VI.

SEARCHES

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

CC Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

RPC

Section Two. - Violation of domicile

Article 128. Violation of domicile. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of
the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not
returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
 A. Searches Under Warrant

RPC

Section Two. - Violation of domicile

Article 128. Violation of domicile. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of
the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not
returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.

Article 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. - In addition to
the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having
legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.

Article 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the
domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their
default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.

RULE 126 Search and Seizure

Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (4a)

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house,
room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
(7a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made,
or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules
of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered
to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of
the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate
to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid
or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things
may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged
in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the
opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
 As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard
as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the
amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we
have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to
when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts
of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit
the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits
or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and
the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and
Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-
Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known
as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the
Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns,
subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court
without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners,
before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in
the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of
the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the
search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In
the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in
the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that
while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed
only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact
that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had
been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring
their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the
past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through
Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command,
they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or
chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently
negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some
of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the
search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is
interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the
articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and
issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical
for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of
the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself
who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when
he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity,
it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued,
and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in
the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.
Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search
warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned
by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to
the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under
Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed
by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla
Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of
the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit
of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows
that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as
the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established
by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

 5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general.
In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of
disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of
the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary
of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos
himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December
7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of
the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter
dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close
the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on
December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The
three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison,
et al." She was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen
issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however,
respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No.
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno
to Judge Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by
Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA
and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was
made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed
by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE
and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter
alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are
presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall
be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity
of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the
Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued
by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain
Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has
not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The
respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be
entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant
with the issuing Judge.

We find merit in the Petition.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.

The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army
and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive
or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as
to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general. Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives
and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement. 6

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive
materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles
might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the
description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
declared null and void for being too general. 7

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing
and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable. 8

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search
Warrant.
 Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?

(The deposition instead)—

A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.

Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?

A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.

Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search
warrant?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?

A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.

Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?

A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and
local sources. 9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not
searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical
to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the
Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners
did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they
already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest
investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress
on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially,
therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Warrant.

Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be
advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is
initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more
substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right
to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an
invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.
Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:

Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who
had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest
was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the
search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises
which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the
public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are
of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission
No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction
as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.

Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.

Aquino, J.; took no part.

Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL
COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:

Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no
less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own
house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This
was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably,
continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to
enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is
like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the
military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently
enjoined.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.2 The petitioner's house was searched two
days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. 4

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other
authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there
must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the warrant.5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional
Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the United States
which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless,
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the
proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.8

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:

SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but
this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to
the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken
by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col.
Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and
swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together with the affidavit presented to him.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering
that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses
whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and
not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is
to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's
claims. 14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge.
Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a
follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver
arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open
window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber
revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second
floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the
witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant
sought was issued forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues
that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested
his conformity in writing. 20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search
they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial
writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our
traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that
the petitioner could not resist.

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner
were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant.
Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the
Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there
was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner.
In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore had no
right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves
recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be
taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful
arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at
borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally
removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to
be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot
even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought
and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are
protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While
conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because "the constable has
blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's
justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against
him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain
in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the
search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos,
"this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null
and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 139301 September 29, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Branch
259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

The Case for the Prosecution

Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under the Department of Interior
and Local Government received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that
appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of
Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were
able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They once spotted Chan, Lao,
the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the evening. On
another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez
Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They were spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m.
to 8:00 p.m.4 The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at Room Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland
Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and in a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific
Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila.5

On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802,
for violation of Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from Judge William M. Bayhon, Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila.6 Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the enforcement of Search Warrant
No. 96-801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29, 1996. With him were PO3 Anciro, Jr.,
PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias and seven other policemen of the PARAC, who were all in uniform, as
well as a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no persons were found inside, the policemen found
two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and
machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit cards.7

Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu at the Furama
Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of Dasmariñas and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen rushed to the
area on board their vehicles. It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw Chan and Lao on board the
latter’s Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and introduced himself, but
Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the members of the raiding team and the two
suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to death during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each
containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car.

The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce Search Warrant No. 96-802.
When the policemen arrived at the place, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in
the building.8 The men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao under the name Henry Kao
Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the condominium
unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the
door.9 Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside the front door.10 The men introduced themselves as
policemen,11 but the appellant could not understand them as she could not speak English.12 The policemen allowed
Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they
were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security guards
into the condominium unit.13 The policemen brought appellant Lee to the second floor where there were three
bedrooms – a master’s bedroom and two other rooms. When asked where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee pointed
to the master’s bedroom.14 Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the master’s bedroom,
while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping.15 Ferias awakened
appellant Zhen Hua and identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised.16

Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the master’s bedroom about six feet high. He stood on a chair, opened the
cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu,17 a feeding bottle, a plastic
canister18 and assorted paraphernalia.19 Inside the drawer of the bed’s headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found assorted
documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and
identification cards of Lao and Lee.20 Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the crystalline
substance, but the latter did not respond because she did not know English.21 Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for
instructions on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the same for future
reference,22 and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions.23 Anciro, Jr., Pangan and
Margallo later showed the seized articles to the other members of the team.24

Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom
where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.25

The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following articles were found and
confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:

a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo each of white crystalline granules
later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;

b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined quantity of suspected
Shabu;

c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu ….

d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;26

Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box.27 The appellants were then brought to the
PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Pangan signed a Certification28 that the search conducted by the
policemen had been orderly and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the transparent plastic bags and their
contents, the transparent baby feeding bottle and the plastic cannister and their contents. On October 26, 1996, he
and Ferias29 brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination30 along with the letter-
request31 thereon.

On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cariño signed Chemistry Report No. D-1243-96 which
contained his findings on the laboratory examination of the items which were marked as Exhibits "A" to "A-4," viz:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Exh. "A" – One (1) "must de Cartier Paris" carton containing the following:

Exh. "A-1" – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline
substance.

Exh. "A-2" – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.10 grams of white crystalline
substance.

Exh. "A-3" – One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52
grams of white crystalline substance.

Exh. "A-4" – One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline
substance.
 NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the residence of the above-named subjects.
xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens, Exhs. "A-1" through "A-4" gave
POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx32

The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest.33 Pangan and the two security guards signed a certification stating
that nothing was destroyed in the condominium unit and that the search was orderly and peaceful.34 The policemen
also accomplished an inventory of the articles seized during the search.35

The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, in an Information filed in
the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Manila, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in their possession and under their control and custody, the
following to wit:

A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline
substance;

B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1 grams of white crystalline
substance;

C. One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52 grams
of white crystalline substance;

D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline
substance

which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.36

Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.

The Case for the Appellants

Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of Kwantong, China, a college graduate
who could not speak nor understand English. She was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her co-
employees was Huang Zhen Hua.37 She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995,38 and he brought her to Belgium
that same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if she only had a Chinese
passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she wanted to go to and visit; whereas many countries
did not require a Belgian passport holder to secure visas before allowing entry therein. In the process, he and Lao
fell in love and became lovers.
Upon Lao’s invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first time in April 1996. Lao met her at
the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought to a hotel in Manila where she stayed for less than a month.39 She
returned to the Philippines a second time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her expenses were
shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the garlic business.40 As far as she knew, Lao was not engaged in any
other business.41 In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to visit the Philippines to enjoy the
tourist spots.42 They were then in China.

In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a tourist visa. She was fetched by
Lao, and she was brought to his condominium unit at No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Niño,
Parañaque. She had been residing there since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls43 and she even
saw Chan once when he cleaned his Nissan car in Lao’s garage.

On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and was met by Lao at the airport. He
tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee told him that he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was
brought to the Villa where he had been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to visit Cebu.

At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the master’s bedroom at the condominium
unit. She had closed all the windows because she had turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping in
the other bedroom in the second floor beside the master’s bedroom. Lao’s Honda Civic car and Chan’s Nissan car
were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone knocking on the bedroom door.
When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen Hua was
sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not among the men. Lee did not hear the policemen knock at the main door before they
entered.44 The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who told her that the policemen
were going to search the house.45 Appellant Lee saw a policeman holding two papers, but no search warrant was
shown to her.46 She was so frightened.

The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the master’s bedroom. Appellant Lee went
to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she returned to the master’s bedroom, she saw shabu on the
bed.47 The policemen took her ring, watch and the ₱600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier been placed in the
cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Lao’s as well. She had never seen any shabu in the room before
the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were
detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had been found in the condominium unit and
that the policemen were demanding ₱5,000,000 for her release. She was also told that if she did not pay the
amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who arrested her would be
promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no money. Since she could not pay the amount, she was
boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and returned to the condominium unit where the policemen took all the
household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing machine, including laundry detergent. Only
the sofa and the bed were not taken. About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of counsel.

Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the condominium unit but that no one
responded. He shouted, "Sir Henry," referring to Lao, but there was no response from inside the condominium. After
about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered the house. They went to the
second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.

Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen. He learned that shabu had been
found and taken from the condominium unit only when he saw someone holding up the substance on television
during the daily news program TV Patrol.48

Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of appellant Lee that upon her invitation,
he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist visa on October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see Anciro, Jr. in the
condominium unit when policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified that aside from the PARAC
policemen, he was also investigated by policemen from Taiwan.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both appellants of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and
 considering the absence of any aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences both accused to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 each. The properties seized in
accordance with the search warrants issued relative to this case are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of
the government and the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
the drugs and paraphernalia subject hereof for proper disposition.

The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of both accused Jogy
Lee and Huang Zhen Hua from the Parañaque City Jail to the Bureau of Correccions (sic) in Muntinlupa
City.

SO ORDERED.49

The Present Appeal

On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:

First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as self-contradictory, inherently improbable and
palpably false to be accepted as a faithful reflection of the true facts of the case;

Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Hua’s conviction was based merely on the trial court’s conclusion that he "is
not an epitome of first class tourist and that he appeared nonchalant throughout the proceedings;"

Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely disregarded the glaring facts and admissions
of the prosecution’s principal witnesses that no regulated drug was ever found in his possession;

Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellant’s arrest was illegal and in violation of his
constitutional and basic rights against arrest without probable cause as determined by a Judge and that his
arraignment did not constitute a waiver of such right;

Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of regularity of performance of the police
officers who took part in the search had been overcome by prosecution's own evidence, thereby wrongly
giving such presumption substance over and above the constitutional presumption of innocence of the
appellant.50

For her part, appellant Lee contends that:

1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS IN THE
TOWNHOUSE RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED BY PARAC OPERATIVES;

1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND
UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION
OF THE ROOM TO BE SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE
JOGY LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, DURING THE
SEARCH AND EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON THE GROUND
THAT HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 51

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of appellant Lee should be affirmed.

The Court’s Ruling

We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee sequentially.

On Appellant Zhen Hua

The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove appellant Zhen
Hua’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, thus:

Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of "shabu" found in the townhouse unit of Henry Lau.
He claims that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy Lee.
Allegedly, at the time of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely four days. He claims that he was just
temporarily billeted as a guest at the townhouse where Jogy Lee was staying. And that he had no control
whatsoever over said townhouse. He puts emphasis on the fact that the search of his room turned out to be
"negative" and that the raiding team failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated drug in his person or
possession. He, therefore, prays for his acquittal.

The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The prosecution’s evidence fails to meet the
quantum of evidence required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of the
supposed weakness of his defense, and his innocence may be doubted, he is nonetheless entitled to an acquittal
(Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335 (1980), cited in People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000).
The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution.

In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial court erred when it did not give much
weight to the admission made by the prosecution witnesses that no regulated drug was found in his person. No
regulated drug was also found inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no
actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu."

Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for barely four (4) days at the time
when he was arrested. The prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua committed
acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It was not even
shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang Zhen Hua, therefore,
there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any circumstantial evidence from which any culpability
may be inferred.52

We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs. Tira,53 ruminated and expostulated on
the juridical concept of "possession" under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the
evidence necessary to prove the said crime, thus:

The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes
not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exits when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive
possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and
character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may
be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has
control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.54

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual or constructive possession of
the regulated drug found in the master’s bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant had
accessed the said room at any given time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of shabu in appellant Lee’s
bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of appellant Lee only on October 22,
1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the search conducted in the condominium unit
leased by Henry Lao. He was a mere visitor of appellant Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua was
aware of the alleged illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry Lao, Peter Chan and appellant Lee. The
policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping when they made
their search.

The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and Chan or Lao.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it.55 Conspiracy
cannot be presumed.56 Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the
conspiracy.57 Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design.58

The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen Hua from China, and before the
search conducted in Lao’s condominium unit, appellant Zhen Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and appellant Lee.
Having dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or with
any of them to possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals by direct participation or
mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice.59 Anciro, Jr. even admitted that during his
surveillance, he could have mistaken appellant Zhen Hua for another group of Chinese persons who were also
being watched.60 Appellant Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.

On Appellant Lee

Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and implementation of Search Warrant
No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show to her the
said warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit; (b) the policemen
gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and personal effects owned
by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the policemen, although not specified in the search warrant.

The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the occasion of the search of the
condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.

Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the policemen planted the regulated
drug on her bed even before they searched the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to find out if
he was already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her bed. She avers that the
sole testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated drug in the master’s bedroom, is incredible because he was
not with the policemen who barged into the bedroom. She notes that even Pangan, the caretaker of the Villa,
testified that he did not see any illegal drug confiscated by the policemen.

According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime charged, considering that Lao and
Chan were the suspects identified in the search warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the
alleged illegal drug transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable cause for her arrest as
her mere presence in the condominium unit does not render her liable for the shabu found in the master’s bedroom
of the condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
are inconsistent; hence, barren of probative weight. The appellant also asserts that she was deprived of her right to
due process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese interpreter to assist her.

The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties. Based on the
testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was shown the search warrant, through the window, and the policemen
identified themselves through their uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also explained the search
warrant to the appellant. Although she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later voluntarily opened
the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no evidence of forcible entry into the unit and no breakage
of any door. The OSG further avers that the appellant had been in the country for quite sometime already and could
not have gotten around without understanding English. In fact, the OSG argues that when Anciro, Jr. told the
appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be brought to the police headquarters in Quezon City, she did
as she was told and took her clothes from the cabinet where the shabu were found by the policemen.

The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision who was a witness for appellant
Lee, even testified that the search was orderly. The OSG contends that there was probable cause for the appellant’s
arrest because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was a member of a syndicate
dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The appellant was not a victim of
frame-up because she was present when the policemen searched the master’s bedroom where she was sleeping
and where she kept her clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the regulated drugs and paraphernalia.

We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and
seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens temporarily residing in the country. The rule against
unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or known
to be offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the guarantee of the other
fundamental rights of the citizens.61 All owes the duty for its effective enforcement lest there shall be an impairment
of the right for the purpose for which it was adopted.62

Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be
allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search
warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is
known as the "knock and announce" principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an
officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important considerations in assessing
whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.63 In Gouled v. The United
States,64 it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate
the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of force.

The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that "if a person takes the beasts of
another and causes them to be driven into a castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the
deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall
cause the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery." Common law courts appended an important
qualification:

But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors …,
for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the
habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no
default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is to be presumed
that he would obey it…65

Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open doors if the possession be not
quietly delivered.66 The principle was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth
Amendment in the United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment as held in Wilson v. Arkansas.67

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to the
accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the
search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and
understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial
provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It is sufficient that the accused
has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be
emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be
searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and implementing the search
warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of
the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the
unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in
resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he
would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the
search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced
intrusion.69 Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by
force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion.70

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the
identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that
there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional
right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence.71 However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive.
At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide whether
or not to make an unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective, if the police officers’ entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may
also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.72 Indeed, there is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.73 In determining the lawfulness of
an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had
reason to believe and the time of the entry.74 In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 it was held that:

[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This
standard—as opposed to a probable-cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance between the
legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy
interest affected by no-knock entries.76

As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida,77 what constitutes breaking includes the lifting of a latch, turning a
door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house,
even a closed screen door.78 However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without force is
not a "breaking" requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the reasons behind the rule
are satisfied – there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the
residence of the accused.79

As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking open any door cannot be
distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an
examination of all the circumstances.80 The proper trigger point in determining, under the "knock and announce"
rule, whether the police waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is when those
inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant.81

In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers
were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were police officers
and had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were going to search the
condominium unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC
uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some
clothes with her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being interpreted to the
appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop the headboard.83

The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door before entering the condominium
unit, and after a while, the appellant opened the door and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr.
testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped you or assisted you in
implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa Subdivision?

A The OIC of the Home Owners’ Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the Security Agency and two
(2) other security guards.

Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr. Witness?

A I can hardly recall their names.

Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the OIC of the Home Owners’
Association, what did you do next?

A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also knock and introduce
ourselves, knock on the said condominium.

Q Did they do that, the request?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa?

A Yes, Sir.

Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said search warrants, what
happened next, if any? What did you do after that?

A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there because the Home Owners’
Association doesn’t have any key for the door. We asked them to knock also because they are the ones who
have access with the tenants.

Q And after knocking, what happened next?

A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that time, we thought they were still
asleep.

Q And then after that what did you do, if any?

A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security guard to try to knock on the
kitchen which is on the back door.

Q And then after that?

A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window of the kitchen and asked
who we are in a sign language.

Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window … I withdraw. Were you able to have a good
look on that female person who showed herself thru the window?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?

A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.84

The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry into the condominium unit. She
could have asked the court for an ocular inspection to show the door which was allegedly broken into by the
policemen, or at least adduce in evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed to do so. The
testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the appellant, who certified, along with
three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that the search was conducted in a peaceful and orderly
manner.85

We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the outer door to gain entry into the
condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly in derogation of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that
the policemen did so only after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after he had called Lao in a
loud voice and received no response from the appellants:

Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required according to your security
guards?

A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police operatives.

Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?

A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is what they told me.

Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the search?

A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I don’t know what time was that.

Q When they conducted the search, were you there?

A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.

Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit occupied by Henry Kau
Chung?

A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door and the door was opened.

Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?

A Kaya naman po ginawa ‘yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala naman pong masamang
mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.

Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the police operatives forcibly break
open the door, how many minutes had elapsed?

A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, "Mr. Henry, pakibuksan n’yo ang pinto, would you
mind to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers na gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then, when
nobody was answering, they forcibly opened the door.

Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that time?

A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do not know.

Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was no one who responded, is
that correct?

A Pardon, Sir?
 Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who responded to your knocking at
the door?

A Nobody was answering, Sir.

Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?

A Yes, Sir.86

COURT:

From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the police officer broke open the
door?

A Matagal din po.

Q For how long?

A Maybe for about three to five minutes.

Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Continue.87

The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention that Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu
on her bed before he continued his search in the bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the policemen.
She relied on her testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take
custody of the shabu in the cabinet.

The appellant’s defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense cannot and should not always be
considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove.
Police officers are, after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will.88

It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take custody of the shabu
subject of this case. However, as explained by Pangan, he remained in the ground floor of the condominium unit
while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee and her lover Lao, and Ferias
proceeded to the room occupied by appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his search. Thus, Pangan testified:

Q When the master’s bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according to you, sleeping, did you
accompany the PARAC members?

A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.

Q What about the members of the security force?

A They were outside, Sir.

Q During the search made on the master’s bedroom?

 A Yes, Sir.

Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen Hua, were you present
then?

A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.

Q How about the other guards?

A They were also outside.89

For his part, Ferias declared:

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?

A No, Sir.

Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What happened next?

A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.

Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?

A He was surprised.90

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?

A No, Sir.

Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What happened next?

A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.

Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?

A He was surprised.91

Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the second floor of the condominium unit,
he did not see them bring in anything:

Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did not see them bringing
anything with them, they were all empty-handed?

A I did not see, Sir.92

No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the security guards of the subdivision, who
accompanied the policemen in implementing the search warrants, certified that, what was found inside the
condominium unit and confiscated by the policemen were two plastic bags which contained white crystalline powder
substances suspected to be shabu.93

The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen were there. She claimed that the
policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed before they started the search and that she noticed the shabu only after
he returned from the room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is hard to believe.

First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellant’s bed, in her full view, for which the
latter could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of Rep. Act
7659:

SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and Members of Police
Agencies and the Armed Forces, ‘Planting’ of Evidence.— The maximum penalties provided for [in]
Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of
Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials,
employees or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous
drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer
the same penalty as therein provided.

Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by the policemen; if she had
done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for the
suppression of the things/articles seized by the policemen.

Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence before or after she was charged of
violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.

Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or policemen who allegedly planted the
evidence.

The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and Ferias, the articles and substances
found and confiscated from the condominium unit of Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the Cityland
condominium unit of Lao and Chan were itemized as follows:

a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo each of white crystalline granules
later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;

b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;

c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu …

d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;

a. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 ½ kilos of Raw Shabu or Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride;

b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2) Kilos of Shabu;
 c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of finished/cooked Shabu;

c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from finished Shabu;

e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined element;

f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in stirring mixtures

g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;

h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;

i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;

j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards;94

Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline powder which were found and
confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company of Ferias, delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination, per the request of Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the PARAC.

We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the search warrants. However, such fact
did not proscribe the policemen from arresting her and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
There was, in fine, probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by Judge William Bayhon
when he issued the search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the condominium units at Atlantic Drive and
Cityland.

Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises being searched when the
facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are
sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being
committed.95 It has been held that:

Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the time the officers entered the
apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry and
announcement of their identity, the officers were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who
was emerging from the kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she emerged
and, without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that
her presence in a small room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink would not
alone establish a reasonable ground for the officers’ belief that she was in joint possession with her
husband, that fact was accompanied by the officers’ information that Ker had been using his apartment as a
base of operations for his narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there
were no sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her husband, were committing
the offense of possession of marijuana in the presence of the officers.96

In Draper v. United States,97 it was held that informations from a reliable informant, corroborated by the police
officer’s observations as to the accuracy of the description of the accused, and of his presence at a particular place,
is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information and verified,
after surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the condominium unit and
that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of
Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant occupied the bedroom and slept in the same bed used by Lao.
The appellant took her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject shabu and paraphernalia were found by
Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium unit with Lao since October 1, 1996 until her
arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as
well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts and circumstances are sufficient on
which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant had joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the
bedroom along with Lao, her live-in partner, in line with our ruling in People v. Tira.98 For the purpose of prosecution
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be
joint.99
Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which were not
described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not render the
seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence such articles
which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant thereto. Moreover, it bears stressing that Anciro, Jr. saw
the unlisted articles when he and the other policemen implemented the search warrants. Such articles were in plain
view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles because of
their close connection to the crime charged. As held in Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire:100

An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant
to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article
of incriminating character. …

Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.
Thus, the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect. … And
an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under
existing law may be seized without a warrant.… Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. …101

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the policemen
have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, at the very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant
would show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would
indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned the same. The
pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan.102

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to provide an interpreter when she
testified. The records show that a Cantonese interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The Rules
of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial. An interpreter
is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deaf- mute. The
appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense.

Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of her guilt of the
crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had joint possession of the shabu which the policemen found and
confiscated from her bedroom.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, convicting him of the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
said appellant is ACQUITTED of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
release the said appellant from detention unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and to submit to the
Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance with the directive of the Court.

The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, convicting her of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 196045

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously
safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.1

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,2 dated 22 September 2010,
and Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the
Omnibus Order,4 dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified
Search Warrant No. 01-118.

THE FACTS

On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBJ) Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI
Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant5 before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of
conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88
Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that
respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would call
prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of
stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of
stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent
Pastrana's personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with
lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not
only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the
complainants from Saudi Arabia;7 the affidavits of respondents' former employees who actually called clients
abroad;8 the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations used by respondents in their scheme;9 and the sketch
of the place sought to be searched .10

On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued
Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118 For: Violation of

R.A. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code)
-versus- and Estafa (Art. 315, RPC)
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD
of 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St.,
Makati City

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant NBI [Special
Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO, that
there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have in their possession/control
located in [an] office premises located at 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as shown in the
application for search warrant the following documents, articles and items, to wit:

Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation
papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of official receipts
purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips;
company brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients
and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC.

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the premises above-described and
forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents, articles and items to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs.

The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of the warrant.

This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this Date.11

Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani
Paulino and Gerardo Denna, Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center.
Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were
able to seize the following:

1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:

a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;

b. List of brokers and 201 files;

c. Sales agreements;

d. Official receipts;

e. Credit advise;

f. Fax messages;

g. Clients message slips;

h. Company brochures;

i. Letterheads; and

j. Envelopes.

2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;

3. Offshore incorporation papers;

4. Lease contracts; and

5. Vouchers/ledgers.

On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in
connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which
circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued
only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118
failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.14

On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant, respondent Abad moved
for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months without action on the
motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion to passing judgment on his own search warrant.15

In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the
case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it
violated the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. It added
that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo divining what specific provision was
violated by respondents; and that even estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC further
opined that the search warrant and the application thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all
wanting in particularization. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All
documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items
seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be used in any proceeding for
whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search "Warrant
No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specific offense, because the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was
violated or even what type of estafa was committed by respondents. The appellate court observed that the
application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or their corporations were not SEC-registered brokers
or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes
unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker capacity without the requisite SEC registration.

The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the test of particularity. It reasoned that
the inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the
SEC" rendered the warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of respondents inside the office
premises to seizure and the implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to what property should be
seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 11 March 2011.
Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.

II.

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN WHICH SHOW A
REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED
LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF
ITEMS DID NOT INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY
THOSE "SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION
WITH THE SEC."19

Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that the punishable acts
defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily included in the other; that operating and
acting as stockbrokers without the requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific acts of
defrauding another by falsely pretending to possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker similarly
constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section 28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC
penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element common to both offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search
warrant did not violate the "one specific offense rule."20

Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a general warrant because the items listed therein
show a reasonable nexus to the offense of acting as stockbrokers without the required license from the SEC; that
the statement "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC"
did not render the warrant void; and that the words "and other" only intend to emphasize that no technical
description could be given to the items subject of the search warrant because of the very nature of the offense.21

In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that the subject warrant was
issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that estafa and violation of the SRC could not be
considered as one crime because the former is punished under the RPC while the latter is punished under a special
law; that there are many violations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of
R.A. No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which could be committed through at least 10
modes, each one of them having elements distinct from those of the other modes.

Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not expressly indicate that the documents, articles, and
items sought to be seized thereunder are subjects of the offense, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits
of the offense, or used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense; that it is a general warrant
because it enumerates every conceivable document that may be found in an office setting; that, as a result, it is
entirely possible that in the course of the search for the articles and documents generally listed in the search
warrant, those used and intended for legitimate purposes may be included in the seizure; that the concluding
sentence in the subject warrant "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual
registration with the SEC" is a characteristic of a general warrant; and that it allows the raiding team unbridled
latitude in determining by themselves what items or documents are evidence of the imputation that respondents and
the corporations they represent are violating their registration with the SEC.23

In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant may be properly evaluated by examining both the
warrant itself and the application on which it was based; that the acts alleged in the application clearly constitute a
transgression of Section 28.1 of the SRC; and that the nature of the offense for which a search warrant is issued is
determined based on the factual recital of the elements of the subject crime therein and not the formal designation
of the crime itself in its caption.

THE COURT'S RULING

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty and security of
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.25

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two points which must be
considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.27 Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing that
"a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."

The search warrant must be

issued for one specific offense.

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a
scatter-shot warrant.28 In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.29

In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were issued for "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," stated:

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as
alleged in the aforementioned applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.30

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez,31 the Court further ruled:

In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an offense exists to justify the
issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to
determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and
circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search
warrant.

xx xx

The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant should issue
only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search warrant is to obtain
evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge
issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts
and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued. x x x32

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation
Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33 First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several
punishable acts under the said law such as manipulation of security prices,34 insider trading,35 acting as dealer or
broker without being registered with the SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37 use of unregistered clearing
agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the
charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime: (1)
with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through
fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of
confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No.
01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search warrants issued for violation of R.A. No.
6425 or the then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In Olaes v. People,40 even though the search warrant merely stated
that it was issued in connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not nullify the same for it was clear in
the body that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that [t]here is probable
cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, [have] in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although
the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)

In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425, without specifying what provisions
of the law were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant
is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3)
separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied)

Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section I
of P .D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked
that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species,
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45

The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to specify what particular
provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the
RPC. Even the application for the search warrant merely stated:

Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered throughout their numerous companies call
prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares of stocks in a certain company likewise based abroad.
Once the client is convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or she is advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the
money supposedly intended for the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the account of the company
which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same is immediately withdrawn and brought to the
treasury department of the particular company. The money is then counted and eventually allocated to the following:
42% to Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming clients (those with small accounts and who
already threatened the company with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is
ever made to buy the shares of stocks.46

Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of various rules and
regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and
possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in categories.
Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued
for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business of buying or selling
securities in the Philippines as a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or
dealer unless registered as such with the Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a
provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void.
The allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers
without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for violation of Section 28.l of
the SRC. It is even worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to
Quash,47 dated 5 April 2002.

In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the application for search
warrant, there could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with that offense. In People v. Hon.
Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law,
as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show
a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural
safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the
privacy of his home and personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)

Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to operate as
brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the application, the NBI and the
1âшphi1

SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each
other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses
are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.50

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence,
or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the offended
party or third person.51 On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of performing dealer or broker
functions without registration with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing damage and
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation
of Section 28.1 of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person
acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in
because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC is ma/um prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal
intent, whereas estafa is ma/um in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.

Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA (Columbia)52 and Laud v. People (Laud)53 even militate
against petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant which covers several counts of a certain
specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz:

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The
search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.54

In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for
Murder, albeit for six (6) counts.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific offense. It included
violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions and estafa, which could be
committed in a number of ways.

Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific offense.

Reasonable particularity of the

description of the things to be
seized

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be
seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be
seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however,
required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt
on the part of the searching authorities.55

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in
the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.57
In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be the subject of a search warrant: (i) the
subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.58

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged committed by
respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant for the
search warrant to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover, even if
Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents,
articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant
were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether legal
or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their
actual registration with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations'
certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one offense and for lack of
particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010 Decision and 11 March 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 [ G.R. No. 227868, January 20, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELY POLICARPIO Y NATIVIDAD ALIAS

"DAGUL," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, C.J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 of the April 5, 2017 Resolution2 of the Court filed by accused-
appellant Ely Policarpio y Natividad (Policarpio).

The Facts

Policarpio was indicted for Violation of Section 261 (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines, for possession of a .45 caliber pistol without authority from the Commission on Election during the
election period (COMELEC Gun Ban). The case was docketed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago
City, Isabela (RTC) as Criminal Case No. 35-5585. Policarpio was also charged with Violation of Sections 11 and
12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, for unlawful possession of 21.07 grams of shabu and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, which
cases were docketed before the RTC as Criminal Case Nos. 35-5586 and 35-5587, respectively.

When arraigned, Policarpio pleaded not guilty to all the three charges.3 After pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial on
the merits followed.

Version of the Prosecution

To substantiate its charges against Policarpio, the prosecution presented Intelligence Officer 3 Dexter Asayco (IO3
Asayco) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), PDEA Agent Seymoure Darius Sanchez (Agent
Sanchez), Barangay Chairman Glesie L. Tangonan (Barangay Chairman Tangonan) and Forensic Chemical Officer
Roda Agcaoili (Forensic Chemist Agcaoili) of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Tuguegarao City, as
its witnesses.

IO3 Asayco testified that he was a member of the PDEA team that implemented Search Warrant No. 0085 at the
house of Policarpio located at No. 29 Purok 4, Barangay Malvar, Santiago City on April 12, 2007 at about 12 o'clock
noon. The PDEA agents knocked on the door of Policarpio's house, and when Policarpio came out, their team
leader, Police Senior Inspector Jaime De Vera (PSI De Vera) read to him the contents of the search warrant and
gave him a copy thereof. The search of the house was conducted by him and agent Sanchez in the presence of
accused-appellant's mother, Perla Policarpio, Barangay Chairman Tangonan and Barangay Kagawad Ohmar
Zodiac Calimag. Policarpio was outside the house when the search was being conducted. In the process of
implementing the search warrant, they confiscated nine (9) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, eleven (11) deposit slips and cash
in the total amount of P17,700.00, which were all found inside a blue clutch bag; several pieces of drug
paraphernalia, which were found in between the dura box and the wall of the room; and one (1) .45 caliber Colt
pistol bearing Serial No. 452857 with magazine and live ammunitions, found beneath the bed cushion. The
confiscated items were marked with IO3 Asayco's and agent Sanchez' initials before turning them over to their Chief
Investigator Danilo Natividad (CI Natividad). The marking was done at the room of Policarpio in the presence of said
accused, his mother, the barangay officials, the media and CI Natividad. He placed his initials "DBA" as his marking
on the seized items. Policarpio signed the confiscation receipts at the place of search in the presence of his mother,
the media and the operating team. The other witnesses also affixed their signatures on the confiscation receipts.
Policarpio was immediately arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.4

Agent Sanchez corroborated the testimony of IO3 Asayco in its material points and added that he placed his initials
"SDS" on the seized items. He clarified that Jay-R Policarpio alias Dagul, indicated in the search warrant as the
name of the subject thereof, and Ely Policarpio are one and the same person. He recounted that their team leader,
PSI De Vera, already knew the exact address of Policarpio even before the implementation of the search warrant.
Also, the barangay officials pointed to them the house of Policarpio. He recalled that Policarpio did not show any
form of resistance during the implementation of the search warrant against him, and gave no reaction when they
showed him the items seized. After marking the confiscated items, he turned over the same to their Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Natividad, in the presence of Policarpio and the barangay officials.5

When Barangay Chairman Tangonan was called to the witness stand, the prosecution and the defense entered into
a stipulation that she was present during the inventory of the confiscated items and that she signed the confiscation
receipt. Afterwhich, the trial court dispensed with her testimony.6

The testimony of Forensic Chemist Agcaoili was, likewise, dispensed with after the parties stipulated that: (1) the
nine (9) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, subject matter in Criminal Case No. 35-5586 for
illegal possession of shabu, were submitted to her for examination on April 12, 2007; (2) the nine (9) plastic sachets
with white crystalline substance tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; and
(3) her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-20-2007.7

Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its documentary evidence, among which is Search
Warrant No. 0085.

It appears that on April 11, 2007, Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian of the RTC, Branch 35, of Santiago City,
Isabela issued Search Warrant No. 0085,8 on the strength of the testimonies of PSI De Vera of the PDEA and of a
certain Fred Manabat. The search warrant reads:

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

Greetings:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court after examining under oath the witnesses Fred Manabat and PSI Jaime
De Vera that there is a probable cause to believe that Jay-R Policarpio @ Dagul of Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago City
committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that the respondent has in possession and
control the following items:

a.) Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as shabu;

b.) Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu.

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day of the house
of the respondent stated above and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-described grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu and drug paraphernalia, bring them before me to be dealt with as
the law directs.

SO ORDERED.

Version of the Defense

Policarpio vehemently denied the charges against him. He narrated that on April 12, 2007 at 6 o'clock in the
morning, he was awakened by knocks on the door of his house located at No. 29 Purok 4, Barangay Malvar,
Santiago City. He claimed that he is a resident of said address since birth. When he opened the door, two (2) police
officers pointed their guns at him. The police officers then ordered him, his wife and children to go out of the house.
And thereafter, the police officers asked him if he is Junior Policarpio, to which query he answered in the negative
because his name is Ely Policarpio. They asked him to sign a search warrant and then they entered his house. The
contents of the search warrant were not explained to him. When the police officers were done searching his house,
they showed him something, but he had no idea what it was and where it came from. After a
while, Barangay Chairman Tangonan arrived and signed a document. Thereafter, he was brought to the police
station and later on, to the court. He denied having signed a confiscation receipt. He alleged that her mother, Perla
Policarpio, was not a resident of his house at the time the search was conducted.9

The RTC Ruling

On October 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision10 finding Policarpio guilty of all the three charges, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 35-5586, for possession of illegal drugs whereby he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php400,000.00) PESOS;

2) In Criminal Case No. 35-5587, for possession of drug paraphernalia, whereby he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and a fine of TEN THOUSAND
(Php10,000.00) PESOS; and

3) In Criminal Case No. 35-5585, for violation of the Comelec gun ban, whereby he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC ruled that the search of Policarpio's house was legal because the same was done by virtue of a valid
search warrant and hence, the items seized are admissible in evidence against him. Anent the confiscated .45
caliber pistol, the RTC declared that Policarpio's possession thereof was in clear violation of the COMELEC Gun
Ban. The RTC held that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to established beyond cavil of a doubt the guilt
of Policarpio of the three crimes charged against him.

Not in conformity, Policarpio appealed the RTC verdict of conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA), which was
docketed therein as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06648.

The CA Ruling

On August 18, 2016, the CA rendered its assailed Decision12 affirming the conviction of Policarpio for Violation of
Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It declared that all the elements of illegal possession of shabu and of
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia were adequately proven by the prosecution. It rejected the appellant's
argument that the prosecution failed to establish the factual details which constituted the essential elements of the
crimes charged. The CA opined that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized narcotics were not
compromised because the chain of custody of the same remained unbroken. It upheld the validity of Search Warrant
No. 0085 and, thus, the illegal drugs and pieces of drug paraphernalia confiscated by virtue thereof are admissible
in evidence against Policarpio. It debunked the defense of denial interposed by Policarpio for being negative and
self-serving evidence. The CA, however, acquitted Policarpio of Violation of Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines. In the end, the CA decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 15
October 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Ely Policarpio is ACQUITTED of
violation of Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code in Criminal Case No. 35-5585.

SO ORDERED.13

The Issues

Unpe1turbed, Policarpio filed the present appeal and posited the same assignment of errors he previously raised
before the CA, to wit:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE
APPARENT VIOLATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT.

II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 261 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881; SECTION 11,
ARTICLE II, OF R.A. NO. 9165; AND SECTION 12, ARTICLE II, OF R.A. NO. 9165.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING

THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE WITH CERTAINTY THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.14

On April 5, 2017, the Court issued a Resolution15 dismissing Policarpio's appeal for his failure to sufficiently show
reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA. The fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the finding of fact and conclusion of law of the Court of Appeals in its August 18,
2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06648, finding accused-appellant, Ely Policarpio y Natividad a.k.a.
"Dagul," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165
with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to three (3) years, as maximum, in Criminal Case No.
35-5587.

SO ORDERED.16

Undaunted, Policarpio filed the present Motion for Reconsideration, insisting on his innocence of violation of
Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165. He contends anew that Search Warrant No. 0085 is invalid because it failed to
specify the exact address of the place to be searched as well the items to be seized. Further, Policarpio maintains
that the searching officers failed to comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
because: (1) the allegedly seized items were not photographed immediately after confiscation and seizure, or even
thereafter; and (2) the inventory of the allegedly seized items were not conducted in the presence of a
representative of the media and DOJ officials. He assails the prosecution evidence for its failure to establish the
proper chain of custody of the subject plastic sachets of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Policarpio concludes that he
is entitled to acquittal of the foregoing charges leveled against him.

The Court's Ruling

After a second hard look on the evidence on record, the Court finds that the Motion for Reconsideration is partially
meritorious. Policarpio's conviction for Violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 must be reversed.

Inceptively, the Court is in complete accord with the ruling of the CA that Search Warrant No. 0085 is valid. We note
that Policarpio had previously raised the contention that the search warrant is invalid and fatally defective in his
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and/or Suppression of Evidence17 filed before the RTC which was subsequently
denied by the said trial court in its Resolution18 dated September 4, 2008. The Court similarly concludes that there
was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the
officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.19

In the case at bench, while the address stated in Search Warrant No. 0085 is merely "Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago
City," the deponents in the application for the search warrant, namely, Fred Manabat and PSI De Vera, were able to
provide an outline of the location of Policarpio's house sufficient to distinguish it from other houses in Purok 4,
Malvar Santiago City and, hence, there was no doubt as to the location of the intended subject of the search and
seizure operation. Also, before the PDEA team proceeded to the house of Policarpio, they first coordinated with
the barangay officials who accompanied the team to the house of said appellant. It is safe to presume that
these barangay officials are familiar with the residents of Barangay Malvar, including Policarpio, who had resided
therein since birth. More importantly, it appears that PSI De Vera knew the exact address of the appellant even prior
to April 12, 2007 and he actually led the raiding team in the implementation of the search warrant. These, in the
Court's view, are sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be
searched, which they in fact did. Verily, the deficiency in the address stated in the search warrant is not of sufficient
gravity that would spell the invalidation thereof.

The Court, likewise, finds that Search Warrant No. 0085 has satisfied the requirement on particularity of description
of the items to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
- by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.20 In People v.
Tee,21 the Court wrote:

Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general
warrant. Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and
records pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be
unconstitutional. A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held
sufficiently particular.

Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to
satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is
property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances
under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. Thus, this Court has held that the
description "illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.

Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the phrase "Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as shabu; Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu" as stated in the Search
Warrant No. 0085 has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on particularity of description of the items to be
seized. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the
warrant, and thus, it prevents exploratory searches.

Having ruled on the validity of Search Warrant No. 0085, we shall now proceed to the determination of the guilt of
the appellant for Violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with which he was charged.

In People v. Romy Lim y Miranda,22 the Court discussed the importance of the chain of custody rule, which adheres
to the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. This is in accordance
with Section 21(l), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by Section 1 of R.A. No. 10640. However, the original
provision of Section 21(l) still applies to this case since the alleged crime was committed in 2007 prior to the
amendment of the law in 2014. Section 21(l) states:

Section 21. x x x.

(1)The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied)

Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. x x x.

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. (Underscoring ours)

Verily, the narcotics must be physically inventoried and photographed immediately after the seizure and confiscation
of the same by the apprehending officer/team. Under the original provision of Section 21 (1), the four persons who
need to be present during the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the drugs are: (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a
representative from the media; (3) a representative from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official. They shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and shall be given a copy thereof. The presence of these persons will
guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up." They are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."23

Records of the case at bench failed to disclose that photographs of the allegedly seized shabu and drug
paraphernalia were taken after their confiscation in the presence of the above-mentioned four persons. Neither of
the two PDEA agents testified anent such photographing of the confiscated narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Agent
Sanchez testified that they took photograph and place markings only on the .45 caliber pistol.24 The prosecution did
not submit any photos as proof that this requirement had been complied with.

Further, the Court observes that the physical inventory of the conf1scated narcotics and drug paraphernalia was not
witnessed by a representative from the media and by a DOJ official. We note that in the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest25 dated April 13, 2007, IO3 Asayco and Agent Sanchez stated that the conduct of the inventory of the seized
items was done in the presence of the barangay officials and the representative from the media. IO3 Asayco even
testified that the confiscation receipt was signed by Policarpio, the barangay officials and the media. A perusal of the
nine (9) confiscation receipts,26 however, would show that the same were signed only by CI Natividad,
Policarpio, Barangay Chairman Tangonan and Barangay Kagawad Calimag. The confiscation receipts did not bear
the signature of the representative from the media, which cast serious doubt as to whether the latter was indeed
present during the inventory. Meanwhile, agent Sanchez knew nothing as to what transpired during the inventory
because after turning over the confiscated items to CI Natividad, he went out of the house.27 No DOJ official
attended the inventory of the allegedly confiscated shabu and drug paraphernalia. To the mind of the Court, the
credibility and trustworthiness of the April 12, 2007 search and seizure, as well as the incrimination of appellant
Policarpio, have not been adequately protected in view of the absence of the representative from the media and the
DOJ during the conduct of the physical inventory. Lastly, there is no clear showing that Policarpio was given a copy
of the nine confiscation receipts.

Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the IRR, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the
seizure and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Here, no
justifiable reason for the non-compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 was proffered.

The unexplained and unjustified lapses cast reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the supposedly
seized shabu and drug paraphernalia and, consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant Policarpio. All
told, Policarpio must be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses charged.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The April 5, 2017 Resolution of the Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Ely Policarpio y Natividad alias "Dagul" is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of Violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 on ground
of reasonable doubt and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held
for another cause.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections of Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court the action he has taken within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Leonen, Gesmundo, Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Kyllo v. United States (2001) https://www.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-8508

Facts of the case

A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a
thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of
heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor
marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to
the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate
judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo
was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized
from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals
held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to
conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only
"amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."

Question

Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a
private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the
"observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the
outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and
were, thus, "information in the public domain."
 B. Warrantless Searches

1. Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

RULE 126 Search and Seizure

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
(12a)

G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS, Appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75,
with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended.

Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise charged3 with the
same crime, before the same court.

Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 As the evidence in the cases was
common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases were consolidated. After a joint trial on the
merits, the RTC rendered a Decision5 dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine of ₱500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing regulations.

SO ORDERED.6

To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there is need to recall the
factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.

PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling
(Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street,
Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the
description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They
accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas
answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas
informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male
persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed
where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according
to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and
approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying
a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and
upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."8 After confiscating the items,
Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper
documentation.9 Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling and that a field
test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise physically examined on the basis
of which corresponding medical certificates were issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were
also accomplished. Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the
accused and the confiscation of the items.10

On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all three (3) accused
were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during
their physical examination. He also escorted all three to the Fiscal’s office where the latter were informed of the
charges against them.11

Cabling corroborated Fami’s testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had introduced themselves as
police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves.12

On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Fami’s informant,
conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under surveillance. Fami then
relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding
and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to
cooperate and point to his other cohorts.14 When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of Nuevas’s
cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking
into its contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was holding to the police officers.16

For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking along Perimeter Street,
on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of
his house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room
where Fami handcuffed Nuevas’s hands, got Nuevas’s wallet, took out ₱1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami’s) wallet.
Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before leaving the house with
Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red owner—type
jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or
Inocencio.17

Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 o’clock in the morning of 27 September 1997, while his ‘compare’
Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman. The two (2) introduced themselves as
police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for
their arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan
precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to
stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they had their
fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table.18

Inocencio testified that he went to his ‘compadre’ Din’s house in the morning of 27 September 1997 to sell his
fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his driver’s license. While there, he and Din were arrested by two
persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other searched the house for a lady named Vangie.
Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first came to
know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he only
saw such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was taken of the three
of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the photograph was taken, they were not
assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards, they were
brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the police what they did wrong, the police replied that they will just
explain it in court. 19

All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic
review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal.20 The Court granted
Nuevas’s withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and terminated as to him, in a Resolution21 dated 25
August 2003.

In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42,23 the cases were transferred to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.24

Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1) in finding them
guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and (2) n not finding that their
constitutional rights have been violated.25

The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.27

The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s
assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there
was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s
version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was
seen holding a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencio’s possession of the marijuana
leaves was established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the plastic bag carried by Din.28

With respect to appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate court stated that the
search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived
their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami
testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in
the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply.29

Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of
Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006, appellants stated that
all the arguments necessary to support their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had submitted
before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of the arguments
discussed in said brief.31 The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental
brief.32

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by the
police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.

In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:

While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was without a search warrant, it
was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received informations [sic] from an asset that on that day, a
male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t].,
Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs. They went to the said area upon that information. Their
waiting was fruitful because not long afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle
carrying a bag and after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves.
With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana and the apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued operation by the team which this time was led by accused
Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas
was upon a probable cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and
the recovery from them [of] 2½ kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this conclusion is necessity [sic]
because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a time with such cumbersome requirements before
one can be issued. Before getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are
not distant to the case of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that
expediency and practicality are some of the justification[s] in the warrantless arrest.33 [Emphasis supplied]

Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection of the plastic bags
of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.34

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.35 The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must
be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.37

The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure conducted in the instant
case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly
voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers.38

We differ.

First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless
searches incidental to lawful arrests.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.39 Recent jurisprudence holds that the
arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the
arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 40

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons
to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be
merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."41
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and
were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found
inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the
plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain
view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.45

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. In Din’s
case, there was none.

Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics
of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)
the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained
and that it was freely and voluntarily given.46

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police
officers. Fami testified in this wise:

FISCAL BELTRAN:

Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your part, what did you do?

A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according to him, he acted arrogantly, sir.

Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you confronted him did he resist?

A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are policeman[?]"

Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?

A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.

xxxx

Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?

A "Sir Famir[sic], don’t charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to Leyte. I was just earning enough money for my
fare, sir."
 xxxx

Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do if you did anything?

A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are the other staffs[sic] sir. 48

xxxx

Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you do?

A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification, sir.49

Cabling likewise testified as follows:

Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he got?

A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.

Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?

A Nobody ordered it, sir.50

There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to
the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability,
Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as
an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others
and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he
not withdrawn his appeal.

However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually
been given. Fami testified as follows:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the plastic bag?

A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the said plastic bag.

Q When you took this plastic bag from Din….

Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?

A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.

Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag belongs to him?

A I did not react, sir.

Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with it?

A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein,
sir.51 [Emphasis supplied.]

Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in your earlier testimony, what did you do?

A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and pinpointed by Nuevas as the ones who
kept suspected prohibited drugs, sir.

Q After you approached these two people, what happened?

A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily surrendered to Fami those marijuana dry leaves,
sir.52

The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the bag.
This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din’s submission of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence
requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.53

The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering something incriminating to
authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami
and Cabling did not testify on Din’s composure—whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time—which fact we
find necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by the
police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note
that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by
clear and positive proof.

Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People
v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.55

Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. 56 As such, Din deserves an acquittal.
1awphi1.net

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s insistence that the appellants have effectively
waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the case. Be it
stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite
of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more
specifically, as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.57

Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.
Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking
into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while
held by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to
Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same.
The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he
conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no
part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Court’s dated but nevertheless current exhortation:

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-
abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend
to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of
law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.59

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal
Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando
Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to
report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO

BOLONG y NARET, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

. . . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for
having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same
way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays
and announces that it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1i brary

So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S. 1 On this occasion, this Court is made to
choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.

Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a
report from a "civilian asset" named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. 2 Solier related that
his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. 3

Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1
Villalonghan, 4 all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. 5 For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. 6 According to his neighbors,
Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. 7

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. 8 Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short,
and usually wore a hat. 9 At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur
Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. 10 All wore civilian clothes. 11

About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton 12 marked "King Flakes." 13 Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and
PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. 14 The same man also toted a
plastic bag. 15

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. 16 PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night. 17 The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he
was carrying any drugs. 18 PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. 19
Tudtud obliged, saying, "it was alright." 20 Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked
on. 21

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag 22 and another in newspapers. 23 PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.
24 They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.25 cralaw:red
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them
to the police station. 26 The two did not resist. 27

The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. 28 Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed
the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams. 29 Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in
her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. 30

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged 31 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 32 Upon arraignment,
both accused pleaded not guilty. 33 The defense, however, reserved their right to question the
validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. 34

Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta,
their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and
SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the
foregoing narration of facts.
chanrob1es vi rtua 1 1aw 1ib ra ry

The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.

Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs of
Levi’s pants, which was his "sideline." 35 At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City
by bus. 36 Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus. 37

Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber
revolver. 38 The man told him not to run. 39 Tudtud raised his arms and asked, "Sir, what is this
about?" 40 The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and
instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levi’s pants. 41

The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. 42 According to Tudtud,
the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. 43 Tudtud told the man the box was not
his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. 44 Tudtud
discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane. 45

"What is that?" the man asked. 46 Tudtud replied that he did not know. 47 Without even unwrapping
the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud. 48

Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street,
some eight meters from Tudtud. 49

Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousin’s wedding in
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted. 50 After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street.
51 Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him. 52 The man ordered him not to move
and handcuffed him. 53 Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go
with them. 54

The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each
other for the first time. 55

Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia
Julaton, 56 Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia, 57 Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita
Abunda, 58 Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified
and presented court documents showing that one "Bobo" or "Bobong" Ramirez was charged in their
respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and
robbery. The defense asserted that the "Bobo" or "Bobong" Ramirez accused in these cases is the
same person as the informant Bobong Solier. 59

Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 60

On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of
the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which states: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above-quoted
constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence "for any
purpose in any proceeding." 61 Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
The following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" even in the absence of a warrant: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 62

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a
search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Court’s rulings in People v. Claudio, 63
People v. Tangliben, 64 People v. Montilla, 65 and People v. Valdez. 66 The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases of People v.
Maspil, Jr., 67 People v. Malmstedt, 68 and People v. Bagista. 69

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000,
Section 12, 70 Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

x x x

It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. 71 Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 72 The question, therefore, is whether the
police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the
peace officers making the arrest. 73

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In the leading case of People v. Burgos, 74 this Court held that "the officer arresting a person who
has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view." 75 In Burgos,
the authorities obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as
member of the New People’s Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused,
the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive
documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable,
ruled that:chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant’s wife.

At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. 76

Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the
accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw 1ib rary

In People v. Aminnudin, 77 this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of
appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

. . . the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the former pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. 78

Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search
yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, 79 or of
standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near, 80
does not justify warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting something in one’s
pocket, 81 handing over one’s baggage, 82 riding a motorcycle, 83 nor does holding a bag on board
a trisikad 84 sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. 85

Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria. 86 Recently, in People v. Binad
Sy Chua, 87 this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel
clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court
ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone
is insufficient.

In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of "suspicious"
circumstances: People v. Tangliben 88 (accused was "acting suspiciously"), People v. Malmstedt 89
(a bulge on the accused’s waist), and People v. de Guzman 90 (likewise a bulge on the waist of the
accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).

There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify
a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos.
To this class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr., 91 People v. Bagista, 92 People v. Balingan, 93
People v. Lising, 94 People v. Montilla, 95 People v. Valdez, 96 and People v. Gonzales. 97 In these
cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no
overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last
two, come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr.
involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and
Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more
faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase "in his presence" therein,
connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be
secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his
liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. 98

The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio, 99 the
accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter,
thus arousing the latter’s suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted
suspiciously.

As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics. There, majority of the
Court held:chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not
merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that
the drugs were in appellant’s luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright
absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the
risk of eventually losing the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in
the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drug. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and
the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. 100

While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the
warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs.
Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.

Although likewise concurring in the majority’s ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his
baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of
the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant "did not exhibit any overt
act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking
on some felonious enterprise." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant
than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have actually
witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that
had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of
witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the
accused.

x x x
To say that "reliable tips" constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my
opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many
decisions made by this Court, in its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional
right against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be practically at the
mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one
whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to
search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be
required to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order
to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to
conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence
information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal
requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majority’s
ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. 101

Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganiban’s concurring opinion in People v. Doria,
supra, where this Court ruled: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her
co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named
his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money was.
Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. 102 [Italics in the original.]

Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Puno’s ponencia, Justice Panganiban said that Doria "rightfully
brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have
seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla." 103

Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to
lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a consented search. As will be
demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.

That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an "on-the-spot
information." The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this case, prevented the
arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant. chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ib rary

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that
would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers’
testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box.
Although appellant Tudtud did appear "afraid and perspiring," 104 "pale" 105 and "trembling," 106
this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in
possession of marijuana be described as "personal," having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his
neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Q — What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks
of marijuana?
A — Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic]
would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to
them there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our
neighbors.

Q — Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?

A — His friends were the once who told me about it.

Q — For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of
marijuana?

A — About a month.

x x x

Q — Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his
apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on
your report my question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana
stocks on August 1, 1999?

x x x

A — Because of the information of his neighbor. 107

In other words, Solier’s information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors
or Tudtud’s friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of
drugs in their neighborhood.

Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliability of their informant. He testified on
cross-examination: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Q — You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?

A — He is trustworthy.

Q — Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?

A — (witness did not answer).

ATTY. CAÑETE: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Never mind, do not answer anymore. That’s all. 108

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1
Floreta for his telling silence.

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
"surveillance." This "surveillance," it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out appellant
Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere "gather[ing] of information
from the assets there." 109 The police officers who conducted such "surveillance" did not identify
who these "assets" were or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
the requisite warrant, PO1 Desierto’s assertions of lack of time 110 notwithstanding. Records show
that the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Solier’s information at
around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening
of the same day. 111 In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to
procure a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report
that the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00
a.m.:chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there
was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock
until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search
warrants even after office hours: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant
may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after
office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required
to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays;." . . .

The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987,
entitled "Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with
Multiple Salas" : jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

"This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and order.
There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these
amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against
public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be
raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the
place to be searched is located.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and
personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive judge or Vice-Executive judge, the
application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application
is filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be
searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.

4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the
examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He
shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants
provided for in this Court’s Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985." 112 [Italics in the
original.]

Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floreta’s testimony that the real
reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same
assumes greater significance. This was PO1 Floreta’s familiar refrain: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
Q — When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic)
stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?

A — No.

Q — Why?

A — Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.

Q — When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search
Tudtud and Bulong at that time?

A — Yes, sir.

x x x

Q — And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And this was 9:00 a.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the
prosecutor do [sic] not assist?

A — They help.

Q — But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?

A — As I said, we do not have sufficient basis. 113

It may be conceded that "the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence
of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the objective
facts to determine the existence of probable cause" and that "a court may also find probable cause in
spite of an officer’s judgment that none exists." 114 However, the fact that the arresting officers felt
that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-gathering
efforts, raises serious questions whether such "surveillance" actually yielded any pertinent
information and even whether they actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby
eroding any claim to personal knowledge. chanrob1es vi rtua 1 1aw 1i bra ry

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 115

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents
of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said "it was alright." He did
not resist and opened the box himself.

The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. 116 The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

. . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to all search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. 117 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag 118 or the chairs 119 containing
marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to
the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. 120

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of
appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open
the subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Q — This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that
something?

A — A 38 cal. Revolver.

Q — How did he point it at you?

A — Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards
somebody).

Q — This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?

A — He said do not run.

Q — What did you do?

A — I raised my hands and said "Sir, what is this about?"

Q — Why did you call him Sir?

A — I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.

Q — Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?

A — Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a
policeman.

Q — When you asked him what is this? What did he say?

A — He said "I would like to inspect what you are carrying. [" ]

x x x

Q — What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?

A — I told him that is not mine.

Q — What did this man say?

A — He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.

Q — What did you do?

A — So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot. 121

Appellants’ implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 122 Consequently, appellants’ lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission
to the warrantless search and seizure. 123

As the search of appellants’ box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there
is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position
of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power. 124

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, 125
next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by
the due process clause. 126 This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom
advocates, 127 the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation
of the right against unreasonable search and seizure "includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing." Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 128

Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an
ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel
Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from
confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw 1ib rary

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

QUISUMBING, J., dissenting: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

I respectfully differ from the majority of my brethren on this case. I vote to sustain the decision 1
dated March 8, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, which convicted in Criminal
Case No. 43,817-99 appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong 2 y Naret, and imposed upon
each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000, for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.

For emphasis, I quote hereunder the information against the appellants filed by the prosecution: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to possess and without being authorized
by law had in their possession two (2) packages of Marijuana leaves and stems with leaves, weighing
890 grams and 3.2 kgs. more or less, respectively, which are prohibited drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

There is no doubt in my mind that appellants are guilty of the illegal possession of prohibited drugs
found by the police inside their carton box. The facts and the law support the findings of the trial
court, leading to the conviction of as well the penalty imposed upon appellants.

Allow me to restate the facts and my reasons for this dissent.

Sometime in the months of July and August 1999, PO1 Ronald Desierto assigned at Police Precinct 8,
Toril, Davao City, received a tip from their "civilian asset," Bobong Solier, that appellant Noel Tudtud
was involved in the prohibited drug trade. According to Solier, Tudtud got his stocks of marijuana
from Cotabato. The information was entered in the police blotter, 4 after which PO1 Desierto and
other members of the Intelligence Section of Toril Precinct 8 conducted surveillance on Tudtud for
five (5) days. 5 Gathering information from other secret informants in the vicinity and from Tudtud’s
neighbors, Solier’s tip to the police was validated. 6

In the morning of August l, 1999, Bobong Solier informed Precinct 8 officers that appellant Tudtud
went on another trip to Cotabato and was expected to arrive in the afternoon of the same day with a
load of marijuana. 7 A team was immediately formed, which included PO1 Ronald Desierto, SPO1
Villanueva 8 and PO1 Ramil Floreta. They posted themselves at the corner of Saypon, MacArthur
Highway, Toril, Davao City. 9 They waited from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., when a Weena bus
stopped and appellants disembarked. 10 Tudtud alighted holding a plastic bag with his right hand
while his left hand was holding a carton box with the markings "King Flakes." Appellant Bolong
helped Tudtud carry the carton box with his right hand. 11

PO1 Desierto and Floreta approached appellants and identified themselves as police officers. 12 For
security purposes, SPO1 Villanueva stood ten (10) meters away from them. 13 PO1 Desierto and
Floreta told appellants that they received information of the arrival of illegal drugs. They requested
appellants if they could be allowed to see the contents of the carton box. Appellant Tudtud said
"okay" and opened the carton box himself. 14 PO1 Desierto and Floreta saw dried sliced fish on top
of the carton box. PO1 Desierto requested Tudtud to take the dried sliced fish out of the carton box.
15 Inside the box, something was wrapped in a striped plastic bag, while another bundle was
wrapped in a newspaper. PO1 Desierto again requested Tudtud to open the striped plastic bag and
the bundle wrapped in newspaper. When appellant Tudtud opened the striped plastic bag, PO1
Desierto and Floreta saw leaves, which appeared to be marijuana. 16 Likewise, the contents of the
bundle wrapped with newspaper revealed what appeared to be marijuana stalks with leaves. 17

Appellants, who did not resist arrest, were forthwith informed of their right to counsel and to remain
silent. They were brought to the police station where the foregoing incident was recorded in the
police blotter. 18

The seized packages of suspected marijuana, weighing 820 grams and 3.2 kilograms, were referred
to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, Davao City, for examination. The forensic result revealed
that the dried leaves were indeed marijuana. 19

For his defense, appellant NOEL TUDTUD testified that in the morning of August 1, 1999, he left for
Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell ten pieces of Levis 20 maong pants to students at the University of
Southern Mindanao. 21 He left for Davao City in the afternoon, taking the Weena bus crossing
Bayabas and arrived at Toril at about 8:30 p.m., where he alighted before going to his residence at
Sapa, Crossing Bayabas, Toril, Davao City. After the bus left, somebody whom he later identified as
PO1 Desierto aimed a gun at him and ordered him to open a box, which yielded marijuana leaves. He
denied carrying said carton box or knowing its contents but despite his pleas he was handcuffed and
brought to the Toril Police Station along with somebody whom he had never met before, herein co-
appellant Dindo Bolong.

In his own testimony, co-appellant DINDO BOLONG likewise denied knowing Noel Tudtud. He too,
disclaimed any knowledge of a carton box containing the subject marijuana. He denied having carried
said carton box together with his co-appellant. He narrated that on August 1, 1999, he went to
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, to do an errand for his cousin who was about to get married. In the
afternoon of that day, he boarded a Weena bus going back to Calinan, Davao City, but decided to
drop by at Toril, Davao City, to meet a relative. When he alighted at the crossing of Bayabas and
Toril in Davao City, at about 8:30 p.m., he and another man, herein appellant Tudtud, were
apprehended by a man who handcuffed them. They were at once brought together to the Toril Police
Station.

In its decision dated March 8, 2000, the trial court disbelieved the version of the defense and gave
credence to the testimony of the apprehending officers, as corroborated by the Philippine National
Police forensic chemist. The trial court found appellants guilty, as follows:
chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both
accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to the provision of Sec. 8, Art. 11
of the Republic Act 6575, as amended by Republic Act 7659, Sec. 20 Art. 4, without any aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense charged, both above-named
accused, Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret, are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, together with all accessory penalty as provided for by law and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 in favor of the government.

The confiscated subject marijuana dried leaves, placed in a carton box with name "King Flakes"
marked Exh. "A" and "B" for the prosecution, are ordered confiscated in favor of the government,
and are turn-over (sic) to the Office of the Narcotics Command, Davao City, for its immediate
destruction through burning, as the circumstances, will warrant.

SO ORDERED. 22

Hence, the present appeal before us. Appellant Noel Tudtud assigned in his Brief several errors. 23

On July 19, 2001, appellant Dindo Bolong filed a manifestation, adopting appellant Tudtud’s brief as
his own. 24

In our view, the resolution of this appeal hinges on the following issues: (1) whether the warrantless
arrest, search and seizure effected by the police officers are unlawful; (2) whether the prosecution’s
evidence suffices to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (3) whether the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and the fine of P500,000 imposed on each appellant are proper.

On the first issue, appellants contend that the warrantless arrest of appellants and the search and
seizure of the marijuana leaves were irregular, hence unlawful. They claim that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them was a product of an illegal search, hence, inadmissible in evidence. chanrob1es v irt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, argues that the findings and conclusions of the
trial court should be sustained. According to the OSG, the law permits the warrantless search and
seizure of the marijuana as an incident to a lawful arrest. I am squarely in agreement with the OSG’s
submission.

The validity of the warrantless arrest and the search made by the police upon the persons of
appellants, as well as the seizure of the marijuana leaves, as herein presented, is no longer a matter
of first impression. Jurisprudence is replete with cases on this score.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" 25 and that evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and
seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 26 But this exclusionary
rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
27 provides one such exception where a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In the case at hand, appellants, were caught in
flagrante delicto, since they were carrying marijuana at the time of their arrest. A warrantless arrest,
under this circumstance, is legitimate. It also necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to search and seize from the offender contraband or prohibited material and whatever may
be used as proof of the offense being committed.

However, the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a) of Rule 113, do not dispense
with the requisite probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
In these cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed. 28 The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
In this case, I note that the arresting officers personally verified the information tipped to them by
their civilian informant concerning appellant Tudtud’s drug trafficking activities. After receiving this
information from Solier, PO1 Desierto and other members of the Intelligence Section of Toril Precinct,
conducted surveillance operations on appellants for five (5) days and confirmed the tip. 29 Having
verified Solier’s data, the police officers had personal knowledge of the probable cause to believe the
subsequent tip-off in the morning of August 1, 1999 that on that day, Tudtud was on another trip to
Cotabato to replenish his stocks of marijuana and was expected to arrive in the afternoon of the
same day. 30 Further, the informant described in detail the personal circumstances of appellant
Tudtud, i.e. that he was short, burly, and usually wore a baseball cap. PO1 Desierto and his team
already had leases as to the identity of the person they were looking for. 31 It was indubitable,
therefore, that the police team of PO1 Desierto had probable cause to search appellant Tudtud’s
belongings since he fitted the description given by the civilian asset. 32

The warrantless search and seizure is further justified by lack of material time to apply for a search
warrant. Faced with such on-the-spot information that Tudtud would arrive that same day with the
prohibited drugs, the law enforcers had to respond quickly. As often said, it is necessary to adopt a
realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the police, instead of critically viewing
them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers, 33 if courts of justice wish to be
of understanding assistance to law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime.

Moreover, appellants consented to the search in this case. This, to me, is established not merely
from the words but the actions taken hereon. When the officers approached appellants, they formally
introduced themselves as policemen. They inquired from appellants about the contents of their
luggage, and requested appellant Tudtud to open the box. Although trembling appellant Tudtud
agreed to the request. 34 Neither did appellant Bolong resist the search. In People v. Cuizon, 35 we
held that illegal drugs discovered as a result of consented search is admissible in evidence. And, in
People v. Montilla, 36 when an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the
same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

Circumstances considered, I believe that there was a valid warrantless search by the police officer.
Any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible in evidence against appellants.
virtua 1 1aw 1ib ra ry
chanrob1es

On the second issue, I concur in the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution has proved
appellants’ guilt for violation of Section 8 37 of the Dangerous Drugs Act beyond reasonable doubt,
for the following reasons:chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 38

The identity of either appellant as a possessor of the seized marijuana leaves is not at issue. Both
were caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police operation. The substance found in appellants’
possession was identified after laboratory analysis by Philippine National Police forensic chemist
Noemi Austero to be marijuana. 39 Appellants’ lack of authority to possess these items was also
established.

Appellants’ awareness of the prohibited drug’s character is also irrefutable. When stopped by the
policemen, appellant Tudtud was holding the plastic bag in one hand and a carton box in his other
hand, with appellant Bolong as helping him in carrying said box. Irrefutably, appellants’ animus
possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles. Recently, in People v. Tee,
40 we held that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. In effect, the onus probandi must be shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or consciousness of the element of possession of the contraband, i.e. his animus
possidendi. 41 Appellants, in this case, have failed to discharge this exculpatory burden.
The conspiracy to commit the offense between appellants Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong clearly
appears from the records. They were apprehended at the same time. They alighted together from the
bus at the highway corner of Toril, Davao City. Appellant Bolong was helping his co-appellant Tudtud
carry the "King Flakes" carton box, which contained what turned out to be a large quantity of dried
marijuana leaves covered by dried fish and concealed in plastic and newspaper wrapper. These
factors convince me that indeed the two appellants had conspired together and helped each other in
the commission of the offense.

As the trial court explained, the frame-up angle in this case that appellants wish to peddle in their
defense does not inspire belief. Like alibi, the defense of frame-up is viewed with disfavor, because it
is easily concocted. It is a common and standard line of defense in cases arising from violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 42 Appellant Tudtud’s alibi that he came from Kabacan, North Cotabato,
where he sold Levis jeans, is uncorroborated. In his memorandum, he referred to Exh. "F," claiming
that the apprehending officers had confiscated the six pants then in his possession, 43 although Exh.
"F" refers to the entry in the police blotter on the arrest of both appellants, with no mention of a
plastic bag containing 6 Levis jeans. 44 In the same vein, the defense of appellant Dindo Bolong, that
he took the bus from Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, after delivering invitations for his cousin’s wedding,
remains a bare allegation that is not substantiated. The version of the incident by the police officers,
coming as it did from law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence
of proof to the contrary, 45 and accepted as credible by the trial court, has not been discredited at all
by appellants who claimed a frame-up without sufficient bases.

Appellants next assail the credibility of the civilian informant, witness Bobong Solier, on the ground
that various informations and complaints had been filed against him in the City Court and Regional
Trial Court of Davao City. But it should be stressed that witness Solier’s testimony is not essential for
the conviction of the appellants. Testimony of the police informant in an illegal drug case is merely
cumulative and corroborative of the apprehending officers’ eyewitness testimonies. 46 Moreover,
Solier’s tip-off was not the sole basis for the police operation in this case as there was prior
surveillance conducted by the police. As it stands, Solier’s testimony merely buttressed the case for
the prosecution.

The investigative including laboratory procedures adopted in this regard by Chief Inspector Noemi
Austero are being criticized by appellants. They lament that the Duquenois Levine Test conducted by
Austero at the PNP Crime Laboratory on the confiscated leaves was inconclusive in regard to
determining whether the confiscated items were indeed marijuana, absent any confirmatory or other
tests. However, nothing on record effectively negates the finding of the trial court that the test was
regularly performed. The trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless there appears on record some
facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial
court.

The trial court, in my view, did not err in ruling that the prosecution has established the guilt of
appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants are guilty of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
under Section 8 of Republic Act 6425, which provides: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof. (As amended by Republic Act 7659.)

In sentencing both appellants to reclusion perpetua and in imposing a fine of P500,000 upon each of
them, the trial court was not in error but only enforcing law and policy on prohibited and dangerous
drugs. Under R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000)
shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction for possession of marijuana or
Indian hemp is 750 grams or more. 47

In the present case, the Chemistry Report submitted by forensic chemist Noemi Austero states that
the subject prohibited drugs were:" (a) Dried suspected Marijuana fruiting tops weighing 3,200
grams contained in a "King Flakes" box, and (b) Dried suspected Marijuana leaves weighing 890.0
grams contained in pink and white plastic bag." 48 The quantity of the confiscated marijuana as
proved by the prosecution weighs more than 4 kilos, much in excess of 750 grams cited by the law
as baseline for the penalty involved. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be properly imposed, in view of Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. 49

To conclude, I am of the considered view that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting the
appellants, as well as the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on them, should be affirmed. chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw 1ib rary

2. Plain View

G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997

ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:

(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;

(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;

(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.1

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 18662 thru the following Information:3

That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16
Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions,
one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1)
.380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the same.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,5 but granted his application for bail. 6 During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, 7 upon
 advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case. 10

After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of
the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on
April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond.
The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby

AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-
appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National
Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his
appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The Regional
Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED. 15

Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by respondent court in its
September 20, 1995 Resolution 18 copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with application for
bail 19 followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental
petition" 21 and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-
General 22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution
promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated
comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous
resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough
exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes
a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25

The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by respondent
court, is as follows: 26

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre
Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where
they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted
their ride on motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to
remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In
the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p.
7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast
(pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz,
quite sure of what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that Manarang had been right in his
observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).

Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or
shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of
both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report
the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and
called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By
the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p.
11, ibid).

He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle
and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of
the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1193). He called the Viper through the radio once
again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in
a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan,
upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the
order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the
alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN,
February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a
mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan
bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten
(10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).

Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was
Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico
Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and
SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the
MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).

In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident,
even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the
Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15,
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan
bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the
Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles
coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that
there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew
about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang
was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident
emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that
the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he
followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.

Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the
two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe
light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it
to stop (p. 11, ibid).

SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2
Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p.
12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They
recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else
with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped
his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to
which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993)
such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of
his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja
made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was
covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant
(p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the
cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
 While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan
and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police
officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate
number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands
with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" (pp.
13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an
armalite rifle tucked in appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so
when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated
the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle
inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to
his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite
rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long magazine filled with
live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering
the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado
modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid).
SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).

The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-
32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L")
with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live
bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines
and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been
interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation
Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and
ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During
the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for
shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to
cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).

On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario
Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4,
1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro
Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid).

Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential
agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the
penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987
Constitution.

After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged
stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.

Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued
for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in
a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to
arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to
the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner. 31

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested
him were not at the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the
policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in
any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken
rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-
equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree
of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is
a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an
additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render
aid or take action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public
place and the raining nighttime — all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The
Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16
magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in
fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and
run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. 39 These formed part of the
arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge
and not on unreliable hearsay information. 40

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash
the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the
legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. 43

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in
evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;

(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 48

3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50

4. consented warrantless search, and

5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's
firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16
rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:

(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the, corpus delicti. 53

Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant. 54

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. 57

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the
person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender
(like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 63

Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is
an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a
Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of
Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed,
petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this
score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:

Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission
Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police
officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been
apprehended on October 26, 1992.

Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to possess
and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him,
present any proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if not at the time of
apprehension, at least during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel
inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court,
appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not.
He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.

Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of a
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject
firearms.

At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom
a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng
appeared in court but was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the
defense found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13,
1994. 67

The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if
they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject
firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that
his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be
reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to
present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing
public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-
Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:

VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnels such as
PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown
without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
 IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be carried out
through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this
Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such violation. 68

which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.

The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted.
Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission
Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders
and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the
Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers
"Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval
"by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides
that:

No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding certification from
the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has
been officially taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been reported
to higher AFP authority.

Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.

What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP, does
not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP
which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing rules
of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and
unambiguous, thus:

No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside
residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence
project proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of
command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides
as follows:

If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian
agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and
are receiving regular compensation for the service they are rendering.

That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the
firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or
registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:

Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if
any?

A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm

pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being
 asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the
caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the same serial number
which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert
Villanueva Fallorina.

Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is
a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of
the accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir. 77

xxx xxx xxx

And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City

PNFEO5 28 November 1992

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered
holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No.
RL M76C4476687.

Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification from
available records on file this Office as of this date:

M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120

Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219

Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723

However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered
to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered
License.

This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

(Sgd.)

JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO

Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch 78

In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we
reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing
discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the
prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidences 81 that an M-16 rifle and any
short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, 82 as in
the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we
find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and
respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. 83

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and
a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. 84 He stresses
that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive
in contravention of the Constitution. 85

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. 87 And until its
repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted
to by petitioner.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The
penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso
facto make the same cruel and excessive.

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does
not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive", "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community" 88

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of
the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this
Court. 91 Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary
to any provision of the Constitution. . . " 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not
be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes
them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.

With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with
the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable
for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the
range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the
following explanation by the Court:

In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, 94 although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised
Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 20 years.

This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not
merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium
period. 95

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the
lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS, Appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75,
with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended.

Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise charged3 with the
same crime, before the same court.

Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 As the evidence in the cases was
common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases were consolidated. After a joint trial on the
merits, the RTC rendered a Decision5 dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine of ₱500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing regulations.

SO ORDERED.6

To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there is need to recall the
factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.

PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling
(Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street,
Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the
description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They
accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas
answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas
informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male
persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed
where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7

Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according
to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and
approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying
a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and
upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."8 After confiscating the items,
Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper
documentation.9 Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling and that a field
test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise physically examined on the basis
of which corresponding medical certificates were issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were
also accomplished. Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the
accused and the confiscation of the items.10

On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all three (3) accused
were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during
their physical examination. He also escorted all three to the Fiscal’s office where the latter were informed of the
charges against them.11

Cabling corroborated Fami’s testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had introduced themselves as
police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves.12

On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Fami’s informant,
conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under surveillance. Fami then
relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding
and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to
cooperate and point to his other cohorts.14 When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of Nuevas’s
cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking
into its contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was holding to the police officers.16

For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking along Perimeter Street,
on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of
his house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room
where Fami handcuffed Nuevas’s hands, got Nuevas’s wallet, took out ₱1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami’s) wallet.
Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before leaving the house with
Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red owner—type
jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or
Inocencio.17

Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 o’clock in the morning of 27 September 1997, while his ‘compare’
Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman. The two (2) introduced themselves as
police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for
their arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan
precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to
stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they had their
fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table.18

Inocencio testified that he went to his ‘compadre’ Din’s house in the morning of 27 September 1997 to sell his
fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his driver’s license. While there, he and Din were arrested by two
persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other searched the house for a lady named Vangie.
Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first came to
know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he only
saw such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was taken of the three
of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the photograph was taken, they were not
assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards, they were
brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the police what they did wrong, the police replied that they will just
explain it in court. 19

All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic
review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal.20 The Court granted
Nuevas’s withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and terminated as to him, in a Resolution21 dated 25
August 2003.

In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42,23 the cases were transferred to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.24

Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1) in finding them
guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and (2) n not finding that their
constitutional rights have been violated.25
The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.27

The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s
assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there
was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s
version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was
seen holding a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencio’s possession of the marijuana
leaves was established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the plastic bag carried by Din.28

With respect to appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate court stated that the
search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived
their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami
testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in
the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply.29

Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of
Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006, appellants stated that
all the arguments necessary to support their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had submitted
before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of the arguments
discussed in said brief.31 The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental
brief.32

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by the
police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.

In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:

While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was without a search warrant, it
was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received informations [sic] from an asset that on that day, a
male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t].,
Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs. They went to the said area upon that information. Their
waiting was fruitful because not long afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle
carrying a bag and after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves.
With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana and the apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued operation by the team which this time was led by accused
Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas
was upon a probable cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and
the recovery from them [of] 2½ kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this conclusion is necessity [sic]
because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a time with such cumbersome requirements before
one can be issued. Before getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are
not distant to the case of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that
expediency and practicality are some of the justification[s] in the warrantless arrest.33 [Emphasis supplied]

Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection of the plastic bags
of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.34

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.35 The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must
be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.37

The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure conducted in the instant
case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly
voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers.38

We differ.

First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless
searches incidental to lawful arrests.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.39 Recent jurisprudence holds that the
arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the
arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 40

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons
to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be
merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."41

Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and
were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found
inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the
plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain
view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.45

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. In Din’s
case, there was none.

Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics
of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)
the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained
and that it was freely and voluntarily given.46

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police
officers. Fami testified in this wise:

FISCAL BELTRAN:

Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your part, what did you do?

A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according to him, he acted arrogantly, sir.

Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you confronted him did he resist?

A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are policeman[?]"

Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?

A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.

xxxx

Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?

A "Sir Famir[sic], don’t charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to Leyte. I was just earning enough money for my
fare, sir."

xxxx

Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do if you did anything?

A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are the other staffs[sic] sir. 48

xxxx

Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification, sir.49

Cabling likewise testified as follows:

Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he got?

A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.

Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?

A Nobody ordered it, sir.50

There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to
the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability,
Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as
an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others
and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he
not withdrawn his appeal.

However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually
been given. Fami testified as follows:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the plastic bag?

A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the said plastic bag.

Q When you took this plastic bag from Din….

Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?

A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.

Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag belongs to him?

A I did not react, sir.

Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with it?

A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein,
sir.51 [Emphasis supplied.]

Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in your earlier testimony, what did you do?

A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and pinpointed by Nuevas as the ones who
kept suspected prohibited drugs, sir.

Q After you approached these two people, what happened?

A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily surrendered to Fami those marijuana dry leaves,
sir.52

The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the bag.
This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din’s submission of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence
requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.53

The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering something incriminating to
authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami
and Cabling did not testify on Din’s composure—whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time—which fact we
find necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by the
police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note
that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by
clear and positive proof.

Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People
v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.55

Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. 56 As such, Din deserves an acquittal.
1awphi1.net

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s insistence that the appellants have effectively
waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the case. Be it
stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite
of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more
specifically, as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.57

Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.
Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking
into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while
held by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to
Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same.
The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he
conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no
part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Court’s dated but nevertheless current exhortation:

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-
abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend
to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of
law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.59
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal
Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando
Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to
report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

3. Search of a Moving Vehicle

[ G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSEMARIE GARDON-MENTOY, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, C.J.:

A lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal effects of an individual. The
process cannot be reversed. Hence, the search must rest on probable cause existing independently of the arrest.

The Case

This appeal challenges the decision promulgated on April 28, 2015,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the conviction of the accused appellant for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs defined and
penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002). She had been
incriminated following the warrantless search of her personal effects as a passenger of a shuttle van.

Antecedents

The information filed on June 1, 2008 charged the accused-appellant with the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165, as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of May 2008, at more or less 4:45 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Malatgao,
Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport and have in her possession, custody and
control of 1,400 grams of Cannavis (sic) Sativa otherwise known as "MARIJUANA", a dangerous drug contained in
three (3) packages which are intended to be sold to prospective buyers with whom the accused had actually been
engaged in selling, giving away and dispatching said prohibited dugs without the necessary permit and/or license
from the proper authorities to possess and sell the same, and where (sic) the said 1,400 grams of marijuana
amounting to FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php40,000.00), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case in this wise:

On May 30, 2008, an informant relayed to SPO2 Renato Felizarte (SPO2 Felizarte) of the Nan-a Municipal Police
Station (police station) in Palawan that a couple named @ Poks and @ Rose (later identified as accused-appellant),
were transporting and selling marijuana in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan. SPO2 Felizarte relayed the
information to Police Senior Inspector Yolanda Socrates (PSI Socrates) who instructed SPO2 Felizarte and PO1
Abdulito Rosales (PO1 Rosales) to conduct surveillance on said suspects. At about 1:43 p.m. of said date, SPO2
Felizarte submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) a pre-operation report dated May 30, 2008
with control number PDEA R0-0508-00006, which the PDEA confirmed.

On May 31, 2008, at about 8 a.m., PSI Socrates briefed the operation team (team). At about 4:30 p.m., the
informant relayed to the team that accused-appellant will be boarding a Charing 19 shuttle van (van) with plate
number VRA 698. Thus, the team proceeded to the National Highway, Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan. At a
distance of one (1) to two (2) meters, PO1 Rosales, while on board his motorcycle, saw accused-appellant board
the van. PO1 Rosales flagged down the van as it approached them. The team introduced themselves as police
officers. They declared that they were conducting a checkpoint because of information about persons transporting
illegal drugs. PO1 Rosales told the driver that they will check the van passengers. The driver then opened the van's
side door. PO1 Rosales asked the van passengers who among them was Rose. Accused-appellant replied, "Aka
po" (I am). PO1 Rosales asked accused-appellant where her baggage was. Accused-appellant apprehensively
requested the driver to hand her the pink bag placed at the rear portion of the van. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1
Rosales, however, noticed that accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane
and brown tape, from the pink bag to a black one. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales suspected this bundle to
contain marijuana leaves. Accused-appellant then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. SPO2 Felizarte
also noticed that accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, but he and PO1 Rosales
restrained her. Afterwards, PO1 Rosales called Barangay Captain Ernesto Maiguez (Brgy. Captain Maiguez) to
proceed to the area.

When Brgy. Captain Maiguez arrived, SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales asked him if he knew accused-appellant.
Brgy. Captain Maiguez said he knew accused-appellant as a rice seller who resided in Barangay Malatgao where he
was chairman. The police officers asked Brgy. Captain Maiguez to pick up the black bag, which accused-appellant
held beside her. Brgy. Captain Maiguez got (the) said bag and placed it by the road. SPO2 Felizarte requested him
to open it. Brgy. Captain Maiguez opened said bag in the presence of accused-appellant and the other van
passengers. PO1 Rosales took photographs while said bag was being opened. The black bag contained, inter alia:
(a) one (1) L-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape; (b) one (1) block-shaped bundle
wrapped in newspaper; and (c) one (1) sachet (covered with tissue paper), all suspected to contain marijuana
leaves. The police officers smelled the bundles and sachet and confirmed that these contained marijuana leaves.
The police officers returned the items inside the black bag. They arrested and informed accused-appellant that she
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and apprised the latter of her constitutional rights. Since accused-appellant
lived near the crime scene, the police officers brought her and the seized items immediately to the police station to
avoid any untoward incident.

PO1 Rosales carried the black bag from the crime scene to the police station. Thereat, PO1 Rosales prepared an
inventory of the seized items in the presence of a media representative and Brgy. Captain Maiguez. PO1 Rosales
also marked the L-shaped bundle as "ADR-1", blocked-shaped bundle as "ADR-2", and sachet as "ADR-3",
respectively, in the presence of accused-appellant. PO1 Rosales brought the bundles and sachet to the Palawan
Crime Laboratory (crime laboratory) where Forensic Chemist and Police Chief Inspector Mary Jane Cordero (PCI
Cordero) examined the seized items. She found the contents of the bundles and sachet positive for marijuana and
prepared Chemistry Report No. D-005-08 stating her findings.

During trial, PO1 Rosales identified the seized items in open court as the same ones he marked at the police
station. He also identified in open court the inventory he prepared at the police station. The defense admitted the
documents presented by the prosecution, namely: the Request for Laboratory Examination; PCI Cordero's
Chemistry Report No. D-005-08; dried marijuana leaves; L-shaped bundle marked "ADR-1"; dried marijuana leaves;
blocked-shaped bundle marked "ADR-2", dried marijuana leaves; and sachet marked "ADR-3". PCI Cordero's
testimony was concluded without cross-examination by the defense.

For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on May 11, 2008, at about 4:00 p.m., she was onboard a van
bound for Puerto Princesa City for a medical consultation and to canvass the price of rice. Shortly after, a man
aboard a motorcycle flagged down the van. Another man, later identified as SPO2 Felizarte, asked the passengers
who among them was Rose. After accused-appellant answered that she was Rose, SPO2 Felizarte handcuffed her.
The other passengers were told to alight from the van, while accused-appellant remained inside. The police officers
searched the baggage of the other passengers and placed these outside the van. The police officers called the
passengers to look at a certain bag while they took photographs. Thereafter, accused-appellant was ordered to
alight from the van while the other passengers returned inside. The bags of the passengers were returned inside the
van, except for one (1) bag, which was held by the police officers. Accused-appellant did not see Brgy. Captain
Maiguez open her black bag. The police officers brought her to the police station where she was asked to sign some
documents, which she refused to do.3

Judgment of the RTC

On June 4, 2013, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant as charged, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having satisfactorily proven the guilt of
accused ROSEMARIE GARDON MENTOY, the Court hereby found her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for transportation of dangerous drug and to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

The confiscated marijuana used in prosecuting this case is hereby ordered to be turned over to the local office of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC regarded the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant as validly made upon probable cause in the
context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court;5 and concluded that the State had established the corpus
delicti of the crime by the testimonies of its witnesses.6

Decision of the CA

On April 28, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant.7 It
opined that a search could precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the
warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused-appellant had been an incident of her lawful
arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the crucial links in the chain of custody.8 It explained
that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest could still be said to precede the arrest if the police
officers had probable cause to effect the arrest at the outset of the search; and that based on the circumstances
showing the existence of probable cause the warrantless search, being an incident to the lawful arrest of the
accused-appellant, was valid.9

Issue

In this appeal, the accused-appellant insists on the illegality of her warrantless arrest. She asserts that
the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from her bag were inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary
rule; and that the apprehending officers did not comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the concurrence of the elements of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs had been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that the arrest had been legally
conducted pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.11

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has merit.

The right against unreasonable

searches and seizures is inviolable

Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause - the existence of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to do so; or the person whose property is to be
searched has used the same to commit crime, and its issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or
conjecture, or hearsay. The right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures is so sacred that no less
than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution declares the right to be inviolable, and for that reason expressly
prohibits the issuance of any search warrant or warrant of arrest except upon probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the exclusionary rule by
unqualifiedly declaring that "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusionary rule is intended to deter the violation of the right
to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.

We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures admit of
some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint.
Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are
limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on
the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors;
(d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area.12

In short, inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is
permissible only when the officer conducting the search had probable cause to believe prior to the search that he
will find inside the vehicle to be searched the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime.13

II

Warrantless search of the accused-appellant's

personal belongings was not based on probable cause

Based on the alleged tip from the unidentified informant to the effect that the accused-appellant would be
transporting dangerous drugs on board a Charing 19 shuttle van with plate number VRA 698, the police officers had
set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao in Narra, Palawan. There, PO1 Abdulito
Rosales later flagged down the approaching shuttle van. The officers at the checkpoint introduced themselves as
policemen. But even at that time none of the officers knew who would be transporting dangerous drugs to. They
were, only told that the suspect was a person named Rose, but they had no independent knowledge of who she was
other than her name being Rose. Upon the driver opening the door of the vehicle, PO1 Rosales nonetheless singled
her out by immediately asking who of the passengers was Rose. The accused-appellant naturally answered the
query by identifying herself as Rose without hesitation. The police officers also did not yet know how or
where Rose was transporting the dangerous drugs. So, PO1 Rosales immediately inquired about her baggage, and,
in response, she requested the driver to hand her the pink bag resting at the rear portion of the van.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Renato Felizarte and PO1 Rosales noticed that the accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped
bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape from the pink bag to a black one, and then placed the black
bag on a vacant seat beside her. At what precise moment this took place was not indicated in the records, but the
officers' mere say-so was entirely subjective on their part. Without objective facts being presented here by which we
can test the basis for the officers' suspicion about the block shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give
unquestioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning
the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the
objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to
overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."14

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down
from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did occur,
give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?
For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to another should
not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to
produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant,
without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that
the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability,
and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in
the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to. the knowledge of the searching or
arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.15

The general rule is that an arrest or search and seizure should be effected upon a judicial warrant. A lawful
warrantless arrest may be effected by a peace officer or private person but only when any of the exceptions listed in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest to be issued is applicable. Section
LaW ㏗i L

5 specifically provides:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause'1 to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. (5a)

In the warrantless arrest made pursuant to Section 5(a), supra, the concurrence of two circumstances is necessary,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b), supra, requires that at the time of the warrantless arrest, an
offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it. In both instances, the essential basis for. the warrantless arrest is the arresting officer's
personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5(a), the officer himself witnesses
the commission of the crime; under Section 5(b), the officer actually knows that a crime has just been committed.16

Both the RTC and the OSG submit that the case of the accused appellant came under Section 5(b), supra.
However, their submission is factually unfounded because PO1 Rosales and SPO2 Felizarte concededly did not
have personal knowledge that the crime had been committed inasmuch as at that point they did not yet know where
the dangerous drug had been hidden. In fact, as the records bear out, they were only able to find and seize
the marijuana after the barangay captain had opened her bag.

On its part, the CA upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of the accused-appellant having been. caught in
flagrante delicto, the situation covered by Section 5(a), supra. An arrest made in flagrante delicto means that the
arrestee is caught in the very act of committing the crime, and the phrase necessarily implies that the positive
identification of the culprit has already been done by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification constitutes
direct evidence of culpability because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption."17 But we find otherwise, because there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the
time of the search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.

Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused appellant once she had identified herself as
Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really contained marijuana. As
earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in
yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2
Felizarte's afterthought justification considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It
is noteworthy in this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had
opened the bag.18

The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did not
precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless
search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.19 As such, the search made against the accused-appellant
would be valid only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.

What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory
limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects
of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her. If the arrest did not
precede the search, where was the probable cause that justified her warrantless arrest?

The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant and the warrantless search of
her personal effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the search. The marijuana seized from
her should be deemed inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule enunciated under Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution. With the confiscated marijuana being the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
accused-appellant should be acquitted because the evidence adduced against her was entirely inadmissible.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on April28, 2015 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06339; ACQUITS accused-appellant ROSEMARIE GARDON MENTOY of the
crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165; and ORDERS her IMMEDIATE RELEASE from
confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women, Bureau of Corrections, in Mandaluyong City, unless she is
confined thereat for some other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be forthwith furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action taken conformably with this decision within
five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa,* Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.

 [ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC
SALIBAD Y MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Can the police conduct a warrantless int1usive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by
an anonymous informant? On this question, jurisprudence has vacillated over the years. The Court definitively
settles the issue once and for all.

In threshing out this issue, it must be remembered that in criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations
of the law on dangerous drugs, our constitutional order does not adopt a stance of neutrality - the law is heavily in
favor of the accused. By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence1 - it is for the
State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court is given no alternative
but to acquit the accused.

Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.

Therefore, while the Court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive stance against the scourge of illegal
drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved by subverting the people's constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In simple terms, the Constitution does not allow the end to justify
the means. Otherwise, in eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister one is cultivated - the
trampling of the people's fundamental, inalienable rights. The State's steadfastness in eliminating the drug menace
must be equally matched by its determination to uphold and defend the Constitution. This Court will not sit idly by
and allow the Constitution to be added to the mounting body count in the State's war on illegal drugs.

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
(accused-appellant Sapla), assailing the Decision3 dated April 24, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals
(CA)4 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed the Judgment5 dated January 9, 2017 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jerry
Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari, finding accused-appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, and as culled from the
records of the case, are as follows:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight
of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in transit through a passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270 the said
marijuana without license, permit or authority from any appropriate government entity or agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."
The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged
against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution and the Defense stipulated
their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a quo. Also, the Prosecution identified and marked its pieces
of evidence, while the Defense made no proposals nor pre-mark[ed] any exhibits.

Trial ensued thereafter.

The Prosecution presented three (3) police officers as its witnesses, namely: 1) Police Officer (PO)2 Jim Mabiasan
(hereinafter referred to as PO2 Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd Maneuver Company, Regional Public
Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City and was the seizing officer; 2) PO3 Lito Labbutan (hereinafter referred to
as PO3 Labbutan), an intelligence operative of Kalinga Police Provincial Office - Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Group (KPPO PAIDSOTG) who was tasked as the arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior Inspector
(PSI) Delon Ngoslab (hereinafter referred to as PSI Ngoslab), deputy company commander of the RPSB and team
leader of the joint checkpoint operation.

The evidence for the Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on
duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then
relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a
possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan, an
operative of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Afterwards, the
chief of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar Lingbawan (hereinafter referred to as PSI Lingbawan), briefed his
operatives on the said information. Later on, the said operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG arrived at the RPSB. PSI
Ngoslab immediately organized a team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3
Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security and backup. The said
officers then proceeded to the Talaca detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the subject male
person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
[was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the Talaca
checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan and
Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The
police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter
answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After
[accused-appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-
appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2
Mabiasan further searched [accused-appellant Sapla] and found one (I) LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter, PO2
Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the
Talaca detachment for proper markings.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized items, one (1) blue
sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer placed his signature on the
said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by [accused-appellant Sapla], and by the following:
1) Joan K. Balneg from the Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3)
Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the said [accused-appellant
Sapla] at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for further
investigation.

At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case, PO2
Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and proper disposition. Also, PSI
Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which requested that a chemistry examination be
conducted on the seized items. The following specimens were submitted for initial laboratory examination: 1) one (1)
blue sack with label J&N rice, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1)
brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 998.376 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-
1" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 3) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 929.735
grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-2" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one (1) brick of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, which weighed 1,045.629 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-3" PNP-TALACA and
signature;" 5) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 979.371 grams, marked "2:30PM
JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-4" PNP-TALACA and signature,"· The said initial examination revealed that the specimens
"A-1" to "A-4" with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug. In addition, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014 revealed that indeed the said specimens [did]
contain marijuana and that the said report indicated that the "specimen[s] submitted are retained in this laboratory
for future reference."

Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal his true identity by using a
fictitious name - Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators were able to contact [accused-appellant Sapla's] sister,
who duly informed the said investigators that [accused appellant Sapla's] real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.

On the other hand, the Defense presented [accused-appellant Sapla] as its sole witness.

The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the
incident. He claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain relative named Tony Sibal. Two
(2) days later, [accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers f1agged down the said jeepney in order to check its passenger[s']
baggages and cargoes. The police of1icers then found marijuana inside a sack and were looking for a person who
wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3) passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers
identified him as the owner of the marijuana found inside the sack. [Accused-appellant Sapla] denied ownership of
the marijuana, and asserted that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested [accused-
appellant Sapla] and brought him to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to
him.7

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating Section 5 of
R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO, a.k.a. ERIC
SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The accused to pay the fine of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be submitted to any authorized representative of the PDEA for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's Decision with
modifications. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 January 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine
of P1,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was without a search
warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the
essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and seizure.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Stripped to its core, the essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid search and seizure
conducted by the police officers. The answer to this critical question determines whether there is enough evidence
to sustain accused-appellant Sapla's conviction under Section 5 of R.A. 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The instant appeal is impressed with merit. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his
release from incarceration.

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the
Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power."11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the hierarchy of
rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, x x x for the right to personal
security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure."12

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a court
issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and is strictly construed
against the government.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant, taking
into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the character of the articles procured."13

The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(3) search of a moving vehicle;

(4) consented warrantless search;

(5) customs search;

(6) stop and frisk; and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.14

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA considered the
police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."15

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."16

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case is a search of a moving
vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling inasmuch as the facts of the said case
are virtually identical to the instant case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the authorities as regards an alleged courier of
marijuana who had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to
Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually called the authorities and informed them that the alleged drug courier had
boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added
that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." With this
information, the police officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the authorities did in the instant case. Afterwards,
upon seeing the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar to the
instant case, the said vehicle was flagged down. The police officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the
description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap.
The man was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so, the police officers saw a transparent
cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In
this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person."18 The Court added that "in search
of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that
the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such
that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given
by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus."19
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the search conducted
was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle.
The target of the search was the person who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB
Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the
floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the
target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such
vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person."20

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving
Vehicle

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the operation
undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

In People v. Manago,21 the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, explained that a
variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setting up of military or police checkpoints.
The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of
public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a
vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a
mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched."23

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle
necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 ( Valmonte) where the Court first held that vehicles can be stopped at a checkpoint
and extensively searched only when there is "probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense."25 This doctrine was directly adopted from United States jurisprudence, specifically from the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v. Taylor.26

As subsequently explained by the Court in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,27 probable cause means that there is the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched:

x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion supp01ied by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a

cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each
case.28
Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not engender Probable Cause on the part of the
Authorities that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle

As readily admitted by the CA, the singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part of the police
officers was the information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from an anonymous person.
Because of this information, the CA held that there was probable cause on the part of the police to conduct an
intrusive search.29

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable cause that
enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search warrant? The answer is a
resounding no.

The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures,
"law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion."30

A. United States Jurisprudence on Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped Information

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless search of a moving vehicle necessitates probable cause
was adopted by the Court from United States jurisprudence, examining United States jurisprudence can aid in a
fuller understanding on the existence of probable cause vis-a-vis tipped information received from confidential
informants.

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31 the SCOTUS delved into the constitutional requirements for obtaining a
state search warrant. In the said case, two Houston police officers applied to a local Justice of the Peace for a
warrant to search for narcotics in the petitioner's home based on "reliable information" received from a supposed
credible person that the "heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being
kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."32

In invalidating the search warrant, the SCOTUS held that a two pronged test must be satisfied in order to determine
whether an informant's tip is sufficient in engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the informant's "basis of knowledge"
must be revealed and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the
informant's report must be provided:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, and need not reflect the direct personal observations of
the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some
of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be
disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528, was "credible" or his information "reliable."33

Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois v. Gates,34 the police received an anonymous letter alleging that the
respondents were engaged in selling drugs and that the car of the respondents would be loaded with drugs. Agents
of the Drug Enforcement Agency searched the respondents' car, which contained marijuana and other contraband
items.

In finding that there was probable cause, the SCOTUS adopted the totality of circumstances test and held that
tipped information may engender probable cause under "a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the
various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip"35 In the said case, the SCOTUS found
that the details of the informant's tip were corroborated by independent police work.

The SCOTUS emphasized however that "standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police
Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. x x x Something more was required, then, before a
magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses'
home and car."36
B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable Cause

As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled that an extensive warrantless search and seizure conducted on the sole
basis of a confidential tip is tainted with illegality. In People v. Aminnudin,37 analogous to the instant case, the
authorities acted upon an information that the accused would be arriving from Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V
Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted the accused, and inspected the latter's bag
wherein bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court declared that the search and seizure was illegal,
holding that, at the time of his apprehension, Aminnudin was not "committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. x x x To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."38

Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that the
warrantless search and subsequent arrest of the accused were deemed illegal because "the prosecution failed to
establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had
committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made."40 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found that the authorities merely relied on "the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning."41 The Court characterized the tip received by the authorities from an anonymous informant
as "hearsay information"42 that cannot engender probable cause.

In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities acted solely on an informant's tip and stopped the tricycle occupied by the
accused and asked the latter to alight. The authorities then rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs
that were loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities then found a package of marijuana inserted between the two
chairs. The Court, again through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "raw intelligence"44 was not
enough to justify the warrantless search and seizure. "The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious
behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."45

Likewise analogous to the instant case is People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where an informant had told the police that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be transporting illegal drugs from Baguio City by bus. Hence, the police officers situated
themselves at the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her
as "Aling Rosa." Subsequently, the authorities apprehended the woman and inspected her bag which contained
marijuana leaves.

In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court in Aruta held that "it was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out
as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for
them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant."47 Hence, the Court held that the search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the pointing
finger of the informant was "a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure."48

Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise involved a search conducted through a
checkpoint put up after an "unidentified civilian informer" shared information to the authorities that a person would
be transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that justified a warrantless search, the Court,
through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that in cases finding sufficient probable
cause for the conduct of warrantless searches, "the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is
indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs."50 However, the Court reasoned that the case of the
accused was different because "he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that
Cogaed was 'suspicious.'"51
In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless search, "[i]t is the
police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic
right to security of one's person and effects."52 The Court explained that "the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the (acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act," and not merely rely on the information
passed on to him or her.53

Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People,54 the Court in Cogaed
stressed that reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.55 The Court emphasized that the matching of information transmitted by an informant "still remained only
as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a
valid search warrant."56

Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 (Veridiano), a concerned citizen informed the police that the accused was
on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities set up a checkpoint. The police
officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance of the accused. Eventually, the police chanced upon the
accused inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. The jeepney was flagged down and the
police asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered
from the accused a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,
held that the accused was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers
reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the
police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious."58

The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.
A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence
of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."59

A year after Veridiano, the Court decided the case of Comprado. As in the instant case, the authorities alleged that
they possessed reasonable cause to conduct a warrantless search solely on the basis of information relayed by an
informant.

The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained that "no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime."60

The Court emphasized that there should be the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which,
taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 In the said case, as in the instant case, the
accused was just a passenger carrying his bag. "There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act.
Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant
was in possession of marijuana."62

Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People v. Yanson63 (Yanson) that a solitary tip hardly suffices as
probable cause that warrants the conduct of a ·warrantless intrusive search and seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the instant case, "the Municipal Police Station of M'lang,
North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with plate number 619 and carrying
three (3) people - that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed the alert team to set up a
checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M'lang."64

Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police
officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an
officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine."65
In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, the Court held that, in determining
whether there is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless searches of a moving vehicle,
"bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to
justify conviction, it requires the existence of 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.'"66

The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated warrantless searches and seizures on the basis
of tipped information, "the seizures and arrests were not merely and exclusively based on the initial tips. Rather,
they were prompted by other attendant circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was
progressively heightened by other factors, such as the accused's failure to produce identifying documents, papers
pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of suspicious behavior upon being approached."67 In such
cases, the finding of probable cause was premised "on more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It
was the confluence of initial tips and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable
cause."68 However, the case of Yanson was markedly different from these other cases. Just as in the instant case,
the police officers proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip:

This case is markedly different. The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the
basis of a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting marijuana
from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting
officers went ahead to initiate a search asking the driver about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon this insistence did
the driver alight. It was also only upon a police officer's further prodding did he open the hood.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution's mere
allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there were other odd
circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive search. Evidently, the police
officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to inspect the

vehicle.69

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot produce probable
cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."70

As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the
floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants."71

And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, promulgated
its Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the said case, police officers had set up a
checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an unidentified
informant that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually, the
authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van matching the description obtained from the informant and
conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle
containing marijuana.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause, the Court held that a tip, in the
absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming from the personal knowledge of the
searching officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a search:

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers' suspicion about the
block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and belief to such
testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never
binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence
of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable
cause when none exists."
But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down
from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did occur,
give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?

For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to another should
not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to
produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant,
without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that
the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability,
and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in
the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or
arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.73

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People74 (Saluday), a bus inspection conducted by
Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case, the authorities merely
conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive inspection"75 of the accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag that
noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search
conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by an informant, unlike
in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in determining probable cause, i.e.,
having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks
being given by the accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in
transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be discriminatory; (3) as to the
purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and (4) the courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.76

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive, the search
undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that he
allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike
in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also inspected, the search conducted in the instant
case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the
search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal
drugs.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police to ensure
that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory, photographing, and
marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the
scene of the incident.

C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that information received by
the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,77 tracing its origins to the 1990 cases
of People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.). Several of the cases following this
line of jurisprudence also heavily rely on the 1992 case of People v. Bagista80 (Bagista).

It is high time for a re-examination of this divergent line of jurisprudence.

In Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers that dangerous drugs would be transported through a bus,
the authorities conducted a surveillance operation at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Pampanga. At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag. The police found marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic wrapper inside the bag.

It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct the warrantless search did not
rest solely on the tipped information supplied by the informants. The authorities, using their own personal
observation, saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.

Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases upholding the validity of a warrantless search and seizure on the
basis of a confidential tip, the police did not rely exclusively on information sourced from the informant. There were
overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the
holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from
being an established and inflexible doctrine.

To cite but a few examples, in the early case of People v. Malmstdedt,81 the authorities set up a checkpoint in
response to some reports that a Caucasian man was coming from Sagada with dangerous drugs in his possession.
At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it. Upon reaching the accused, the police personally
observed that there was a bulge on the accused's waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's
identification papers, which the accused failed to provide. The accused was then asked to reveal what was bulging
on his waist, which turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In this case, the Court ruled that the probable
cause justifying the warrantless search was based on the personal observations of the authorities and not solely on
the tipped information:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection,
that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.82

In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did not solely rely on confidential information that the accused would deliver
an unspecified amount of shabu using a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411. Upon conducting a visual
search of the motor vehicle that was flagged down by the authorities, the police personally saw a gun tucked on the
accused's waist. Moreover, the accused was not able to produce any pertinent document related to the firearm. This
was what prompted the police to order the accused to alight from the vehicle.

In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities did not solely rely on the police informer's report that two men and a woman
on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, at a Petron
Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan. The authorities conducted a surveillance operation and personally saw the
accused handing out a white envelope to her co-accused, a person included in the police's drug watch list.

In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the authorities had probable cause in conducting an intrusive warrantless
search, the Court explained that probable cause was not engendered solely by the receipt of confidential
information. Probable cause was produced because a prior test-buy was conducted by the authorities, which
confirmed that the accused was engaged in the transportation and selling of shabu.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,86 the person subjected to a warrantless search and seizure was
personally observed by the police to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he
tried to resist. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost the accused-appellant to determine
if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information,
this area was a haven for drug addicts.87

In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also 'wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.' Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the suspicion. After
stopping him the police officers found an unlicensed 'homemade firearm' in his possession."89

In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the authorities did not rely on an anonymous, unverified tip. Deep penetration agents
were recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate. An undercover agent actually met and conferred with the accused,
personally confirming the criminal activities being planned by the accused. In fact, the agent regularly submitted
reports of his undercover activities on the criminal syndicate.

The jurisprudence cited by the CA in holding that the anonymous text message sent to the RPSB Hotline sufficed to
engender probable cause on the part of the authorities, i.e., People v. Tampis91 (Tampis), stated that "tipped
information is - sufficient to provide probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure."92

However, in Tampis, as in the aforementioned jurisprudence, the police did not merely rely on information relayed
by an informant. Prior to the warrantless search conducted, the police actually "conducted a surveillance on the
intended place and saw both appellants packing the suspected marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings
'Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto' inscribed on its side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were able to personally witness the
accused packing illegal drugs into the brown bag prior to the warrantless search and seizure.

Moreover, it is observed that when the Court in Tampis held that "tipped information is sufficient to provide probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the case of Aruta as its basis. However, the
Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped information in and of itself is sufficient to create probable cause. In fact,
in Aruta, as already previously explained, despite the fact that the apprehending officers already had prior
knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged activities, the warrantless search conducted on Aruta was
deemed unlawful for lack of probable cause.

The earliest case decided by the Court which upheld the validity of an extensive warrantless search
based exclusively on a solitary tip is the case of Maspil, Jr., wherein the authorities set up a checkpoint, flagged
down the jeep driven by the accused, and examined the contents thereof on the sole basis of information provided
by confidential informers.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless search, the Court in Maspil, Jr. depended heavily on the early case
of Valmonte, which delved into the constitutionality of checkpoints set up in Valenzuela City.

It bears stressing that the Court in Valmonte never delved into the validity of warrantless searches and seizures on
the pure basis of confidential information. Valmonte did not hold that in checkpoints, intrusive searches can be
conducted on the sole basis of tipped information. Valmonte merely stated that checkpoints are not illegal per
se.95 In fact, in Valmonte, the Court stressed that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search."96

Hence, the jurisprudential support of the Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best, frail.

With respect to Bagista, the Court held therein that the authorities had probable cause to search the accused's
belongings without a search warrant based solely on information received from a confidential informant.

In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97 (Carroll) in holding that "[w]ith
regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."98

Does Carroll support the notion that an unverified tipped information engenders probable cause? In Carroll, which
upheld the validity of a warrantless search of a vehicle used to transport contraband liquor in Michigan, the
SCOTUS found that the warrantless search was justified in light of the following circumstances:

The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents, and one
Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the highway between Detroit and
Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as
follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that
apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants, Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as
one Stafford, working in the Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey.
The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the
liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska
came back and said they could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it
the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of
which Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the
evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real
character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in
December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to
Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On
the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed
Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch,
that the Carroll boys had passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see
where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them.
On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with
Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met
and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government
agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they
stopped them and searched the car.

xxxx

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its neighborhood along
the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into
this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition
agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and
seize liquor carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll
boys, as they called them, were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged in plying the
unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids half
way to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they escaped observation. Two
months later, these officers suddenly met the same men on their way westward, presumably from Detroit. The
partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile they had
been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm
equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where
they plied their trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying liquor we
can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put
by defendant's counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for defendants at the
particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did appear, the
officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in
respect to the defendants.99

Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause justifying the warrantless search was not founded on information relayed by
confidential informants; there were no informants involved in the case whatsoever. Probable cause existed because
the state authorities themselves had personally interacted with the accused, having engaged with them in an
undercover transaction.

Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the jurisprudential support upon which Bagista heavily relies is not strong.

It is also not lost on the Court that in Bagista, the Court did not decide with unanimity.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla expressed the view that "the information
alone received by the NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the accused, did not
give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless search made on the bag of the accused." In explaining his
dissent, Justice Padilla correctly explained that:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information they
received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3" in height would be transporting
marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where
the accused was riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical appearance answered the
description of the suspect as described in the alleged information. If there really was such an information, as
claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL
passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying
marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they
allegedly found the marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence
when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable cause
to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they
allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the basis of
mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that
the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.100

It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future age.101 For Justice Padilla's Dissenting
Opinion, such age has come. This holding, which is reflected in the recent tide of jurisprudence, must now fully find
the light of day as it is more in line with the basic constitutional precept that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law, hovering above the articles on governmental power. The Court's holding that tipped
information, on its own, cannot engender probable cause is guided by the principle that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any allowable
transgression of such right is subject to the most stringent of scrutiny.

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that
exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both long-standing and the most recent
jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.

Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of
an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the authorities are given the unbridled license to
undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the absence of any overt circumstance that engenders a
reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.

This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in People v. Montilla.102 In holding that law and jurisprudence require stricter grounds for valid arrests and
searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban explained that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on
tipped information alone places the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures in great
jeopardy:

x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the Makapilis during the
Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be
subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required
to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants,
for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. This
would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and
seizure. Indeed, the majority's ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures.103

It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless searches and seizures
on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.

Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated information to the police.
Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate another by simply
giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person
on the sole basis of a bogus tip.

On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the infiltration of a citizen's
vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw intelligence was received, even
if there really was no such information received or if the information received was fabricated.
Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and seizure will be at
the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures will be rendered hollow and
meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of Rights.

D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police merely adopted the unverified and
unsubstantiated suspicion of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. Apart
from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no reason to reasonably believe that the passenger
vehicle contained an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the part of the police to conduct
an intrusive search is the fact that the information regarding the description of the person alleged to be transporting
illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was
relayed merely through a text message from a completely anonymous person. The police did not even endeavor to
inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous text message, without
giving any second thought, the police accepted the unverified information as gospel truth and immediately
proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information coming from a complete and anonymous
stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably
produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search.

In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the authorities did not even personally receive and
examine the anonymous text message. The contents of the text message were only relayed to them by a duty
guard, whose identity the police could not even recall:

Q x x x [W]ho received the information, was it you or another person, Mr. Witness?

A The duty guard, sir.

Q And usually now, informations (sic) is usually transmitted and text (sic) to the duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you produce the transcript of the text message (sic) can you write in a piece of paper, Mr. Witness?

A Our duty guard just informed us the information, sir.

Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A I cannot remember, sir.104

Simply stated, the information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.

Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself, tipped information received by the authorities through the duty
guard was unwritten and unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by a
police station that shall be duly considered by the authorities should be properly written in a log book or police
blotter:

Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by the Police Stations or a
detachment properly written in a log book or written in a Police blotter, that is the Standard Operating Procedure,
correct, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.

Q It was not written the information that you received, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Not at that time, sir.105

Further, it does not escape the attention of the Court that, as testified to by PSI Ngoslab on cross-examination, the
mobile phone which received the anonymous person's text message was not even an official government issued
phone.106 From the records of the case, it is unclear as to who owned or possessed the said phone used as the
supposed official hotline of the RPSB Office. Furthermore, PSI Ngoslab testified that he was not even sure whether
the said official hotline still existed.107

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise from double
hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and prudent man will
surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the item sought in connection with said offense are
in the place to be searched based solely on the say-so of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text
message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete stranger.

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search, considering that
the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous
tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving
vehicle.

The Inapplicability of The Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Neither are the other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures applicable in the instant case.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was not incidental to a
lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search, which is not the case here. Further, the
prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of evidence in plain view, that it was a customs
search, and that there were exigent and emergency circumstances that warranted a warrantless search.

Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be considered a valid stop and frisk search. The
Court has explained that stop and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is
limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."108 The search conducted by the authorities on
accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband.

Moreover, while it was clarified by the Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals109 that probable cause is not required to
conduct stop and frisk searches, "mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a 'stop and frisk.' A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him."110 In Comprado, Cogaed, and Veridiano, the Court has held that
mere reliance on information relayed by an informant does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police to
conduct a warrantless search and seizure. In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court has held that
information from an informant is mere suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla as a valid consented search.

The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in this case and that the illegal drugs - four (4)
bricks of marijuana, discovered as a result of consented search [are] admissible in evidence."111

The Court disagrees.

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:
 1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.112

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that "[t]he
fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid
waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is
not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto."113

Hence, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag114 or the chairs containing marijuana to the
arresting officer,115 the Court has held there was no valid consent to the search.116

Again, in Veridiano, the Court emphasized that the consent to a warrantless search and seizure must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by duress or coercion.117 Mere passive conformity to
the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent and that the presence of
a coercive environment negates the cl2im that the petitioner therein consented to the warrantless search.118

The very recent case of Yanson is likewise instructive. As in the instant case, "Sison, [the therein accused] who was
then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officers to open the pickup's hood. His beguiling conformity is easily
accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who had specifically flagged him and his companions
down. He was under the coercive force of armed law enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated."119

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court that accused-appellant Sapla's
apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to
a coercive environment, considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a checkpoint.

In fact, from the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily apparent that accused-appellant Sapla's
alleged voluntary opening of the sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan asked accused-appellant Sapla to
open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]."120

At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of opening the blue sack was mere passive conformity to a
warrantless search conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot consider the
search conducted as a valid consented search.

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted by the police in
the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding."121

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, there is no more need for the Court to discuss
the other issues surrounding the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla, particularly the gaps in the chain of
custody of the alleged seized marijuana bricks, which likewise renders the same inadmissible. The prosecution is
left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla. Consequently, accused-appellant
Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.
Epilogue

The Court fully recognizes the necessity of adopting a resolute and aggressive stance against the menace of illegal
drugs. Our Constitution declares that the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.122

Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right against unreasonable searches and seizures for
expediency's sake, the very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered wholly nugatory. By
disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal drugs, instead of protecting
the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words, when the Constitution i.s
disregarded, the battle waged against illegal drugs becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle
waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the
people.123

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the
rule of men dislodges the rule of law.124

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 24, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.
 4. Consented Warrantless Search

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at
times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the
clutches of the law on mere technicalities.

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a
traveling bag, which are prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos.1

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found
the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar
Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988
and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex
gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the
informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back
bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females
and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then
carrying a traveling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced themselves
as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the
former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash
Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property
Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga,
P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the prosecution
rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search
and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial
court continued to hear the case.

In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident differed
from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice
Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in
carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with
them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that
the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was
shown to her by the arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or Objection to
Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a
product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-
appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.2

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a
bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is
that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a
general search warrant which may be quashed.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant
violated the latter's constitutional rights.

4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos,3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid
warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse
to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.4

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers,
effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.6

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited
only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and
would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.7

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

 5. Customs search;9

6. Stop and Frisk;10 and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.11

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon
the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.12

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he
relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it
must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.13

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested.
Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.

In People v. Tangliben,14 acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors
and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him
to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the
night of his arrest.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's
alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew
that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their "business address". More significantly,
Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably
suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting
suspiciously.

In People v. Malmstedt,15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his
person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could
not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The
Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly,
including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers had
reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third,
Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted
exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.

In People v. Bagista,16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the
north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that
a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north.
They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by
the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence
obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as
this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are
exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,17 the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan
Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place,
they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen.
When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to
determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on
information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless
search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the
information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.

In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination
of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement
officers received information from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for
Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory
Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello
about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found
dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of
Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was
held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.

Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the day
before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on
board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the
culprit's identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of
probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular
No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The
failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's constitutional right.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested
under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
 (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

xxx xxx xxx

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had
she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as
the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by
the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate
as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there
any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-
appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that
the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.18

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin19 where, this Court observed that:

. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It
was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused-
appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view" under the second exception. The
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to
request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There
was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the
vehicle.

People v. Solayao,20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.21 In
said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the
instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents
as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the
NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of
probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency circumstances,
as applied in People v. De
Gracia.22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM
during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of
explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder
prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was
probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be consent given
by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor
General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citing People
v. Malasugui23 where this Court ruled:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:

Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened
after that?

A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with
our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was
carrying.

Q What was her reaction?

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the instant
case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search
effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.25 On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as
expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal.
Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the
articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.

Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to
the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the
unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,26 where this Court held:

[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This
he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

 A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he
carried, what did you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe
that appellant — based on the transcript quoted above — did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his
belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or
a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:27

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of
his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin,
65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As
pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen,
the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights."28 (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated
in People v. Omaweng,29 where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:

PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:

Q — When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A — When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.

Q — And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A — He said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings" (sic).

Q — When he said that, what did you do?

A — We asked him if we could open and see it.

 Q — When you said that, what did he tell you?

A — He said "you can see it".

Q — And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you do?

A — When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was
contained in the bag.

Q — And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A — When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed
it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.
(Emphasis supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of
his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the
first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to
have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.

In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would
have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellant's name
was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting
officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.

This argument is untenable.

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in
the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.30

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too much
difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been
particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon
of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana.
The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves
near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents
failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above
particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.31 (Emphasis
supplied)

While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, accused-
appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following
reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and
participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.32 The plea and active
participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into
objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto
during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,33 which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or
a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the
invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning
the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do
not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former
— an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of
the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be
presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the
protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional
grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such
evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights
under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis
supplied).

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that they
had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.34

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable,
the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by
Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."35

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.36

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name
of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that
some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society
to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless
she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO

BOLONG y NARET, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

. . . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for
having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same
way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays
and announces that it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1i brary

So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S. 1 On this occasion, this Court is made to
choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.

Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a
report from a "civilian asset" named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. 2 Solier related that
his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. 3

Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1
Villalonghan, 4 all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. 5 For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. 6 According to his neighbors,
Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. 7

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. 8 Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short,
and usually wore a hat. 9 At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur
Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. 10 All wore civilian clothes. 11

About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton 12 marked "King Flakes." 13 Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and
PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. 14 The same man also toted a
plastic bag. 15

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. 16 PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night. 17 The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he
was carrying any drugs. 18 PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. 19
Tudtud obliged, saying, "it was alright." 20 Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked
on. 21

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag 22 and another in newspapers. 23 PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.
24 They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.25 cralaw:red

The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them
to the police station. 26 The two did not resist. 27

The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. 28 Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed
the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams. 29 Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in
her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. 30

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged 31 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 32 Upon arraignment,
both accused pleaded not guilty. 33 The defense, however, reserved their right to question the
validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. 34

Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta,
their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and
SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the
foregoing narration of facts.chanrob1es vi rtua 1 1aw 1ib ra ry

The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.

Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs of
Levi’s pants, which was his "sideline." 35 At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City
by bus. 36 Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus. 37

Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber
revolver. 38 The man told him not to run. 39 Tudtud raised his arms and asked, "Sir, what is this
about?" 40 The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and
instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levi’s pants. 41

The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. 42 According to Tudtud,
the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. 43 Tudtud told the man the box was not
his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. 44 Tudtud
discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane. 45

"What is that?" the man asked. 46 Tudtud replied that he did not know. 47 Without even unwrapping
the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud. 48

Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street,
some eight meters from Tudtud. 49

Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousin’s wedding in
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted. 50 After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street.
51 Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him. 52 The man ordered him not to move
and handcuffed him. 53 Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go
with them. 54

The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each
other for the first time. 55

Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia
Julaton, 56 Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia, 57 Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita
Abunda, 58 Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified
and presented court documents showing that one "Bobo" or "Bobong" Ramirez was charged in their
respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and
robbery. The defense asserted that the "Bobo" or "Bobong" Ramirez accused in these cases is the
same person as the informant Bobong Solier. 59

Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 60

On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of
the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which states: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above-quoted
constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence "for any
purpose in any proceeding." 61 Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
The following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" even in the absence of a warrant: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 62

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a
search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Court’s rulings in People v. Claudio, 63
People v. Tangliben, 64 People v. Montilla, 65 and People v. Valdez. 66 The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases of People v.
Maspil, Jr., 67 People v. Malmstedt, 68 and People v. Bagista. 69

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000,
Section 12, 70 Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

x x x

It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. 71 Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 72 The question, therefore, is whether the
police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the
peace officers making the arrest. 73

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In the leading case of People v. Burgos, 74 this Court held that "the officer arresting a person who
has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view." 75 In Burgos,
the authorities obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as
member of the New People’s Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused,
the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive
documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable,
ruled that:chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant’s wife.

At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. 76

Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the
accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw 1ib rary

In People v. Aminnudin, 77 this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of
appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

. . . the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the former pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. 78

Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search
yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, 79 or of
standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near, 80
does not justify warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting something in one’s
pocket, 81 handing over one’s baggage, 82 riding a motorcycle, 83 nor does holding a bag on board
a trisikad 84 sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. 85

Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria. 86 Recently, in People v. Binad
Sy Chua, 87 this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel
clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court
ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone
is insufficient.

In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of "suspicious"
circumstances: People v. Tangliben 88 (accused was "acting suspiciously"), People v. Malmstedt 89
(a bulge on the accused’s waist), and People v. de Guzman 90 (likewise a bulge on the waist of the
accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).

There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify
a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos.
To this class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr., 91 People v. Bagista, 92 People v. Balingan, 93
People v. Lising, 94 People v. Montilla, 95 People v. Valdez, 96 and People v. Gonzales. 97 In these
cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no
overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last
two, come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr.
involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and
Lising and Montilla were consented searches.

Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more
faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase "in his presence" therein,
connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be
secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his
liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. 98

The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio, 99 the
accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter,
thus arousing the latter’s suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted
suspiciously.

As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics. There, majority of the
Court held:chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not
merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that
the drugs were in appellant’s luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright
absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the
risk of eventually losing the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in
the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drug. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and
the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. 100

While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the
warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs.
Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.

Although likewise concurring in the majority’s ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his
baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of
the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant "did not exhibit any overt
act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking
on some felonious enterprise." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant
than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have actually
witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that
had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of
witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the
accused.

x x x

To say that "reliable tips" constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my
opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many
decisions made by this Court, in its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional
right against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be practically at the
mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one
whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to
search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be
required to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order
to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to
conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence
information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal
requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majority’s
ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. 101

Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganiban’s concurring opinion in People v. Doria,
supra, where this Court ruled: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her
co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named
his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money was.
Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. 102 [Italics in the original.]

Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Puno’s ponencia, Justice Panganiban said that Doria "rightfully
brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have
seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla." 103

Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to
lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a consented search. As will be
demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.

That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an "on-the-spot
information." The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this case, prevented the
arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant. chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ib rary

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that
would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers’
testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box.
Although appellant Tudtud did appear "afraid and perspiring," 104 "pale" 105 and "trembling," 106
this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in
possession of marijuana be described as "personal," having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his
neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Q — What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks
of marijuana?

A — Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic]
would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to
them there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our
neighbors.

Q — Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?

A — His friends were the once who told me about it.

Q — For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of
marijuana?

A — About a month.

x x x

Q — Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his
apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on
your report my question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana
stocks on August 1, 1999?

x x x

A — Because of the information of his neighbor. 107

In other words, Solier’s information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors
or Tudtud’s friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of
drugs in their neighborhood.

Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliability of their informant. He testified on
cross-examination: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Q — You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?

A — He is trustworthy.

Q — Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?

A — (witness did not answer).

ATTY. CAÑETE: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Never mind, do not answer anymore. That’s all. 108

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1
Floreta for his telling silence.

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
"surveillance." This "surveillance," it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out appellant
Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere "gather[ing] of information
from the assets there." 109 The police officers who conducted such "surveillance" did not identify
who these "assets" were or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge.

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
the requisite warrant, PO1 Desierto’s assertions of lack of time 110 notwithstanding. Records show
that the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Solier’s information at
around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening
of the same day. 111 In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to
procure a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report
that the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00
a.m.:chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there
was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock
until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search
warrants even after office hours: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant
may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after
office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required
to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays;." . . .

The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987,
entitled "Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with
Multiple Salas" : jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

"This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and order.
There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these
amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against
public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be
raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the
place to be searched is located.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and
personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive judge or Vice-Executive judge, the
application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application
is filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be
searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.

4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the
examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He
shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants
provided for in this Court’s Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985." 112 [Italics in the
original.]

Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floreta’s testimony that the real
reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same
assumes greater significance. This was PO1 Floreta’s familiar refrain: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Q — When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic)
stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?
A — No.

Q — Why?

A — Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.

Q — When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search
Tudtud and Bulong at that time?

A — Yes, sir.

x x x

Q — And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And this was 9:00 a.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the
prosecutor do [sic] not assist?

A — They help.

Q — But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?

A — As I said, we do not have sufficient basis. 113

It may be conceded that "the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence
of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the objective
facts to determine the existence of probable cause" and that "a court may also find probable cause in
spite of an officer’s judgment that none exists." 114 However, the fact that the arresting officers felt
that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-gathering
efforts, raises serious questions whether such "surveillance" actually yielded any pertinent
information and even whether they actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby
eroding any claim to personal knowledge. chanrob1es vi rtua 1 1aw 1i bra ry
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 115

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents
of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said "it was alright." He did
not resist and opened the box himself.

The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. 116 The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

. . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to all search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. 117 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag 118 or the chairs 119 containing
marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to
the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. 120

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of
appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open
the subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Q — This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that
something?

A — A 38 cal. Revolver.

Q — How did he point it at you?

A — Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards
somebody).

Q — This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?

A — He said do not run.

Q — What did you do?

A — I raised my hands and said "Sir, what is this about?"

Q — Why did you call him Sir?

A — I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.

Q — Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?

A — Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a
policeman.

Q — When you asked him what is this? What did he say?

A — He said "I would like to inspect what you are carrying. [" ]

x x x

Q — What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?

A — I told him that is not mine.

Q — What did this man say?

A — He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.

Q — What did you do?

A — So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot. 121

Appellants’ implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 122 Consequently, appellants’ lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission
to the warrantless search and seizure. 123

As the search of appellants’ box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there
is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position
of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power. 124

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, 125
next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by
the due process clause. 126 This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom
advocates, 127 the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation
of the right against unreasonable search and seizure "includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing." Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 128

Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an
ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel
Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from
confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw 1ib rary

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

5. Customs search

G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Juan T. David for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief
of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion
Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the
order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of
March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners
in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent
Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil
Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496
and from proceeding with said case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and
loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left
gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after
the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person
claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios
Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her
residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the
request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not
examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods
because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the
goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section
2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without
knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa
had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained
their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago
and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and
customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for
the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their
favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the
nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November
16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an
assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and
detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to
wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition
stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided
for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the
full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power
to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of
the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners
averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to
the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the
Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios
Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the
lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal
of the case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the
goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13,
1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and
that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A
supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and
the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a
manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for
the release under bond of the goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios
Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the
corresponding bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been
directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the
respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed
goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting
the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.

In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their
answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by
respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967,
because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the
nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go
after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios
Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police
Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search
warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by
the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers
have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that
petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that
they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and
taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all
lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the
tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the
imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon
the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and
the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges
must be in full. 4

The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated
that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not
been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to
avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states
that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states
that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only
100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of
men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320
dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared,
but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380
dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the
nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5)
of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected
contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture. 8

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the
Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the
Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and
orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the
Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs
Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law.
The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time
the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods
even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by
this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that
Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and
rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial
shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon
examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting
that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs
had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy
Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the
goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction
over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes
because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor
subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of
Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on
the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory
injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion
to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the
preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00.
Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:

This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods
and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?

Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12,
1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.

The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to
verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,
1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the
Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody,
these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).

The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).

The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have
been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act
1937.

Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the
Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To
permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render
ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of
Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra,
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the
Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are
later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And
so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did
not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there
was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
 Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not
seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila
Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for
the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was
his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be
subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and
examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the
presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of
any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This
was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the
two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief
of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court,
considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and
in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of
a search warrant. . . .

Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made
lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but
also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find
any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial
and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The
Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The
substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at
L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von
Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .

In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make
any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the
court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18 All that they
complained of was,
 That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.

But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant
or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition
laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court said:

. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is
a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of
the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before
their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places
is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which
is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The
baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from
those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal
laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a
search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all
the circumstances under which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question
was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for
the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it
necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion
U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
 (c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and 1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët

6. Stop and Frisk

Terry v. Ohio (1968) https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/67

Facts of the case
Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing
a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

Question
Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus
narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and
that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented
a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the
searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the
investigation.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is
no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-
and-frisk" — which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever
vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.

The Case

This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994
in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."

In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City
Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as
follows:2

That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a
prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.

Contrary to Law.

Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.3 With the agreement of the
public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.4 After trial in due course, the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a
decision5 convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:6

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal
Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx

Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal8 dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the
appeal and affirming the trial court:10

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against appellant.

Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
 ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12

At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of
the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a
driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station
of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming
the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced
upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo
Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed
the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined
it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and
was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped
the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white
sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded
paper. (Exhibit "E-4").

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a
chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint
Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip
(Exhibit "D") to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for
chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".

The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".

It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which
she identified. (Exhibit
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her Certification dated
April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according
to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also
found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final
Report of her examinations (Exhibit "G").

After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed
it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
 Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to
Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal
of Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery
when he was apprehended.15

Version of the Defense

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:16

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle
at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen
ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the
influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera
which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver.
At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that
he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the
driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police
headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.

On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to follow him.
The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the
accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The
policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana.
However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of
the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later
told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was
led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case.
The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not
call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.

At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest
Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the
accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.

Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were
stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen
found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11,
1988.

Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his
pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that tricycles
were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.17

The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting
officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on
what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to
be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up," because the appellant
neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city
fiscal of Kalookan City.

On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration.
It further found petitioner's contention — that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue —
to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.

Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that
the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for
the purpose of extorting money.

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is
consistent with both innocence and guilt.

VI

The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are
inadmissible in evidence.

Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of
prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized

During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as
memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He
adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case
of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.19

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached
petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended
period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and
conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have
failed to investigate this behavior further.

In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified
the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him.

It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.

In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.20 Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions
to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure."22 In People vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these
cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the
term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched."

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search and
seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said
case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and
acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two
live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said
that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be
useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer
to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had
red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information
was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan
City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore
had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in petitioner's possession:25

FISCAL RALAR:

Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Sangandaan, Caloocan City?

A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around
at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one
Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?

A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we
called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce
ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?

A That person seems like he is high on drug.

Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high
on drug?

A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.

Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?

 A He was roaming around, sir.

Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?

A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.

Q How did you introduce yourselves?

A In a polite manner, sir.

Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his
hands?

A He tried to resist, sir.

Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?

A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.

Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?

A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was he holding?

A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed
residue.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of
any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of
a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the
following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.26 Otherwise, the Courts will
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence
from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived
such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from
an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to
the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.27

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.28
We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their
narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that — "As long as the witnesses concur on the material points,
slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
statements.

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas'
contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both arresting policemen. The
question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial,
considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did
not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and
does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.31

The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed
marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was
undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when
asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was
holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.

Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the
extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or
present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable,
considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988.32 Since then, he
could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of
frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.33

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of
six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:

Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition
or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act,
except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:

Sec. 8. . . . .

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.34

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and
to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, 2 as follows:

That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first
securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.

At arraignment3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.

At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," 4 while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the
time they arrested petitioner.5

At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the
arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.

Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station
No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving
very fast."6

Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul
Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station
No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.8

On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was
going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former
were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the
corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion,
since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.9
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were
brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite
Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance
of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer available,
wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and
booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for examination. 11

On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was inadmissible in
evidence. 12

Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things, the
examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from
Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on
the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary
examination of the grenade, he "[f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly
[were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a
certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13

Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the
Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to
catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The
policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested
with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer.
The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa
akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot
me." Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other
police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was
found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14

The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a
"warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 15 Probable cause
was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an
investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and
his companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens
the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran
away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the
officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." 18

The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury
Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:

[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However,
the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and
issued a notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST."

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST

ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM
AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.

In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the
hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.

In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision
be affirmed in toto. 24

In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner
abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and
second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised
as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade
seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the
ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:

We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the
company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a
time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he
was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically
notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too
preposterous to inspire belief.

In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased
petitioner two days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense
was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:

The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of
duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade,
and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then
be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in
agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be
the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on
which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied upon, was
inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:

[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of
a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were
responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the
Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the
historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe
suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal
knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
 an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza
Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.

Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE

TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID
AND LEGAL.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING

IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.

In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless
arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit
a crime," as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza
Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that come
(sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that
of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision..

For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.

The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial
court was:

[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA,
as maximum.

The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess
grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the
minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section
9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion
perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.

Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's decision to this Court, yet the trial
court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.

We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and consider
the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant,
the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the
parties as their Supplemental Briefs.

Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish
petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.

First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it
over to his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to
corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo
referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after
petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence
whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never
declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not,
and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he
examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve
the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.

Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then
considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it
was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police
officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order
to discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."

Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by
police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:

Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was
present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to
counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.

Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were
invalid, as will be discussed below.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:

Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk."35

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the
grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed.37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence. 38

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . . . 39

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.

Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this
likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to
further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of
five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu
explicitly declared on cross-examination:

Q And what were they doing?

A They were merely standing.

Q You are sure of that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion.

A None, sir.

Q Neither did you see them create commotion?

A None, sir.42

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:

When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his
person. 43

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention,
unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Martinez, JJ.,
concur
 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-
rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were
being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the
4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television
station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping
Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1

Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103.

In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true names and
identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession,
custody and control, the following to wit:

Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites

Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs

without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper
authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their
conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common designs, come to an
agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein and
publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and
removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several
John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon
the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.

Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized
to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion
during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4

The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The
surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements
of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.

Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar
building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on
foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of
the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six
meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding
of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.

As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao
as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of
M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of
the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the
room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested
appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then
made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently
closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that
appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.

Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989, he
was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he
was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however,
that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his
possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to
lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he
does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives
were already there.

Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the
1987 coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then
told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at
the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.

De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col.
Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."

On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a
recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and
pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de
Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.

That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he
did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the
same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was
merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is
necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety
due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which
criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the
country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional government
under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree
No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public
peace and order.

I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms
and ammunition.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether
the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the
proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance
since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, 8 in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and
intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime;
but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to
commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 10

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such intent to
possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored
in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered
a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is
no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having
intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority
therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar
Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding
the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the
explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent
material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration
the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier,
having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence without
leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about
the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and
power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large
quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military
camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or
armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in
a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly,
with the trade of firearms and ammunition.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually intended
to possess the articles confiscated from his person.

II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. While
the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the
parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team, considering the gravity of
the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.

It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant
at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily
and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at
that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and,
for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs.
Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
 It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information
received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,

et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and
detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until
December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the
firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of
rebellion.

The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph
2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the
command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below
held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed
opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of
guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower
court.

The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in
determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that
appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other
offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms
committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22

As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court
has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized
under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and
onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation
of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a
special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.

It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in this
prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive
clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good behavior. In
any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be
insulated against any tenuous importunity.

Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia
were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of
the court a quo:

2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16 ammo and
100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military that the Eurocar Sales
Building was being used by the rebels was not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's
personal defense. They are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col.
Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.

His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is not
credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano on
November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that
De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with
soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military
coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the
Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as
heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP
intelligence agents. 25

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is
committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the
governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently,
appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted
out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.

WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein for
executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 8. Other Warrantless Searches
a. Search by Private Person

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to
Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to
a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein
his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1'
x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with
masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused,
he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
 gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p.
38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being
the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27,
1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p.
1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible
any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling
and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache
& Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by
the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and
other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous
cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched
the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of
police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d
621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938
(1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in
which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-
8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search
and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner
Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by
police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone
else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious
legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the
records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:

Fiscal Formoso:
 You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate
the accused together with the girl?

WITNESS:

Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination.
As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled
confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and
nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner
of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant
met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship
the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave
the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary
to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour
could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and
for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the
trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand,
appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1,
1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted
for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8,
1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172
SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records
further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number.
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated
in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
b. Administrative Search

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EANNA O'COCHLAIN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 9, 2016 Decision1 and July 21, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22, 2013 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna
O'Cochlain (Eanna) guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to a Filipina and residing in
Barangay Aring, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. In an Information4 dated July 15, 2013, he was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana, committed as follows:

That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
had in his possession, custody and control: two (2) sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous
drug, with an aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or authority to possess, in
violation of the aforesaid law.5
With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the presence of a public prosecutor, Eanna pleaded
"NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment.6 He was allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty, but a hold
departure order was issued to prevent him from leaving the Philippines and his passport was
surrendered to the court for its custody in the course of the proceedings.7

Version of the Prosecution

Aside from the sworn statements of other intended witnesses,8 the testimonies in open court of
Security Screening Officer Dexter Suguitan (SSO Suguitan), Police Officer 3 Joel Javier (PO3 Javier),
and PO1 Erald Terson (PO1 Terson) reveal as follows:

While on his break time around 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2013, SSO Suguitan of the Department of
Transportation - Office of Transportation Security (OTS), assigned at the initial security screening
checkpoint of the Laoag City International Airport, was told by CAAP9 Security and Intelligence Flor
Tamayo (CSI Tamayo) that the parking space in front of the departure area smelled like marijuana
("agat sa marijuana"). He suspected that Eanna was the one who smoked the illegal drug, recounting
that at aroud 6:35 p.m. he saw a certain male Caucasian at the parking area lighting something
unrecognizable as he was covering it with his palm. CSI Tamayo observed that whenever he would
suck what he seemed to be smoking, no visible vapor would come out from his mouth.

However, SSO Suguitan dismissed CSI Tamayo's story as he thought that it would be impossible for
a passenger to smoke marijuana at the airport. After a while, he returned to his post at the initial
check-in area. Meanwhile, CSI Tamayo reported what he saw to PO2 Pancho Caole, Jr. (PO2 Caole,
Jr.) and SSO Fidel Bal-ot (SSO Bal-ot) , who were manning the final screening area.

Later on, SSO Bal-ot directed SSO Suguitan to proceed to the final security checkpoint.10 The latter
was instructed to conduct a pat down search on Eanna, who agreed. He was frisked while he raised
his hands by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with palms open. When something was
felt inside the pocket of his upper garment, he was asked to take it out. He then brought out a pack
of Marlboro red from his left pocket, as well as a matchbox and another pack of Marlboro red from his
right pocket. The pack of Marlboro red on his left hand contained cigarettes but the one on his right
hand contained two (2) rolled sticks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SSO Suguitan
knew it was marijuana because that was what CSI Tamayo earlier told him. He took the pack of
Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and showed it to PO1 Peter
Warner Manadao, Jr. (PO1 Manadao, Jr.) and other police personnel on duty. SSO Suguitan put them
on the nearby screening table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves were the only items placed thereon.

PO1 Udel Tubon11 then called the attention of PO3 Javier, who was the investigator on duty of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) - Aviation Security Group (ASG). PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr.,
SSO Suguitan, and SSO Bal-ot were at the final checkpoint when he arrived. They told him that
marijuana was found in Eanna's pocket. SSO Suguitan turned over to PO3 Javier the pack of
Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. PO3 Javier then placed them
on a tray, together with Eanna's other belongings. As the area started to become crowded, the seized
items were brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office. He was accompanied by SSO Suguitan and
Eanna.

Together with PO3 Javier at the PNP-ASG office were Police Superintendent Diosdado Apias (P/Supt.
Apias), PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and a certain SPO3 Domingo.
While waiting for the arrival of the barangay officials, which took 15-20 minutes, the two rolled sticks
of dried marijuana leaves were placed on the investigation table where everybody could look but not
touch. Eanna was seated in front of the table, while the others guarded him. PO3 Javier then
prepared the inventory. The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and other seized items were
listed. The check-in baggage of Eanna was also inspected, but it only contained clothes and other
personal belongings. The confiscation/inventory receipts were signed by PO3 Javier and SSO
Suguitan, as well as two (2) officials of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City (Barangay Chairman Edilberto
Bumanglag and Barangay Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro) and an ABS-CBN cameraman (Juanito
Badua), who acted as witnesses. In their presence, as well as of Eanna, PO3 Javier marked the two
rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves as "EO-1" and "EO-2" and, thereafter, placed them inside a
Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag. The guard of the PNP-ASG office, PO1 Terson, took pictures during the
inventory and marking, while P/Supt. Apias prepared the requests for the medico-legal examination
of Eanna and the laboratory examination of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. The
marking, physical inventory, and photographing were likewise witnessed by PO1 Manadao, Jr. and
PO2 Caole, Jr., who executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest with PO3 Javier.

Subsequently, Eanna was brought to the Governor Roque R. Ablan, Sr. Memorial Hospital for his
medico-legal examination. PO3 Javier proceeded to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office to submit the request for laboratory examination and the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana
leaves. The request and the specimens were received by PO3 Padayao, the evidence custodian.
Based on the qualitative examination conducted by Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann
Luis Navarro (P/Insp. Navarro), which was reduced into writing, the specimens were found to be
positive for the presence of marijuana.

Version of the Defense

At around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 2013, Eanna was with his wife at the Laoag City International
Airport for their Cebu Pacific flight bound for Manila. Since the x-ray machine operator at the initial
security screening was not yet around, he left his wife in the line and smoked his pre-rolled tobacco
and Marlboro cigarette outside, about 30 meters away. Ten minutes passed, he went back to the
initial security checkpoint carrying his check-in and cabin luggage, camera bag, and some shopping
bags. The airport police conducted a body search and examined his belongings. Afterwards, he
proceeded to the final security check where he was inspected by a male "immigration officer" wearing
a brown shirt. As a result, a red Marlboro cigarette pack, containing two pieces of rolled paper of
flavored tobacco, was found in his possession.12 It was shown to him while he was in front of his
wife. The cigarette pack was then put on the desk, on top of one of his luggage. A camera bag
(containing a Sony camera, connecting cables, headphones, an MP3 player, cigarette paper, and a
pack of Marlboro) was also searched. The officer got some tiny grains after sticking his fingers into
the bag. He showed them to Eanna and asked what they were. The latter replied that they were
flavored tobacco, which he has been smoking for the past 30 years. Despite the claim, the officer
directed an airport police to bring Eanna to the police station that was about 150 meters away.

Together with his wife, Eanna was escorted by about five to six airport police. At the PNP-ASG office,
his camera bag and other luggage arrived approximately 20 minutes later. They were placed on top
of the table and stayed there for 30-45 minutes before the police started to search the contents and
catalog the items. Prior to the inventory of the seized items, Eanna and his wife repacked their
luggage as the latter still proceeded with her scheduled flight. Thereafter, with the permission of PO3
Javier, Eanna went outside the office to smoke as he waited for his Batac-based Filipino relatives who
arrived approximately after two hours. While smoking outside, he could not see what was happening,
if any, to his luggage and camera bag.

The camera crew of ABS-CBN arrived at almost 11:00 p.m. An asset from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) called Badua and told him to come to the PNP-ASG office. He went with
an off-duty security guard of ABS-CBN Laoag City. There, he was allowed to cover the incident, which
became the basis of a television news report.

The sticks of the alleged marijuana were shown to Eanna thrice - once at the airport and twice at the
police station. On the second instance, he was shown two thin rolled sticks that were placed on top of
the table in front of him. On the third time, however, he saw a thin and a fat rolled sticks made of
paper that were different from what he was using.

RTC Ruling

After trial, Eanna was convicted of the crime charged. The fallo of the November 22, 2013 Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, accused Eanna O'Cochlain is hereby pronounced GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the charge of illegal possession of marijuana weighing 0.3824 gram and is therefore sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).

The two sticks of marijuana subject hereof are confiscated, the same to be disposed in the manner
that the law prescribes.

SO ORDERED.13
The search conducted on Eanna and his subsequent arrest were upheld. According to the RTC, the
search upon his person was not unreasonable but was actually an exception to the proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or right that
was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations to maintain peace, order and
security at the airports. In fact, Eanna's plane ticket carried a proviso allowing airport authorities to
check on his person and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No.
6235.14 Moreover, another exception to the rule is consented warrantless search and seizure. In this
case, Eanna agreed to the body pat down search that was requested by SSO Suguitan.

For the RTC, SSO Suguitan was a credible witness. It was observed that he was spontaneous in his
testimony and that he appeared candid and truthful in his statements. There was nothing in his
testimony or in the manner he testified that could arouse serious suspicion of lying. Some of his
inconsistent statements, which the defense considered as irreconcilable, were insignificant and trivial
as they do not impinge on any of the elements of the offense charged. Instead, the statements
bolster SSO Suguitan's credibility as they were indicia of his unrehearsed testimony.

The RTC opined that Eanna's denial was not based on clear and convincing evidence; rather, it was
bare and self-serving. His testimony was even fraught with incoherence and serious inconsistencies
which he obviously committed as he desperately tried to show that what was taken from his
possession was mere tobacco. Considering his flip-flopping testimony, his denial was not given
credence and did not prevail over the credible testimony of SSO Suguitan and the unquestioned
findings of the forensic chemist.

Finally, as to the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized, the RTC was satisfied that the
prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject marijuana. It
ruled:
In this case, the Court does not doubt a bit that the two sticks of marijuana presented in evidence
are the same sticks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. There was not only compliance by
the airport authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of the law and its implementing rules and
regulations, there is a complete account of the complete chain of custody of the two sticks of
marijuana that negates any doubt that their integrity and evidentiary value have been preserved. As
it has been established by the prosecution, upon being informed of the arrest of the accused, after
SSO Suguitan had confiscated the two [sticks] of marijuana from the accused, PO3 Joel Javier, the
duty police investigator at the airport at [the] time who was at the ramp outside the departure
terminal was called and when he arrived at the place where the accused was accosted and was
informed of the arrest of the accused, he took custody of the two sticks of marijuana which were
then on the screening desk or table and invited the accused to the office of the PNP-CAAP Aviation
Security Group located within the premises of the airport not far tram the departure terminal. There,
PO3 Javier marked the two sticks of marijuana with E0-1 and. E0-2. Upon the arrival of two
Barangay officials, Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro of
Barangay Araniw, Laoag City which has territorial jurisdiction over the airport, and a member of the
media in the person of Juanito Badua, a cameraman of ABS-CBN, Laoag, PO3 Javier also conducted
the required inventory not only of the two sticks of marijuana but the other belongings of the
accused contained in his luggage. In the course of the inventory, PO1 Erald Terson, also a member of
the PNP Aviation Security Group, took pictures of the seized items as he was directed to do by their
superior. Sometime later, as the accused was brought for medical examination, PO3 Javier was the
one who brought the two sticks of marijuana together with the prepared letter request to the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination. And to complete the chain, the prosecution
established that at the said crime lab, the two sticks were received by PO3 Padayao who thereupon
turned them over to the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro. As the Court takes
judicial notice from the record of the case, the two sticks were finally submitted to court on July 19,
2013, received by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Bernadette Espejo[,] who issued the
corresponding Acknowledgment Receipt therefor.

Significantly relative to the chain of custody and as would have equally done by the other concerned
witnesses such as forensic chemist Police Inspector Navarro who issued her written chemistry reports
of the qualitative examinations she conducted on the specimens, and PO3 Padayao, both of the crime
lab, SSO Suguitan[,] who discovered the two sticks of marijuana[,] identified the same in open court,
pointing in the process the respective markings E0-1 and E0-2 that he witnessed to have been placed
by the investigating police officer, PO3 Javier[,] which, after the inventory, the latter placed in a
plastic bag (Ziploc). PO3 Javier himself also identified the two sticks of marijuana.

At this point, the Court is not oblivious of the fact that in his testimony SSO Suguitan initially claimed
that he turned over the two sticks of marijuana to PO1 Manadao, Jr. But actually[,] as it can be
clearly appreciated from the testimony of SSO Suguitan, the turn over that he said was merely the
placing of the two sticks of marijuana on top of the table at the final screening area, in front of PO1
Manadao and the accused. In fact, as SSO Suguitan conoborated PO3 Javier, the two sticks of
marijuana which were still on the screening desk were thereafter placed on a tray and PO3 Javier
was the one who then actually took custody thereof as the accused was invited to the office of the
PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group. PO3 Javier himself, when he was asked by the defense if it was
PO1 Manadao who turned over the specimens to him, categorically said, "No, sir, Mr. Dexter
Suguitan."
Also, the Court cannot be amiss to point out that the two sticks of marijuana could not have been
switched with another or contaminated while it was in the custody of PO3 Javier. While admitting that
there were many things that they prepared while they were already in their office, he testified in
effect that no such [thing] happened. The people there at the office were not examining the
specimens, they were just looking and not holding it.

The Court at this point cannot but express its observation that PO3 Javier, just like SSO Suguitan,
was equally credible. He was straightforward, consistent and candid in his testimony that it cannot in
any way be considered suspect.15
Eanna moved to reconsider the RTC judgment, but it was denied; hence, a notice of appeal was
filed.16

CA Ruling

Finding no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the CA affirmed the assailed
RTC Decision.

The CA affirmatively answered the issue of whether there was probable cause to justify the
warrantless search of Eanna and the seizure of his belongings. It appreciated the prosecution's
version that CSI Tamayo saw him smoking while out.side the departure area of the airport terminal.
Although no smoke coming from his mouth was seen, CSJ Tamayo still smelled the scent of
marijuana. Similar to the RTC ruling, the warrantless search and seizure was also valid because the
search was conducted pursuant to a routine airport security procedure and Eanna voluntarily gave his
consent thereto.
It was likewise held that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drug were
satisfactorily established. First, Eanna was caught in possession and custody of two sticks of
marijuana on July 14, 2013 at the Laoag City International Airport during the routine search
conducted by the airport authorities. Second, he failed to prove that he was authorized by law to
possess the same. And third, he freely and consciously possessed the illegal drug.

The CA downplayed the alleged varying testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As the RTC opined,
the inconsistences raised by the defense were minor and trivial and could not affect the RTC's finding
as to the credibility of the airport police officers.

Finally, anent the chain of custody rule, the CA regarded as specious Eanna's claim that the
procedures set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed. The testimony of SSO
Suguitan was quoted and the ratiocination of the RTC was adopted to support the finding that the
airport officials complied with the rule.

Eanna filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on July 21, 2016.

Now before us, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief as it had exhaustively discussed the legal issues and arguments in its appeal brief
before the CA.17 On his part, Eanna filed a Supplemental Brief18 to bolster his claim that there were
gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drug seized. He argues that:

1. PO3 Javier was not at the scene where Eanna was found in possession of the alleged illegal
drug; thus, he had no personal knowledge of its possession by Eanna and its seizure by SSO
Suguitan.

2. It was not made clear by the prosecution that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly
containing marijuana were marked immediately upon confiscation.

3. The drug evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration, tampering and swapping because
the Ziploc where it was placed was not sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than
the natural, built-in resealable feature of the plastic bag.
 4. The presence of the marking "JEP" on the two rolled sticks of alleged marijuana could not be
explained and the marking made thereon compromised their integrity and physical
appearance.

5. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is unavailing because the
police authorities deviated from the mandated procedure and offered no valid ground to show
that their actuations were justified.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.

The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the
aviation security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a number of cases.19 In the leading
case of People v. Johnson,20 we held:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches
are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.21
Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,22 a routine security check being conducted in air23 and sea24 ports has been a
recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless search; (6)
"stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.25

Notably, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States of America.26 Having been derived almost verbatim therefrom, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the US Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts,
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.27

Like in our country, the circumstances under which a warrantless search, unsupported by probable
cause, may be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment are very limited and that
exceptions thereto are few specifically established and well delineated.28 In a similar way, the
government bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search was conducted pursuant to an
established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.29

US courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable"
such as work-related searches of government employees' desks and offices, warrantless searches
conducted by school officials of a student's property, government investigators conducting searches
pursuant to a regulatory scheme when the searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards," and a State's operation of a probation system.30 The Fourth Amendment permits the
warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses; "special needs" cases such as schools,
employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airport screenings under the
administrative search doctrine.31

Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.32 However, because administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of
detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion.33 Where the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
"reasonable."34 In particular, airport searches have received judicial sanction essentially because of
the magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the overriding concern has
been the threat of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public posed by the introduction
of inherently lethal weapons or bombs.35

Although the US Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport screening searches are
constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, it has suggested that they qualify as
such.36 Airport security searches can be deemed lawful administrative searches because (1) these
searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward finding particular items (weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose grave danger to airplanes and air travelers; (2) the
scrutiny of carry-on luggage is no more intrusive (in both its scope and intensity) than is necessary
to achieve the legitimate aims of the screening process (that is, to ensure air travel safety); (3)
airline passengers have advance notice that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to these security
measures, thus giving passengers the opportunity to place their personal effects in checked luggage;
(4) all passengers are subject to the same screening procedures; and (5) passengers are aware that
they can avoid the screening process altogether by electing not to board the plane. 37 Moreover,
abuse is unlikely because of its public nature.38

As a permissible administrative search, the scope of airport routine check is not limitless.39 Airport
screening procedures are conducted for two primary reasons: first, to prevent passengers from
carrying weapons or explosives onto the aircraft; and second, to deter passengers from even
attempting to do so.40 The oft-cited case of United States v. Davis41 sets the appropriate standards
for evaluating airport screening searches as constitutionally reasonable administrative searches,
thus:
[S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative
purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be
permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause
directed to a particular place or person to be searched.

As we have seen, screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of
weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The essential purpose of
the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to
deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board at all.

Of course, routine airport screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and apprehension
of law violators. This practical consequence does not alter the essentially administrative nature of the
screening process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional. x x x.

There is an obvious danger, nonetheless, that the screening of passengers and their carry-on luggage
for weapons and explosives will be subverted into a general search for evidence of crime. If this
occurs, the courts will exclude the evidence obtained.42 (Citations omitted.)
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener's
actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that
could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft.43 The search cannot also serve unrelated law
enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a
general search for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who
travel through the system.44 As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement, the screening
program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for evidence of crime.45 It is improper
that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement objectives" such as uncovering contraband
unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a
desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."46 In United States v. $124,570 US.
Currency,47 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives from coloring
administrative searches.48

Hence, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only so long as the scope of the
administrative search exception is not exceeded; "once a search is conducted for a criminal
investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search
rationale."49 Where an action is taken that cannot serve the administrative purpose, either because
the threat necessitating the administrative search has been dismissed or because the action is simply
unrelated to the administrative goal, the action clearly exceeds the scope of the permissible
search.50 To the extent that airport administrative searches are used for purposes other than
screening luggage and passengers for weapons or explosives, they fall outside the rationale by which
they have been approved as an exception to the warrant requirement, and the evidence obtained
during such a search should be excluded.51

Furthermore, to be constitutionally permissible, warrantless and suspicionless airport screening

searches must meet the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.52 "What is reasonable
depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search
or seizure itself."53 There can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.54 In other words, an
administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with
satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.55 Specifically, the Court must balance an
individual's right to be free of intrusion with "society's interest in safe air travel."56 On this
score, Davis again has provided a guidepost. There it was held that an airport security search is
considered as reasonable if: (1) the search is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light
of current technology, to satisfy the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3)
a potential passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to fly.57

In State v. Hanson,58 the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i believed in the soundness of the
logic of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Skipwith,59 which ruled:
Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or otherwise, does not in itself make all non-
probable-cause searches reasonable. Reasonableness requires that the courts must weigh more than
the necessity of the search in terms of possible harm to the public. The equation must also take into
account the likelihood that the search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm. On
the opposite balance we must evaluate the degree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the
person and effects of the citizen which the search entails.

In undertaking our calculation of the weight to be accorded to these three factors in the case at bar -
public necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion - we need not reiterate what was said
in Moreno about the dangers posed by air piracy; suffice it to say that there is a judicially-recognized
necessity to insure that the potential harms of air piracy are foiled. The search procedures have
every indicia of being the most efficacious that could be used. The group being screened is limited to
persons with the immediate intention of boarding aircraft. Metal detectors, visual inspection, and rare
but potential physical searches appear to this court to provide as much efficiency to the process as it
could have.

On the other side of the judicial scales, the intrusion which the airport search imposes on the public
is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at
times it can be incriminating. There are several factors, however, which make this search less
offensive to the searched person than similar searches in other contexts. One such factor is the
almost complete absence of any stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known,
designated airport search point. As one commentator has put it in the border search context,
"individuals searched because of their membership in a morally neutral class have less cause to feel
insulted . . . ." In addition, the offensiveness of the screening process is somewhat mitigated by the
fact that the person to be searched must voluntarily come to and enter the search area. He has every
opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the boarding area. Finally, the circumstances
under which the airport search is conducted make it much less likely that abuses will occur. Unlike
searches conducted on dark and lonely streets at night where often the officer and the subject are
the only witnesses, these searches are made under supervision and not far from the scrutiny of the
traveling public.

Moreover, the airlines, which have their representatives present, have a definite and substantial
interest in assuring that their passengers are not unnecessarily harassed. The officers conducting the
search under these circumstances are much more likely to be solicitous of the Fourth Amendment
rights of the traveling public than in more isolated, unsupervised surroundings.

Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of the relevant factors, is that the standards for initiating
a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied in border
crossing situations. In the critical pre-boarding area where this search started, reasonableness does
not require that officers search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest signs of
nervousness or who otherwise appear suspicious. Such a requirement would have to assume that
hijackers are readily identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The number of lives
placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid taking such deadly chances. As Judge Friendly has
stated:
Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the harm against the need. When the
object of the search is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to arrest is generally the
appropriate test . . . . When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets
the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of
preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given
advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.
(Citations omitted.)
According to United States v. Aukai,60 US case law had erroneously suggested that the
reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent upon the passenger's consent, either
ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent. It opined:

The constitutionality of an airport screening search, however, does not depend on

consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, and requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to revoke
consent to an ongoing airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world. Such a rule
would afford terrorists multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport security by "electing not
to fly" on the cusp of detection until a vulnerable portal is found. This rule would also allow terrorists
a low-cost method of detecting systematic vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that could be
extremely valuable in planning future attacks. Likewise, given that consent is not required, it makes
little sense to predicate the reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an
irrevocable implied consent theory. Rather, where an airport screening search is otherwise
reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44901, all that is required is
the passenger's election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at
315; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and procedures, that election occurs when
a prospective passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the
x-ray machine.61 (Citation omitted.)

Currently, US courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening search does not depend
on the passenger's consent once he enters the secured area of an airport. The requirement
in Davis62 of allowing passengers to avoid the search by electing not to fly does not extend to one
who has already submitted his luggage for an x-ray scan.63 If a potential passenger chooses to avoid
a search, he must elect not to fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor
belt.64 The right to abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening
procedures. Any other rule would allow potential hijackers to leave whenever detection seemed
imminent and permit them to try again another day.65

The instant case does not qualify as a legitimate administrative search in an airport.

Similar to the mission of the Transportation Security Administration of the US Department of

Homeland Security, the Office of Transportation Security under the Department of Transportation and
its predecessors has been primarily66 mandated to ensure civil aviation security.67 To be precise, the
OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention on aviation security which seeks to
safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference, which include but not
limited to:

1. unlawful seizure of aircraft,

2. destruction of an aircraft in service,

3. hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,

4. forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical

facility,

5. introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material

intended for criminal purposes,

6. use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious
damage to property or the environment,

7. communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or

on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or
on the premises of a civil aviation facility.68

Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-Hijacking Law.69 It provides that an
airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or
carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as a public utility within the Philippines, any explosive,
flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.70

It is in the context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport security searches
and seizures are considered as permissible under Section 2, A1iicle III of the Constitution.

In this case, what was seized from Eanna were two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. Obviously,
they are not explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substances or materials, or dangerous
elements or devices that may be used to commit hijacking or acts of terrorism. More importantly, the
illegal drugs were discovered only during the final security checkpoint, after a pat down search was
conducted by SSO Suguitan, who did not act based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an
information given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession of marijuana. In marked
contrast, the illegal drugs confiscated from the accused in Johnson and the subsequent cases
of People v. Canton,71People v. Suzuki,72Sales v. People,73 and People v. Cadidia,74 where incidentally
uncovered during the initial security check, in the course of the routine airport screening, after the
defendants were frisked and/or the alarm of the metal detector was triggered.

Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking program, not
the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug was found by chance, a
search on the person of the passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate and conscious
effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirement.75 The Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the
government may more effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to be fought, those who fight
it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having
committed a crime.76

Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this case.

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived.77 A person may voluntarily consent to have government officials conduct a search or
seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution. Like the Fourth Amendment, Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe voluntary cooperation.78

Yet, a person's "consent to a [warrantless] search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal,

specific and intelligently given, [and] uncontaminated by any duress or coercion[.]"79 The question of
whether a consent to a search was "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 80
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether [he] was in a
public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence [will] be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.81
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 82 The
government bears the burden of proving "consent."83 In the US, it has been held that when the
government relies on the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement, two main issues must be
litigated: did the defendant indeed consent, and did the defendant do so with the requisite
voluntariness?84 Here, we have ruled that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 85

While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the
government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of effective consent.86 On the
other hand, lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.87 Even when security agents
obtain a passenger's express assent to a search, this assent ordinarily will not constitute a valid
"consent" if the attendant circumstances will establish nothing more than acquiescence to apparent
lawful authority.88

The Fourth Amendment inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter applies equally to police encounters that take
place on trains, planes, and city streets.89 "Consent" that is the product of official intimidation or
harassment is not consent at all.90

In this case, the Court finds that there is a valid warrantless search based on express consent. When
SSO Suguitan requested to conduct a pat down search on Eanna, the latter readily agreed. Record is
devoid of any evidence that he manifested objection or hesitation on the body search. The request to
frisk him was orally articulated to him in such language that left no room for doubt that he fully
understood what was requested. Unperturbed, he verbally replied to the request demonstrating that
he also understood the nature and consequences of the request. He voluntarily raised his hands by
stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with palms open. His affirmative reply and action
cannot be viewed as merely an implied acquiescence or a passive conformity to an authority
considering that SSO Suguitan is not even a police officer and cannot be said to have acted with a
coercive or intimidating stance. Further, it is reasonable to assume that Eanna is an educated and
intelligent man. He is a 53-year old working professional (claimed to be employed or attached to a
drug addiction center) and a well-travelled man (said to have been in 22 different countries and
spent hours in customs).91 Indubitably, he knew, actually or constructively, his right against
unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. Having been obtained through a
valid warrantless search, the sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence against him. Corollorily,
his subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of an illegal drug in his person in flagrante delicto.

There is substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

At the time of the commission of the crime, the applicable law is R.A. No. 9165.92 Section 1 (b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of
custody as -
[T]he duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.93
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated
prior to its admission into evidence.94 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the
evidence is what the party claims it to be.95 In a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient
evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the
government claims it to be.96 As regards the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established US
federal evidentiary rule is when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration
by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.97 This evidentiary rule
was adopted in Mallillin v. People,98 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody
of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.99
In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary and testimonial
evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in
every step of the way.

Upon confiscation of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from Eanna, SSO Suguitan put
them on the nearby screening table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The sticks were the only
items placed on the table.100 Thereafter, the seized items were turned-over by SSO Suguitan to PO3
Javier, who placed them on a tray together with he other belongings of Eanna.101 It must be
emphasized that SSO Suguitan is an airport screening officer and not a police officer who is
authorized to "arrest" or "apprehend"102 Eanna. Hence, he should not be considered as the
"apprehending officer" who must immediately mark and conduct the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items conformably with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR).

PO3 Javier was the only one in possession of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from the
time he took custody of the same at the airport up to the time he submitted the same to the crime
laboratory office.103 At the PNP-ASG office, the confiscated illegal drug was marked, physically
inventoried, and photographed in front of Eanna, with SSO Suguitan, a Barangay Chairman, a
Barangay Kagawad, and an ABS-CBN cameraman as witnesses.104 Per Request for Laboratory
Examination,105 the specimens were personally delivered by PO3 Javier to the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Crime Laboratory Service where PO3 Padayao received them. Finally, based on the Chemistry
Report106 of Police Inspector Navarro and the stipulation of facts107 agreed upon by the parties, the
specimens tested positive for the presence of marijuana after a qualitative examination.

The specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested, and
presented in court were positively identified not only by PO3 Javier but also by SSO Suguitan as the
same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves seized from Eanna.108 Hence, it would be immaterial
even if, as Eanna argues, PO3 Javier had no personal knowledge of their possession by Eanna and
their seizure by SSO Suguitan.

Eanna contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were not marked
immediately and were just laid bare on a table at the PNP-ASG office. According to him, the ABS-CBN
video footage taken shortly before midnight, which Badua submitted and which was already edited
following the news report format, showed that the two sticks were without markings at first and then
with markings later on.

The Court notes that the compact disk showing the video of what transpired inside the PNP-ASG
office does not contain the full footage that Badua had taken. It was already edited for purposes of
news report.109 Assuming that there is truth to the allegation that the two sticks of marijuana were
not immediately marked, such fact does not automatically result in an acquittal. As long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of an illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with Section
21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR may be excused. In several cases,110 we affirmed the conviction
of the accused-appellant despite recognizing that the seized illegal drug was not immediately marked
at the place of arrest. Likewise, in People v. Sic-open,111 the Court sustained the conviction of the
accused-appellant even if the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug were not
immediately done at the place where it was confiscated. Here, the reason for the non-observance
with the rule is justified. Immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the confiscated
drug cannot be done at the final checkpoint area because it started to become crowded by the
constant comings and goings of departing passengers. The seized items were fittingly brought by
PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office where it was made sure that the barangay officials and a media
man were in attendance to witness the regularity of the entire proceedings.

The peculiar situation in airports calls for a different treatment in the application of Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. To require all the time the immediate marking, physical inventory, and
photograph of the seized illegal drug will definitely have a domino effect on the entire airport
operation no matter how brief the whole procedure was conducted. Stuck passengers will cause flight
delays, resulting not just economic losses but security threats as well. Besides, to expect the
immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the dangerous drug at the place of arrest
is to deny the reality that the persons112 required by law to witness the procedure are unavailable at
the moment of arrest. Unlike in a buy-bust operation which is supposed to be pre-planned and
already coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of necessary witnesses, arrests and
seizures in airports due to illegal drugs are almost always spontaneous and unanticipated.

In our view, the period of waiting for the arrival of the witnesses did not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject illegal drug, on the following grounds:

First, the airport police ensured that only authorized personnel were inside the PNP-ASG office during
the investigation. PO3 Javier claimed that he was with SPO3 Domingo, PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole,
Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and P/Supt. Apias.113 It was only the members of the PNP-ASG and of
the Laoag City PNP, the media, and the two barangay officials who were allowed to stay inside the
room.114 The defense counsel recognized that the PNP-ASG office has a limited space and not big in
size, estimating it to be around three by four meters (although PO1 Terson approximated it to be five
by seven meters).115
Second, the airport police made sure that no one could touch the confiscated drug even if it was in
full view of everyone. PO3 Javier testified that the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were
placed on the investigation table where everybody could look but not hold.116 Eanna could also see
any attempt to switch or alter the evidence as he was seated just in front of the table while the
others guarded him.117 Interestingly, instead of being concerned at the time of the risk of
substitution, he even requested to smoke so he was allowed to go out of the PNP-ASG
office.118 Although the apprehending officers could have exercised a better judgment, they are under
no obligation to explain why the accused was permitted to leave the office in order to smoke. Such
fact should not be taken against them as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
not automatically rendered infirmed. Certainly, we consider the totality of eircumstanees present in
this case. Eanna's right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise includes the constitutional
right to enjoy his liberty, albeit in a restricted sense due to his arrest. He retains his (limited)
freedom of movement during the course of the investigation. Likewise, it must be added that the
natural tendeney of an innocent person aceused of committing a crime is not to rest easy by ensuring
that the evidence being used against him is not altered, tampered or swapped. In this case, Eanna's
resolve to smoke outside notwithstanding a pending concern either shows that he was adamant in his
claim that what was confiscated from him were merely flavored tobaeco or that he was already
resigned to the fact that he was busted possessing marijuana. The Court cannot speeulate or engage
in guesswork.

And third, the plausibility of tampering with the evidence is nil as the airport police were preoccupied
in accomplishing the necessary documentation relative to the arrest and seizure. PO3 Javier shared
that while waiting for the arrival of the barangay offieials, their group were busy preparing
documents which mainly consist of reports regarding the incident.119 The trial court equally noted
that "there were a lot of things they were doing like the preparation of the spot report that they
[would] forward to Manila such that their Deputy Chief even helped them. It is precisely for [this]
reason that the two sticks of marijuana [appear] to have been submitted to the crime lab only at
12:50 a.m. of the following day, July 15, 2013."120

It has been raised that the drug evidence should have been placed in a sealed container. Eanna
asserts that the evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration, tampering and swapping because
the Ziploc was not sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than the natural, built-in re-
sealable feature of the plastic bag. Contrary to his allegation, however, the specimens that were
submitted to the RTC were actually placed in a big transparent resealable Hefty One Zip plastic bag
sealed with a masking tape with markings.121 Even if there is truth to his representation, the
specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested, and presented in
court were positively identified by SSO Suguitan and PO3 Javier, who both testified under oath, as
the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves that were seized from Eanna. Raising a mere
possibility is not enough. Eanna should have shown with particularity how the drug evidence was
altered, tampered or swapped. The nature of illegal drugs as fungible things is not new to him. He is
not a stranger to prohibited drugs, claiming to be familiar with marijuana since he is employed or
attached to a drug addiction center and has been in 22 different countries and spent hours in
customs.122 As the RTC opined, he could have submitted for laboratory examination the tiny grains of
dried leaves and seeds that were found in his camera bag in order to prove that the alleged sticks of
marijuana seized from him were in fact flavored tobacco that he used to smoke all the time.123

The same reasoning as above can be said even if we are to admit that PO3 Padayao placed his own
marking on the specimens he received from PO3 Javier and before he turned them over to the
forensic chemist. A marking made on the corpus delicti itself is not automatically considered a form
of contamination which irreversibly alters its physical state and compromises its integrity and
evidentiary value.

Where a defendant identifies a defect in the chain of custody, the prosecution must introduce
sufficient proof so that the judge could find that the item is in substantially the same condition as
when it was seized, and may admit the item if there is a reasonable probability that it has not been
changed in important respects.124 However, there is a presumption of integrity of physical evidence
absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or tampering with the evidence.125 Merely raising the possibility
of tampering or misidentification is insufficient to render evidence inadmissible. 126 Absent some
showing by the defendant that the evidence has been tampered with, it will not be presumed that
those who had custody of it would do so.127 Where there is no evidence indicating that tampering
with the exhibits occurred, the courts presume that the public officers have discharged their duties
properly.128

In this jurisdiction, it has been consistently held that considering that the integrity of the evidence is
presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence
has been tampered with, the defendant bears the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by the public
officers and a presumption that the public officers properly discharge their duties.129People v.
Agulay130 in fact ruled that failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR
of R.A No. 9165 does not bar the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. Thus:
The dissent agreed with accused-appellant's assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with
the proper procedure in the custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the
procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity
accorded police authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is
without merit.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-
bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section
21 (a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979.
Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the
Court still applied such presumption. We held:

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is
a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of
illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.131 (Emphasis in the original)
People v. Daria, Jr.,132Peop1e v. Gratil,133 and People v. Bala134 have followed the Agulay ruling.

It is unfortunate that rigid obedience to procedure on the chain of custody creates a scenario wherein
the safeguards supposedly set to shield the innocent are more often than not exploited by the guilty
to escape rightful punishment.135 The Court reiterates that while the procedure on the chain of
custody should be perfect, in reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain.136 The chain of custody need not be perfect for the evidence to be admissible.137 A complete
chain of custody need not always be proved.138 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's anest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible or render void and invalid such seizure.139 The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.140

Non-compliance with the requirements of the law is not automatically fatal to the prosecution's case
and the accused may still be held guilty of the offense charged. This Court ratiocinated in People v.
Del Monte:141
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be
a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded [to] it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.142 (Italics in the original.)
We restated in People v. Moner143 that if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in
the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility
that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence
presented for each particular case. The saving clause under Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence
are well within the power of trial court judges to decide. The Court went on to state that under the
doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of the
rules of evidence, which are promulgated by the Court pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, or if it is a subject of substantive law, which is passed by an act of
Congress. Taking into account the distinction in criminal law that a substantive law declares what
acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them while a procedural law provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished, it was concluded that
the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure; therefore, it is the Cmni
which has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence.

Certainly, the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, it being
ultimately anchored on the weight and admissibility of evidence which the courts have the exclusive
prerogative to decide. Any missing link, gap, doubt, challenge, break, problem, defect or deficiency in
the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.144 Once admitted, the
court evaluates it and, based thereon, may accept or disregard the evidence.145 In People v.
Sipin,146 this Court, through the ponente, recently conveyed:
At this point, it is not amiss for the ponente to express his position regarding the issue of which
between the Congress and the Judiciary has jurisdiction to determine sufficiency of compliance with
the rule on chain of custody, which essentially boils down to the application of procedural rules on
admissibility of evidence. In this regard, the ponente agrees with the view of Hon. Associate Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in People v. Teng Moner y Adam that "if the evidence of illegal drugs
was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence
relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the
weight of evidence presented for each particular case." As aptly pointed out by Justice Leonardo-De
Castro, the Court's power to promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress.

The ponente subscribes to the view of Justice Leonardo-De Castro that the chain of custody rule is a
matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, and that the Court has the last say regarding the
appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary matters are indeed well within the powers of courts to
appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the
chain of custody rule as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been
preserved may wanant the conviction of the accused.

The ponente further submits that the requirements of marking the seized items, conduct of
inventory and taking photograph in the presence of a representative from the media or the
DOJ and a local elective official, are police investigation procedures which call for
administrative sanctions in case of non-compliance. Violation of such procedure may even
merit penalty under R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty of "planting"
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity and
purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.
Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. - The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person found violating any regulation duly issued by the Board pursuant to this Act, in addition to the
administrative sanctions imposed by the Board.
However, non-observance of such police administrative procedures should not affect the validity of
the seizure of the evidence, because the issue of chain of custody is ultimately anchored on the
admissibility of evidence, which is exclusively within the prerogative of the courts to decide in
accordance with the rules on evidence. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be
possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, many of them far from
ideal, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.147 Like what have been done in past cases, we must not look for the stringent
step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would detennine
the guilt or innocence of the accused.148 The identity of the confiscated drugs is preserved when the
drug presented and offered as evidence in court is the exact same item seized from the accused at
the time of his arrest, while the preservation of the drug's integrity means that its evidentiary value
is intact as it was not subject to planting, switching, tampering or any other circumstance that casts
doubt as to its existence.149

To assess an allegedly faulty chain of custody, the court looks for ampie corroborative evidence as to
the evidence's acquisition and subsequent custody.150 Before admitting or excluding real evidence, it
must consider the nature of the evidence, and the surrounding circumstances, including presentation,
custody and probability of tampering or alteration.151 If, after considering these factors, it is
determined that the evidence is substantially in the same condition as when the crime was
committed, the evidence may be admitted.152 The court need not rule out every possibility that the
evidence underwent alteration; it needs only to find that the reasonable probability is that the
evidence has not been altered in any material aspect.153 Physical evidence is admissible when the
possibilities of misidentification or alteration are eliminated, not absolutely, but as a matter of
reasonable probability.154 All that is required is that the evidence m question was the same as that
involved in the offense and that it 1s substantially unchanged.155

Courts are reminded to tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who
conducted the illegal drug operations and must thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors
that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law and the rules.156 In the performance of this
function, among the evidentiary rules to apply are the following: test in measuring the value of a
witness' testimony, appreciation of inculpatory facts, positive and negative evidence, one-witness
rule, best evidence rule, suppression of evidence, presumption of regular performance of official
duty, rules on circumstantial evidence and conspiracy, and (non) presentation of poseur buyer or
marked money.157

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 9, 2016 Decision and the July 21, 2016 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22,2013 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-
appellant Eanna O'Cochlain guilty for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
c. Substance Testing

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association

No. 87-1555

Argued November 2, 1988

Decided March 21, 1989

489 U.S. 602

Syllabus

Upon the basis of evidence indicating that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees had caused
or contributed to a number of significant train accidents, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
promulgated regulations under petitioner Secretary of Transportation's statutory authority to adopt
safety standards for the industry. Among other things, Subpart C of the regulations requires railroads
to see that blood and urine tests of covered employees are conducted following certain major train
accidents or incidents, while Subpart D authorizes, but does not require, railroads to administer
breath or urine tests, or both, to covered employees who violate certain safety rules. Respondents,
the Railway Labor Executives' Association and various of its member labor organizations, brought suit
in the Federal District Court to enjoin the regulations. The court granted summary judgment for
petitioners, concluding that the regulations did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling, inter alia, that a requirement of particularized suspicion is essential to a
finding that toxicological testing of railroad employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The court stated that such a requirement would ensure that the tests, which reveal the presence of
drug metabolites that may remain in the body for weeks following ingestion, are confined to the
detection of current impairment.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the drug and alcohol testing mandated or authorized by
the FRA regulations. Pp. 489 U. S. 613-618.

(a) The tests in question cannot be viewed as private action outside the reach of the Fourth
Amendment. A railroad that complies with Subpart C does so by compulsion of sovereign authority,
and therefore must be viewed as an instrument or agent of the Government. Similarly, even though
Subpart D does not compel railroads to test, it cannot be concluded, in the context of this facial
challenge, that such testing will be primarily the result of private initiative, since specific features of
the regulations combine to establish that the Government has actively encouraged, endorsed, and
participated in the testing. Specifically, sincechanrobles. com-red

Page 489 U. S. 603

the regulations preempt state laws covering the same subject matter, and are intended to supersede
collective bargaining and arbitration award provisions, the Government has removed all legal barriers
to the testing authorized by Subpart D. Moreover, by conferring upon the FRA the right to receive
biological samples and test results procured by railroads, Subpart D makes plain a strong preference
for testing and a governmental desire to share the fruits of such intrusions. In addition, the
regulations mandate that railroads not bargain away their Subpart D testing authority, and provide
that an employee who refuses to submit to such tests must be withdrawn from covered service.
Pp. 489 U. S. 614-616.
(b) The collection and subsequent analysis of the biological samples required or authorized by the
regulations constitute searches of the person subject to the Fourth Amendment. This Court has long
recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be tested for alcohol content, and
the ensuing chemical analysis, constitute searches. Similarly, subjecting a person to the breath test
authorized by Subpart D must be deemed a search, since it requires the production of "deep lung"
breath, and thereby implicates concerns about bodily integrity. Moreover, although the collection and
testing of urine under the regulations do not entail any intrusion into the body, they nevertheless
constitute searches, since they intrude upon expectations of privacy as to medical information and
the act of urination that society has long recognized as reasonable. Even if the employer's antecedent
interference with the employee's freedom of movement cannot be characterized as an independent
Fourth Amendment seizure, any limitation on that freedom that is necessary to obtain the samples
contemplated by the regulations must be considered in assessing the intrusiveness of the searches
affected by the testing program. Pp. 489 U. S. 616-618.

2. The drug and alcohol tests mandated or authorized by the FRA regulations are reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, even though there is no requirement of a warrant or a reasonable suspicion
that any particular employee may be impaired, since, on the present record, the compelling
governmental interests served by the regulations outweigh employees' privacy concerns. Pp. 489 U.
S. 618-633.

(a) The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees engaged in safety-
sensitive tasks in order to ensure the safety of the traveling public and of the employees themselves
plainly justifies prohibiting such employees from using alcohol or drugs while on duty or on call for
duty and the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. That interest
presents "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable cause requirements. Pp. 489 U. S. 618-621. chanrobles.com- red

Page 489 U. S. 604

(b) Imposing a warrant requirement in the present context is not essential to render the intrusions at
issue reasonable. Such a requirement would do little to further the purposes of a warrant, since both
the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are
narrowly and specifically defined by the regulations, and doubtless are well known to covered
employees, and since there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate, in light of the
standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with
administering the program. Moreover, imposing a warrant requirement would significantly hinder,
and in many cases frustrate, the objectives of the testing program, since the delay necessary to
procure a warrant could result in the destruction of valuable evidence, in that alcohol and drugs are
eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, and since the railroad supervisors who set the
testing process in motion have little familiarity with the intricacies of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Pp. 489 U. S. 621-624.

(c) Imposing an individualized suspicion requirement in the present context is not essential to render
the intrusions at issue reasonable. The testing procedures contemplated by the regulations pose only
limited threats to covered employees' justifiable privacy expectations, particularly since they
participate in an industry subject to pervasive safety regulation by the Federal and State
Governments. Moreover, because employees ordinarily consent to significant employer-imposed
restrictions on their freedom of movement, any additional interference with that freedom that occurs
in the time it takes to procure a sample from a railroad employee is minimal.
Furthermore, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, established that governmentally imposed blood
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's privacy and bodily integrity,
and the breath tests authorized by Subpart D are even less intrusive than blood tests. And, although
urine tests require employees to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great
privacy, the regulations reduce the intrusiveness of the collection process by requiring that samples
be furnished in a medical environment, without direct observation. In contrast, the governmental
interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling. A substance-impaired
railroad employee in a safety-sensitive job can cause great human loss before any signs of the
impairment become noticeable, and the regulations supply an effective means of deterring such
employees from using drugs or alcohol by putting them on notice that they are likely to be
discovered if an accident occurs. An individualized suspicion requirement would also impede railroads'
ability to obtain valuable information about the causes of accidents or incidents and how to protect
the public, since obtaining evidence giving rise to the suspicion
chanrobles. com-red

Page 489 U. S. 605

that a particular employee is impaired is impracticable in the chaotic aftermath of an accident, when
it is difficult to determine which employees contributed to the occurrence and objective indicia of
impairment are absent. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the regulations are unreasonable
because the tests in question cannot measure current impairment is flawed. Even if urine test results
disclosed nothing more specific than the recent use of controlled substances, this information would
provide the basis for a further investigation, and might allow the FRA to reach an informed judgment
as to how the particular accident occurred. More importantly, the court overlooked the FRA's policy of
placing principal reliance on blood tests, which unquestionably can identify recent drug use, and
failed to recognize that the regulations are designed not only to discern impairment, but to deter it.
Pp. 489 U. S. 624-632.

839 F.2d 575, reversed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,and WHITE, BLACKMUN,
O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and in all but portions of Part III of which STEVENS, J., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 489 U. S.
634. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 489 U. S. 635
red
chanrobles.co m-

Page 489 U. S. 606

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
 (g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates
they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as
it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates
for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall
consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply
with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the
offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers
to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions. 2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves
the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to
exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that
Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing
since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding
SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and
the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore,
in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision
deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its
validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal
drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result
of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the
illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
[close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such
application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for
drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent
under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. 15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has
long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion
through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among
school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions
following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random
urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the
football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's
drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools
stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal
undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a
higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since
a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the
dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search
under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the
basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non -
athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty
of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy,
the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting
in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of
the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use
by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school
are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," 23 has failed to show how the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 24 Petitioner Laserna's
lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote
without elaboration:
 The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of
mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that
the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search
and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of
the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara
v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public
and defers to the state's exercise of police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--
and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of
drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; 34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating
to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being
of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace
via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal
drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal
and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern -
day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard
of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. 38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other
agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers
have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the
increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power
of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.