector and told him that at this rate it was better for us to be drinking milk
and not water!
Clearly, the CWASC was confident about its ability to recover costs. The communities were
also relatively better off in Indore (Table 1). Households had devised coping strategies and
some even reported paying for two connections. This, along with the committee’s stringent
policy of fines and disconnection for nonpayment, ensured high cost recovery and allowed
them to begin repaying the loan. Table 2 presents a comparison of coproduction of water
supply in the three cities.

The CMWSS and coproduction of water supply

‘‘Stretching’’ versus ‘‘deepening’’ role of the CWASC
In all three cases, the local government clearly favored cost recovery over social goals. This is
not surprising since most households in the project settlements were not paying for municipal
water prior to the project. Urban water utilities are prone to problems of overstaffing,
underpricing, and high levels of unaccounted for water. They do not have the requisite
capital to invest in expansion and improvement of the network and are unable to cover
O&M costs out of revenues from tariffs (McKenzie and Ray, 2009). Cost recovery,
therefore, presented a crucial incentive. The same cannot be said for the CWASCs
responsible for recovering costs from households to repay their loans, which affected their
relations with local government. In Gwalior, the municipal corporation dominated decision-
making and expected the CWASC to acquiesce, whereas in Jabalpur, the municipal
corporation supported the CWASC, but it seldom interacted directly with them. The
complementary contributions of the actors involved were not fully exploited as local
governments were hesitant to let go of their privileged status as technocrats and grant
legitimacy to community inputs. They appeared preoccupied in their pursuit of economic
growth as higher levels of government mounted pressure on them. Responsibilities were
simply transferred to the CWASCs and intermediaries with minimal changes to their
functioning, highlighting the frailty of the partnership. This is not uncommon since the
state’s role of facilitator has remained largely rhetorical and there are discrepancies in how
community participation is interpreted by different partners (Baruah, 2007; Dutta, 2002).
Table 1 presents results from the survey, which indicates that households in Gwalior might
not have been prepared for the partnership. For instance, 92% of those surveyed in Gwalior
reported that they believe the local government is responsible for resolving problems related
to water and sanitation as compared with only 13% in Indore. Similarly, 93% reported that
they complain to the local government agency about their water supply problems and only
21% reported trusting government officials as compared with 5% and 71%, respectively, in
Indore. Rather than being treated as a partner, the CWASCs in Gwalior and Jabalpur were
viewed as an extension of the municipal staff reiterating what Krishna (2003: 367) has called
the ‘‘stretching role’’ of CBOs. In contrast, the CWASC in Indore played more of a
‘‘deepening role.’’ They deployed a ‘‘precedent setting’’ strategy (Appadurai, 2001) to
establish their credibility and legitimize their potential to have control over state resources
by demonstrating their capacity to manage the project and recover costs, shifting the burden
for municipal officials and incentivizing them to be more responsive. The local government
felt they were able to ‘‘rely’’ on the CWASC to help them fulfill their responsibilities.
1366 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

The sustained interfaces between them through the DUDA officer produced a synergistic
relationship and the committee grew comfortable demanding additional services.12 The
willingness of the government to support the partnership also meant that it could be held
accountable. This helped mobilize communities around issues important to them since
they could direct their demands at the government. The negotiations between them
accommodated conflicts and created new associational incentives that allowed for a more
dynamic process of institutional learning (Heller, 2001: 158). It is important to note, however,
that the project settlements in Indore had a relatively higher socioeconomic status than those
in the other two cities, which could have facilitated cost recovery, drawing the government’s
attention (Table 1). Contrary to this, the CWASCs in Gwalior and Jabalpur, where
socioeconomic status was lower, faced huge opportunity costs and could not sustain their
initial motivation. The local governments in these two cases remained distant and
unresponsive and the partnerships were reduced to an exercise in cost recovery with little
attention to building the partners’ capacity as envisioned in the project design. Consequently,
the relations remained unchanged in Jabalpur, whereas in Gwalior, they became more
tenuous as both partners began to feel the pressure to participate. This became evident
when the sewerage projects were implemented following water supply (Das, 2015).

Intermediary location, resources, and influence

Eliminating the formal role of intermediary organizations was meant to build the capacity of
local governments to work with low-income communities; yet, both partners continued to
rely on intermediaries informally indicating a lack of readiness to embrace this new
configuration. Local governments recognized their own lack of capacity to manage the
complexities of social relations. It is interesting to note, however, that in Indore, where
DUDA had replaced the municipal corporation in the partnership, there was much more
interaction between the partners. This could be because DUDA has in-house community
officers whereas municipal corporations typically recruit local NGO representatives,
sometimes on an ad hoc basis. Despite playing similar roles (mobilizing and imparting
skills and training), differences in the location, access to resources, and influence of the
intermediary appeared to have influenced outcomes. The DUDA community officer had
access to government resources, flexibility in decision-making, and motivation. The
presence of the officer and supporting staff relieved pressure on the partners by facilitating
regular interactions. The link to larger decision-making structures gradually became a
conduit for the flow of services. The CWASC formed a strategic alliance with the DUDA
community officer and focused on building a relationship with the government. Contrary to
this, in the other two cases, the intermediaries lacked access to resources and institutional
support, and the only thread tying them to the project was their motivation. They were,
therefore, limited in their capacity to strengthen linkages with the government and their
involvement remained project-focused. For instance, in Jabalpur, the social worker was able
to build the CWASC’s skills in managing the project whereas, in Gwalior, the absence of a
permanent intermediary meant that community-level dynamics tended to overwhelm
participatory processes.
The discussion above highlights that although coproduction posits that the
complementarities of the partners strengthens the likelihood of positive outcomes, the
partners are often constrained by the environments within which they are embedded and
expected to function. Local governments are faced with pressures of decentralization. In
many cases, decentralization is piecemeal, which leaves them strapped for revenue. This
solidifies their incentive for cost recovery. Similarly, low-income communities are
Das 1367

constrained by their socioeconomic and sociocultural status and the associated opportunity
costs of participation. Disincentives, therefore, create tension and tend to pull the partners
away from the collaborative space. In such cases, intermediaries with influence and access to
resources could enhance the relations by relieving some of the pressures of coproducing
services.

Conclusion
New configurations of urban water governance that call for the inclusion of non-state actors
have sharpened the focus on community-managed water supply projects and they are
emblematic in cities across the global South. Anchored on the premise of cost recovery,
such projects seek to build the capacities of local government and low-income communities
by institutionalizing their partnership. In this article, I investigated how coproduction of
water supply unfolds on the ground and (re)shapes relations between them and what this
means for urban service delivery. Drawing on evidence from case studies in Madhya
Pradesh, India, I argued that coproduction, which seeks to democratize local governance
through participation and institutional strengthening, could recast relations between local
government and low-income communities. The emergent relationship could potentially help
CBOs negotiate support for more than just improved services when motivations coalesce. It
may still fall short, however, in moving socially progressive goals center stage where cost
recovery takes precedence. The rationale for the absence of institutional space for
intermediaries in the CMWSS was to strengthen state-community collaboration; yet,
intermediaries continued to function informally and influenced outcomes raising questions
about the readiness of partners to work collaboratively.
Contextual- and project-related factors played an important role in each of the cases and
generalizations from them can only be considered exploratory. Nevertheless, the findings
yield useful insights for water governance in India and the global South, more broadly. First,
when motivations for coproduction (for instance, material benefits of basic services, access to
larger decision-making structures, and enhanced self-worth for the community and cost
recovery for local government) align, it can catalyze change through the efforts of strong
community-based partners that seek to have control over state resources. Access to water
supply is not so much about public versus private ownership but about the leverage that
marginalized groups have on actors within larger decision-making structures (Bakker, 2010).
CBOs, however, are often susceptible to local sociopolitical complexities that can result in
undemocratic decision-making, which necessitates a more engaged local government. This is
difficult to guarantee given the pressures of decentralization. For instance, cost recovery
appears to be a key motivation for local governments who are found to be more
responsive to communities that are able to pay for water. When coproduction is reduced
to an exercise in cost recovery to promote financial sustainability, resource constrained
communities can end up being marginalized, undermining the benefits of decentralization.
Rather than democratizing local governance, the goals of the project converge around
promoting the market, giving more voice to those who align themselves with it and
excluding others in the process (Jaglin, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005). Second, when
coproduction is superimposed on low-income communities that have strained relations
with the state, it can end up fueling the tension between them, smothering motivations
and enervating the relationship. Eliminating the role of an intermediary in such cases
might not serve its purpose. The Indore case, for instance, reinforces the importance of
having community officers with influence and access to resources to effect change at a
broader level and move beyond project prescription. As Bovaird (2007) suggests, having a
 1368

Table 2. Comparing coproduction of water supply in Gwalior, Indore, and Jabalpur, India.

Gwalior Indore Jabalpur

Motivations CWASC CWASC CWASC

Material benefits; financial
compensation
Local government
Cost recovery
Disincentives CWASC
Weak capacity and lack of experience;
low socioeconomic status; high
opportunity costs of participation;
lack of leadership and fractured
relations among members; existing
relations with local government
Local government
Lack of capacity to address
complexities of social relations; prior
experience with such projects;
pressures of decentralization
Material benefits; financial compensation;
self-worth; link to higher decision
making structures; prior experience
with collective action; women’s
participation; willingness and capacity
to recover costs
Local government/DUDA
Cost recovery
CWASC
Socioeconomic status; opportunity
costs of participation; existing
relations with local government
Local government/DUDA
Lack of capacity to address
complexities of social relations; prior
experience with such projects;
pressures of decentralization
Material benefits; financial
compensation
Local government
Cost recovery
CWASC
Weak capacity and lack of experience;
low socioeconomic status; high
opportunity costs of participation;
lack of leadership; existing relations
with local government
Local government
Lack of capacity to address
complexities of social relations; no
prior experience; pressures of
decentralization
(continued)
Environment and Planning A 48(7)
 Das

Table 2. Continued.

Gwalior Indore Jabalpur

Governance No intermediary; CWASC responsible
mechanisms for mobilizing communities
Strategies deployed Stretching role (Krishna, 2003); aligning
with markets (Jaglin, 2002;
Swyngedouw, 2005)
Findings Motivations of actors not aligned;
relations enervated; some
improvement in water supply;
CWASC struggling without
intermediary
DUDA community officer helped
CWASC mobilize communities
Deepening role (Krishna, 2003);
‘‘precedent setting’’ to have control
over state resources (Appadurai,
2001); aligning with markets (Jaglin,
2002; Swyngedouw, 2005)
Motivations of actors coalesced;
relations invigorated; conduit to
services in addition to water supply;
CWASC and local government
enthusiastic about community
management
Social worker/benefactor helped
CWASC mobilize community
Stretching role (Krishna, 2003); aligning
with markets (Jaglin, 2002;
Swyngedouw, 2005)
Motivations of actors not well aligned;
relations unchanged; some
improvement in water supply;
CWASC dependent on intermediary

CWASC: Community Water and Sanitation Committee; DUDA: District Urban Development Agency.
1369
1370 Environment and Planning A 48(7)

‘‘coproduction development officer. . .who can act internally in organizations (and

partnerships) to broker new roles for coproduction between traditional service
professionals, service managers, and the political decision makers who shape the strategic
direction of the service system’’ (858) can be productive. Moreover, the ‘‘will to federate’’ or
seek collaboration and exchanges among poor communities themselves can encourage
expansion onto a broader canvas seeking collective ways to solve shared problems
(Appadurai, 2001: 42) and help re-center social goals.
State-community collaboration seeks to locate resource users more centrally in the
decision-making process while providing institutional scaffolding, which can aid efforts on
a wider scale. However, not all local governments and low-income communities may be
ready for it. Wider political-economic transformations such as decentralization play their
part in shaping such efforts. For instance, smaller municipalities that function in a context of
fiscal constraint and technocratic dominance owing to piecemeal decentralization can often
end up marginalizing community-based initiatives. At the same time, low-income
communities with weak capacities are found to flounder. The presence of intermediaries
could be crucial in such cases to help tilt the balance in favor of socially progressive
goals. Coproduction influences relations among associated actors and they are constantly
being rearticulated as motivations (linked to shifts in the broader context) change at different
stages of the relationship. Consequently, the reach of coproduction could be limited to
enhancing service delivery or move beyond that to initiating and sustaining democratic
practices.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editor for their comments. I would also
like to extend my gratitude to the enumerators and participants in Gwalior, Indore, Jabalpur, and
Bhopal, India, for their invaluable contributions to the study.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Notes
1. In this article, I use the term ‘‘intermediaries’’ broadly to describe diverse actors—individuals,
organizations, institutions, and even networks based on a review of the literature on the use of the
concept across different disciplines by Medd and Marvin (2008).
2. In 1991, the economic liberalization of India began to erode the developmental state and pave the
way for marketization. Scholars have emphasized how this resulted in widening the already
existing chasm between the rich and poor (see Benjamin, 2000; Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2008).
3. Closing the financing gap will entail a combination of tariffs, taxes, and transfers, and mobilizing
repayable finance in addition to reducing costs (OECD, 2009).
4. ’’Coproduction is the provision of services through regular, long-term relationships between
professionalized service providers (in any sector) and service users or other members of the
Das 1371

community, where all parties make substantial resource contributions’’ (Bovaird, 2007: 847). Also
see Ostrom (1996) and Joshi and Moore (2004) for definitions of coproduction.
5. Notified slums refer to slums that have received notification from the concerned local government
agency making them eligible for basic services such as water and sanitation.
6. Below Poverty Line (BPL) is a poverty threshold that is used in India. The Planning Commission
recently revised the threshold to Rs. 858.60 monthly or Rs. 28.35 daily for urban areas and Rs.
672.80 monthly or Rs. 22.42 monthly for rural areas. Households that qualify as BPL households
are eligible to receive government assistance through various programs. See Now, Planning
Commission lowers the poverty line. (n.d.). The Hindu. Retrieved October 8, 2012, from http://
www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-planning-commission-lowers-the-poverty-line/
article3013870.ece
7. The Indore Municipal Corporation implemented one of India’s largest slum upgrading projects
(1990–1997) funded by the British government’s Department for International Development
(DFID). The project sought to provide basic infrastructure to 400,000 slum dwellers living in
183 slums across the city (Verma, 2000). Despite the accolades, however, its outcomes fell short
as outlined in the impact assessment study and it ultimately left residents cynical and they lost faith
in the government.
8. Households owed the government as much as Rs. 10,000 (personal communication with residents
and key informants in Ramaji ka Pura, Gwalior).
9. The goal of the project called the Dada Baburao Paranjape Smriti Water Connection Yojana was to
provide household connections to those living below the poverty line by subsidizing connection
charges and user charges. The project was recognized at the National Urban Water Award in 2010.
See http://www.waterawards.in/2010-winner-profile-jmc.php
10. A key reason for not participating was its past experience with slum upgrading (see Verma, 2000)
(Interviews, July 2007).
11. The DUDA facilitates the disbursement of funds from the state to the district or city level and
monitors funding allocations.
12. Members of the user committee pointed out road improvements and expressed interest in
mobilizing the communities in support of drainage facilities (Interviews, June 2011).

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