Hot Pursuit Cases

[ G.R. No. 242889.
March 14, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LENG HAIYUN, DANG HUIYIN, LIU
WEN XION A.K.A. "LUI XIN," AND LEI GUANG FENG, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J., J.:
To come within the purview of a "hot pursuit" arrest, a police officer's personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
offense must be judged based on a confluence of circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create probable cause.
In this case, several circumstances, namely, the police officer's reasonable suspicion,
coupled with the immediacy of their investigation, the presence of the police officers at the
gasoline station that caused accused-appellants to flee, and their chase of accused-
appellants' vehicle and subsequent interception at the checkpoint of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), sufficiently support the existence of probable cause to justify the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellants.
This resolves an appeal1 of the Decision2 dated February 20, 2017 and the
Resolution3 dated December 12, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 07690, which affirmed the Joint Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
14, Laoag City dated July 30, 2015 in Criminal Case Nos. 2131-19, 2132-19 and 2133-19. The
RTC found accused-appellants Leng Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui Xin" and
Lei Guang Feng (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of
Section 3, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, and Section 1, COMELEC Resolution No.
9561-A, in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166,5 and Sections 261(q) and
264 of Batasang Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines.
Leng Haiyun, et al.'s conviction by the RTC and CA stemmed from three separate
Amended Informations6 quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2131-19
That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin, province

of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in their possession, control and custody eight (8) live hand grenade PRB
423; one magnet plate; four (4) explosives main charge; four (4) packs of
alleged explosives; one sim card; one Initiator/Power Supply; without first
securing the necessary license or authority to possess the same from the
appropriate government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

have in their possession, control and custody three (3) MKE MP5KA4 with
Serial Numbers TO624-OBY00096; TO624-O9Y00129 & TO624-10D00197;
one 1 cal. 45 Commando; M1911-A1CS (Citadel); one caliber 45 M1911-A1CS
with silencer (no markings); one 1 9mm glock 17 with Serial Number
AADW113; one 1 9mm Seretta, no serial number; one 1 walther P99 cal. 40
with serial number 405435; seven (7) magazines for MPS (30 rds); two (2)
short magazines for glock 17 (17 rounds); two 2 magazines for walther P99,
cal. 40; sixty eight (68) ammunitions for cal. 45; twenty (20) ammunitions for
cal. 40; one hundred one (101) ammunitions for cal 9mm; one 1 silencer for
unknown caliber; without first securing the necessary license or authority to
possess the same from the appropriate government agency.1a⍵⍴h!1
CONTRARY TO LAW.

carry in a public place and outside of their residence during the election
period three (3) MKE MP5KA4 with Serial Numbers TO624-OBY00096;
TO624-O9Y00129 & TO624-10D00197; one 1 cal. 45 Commando; M1911-
A1CS (citadel); one 1 cal. 45 M1911-A1CS with silencer (no markings);
one 1 9mm glock 17 with Serial Number AADW113; one 1 9mm Seretta, no
serial number; one 1 walther P99 cal. 40 with serial number 405435; seven
(7) magazines for MP5 (30 rds); two (2) short magazines for glock 17 (17 rds);
two (2) magazines for glock 17 (30 rds); three (3) magazines for cal. 45 (7
shooters) two (2) magazine for Beretta, 9mm; two (2) magazines for walther
99, cal. 40; sixty eight (68) ammunitions for cal. 45; twenty (20) ammunitions
for cal. 40; one hundred one (101) ammunitions for cal. 9mm; three (3)
silencer for MP5; one (1) silencer for beretta, 9mm; one 1 silencer for
unknown caliber; eight (8) live hand grenade PRB 423; one magnet plate;
four (4) explosives main charge; four (4) packs of alleged explosives;
one 1 sim card; one 1 Initiator/Power Supply; without first securing the
written authority or permit from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Leng Haiyun et al. pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.7 After
termination of the pre-trial, trial on merits ensued.
The Antecedents
On May 28, 2013, at around 6:30 in the evening, Michael Claveria (Claveria), a gasoline
boy on duty at the North Metro Oil Gasoline Station at Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, noticed a
silver gray Toyota Previa parked at the southern portion of the gasoline station. Around 30
minutes later, Claveria saw someone alight from the Toyota Previa and break two bottles at
the driver's side.8 Thereafter, Claveria proceeded to the police station to report the
incident.9 In their patrol car, the police officers followed Claveria back to the gasoline
station.10 Upon arrival at the gasoline station, the police officers spotted the Toyota Previa,
but Leng Haiyun et al. noticed the police officers' presence.11 As a result, Leng Haiyun, et al.
fled toward the north direction,12 and the police officers gave chase.13 In turn, Police
Inspector Joseph Tayaban (PI Tayaban) contacted the police officers at the COMELEC
checkpoint in Barangay Davila, Pasuquin, and requested them to intercept the Toyota
Previa.14 When the vehicle stopped at the COMELEC checkpoint, the police officers alighted
from the patrol car. PI Tayaban and Police Senior Inspector Joseph Baltazar (PSI Baltazar)
approached the driver's side of the Toyota Previa and signaled the driver to lower the tinted
window.15 Upon the driver's compliance, PI Tayaban saw four foreigners later identified as
Leng Haiyun, et al. PI Tayaban also saw around six pieces of plate numbers scattered on the
floor behind the driver. When asked, Leng Haiyun, et al. failed to show their passports or
other documents pertaining to their entry and stay in the country.16
Thereafter, the driver of the Toyota Previa handed a mobile phone to PI Tayaban. On
the other end of the line was a female who identified herself as "Candy." She asked PI
Tayaban what the transgression of those aboard the Toyota Previa was. PI Tayaban
answered that it was just for a light offense – they caused alarm at the gasoline station
when they broke bottles. When Candy asked PI Tayaban to release the foreigners, PI
Tayaban insisted that Candy should instruct them to go with the police officers, as only a
light offense was involved. The occupants of the Toyota Previa complied, and they followed
the patrol car. While approaching the police station, PI Tayaban stepped out of the patrol
car and boarded the Toyota Previa to prevent the escape of Leng Haiyun, et al.17
Upon reaching the police station, PI Tayaban instructed Leng Haiyun, et al. to alight from
the vehicle. While they were alighting, PI Tayaban and other people saw, in plain view,
several butts and barrels of different firearms under the chair of the second row of the car.
Thereafter, the police officers cordoned the area and handcuffed Leng Haiyun, et al. Upon
PSI Baltazar's request, personnel of the Provincial Police Office headed by Police
Superintendent Jerico Baldeo (PS Baldeo) and Police Chief Inspector Jay De Guzman (PCI De
Guzman) arrived.18
Thereafter, PCI De Guzman began the search and in the presence of Leng Haiyun, et al.,
barangay officials, and members of the media, and with the assistance of Pasuquin police
officers, Police Officer 2 Ruel Llamelo (PO2 Llamelo) and Police Officer 3 Lumiowel
Bulosan (PO3 Bulosan), opened the sliding door of the right side of the vehicle.19
PCI De Guzman saw an MP5 submachinegun on the floor of the vehicle and found
several other firearms, pieces of explosives, and plate numbers on the floor of the second
and third rows of the Toyota Previa. PCI De Guzman handed them to PO2 Llamelo, who
listed each item. PO3 Bulosan, in turn, marked each item.20
For their part, Leng Haiyun, et al. denied the allegations against them. They averred that
no firearms and explosives were found inside the Toyota Previa. They maintained that they
saw the subject firearms and explosives for the first time on top of a table outside the police
station. They also belied the police officers' claim that several plate numbers were found
scattered on the floor of the Toyota Previa.21
After trial, the RTC convicted Leng Haiyun, et al. for illegal possession of explosives and
violation of the election gun ban but dismissed the case for illegal possession of firearms.
The dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 30, 2015 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 2131-19, the accused Leng

Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui Xin", and Lei
Guang Feng are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of explosives penalized under Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act
No. 9516 and are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 2133-19, the accused Leng

Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui Xin", and Lei
Guang Feng are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the election offense of violation of Section 261 (q) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution
No. 9561-A and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from two years as minimum
to five years as maximum;
(3) Crim. Case No. 2132-19 is hereby DISMISSED pursuant

to Agote v. Lorenzo and Madrigal v. People.
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other

contraband recovered from the accused are hereby
FORFEITED and CONFISCATED in favor of the Government.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the warrantless arrest of Leng Haiyun, et al. and the subsequent
search of the subject vehicle are valid. It held that the warrantless arrest effected by the
police officers was justified under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. As a consequence of the arrest,
the police officers were authorized to search the vehicle where the firearms were seen.
Further, even assuming that the police officers should be deemed to have already effected
an arrest when they asked Leng Haiyun, et al. to proceed from the checkpoint to the
Pasuquin police station, there was a justification for such warrantless arrest. Leng Haiyun, et
al. were committing a crime in the presence of the police officers because the presence of
several plate numbers inside the Toyota Previa is a violation of Section 18 of the Land
Transportation Code.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Leng Haiyun, et al. in its Decision dated
February 20, 2017, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May 27,
2015 of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA held that contrary to the claims of Leng Haiyun, et al., the report of the gasoline
boy was not the sole basis for their warrantless arrest. The warrantless arrest was made
pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Given that the arrest was valid,
the police officers were therefore authorized to search the entire vehicle where the firearms
were seen. Verily, since the warrantless search was legally conducted, all the pieces of
evidence obtained as a result of such search were admissible in evidence and sufficient to
prove Leng Haiyun, et al.'s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.24
Hence, the instant appeal.
In the Resolution25 dated February 13, 2019, this Court notified both parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs. On May 14, 2019, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation26 stating that it no longer intends to file a supplemental brief
as its Appellee's Brief27 sufficiently contained a summation of the facts of the case, the
issues to be resolved, the arguments in support of its position, the relief sought and the
authorities to support its arguments. On October 29, 2019, accused-appellants filed a
Manifestation28 stating that they intend to file their supplemental brief. On February 4,
2020, accused-appellants filed their supplemental brief,29 while on February 21, 2020, they
filed an addendum to their supplemental brief.30
The Issue
The essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid warrantless arrest,
and search, and seizure conducted by the police officers.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Accused-appellants first contend that they cannot be convicted of the offenses of illegal
possession of explosives and violation of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9561-A, because such will violate their right against
double jeopardy; and, second, the prosecution failed to prove animus possidendi.
We disagree.
There is no double
jeopardy and the
prosecution has proven
accused-appellants'
animus possidendi
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9516, amending P.D. No. 1866, provides:
SECTION 3-D. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. - Subject

to the provisions of the Rules of Court on double jeopardy, if the application
thereof is more favorable to the accused, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case for violation of this Decree shall be a bar
to another prosecution of the same accused for any offense where the
violation of this Decree was a necessary means for committing the offense or
in furtherance of which, incident to which, in connection with which, by
reason of which, or on occasion of which, the violation of this Decree was
committed, and vice versa.
Accused-appellants insist that under this provision, they can no longer be convicted of
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives since the possession of such
contraband is a necessary means of committing the offense of violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9561-A.31
Their interpretation is skewed. The foregoing provision presupposes that there is a

conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case for violation of P.D. No.
1866 as amended by R.A. No. 9516. The prior conviction or acquittal, therefore, must be for
illegal possession of firearms and explosives, which shall bar the prosecution for another
offense. Even assuming that accused-appellants asked for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
2133-19 charging them for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9651-A, this Court does not
see how the offense of illegal possession of explosives was a necessary means of
committing the COMELEC gun ban violation. The charge under Criminal Case No. 2133-19
was for violation of the COMELEC gun ban, which accused-appellants could be convicted of,
as in fact they were, by their mere illegal possession of firearms during a gun ban.
Needless to say, the charge under Criminal Case No. 2131-19 was for illegal possession
of explosives under Section 3-A of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516. It would
appear, however, that the argument of accused-appellants is anchored on Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, where the law expressly states that the accused
cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms if the person arrested has
committed another crime. As the offenses differ, and taking off from Agote v. Hon.
Lorenzo,32 it is only the charge for illegal possession of firearms filed against accused-
appellants that was dismissed by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2132-19.
Accused-appellants likewise maintain their lack of animus possidendi. They claim that
the prosecution failed to prove that they were aware of the firearms and ammunitions
inside the vehicle, considering that their use thereof was limited to 10-20 minutes
only.33 True, animus possidendi "is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which
largely depends on the attendant events in each case."34 In determining the presence
of animus possidendi, this Court is guided by the "prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances."35 "What exists in the realm of thought is
often disclosed in the range of action."36
In this case, when the accused-appellants spotted the police officers' vehicle, "they rode
up and fled towards the north direction."37 This suspicious actuation only reveals that
accused-appellants had a reason to be on edge. Besides, this Court can hardly believe that
accused-appellants were oblivious to the presence of the firearms and ammunitions inside
the Toyota Previa. Indeed, the police officers did not just seize one or two firearms. They
seized several high-powered firearms, three loaded submachineguns, over 100
ammunitions, five silencers, eight hand grenades, and a bomb.38 In fact, the police officers
immediately noticed the existence of the butts and barrels of several firearms as soon as
one of the accused-appellants slid open the vehicle's door and alighted
therefrom.39 Remaining ignorant about the presence of the dangerous weapons, especially
considering their visibility, is contrary to logic and reason. To be sure, accused-appellants'
act of entering a car loaded with deadly weapons and contraband for "touring
purposes"40 smacks of concoction rather than a narration of the truth.
There was a valid

warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court
Accused-appellants vehemently assert that the root cause of the search of the vehicle
and the arrest was the report of the gasoline boy that one of the accused-appellants was
breaking bottles and causing a commotion.41 They posit that breaking bottles is not per se a
crime, since the same may be done negligently.42 Accused-appellants also controvert the
CA's finding that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest43 because there
was no valid warrantless arrest in the first place.44
While this Court agrees with the CA's Decision over the validity of the warrantless arrest,
certain factual circumstances lead Us to depart from its reasoning.
Contrary to the CA's ruling, the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview
of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, but of Section 5 (b).
Section 5, Rule 113 provides:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.45
Also known as "hot pursuit" arrest, Section 5 (b) requires the following to be valid: "(1)
the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it."46
In Abelita III v. P/Supt. Doria,47 this Court found that there was a valid warrantless
arrest under the foregoing provision. There, P/Supt. Doria received a report about an
alleged shooting incident. He thereafter instructed SPO3 Ramirez to investigate. SPO3
Ramirez reported that the accused therein, who was also implicated, just left the place of
the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for the accused and when he found the latter, P/Supt.
Doria informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested the accused to go with
him to the police headquarters, but the accused suddenly sped up his vehicle and
proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and other police officers chased the accused and
accordingly arrested him. This Court ruled that the police officers' investigation of the
incident report and the petitioner's act of trying to get away were "enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause."48 Thus:
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which

means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report
about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report
and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident.
They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police
headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which
they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of
the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.49
In the present case, an offense had just been committed and the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellants have committed it. It must
be remembered that Claveria, a gasoline boy, saw one of the accused-appellants alight from
the Toyota Previa and break two bottles at the driver's side. While accused-appellants argue
that "the complaint of breakage of bottles from the gasoline boy is not in itself a crime,"50 it
cannot be denied that such act alarmed the personnel of the gasoline station. When
accused-appellant Liu Wen Xion took the witness stand, he admitted the bottle-breaking
incident, thus:
Q Now, Mr. witness when one of the police officers in the person of Police
Inspector Tayaban testified last September 16, 2013 he said the following
that they went to the gasoline station because there was a report made
regarding this bottle breaking incident perpetrated or authored by one of
the occupants of a Toyota Previa, are you aware of that bottle incident, Mr.
witness?
A At the time we were are at the gasoline station it is only our vehicle that was
parked there. About the throwing of bottle it is my friend who threw out a
bottle of a drink that he consumed, sir.
Q What drink is that, Mr. witness if you recall?
A A Red Bull, after drinking he just absent mindlessly threw out, sir.51
At that point, the act of the friend of Liu Wen Xion may be classified as unjust
vexation, a crime "broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person."52 The distress felt by the
gasoline personnel was precisely the reason why they reported accused-
appellants' acts to the police station.
From that moment on, the police officers lost no time in investigating the incident. Upon
receipt of the report, their chief of police, PSI Baltazar, formed a team, together with three
others and PI Tayaban, and immediately responded to the place of the reported
incident.53 Upon arrival, the police officers spotted the vehicle, but accused-appellants
noticed their presence, causing the latter to ride up and flee toward the north
direction.54 The police officers immediately chased them and contacted Davila's Public
Safety Company, who were conducting a COMELEC checkpoint, to intercept the fleeing
vehicle.55 All these circumstances, taken together, point to no other conclusion than that
the police officers had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
While the accused-appellants impress upon this Court that there "was no testimony by
the police authorities that indeed they saw the broken bottles,"56 Abelita III57 is an
authority for the rule that the arresting officers need not have personally witnessed the
commission of the offense "with their own eyes."58 To this Court's mind, PI Tayaban's
reasonable suspicion, coupled with numerous circumstances, such as the immediacy of the
police officers' investigation, their presence at the gasoline station that caused accused-
appellants to flee, and their chase of accused-appellants' vehicle and subsequent
interception at the COMELEC checkpoint, sufficiently support the existence of probable
cause to justify accused-appellants' warrantless arrest.
In fact, the police officers' reasonable suspicion about the existence of probable cause
was further raised when PI Tayaban saw six plate numbers scattered on the vehicle's floor
behind the driver's seat59 and accused-appellants' lack of any means of identification or
even official travel documents.60 Curiously, accused-appellants allege that the Toyota
Previa was only being used "to tour around the province,"61 yet they could not even
present their passports to the police officers, if only to accord such allegation with a
semblance of legitimacy. In truth, PI Tayaban was able to verify from the Bureau of
Immigration that accused-appellants "passed through the back door"62 and had no papers
to show the legality of their entry into the country.
More importantly, owing to PI Tayaban's apprehension that accused-appellants might

escape, he disembarked from their mobile patrol and transferred to the Toyota Previa to
ensure that accused-appellants would reach the precinct.63 In sum, what is important is
that PI Tayaban had knowledge of facts that he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, pointing to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
True, when PI Tayaban invited accused-appellants to the precinct and they

acceded,64 they were already under arrest. Yet, pursuant to the foregoing discussion, this
Court is satisfied that the police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest under Section
5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The police officers seized

the contraband in "plain
view" and as an incident
to a lawful arrest
Accused-appellants argue that the warrantless search and seizure are illegal since the
warrantless arrest was unlawful at the inception.65 Accordingly, the evidence yielded are
inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the poisonous tree.66
We disagree.1âшphi1
We find that the police officers' seizure of the evidence was in "plain view." The general
rule presupposes a valid search warrant before a law enforcer can validly search or seize a
person's house, papers, or effects. There are, however, eight instances of a valid search and
seizure despite the absence of a search Wai.Tant, thus:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.67
The plain view doctrine authorizes the seizure and presentation as evidence of objects
that fall in the "plain view" of an officer "who has a right to be in the position to have that
view."68 For the successful invocation of the doctrine, the prosecution must satisfy the
following requirements: "(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which [they] can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item [they observe] may be evidence of a crime,
contraband[,] or otherwise subject to seizure."69
Here, all the foregoing requirements are present. PI Tayaban had a prior justification for
the intrusion because accused-appellants were legally arrested in accordance with Section 5
(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. They already arrived at the precinct and PI Tayaban
merely asked them to alight from the vehicle.70 It was when accused-appellants were in the
process of disembarking from the vehicle that PI Tayaban and the other police officers "saw
in plain view several butts and barrels of different firearms."71 PI Tayaban testified:
Q And after that what happened?
A So I alighted from that vehicle and instructed them to also alight from that
vehicle, ma'am.
Q Who were present when you alighted the vehicle?
A There were already media personalities at that time, ma'am. ABS-CBN, the TV
broadcaster and while they were disembarking at that vehicle, ma’am we
saw in plain view several butts and barrels of different firearms, ma’am.
Q Where did you see those butts and barrels of firearms?
A Under the chair of that second layer of the car, ma'am.
Q Could you describe the door of the van?
A The van Toyota Previa is like a Revo style but the difference is just that the side
of that door is sliding. You can push that so that they can come out, ma'am.
So that's the thing, ma'am. They opened that door so very wide so that we
can view the inside of that vehicle, ma'am.
xxx
THE COURT
Q How were you able to see it, did you use flashlight or what? Or when it was
opened in the sense that the car would be automatically lighted?
A Upon opening the car it will light and at that time there's a light in front of
our station and exactly the place is lighted, your Honor.
Q So even without the aid of any flashlight you would be able to see what is
inside the van?
A Yes, your Honor.72
Certainly, PI Tayaban and the other police officers were strategically positioned in a such
that they could see the inside of the vehicle. Being in that lawful position and during such
lawful intrusion, PI Tayaban inadvertently discovered the butts and barrels of different
arms, which the police officers have undoubtedly observed as contraband. As a continuation
of the search conducted in "plain view" and in the course thereof, the police officers
likewise discovered explosives. PI Tayaban further testified:
Q So when you saw those butts and barrels of firearms inside the van which
were under the chair which you said a while ago, what did you do next?
A We immediately cordoned that area and contained also these four (4) male
persons and handcuffed them and I informed them of their constitutional
rights in the English language even though they are Chinese people and I
informed them that they have the right to remain silent and told them that
they can have a counsel preferably of their own choice and that if they
cannot afford the services of a counsel our government will provide them for
free.
xxx
Q So after you secured the vehicle containing the firearms what did you do next?
A Police Senior Inspector Baltazar, our Chief of Police summoned the Provincial
Office for assistance, ma'am and personnel from Provincial Police Office
(PPO) came.
Q Who in particular came?
A Headed by Police Superintendent Baldeo with Police Chief Inspector Jay de

Guzman, ma'am.
Q So do we understand from you that you waited for them before confiscating
or did anything with those firearms inside the van?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q So when they arrived what did they do, if any?

A Police Chief Inspector Jay de Guzman commenced the search of that vehicle,
ma'am, with the presence of the media people and the barangay officials
and the police officers around there, ma'am.
Q Do you know what are those confiscated items inside the van?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q What are those?
A There were eight (8) different types of firearms with three (3) submachine
guns and several ammunitions and also there were eight (8) hand grenade
explosives and one (1) improvised explosive device, a bomb, ma'am.73
In the same case of Abelita III,74 the police authorities, after catching up with the
petitioner, saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as the accused
opened the door. During their search, they also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's
seat. Since a shooting incident just happened and the petitioner was implicated, the police
officers seized the firearms under the plain view doctrine because the firearms may be
evidence of a crime. Thus, just like Abelita III, PI Tayaban and the police officers in this case
were justified in seizing the firearms and explosives.
In addition, the seizure made by PCI de Guzman of the firearms and explosives from
accused-appellants also qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rules
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested

may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
The foregoing is authorized because accused-appellants "may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence,
or which might furnish them with the means of escaping or committing violence."75 It is
well-settled that the police officers must have effected a lawful arrest before the search
because the "precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search."76
In Miclat, Jr. v. People,77 the petitioner therein was caught in the act of arranging heat-
sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of the police officer, who thereafter searched the
petitioner after the latter's valid warrantless arrest. This Court, in ruling that the seizure
made by the police officer was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but also fell within the
purview of the plain view doctrine, declared:
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the

heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The
seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner
was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview
of the "plain view" doctrine.
xxxx
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is

plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner's arrest is among the exceptions to
the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence
seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in
evidence to prove petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.78
Indeed, as a consequence of accused-appellants' arrest, the police officers were

authorized to search the Toyota Previa, "on the ground that a contemporaneous search of a
person arrested may be effected and may extend to areas that are within [their] custody
and immediate control."79 Needless to say, the Toyota Previa was within accused-
appellants' immediate control. More importantly, in establishing the primordial
requirement to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the prosecution has shown that
PO1 Tayaban arrested accused-appellants first prior to the search. This was brought about
by the bottle breaking incident at the gasoline station. Since accused-appellants were
already arrested pursuant to the police officers' probable cause that accused-appellants
committed an offense, the arrest can, in no way, be considered a mere pretext for the police
officers' conduct of the search.
Having established that accused-appellants' arrest falls among the instances for a valid
warrantless arrest and the evidence seized from accused-appellants was the result of a
search of evidence in "plain view" and as an incident to accused-appellants' lawful arrest,
the contraband seized were admissible in evidence to prove their guilt.
In a last-ditch attempt to secure their acquittal, accused-appellants stress that serious

doubts exist as to the existence of the firearms, ammunitions, and grenades inside the
vehicle.80 Suffice to state that PCI De Guzman categorically testified that he personally
conducted the search and positively identified the seized items.81 PO2 Llamelo likewise
testified that PCI De Guzman handed the seized items to him, and he listed them down in
the inventory sheet.82 PO2 Llamelo also painstakingly identified all the contraband seized in
the present case.83 While accused-appellants take issue regarding the bulletproof vests not
included in the inventory, PO2 Llamelo has explained that these vests were used to cover
the explosives inside the supply room.84 Moreover, We do not see how the conduct of the
search was illegal,85 as accused-appellants would have it.
Accused-appellants point out that Barangay Kagawad Armando Aguinaldo (Kagawad

Aguinaldo), one of the witnesses to the search, did not witness an actual search being done
because he merely witnessed the taking out of the firearms from the vehicle.86
We do not agree. Kagawad Aguinaldo testified that he was only a little behind PCI De
Guzman, or by his side.87 Upon opening the vehicle, Kagawad Aguinaldo even declared that
he "saw a gun."88 On cross-examination, Kagawad Aguinaldo admitted that his attention
was only focused on the items being brought out.89 For all intents and purposes, We find
that Kagawad Aguinaldo witnessed the search as he was able to view the inside of the
vehicle from where he was standing and observe the seized items as they were being taken
out.90 In effect, what accused-appellants were questioning is the fact that nobody else
aside from PCI De Guzman was admitted inside the vehicle. This is only natural, as the police
officers must protect the seized items from being contaminated by outside sources.
Finally, accused-appellants aver that there is no evidence to prove their presence during
the search.91 This allegation is belied by the testimony of PO2 Llamelo, who admitted
during cross-examination that accused appellants witnessed the search. Hence:
Q That's why because of your intention to protect these four (4) Chinese
nationals you ensure that they were inside the station all the while because
of the many people around, correct?
A They were just near us, sir, they witnessed the search.92
Accused-appellants boldly invoke this Court's compassion and sympathy by declaring

how they "are Chinese Nationals in a foreign land"93 and "sentenced to life in prison
effectively removing them from their families and homeland."94
Inasmuch as this Court sympathizes with their plight, their present circumstance is
something they could have thought about twice, thrice, and even many times over,
considering their equally bold and deliberate disrespect of Philippine immigration laws
when they employed extralegal means to enter the country.
Given the foregoing, there is no reason for this Court to reverse the RTC's ruling, which
the CA Decision affirmed.
Penalties
For Criminal Case No. 2131-19, We find the penalty imposed by the RTC proper. Section
395 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516, provides that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall willfully and unlawfully possess,
among others, any explosive or incendiary device, with knowledge of its existence and its
explosive or incendiary character.
We likewise find the penalty imposed by the RTC for Criminal Case No. 2133-19 proper.
Article 26496 of the Omnibus Election Code states that any person found guilty of any
election offense under the Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one
(1) year but not more than six (6) years. Thus, the RTC correctly meted an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from two years as minimum to five (5) years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

February 20, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
07690, which affirmed the July 30, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Laoag City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2131-19 and 2133-19, and its
Resolution dated December 12, 2017 are AFFIRMED. Thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 2131-19, the accused-appellants Leng Haiyun, Dang
Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Liu Xin," and Lei Guang Fang are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of explosives
penalized under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act No. 9516 and are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 2133-19, the accused-appellants Leng Haiyun, Dang
Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Liu Xin," and Lei Guang Feng are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense of violation
of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9561-A, and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years as minimum to five (5)
years as maximum; and
(3) Criminal Case No. 2132-19 is DISMISSED.
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other contraband recovered

from the accused are hereby FORFEITED and CONFISCATED in favor of the
Government.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019
FRANKLIN B. VAPOROSO AND JOELREN B. TULILIK, PETITIONERS, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Franklin B.
Vaporoso (Vaporoso) and Joelren B. Tulilik (Tulilik; collectively, petitioners) assailing the
Decision2 dated November 17, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated February 26, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01414-MIN which affirmed the Decision4 dated
December 14, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34
(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. CrC 430-2013 and CrC 431- 2013, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, 5 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations6 filed before the RTC charging
petitioners of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged
that at around 7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D.
Torculas (PO2 Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo
City, he noticed two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with
the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked
on the side of the road. When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped
away. At this point, the owner of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase (Dombase), approached PO2
Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her
belongings. This prompted PO2 Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark,
secluded area in Bangoy Street, prompting him to call for back-up.7 Shortly after, Police
Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1 Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived
and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area. 8
About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2
Torculas and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them.
Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to
apprehend them.9 After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from
petitioners,10 the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and
thereafter, brought them to the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers
conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with
similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in
the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inventory in the
presence of Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio
Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban. At around 10:15 in the morning of August
26, 2013, the seized items were turned over to the Provincial Crime Laboratory of Tagum
City, where, upon examination, tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.11 On December 18, 2013, the subject sachets
were delivered to the court.12
During arraignment, or on October 9, 2013, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the

charges.13 On September 10, 2015, trial was dispensed with as the parties agreed to simply
stipulate on the factual matters of the case.14 On September 16, 2015, they were directed to
submit their respective memorandum. 15
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision16 dated December 14, 2015, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, and accordingly,
sentenced each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen
(14) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, as maximum, and ordered each of them to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.17 Ultimately, it ruled that the subsequent search conducted at the
police station was a justifiable search incidental to a lawful arrest, considering that: (a)
petitioners were validly arrested and thereafter placed in custody; (b) their administrative
processing was not yet completed when they were searched at the police station; and (c) no
substantial time had elapsed between the initial search at the place of the arrest and the
subsequent search at the police station.18
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal19 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated November 17, 2017, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC that
the body search conducted on petitioners at the police station was a valid search incidental
to a lawful arrest.21 It held that under Rule 19 of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Handbook (PNPM-DO-DS-3-2-13), a search is permissible and intended to screen contraband
items or deadly weapons from suspects before placing them behind bars. 22 The CA also
noted that the police officers substantially complied with the chain of custody requirement,
which was categorically admitted by both parties in their stipulation of facts. On the other
hand, it ruled that petitioners neither presented any evidence to support their defenses of
denial and frame-up nor provided any explanation as to how they were able to possess the
said prohibited drugs.23
Undaunted, petitioners sought reconsideration,24 which was denied in a Resolution25 dated

February 26, 2018; hence, this petition.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.26
Guided by this parameter and as will be explained hereunder, the Court is of the view that
petitioners' conviction must be set aside.
I.
A judicial perusal of the records reveals that the arresting police officers conducted a total
of two (2) searches on petitioners, namely: (a) the body search after the police officers
apprehended them; and (b) a "more thorough" search conducted at the Panabo Police
Station where the seized drugs were allegedly recovered from them. In this regard,
petitioners insist that these were illegal searches, and thus, the items supposedly seized
therefrom are inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as representative of the people, maintains that the courts a quo correctly
ruled that the drugs seized from petitioners were products of a valid search incidental to a
lawful warrantless arrest.27
In view of the foregoing assertions, it behooves the Court to ascertain whether or not the
police officers lawfully arrested petitioners without a warrant, as the resolution thereof is
determinative of the validity of the consequent search made on them. This is because in
searches incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.28 At this point, the Court
notes that petitioners failed to question the legality of their arrest, and in fact, actively
participated in the trial of the case. As such, they are deemed to have waived any objections
involving the same.29 Nonetheless, it must be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a
waiver only as to any question concerning any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to
the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. In Sindac v.
People,30 the Court held:cralawred
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively
participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes
conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.31 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In this light, there is a need to determine whether or not the police officers conducted a
valid warrantless arrest on petitioners, notwithstanding the latter's waiver to question the
same.
II.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the general
parameters for effecting lawful warrantless arrests, to wit:cralawred
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:cralawred
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Based on the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.32
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.33 Verily,
under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must
be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and
resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered
inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. 34 In People
v. Manago,35 the Court held:cralawred
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no
time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered
as they were within a verv limited period of time. The same provision adds another
safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts
of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on
his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have
been taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners
to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately
thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his
assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her
belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight37 upon being flagged by a police officer,
coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide PO2
Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed
and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal
knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded
area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they
were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably
show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a
valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained
personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he. did not waver in his
continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested.38 From the
foregoing, the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit"
warrantless arrest on petitioners.
III.
Having ascertained that petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant pursuant to the
"hot pursuit" doctrine, the Court now examines the two (2) searches made on them,
namely: (a) the body search after the police officers apprehended them; and (b) a "more
thorough" search conducted at the Panabo Police Station where the seized drugs were
allegedly recovered from them, as to whether these may fall within the purview of a valid
search incidental to their lawful arrest.
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:cralawred
Section 13. Search incident to a lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect: (a) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully
arrested; and (b) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and
within the reach of the arrestee.39 In People v. Calantiao,40 the Court reiterated the
rationale of a search incidental to a lawful arrest to wit:cralawred
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can
be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On this note, case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of
and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be
made in a place other than the place of arrest."42
Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search
made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs
but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of
apprehension. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which
yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had
already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention
the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual
arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.
In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station
is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom
constitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.43
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 17, 2017 and the
Resolution dated February 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01414-MIN
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioners Franklin B. Vaporoso and
Joelren B. Tulilik are ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause their immediate release, unless they are being lawfully held
in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary
Carpio (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Caguioa, JJ., on official leave.

Lazaro-Javier, J., concur.
[ G.R. No. 247401. December 05, 2022 ]
ROMEO BACOD Y MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[2] dated January 14, 2019 and Resolution[3] dated May
14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals – First Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40093. In the
questioned Decision and Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Romeo
Bacod y Mercado (Bacod), finding that Branch 224, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC)
did not err in convicting Bacod for: (1) Illegal Possession of Firearms — violation of Section
28(a) in relation to Section 28(e-1) of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591; and (2) Illegal Possession
of Explosives — violation of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by RA 9516.
Factual Antecedents
Four consolidated Informations were filed with the RTC charging Bacod and another
accused, Remigio Umali y De Leon (Umali), with Robbery, violation of RA 10591, and
violation of PD 1866 as amended by RA 9516. Of the four Informations, three of them
implicate petitioner Bacod. The accusatory portions of the three Informations read:
Criminal Case Nos. R-QZN-15-03913-CR [Illegal Possession of Firearms]
That on or about the 20th day of April, 2015, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
without authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control One (1) Caliber .45 pistol (Remington) with
defaced Serial number inserted with one (1) magazine loaded with seven (7) pieces of live
ammunition, without the necessary license to possess, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case Nos. R-QZN-15-03915-CR [Illegal Possession of Explosives]
That on or about the 20th day of April, 2015 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) MK-2
Fragmentation Hand Granade (serviceable), without necessary license to possess, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case Nos. R-QZN-15-03916-CR [Highway Robbery]
That on or about the 20th day of April, 2015, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true name, identity and whereabouts
have not yet been ascertained and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and by
means of violence and/or intimidation against persons, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob and take away one (1) truck load of Champion Laundry
Bar/Powder soap more or less One Thousand Three Hundred And Twenty Eight (1,328)
boxes/sacks with estimate amount of Php1,200,000.00, Philippine Currency, along with
Isuzu Ten Wheeler Truck with Plate No. HVR-802 driven by one ERNESTO A. OITE, owned by,
and registered to, S&S Trucking/Roderick Ilagan, represented by Elmer R. Ramos, while the
said vehicle was traversing G. Araneta Avenue, this city, to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party, in the amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When Bacod and Umali were arraigned, both pleaded not guilty. During trial, the
prosecution's evidence, as summarized by Bacod in his Appellant's Brief and adopted by the
CA, established the following:
5. At around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 20 April 2015, driver ERNESTO A. OITE
(hereinafter "Ernesto") and his helper, MICHAEL P. ROSAS (hereinafter "Michael"), were
travelling along G. Aranet[a] Avenue, corner Palanza Street, in Barangay Santol, Quezon City,
aboard a ten (10) – wheeler truck carrying One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Eight
(1,328) boxes/sacks of laundry soap worth approximately One Million [T]wo Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00). Ernesto later noticed that a car and a van were tailing him
and trying to block his way. At first, Ernesto tried to shake off the pursuing vehicles, but
upon stopping at a red light the van was able to stop by his side of the truck while the car
blocked the truck's path in front. About five (5) men in police uniforms and with guns tucked
by their waists suddenly emerged from the van and the car, and then approached the truck.
The unknown men in police uniforms asked for the receipt covering the truck's cargo so
Ernesto alighted to comply. However, just as he was handing over the receipt, the strangers
grabbed him and tried to put him inside their van. Ernesto saw that Michael was similarly
being dragged away to the vehicle so they both wriggled out of their captors' clutches and
ran away.
5.1 Ernesto and Michael were soon able to board a tricycle, and with the help of the latter's
driver, were able to arrive at a police checkpoint along Guirayan Street, corner Aurora
Boulevard, in Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City by 11:15 o'clock of that same night. At the
checkpoint, Ernesto and Michael reported how their truck had just been held up and taken
away. In response, PO3 ROMMEL APANAY (hereinafter "PO3 Apanay"), PO3 EDEL
CAÑAVERAL (hereinafter "PO3 Cañaveral"), PO1 ZOILO NAZARIO (hereinafter "PO1
Nazario"), and PO1 TEODERICO SERRANO, JR. (hereinafter "PO1 Serrano, Jr."), who were
then manning the checkpoint, boarded their police mobile along with Ernesto and Michael
and then went after the stolen truck.
5.2 The police officers quickly sighted and then caught up with the truck just as it was
heading into Pureza Street. With the stolen vehicle's path effectively barricaded off by the
police car, the real policemen exited their mobile with guns drawn, took up firing positions
around the truck, and then ordered its occupants to come out of the truck — later identified
as accused Romeo M. Bacod — and was promptly arrested by PO3 Cañaveral and PO3
Apanay. PO1 Nazario frisked the suspect and found a .45-caliber Remington semi-automatic
pistol tucked in the latter's waist. At the same time, PO1 Serrano, Jr. ordered the suspect to
open the sling bag he was carrying. The suspect did so and there the police officers saw and
confiscated a hand grenade from the bag. Afterwards, the policemen brought their quarry
back to the police station where Ernesto identified the arrestee as one of the brigands.
Later, upon inspection of the pistol at the police station, the same was found to contain in
its magazine seven (7) live rounds of ammunition. From the locus of arrest up to the police
station, PO1 Nazario held custody of the gun, [ammunition], and hand grenade taken from
Romeo M. Bacod.
5.3 During that same pursuit and arrest, another roving team of police officers aboard other
mobiles arrived at the scene after being summoned via police radio to aid in the chase.
Thus, while PO3 WELSON CAÑA (hereinafter "PO3 Caña"), PO3 ROQUE GERALDEZ
(hereinafter "PO3 Geraldez"), PO3 Julie Ann Jo Cinco (hereinafter "PO3 Cinco"), PO2
ALEMAR FAJARDO (hereinafter "PO2 Fajardo"), PO2 JOVENNY SERRANO (hereinafter "PO2
Serrano"), PO1 NOEL SANCHEZ (hereinafter "PO1 Sanchez"), and PO1 MARCO ROGEL
COMBOYA (hereinafter "PO1 Comboya"), were scanning the nearby streets, they found a
car carrying one (1) man parked somewhere along Pureza Street. PO3 Geraldez and PO1
Comboya approached the car, shined a light through its windows, and inside they saw that
the passenger was wearing a police officer's athletic uniform. The passenger was ordered
out of the car, and after he alighted, Ernesto identified him as one of the robbers. The man,
later identified as accused Remigio D. Umali, was apprehended. Then, PO3 Caña proceeded
to bodily search Umali while PO3 Cinco searched the suspect's car. Tucked by the arrestee's
waist was found a .38-caliber revolver containing five (5) rounds of live ammunition in its
cylinder.
5.4 The police officers brought the accused and the pieces of evidence seized back to the
police station, where case investigator SPO3 ANDRES DULAY (hereinafter "SPO3 Dulay")
received the confiscated evidence from the arresting officers. The police officers then
marked the .45-caliber pistol "RB/ZN," its magazine "RB/ZN-8," and the seven (7) cartridges
in it, "RB/ZN-1" to "RB/ZN-7," respectively. The hand grenade was marked "RB/TS 4-20-15."
The revolver was marked "RU/WC 4-20-15" and the five (5) cartridges in it were marked
"RU/WC-1" to "RU/WC-5," respectively. Photographs of the evidence recovered were also
taken during the same occasion. Eventually, the police officers executed their sworn
statements regarding the arrest and the corresponding charges were filed against both of
the accused.[5]
As for the defense, Bacod testified in his behalf. Umali, on the other hand, did not testify as
he jumped bail. The cases filed against him were placed in the archived docket of the RTC
pending his apprehension or voluntary surrender.[6] Bacod's testimony, as summarized by
the RTC, was as follows:
Thereafter, the defense presented its lone witness, accused ROMEO BACOD y MERCADO,
working as a Mechanic-Driver and residing at No. 187, 4th St., Bagong Barrio, Zone 12,
Caloocan City, and testified that he was at home on April 20, 2015, resting when four
policemen together with his co-accused Remigio Umali came to him and asked him to fix a
ten-wheeler truck that broke down in Sta. Mesa, Manila. When they reached Pureza Street,
he saw the ten-wheeler truck. He dismantled the clutch and replaced it with rubber cap. He
alleged that a person drove the truck with him sitting on the passenger seat following the
Mitsubishi Galant driven by accused Remigio Umali to the place which is unfamiliar to him.
Then all of a sudden, police officers came and flagged them down because according to
those police officers[,] the truck was a hijacked vehicle. He testified that in fear[,] he did not
know what to say to the police officers who apprehended him while the other persons who
were earlier introduced to him by Remigio Umali as policemen were able to scamper from
the crime scene. He was then brought to the police station where an investigation was
conducted. At the police station, he was surprised to know that the said ten-wheeler and its
contents were hijacked by his companions. He denied the allegations that he possesse[d] a
caliber .45 Remington piston and a grenade and the same were not recovered from him.
During his cross-examination, he mentioned that he met those police officers who flagged
them down only for the first time on the night of April 20, 2015 when he was apprehended
by them and that he had no previous altercation with the said police officers. He could only
deny the allegations imputed against him as far as his possession of the caliber .45
Remington pistol with five live ammunitions and a hand grenade. He also mentioned that he
failed to file a case against the police officers for their alleged planting of object evidence.[7]
RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision[8] dated February 24, 2017, the RTC acquitted Bacod and Umali from the
Robbery charge but convicted them for the rest of the charges. The disposition portion of
the Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders the following judgment as follows:
For criminal case number R-QZN-15-03913-CR, the accused, ROMEO BACOD y MERCADO, is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 28(a) in
relation to Section 28(e-1) of Republic Act 10591 otherwise known as An Act Providing for
Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum.
For criminal case number R-QZN-15-03914-CR, the accused, REMIGIO UMALI y DE LEON, is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 28(a) in
relation to Section 28(e-1) of Republic Act 10591 otherwise known as An Act Providing for a
Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum.
For criminal case number R-QZN-15-03915-CR, the accused, ROMEO BACOD y MERCADO, is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 9516, otherwise known as Codifying the
Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition, of
Firearms, Ammunition, or Explosives or Instruments used in the Manufacture of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for certain violations thereof and
for relevant purposes and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIXTEEN YEARS (16) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of [PRISION TEMPORAL], as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS, as maximum,
and to PAY the required FINE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00).
For criminal case number R-QZN-15-03916-CR, on the ground of reasonable doubt, both the
accused, ROMEO BACOD y MERCADO and REMIGIO UMALI y DE LEON, are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY.
Consequently, let a Mittimus Order to the National Penitentiary be issued against accused
ROMEO BACOD y MERCADO for his service of sentence. Meanwhile, let a Warrant of Arrest
be issued against accused REMIGIO UMALI y DE LEON for his immediate apprehension and
service of sentence.
The subject caliber .45 Remington pistol with three (5) (sic) pieces of live ammunitions and
caliber .38 revolver with seven (7) live ammunitions and the hand grenade are hereby
ORDERED DISPOSED. Let the subject firearms, ammunitions and explosives be
TRANSMITTED to the Firearms and Explosive Office, Camp Crame, EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City
for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In acquitting Bacod and Umali in the Robbery charge, the RTC reasoned that the prosecution
failed to overcome the presumption of innocence, considering that it did not present the
drivers of the truck to testify as to the actual robbery. While there may be circumstantial
evidence to establish their guilt, it did not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt to
overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, despite acquitting both accused from the Robbery charge, the RTC still convicted
both for Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Bacod for Illegal Possession of Explosives.
According to the RTC, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Bacod's
and Umali's possession of the prohibited items, and that they do not possess the requisite
license to possess the same.
Aggrieved by the Decision, Bacod filed an appeal with the CA. In the CA, Bacod assailed the
admissibility of the seized items — the firearm with the live ammunition, as well as the hand
grenade — arguing that the items were inadmissible as they were seized pursuant to an
unlawful warrantless arrest. Bacod also argued that the prosecution failed to prove all the
elements of the crimes he was convicted with.
RULING OF THE CA
In a Decision[10] dated January 14, 2019, the CA denied the appeal with modification as to
the penalty imposed. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 24,
2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224 of Quezon City convicting accused-appellant in
Criminal Case Nos. RQZN-15-03913-CR and R-QZN-15-03915-CR for violation of Section 28
(a) in relation to Section 28 (e-1) of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591 and Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1866, as amended by RA 9516, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification in
that the penalty, in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-03913-CR, is adjusted to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to eleven (11) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The CA ruled that Bacod's acquittal in the Robbery charge did not translate into the
invalidity of his arrest. Consequently, the search incidental to a lawful arrest conducted on
his person that brought about the discovery of the seized items was not an unlawful
warrantless search. The CA held that, considering the circumstances of Bacod's arrest, the
police officers had "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."[12] The CA added that, in addition
to the search being a "search incidental to a lawful arrest," the search could also be justified
by another exception to the requirement of warrants prior to the conduct of arrests:
searches of moving vehicles.[13]
As to the elements of the crime, the CA affirmed that RTC's finding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, the
certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police
dated April 21, 2015 proves that Bacod is "not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind of caliber."[14] The CA, however, increased the penalty for the conviction for Illegal
Possession of Firearms after it considered the aggravating circumstance that the firearm
was confiscated with a loaded magazine.
Bacod sought reconsideration of the Decision of the CA, but the CA denied the same in a
Resolution[15] dated May 14, 2019.
Hence, the present Petition filed by Bacod.

On September 2, 2019, the Court issued a Resolution[16] requiring the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file its Comment to Bacod's Petition. In compliance, the OSG filed its
Comment on February 10, 2020.
ISSUES
The issues presented by Bacod is his Petition are the following:

(1) "Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in convicting the petitioner despite the
inadmissibility of the pieces of evidence allegedly seized from him pursuant to the
unlawful warrantless search and seizure conducted after his unlawful warrantless
arrest,"[17] and
(2) "Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in convicting the petitioner of the offense
of qualified unlawful possession of firearms and ammunitions despite the prosecution's
failure to prove the elements thereof."[18]
RULING OF THE COURT
The petition has no merit.
Contrary to Bacod's contentions, the seized items upon which his convictions are anchored
were not inadmissible. The CA was correct in its ruling that Bacod's acquittal in the Robbery
charge did not result in the invalidity of his arrest. As the arrest was lawful, the warrantless
search conducted on his person which led to the discovery of the firearms, ammunition, and
hand grenade subject of this case was, therefore, lawful as well.
As narrated in this decision, Bacod's acquittal in the Robbery charge was based on
reasonable doubt. The RTC acquitted Bacod because the drivers of the stolen truck were not
presented as witnesses during the trial. Without ruling on the propriety of the RTC's
decision to acquit, the Court rules that it was understandable considering that without the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses, there was room to entertain Bacod's claim that he was
merely at the scene of the crime to repair the truck. This claim — that he did not steal the
vehicle and was merely at the scene as a mechanic — may be argued to have created the
reasonable doubt sufficient for an acquittal because of the absence in the case records of
the testimonies of the identifying witnesses. This reasonable doubt, however, did not
negate the probable cause that allowed the police officers to arrest and search Bacod
without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[a] peace
officer x x x may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x [w]hen an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it." In Pestilos v.
Generoso[19] (Pestilos), the metes and bounds of this exception to the requirement of
warrants was explained as follows:
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances"
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure
that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their
probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the commission
of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they
were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with
the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.[20] (Emphasis
and italics in the original)
Pestilos added that to establish this exception to the requirement of warrants before an
arrest, the following elements must be present: "1) the crime should have been just
committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge."[21] Based on the foregoing, the Court rules that the exception applies in the
present case.
To illustrate the applicability of the exception, a review of the testimony of the responding
police officers is in order. During the trial, PO1 Zoilo Nazario (PO1 Nazario) testified that he
was manning a checkpoint when one of the drivers of the vehicle, Ernesto Oite (Oite),
approached him to inform him of the hijacking incident involving the truck. [22] PO1 Nazario
further testified that:
3) from that information, they were prompted to search for the culprits and the vehicle that
Oite was driving; 4) he and his companions-policemen were able to locate the ten-wheeler
truck; 5) they immediately approached the said truck and subjected the apprehended
accused Romeo Bacod to body frisking where one unit of fragmentation hand grenade was
recovered. Then, he testified that he acted based on the information of driver Oite during
the hot pursuit. He alleged that when they ascertained the identity of the truck that was
being driven by accused Romeo Bacod, as pointed by Mr. Oite, the police officers chased the
accused and were able to apprehend him. The witness asked the accused to alight from the
truck and recovered from him a caliber .45 Remington Pistol tucked on his waist. He averred
that accused Bacod was positively identified by Oite as the one who stopped him and who
took his truck. After the arrest and the confiscation of the firearms, they proceeded at the
Galas Police Station and turned the accused and the object evidence over to the investigator
for proper disposition. At the police station, accused Bacod and Umali were positively
identified by Mr. Oite and Ramos.[23]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requirement of immediacy was present, as the
responding police officers were able to catch up with the stolen vehicle shortly after it was
taken, and the police officers were able to do so through a "hot pursuit." An offense,
therefore, "has just been committed" when Bacod was apprehended. The police officers
also had "personal knowledge of the circumstances" as the drivers of the stolen truck —
who personally reported the hijacking incident — were with the police officers the entire
time they were conducting the hot pursuit. The police officers were therefore able to
identify the truck with certainty as they were with the very persons from whom the vehicle
was taken. Bacod was then found not just inside the stolen vehicle, but he was, in fact, even
driving it.
All of the foregoing circumstances lead to the conclusion that there was probable cause
from the perspective of the police officers to arrest Bacod. Probable cause is defined "as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty."[24] In this
case, it is unmistakably reasonable to suspect that the person seen driving a stolen vehicle
shortly after it was taken was the one who stole it. In fact, even the Rules of Court establish
as a disputable presumption "[t]hat a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act." [25]
Moreover, even if Bacod was subsequently found at the trial to be not guilty of the robbery,
this does not mean that the police officers had no basis in effecting the arrest during
the hot pursuit. As explained by the Court as early as 1917 in the case of United States v.
Santos,[26] "[o]ne should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not
presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity
to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape
of the criminal."[27] Police officers, in the context of a live operation, do not have the benefit
of time that judges or even prosecutors have to carefully deliberate the existence of
probable cause. In addition, probable cause is a much lighter quantum of evidence
compared to proof beyond reasonable doubt. The legality of an arrest must, therefore, be
determined from the lens of a police officer looking, in real-time, at the circumstances that
existed on the ground, and not equated with the evaluation of a judicial officer after the
rigors of trial.
Having said the foregoing, the Court is thus of the opinion that the police officers had
probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest, under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, upon Bacod. As there was a valid arrest, the inevitable conclusion is
thus that the ensuing search upon Bacod was a valid "search incidental to a lawful arrest."
Ultimately, this finding results in the admissibility of the items confiscated from Bacod
during the search.
In sum, the CA did not err in its ruling that the pieces of object evidence in this case were
admissible. As to the elements of the crime, the CA also committed no error, and the Court
adopts the following findings and conclusions of the CA:
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not
have the corresponding license for it. In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. In his direct examination, PO1 Nazario
confirmed the items he confiscated from accused-appellant such as the .45 pistol
(Remington) with defaced serial number marked as "RB/ZN;" one (1) magazine inserted in
the said pistol marked as "RB/ZN-8;" and, seven (7) live ammunition with markings "RB/ZN-
1," "RB/ZN-2," "RB/ZN-3," RB/ZN-4," "RB/ZN-5," "RB/ZN-6," & "RB/ZN-7." According to him,
it was the police investigator who marked the aforementioned pieces of evidence. For his
part, PO1 Teodirico Serrano, Jr. declared that he recovered from accused-appellant a sling
bag marked as "RB-2" containing a hand grenade which was subjected for examination at
Explosive Ordinance Device, Camp Karingal, Quezon City and was marked, "RB/TS." Based
on the certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National
Police dated April 21, 2015, accused appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of
any kind of caliber.
Finally, Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e-1) of RA 10591 states that the penalty of
one (1) degree higher than prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm loaded with ammunition or
inserted with a loaded magazine. Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the
maximum period of the imposable penalty cannot exceed prision mayor in its maximum
period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance. The minimum period, as
provided in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be within the range of prision mayor in its
medium period. In light of the foregoing, We modify the imposition of the penalty in
Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-103913-CR to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor in its maximum period
as maximum.
In the same vein, Section 3 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 9516, provides that the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess
handgrenade(s), rifle grenade(s) and other explosives, including but not limited to "philbox
bombs", "molotov cocktail bomb", "fire-bombs", or other incendiary devices capable of
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.
As such, We uphold the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment of sixteen (16) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as minimum, to twenty (20) years,
as maximum, in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-03915-CR.[28]
All told, the CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting Bacod for the crimes
of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Illegal Possession of Explosives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
January 14, 2019 and Resolution dated May 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 40093 affirming the convictions of petitioner Romeo Bacod y Mercado for (1) violation
of Section 28(a), in relation to Section 28 (e-1) of Republic Act No. 10591, and (2) violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 9516, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Inting, Gaerlan, and Singh, JJ., concur.

Dimaampao,* J., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218250. July 10, 2017 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GIO COSGAFA Y CLAMOCHA, JIMMY

SARCEDA Y AGANG, AND ALLAN VIVO Y APLACADOR, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 12, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
of Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00418, sustaining the accused-appellants' conviction for
the crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, in its
Decision[2] dated May 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 12230.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Accused-appellants Gio Cosgafa y Clamocha (Gio), Jimmy Sarceda y Agang (Jimmy), and
Allan Vivo y Aplacador (Allan) were charged with murder in an Information dated April 28,
2004 as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of October 2002 in the municipality of Tubigon, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, by suddenly attacking the victim Nathaniel
Asombrado, Sr. without affording the latter an opportunity to defend himself with the use
of Batangas knives and icepick, hitting him on the different parts of his body, arms and
head, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death;
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim in the amount to be proved
during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659.[3]
Upon arraignment on May 28, 2004, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and,
thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, to wit: (1) Ronald Manatad (Ronald); (2)
Panfilo Baura (Panfilo); (3) Rosbill Manatad (Rossbill); (4) Police Officer 3 Vincent Russam
Mascariñas (PO3 Mascariñas); (5) Dra. Adoracion L. Torregosa (Dra. Torregosa); (6) Ruben
Asombrado (Ruben); and (7) Senior Police Officer 1 Joel Sabang (SPO1 Sabang).[4]
At around 6:30 p.m. of October 25, 2002, brothers Ronald and Rosbill, Panfilo, a certain
Joseph Mantahinay (Joseph) and Joseph Bryan Mendez (Bryan) were at the victim's house
for the fiesta. After dinner, they finished half a gallon of Bahalina, an aged native coco-wine.
At around 1:00 a.m. the following day, the group decided to go to the disco held at a nearby
school.[5]
On their way thereto, the group stopped by a sari-sari store owned by a retired police
officer Pedrito Lapiz (Lapiz) to talk to a certain person who called the victim. While waiting,
Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo proceeded to the bridge, about seven meters away, and sat on
the railings. When they got there, accused-appellants were already sitting on the railings
across them. Suddenly, Gio approached Rosbill and tried to box him but he did not connect.
Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo then ran back to where they left the rest of the group and told
them what happened.[6]
Upon learning what happened, the victim proceeded to the bridge to confront Gio. When he
got there, accused-appellants took turns in holding and stabbing the victim. When the
victim fell on the ground, the accused-appellants ran away. Seeing that the accused-
appellants had deadly weapons and they had none, the victim's group failed to come to his
rescue.[7]
The victim was then brought to the hospital but was declared dead therein. Dra. Torregosa,
Municipal Health Officer of Tubigon, Bohol, examined the victim's body and found that the
victim sustained nine stab wounds, four incised wounds, and one contusion, succumbing
thus to "Hypovolemia due to severe intra-abdominal hemorrhage, secondary to multiple
stab wounds, abdomen, and chest" as reflected in the Post Mortem Findings. [8]
During Dra. Torregosa's testimony in court, she declared that wounds 1 to 6, which were
circular in shape and one centimeter in diameter, could have been inflicted by a sharp
pointed instrument like an ice pick; wounds 7 and 8 located at the hypochondriac region,
which could have been inflicted by a sharp pointed weapon such as a Batangas knife, were
deeply penetrating and pierced the liver; also, wounds 9 to 13 could have been inflicted by
a Batangas knife; while the contusion, wound 14, on the victim's forehead could have been
inflicted by a fist or any hard object such as the handle of a screwdriver.[9]
PO3 Mascariñas and SPO1 Sabang testified that while posted as security in the school where
the disco was being held, around 2:30 a.m. of October 26, 2002, they responded to a report
by Barangay Tanod Nicandro Cabug-os (Barangay Tanod Cabug-os) about a stabbing incident
nearby. The victim was already brought to the hospital when they arrived at the crime
scene. Upon inquiry around the area, they learned from Lapiz that accused-appellants were
the ones responsible for the crime. They immediately conducted a hot pursuit, which
resulted to the accused appellants' arrest.[10]
At the police station, accused-appellants admitted that they were the ones who stabbed the
victim. Jimmy even led the police officers to his house to surrender the Batangas knife that
he used on the victim. It was wrapped in a white shirt with brownish blood-like stains when
recovered. A Batangas knife was also recovered from Allan upon arrest. An unidentified
person also handed to the police officers an ice pick (screwdriver with sharpened tip) found
at the crime scene.[11]
Ruben, the victim's brother, testified as to the expenses incurred due to the victim's death,
to wit: (1) PhP20,000 for the embalming per O.R. No. 3036; (2) PhP15,000 for the novena of
the dead; (3) burial expenses such as PhP5,000 for the coffin and PhP3,000 for the tomb; (4)
PhP13,000 attorney's fees for the preliminary investigation; (5) PhP18,000 for court hearings
in the RTC; (6) PhP6,000 as miscellaneous expenses and food for the witnesses; (7)
PhP13,500 for Tagbilaran City hearings, amounting to PhP93,500 altogether. An amount of
PhP1 Million was also claimed for moral damages.[12]
Only the accused-appellants testified for the defense.
Gio and Jimmy admitted in open court that they stabbed the victim but interposed self-
defense. They, however, averred that Allan had no participation in killing the victim. [13]
Gio admitted that he used the screwdriver/ice pick, while Jimmy admitted that he used
the Batangas knife in stabbing the victim.[14]
All three accused-appellants admitted that past 12 midnight of October 26, 2002, they were
in the alleged area for the fiesta. They dined and consumed drinks in several houses. On
their way home, they stopped at the bridge to wait for Gio and a certain Vito Babad to
exchange pants when the victim's group arrived and sat on the opposite railings fronting
Jimmy and Allan. Jimmy averred that one person from the victim's group stood up and
asked them "What are you looking Bay?". Jimmy responded that they were just waiting for
their companion. The victim's group then approached accused-appellants' group, which
prompted Jimmy to push and box Rosbill although the latter did not get hit. [15]
The victim's group then ran back to where the rest of their group were. On the other hand,
accused-appellants' group ran towards the disco place when suddenly, they found the
victim running after them. According to the accused-appellants, the victim was bigger and
taller in built than them. When the victim gained upon them, he held Jimmy's shirt and
kicked him, causing Jimmy to fall down. Jimmy then was able to get a hold of a tree branch
and hit the victim with it. Gio then came to Jimmy's rescue and fought with the victim.
According to Gio, however, he was no match to the victim as the latter was not only bigger
and taller than him but also trained in martial arts. Hence, they were forced to stab the
victim to defend themselves. At that moment, Gio and Jimmy did not notice where Allan
went. When the victim finally fell on the ground, Gio and Jimmy ran towards the creek.[16]
RTC Ruling
The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, rejecting
Gio and Jimmy's uncorroborated claim of self-defense, as well as their claim that Allan had
no participation in the perpetration of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of superiority in number in killing the victim, who was unarmed and alone,
with the use of deadly weapons. Thus:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Gio Cosgafa y
Clamocha, Jimmy Sarceda y Agang, and Allan Vivo y Aplacador, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, as embraced in the foregoing Information and hereby
sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of Nathaniel Asombrado, Sr., the sum
of Php50,000.00 funeral expenses and litigation expenses in the sum of Php40,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of Php10,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The three accused who are detention prisoners are hereby credited in full of the period of
their preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
SO ORDERED.[17]
CA Ruling
The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellants. It rejected Gio and Jimmy's claim
of self-defense and found that the prosecution evidence was sufficient to prove Allan's
participation in the crime. The appellate court, however, modified the civil liability awarded
to the heirs of the victim. It added awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and
temperate damages. The said court also found it proper to award temperate damages,. in
lieu of the actual damages, considering that some pecuniary expenses were definitely
incurred by the victim's family albeit not proven. Lastly, it imposed an interest rate of six
percent (6%) per annum for all the monetary awards from the date of finality of the decision
until the same are fully paid. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 24, 2013 [sic] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35 of Iloilo City [sic] in Criminal Case No. 48928 [sic] is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that appellants Gio Cosgafa y Clamocha, Jimmy Sarceda y Agang and
Allan Vivo y Ap1acador are jointly and severally ORDERED to pay the following:
(1) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) Php50,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) Php40,000.00 as litigation expenses;
(5) Php10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Appellants are further ORDERED to pay the heirs interest on all damages (sic) awarded at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Hence, this appeal.
The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their supplemental briefs but both parties
manifested that they no longer intend to file the same, having already discussed all of their
arguments in their respective briefs before the CA.[19]
Issues
(1) May Gio and Jimmy properly invoke self-defense?
(2) Was Allan's participation in the crime sufficiently proven?
(3) Does the circumstance of abuse of superior strength exist?
This Court's Ruling
Gio and Jimmy basically assert that they cannot be adjudged criminally liable for the
resulting death of the victim as they only stabbed the latter in self-defense. Allan, on the
other hand, faults the trial court for convicting him of the crime charged despite the
categorical statement of his co-accused that he had no participation in the criminal act.
Accused appellants also argue that abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder as there is no gross disparity of forces to speak of since it was
admitted that the victim was bigger and taller in size compared to the accused-appellants.
We find no merit in the instant appeal.
At the outset, let it be stated that absent any showing that the lower court overlooked
circumstances which would overturn the final outcome of the case, due respect must be
made to its assessment and factual findings. Such findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.[20]
Now for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) a person is
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing
is not parricide or infanticide.[21]
First. The fact of victim's death is undisputed.
Second. The fact that accused-appellants were the ones responsible for the victim's death
was also established. Gio and Jimmy, in fact, admitted in open court that they stabbed the
victim, which resulted to the latter's death, albeit they interposed self-defense to justify the
killing. Jurisprudence is to the effect that when self-defense is pleaded, the accused thereby
admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to
prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. [22]
The accused must discharge the burden of proving his affirmative allegation with certainty
by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, considering that the prosecution's evidence, even if weak, cannot be
disbelieved in view of the admission of the killing.[23]
It bears stressing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to
fabricate.[24] Thus, it must be proven by satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. [25] The following
elements must thus be proved by clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[26]
After a careful review of this case, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
correctly ruled that the above-enumerated elements are not present in this case.
The first element - unlawful aggression on the part of the victim - is the primordial element
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[27] Without unlawful aggression, there can be
no justified killing in defense of oneself.[28] Case law is replete with discussions on what
unlawful aggression is contemplated by the law on this matter. Basically, this Court has
ruled that there is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb, or right is either
actual or imminent.[29] The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be imagined or an imaginary
threat.[30]
In this case, accused-appellants' self-serving assertion that the victim was the aggressor
when the latter, without provocation on their part, chased them and held Jimmy's shirt and
kicked him until he fell on the ground, cannot prevail over the positive and consistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, found credible by the RTC and the CA, as to what
actually transpired. The prosecution witnesses clearly and categorically testified that the
victim, alone and unarmed, went to the accused-appellants merely to confront them on why
Gio boxed his companion.
Even if the defense's version of the story would be believed, the CA correctly observed that
the alleged attack coming from the victim, where the latter chased them and grabbed and
kicked Jimmy, is not the kind of attack that would put the person of the accused-appellants
in peril. Indeed, despite the victim's bigger physical built, the fact that Gio, who was armed
with an ice pick, already came to Jimmy's rescue, who notably was also armed with
a Batangas knife and who had already hit the victim with a tree branch, indicates that the
threat from the supposed aggression already ceased to exist. More so, when Gio already
stabbed the victim with the ice pick causing the latter to fall on the ground, there was no
more aggression to prevent or repel. It, thus, became unnecessary for the accused-
appellants to continue to inflict injuries and/or to stab the fallen victim, which caused his
death.
Moreover, the perceived threat to their lives due to the victim's bigger built and alleged
knowledge of martial arts, is merely based on accused appellants' speculation and
imagination, not proven to be real nor imminent.
More importantly, as clearly shown by the evidence on record, the severity, location, and
the number of wounds and injuries suffered by the victim belie the accused-appellants'
claim of self-defense. On the contrary, this evidence is indicative of a serious intent to inflict
harm on the part of the accused-appellants for purposes of retaliation and not merely for
the purpose of defending themselves from an imminent peril to life.
Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by
the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense, the
aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.[31]
From the foregoing, Gio and Jimmy's self-defense plea necessarily fails.
As to Allan, despite the statement made by his co-accused that he had no participation in
the killing, We are one with the RTC and the CA in finding that his participation in the crime
was established by the prosecution. This is through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that led to the inescapable conclusion that Allan indeed participated in the killing
of the victim.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[32] In this case, We do not find any
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, viz.: (1) Allan was with Gio and Jimmy before and during the incident; (2) prosecution
witnesses identified him as one of the assailants; (3) he fled immediately after the incident;
and (4) the police intercepted him near a creek and a Batangas knife was found in his
possession. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, which constrain Us to
conclude that Allan, with his co-accused, participated in the killing of the victim.
Notably, he did not deny any of these facts during his testimony. Instead, Allan imputes
error on the part of the trial court in upholding the admissibility of the knife recovered from
him despite its being a product of an invalid search considering that the police officers had
no personal knowledge that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime when he was
arrested without warrant. We do not agree.
As can be gleaned from the factual backdrop of this case, the arrest of Allan and his co-
accused resulted from a hot pursuit, immediately conducted by the police officers in the
area upon learning, through a report from Barangay Tanod Cabug-os, and investigating
about the incident that just occurred. Thus, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the persons to be pursued and arrested are responsible for the
crime that had just been committed. Indeed, the arresting officers had probable cause to
pursue the accused-appellants based on the information from witnesses in the area that
they gathered from their immediate investigation. This is in accord with Section 5(b) of Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on valid warrantless arrest.[33] It is, thus,
readily apparent that the knife seized from Allan is admissible in evidence, the same having
been recovered from him incidental to a lawful arrest, contrary to the defense's argument.
Deduced from the foregoing, therefore, Allan's participation in the killing of the victim
cannot be doubted.
Third. Anent the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, We find that the
same is clearly present in this case. Abuse of superior strength is present when the attackers
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate
the crime with impunity.[34] Such qualifying circumstance was perpetrated by the accused-
appellants when they took turns to stab and maul the victim, who was alone and unarmed.
Indeed, they purposely used such excessive force out of proportion [35] considering that they
consistently averred that they feared the victim's bigger built and his knowledge of martial
arts.
As to the penalty, the RTC and the CA correctly sentenced the accused-appellants to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that attended the commission of the crime.
For the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[36]
In this case, the civil indemnity amounting to PhP75,000 and temperate damages, in lieu of
actual damages, amounting to PhP50,000 awarded are proper, hence, We sustain the same.
Pursuant, however, to prevailing jurisprudence, We increase the award of moral damages
from PhP50,000 to PhP75,000.[37]
In addition, the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the
offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, as in
this case.[38] Thus, We find it proper to award PhP75,000 exemplary damages in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.[39]
While We find the grant of attorney's fees proper due to the award of exemplary
damages,[40] We, however, find no basis on the award of PhP50,000 litigation expenses. We,
thus, delete the same.
The imposition of an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary
awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid was likewise proper. [41]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 12, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals of Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00418 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 28, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2 of Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 12230 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellants Gio Cosgafa y Clamocha, Jimmy Sarceda y Agang and Allan
Vivo y Aplacador are jointly and severally ORDERED to pay the following:
(1) Php75,000 as civil indemnity;
(2) Php75,000 as moral damages;
(3) Php75,000 as exemplary damages;
(4) Php50,000 as temperate damages;
(5) Php10,000 as attorney's fees.

Appellants are further ORDERED to pay the heirs interest on the civil indemnity and all
damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.

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[ G.R. No. 242889.

March 14, 2022 ]

LOPEZ, J., J.:

Criminal Case No. 2131-19

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin, province

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin, province

Criminal Case No. 2133-19

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin, province

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 2131-19, the accused Leng

(2) In Criminal Case No. 2133-19, the accused Leng

(3) Crim. Case No. 2132-19 is hereby DISMISSED pursuant

The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other

Costs against the accused.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9516, amending P.D. No. 1866, provides:

SECTION 3-D. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. - Subject

Their interpretation is skewed. The foregoing provision presupposes that there is a

There was a valid

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which

Q What drink is that, Mr. witness if you recall?

More importantly, owing to PI Tayaban's apprehension that accused-appellants might

True, when PI Tayaban invited accused-appellants to the precinct and they

The police officers seized

Q And after that what happened?

Q Who were present when you alighted the vehicle?

Q Where did you see those butts and barrels of firearms?

A Under the chair of that second layer of the car, ma'am.

Q Could you describe the door of the van?

A Yes, your Honor.72

Q Who in particular came?

A Headed by Police Superintendent Baldeo with Police Chief Inspector Jay de

Q So when they arrived what did they do, if any?

Q What are those?

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is

Indeed, as a consequence of accused-appellants' arrest, the police officers were

In a last-ditch attempt to secure their acquittal, accused-appellants stress that serious

Accused-appellants point out that Barangay Kagawad Armando Aguinaldo (Kagawad

Accused-appellants boldly invoke this Court's compassion and sympathy by declaring

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

(3) Criminal Case No. 2132-19 is DISMISSED.

The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other contraband recovered

Costs against the accused.

Leonen, Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019

FRANKLIN B. VAPOROSO AND JOELREN B. TULILIK, PETITIONERS, v. PEOPLE OF THE

During arraignment, or on October 9, 2013, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal19 before the CA.

Undaunted, petitioners sought reconsideration,24 which was denied in a Resolution25 dated

The Court's Ruling

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

Carpio (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Caguioa, JJ., on official leave.

[ G.R. No. 247401. December 05, 2022 ]

ROMEO BACOD Y MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Criminal Case Nos. R-QZN-15-03915-CR [Illegal Possession of Explosives]

Criminal Case Nos. R-QZN-15-03916-CR [Highway Robbery]

Hence, the present Petition filed by Bacod.

The issues presented by Bacod is his Petition are the following: