Plato's Use of Myth in the Education of Philosophic Man

Author(s): Janet E. Smith

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 20-34
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH
IN THE EDUCATION OF PHILOSOPHIC MAN

JANETE. SMITH

THE within
EFFORTTOUNDERSTANDtheplaceofmyth Plato'sphilosophy
wouldbenefit
fromnotingthatPlatohaddifferent fortheeduca-
programs
tionof unphilosophic
men(the"many")and forphilosophic
men(those
capable ofbeing myth
philosophers); hasanimportant anddifferentroleto
playin eachof these programs.'Platodoesnot state
directly the contribu-
tionwhich hebelieved myth couldmaketophilosophy; mostofhiscom-
on
mentary myth is directedtowardsthe placewhich mythhasin the
education oftheunphilosophic.2 Yetitisnotright tosuppose thatwhathe
saysabout myth thereis fully to
applicable theuse of atall
myth times, for
justas thereis a difference
between myths
primitive andthose which Plato
allows inhisstate,sotoohisuseofmyth fortheeducationofthe"many" is

1Plato'suse of mythhas beenthesubjectof a vastnumberof studies.Those consideredto be

standardare PercevalFrutiger,Les Mythesde Platon (Paris 1930; reprintedNew York 1976);
LudwigEdelstein,"The Functionof Mythin Plato's Philosophy,"JHistldeas 10 (1949) 468-
481; Paul Friedlinder,
Plato: An Introduction12,tr. Hans Meyerhoff (New York 1958; reprint-
ed Princeton1969) 171-219; and J. A. Stewart,The Mythsof Plato (London 1905; reprinted
New York 1960). I have also foundespeciallyilluminating Paul Stocklein,"Ueber die Philo-
sophischeBedeutungvon PlatonsMythen,"PhilologusSupp. 30.3 (Leipzig 1937). Manyof the
most perspicaciousobservationsmade about mythhave been made as partsof studiesnot
directlyconcernedwithmyth;mentionwill be made of thesestudiesin the followingnotes.
The mostrecentfull-scalepublicationon thistopic is JuliusElias, Plato's Defenseof Poetry
(Albany,N.Y. 1984). Elias's viewsand minecorrespondin manyways; he offerswhathe callsa
"weak defence"of poetrywhichcorrespondsto my understanding of theplace of mythin the
educationof unphilosophicman. He also offersa "strongdefence"of mythwhichholds that
Platoused mythto presenttheundemonstrable firstprinciplesor axiomsof his thought.While
I am not fullyconvincedthatPlato thoughtthesefirstprinciplesaltogetherindemonstrable,
much of what Elias has to say about mythin the dialoguesis in harmonywiththe analysis
offeredhere.
Severaldoctoraldissertations have been writtenon thissubject,some published,some un-
published;David L. Hitchcock,The Role of the Mythand Its Relationto theRationalArgu-
mentin Plato's Dialogues, (unpublished:ClaremontGraduateSchool 1974); Donald H. Roy,
The PoliticalStatusand Functionof Plato's Myths(unpublished:Universityof Notre Dame
1977); RobertZaslavsky,PlatonicMythand PlatonicWriting(Washington,D.C. 1981); Kent
F. Moors, PlatonicMyth: An Introductory Study (Washington1982); and JanetE. Smith,
Plato's Use ofMythas a PedagogicalDevice (unpublished:Universityof Toronto 1982).
2In the RepublicPlato clearlydistinguishesthe two groupsforwhichhis educationalpro-
grammesare designed:"Aftermuch hard work, and a long investigation, Glaucon, we have
finallydiscoveredwhich of the two are philosophicaland which are not . . . . Since the
philosophicalare thosewho are able to graspthatwhichis alwaysunchangingand thosewho
are not philosophicalare those who wander about all over the place among manydifferent
things,whichof thetwo oughtto be rulersof thecity?"(484a-c).
20
PHOENIX, VOL. 40 (1986) 1.

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 21

not altogether withhis use of mythin the educationof the

coincident
philosophic.It is in the dialogues where we see Socratesengagingin the
ability;thusitwilllargely
ofyoungmenwithsomephilosophical
education
be throughexamininghis use of myththerethatwe will discoveritsplace in
theeducationof thephilosophic.3
An examinationof the use of myth4in the dialoguesshows thatmyths
serveseveralfunctions:(1) they are "playful"in a way which is vital to
philosophy;(2) they serve the relatedpurpose of providinginsightsor
hypothesesforexamination;(3) theyhelp keep thedialogues"undogmatic"
and encouragefurtherinvestigationof topics probed in the dialogues; (4)
theyservePlato's philosophicalgoal of shiftingone's attentionfromthe
Worldof Becomingto "worldsbeyond"whichincludetheWorldof Forms
and the afterlife;and (5) theytend to draw togethermanyof the concerns
and imagesof the dialogue as a whole. Althoughthis list of functionsis
probablynot exhaustive,it may help to revealsome of the contributions
whichmythcan make to thephilosophicprocedure.
But beforetheseclaimsare substantiated, it is properto reviewbrieflythe
place of myth in the Plato's educationalprogramfor the unphilosophic,
since,afterall, even the philosophicin their youthmustpass throughthe
sameeducationalprogramas theunphilosophic-and certainfeaturesofthat
educationare retainedthroughouttheirlives.5In Plato's view mythserved
two chieffunctionsin the educationof the unphilosophic:to assistin the
acquisitionof trueopinion,and to helpmenlearncontrolof theiremotions.
Since Plato believed that the "many" are eitherincapable of acquiring

3Manyhaveinterpreted thedialoguesas a "reproductionof thedialecticprocessin itsvarious

stages"(WernerJaeger,Paideia2, tr. GilbertHighet [New York 1944; reprintedNew York
1965]315). See also RobertCushman,Therapeia(Chapel Hill, N.C. 1958) 6; JohnGould, The
DevelopmentofPlato's Ethics(Cambridge1955) 23; and PhilipMerlan,"Form and Contentin
Plato's Philosophy,"JHistldeas 8 (1947) 406-430.
4Thereis, ofcourse,some debateamongscholarsaboutwhichpassagesin thedialoguesareto
be consideredmyths.The debatederivesfromthe factthaton occasion Plato does not use the
word mythosas a label forpassages which most would recognizeas myths(for instancethe
"myth"of Theuthin thePhaedrusand the "myth"of reminiscence in theMeno). Still,forthe
mostpart,thereis also a remarkableamountof agreement;in thisarticleI have, I believe,used
onlypassageswidelyagreedto be myths.Frutiger(above, n. 1) includesin Chapter3 a listof
passageshe considersto be myth;I acceptall the passagesdesignatedthere.I also acceptsome
of thepassageswhichhe includesin Chapter4 as passagesfalselybelievedto be myths(such as
thesectionon thecave in theRepublic).I have attemptedto providea definitionformythin an
article"Plato's Mythsas 'Likely Accounts,'Worthyof Belief,"(Apeiron19 [1985] 24-42).
5For full discussionsof the educationalprogrammesof Plato see Robin Barrow, Plato's
Utilitarianismand Education(London 1975); B. Bosanquet,The Educationofthe Youngin the
Republicof Plato (1917, reprintedFolcraft,Pa 1973); R. G. Bury,"The Theoryof Education
in Plato's Laws," REG 50 (1937) 304-320; JohnGould (above, n. 3); WernerJaeger,Paideia 2
and 3 (above, n. 3); RupertC. Lodge, Plato's Theoryof Education(London 1947); Glenn R.
Morrow, Plato's Cretan City (Princeton1960); Richard Lewis Nettleship,Lectureson the
RepublicofPlato2(New York 1901; reprintedLondon 1964).

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22 PHOENIX

knowledgeor uninterested in it, theeducationalprogramwhichhe develops

forthemin theRepublicand theLaws has as itschiefaim theinculcationof
trueopinion-which will serveto makemenobedientto thelaw (Rep. 429d
and 522a ff.).And mythconstitutesnearlythe whole of the "intellectual"
educationof the unphilosophic;thus Socrates labors to ensurethat the
contentof the mythis in accord withthe truth(Rep. 379a ff.;in the Laws
censorshipof mythsis legislated,765d ff.).Moreover,thisinculcationof or
indoctrination intotrueopinionis an on-goingprocessforthecitizenry.In
the Laws the Atheniansets up threechoruseswhich embracethe whole
populace and requiresthat they "charm themselvesunceasingly"(665c);
myths,along withsongs and speeches(xoyoL),are includedin the category
of "charms"(664a).6
Myth also helps to soothe and governthe emotions. In the Republic,
Socratesspeaksof the musicaleducationof the soul (whichhas mythas its
chiefcomponent);througha varietyof meansit makesthesoul gracefuland
harmonious,wherebyit acquiresthevirtues(401c ff.).And theLaws, which
is to a largeextentan elaborationof the educationalprogramof theRepub-
lic, explicitlypresentseducationas habituationin takingpleasurein whatis
good and feelingpain forwhatshouldbe hated(653 b ff.;see Rep. 395d ff.).
Yet how could thesefeaturesof mythbe usefulforthephilosopher?After
all, the successof thesemeans of indoctrination dependsupon an unques-
tioningacceptance of thesemythsby thepopulace (Rep. 538cff.).How does
thisfitwiththephilosopher'seducationin the artof dialectic,whichhas as
itspurposeteachingstudentsto "ask and answerin themostknowledgeable
way" (Rep. 534d)?This is a skillto be acquiredand exercisedall in due time.
The educationof thephilosopheris not somethingotherthanbut something
morethanthe educationof the unphilosophic:it is the longerway (Rep.
504b). As Socratesbeginshis descriptionof the philosopher,he mentions
theroleof mythin theeducationof theguardiansin theiryouth:

[Music],thecomplement ofgymnastic,ifyouremember, educatestheguardians

by
habituation,importingnotknowledge,butharmoniousness [ofspirit]bymeansof
melody, andgracefulness
bymeansofrhythm andothercharacteristics
akintothese.
It doesthisthrough boththesortthataremythical
stories, andthosethat
(LVu0eS~Ls)
aretruer.But it includedno suchlearningleadingto thegood,as you are now
seeking(522aff.).7
Philosophers,too, mustacquiretrueopinionand controlof theiremotions.
Nor are these needs that vanish when they undertaketheirphilosophic

6For mythas charmsee Elizabeth Belfiore,"Elenchus,Epode, and Magic: Socratesas Si-

lenus,"Phoenix34 (1980) 128-137; PierreBoyanc6,Le Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes
Grecs(Paris 1936; reprintedParis 1972); P. Lain-Entralgo,The Theoryofthe Wordin Classical
Antiquity(New Haven, Conn. 1970).
7Thetranslations forall Greektextsare myown.

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 PLATO'SUSE OF MYTHIN EDUCATION 23
studies.Herewe shallexaminea fewpassagesin thedialogueswhichshow
thatthemyths continue to servethesefunctions-and more-in theeduca-
tionofthephilosophic as portrayed there.
Theacquisition oftrueopinion,whichis theendoftheeducational pro-
cessfortheunphilosophic, is justa stagein theeducationalprogram ofthe
philosophic.Mythscan helpintroduce a youngmanto a truth whichwill
laterreceive
dialecticalexamination. Indeed,intheLawstheAthenian atone
point that
indicates it is much easierto do philosophy with thosewho
alreadyhave true opinion, who learned thelessonsof theirchildhoodand
honoredthemythstheyweretold (887c ff.).Socrates,too, adviseshis
to listencloselyto theteachings
interlocutors ofmyths: forinstance,
in the
Phaedrus Socratesadmonishes Phaedrus toconsiderseriously thecontentof
themythabouttheoriginof thewritten word.Phaedrushas attempted to
dismissSocrates'explanation oftheoriginofthewritten wordbycallingita
made-uptalefromEgypt(275b3).SocrateschidesPhaedrusforhis false
standards:
But,myfriend, ofZeusatDodonasaidthatthefirst
thoseatthetemple prophetic
wordscamefromanoaktree.Indeedmenatthattime,sincetheywerenotwiselike
youyoung men,wereintheir tolisten
satisfied
simplicity tooaktrees androcks,
that
provided they spokethetruth.
But to it
you,apparently, makesa difference
who
isspeaking
andwhereheisfrom;you arenotcontenttofocus on
only this:
ifwhatis
saidis trueornot(275b-c).

Thisremark suggests thattheremaybe muchthatit is truein myth.The

Seventh Lettergivessimilar advicetorespect ancient andholytales(regular-
ly interpreted to meanmyths):1TEe0EreOaL E 6v'rw
ESd& XPTTOS 1tXaOLSTE
KaiLEpoEsX6yoLt (335a2).Certainly Socrateshimself evincesan attitude
of
reverence towardsthe mythswhichhe tells.He usuallycitesa revered
sourceor somekindof authority forthem.For instance, in theMenohe
referstopriests andpriestesses
as thesourceforthemyth;intheSymposium
heattributes themythheis goingto tellto thewisewomanDiotima;andin
theRepubliche claimsto haveheardEr himself, a manwho has returned
fromtheafterlife, tellthetale. In short,Socratesin everyway givesthe
impression thatthereis muchto learnfromthemyths-andthatthosewho
do philosophy shouldnotdiscountthem.
The rbleof themythat theend of thePhaedogivesevidencethatthe
charming orsoothing oftheemotions doesnotstopwiththeearlyeducation
ofthephilosophers. In thePhaedoSocratesadvisescontrolofemotion, not
to maketheyounglaw-abiding in anydirectway,butso thattheirminds,
liberatedfromcumbersome passions,mayengagein philosophy. In this
dialogue,it is the fearofdeathwhich troublesSimmias andCebes; Socrates
triesto freethemfromit so thattheymaybecomebetterphilosophers
(which,in turn,is the truestway to be freefromthe fearof death). Cebes

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24 PHOENIX
asksfora charmto chaseawaythefearofdeath(77e)andSocratessupplies
thischarmwhenhe adviseshimto sing as a charm,themythtold
(irnTELv),
at theclose of the dialogue(114d) and remarks thatthemythhas been
offered as a meansofconsolation (see 115d4).
Yet,although therearethesesimilarities betweentheuse ofmythin the
education of theunphilosophic and theeducationof thephilosophic, the
mostfundamental difference betweenthemis thattheunphilosophic are
discouraged, notto sayprohibited (as theLaws teaches)fromquestioning
themyths, whereasthephilosophic areencouraged to questionthemyths,
as all else.Indeed,it is thevalueplacedon thequestioning whichchiefly
distinguishes the education of the philosophic from that ofthe unphilosoph-
ic.AtRepublic 538cff.Socrates tellshowquestioning upsetsthosewhohave
learned fromtheiryouthtohonorthejustandhowiteasilyfosters rebellion
anddisobedience: thosewhohaveonlytrueopinionarevulnerable because
they have only memorized the truths which they have learnt;they have not
learntthereasonsforthem,i.e., theycannotdefendtheirtrueopinionsor
recover trueopinionwhenlost.Memorization is a goodmeansofacquiring
trueopinionbutnotforacquiring knowledge-andthephilosophic man
seeksto haveknowledge. It is onlythequestioning spirit which willenable
thephilosopher to "chaindown"hisviewswithan accountandthusensure
thathewillnotbe robbed,beguiled, or forgetfulofthetrueopinionwhich
he has acquired(Rep. 412e ff.).Questioning, then,is encouraged forthe
philosophic; in facttheireducation beginswiththeactofquestioning, par-
ticularly thequestioning of thedisparity betweenappearance and reality
(532a).
Not all, of course,are eligiblefor,thatis, capableof, a philosophic
education. In BookSixoftheRepublic Socrates repeatedly liststhequalifica-
tionsforthosewhoaretobe trained as philosophers: forinstance, at487ahe
speaksofa pursuit to be practised bya man"bynature ofgoodmemory, of
quickapprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly, and akin to truth,
jus-
tice,bravery, andsobriety." Theeducation ofthesemenis bestdescribed as
a conversion: they must be turned from the World of Becoming to the
WorldofBeing.As theireducation is described intheRepublic, itseemsthat
aftertheindoctrination ofmythintheirchildhood, andafter theawakening
ofthought provoked bysuchthings as mathematics, geometry, solidgeome-
try,astronomy, and other sciences the will
(523a), philosophic thenpursue
knowledge exclusively through dialectic, understood in therather narrow
senseofthetesting ofhypotheses andtheattendant toolssuchas elenchus
anddiairesis.
Yet "dialectic"in theroot(and broad)sensemeansdiscussion,and is
frequently usedbyPlatoto describe thesortofdiscussion whichgoeson in
thedialogues;clearlyitincludesmuchmorethanthetesting ofhypotheses.
Those who make Plato's methodof philosophytheircentralinterestrarely

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 25

considerthepossibility thatmythand otherpoeticelementsmayassist

dialectic in thenarrowsense,andthattogether withit theymayconstitute
Plato'smethodofdoingphilosophy, or dialecticinthebroadsense.Robin-
son'schapter on analogyin hisbookPlato'sEarlierDialecticexplainswhy
scholarsneglectthe r6le of myth,analogy,and otherpoeticdevicesin
Plato'sphilosophic method:it is becausePlatohimself neglects to discuss
them.RobinsonsaysthatwhereasPlatois self-conscious inhisjustification
ofhishypothetical method, heoffers littlejustification
forhisuseofanalogy
andotherpoeticdevices.8 Nevertheless, Platomakesregular useofthem.If,
indeed,the dialoguesare a portrayal of thephilosophicquest,thevery
presence ofmyth inthedialoguesindicates thatithascontributions tomake
tothisquest.Whatarethesecontributions?
One observation thatwe canperhapsmakeaboutdialectic, inthenarrow
sense, is thatit can be tedious;unrelenting, rigorous dialecticneedssome
meansof reliefto maintain interest on thepartof theparticipants andthe
observers. Plato givesmuchindication in the dialoguesthathe did not
believephilosophy to be a boringbusiness,butrather thathe thought itto
be a formofplay:in theSeventhLetter,Platoclaimsneverto havewritten
aboutthemostseriousthings (341c);in thePhaedrus,Socratesrefers to all
written workas play;' intheLaws theAthenian maintains thatmanshould
spendhiswholelifeat play(803cff.;cf.814dff.);andin theSixthLetter
playis referred to as thesisterofseriousness (323dl).
The dialoguesand all thatis withinthemseemto be playfulin several
important ways.First,theyarea breakfromthetediumofthebusinessof
daily life;theyare regularly set at partiesand at othercasualand festive
gatherings of men. At such gatherings, theguestsfrequently toldtalesas
part of the entertainment, e.g., the tales told byAristophanes Socrates
and
in theSymposium. Andwithinthedialoguesthemythsareoftentoldas a
breakfrom therigors ofdialectic.Forinstance, intheStatesman, aftera very
detaileddiairesis, at268dtheEleaticadvisesa newbeginning whichhe says
willoffer someamusement; thisamusement is themyth.The myth,while
offering needed relief,also makes a contribution to thepursuit ofthenature
ofthestatesman; itis playwitha seriouspurpose.
It canbe saidthatphilosophy inherently has a kindofplayfulness about
it: it is a kindof "playingwithideas."This,obviously,is nota frivolous
kindofplay;onecanplaywithseriouspossibilities. Dialecticneedspossibil-
itiesto "playwith."Mythhelpsthephilosophic searchby facilitatingthe

8RichardRobinson,Plato's EarlierDialectic2 (Oxford 1953; reprintedOxford1970) 202.

9The recognitionof the importanceof play in Plato's thoughtis common. See G. Ardley,
"The Role of Play in the Philosophyof Plato," Philosophy42 (1967) 226-244; R. G. Bury
(above, n. 5) 304-320; W. K. C. Guthrie,A Historyof GreekPhilosophy4 (Cambridge1975)
58-65; Jan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (London 1949); and P. Plass, "Play and Philosophic
Detachmentin Plato," TAPA 98 (1967) 343-364.

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26 PHOENIX

playingwithideas:it oftenprovidesthepossibilities whichdialectictests.

Dialectic,in the narrow sense, is the examination of hypotheses through
questioning andanswering. Dialecticcannotfunction without hypotheses to
be tested.Wheredo theparticipants getthem? There aremany sources for
newhypotheses, suchas directintuition, analogy,authority, andcommon
opinion.10 In a certainsense all have thestatusof intuition-understood as
aninsightwhichprovides a newwayofseeingthings, whichmayormaynot
bevalid,i.e., ithelpsoneto seethatwhichhasnotyetbeenproven.11 These
12
then,needto be tested. Theinsights ofintuition
intuitions, providea kind
of new beginning forthedialectical process;theyfollowupon elenchus,
whichextracts andrefutes falseopinion,andtheyprovidenewmaterial with
whichtowork.Becausethereis no guarantee, ofcourse,thattheinsights or
opinionoffered by intuition willbe true,theytoo aresubjectto examina-
tion.Although itplaysno partinproving something trueorfalse,intuition
doesservea definite purpose in thephilosophic endeavour.
Mythhasfeatures in commonwithall thesourcesofintuition (analogy,
authority,andcommonopinion)mentioned above.Robinsonobserves that
and
analogies examples produce new or
insights intuitions
(above, note 8,
213).He cites Socrates'use of the comparison of thecityand the man in the
Republicas anexampleofanalogythatproducesa newhypothesis aboutthe
natureofjustice.Theanalogiesandexamples inthemyths oftenworkinthe
sameway.Forinstance, themythofthecharioteer andhorsesinthePhaed-
rusrevealsmuchto Socratesand Phaedrusaboutthenatureof love and
thesuggestions
rhetoric; aboutthenatureofrhetoric arefollowed up atleast
tosomeextent in thesecondhalfofthedialogue.
Socrates' useofmythintheMenoexemplifies theappealto authorityand

'oFor intuitionas a sourceof hypothesessee R. E. Carter,"Plato and Inspiration,"

JHistPhil
5 (1967) 111-121; VictorGoldschmidt,Le Paradigmedans la Dialectiqueplatonicienne(Paris
1947) 51; Rene Schaerer,La Questionplatonicienne(Neuchatel 1969) 129 and 294; and Robin-
son (above, n. 8) 109. For analogy, see Robinson 211 and 215, and Goldschmidt18. For
authority see Goldschmidt45 and forcommonopinion,Goldschmidt47.
"Scholarsuse theword "intuition"fortwo different stagesofPlato's epistemology.It is used
sometimesto referto thefinalgraspingof a truth(or of an Idea) whichis theculminationof the
epistemologicalprocess. This differsfromthe "intuition"to which I make reference.This
intuitionis simplya suddeninsightof a possibletruth.The two typesof intuitionaresimilarin
theirsuddenness,and theirindependence,in a sense,fromdialecticalexamination.Theirdiffer-
ences are greater:the initialintuitionis tentativeand cries out for examination;the final
intuition followsa dialecticalexaminationand is thesourceof thecertainty whichcharacterizes
knowledge.
12L. W. Wild, in "Plato's Presentationof the IntuitiveMind in his Portraitof Socrates,"
Philosophy14 (1939) 326-340, commentson Socrates'divergencefrommost "mystics"who
have "supremefaithin revelationand hold the findingsof reasonin relativecontempt"(331):
"... his [Socrates']work was to apply reasonto the notionsthatmen commonlyacceptun-
examined,and to teach his followersthatonly with the sanctionof reason were theyto be
accepted."

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 27

commonopinionas a meansofproviding a newhypothesis. Afteran elen-

chicexamination ofMeno'sviews,andafterSocratesandMenohavemade
severalunsuccessful (thoughnottotallyfruitless) attempts to definevirtue
andthusto understand howonecomesto learnit,Menoannounces thathe
is in a stateofaporia(80a4).Socratesat thispointintroduces something, a
myth, which he has heard from wise men and women. He uses themyth to
introduce a newpossibility, a newhypothesis forexamination: theviewthat
thesoulhaslearnedeverything beforebeingborn(81c5-7).This"doctrine"
ofthemythis, it seems,a novelone,butthedetailsofthemytharethose
familiar totheGreeks;themention ofPersephone andHadesgivesthestory
a kindofauthenticity. In a sense,Socratesmakesan appealheretocommon
opinion.Now, although Socratesclaimsthathe findsthemythto be true
andcitesauthorities, he also offers to proveit oCat,82bl) to Meno
a Thus Socrates (mspErT
introduces a
by examiningslave-boy. something through
myth before he attemptsto establish the same thingthrough dialectic.
Manyofthehypotheses whichSocratesoffers forexamination, manyof
the"truths" whichhe seeksto teach,suchas thetheory ofreminiscence, are
formanyreasonsdifficult to accept.Mythcan oftenhelpin rendering the
interlocutor moreamenableto the propositionbeingpresented.In the
Laws,aftermuchargumentation, theAthenian indicates thatmythserves
well as a meansto persuadethe reluctant of the truth-butit is not a
substitute forargumentation; itis a supplement (903a).In thedialogues, we
seemythin serviceoftruths whicharedifficult to accept.Mythalongwith
argumentation helpsSocratesinhisattempt to convert thefalseopinionsof
theinterlocutors intotrueopinion.For instance, in theGorgiasCallicles
saysthatifwhatSocratessaysbe true,humanlifebecomesturnedupside
down:menarepresently doingtheoppositeofwhatis right(481c;andsee
alsoRep.450cff.).In thatdialogue,Socrateslaborshardthrough dialectic
andmyth topersuadetheinterlocutors ofthetruth heis teachingthere:that
it is betterto havewrongdone to one thanto do it to another(527b2).
Calliclesresiststhistruththroughout thedialogue,and finally at theend
Socratestellsa myth,whichhe hopeswillhelpconvinceCalliclesof the
truth forwhichhe has beenarguing.Althoughthereis no indication that
Calliclesis swayedbythismyth, Socratesdoesuseitas a persuasive supple-
mentto hisargument.
Callicles'recalcitrance
inthefaceofthemythmaybe theexception rather
thantherule;Socrates regularly triestomoldhisarguments-and hismyths
-to thetastesofhisinterlocutors (whichin thePhaedrushe arguesis the
markofthegood[philosophic] rhetorician [271dand261a]).For instance,
Socrates'use of themythin thePhaedrusis clearlydesignedto winover
Phaedrus(andquiteclearlydoes). In reference to his firstspeech,calleda
mythos(237a), Socratesremarksthatthe enchantingplace in whichhe and
Phaedrusfindthemselvesgiveshimtheimpressionof beingdivine;underits

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28 PHOENIX

influence,he findshimself in a near-frenzy andtending to use speechwith

therhythms ofdithyramb (241c). While radically changing hisargument in
thesecondspeech(alsocalleda mythos, 253c),Socrates continues tospeakin
a highlypoeticfashion.At theclosehe claimsthathe was forcedto use
poeticalfigures forthesakeofPhaedrus(257a).The myth, however, is not
thefinalword;it is followedby a rigorousdialectical discussion, which
touchesupon someof thepointsof themyth-butwhichleavesothers
unexamined. Socratesis not so muchinterested in establishing truths for
Phaedrus as ininstructing himhowtodiscover truth.Themyth, then,inno
waysupplants dialecticor closesthequestioning process;Socratesmakesit
clearthaton-going examination ofthetopicsofthedialogueis desirable.
As we havementioned, whatis "established" in a Platonicdialogueis
nevermadea pointof"dogma,"inthesenseofa truth notto be questioned;
one alwayssensesthatwhatever truthhas beenfoundis opento further
consideration andelaboration. Plato'sprimary goalwas notdelivering doc-
trinesbut goadingpeople to discoverthe truthforthemselves. Indeed,
Plato'schoiceofpresenting hisviewsin thedialogueformservesto hinder
thereaderfromaccepting thesedoctrines as pronouncements ofauthority;
no authority speaks. Nor is it alwayseasy to determine what has been
established.The argument betweenSocratesandhisinterlocutors is usually
meandering-they followit wherever it takesthem;extracting a coherent
"defence" ofa doctrine fromthemanyfalsestartsanddigressions becomes
very difficult.Indeed, it is even the case that several dialogueswhichhave
Socratesandhisinterlocutors arriving at sometruth withinthemneverthe-
lessendinaporia(suchis frequently theinterpretation oftheMeno);thatis
to say,although Socratesleadshisinterlocutors to thetruthwhichwould
resolvethedifficulty theyareexploring, towardstheendofthedialoguehe
willintroduce or allow the interlocutor to introduce further difficulties
whichappearto throwintodoubtthepreviously established conclusion.
Thistechnique ensuresthattheinterlocutor willcontinueto seekstrong
reasonsforwhathe is learning; it has thesameeffect on thereader.The
dialoguesmayindicatewhatthetruthis on a givenmatter and maygivea
kindofdefense forthisdoctrine butone is alwaysleftwiththesensethata
tighterdefense couldbe given;one is alwaysinvited, notto saycompelled,
tosearchforoneself.
The mythsareinstrumental in creating thiseffect as well.13The content
andformofmythareprovocative andforceonetodo further investigation;
oneneedstoponderthemeaning oftheimagesofthemythandtoattempt to
separatewhat in the myths is fictivedetail and what are the truths which
Socratesispromoting through themyth.Indeed,themyths havethecurious
doublepowerof bothreiterating truthsestablished by previousargument
"For moreon thispoint,see Merlan(above, n. 3) 411.

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 29

and suggestingnew possibilities.It is the symbolsor imagesof the myth

whichgiveit thispower; it is thenatureof a symbolto have morethanone
meaningor sense. One senseof a symbolcould capturean establishedtruth;
anothersenseof thesame symbolcould open up new horizons.14
PhilosophyforPlato is "playful,"not onlybecauseit is the"playingwith
ideas," butalso because,as a passagenotedabove indicates,"play" is one of
the meansof access to the "most serious matters."In the SeventhLetter,
Platoclaimsthathe neverwroteabout the"mostseriousthings:"theproper
interpretation of this claim would seem to be thatwhen he speaks of the
"mostseriousthings"here he is referring to the intellectionor intuitionof
theWorldof Forms,whichis theineffable experienceof an individual.Now
this is not, of course, to say that one cannot writeabout the World of
Forms,butthatwritingabout themand experiencing them,themostserious
thing, are two verydifferent matters.Guthrie's comments (above, note 9,
62) on theplayfulness of the are
dialogues helpful in thisregard:
Now no onewillbelievethattheauthorofthetwelvebooksoftheLawsandtenof
theRepublic,to say nothingof theStatesman and all of thedialoguesaimedat
continuingtheSocraticquestforvirtue,thought ofhumanactivity as scarcely
worth
ofpaidiaandspoudehe himself
In hisattribution
seriousattention. canuse a little
playfulironyto remind us thatthereis a divinerealmabovethehuman,thereis a
changeless abovetheturmoil
reality ofthephysical world,anditis tothesethatour
highest andspiritual
intellectual powersshouldbe devoted.
The dialogues,then,or philosophicaldiscourses,do not put one in contact
withthe World of Forms, but may help point the way to the World of
Forms. The philosophicalplay which Plato advocatesis a tool of philo-
sophy,a meansof conversion,of movingone's attentionfromtheWorldof
Becomingto theWorld of Forms. Certainlydialectic,whichis a powerful
tool forexposingthefalsenessofone's opinionsand forsuggesting thatthere
is a unitybehindthe claimsone makes about reality,serveswell the tasks
centralto the philosophicquest, i.e., not takingthingsas theyseem, but
tryingto see thingsas theyare, and tryingto discoverwhat are theeternal
verities.Myth, too, with its images and analogies,helps studentsto see
thingsin a new way; a briefconsiderationof the mythof the Phaedrus
indicatesthat mythcan help to shiftone's attentionfromthe World of
Becomingto theWorld of Being.
Socrates,in the Phaedrus, argues that the one composingmythsand
constructing imagesmusthave knowledge(269d5). To draw upon the cave
image,he mustbe one who has advancedout of thecave and has seenthings
as theyreallyare. The mythopens mento thepossibilitythatwhattheysee

arguesfor the provocativecapacityof mythand attributesit to the symbolic

14St6cklein
natureof myth: he observes (above, n. 1, 11) that pure symbol always overflowsand is
"unfillupable"
(unausschopfbar)of meaningand alwaysadequateto lead to deeperexpression.

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30 PHOENIX

(in termsof the cave, the shadows againstthe wall) is not the whole of
oreveninPlatonic
reality, terms,the"really inhisdiscus-
real."Socrates,
sionofrhetoric,
clarifies
thatthetruerhetorician inwrit-
(thephilosopher)
inghis speechesknowsthetruthand thuscan constructmythsusingproba-
bilities,which have a semblance to the truth(273d). The mythof the
Phaedrus(Socrates'second speech) clearlyserves,forinstance,to reorient
thesightof Phaedrusfromstrictly humanlove to a love whichhas a shareof
thedivine.This requiresfirsta solid understandingof thenatureof thesoul,
whichSocratespresentsin a scientific mannerand thenhe elaboratesthrough
a myth:

Concerning theimmortality ofthesoul,enoughhasbeensaid.Concerning theform

ofthesoul,we needto discussit in thefollowing way:to speakofit justas it is,
wouldinevery waybe a taskfora godanditwouldrequire a lengthy
discourse,but
togivea semblanceofit( 4 &~ thisa mancando andina shorter
OLKWv), discourse.So
letusspeakofitinthisway.Letus likenit(iOLKiTw)tothecombined powerofa team
ofwingedhorsesandtheircharioteer (246a).
One wonders,of course, whethersuch a divine discourseis even in the
realmof possibility,foreven in the mythof thisdialogue,Socratesargues
thatknowledgeof the divineis possible only to the divine(247d). But he
also arguesthata partof man is divine:the voosor reasonof man is divine
and thuscan have some knowledgeof the divine.Nonetheless,knowledge
of the natureof the soul, like any knowledgeof the divine,includingthe
Forms,is extremely difficultto achieve.As Socratesremarks,it is easierto
suggest truths about the soul in an image than to prove them. He also
remarksthathis understanding of the soul, especiallywhen appliedto the
souls of the gods, is not a product of vision (806v~ES), nor of adequate
comprehension(LKvo)svoS cxVOtVT), but of the imagination v,
246c). Socrates declares that in the mythhe is speaking (rXciTTohL
of matters
openly
veryout of theordinary:
No earthly poethas everyetsungworthily ofthatregionbeyondtheheaven,nor
everwill.Butitis thus-one oughtto dareto speakthetruth, sinceI am
especially
speaking aboutthetruth.You see, it is therethatTrueBeinghas itshome;True
Beingis without andintangible;
shape,colorless, itis visibleonlyto thereason,the
pilotofthesoul;andall trueknowledge is knowledge ofTrueBeing(247c).
Note thatalthoughSocratesclaimsthathe speaks of the "regionbeyond,"
he also claimsthathe speaks thetruth,a truthaccessibleto thereason.The
worldof whichhe speaksis quite clearlytheWorld of Forms. Throughout
themythhe acknowledgesthatknowledgeof thisworldis verydifficult for
manand givesadvicemuchlike thatgivenelsewherein thedialogues,nota-
blytheRepublicand thePhaedo: thatone mustleave "thefieldof manifold
sense-perceptions and enterthatin whichtheobjectof knowledgeis unique
and graspedonly by reasoning"(Phaedrus249b).

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 31
We also findone of themainpointsof Plato'sphilosophy madevery
naturallyin the context of thismyth. Socratescalls upon the theoryof
to
anamnesis explainman'sability to the
recollect Forms-a doctrinenot
confinedtomythbutdemonstrated inboththeMenoandthePhaedo.Much
ofthemyth, then,assumestheWorldofFormsandotherPlatonicdoctrines
suchas theimmortality ofthesoulandthedoctrine ofanamnesis. Themyth
of thePhaedrusalso servesto give"likely"explanations forthedifferent
naturesandwaysoflivingamongmenandsomeexplanation ofthenature of
bothlifebeforebirthand afterdeath,forthemythtellshow souls are
attachedtodifferentgodsinthe"regions beyond"andmakechoicesoflives
andloveson thebasisof theseattachments. Theseexplanations obviously
cannotbe confirmed in a philosophical
way,butmuchis conveyedto us
aboutdifferenttypesof menand aboutlovewhichcan be verified. Later
whenSocratesis explaining how his speechmettherulesof rhetoric, he
remarks uponthepartofthemythwhichusedtheimageofthecharioteer in
thisfashion:
S. . andinsomewaywedescribed
ina figure thepassion
oflove,
perhapsachievingsometruth,butperhapsalso(CdLTLKOtovTE)
goingastraysomewhat.
We have,
thus,puttogethera notaltogether we
discourse;
unpersuasive havesunga mythic
hymn TLVaiivov)
and
reverently in
piously honor ofyourmaster,
Phaedrus,
(pvOLK6v
andmine, Eros,theguardianofbeautiful
boys(265b).

Themyth, then,workstogether withthedialectic, boththatofthedialogue

inwhichitappearsandwithdialectical demonstration inotherdialogues, to
exposetheinterlocutors to "regionsbeyond,"whichincludetheWorldof
Formsand theafterlife, and to reiterate and at timesto introduce other
doctrinesconnected withthese.Now mythrarely offers for
arguments these
doctrines.Nevertheless, it does aid in makingtheinterlocutor receptive to
arguments and leadshim to these arguments him
byoffering insights to be
tested,insights oftenabout"worlds"withwhichhe is not familiar. The
myth, then, helps theinterlocutor his
begin philosophical conversion from
attachment to whatseemsto be so to whatis so. In thePhaedrusthemyth
hasservedthispurposebydrawing theattentionofPhaedrusto theWorld
ofFormsinitsdiscussion oftheactivity ofsoulsbefore incarnation,andby
suggestingthat dedication to or
philosophy, study of the World ofForms,
willaffectone'sattainment ofimmortality.
Mythalsoprovides a serviceforthedialogues(andthephilosophic quest)
whichis reallyquitebeyondthepowersofdialectic: ithelpsto embrace or
synthesize, in a sense,manyofthetopicsofa dialogue.Platonicdialogues
arewonderfully integralworksof artwhichhavethemes, images,vocabu-
lary,characterizations, all
i.e., parts of thedialogue,designedlyappropriate
to each otherand all contributing
to theaim of thewhole. But thedialectic,
withits analyticalthrust,is not the elementof the dialogue which draws

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32 PHOENIX

together thesedifferent elements. Myth,however, oftendoesdrawtogether

many of the themes of the dialogue:there is often a repetition oflanguage
andmention oftopicsornameswhichappearelsewhere inthedialogue;the
mythoftenreiterates or sometimes introduces quitedirectly andexplicitly
centralpoints of the dialogue; and the myth often includes an imageor a
seriesofimageswhichcaptures ina vividwaymanyofthechiefconcerns of
thedialogue(cf.Jaeger, above,note3, 151).
Themyths do havethepowerto helponeremember, to someextent, the
contents of a dialogue,and oftento providea kindof "picture"of the
meaning ofthedialogue;indeed,eachis carefully crafted to "fit"withthe
dialoguein whichit appears.The mythof thePhaedrus,withitsstriking
imageofthecharioteer andthehorses,againprovides a goodexample ofthe
powerofmythtocapture themainthemes ofthedialogues.15A fullpresen-
tationof all theconnections of themythwiththedialogueis notfeasible
here,butthefollowing briefreviewofsomeofthelarger connections should
suggest therichness ofthemythinthisregard.
The imageof thecharioteer and his teamrepresents theconflict within
manbetween hisreasonandhispassions:man'sreason,thecharioteer, may
eithercontrol hispassionsorsuccumb tothem,foroccasionally theblackor
unruly horseprevails andoccasionally thewhiteorgoodhorse.Thestruggle
represented in thisimage between two opposingforces,one goodandone
bad,appearsso manytimesinthedialoguethat,ina sense,itdominates the
dialogue. We see the spirit of contestwhich the
pervades dialogue the in
following pairings: the non-lover versus thelover,Phaedrus versusSocrates,
Lysias versus Socrates, Socrates (1stspeech) versus Socrates (2ndspeech),
thewritten versusthespokenword,and rhetoric versusphilosophy. And
withinthedialogueSocrates,as a loverofPhaedrus, seemsto embodythe
struggle represented by thecharioteer andhorses:he appearsmomentarily
toyieldtothebadhorseandgivesa speechwhich,atleastostensibly, argues
fora badpassion.Buteventually thegoodhorsewinsoutandSocrates leads
bothhimself andPhaedrusto be loversofphilosophy, which,as Socrates
indicatesinthemyth, is theproperoutcomeofa loverelationship (256aff.).
Thedialoguecloseswithindications andpromises thattheparticipants will
continue theirstruggle inpursuit ofwisdom.Socrates admonishes Phaedrus
to tryto leadLysias,hisbeloved,aright (278c).Phaedrusalsosuggests that

15AnneLebeck, in "The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus," GRBS 13 (1972) 267-290,

providesan excellenttreatment of the connectionof therelationof a mythto a dialogue.She,
too, sees mythas a means of provokinginsightand of synthesizing the major themesof the
dialogue(289): "A key doctrineof the mythis anamnesis,thatprocessof recollectionwhich
culminates in insight.This sametermcould be used to describethetechniqueofverbalreminis-
cence whichcharacterizesboth mythand dialogue. As words and imagesrecurtheycall up
wholepassages,majorideas. A networkof associationis createdwhichcontinuallyexpandsthe
reader'sconsciousness."

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 PLATO'S USE OF MYTH IN EDUCATION 33

Socratesdeliver theirmessageto Isocrates,who,itis suggested, hasa special

relationship withSocrates.For bothabsentrhetoricians thereis hopethat
theirmorephilosophical loverswilllead themto thelove of philosophy.
Thisapplication ofthecharioteer andhorsescouldbe expanded as wetraced
Socrates'response andrelation toPhaedrus throughout thedialogueincom-
parisonwiththedepiction oftheexperience offalling in lovein themyth;
theother"contests" in thedialoguecouldbe probedin thesamefashion.
Theimageandthemythinwhichitis foundtruly capture themainconcerns
ofthedialogueandeven,ina sense,overflow theboundaries ofthedialogue
as theypointto thephilosophical discussionsbasedon lover-relationships
whichareto takeplacein thefuture.
Another indicationthatthemyths"fit"thedialoguesin whichtheyap-
pear,and thattheycapturesomeofthethemesofthedialogues,is thefact
thatthemyths, eventhoseaboutthesametopic,couldnotbe removed from
onedialogueandplacedin another. Therearefoureschatological myths in
thedialogues, andtheyarein no senseinterchangeable. Socrates'presenta-
tionof theafterlife in theApologyhas Socratesspendingan eternity in
the
conversation, veryactivity for which he has been defending himself.The
mythin thePhaedo,withits emphasison catharsis of thesoul (notethe
of of
number occurrences forms the of word "pure"in themyth;108c3,
109b7[twice],109d3,110c2,111b6,113d7,114cl, 114c3),reinforces the
argument ofthedialoguethatdeathis notfrightening forthephilosopher,
forhehaspurified himself.AndwhereasboththeGorgiasandtheRepublic
areconcerned withjusticeandrewardandpunishment, themyths arevery
different, sincetheyare alliedcloselywiththecentralarguments of the
dialoguesin whichtheyappear.In theGorgiasSocratesarguesthatit is
betterto haveinjusticedone to oneselfthanto do it to one another, for
injusticecorrupts the immortal soul. Thus the judgment of the dead,fea-
turedin themyth,whereinmenarejudgedstripped of theirbodies,rein-
forcesa pointcentralto thedialogue,i.e., thatthesoulis moreimportant
thanthebody.Themythis tiedto thepreceding discussion inotherimpor-
tantways,forinstance, eventhegreatking(whomPolususedas an example
to arguethatpowerwas the greatest good [470e]) appearsin themyth
[524e]. In themyth of the Republic(whichhas certainparallelswiththe
image of the Cave,for both featuremenwhohavebeento different worlds
andhaveseenstrange thingswhich those leftbehind to
ought know),Socra-
tes,in an to
attempt encourage men to be just,tellsofmenchoosingtheir
nextlives-a choicedetermined by their goodness(or lackof it) in their
former lives.He stressesa mainpointof theargument of thepreceding
discussion oftheRepublic;oneoughtto pursuestudieswhichenableoneto
judgewhatistruly goodinthisworld(618c).Storiesaremuchmorepleasing
to manythan dialecticalanalysis; many of the readersof these dialogues
-and notonlytheunphilosophic-findthemythsamongthemostmemor-

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34 PHOENIX

ableportionsofthedialogue. Forthemthemyths capturemuchofwhat

Platowasattempting toconvey the
through dialogues. Plato'sefforts
tolink
themyths with
closely themain lineofargumentation,then,have bornethe
fruit
heseems tohavehopedandplanned for.
intheMetaphysics
Aristotle (A 982b16)saysthattheloverofmyth is a
loverofwisdom; a loverofmyth isonewhoisfilledwitha senseofwonder,
andthisis thefirst stepforthephilosopher. Thedialoguesportray many
men
young taking their first
steps andsome of their
moreadvanced stepson
thepathofphilosophy. Themyths whichPlatohascomposed forhisdia-
loguesareworthy companions todialectic;theyaredesigned tofoster
and
stimulate
andassist thephilosophicquest.Asthecomposition ofa manwith
brilliant
abilities
bothphilosophical and literary,
Plato'smythsare a
treasure-house
ofmaterial forthoseinhistime,andours,whoembark on
thephilosophical
quest.
PROGRAM OF LIBERAL STUDIES,
UNIVERSITYOF NOTRE DAME,
NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 46556.

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