Why it is always better to cease to exist

Jiwoon Hwang

jiwoon@protonmail.com

Epigraph

“Sleep is good, death is better; but of course, the best thing would
to have never been born at all.” – Heinrich Heine

"Death solves all problems - no man, no problem." – Anatoly

Rybakov

“Death is not an evil, because it frees us from all evils, and while it
takes away good things, it takes away also the desire for them. Old
age is the supreme evil, because it deprives us of all pleasures,
leaving us only the appetite for them, and it brings with it all
sufferings. Nevertheless, we fear death, and we desire old age.” ―
Giacomo Leopardi

Abstract

I shall argue that David Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry of

harms and benefits, when combined with (exclusively) hedonistic
view of harms and benefits, entail pro-mortalism. Professor
Benatar’s view that the absence of pleasure of who never exists
does not deprive, while the absence of pleasure of who ceased to
exist does deprive, has some absurd conclusions that judges which
life is preferable one differently in present- and future-life cases. I
subsequently show that Benatar’s asymmetry should be applied to
post-mortem nonexistence as well, and argue so long as one’s
remaining life will contain any pain, it is always preferable to
cease to exist than to continue to exist.

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Introduction

I shall argue that David Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry of

harms and benefits[1], when combined with (exclusively)
hedonistic view[2] of harms and benefits, entail pro-
mortalism[3]. Professor Benatar’s view that the absence of
pleasure of who never exists does not deprive, while the absence
of pleasure of who ceased to exist does deprive, has some absurd
conclusions that judges which life is preferable one differently in
‘present-‘ and ‘future-life cases’.[4] I subsequently show that
Benatar’s asymmetry should be applied to post-mortem
nonexistence[5] as well, and argue so long as one’s remaining life
will contain any pain[6], it is always preferable to cease to exist
than to continue to exist.

While Rafe McGregor and Emy-Sullivan Bisset argued that there

are pro-mortalist implications of Benatar’s Asymmetry[7], it is far
from clear whether they believe in pro-mortalism to be true.
According to Professor Benatar, one of the authors thinks
purported pro-mortalist implications of Professor Benatar’s
arguments as a reductio ad absurdum of his arguments[8]. I shall
argue that Benatar’s Asymmetry combined with (exclusively)
hedonistic view of harms and benefits entails pro-mortalism, but
I, rather than thinking the pro-mortalist implications as
a reductio, believe in a soundness of pro-mortalism.

In this paper, I am in no way suggesting that Professor Benatar is

a pro-mortalist. Also, I shall note that the pro-mortalism I shall be
defending is a pro-mortalism on earlier death, rather than
death per se. In other words, while I think (painless) earlier death
is preferable to later death, I do not think there is an intrinsic
positive value in death per se, thereby even might implying that
being caused to ultimately die by being brought into existence
could be a benefit. In my view, earlier death has an instrumental

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value because of the prevention of future suffering it brings. My
view is not that earlier death is necessarily good for everyone,
but in fact good because as a matter of empirical fact,
everyone’s daily[9] life contains a morally considerable amount
of suffering.

In this paper, I assume, as most contemporary professional

philosophers do, that death (or cessation of existence) is an
irreversible cessation of sentience (subjective experience). In this
paper, I shall use death in a sense of irreversible cessation of
sentient existence, and existence in a sense of sentient existence.
Here, I, for sake of the argument, assume dying (the process
leading to death) is always painless. Of course, it is not the cases
of most death of humans or non-human animals. However, the
argument I shall be defending is not that shorter lives are
preferable to different lives which are longer. Obviously, very
often a shorter life span in human life is a strong indicator of poor
quality of life (poverty, disease, violence, mental illness, etc.)
while that person[10] was living. Rather, the question I am asking
is that whether for anyone and everyone, if life had painlessly
ended earlier than it would otherwise have been, that earlier
death is preferable to a latter death. I answer affirmatively to that
question.

Benatar’s Asymmetry and Absences of Harms and

Benefits (pain and pleasure)[11]

David Benatar’s Asymmetry[12], although diagrammatically

presenting only 4 cells in its usual forms, can be amplified to show
4 more cells, the absences of pain and pleasure in the case X
exists[13] and ceased to exist[14]. (Fig 1)[15]

Scenario C Scenario A Scenario B

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X ceased to
X exists X never exists
exist
7: Absence of 5: Absence of 1: Presence of 3: Absence of
pain pain pain pain

(Good) (Good) (Bad) (Good)

8: Absence of 6: Absence of 2: Presence of 4: Absence of
pleasure pleasure pleasure pleasure

(Bad) (Bad) (Good) (Not bad)

(Fig 1)

Why the harm of coming into existence is contingent

upon the harm during the course of existence

However, as I shall argue, axiological assessments of cells 6 and 8

are inconsistent with the axiological assessment of cell 4. If
Professor Benatar is correct that the absence of pleasure of the
potential person who never becomes actual is not worse[16] than
the presence of pleasure of the existent person, it should be the
case that the absence of pleasure of the person who exists and who
ceased to exist should not be worse than the absence of pleasure
of the person who never exists, as the absence of pleasure of the
person who exists or ceased to exist cannot make the person’s
coming into existence any worse. (Fig 2)

Scenario C Scenario A Scenario B

X ceased to
X exists X never exists
exist

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7: Absence of 5: Absence of 1: Presence of 3: Absence of
pain pain pain pain

(Good) (Good) (Bad) (Good)

8: Absence of 6: Absence of 2: Presence of 4: Absence of
pleasure pleasure pleasure pleasure

(Not bad) (Not bad) (Good) (Not bad)

(Fig 2)

There is nothing inconsistent with Benatar’s asymmetry in

considering the harm of coming into existence as the total harm
one will suffer during the course of one’s life. If (exclusively)
hedonistic view of harms and benefits is correct, and Benatar’s
asymmetry is correct, and I am correct that cells 6 and 8 cannot
be axiologically assessed differently from cell 4, it will entail pro-
mortalism, so long as the life one would experience if one hasn't
died earlier would contain any pain, including single pinprick.

Why Fig 2 is correct while Fig 1 is mistaken.

To see why Fig 2 is correct while Fig 1 is mistaken, let us consider

what different axiological assessments between cells 6, 8 and cell
4 entail. As 2 is not an advantage over 4, while nor 4 is an
advantage over 2, the harm of coming into existence is, quite
independently of the amount of pleasure (cell 2), equal to the
disvalue of the total amount of pain the life will contain during the
course of her life. I.e. the harm of coming into existence = the
total amount of pain.

However, Fig 1 suggests that the purported relative bad (i.e.

relative disadvantage) of the absence of pleasure of who exists

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(cell 6) and ceased to exist (cell 8) are, equal to the amount of
pleasure of cell 2. This implies that life is worth continuing when
pleasure is greater than pain (in other words, pleasure minus pain
is greater than zero), as 8 is a disadvantage to 2 as much as the
value of 2, while 7 is an advantage over 1 as much as the disvalue
of 1. In determining whether life is worth continuing, in Fig 1's
view, we should consider whether Scenario C (X ceased to exist) is
a net advantage over Scenario A (X exists). As a net advantage of
Scenario C over Scenario A is a relative advantage of 7 over 1
minus relative disadvantage of 8 over 2, while a relative advantage
of 7 over 1 is 1 and relative disadvantage 8 over 2 is 2, the net
advantage of Scenario C over Scenario A is 1 minus 2. That is to
say, ceasing to exists becomes benefit when 1 minus 2, i.e., pain
minus pleasure is greater than zero. (In other words, when pain is
greater than pleasure[17])

However, this (axiological assessments of Fig 1) entails some

absurd conclusions. Fig 1 judges a life worth continuing based on
the value of pleasure minus pain, while it judges a life worth
starting (the benefit/harm of coming into existence) based on the
sheer quantity of pain (coming into existence is not a harm if and
only if there will be no pain). In other words, Fig 1 judges whether
life is worth continuing in classical[18] utilitarian[19] standards
while judging whether life is worth starting in negative utilitarian
standards.

Professor Benatar argued life worth starting (future-life cases)

should be applied a higher standard than a life worth continuing
(present-life cases).[20] However, while the view of Fig 1, which
represents the view of Professor Benatar, may qualify less life as
worth or indifferent starting than continuing, Fig 1 judges a life
that is better than another life in future-life cases worse than the
aforementioned another life in present-life cases.

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Consider, for example, lives of X and Y. While the life of X
contains fifteen kilounits of pleasure[21] and five kilounits of
pain[22], the life of Y contains seventy kilounits of pleasure and
fifty kilounits of pain. While the life of X is a less bad life to come
into existence than the life of Y, as neither the 15 kilounits of
pleasure of X nor the 70 kilounits of pleasure of Y are an
advantage over the absence of pleasure of the counterfactual
scenario which X and Y never exist (cell 4), while both the 5
kilounits of pain of X and the 20 kilounits of pain of Y are
disadvantage to the absence of pain of the counterfactual scenario
which X and Y never exist (cell 2). Here, X was harmed as much
as 5 kilounits and Y was harmed as much as 20 kilounits. Clearly
the life of X is a better (less bad) life to come into existence than
the life of Y. However, when we are judging whether life is worth
continuing, suddenly the life of X becomes worse (less good) than
the life of Y. While the scenario A of the life of X is has 10 kilounits
of net advantage over scenario C, the scenario A of the life of Y has
20 kilounits of net advantage over scenario C. However, as
Professor Benatar himself suggests (this very example is Professor
Benatar’s), “Nevertheless, X’s life might reasonably be judged less
bad, even if Y’s has greater net value, judged in strictly
quantitative terms—ten kilo-units versus twenty kilo-units of
positive value.”.[23]

While Professor Benatar claims that his view applies higher

standards for future-life cases than present-life cases, his view, as
represented by Fig 1, judges a preferable life in future-life cases as
a less preferable life in present-life cases. Consider, lives of C and
D. While C’s life contains neither pleasure nor pain, D’s life
contains 10 kilounits of pain and 100 kilounits of pleasure. While
C is not harmed by coming into existence, D is harmed by coming
into existence. In other words, C’s life is a life indifferent starting
or not, whereas D’s life is a life worth not starting[24] (better not
started at all). However, C’s life is a life indifferent continuing or

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ending, while D’s life is a life worth continuing (worth not
ending). Here, C’s life is judged preferable to D’s in future-life
cases, while D’s life is judged preferable to C’s in present-life
cases. I can’t find the reason to think D’s life is better than C’s just
because C and D are happened to exist now. Professor Benatar’s
view, as represented by Fig 1, entails an absurd view that the
answer to the question which life is a better one over another
depends on what time the assessor judges – namely before or
after A and B come/came into existence.

However, adopting Fig 2 removes this inconsistency in the

judgments of relative preferabilities of lives of the present- and
future-life cases. As the presence of pleasure is not an advantage
over its absence in both present- (comparison of scenarios A and
C) and future-life cases (comparison of scenarios A and B), only
the amount of pain is what counts, and the life which contains less
amount of pain is always preferable to the life which contains
more amount of pain, quite independently of the amount of
pleasure the life will contain.

Worlds S (Short) and L (Long)

Let us consider, both worlds S (short) and L (long). In S, X lives

for twenty years and in L, X lives for eighty years. X in both world,
on each year of her life, experience two kilohedons and one
kilodolors each. Therefore, the hedonistic history of X both in S
and L until their twentieth birthday are equal. Indeed, S and L are
identical twins brought into existence at the identical time and
place, in the worlds which are identical at the moment they are
brought into existence, identical until X in world S’s death and X
in world L’s twentieth birthday and X in worlds S and L are even
identical in all subjective experiences until S’s death and L’s
twentieth birthday. However, for the duration of sixty years after
X in world L’s twentieth birthday, X in world L experiences two

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kilohedons and one kilodolors each year. The total hedons and
dolors of X in world S’s life is 40 kilohedons and 20 kilodolors,
and the total hedons and dolors of X in world L’s life is 160
kilohedons and 80 kilodolors. X in world S’s and X in world L’s
lives can be represented on Benatar’s asymmetry. (Figs 3 and 4,
respectively)

Scenario A Scenario B
X exists X never exists
1: Presence of 20 kilodolors 3: Absence of dolors

(Bad as 20 kilounits) (Better than 1 as 20 kilounits)

2: Presence of 40 4: Absence of hedons
kilohedons
(Neither worse nor better than
(Good as 40 kilounits) 2)

(Fig 3: World S)

Scenario A Scenario B
X exists X never exists
1: Presence of 80 kilodolors 3: Absence of dolors

(Bad as 80 kilounits) (Better than 1 as 80 kilounits)

2: Presence of 160 4: Absence of hedons
kilohedons
(Neither worse nor better than
(Good as 160 kilounits) 2)

(Fig 4: World L)

Here, we can see in Figs 3 and 4, neither the presences of X in

world S’s 40 kilohedons nor X in world L’s 160 kilohedons (cell 2
of each Fig) in Scenario A are any advantages or disadvantages

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over the absences of X in world S’s and X in world L’s hedons in
the Scenario B (cell 4 of each Fig). However, while the presence of
20 kilodolors of X in world S in Scenario A (cell 1 of Fig 3) is only
20 kilounits of disadvantage to the absence of dolor in Scenario B
(cell 3 of Fig 3), the presence of 80 kilodolors of X in world L in
Scenario A (cell 1 of Fig 4) is 80 kilounits of disadvantage to the
absence of dolor in Scenario B (cell 3 of Fig 4), Here, we can
conclude that the harm of coming into existence of X in world S is
20 kilounits, while the harm of coming into existence of X in
world L is 80 kilounits. Therefore, X in world S’s life is a
preferable life to come into exist (and to exist and to cease to
exist), and world S is a preferable world for X to come into
existence (and to exist and to cease to exist). It follows from this
that killing X in world L painlessly on her twentieth birthday will
convert X’s life in world L into a hedonistic and axiological
equivalent of X’s life in world S, thereby reducing the harm of
coming into existence of X in world L to 20 kilodolors, reducing
the harm by 60 kilodolors, and benefiting her by 60 kilounits.

If there are two lives which, both twenty years long, but one
contain 20 kilodolors and 40 kilohedons, another contain 80
kilodolors and 160 kilodolors, those believe in the soundness of
Benatar's asymmetry will judge, I assume, the former life as a
preferable one to the latter one. If we were to judge the same
duration – different suffering choices solely based on the amount
of suffering lives will contain, there is no good reason not to judge
different duration – different suffering choices solely based on the
amount of suffering lives will contain.[25] As much as there is no
reason to prefer a bigger wallet to a smaller wallet that is
containing the same amount of money, there is no reason to
prefer a life which hedonistic container is bigger (i.e. the duration
of the life is longer) to a life with the same hedonistic contents
(dolors and hedons) with a smaller hedonistic container (i.e. the
duration of the life is shorter).

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Professor Benatar’s present- and future- life distinction lose its
soundness at least for the hedonistic version of Benatar’s
asymmetry when we adopt Fred Feldman’s two-world comparison
methodology and his ‘eternalism’.[26] When we invest some
money on some company, the successfulness of our investment is
determined after our investment. There is no backward causation
here. Similarly, the harm of coming into existence is determined
by the amount of suffering that person will experience during the
course of her life. We can reduce or increase that person’s
suffering and the harm of coming into existence even after that
person’s coming into existence, either by same/similar-duration
choices and/or different duration choices. For example, we can
reduce a person’s harm of coming into existence even after her
coming into existence by providing the best nurture and
education we can to her, as good nurture and education will
reduce her suffering and will effectively cause a conversion of her
coming into existence into a coming into existence as less harmful
life. There is no backward causation here. Similarly, we can
reduce a person’s harm of coming into existence even after her
coming into existence by painlessly ending her life, as that will
reduce the total amount of suffering she will experience during
the course of her life and will effectively cause a conversion of her
coming into existence into a coming into existence as less harmful
life. There is no backward causation here either.

Prevention account of the goodness of (earlier) death

If my arguments so far are sound, then we can deduce something

the opposite of so-called the deprivation account of the badness of
death - the prevention account of the goodness of (earlier)
death. My view that an earlier death is better than the later death
assigns a positive value to an earlier death. However, that positive
value assigned on earlier death is an instrumental value
contingent on the fact that there will be some pain or suffering in

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the counterfactual scenario one hasn't died earlier. An objection
may be raised, that because post-mortem existence is not a state
of affairs anyone can be, earlier death cannot prevent suffering or
better (instrumentally good) for anyone.[27]

This requirement can be called existence requirement or two-

states requirement, and there are extensive arguments rejecting
existence requirement or two-states requirement. One of notable
such argument is Fred Feldman’s[28]. Professor Feldman argues
that we can compare two worlds which someone exists for longer
and shorter periods of time, and judge which world is preferable
for someone. Professor Feldman thinks death is good or bad for
the dead ‘eternally’[29]. While I deny that anyone’s earlier death
can be bad, I think earlier death is (instrumentally) good
eternally. That is to say, borrowing from Professor Feldman’s two-
world comparison, the world A, which X’s life is shorter than X’s
life in the world B, is better for X, provided that in the world B,
the hedonistic history of X before X’s death in the world A is the
same as the hedonistic history of X in the world A, and after X’s
death in the world A, X in the world B’s life contains any amount
of pain.

Some readers might ask whether earlier death can be described as

preventing suffering, as that person’s suffering was already
started. My answer is this. Although the earlier death of the
person who was already brought into existence obviously do not
and can not prevent the suffering that person already experienced
during the course of her life so far, the earlier death prevents
the future possible suffering the person will experience if she
would have died later. Needless to say, as Heinrich Heine
suggests[30], in my view, never coming into existence is
preferable to (earlier) death.

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Although the term prevention of suffering may be misleading as it
could mean (1) prevention of future possible suffering of potential
(future) people by ensuring they never become actual; (2)
prevention of future possible suffering of an actual (present)
people by ensuring they ceased to exist before that future possible
suffering; and (3) prevention of future possible suffering by
preventing particular causes of suffering (such as disease),
without (much) changing number and/or identity of the future
actual people, the usage of the term alleviation may also be
misleading. Alleviation usually means that one’s suffering was
reduced, but imperfectly, thereby one is continuing to (exist and)
suffer. The term alleviation usually implies (1) one’s suffering was
reduced imperfectly; and (2) the reduction of one’s suffering was
not achieved by not coming into existence or ceasing to exist, but
by amelioration of one’s condition of existence. For prevention of
one’s future possible suffering by ceasing to exist, neither of the
implied meaning of alleviation is the case, for obviously (1) it
prevents future possible suffering perfectly and entirely; and (2)
its prevention of one’s suffering was achieved by ceasing to exist.

The whether-when distinction of death per se and earlier

death.

However, assigning a positive value to earlier death does not

entail assigning a positive value to death per se. Quite contrary,
my view that earlier death is preferable to later death is
compatible with the view death per se has a neutral or negative
intrinsic value. In this paper, death per se is a death that is
imposed on the (mortal) person who was brought into existence
by procreation, while earlier death is a timing change of death that
a person who ceased to exist earlier than otherwise could have
been had been subjected to. In other words, death per se pertains
to whether death happens or not, while earlier death pertains
to when (the timing) death happen.[31] I assign a positive value

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only to earlier death, but not death per se. In other words, my
pro-mortalism applies only to earlier death, but not to death per
se. Neutro-mortalism on death per se or anti-mortalism on
death per se are entirely compatible with pro-mortalism on earlier
death. Pro-mortalism on earlier death (which may be called
temporal pro-mortalism) is a preferable kind of pro-mortalism to
pro-mortalism on death per se (which may be called per se pro-
mortalism). If a positive value should be assigned to death per se,
as per se pro-mortalism suggests, it may imply being caused to die
by coming into existence is a benefit. It is highly implausible.

On David Benatar's annihilation account of the badness

of death

As I noted on above paragraph, my view that earlier death is

preferable to later death because earlier death prevents future
possible suffering is compatible with the view death per se has a
neutral or negative value. One of the argument that assigns a
negative value to death per se is David Benatar’s the annihilation
account[32]. According to Professor Benatar, death is bad because
of the annihilation (of the self) it brings about. Professor Benatar’s
annihilation account, so long as it only pertains to the death per
se, rather than its timing, is entirely compatible with the view that
earlier death is always better than the latter death.

However, it will be difficult to derive the badness of earlier death

from the purported badness of annihilation. While one might
claim that earlier annihilation deprives more pleasure, therefore
bad, even if I grant that earlier death do deprive pleasure and
worse than the more time of presence of pleasure by later death
(the soundness of the deprivation account), how can earlier
annihilation per se can be bad in the respect of annihilation
merely by virtue of its (earlier) timing? For example, can earlier
death be bad, granted the soundness of deprivation account, when

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there are neither pain nor pleasure (or neither harm nor benefit)
there will potentially be (between the timings of earlier and later
death)?

Why most people delay death

One of the explanations of nearly universal preference for

continued existence is a time preference. Because death per se or
annihilation per se is what most of us disprefer, we assign
(whether or not correctly or rationally) a negative value to death.
As most of us also have a positive time preference, most of us
discount future bad with some positive discount rate. However, as
Derek Parfit suggested, this ‘discount rate’ is ‘indefensible’.
[33] Reasons people delay death may include duties one has
voluntarily undertaken (for example, contractual obligations or
parental obligations),

On suicide, assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia

While I think it is better for any person to die as early as possible,

so long as that person’s earlier death would mean less
suffering[34], there may be reasons to desist from ending one’s
life (either by commission or omission). For example, one may
think one’s suicide may cause one’s family and friends an
immense amount of suffering. Also, one may think one’s existence
otherwise serves (potential or actual) interests of (potential or
actual) others. For example, effective altruists, suffering-focused
altruists, philanthropists, animal advocates/activists, children’s
advocates/activists, wild-animal suffering researchers and
advocates, suffering risk researchers and advocates, anti-natalist
and/or pro-mortalist philosopher/advocates/activists, educators,
entrepreneurs, et al., may think that even if one’s earlier death
serves one’s interests, but may nonetheless altruistically desist

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from ending one’s life to reduce suffering of (potential or actual)
others.

Suicide may be morally impermissible due to one’s voluntarily

undertaken duty toward others. For example, a voluntary parent
of a young child, biological or adopted, can be said not to have a
moral right to ‘carry out’[35] suicide.[36]

However, I think if my arguments so far are sound, it will mean

that suicides are permissible and rational (much) more often than
that are, if ever, currently judged permissible or rational by most
people.

Indeed, although a successful and completed suicide cannot be

(pre-mortemly) punished[37], failed suicide attempts are very
often de facto punished with de facto imprisonment (involuntary
commitment) in the psychiatric hospital.[38] For example, aiding
or abetting suicide of another is a crime in almost[39] all
jurisdictions. The access to commonly preferred (painless,
reliable, dignified, etc.) methods of suicide, such as barbiturate
overdose, is very difficult to access in almost[40] all jurisdictions,
as barbiturates are controlled substances in almost all
jurisdictions. Although there may still be some reasons to regulate
people’s access to commonly preferred methods of suicide
(perhaps it can also be used for homicide, etc.) and assisted
suicide, if my arguments so far are sound, such regulations will be
less often justifiable than currently thought of. For example, even
in jurisdictions which assisted suicide and/or euthanasia is legal,
very often it is required that (1) it should be the last resort after
exhausting all treatment options, (2) the suffering must be severe,
(3) the suffering should be diagnosable conditions[41].

On involuntary euthanasia

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My pro-mortalism does not imply that it is obligatory or even
permissible to kill other people without their consent, even
painlessly and with good intent. There may be many reasons for
this, such as autonomy[42] and right to life.

On late-term abortion and infanticide

However, if we were to consider that late-term abortion and

infanticide are permissible, or even obligatory in conditions which
the continued existence of that person would be a harm if my
arguments so far are sound, we should consider that late-term
abortion and infanticide are permissible, or even obligatory
in all cases.[43]

Negative Utilitarianism

It has been suggested by opponents of negative utilitarianism

(NU) that negative utilitarianism implies (temporal) pro-
mortalism. Critics of NU consider purported pro-mortalist
implications of NU as a reductio ad absurdum of NU.[44] While a
NU may try to argue that NU does not imply pro-mortalism by
appealing to the possibility of negative indirect (“flow-through”)
effects on others of an earlier death of a person, the axiology
behind NU implies at least earlier death is a benefit for any
person herself. It is also possible to imagine, at least for sake of
argument, the cases of applications of pro-mortalism that does
not involve flow-through effects, as suggested by a 'red button'
thought experiment. ("If there is a giant red button that if pushed,
would kill all sentient beings instantly and painlessly, would you
push it?”) Not many negative utilitarians I am aware of tried to
defend pro-mortalism. Rather, it seems that most NUs tried to
avoid this controversial and inconvenient question. My defence of
pro-mortalism can be used by negative utilitarians against a pro-

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mortalism reductio raised by the opponents of negative
utilitarianism.

Piecemeal approach to pro-mortalism

There are other approaches to pro-mortalism. For example, one

can think each moment one wakes up from sleep or every second
of her life as axiologically similar to cases of coming into
existence. Why should we treat the cases which a person wakes up
from unconsciousness differently from coming into existence?
Moreover, is the intervening period of unconsciousness even
needed? If not, we can construe each second[45] of a person’s life
as a new life, as a coming into existence. This might not be a very
absurd view if we were to deny that one exists as a distinct
metaphysical self (personal identity) that does not change over
time. One can prevent oneself from further coming into existence
by death. This argument, I believe, would have some intuitive
appeal to some anti-natalists.

Notes

[1] While I believe in the soundness of (a hedonistic version of)

the Benatar’s asymmetry, I shall not argue for it here. See, e.g.,
Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming
into Existence. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 2006. Chapter 2.

[2] Here, I shall use Derek Parfit’s taxonomy of views on quality of

life, which he distinguishes (1) hedonistic view, (2) desire
fulfillment view, and (3) objective list view. (Reasons and Persons.
Clarendon Press: Oxford. 1984. 493-502) However, my argument
will work in any cases which the total harm of life will increase
with the length of one’s life, as my argument is that the life with
lesser amount of total harm is, quite independently of the amount
of the total benefit of that life, is always a preferable life (to exist,

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to come into exist and to cease to exist) to the life with more
amount of total harms, even if that life contains much more
benefits. Presumably this will be the case in the desire fulfillment
(or antifrustration) view if (but perhaps not only if) one think (1)
desire frustration is only bad when one is aware of its frustration;
or (2) desire ceases to matter when the desire no longer exists
(whether or not the cessation of existence of desire was achieved
by the cessation of existence of the desirer). Presumably, this will
be the case in the objective list view if (but perhaps not only if) the
list of harms in the objective list view does not include shorter life
or consequences that may arise from a shorter life (for example,
one's inability to see children's high school graduation). I shall not
argue for the soundness of hedonistic view or any other view on
the quality of life or harms or benefits here. Here, I just assume
hedonistic view.

The very term hedonism has a bias, as it is, at least etymologically,

referring to only pleasure. We might have to
say hedondolorism or for suffering-focused or negative utilitarian
context (anti)dolorism, but in the interests of brevity and
familiarity, I used hedonism and its derivative forms, instead
of hedondolorism. A similar point can be raised for the names of a
lift or an elevator. Needless to say, we can use a lift to not just
ascend, but to descend as well. However, it will be verbose and
unfamiliar to call a lift ascend-descendor.

[3] The first use of the term ‘pro-mortalism' in the English

language I could find was by Chip Smith in his blog post in 2007.
(“Initial Harm Part Two: The Antinatalist Logic of Libertarian
Nonaggression”, http://hooverhog.typepad.com/hognotes/
2007/06/initial_harm_pa_1.html, June 20, 2007, Retrieved on
Oct 14, 2017.)

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[4] Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of
Coming into Existence. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 2006. Especially
22-28

[5] The term ’post-mortem nonexistence’ was coined by Frederik

Kaufmann. (Kaufman, Frederik. "Pre-vital and post-mortem non-
existence." American Philosophical Quarterly 36.1 (1999): 1-19.)

[6] I shall use the term pain and suffering both mean any kind of
unpleasant subjective experience, physical, mental, etc.. Although
very often pain and suffering are used in different senses, typically
the former meaning physical pain and the latter meaning mental
suffering, I shall use two terms interchangeably. However,
Professor Benatar’s usage of the term person seems not intended
to exclude non-human animals from his anti-natalist arguments.
(see, e.g., Better Never to Have Been. 2-3)

[7] McGregor, Rafe, and Ema Sullivan-Bissett. "Better no longer

to be." South African Journal of Philosophy= Suid-Afrikaanse
Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte 31.1 (2012): 55-68.

[8] Benatar, David. "Every conceivable harm: a further defence of

anti-natalism." South African Journal of Philosophy= Suid-
Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte 31.1 (2012): 158.

[9] Professor Benatar mentions “hunger, thirst, bowel and bladder

distension (as these organs become filled), tiredness, stress,
thermal discomfort (that is, feeling either too hot or too cold), and
itch” as “conditions causing negative mental states daily or more
often”. (Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of
Coming into Existence. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 2006. 71)

[10] In this paper, I shall use the term person or people

completely interchangeably with sentient being or sentient beings,
respectively, although in the context of bioethics, very often

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personhood is meant something different from sentience. My
choice to use person or people instead of sentient being(s) is
partly in the interest of brevity, but it is also because Professor
Benatar speaks of persons in his anti-natalist arguments.

[11] Professor Benatar thinks there can be non-hedonistic harms.

Although his asymmetries in his earlier publications use ‘pain’
and ‘pleasure’, his book in 2015 instead used harms and benefits.
Here, I shall use pain and pleasure.

[12] Benatar, David. "Why it is better never to come into

existence." American Philosophical Quarterly 34.3 (1997): 347.

[13] Benatar, David. "Still better never to have been: a reply to

(more of) my critics." The Journal of ethics 17.1-2 (2013): 136.

[14] Benatar, David. Better never to have been: the harm of

coming into existence. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 2006. 45 n. 33.

[15] Cells 7 and 8 are added by me from Ibid.

[16] From what Professor Benatar said in his writings (see, e.g.,
pp. 41-2, ibid. or Benatar, David. "Every conceivable harm: a
further defence of anti-natalism." South African Journal of
Philosophy= Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte 31.1
(2012): 142), it is clear that the axiological assessments of cells 3
and 4, and presumably of cells 5 to 8 are relative assessments
relative to cells 1 and 2.

[17] While there may be cases such as which pains of life are
concentrated in earlier parts of life, and pleasures of life are
concentrated in later parts of life, and when considering whether
life is worth continuing, one’s pains are over and one’s pleasure is
about to start, for sake of simplicity, I shall presume pains and

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pleasures are temporally equally distributed during the course of
one’s life.

[18] While classical (hedonistic) utilitarianism (the axiological

position that value is pleasure minus pain) can also be called
positive (hedonistic) utilitarianism, as the term positive
utilitarianism is presumably antonym of negative (hedonistic)
utilitarianism (the axiological position that value is minus pain, or
disvalue is pain, while pleasure does not count), the very term
positive utilitarianism can be ambiguous or misleading, as it can
refer to either (1) the axiological position that value is pleasure
minus pain (classical utilitarianism) or (2) the axiological position
that value is pleasure, while pain does not count. Although
apparently, most people who are using the term classical
utilitarianism is using the term as a synonym of classical
utilitarianism, there is a danger that the term classical
utilitarianism, used by the author in the (1) sense, misunderstood
by readers as (2) sense. Therefore, the term classical
utilitarianism is the term I prefer over the term positive
utilitarianism.

[19] While (hedonistic) utilitarianism also means a hedonistic

consequentialist view of normative ethics or axiology, especially in
cases of there being or will be two or more actual or potential
sentient beings, I am using the term utilitarianism here that is
applied to one-person isolated cases. Here, I am using the term
utilitarianism as referring to its axiological position, rather than
as a normative ethical position.

[20] Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of

Coming into Existence. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 2006. Especially
22-28

[21] A unit of pleasure can also be simply called hedon.

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[22] A unit of pain can also be simply called dolor.

[23] Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been. pp. 63-4

[24] ‘life not worth starting’ is ambiguous whether life indifferent

starting is included.

[25] The terms same duration choices, different duration choices,

different suffering choices were inspired by Derek Parfit’s
terms same person choices, different people choices, same
number choices, different number choices. Reasons and Persons.
135-137.

[26] Two-world comparison method for the comparison of earlier

and later death was borrowed from Fred Feldman. (Feldman, F.
(1991). Some puzzles about the evil of death. The Philosophical
Review, 100(2), 205-227.)

[27] Kevin Caruso claims “And if you die by suicide, you will not
feel relief from the pain, because relief is only felt by the
living.” (Caruso, Kevin. Suicide Does Not Stop the Pain. http://
www.suicide.org/suicide-does-not-stop-the-pain.html. Retrieved
on Oct 14, 2017). Although it is clear that a (successful) suicide
will not feel a relief in post-mortem existence, it is far from clear
whether most prospective suicides who do not believe in an
afterlife really believe that they will feel relief after death. Rather,
I suspect, most prospective suicides who do not believe in afterlife
desire to die because of their dispreference on the existence and
suffering therein, rather than because of their preference for
a felt sense of relief from suffering.

[28] Feldman, F. op. cit.

[29] Ibid.

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[30] His quote is already on the epigraph of this paper. Although
he did not stipulate he is only referring to earlier death, as he is an
anti-natalist, it is clear that he is referring to earlier death, as one
cannot die if one haven’t been brought into existence.

[31] Julio Cabrera makes a similar whether-when distinction of

death, which he calls the former as ‘structural death’ and the latter
as ‘punctual death’. (Cabrera, Julio. Negative Ethics. May
2011. http://philosopherjuliocabrera.blogspot.com.es/2011/05/
negative-ethics.html. Retrieved on Oct 14, 2017)

Also, Quentin S Crisp articulates this distinction by suggesting

procreation is worse than murder: “I began to harbour a growing
belief, which set me apart to the extent (I sensed) it was not to be
spoken aloud, that having children was a thing worse than
murder. Murder is the curtailing of a life that would have ended
anyway; having a child creates a death that would never have
been.” (Antinatalism: A Thought Experiment, http://
www.litfmag.net/issue-2/antinatalism-a-thought-experiment/,
Retrieved on Oct 14, 2017)

[32] Benatar, David. The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to

Life’s Biggest Questions. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 2017. 102-110.

[33] Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. 357.

[34] While death at older ages are protracted and painful in many
cases, some deaths at earlier ages are extremely painful. Consider,
death by a sadistic murder which involves days of extreme torture.
It might be said that days of extreme torture is worse than
decades of so-called ordinary sufferings of life. Although I am not
sure we can say extremely intense but shorter sufferings are worse
than less intense but longer suffering, I assume that death in

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earlier death is equally painful as death in later death, or both
deaths are painless.

[35] The term ‘carry out’ was suggested by David Benatar as a

replacement of ‘commit’, to remove the bias of the usage of the
word ‘commit’ will have.

[36] Sarah Perry raises a similar point: “I think parents lose their
moral right to commit suicide when they take on the
responsibility for a child”. (Every Cradle Is a Grave: Rethinking
the Ethics of Birth and Suicide, Nine-Banded Books, Charleston,
WV, 2014. 27)

[37] It will be still possible to “punish” post-mortemly by, for

example, denying funeral or confiscation of property (I.e. the
property is not transferred in a way the suicide desired, but
confiscated by the state).

[38] For defences of suicide rights, see, e.g., Szasz, Thomas

Stephen. Fatal freedom: The ethics and politics of suicide.
Syracuse University Press, 2002. And Szasz, Thomas. Suicide
prohibition: The shame of medicine. Syracuse University Press,
2011. And also, Sarah Perry, Every Cradle Is a Grave.

[39] One notable exception of the prohibition of suicide assistance

are in jurisdictions which assisted suicide is permitted. However,
even in cases which assisted suicide is permitted, very often only
physicians are allowed to assist a suicide, under strict criteria.
Switzerland is a notable exception. Article 115 of the Swiss
Criminal Code criminalizes assistance of suicide only if ‘for selfish
motives’. In practice, it is non-physicians who attend assisted
suicide procedure by Dignitas (Switzerland), although all patients
must get a prescription of sodium pentobarbital from a Swiss
physician who is willing to write a prescription.

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[40] In some jurisdictions, barbiturates are sold OTC for
veterinary purposes. See, e.g., Lacey, Marc. In Tijuana, a Market
for Death in a Bottle. The New York Times. Jul 21, 2008. http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/world/americas/
21tijuana.html Retrieved on Oct 15, 2017.

[41] Additional requirement may include one is suffering physical

pain from terminal conditions, such as a metastatic cancer.

[42] See also, Benatar, David. Better never to have been: the harm
of coming into existence. pp. 218-9.

[43] I shall not argue for the permissibility of abortion, late-term

abortion and infanticide here. There is extensive literature on this
topic. See, e.g., Tooley, Michael. "Abortion and infanticide."
Philosophy & Public Affairs (1972): 37-65.

[44] SMART, Roderick Ninian. "Negative utilitarianism." Mind

67.268 (1958): 542-543. See also Ord, Toby. "Why I’m Not a
Negative Utilitarian." University of Oxford, published online at
URL http://www.amirrorclear.net/academic/ideas/
negativeutilitarianism/index.html. Date of retrieval 20.2 (2013):
2014.

[45] Obviously the second, as 1000 milliseconds, is irrelevant

here. We can understand each moment of a person’s life as a
coming into existence. It can be a minute, an hour, a day, a
millisecond, a centisecond, a decisecond, etc..

If you are affected by this article, you can seek help by

contacting crisis hotlines.

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