PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS

PSYCHOLOGY OF
NEUROTICISM AND SHAME

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 PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS, MOTIVATIONS
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PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS, MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS

PSYCHOLOGY OF
NEUROTICISM AND SHAME

RAYMOND G. JACKSON
EDITORS

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York
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Psychology of neuroticism and shame / [edited by] Raymond G. Jackson.

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ISBN 978-1-61761-876-5 (Ebook)

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

 CONTENTS

Preface ix
Chapter 1 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for
Stress and Impaired Health and Well-Being 1
Sharon Grant
Chapter 2 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy:
An Investigation through the Lens of Mencius 37
HuaNan Gong
Chapter 3 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of
Information and Communication Technology 59
Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips
Chapter 4 College Students' Perceptions of
Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 85
Gina Robertiello
Chapter 5 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in
Prisoner Confrontations 109
Michelle Butler
Chapter 6 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics:
Test of a Two-Factor Model of Their
Effects on Affective Health 129
Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard
and J. Alexis Ortiz
Chapter 7 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 151
Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren
Chapter 8 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood:
Integrating the Contributions of Erikson and Fromm 169
Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell
Chapter 9 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 183
Neil Pembroke
viii Contents

Chapter 10 Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for

Health Behaviors: The Role of Implicit Neuroticism 197
Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan
Chapter 11 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 211
Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley,
Chris Stiff and Martin Hagger
Chapter 12 Why Neuroticism May Be Relevant to Understanding
Response to Meditation-Based Interventions:
A Review of Some Forgotten Literature 225
Brian L. Thompson
Chapter 13 Neuroticism and Psychoticism as Correlates of Suicidal Behavior 235
David Lester
Index 239
 PREFACE

This book reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental health, focusing
on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and well-being.
This book also examines biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the toxic effect
of neuroticism, and possible intervention strategies are discussed. Moreover, whether
individuals with neurotic traits are more prone to use information and communication
technology are considered, as well as the potential to develop addictions to technology. In
addition, Eriksonian identity formation in emerging adulthood is analyzed, with a special
emphasis on how the unique epigenetic struggles of this developmental period may lead to
experiences of neuroticism and anxiety. Moreover, numerous researchers suggest the
experience of shame is linked to aggressive behavior. In this book, prisoner self-narratives are
explored to determine whether the presence of shame in their identity influenced their
involvement in confrontations. Whether shaming has something to do with psychiatric health
is discussed as well. In addition, the utility of self-determination theory (SDT) in
understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being motivated by shame
avoidance is explored. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain the adaptive
and maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on behavior are also
identified and discussed.
Chapter 1 - This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental
health, focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health
and well-being. Although neuroticism is often associated with excessive or unfounded
symptom and illness reporting, studies of objective health outcomes, such as longevity or
mortality, have confirmed that the trait does indeed play a genuine role in objective health
status. With regard to mental health, neuroticism is associated with a range of conditions, and
recent work has linked the trait with DSM-IV personality disorders. In addition, neuroticism
is a strong and consistent predictor of both subjective (hedonic) and psychological
(eudaimonic) dimensions of well being. This chapter presents an overarching process model,
describing the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational
stressors to negative health and well-being outcomes. Evidence is reviewed linking
neuroticism with stressor exposure and emotional reactivity, negative cognitive appraisal,
maladaptive and ineffective coping, and risky health behavior. The combined/interactive
effect of neuroticism and other traits on vulnerability is also considered. The chapter
examines biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the toxic effect of
neuroticism, and concludes with a discussion of possible intervention strategies.
x Raymond G. Jackson

Chapter 2 - In the West, shame is believed to arise from feelings toward sex, which is the
origin of knowledge of goodness and evil as well as the origin of the conscience. In the Bible,
sexual shame is elevated as the beginning and the source of other types of shame, so at the
same time it is the prototype and standard of other types of shame. However, the generality
and power of sexual shame need not be universal. In Chinese traditional thinking it is clear
that shame is closely bound up with taste (eating), which occupies the primal location and
plays an important role in ―taste.‖ In ancient Chinese words and expressions, the meaning of
―shame‖ is ―dedication‖ and ―delicious (food)‖ and the word ―shame‖ is used as both verb
and adjective. Shame firstly involves delicious food. Beginning with the Confucian Analects,
―shame‖ in relation to the meaning of delicious food stirs feelings of morality. This reason for
this association is that shame is related to the delicious food that comes from ―sheep,‖ as well
as the values of goodness, beauty, and faith. Generally speaking, ―shame‖ is related to all
valuable things. The shape of ―xiu‖（羞 means shame) in the Chinese ancient character
shows an uncertain expression of conflict when people decide whether or not to capture the
sheep. In this sense, the shame is derived from what one thinks and feels when a person faces
beautiful and valuable things. Mencius regards the concept of shame as a category of
morality, and the concept‘s role as an important source of human‘s nature and conscience is
greatly consolidated. Furthermore, shame is the basic foundation that defines man as man.
The Confucians decline the human‘s shield of morality in order to emphasize the effects of
shame. Under this teaching, they merged substance (体) with function (用): existing with
shame. For the Taoist who stresses the discipline of the mind, shame is taken as a defense to
retain the ―nativeness‖ of the mind.
Chapter 3 - The present paper considers whether individuals with neurotic traits (anxiety,
depression, shyness, low self-esteem) are more prone to use information and communication
technology. We have previously found that individuals with low self esteem and social
anxiety are prone to use the internet. The internet offers the opportunity to edit one‘s self-
presentation through email and blogging benefitting the socially anxious. As the internet
serves to document behaviour, it also provides evidence of emotional or irrational behaviours.
Procrastinators prefer email, and those prone to panic are more likely to post messages on
discussion groups. There is also evidence that neurotic individuals send more SMS. The
present paper also considers the potential to develop addictions to technology. There is
limited research addressing neuroticism as a predictor of the use of information and
communication technology, nevertheless, this is an area of potential interest, particularly as
the internet serves to document behaviour and self presentation in a way that was hitherto not
possible.
Chapter 4 - Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative
approach. The emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior; benefitting the
injured parties, as well as the offender. In Criminal Justice courses across the nation, this
topic has been hotly debated. Is restorative justice working? Is it fair to the victim? Does it
fulfill any of the goals of punishment? Although laypersons might feel differently, those
taking courses on crime and justice have discussed the topic at length, and many have
supported this approach. Some are working in the criminal justice system and some are
working on degrees in order to obtain a position in the criminal justice system. After
discussing the theory of restorative justice, especially the research of John Braithwaite, it was
the researcher's intention to determine student perceptions of restorative justice efforts, and
 Preface xi

their views on the utility and success of this approach. This research was conducted via the
administration of a survey in courses at a private catholic college in New Jersey, with social
science and non-social science majors.
Results demonstrated that male and female social science students had similar
perceptions about the topic, and that their opinions were similar to those of the non-social
science majors as well. Almost all respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S.
should be to protect society. They thought prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate
offenders, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders. Most did
not think that restorative justice efforts were fair to the victim (because this effort is not
punitive enough), and they did not think criminals were treated too leniently today. However,
most respondents did think that a victim should participate in the punishment of their
victimizer (i.e. they should have a say). They did not think shaming criminals deterred the
behavior of the criminal or the behavior of onlookers, or that reintegrative shaming caused
less stigma. Finally, most did not think that our current punitive techniques caused offenders
to think worse of themselves.
Chapter 5 - Numerous researchers suggest that the experience of shame is linked to
aggressive behaviour (see Scheff, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Tangney & Dearing,
2002). In this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence
of shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. The self-narratives
of 89 adult male prisoners were examined to determine whether the prisoners expressed
themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types of shame they experienced and if these
experiences of shame influenced their involvement in confrontations with other prisoners.
Results indicate that individuals expressing themes of shame in their self-narrative were more
likely to engage in confrontations than those who did not express such themes. In particular,
those who were insecure in their sense of self seemed to be more likely to react aggressively
to behaviours which undermined their identity and were more likely to feel pressurised to
conform to prisoner norms of masculinity and aggressiveness. This suggests that the
expereince of shame may predispose individuals with an insecure self to engage in
confrontations as a means of ego defence. Potential ramifications and limitations are
discussed.
Chapter 6 - The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of neuroticism and
positive personal characteristics on affective health in the context of a two-factor model. The
model posits that neuroticism will primarily impact negative affect while positive personality
characteristics will primarily impact positive affect. The relationship between neuroticism,
positive personal characteristics, and affective health was examined in three large samples of
undergraduate students. The positive personal characteristics assessed included extraversion,
resilience, optimism, spirituality, purpose in life, and indicators of social and emotional
intelligence. Multiple regression analyses were used to simultaneously examine the effects of
neuroticism and the positive characteristics on negative affect and positive affect. The results
consistently showed that neuroticism was a strong predictor of negative affect while positive
characteristics were generally not related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism.
In addition, the positive characteristics were still related to positive affect when controlling
for neuroticism. Finally, neuroticism was not related to positive affect when controlling for all
positive characteristics at once but was usually related to less positive affect when controlling
for one at a time. The main implication is that neuroticism should be considered within the
context of both the positive and negative domains of human experience. Neuroticism may
xii Raymond G. Jackson

have its strongest impact on negative affective health while positive characteristics may have
their strongest impact on positive affective health.
Chapter 7 - In the Icelandic sagas shame, humiliation, respect and honour are central
themes. The sagas describe a culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how a man
can obtain and sustain his honour. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining
respect in the eyes of the other. An honourable man who has been humiliated and insulted and
has been unable to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation looses his status and
reputation as an honourable man. It leads to self contempt and deep depression.
Contrary to what was the case in the Icelandic sagas, shame and humiliation are hidden
and privatized in modern society. We feel ashamed of our shame. In this article we explore
the question if, parallel to the Icelandic sagas where shame without redress could lead for
instance to apthy, modern types of shame and shaming is equally associated to psychiatric ill-
health.
Chapter 8 - This commentary will focus on an exploration of Eriksonian identity
formation in emerging adulthood with a special emphasis on how the unique epigenetic
struggles of this developmental period may lead to experiences of neuroticism and anxiety.
Recent lines of research (Arnett, 1998, 2000, 2001) suggest that emerging adulthood is a time
of profound identity exploration for young people. Emerging adults explore issues of identity
concerning work, love, purpose, and meaning amidst a period of life marked by increased
freedom and significant decision-making. However, contemporary western society seems to
foster a prolonged adolescence in emerging adulthood. While emerging adults begin to make
choices concerning their identities and their life course, they are relatively free of adult
responsibilities and commitments. Meanwhile, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) perceived the
conflict between identity versus role confusion as an integral struggle in adolescence.
With the shift in contemporary society toward a prolonged adolescence, many emerging
adults face questions concerning identity in a developmental period which differs markedly
from traditional conceptions of adolescence. Greater freedom afforded by college, separation
from parents, and increased autonomy to make life decisions makes emerging adulthood
unique. Erikson (1950, 1968) felt that lacking a coherent sense of identity causes great
anxiety, as does the struggle to achieve this sense of identity. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941,
1947, 1955) suggests that freedom, while perceived of as liberating, actually, causes a great
deal of anxiety and that humanity tends to escape from freedom rather than embrace and
capitalize on its potential.
Therefore, the understanding of a great deal of anxiety and neuroticism in emerging
adulthood may lie in an integration of these theories. The increased freedom of emerging
adulthood, combined with the potentially stressful issues of identity, intimacy, and facing the
incoming commitments of adulthood, may contribute to increased experiences of anxiety and
neuroticism. The anxiety produced by increased freedom may lead some to seek escape from
this very freedom, which in turn, may cloud and disrupt identity exploration and commitment
leading to role confusion and even more anxiety. For instance, automaton conformity
(becoming totally immersed in one‘s culture and forsaking an individual sense of identity)
could alleviate the anxiety of freedom, but it may exacerbate the anxiety of role confusion
throughout emerging adulthood. Finally, potential solutions for such neuroticism and anxiety
are suggested based upon the theories of Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941,
1955).
 Preface xiii

Chapter 9 - Psychologists have been aware for a long time of the significant
psychological distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (K. Horney). The tyranny
that perfectionists subject themselves to often leads to self-condemnation and depression.
While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism that
is most frequently discussed by psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for
perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement. There is therefore
a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Three approaches to the treatment
of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in cognitive therapy.
It is argued that perfectionism is grounded in a faulty core belief about the self—namely, ―I
am what I achieve.‖ It is further argued that release from perfectionism requires embrace of
the belief that what is ultimately most important is a personal conviction that one is good,
worthy, and loveable.
The second method makes use of strategies developed by John Bradshaw for accepting
and affirming all one‘s sub-selves. Bradshaw‘s approach is critiqued, however, for the way in
which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. This confusion leads to
significant deficiencies in his therapeutic system.
The third method is a modification and adaptation of Heinz Kohut‘s strategy of
―mirroring‖ developed for use in work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder.
Therapeutic mirroring is a stance of affirmation, acceptance, and admiration. It is contended
that shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between the grandiose and
idealizing selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation. It is suggested that
a strong therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace condemnation with mirroring.
Chapter 10 - There is considerable evidence that neuroticism is associated with self-
reported physical health, although the exact mechanisms involved are not clear. However,
self-reports of neuroticism may be distorted by concerns about social desirability and/or lack
of awareness, thus potentially biasing its correlations with health behaviors. In this chapter,
we first review issues concerning the explicit (self-report) measurement of neuroticism. We
then review recent research which indicates that explicit and implicit measures of neuroticism
are at best weakly related. Discussion then focuses on how implicitly assessing neuroticism
might enhance our understanding its associations with outcome variables, including health
behaviors. This discussion also considers the characteristics of two related implicit measures,
the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Go/No-
go Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2000). Preliminary evidence is presented that
suggests that the GNAT may be a more appropriate measure than the IAT. We present
evidence from two large undergraduate samples that GNAT-assessed neuroticism predicts
self-reported health behaviors over and above self-reported neuroticism. The chapter closes
with the suggestion that measuring neuroticism both implicitly and explicitly is a promising
research strategy for understanding its associations with other variables.
Chapter 11 - Shame has been identified as an intense unpleasant emotion (Wicker, Payne,
& Morgan, 1973) with potentially deleterious effects on motivation and goal-striving (Fischer
& Tangney, 1995). This chapter aims to explore the utility of self-determination theory (SDT)
in understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being motivated by shame
avoidance. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain the adaptive and
maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on behaviour will be identified
and discussed. Specifically, introjected regulation, one of six regulatory styles specified by
SDT, is particularly pertinent to well-documented associations between shame, maladaptive
xiv Raymond G. Jackson

coping, and avoidant behavioural tendencies (e.g., Tangney, Fischer, Flicker, & Barlow,
1996). Introjected regulation is considered a psychological mediator characterised by
avoidance of thoughts of shameful experiences or behaviours that could result in shameful
emotional reactions in the future. The value of SDT in explaining and evaluating behavioural
consequences of shame will be discussed using applied examples from educational, health,
and resource conservation research. As the regulatory styles proposed by SDT have differing
patterns of associations with psychological well-being, behavioural quality, and persistence,
the theory can offer both an account of the consequences of shame and methods through
which to reduce maladaptive reactions to this emotion. Ideas for further research approaching
shame from an SDT perspective will be proposed, including an examination of whether
inducing particular motivational orientations could serve as a buffer against the maladaptive
effects of shame.
Chapter 12 - Before the explosion of interest in mindfulness-based interventions (e.g.
Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004), early meditation researchers explored the impact of
personality traits on response to sitting meditation practice, particularly with Transcendental
Meditation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of that early research
and explore how some of the findings of these often forgotten studies may be incorporated
into contemporary research on meditation-based treatments. Given the incidence of
depression in individuals high in neuroticism, particular emphasis is placed on understanding
how neuroticism might impact and be impacted by Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for
depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
Chapter 13 - A review of research indicated that suicidal behavior is consistently
associated with Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism and psychoticism. It is suggested that
future research should explore the value of a zonal analysis involving these two traits in
identifying different rates and types of suicidal behavior.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 1-36 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

NEUROTICISM: THE PERSONALITY RISK

FACTOR FOR STRESS AND IMPAIRED
HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Sharon Grant
Faculty of Higher Education, Swinburne University of Technology,
Melbourne, Australia

ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and physical and mental health,
focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired health and
well-being. Although neuroticism is often associated with excessive or unfounded
symptom and illness reporting, studies of objective health outcomes, such as longevity or
mortality, have confirmed that the trait does indeed play a genuine role in objective
health status. With regard to mental health, neuroticism is associated with a range of
conditions, and recent work has linked the trait with DSM-IV personality disorders. In
addition, neuroticism is a strong and consistent predictor of both subjective (hedonic) and
psychological (eudaimonic) dimensions of well being. This chapter presents an
overarching process model, describing the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate
mechanisms that tie situational stressors to negative health and well-being outcomes.
Evidence is reviewed linking neuroticism with stressor exposure and emotional
reactivity, negative cognitive appraisal, maladaptive and ineffective coping, and risky
health behavior. The combined/interactive effect of neuroticism and other traits on
vulnerability is also considered. The chapter examines biological and psychological
mechanisms underlying the toxic effect of neuroticism, and concludes with a discussion
of possible intervention strategies.
2 Sharon Grant

INTRODUCTION
Chapter Overview

The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the personality-illness
relationship, including the role of psychological stress in mediating this relationship.
Discussion of stress focuses on the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping, in which
cognitive appraisal and coping mediate between potentially stressful events and the
subsequent experience of stress, illness, and disease. The Five-Factor Model (FFM) of trait
personality (extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness) is then
introduced as a powerful framework for understanding the role of personality in illness and
disease.
The next section of the chapter identifies neuroticism as the personality risk factor for
stress and impaired health and well-being. The section begins with a review of studies on the
relationship between FFM personality and physical and mental health outcomes. Discussion
of the relationship between personality and mental health focuses on DSM-IV personality
disorders, a topic area which has generated considerable interest in recent years. The
relationship between personality and well being in the general population is also discussed.
In the next section, explanatory mechanisms or mediating processes in the personality-
illness relationship are examined. An overarching process model is presented which describes
the effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to
health and well-being.
The chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of possible interventions to
appease the detrimental impact of neuroticism. It is noted that future research should focus on
the direct evaluation of explanatory mechanisms underlying the personality-illness
relationship.

The Personality-Illness Relationship: Where It Began

The idea of a relationship between personality and illness began in ancient Greek
philosophy, with Hippocrates‘ notion of mind-body dualism (Brantley & Garrett, 1993).
Hippocrates believed that four bodily humors provided the basis for personality: black bile,
blood, phlegm, and yellow bile (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987). The four humors were
theorized to correspond with specific temperaments - melancholic (depressed), sanguine
(optimistic), phlegmatic (apathetic), or choleric (angry) respectively – with a person‘s
predominant humor determining his or her ‗personality type‘ (Friedman & Booth-Kewley,
1987). Hippocrates‘ theory was later expanded by Galen, a second century physician who
believed that humoral imbalance, an excess of any one humor, would give rise to illness and
disease (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987;
Michaels, Michaels, & Peterson, 1997). In contrast, a balance between the humors was
thought to promote ‗good humor‘ or well-being (Winter, 1996). However, with the
emergence of Cartesian dualism interest in the personality-illness relationship declined and
the area did not re-emerge as a legitimate field of scientific enquiry until much later (Brantley
& Garrett, 1993).
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 3

Modern interest in the personality-illness relationship arose from Freudian psychology, in

particular the psychodynamic treatment of hysterical paralysis (see Brantley & Garrett, 1993;
Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Friedman, 1990; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987). Freud drew
attention to the effect of unconscious conflict on physiological arousal and related symptoms
(Emmons & King, 1988). The psychodynamic tradition gave birth to ‗Specificity Theory‘, the
notion that a given illness could be attributed to the influence of a specific trait or underlying
conflict (Brantley & Garrett, 1993). By mid-century, there was considerable interest in the
topic, which came to be known as ‗psychosomatic medicine‘: the study of mental disturbance
and organic disease (Friedman, 1990). Interest in Specificity Theory persevered throughout
the 1950s and 1960s (Brantley & Garrett, 1993), however much of the research was
methodologically questionable and the field eventually fell into disrepute (Friedman, 1990).
In the 1960s and 1970s, attention shifted to the relationship between quantifiable life
events and illness (e.g., Holmes & Rahe, 1967), and psychological stress was introduced as a
mediator of the personality-illness relationship (Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Lazarus, 1990).
Since then, stress has become a pivotal context in which to examine personality and illness
(see e.g., Wiebe & Smith, 1997).
While interest in the personality-illness relationship has fluctuated over time (Brantley &
Garrett, 1993; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1987), there is currently much
interest in the topic (Korotkov & Hannah, 2004; Michaels et al., 1997; Wiebe & Smith,
1997), with considerable attention to the role of personality in the stress-illness relationship
since the mid-1980s (Vollrath, 2001). Given the importance of stress and related concepts in
the personality-illness literature, the stress-illness relationship will be discussed in some detail
below.
Renewed interest in personality and health has been driven by the progression of health
and personality psychology, and behavioral medicine more generally (Korotkov & Hannah,
2004; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). In recent years, studies linking personality to objective
health outcomes, such as illness onset and longevity, have seen a resurgence of research in
this area, with such studies dismissing longstanding criticism regarding the limited predictive
validity of personality measures (Smith, 2006).

Stress as a mediator of the personality-illness relationship

The role of personality in stress and related health outcomes is recognized in
epidemiology, physiology, sociology, and psychology, with each discipline adopting its own
unique theoretical and/or methodological approach (Parkes, 1994). However, a central thesis,
regardless of the discipline, is that susceptibility to stress-related illness and disease is not
random but systematic; that is, a person may be more or less vulnerable or resilient on the
basis of personality (Friedman, 1990).
Psychological models of stress vary, although most include a basic tri-level structure in
which the effect of an antecedent variable or ‗stressor‘ is altered by or filtered through
moderating or mediating variables (e.g., cognitive appraisal, coping) to influence the outcome
variable, ‗strain‘ e.g., health (see Deary et al., 1996). Perhaps the most influential model to
have emerged is Lazarus and Folkman‘s (1984) Transactional Model of Stress and Coping.
Within this model, cognitive appraisal is theorized to mediate between the perception of a
potentially stressful event and the subsequent experience of stress to influence the
individual‘s psychological and physiological response to the event.
4 Sharon Grant

Cognitive appraisal can be defined as an individual‘s evaluation of the significance of a

potentially stressful event for personal well-being, given his/her goals and needs (Kuppens,
Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007). According to Lazarus and Folkman,
the appraisal process is tri-phasic: (1) Primary Appraisal – assessment of the event‘s
significance for personal well-being; (2) Secondary Appraisal – (a) assessment of what can be
done about the event, given one‘s available resources and (b) subsequent initiation of a
coping response; and (3) Reappraisal - re-assessment of the event, including whether a further
coping response is required. It should be noted that cognitive appraisal is not necessarily
conscious in this model (Siegall & Cummings, 1995).
Primary appraisal is subdivided into (1) ‗irrelevant‘, (2) ‗benign-positive‘ and (3)
‗stressful‘ (Monroe & Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990), where the latter is thought to
arise from the appraisal of (a) harm (possibility of damage/loss), (b) threat (possibility of
future damage/loss), or (c) challenge (possibility of gain/growth and damage/loss) (Monroe &
Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kesley, & Leitten, 1993). Harm
appraisal is ‗post hoc‘ by definition, in that it does not occur until after the stressful event,
while threat and challenge appraisal are ‗a priori‘, occurring before or in anticipation of the
stressor (Peacock & Wong, 1990; Tomaka et al., 1993). The appraisal of a situation as
harmful, threatening, or challenging is associated with an alteration in the intensity of mood
or affect, triggering a cycle of change in the person‘s psychological and physiological
functioning (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Dewe, Cox, & Ferguson, 1993; Siegall & Cummings,
1995). Challenge appraisal may fluctuate between potential growth/gain and potential
damage/loss, and can therefore oscillate between a state of positive and negative
physiological arousal (Semmer, 1996).
While primary appraisal is concerned with assessment of the event‘s significance for
personal well-being (Callan, Terry, & Schweitzer, 1994; Peacock & Wong, 1990), secondary
appraisal is concerned with assessment of whether one can manage the event categorized as
‗stressful‘ during primary appraisal (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Hobfoll, 1988; Monroe &
Kelley, 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990). During secondary appraisal, the individual must
assess available coping strategies or preferred coping styles in light of the situation at hand
and select a coping response (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Matheny, Aycock, Curlette, & Junker,
1993; Peacock & Wong, 1990). A coping response is not initiated unless the event is
appraised as stressful in the first instance therefore coping is dependent on the outcome of
primary and secondary appraisal (Dewe et al., 1993; Siegall & Cummings, 1995). It is during
the coping phase that the individual is able to test the ‗workability‘ of secondary appraisal
(Payne, 1991).
The fact that coping is interwoven with cognitive appraisal as a key variable in the
stimulus-response process is a defining characteristic of the Transactional Model of Stress
and Coping (Dewe et al., 1993; Monroe & Kelley, 1997). Coping, any behavioral or cognitive
attempt to control, reduce, or prevent distress in the presence of internal or external demand
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus, 1990), is thought to influence physiological arousal via
its impact on (a) the intensity or duration of the stressor and/or (b) the likelihood that the
stressor will recur or be appraised as stressful in the future (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Although
the central purpose of coping is to reduce tension and restore equilibrium through stressor
reduction, coping may be adaptive or maladaptive (Parkes, 1994).
Stress is thought to arise from (a) the appraisal of an event as harmful, threatening, or
challenging, and (b) the appraisal that an adequate or appropriate coping response is
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 5

unavailable (Cohen, Kamarck, Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Edwards, 1989). The stressor is
manageable to the extent that the individual‘s perceived coping resources (secondary
appraisal) are appraised as high in relation to the perceived threat (primary appraisal)
associated with the event (Bouchard, 2003). At a general level, stress is hypothesized to
contribute to illness and disease through deregulation of (a) the autonomic nervous system
(e.g., cardiovascular and neuroendocrine activity) and (b) immune system functioning
(Brantley & Garrett, 1993; Brown, 1993; Michaels et al., 1997; Siegrist, 1995; Wiebe &
Smith, 1997).
Reappraisal is concerned with the individual‘s subsequent assessment of the stressful
event. Information and experience gained from the initial person-environment transaction is
used to re-evaluate the situation and assess whether a further coping response is required
(Tomaka et al., 1993). If the event is appraised as irrelevant or benign at this point, then no
further coping response is initiated. If on the other hand, the event is still appraised as
stressful, there is a continuation of the cognitive appraisal-coping-reappraisal sequence.
To summarize, according to the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping, an
individual‘s response to a potentially stressful event is a function of the perceptual inter-face
between person and environment, as opposed to the quality or intensity of events per se
(Cohen et al., 1983; Fleming, Baum, & Singer, 1984; Monroe & Kelley, 1997). With regard
to strain, the causal mechanism is the individual‘s cognitively-mediated response (cognitive
appraisal, coping) to the stressful event, the product of which is related to physiological
arousal and subsequent vulnerability to stress-related illness and disease (Cohen et al., 1983).
Several of models theorize a central role for personality in this process. For example,
personality may influence the likelihood that a person will experience a stressful event
(stressor exposure), his/her assessment of that event (cognitive appraisal), the selection of
more or less adaptive coping strategies (coping), the extent of his/her emotional or
physiological reaction (reactivity), and the etiology and progression of stress-related illness
and disease e.g., due to underlying pathology (Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Friedman, 1990;
Leventhal & Tomarken, 1987; Mäkikangas & Kinnunen, 2003; Siegall & Cummings, 1995;
Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). As discussed later in this chapter,
empirical work has identified a clear role for stress and related mediating processes in
explaining the personality-illness relationship.

The ‘Big five’ traits and the personality-illness relationship

Much of the variance in personality can be accounted for by the ‗Big Five‘ factors of
extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness (Costa & McCrae,
1992; Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & John, 1992). Stone and Costa (1990) described the Five
Factor Model (FFM) as a powerful framework for understanding the role of personality in
illness and disease. Preliminary support for the Big Five – then labelled Surgency
(extraversion), Emotional Stability (neuroticism), Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and
Culture (openness) – first appeared in the early 1960s (Goldberg, 1993; Winter, 1996).
However, sporadic support for the Big Five throughout this decade, coupled with a
demoralization of personality psychology in the 1970s, meant that the FFM did not emerge as
a dominant framework until much later (McCrae & John, 1992). The 1980s saw mounting
evidence for the validity of the FFM, and the subsequent development and broad application
of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) (Costa & McCrae, 1985), and later the NEO-PI
Revised and the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), as major assessment tools for the Big
6 Sharon Grant

Five (Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae, Costa & Busch, 1986; Rust, 1999).
The NEO-PI-R measures 30 facets or sub-traits classified according to the Big Five domains:
(1) Extraversion (activity, assertiveness, excitement seeking, gregariousness, positive
emotions, warmth); (2) Neuroticism (angry hostility, anxiety, depression, impulsiveness, self-
consciousness, vulnerability); (3) Conscientiousness (achievement striving, competence,
deliberation, dutifulness, order, self-discipline); (4) Agreeableness (altruism, compliance,
modesty, straightforwardness, tender-mindedness, trust); and (5) Openness (actions,
aesthetics, fantasy, feelings, ideas, values).
The role of traits - defined and measured according to the FFM - in the personality-illness
relationship is a relatively young research pursuit. Historically, the personality dimension that
has received the most attention in this context is ‗Type A‘ behavior pattern (TABP) (Jex,
1998). TABP first came to prominence in the field of cardiology in the 1950s (see Friedman
& Rosenman, 1959), based on the observation that people with coronary heart disease (CHD)
frequently exhibited ‗hurry sickness‘ e.g., ambitiousness, competitiveness, explosive speech,
impatience, irritability, rapid jerky body movement, tense facial and body musculature, time
urgency (Dembroski & Costa, 1987; Järvikoski & Härkäpää, 1987; Powell, 1987). TABP was
measured on a single dimension from ‗Type A‘ to ‗Type B‘, where Bs exhibited such
behavior to a lesser extent. The general argument was that ambitious, hard-driving, Type As
were more likely to succeed than their Type B counterparts, but simultaneously risked paying
a hefty price in relation to their health (Spence, Helmreich, Pred, 1987).
However, inconsistent evidence for a TABP-CHD relationship led to a re-
conceptualization of TABP as a multi-dimensional construct, as opposed to a global
coronary-prone behavior pattern (Dembroski, 1985; Ganster, Schaubroeck, Sime & Mayes,
1991; Spence et al., 1987). A distinction was drawn between ‗toxic‘ versus ‗protective‘ Type
A behaviors, and attention quickly shifted to hostility as the likely toxic component (Costa,
Stone, McCrae, & Dembroski, 1987; Dembroski, 1985; Dembroski & Costa, 1987;
MacDougall, Dembroski, Dimsdale, & Hackett, 1985).
There is now considerable evidence to support the view that the relationship between
TABP and CHD is dimension-specific (Costa et al., 1987; Dembroski, 1985; Dembroski &
Costa, 1987, 1988; Ganster et al., 1991; MacDougall et al., 1985). Spence et al. (1987)
identified a two-factor model of Type A behavior, ‗achievement striving‘ and ‗impatience-
irritability‘, which subsequently gained popularity in the literature (see e.g., Bluen, Barlin, &
Burns, 1990; Lee, 1992; Lee, Ashford, & Jamieson, 1993; Spector & O‘Connell, 1994;
Spence et al., 1987; Spence, Pred, & Helmreich, 1989; Ward & Eisler, 1987a, 1987b).
Achievement striving is positively related to academic and job performance, problem-focused
coping, and job satisfaction, suggesting a protective function (see Bluen et al., 1990; Lee,
1992; Lee et al., 1993; Spence et al., 1987; Spence et al., 1989). However, this dimension
may be associated with disordered achievement-related self-regulation (Ward & Eisler,
1987a, 1987b). In contrast to achievement striving, impatience-irritability is negatively
related to problem-focused coping and job satisfaction, and positively related to depression
(see Bluen et al., 1990; Lee, 1992; Lee et al., 1993; Spence et al., 1987; Spence et al., 1989).
Within the FFM, achievement striving is captured by the dimension of conscientiousness.
Impatience-irritability on the other hand, is captured by neuroticism and antagonism or low
agreeableness.
This chapter reviews the literature on the Big Five and the personality-illness
relationship, focussing on neuroticism as the personality risk factor for stress and impaired
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 7

health and well-being. Consistent with Suls and Martin (2005), the chapter focuses on
neuroticism scores that fall at the high end of the normal personality continuum.

NEUROTICISM AS A RISK FACTOR FOR STRESS AND IMPAIRED

HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
This section focuses on studies of the relationship between personality and physical and
mental health outcomes. Explanatory mechanisms underlying the personality-illness
relationship are considered later in the chapter.

Neuroticism and Physical Health

While neuroticism is negatively related to physical health, extraversion,

conscientiousness, openness, and agreeableness are generally positively related to physical
health. When discussing the relationship between personality and physical health, it is
important to distinguish between two different types of studies that exist within this literature:
those based on self-reported health outcomes, such as symptom and illness reports or
perceived health status, and those based on objective health outcomes, such as diagnosed
disorders and diseases or mortality (c.f Smith, 2006). The importance of this distinction is
elaborated below.

Self-reported health outcomes

Neuroticism has been consistently linked with self-reported symptoms and illness. For
example, Jerram and Coleman (1999) found that neuroticism was associated with higher self-
reported illness, poorer perceived health, and higher physician utilization among the elderly.
In contrast, agreeableness and openness were associated with good perceived health, and
conscientiousness was associated with higher physician utilization but good perceived health
among men, while agreeableness was associated with lower physician utilization and lower
self-reported illness among women. Goodwin and Engstrom (2002) found that low
neuroticism and high extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness were associated with
good perceived health among both healthy and unhealthy respondents.
While self-report measures are convenient, such measures are more likely to indicate
illness behavior - behavior associated with the perception of illness e.g., absenteeism,
physician utilisation, over or under reporting symptoms, self-medicating - as opposed to
objective health status per se (Smith & McKenzie, 2006; Wiebe & Smith, 1997).
The association between neuroticism and self-reported symptom and illness reporting
may reflect the trait anxiety or negative affectivity (NA) facet of the trait. NA is characterized
by a generalized sense of negative emotionality or subjective distress (Watson & Clark, 1984;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Those who score high on
NA tend to be introspective, and to dwell on the negative side of themselves, others, and the
world in general (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). As a result, they have
a negative self-concept and feel dissatisfied on the whole (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). As
such, NA may increase self-focused attention or somatic concern, leading to a preoccupation
8 Sharon Grant

with sensation and illness and an increased tendency to perceive, report, or act on sensation as
illness (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Watson and Pennebaker (1989) described NA as a general
trait of somatopsychic distress that is associated with a broad range of self-reported
symptoms. They found that NA was unrelated to objective health status. Recent research has
shown that neuroticism is associated with negative aging self-stereotypes, which in turn affect
perceived health status (Moor, Zimprich, Schmitt, & Kliegel, 2006).
The relationship between neuroticism and excessive or unfounded symptom and illness
reporting is consistent with an Illness Behavior Model. According to this model, neuroticism
is related to subjective health status via hyper-vigilance and hypochondriasis. However, other
studies have refuted a general attentional or recall bias hypothesis. For example, Johnson
(2003) found that neuroticism was positively related to tension symptom reporting (e.g., high
blood pressure, neck pain, migraine) but was unrelated to asthma or common cold symptom
reporting. Stone and Costa (1990) suggested that the disposition to report symptoms in the
absence of organic disease may indicate (a) a tendency to worry about health more than usual
due to anxiety, depression, or a general vulnerability factor; (b) hyper-sensitivity to pain; (c) a
history of reinforcement for adopting a sick role; (d) an illness or disease-prone experience of
life and subsequent tendency to perceive, recall and report symptoms in a manner consistent
with this; or (e) symptoms that are due to something other than organic disease. According to
this view then, the tendency to over-report symptoms can be attributed to individual
differences in subjective experience rather than a report bias (Goodwin, Cox, & Clara, 2006).

Objective health outcomes

In light of the ambiguities associated with self-reported health outcomes, researchers are
increasingly turning their attention to prospective studies of objective health outcomes. Such
studies have confirmed that neuroticism does indeed play a genuine role in objective health
status.
Several studies have examined the relationship between personality traits and mortality or
outcomes associated with the prevalence and course of specific physical disorders or diseases.
Wilson et al. (2005) found that high neuroticism (90th percentile) was associated with a 33%
increase in risk of death among those aged 65 or older, compared with low neuroticism (10th
percentile). High extraversion was also associated with higher risk, although the risk (21%)
was substantially lower than for high neuroticism. Adjustment for baseline cognitive, social,
and physical activity attenuated the effect of both traits, suggesting that these variables were
possible mediators. A recent study of risk of mortality from particular causes (Shipley, Weiss,
Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2008) revealed that a one standard deviation increase in neuroticism
was associated with a 12% increased risk of death from cardiovascular disease. This remained
significant after adjustment for age, gender, occupational social class, education, smoking,
alcohol consumption, physical activity, and health. However, neuroticism was not associated
with death from lung cancer and other forms of cancer, respiratory disease, or stroke.
Extraversion was a protective factor for risk of death from respiratory disease in this study.
Goodwin and Friedman (2006) examined the relationship between the Big Five and
common mental and physical disorders among adults in the general population. They found
that neuroticism was associated with increased likelihood of a wide range of mental and
physical disorders, while conscientiousness was associated with reduced likelihood. A study
of the relationship between neuroticism and physical disorders among adults in the general
community (Goodwin et al., 2006), showed that neuroticism was associated with increased
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 9

odds of arthritis (odds ratio [OR] = 1.5), diabetes (OR = 3.33), kidney/liver disease (OR =
2.56), stomach/gallbladder problems (OR = 2.27) and ulcer (OR = 3.23). These associations
persisted after adjusting for differences in demographic characteristics and comorbid mental
health disorders. A twin study (Charles, Gatz, Kato, & Pedersen, 2008), indicated that the
likelihood of having a physical condition at 25-year follow up was related to higher prior
neuroticism, although some associations were attenuated when familial similarity was
controlled.
Other studies have focused on progression or recovery in relation to specific conditions.
A recent study (Ironson, O‘Cleirigh, Weiss, Schneiderman, & Costa, 2008) reported that
facets within the domains of extraversion (assertiveness, positive emotionality,
gregariousness), conscientiousness (achievement striving, order) and openness (ideas,
aesthetics) were associated with slower HIV disease progression. In addition, profile analyses
indicated that the following ‗types‘ were associated with slower disease progression: low
neuroticism plus high extraversion, low neuroticism plus high conscientiousness, high
extraversion plus high conscientiousness, high extraversion plus high agreeableness, and high
extraversion plus high openness. In contrast, low extraversion plus low openness was
associated with faster disease progression. Once again, the results suggest that high
neuroticism is a risk factor, while high scores on the remaining traits confer an adaptive
effect.
Chung, Berger, Jones, and Rudd (2006) investigated the relationship between personality
traits and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and health problems in older
patients following myocardial infarction (MI). They found that neuroticism predicted all post
MI PTSD symptoms as well as general health problems, while low agreeableness
(antagonism) predicted hyper-arousal symptoms only. In addition, extraversion,
conscientiousness, and openness were unrelated to post-MI PTSD or general health problems.
The results remained significant when controlling for angina, angioplasty, bypass surgery,
heart failure, and previous mental health problems. The authors noted the consistency
between their findings and the general PTSD literature, where neuroticism is the primary
personality risk factor for developing PTSD.

Neuroticism and Mental Health

Psychopathology
Neuroticism is associated with a range of mental disorders, most notably anxiety, mood,
substance, and personality disorders (see e.g., Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Costa &
McCrae, 1990; de Graaf, Bijl, Ravelli, Smit, & Vollenbergh, 2002; Frokjaer et al., 2008;
Hirschfeld, Klerman, Lavori, & Keller, 1989; King, Bernardy, & Hauner, 2003; Mangold &
Wand, 2006; Weinstock & Whisman, 2006; Zonderman, Herbst, Schmidt, Costa, & McCrae,
1993). In addition, the trait has been linked with first instance of mental disorders in the
general population, as well as symptom severity, treatment efficacy, and remission and
recovery among psychiatric patients (Goodwin et al., 2006). A full review of the role of
personality in mental health is beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, the discussion
below will focus on personality disorders (PDs) only.
The relationship between broad dimensions of normal personality, as measured by the
Five Factor Model, and PDs has become a major focus for research, with an abundance of
10 Sharon Grant

studies in the past decade (for reviews see Samuel & Widiger, 2008; Saulsman & Page,
2004). Led by Widiger and colleagues, recently there has been considerable discussion of the
implications of this research for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition (DSM-V) (see e.g., Widiger & Samuel, 2005; Widiger, Simonsen, Krueger, Livesley,
& Verheul, 2006; Widiger & Lowe, 2008; Widiger & Trull, 2007). For example, are
personality disorders best diagnosed using categorical or dimensional models of
classification? The basic argument is that PDs can be conceptualized as ‗extreme variants‘ of
normal personality dimensions. Widiger and Lowe (2007) highlighted three advantages of a
Five-Factor Model of PDs: (a) precise yet comprehensive description of both abnormal and
normal personality functioning; (b) avoidance of the limitations/problems inherent in the
categorical diagnostic system (e.g., heterogeneous category membership, boundary with
normality is unstable, diagnostic co-occurrence); and (c) integration of research on general
personality functioning into current description and understanding of PDs.
Saulsman and Page (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of studies examining the
relationship between the Big Five domains and the 10 PD diagnostic categories included in
DSM-IV: Antisocial, Avoidant, Borderline, Dependent, Histrionic, Narcissistic, Obsessive-
Compulsive, Paranoid, Schizoid, and Schizotypal. They examined maladaptive personality
domains both within and across PD categories. Findings revealed that (high) neuroticism and
(low) agreeableness were common across most PDs (except Dependent), while high or low
extraversion and, to a lesser extent high or low conscientiousness, were common to some PDs
but not others. In general, effect sizes for neuroticism and agreeableness were substantial and
directionally-consistent across the PDs. Neuroticism was positively associated with PDs
characterized by emotional distress (Avoidant, Borderline, Dependent, Paranoid, and
Schizotypal) and agreeableness was negatively associated with PDs characterized by
interpersonal problems (Antisocial, Borderline, Narcisstic, Paranoid, and Schizotypal). For
extraversion, PDs characterized by gregariousness showed a positive association (Histrionic
and Narcissitic), while those characterized by shyness and withdrawal showed a negative
association (Avoidant, Schizoid, Schizotypal). For conscientiousness, PDs associated with
orderliness showed a positive association (Obsessive-Compulsive), while those associated
with recklessness showed a negative association (Antisocial and Borderline). The magnitude
of the effect sizes for each PD indicated that, overall, the Five-Factor Model was better at
conceptualizing some PDs (Avoidant and Borderline) than others (Obsessive-Compulsive and
Schizoid). Results were generally consistent across both clinical and non-clinical samples.
The authors concluded that high neuroticism-low agreeableness is likely to be an issue for a
substantial number of PD patients. It may be that low agreeableness exacerbates the effect of
high neuroticism on mental ill health.
A limitation of the Saulsman and Page meta-analysis was that it focused on a domain-
level analysis, rather than a facet-level analysis based on the 30 sub-traits of the FFM. The
authors acknowledged that for some PDs, lower order facets may show a consistent pattern
(all high or all low), whereas for other PDs lower order facets may be inconsistent (some high
and some low). Notably however there were few facet-level studies available for analysis at
the time of this meta-analysis.
Samuel and Widiger (2008) replicated and extended the Saulsman and Page meta-
analysis by conducting both a domain-level analysis and a facet-level analysis, using 18 new,
independent samples. While the Saulsman and Page meta-analysis indicated that five of the
10 PDs were meaningfully related to neuroticism, Samuel and Widiger found that only one of
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 11

these PDs (Borderline) correlated above .20 with the impulsivity facet. Furthermore, the
Antisocial and Dependent PDs correlated with neuroticism for different reasons: Antisocial
PD correlated only with the angry hostility and impulsiveness facets, whereas Dependent PD
correlated with the other four facets. Similarly, the Antisocial, Borderline, Paranoid,
Narcissistic, and Schizotypal PDs all correlated with low agreeableness, but the facet-level
analysis indicated that only one of the PDs (Narcissistic) was associated with the modesty
facet. The authors concluded that PDs may be associated with the same FFM domain but for
largely different reasons. On the basis of their findings, they suggested that the five global
domains may be too broad to have diagnostic utility.
The development of explanatory models of the relationship between personality traits and
psychopathology is in its infancy. The question remains as to how neuroticism, agreeableness
and extraversion are maladaptive among those with PDs. Saulsman and Page (2004) noted
that extreme scores on personality traits are not sufficient for the development of PDs. Clark
(2005) proposed that innate temperament dimensions interact with life stress to differentiate
into risk factors for psychopathology through developmental pathways.

Well-being
A discussion of the relationship between personality and mental health would not be
complete without considering dimensions of psychological functioning in the general
population. Well-being is an important index of psychological functioning and quality of life,
and represents a desired mental state for most people (Schmutte & Ryff, 1997; Siegrist,
2003). Based on the current conceptulization in the literature, well-being can be defined as a
multi-dimensional construct consisting of both hedonic and eudaimonic dimensions (Ryan &
Deci, 2001). Hedonic or ‗subjective well-being‘ includes the dimensions of negative affect,
positive affect, and life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Lucas,
Diener, & Suh, 1996). Domain-specific measures of satisfaction, such as job satisfaction, may
also be used (see Grant & Langan-Fox, 2007). In contrast, eudiamonic or ‗psychological well-
being‘ is based on a broader approach which includes autonomy, environmental mastery,
personal growth, positive relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance (see Deci & Ryan,
2006; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1996).
The relationship between personality and subjective well-being has been widely studied,
with two major meta-analyses in the past 10 years. A meta-analysis (DeNeve & Cooper,
1998) of the relationship between 137 distinct personality constructs and subjective well-
being found that when personality traits were grouped according to the Big Five, neuroticism
was the strongest predictor of negative affect (.23) and life satisfaction (-.24), however
extraversion and agreeableness were the strongest predictors of positive affect (.20 and .17
respectively). More recently, Steel, Schmidt, and Shultz (2008) performed a separate meta-
analysis of the relationship between personality and subjective well-being, based only on the
NEO-PI. They reported substantially larger meta-analytic correlations than those reported by
DeNeve and Cooper, suggesting that combining disparate measures of the Big Five within the
same analysis may attenuate the relationship between the traits and subjective well-being.
Consistent with DeNeve and Cooper, neuroticism was the strongest correlate of negative
affect (.54) and life satisfaction (-.38), and extraversion was the strongest correlate of positive
affect (.44).
VittersØ (2001) argued that it is important to identify the unique contribution of
neuroticism and extraversion to subjective well-being, given that the two traits are typically
12 Sharon Grant

correlated, particularly within the FFM. VittersØ found that when neuroticism was controlled
in multiple regression analysis, the effect of extraversion on subjective well-being was
substantially diminished or disappeared altogether. In a similar study, Hills and Argyle (2001)
investigated the relationship of emotional stability (the positive analogue to neuroticism) and
extraversion to happiness. They found that happiness was more strongly related to emotional
stability than to extraversion, with emotional stability accounting for a greater proportion of
the total variability explained in multiple regression analysis.
Consistent with the subjective well-being literature, neuroticism and extraversion have
also emerged as major correlates of psychological well-being. However, the other three traits,
and in particular conscientiousness, are also important in this context. A study (Siegler &
Brumment, 2000) of facet-psychological well-being correlations indicated that over 80% of
the correlations within the domains of neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness were
significant, compared with less than half of the correlations within the domains of
agreeableness and openness.
Adjusting for various spurious effects (i.e., common affective underpinnings, shared item
content and source overlap), Schmutte and Ryff (1997) found that neuroticism was negatively
related to autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and self-acceptance; extraversion
was positively related to all dimensions of psychological well-being except autonomy;
conscientiousness was positively related to environmental mastery, purpose in life, and self-
acceptance; and agreeableness and openness were positively related to positive relations and
personal growth respectively.
A factor analysis of the Big Five and well-being dimensions (van Dierendonck, 2005)
revealed four factors: a well-being factor on which all subjective and psychological well-
being scales loaded with neuroticism; a self-actualization factor consisting of personal
growth, purpose in life and conscientiousness; an interpersonal relations factor consisting of
positive relations and extraversion and agreeableness, and a fourth factor consisting of
autonomy and openness.
A study (Bardi & Ryff, 2007) of the combined/interactive effect of neuroticism and other
traits in the prediction of psychological well-being following relocation, found that
participants who scored low on neuroticism and high on openness reported higher
environmental mastery and self-acceptance one month after relocation, and higher personal
growth late in the post-relocation adjustment process. In addition, neuroticism had a
significant main effect on all six aspects of psychological well-being, predicting lower post-
move well-being scores.
Together, these studies suggest that neuroticism is consistently related to all dimensions,
except personal growth; extraversion is consistently related to environmental mastery,
positive relations, purpose in life, and self-acceptance; conscientiousness is consistently
related to environmental mastery, purpose in life and self-acceptance; and agreeableness is
consistently related to positive relations.
Other studies have examined the relationship between the Big Five and subjective and
psychological well-being simultaneously. Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) found that
people who scored low on both subjective and psychological well-being had the highest
average for neuroticism and the lowest average for extraversion and conscientiousness. In
contrast, those who scored high on both subjective and psychological well-being
demonstrated the opposite trait profile. Openness distinguished between types with high
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 13

psychological well-being but low subjective well-being, and types with low psychological
well-being but high subjective well-being.
Grant, Langan-Fox and Anglim (2009) examined the relationship between personality
and well-being using a structured model comparison approach. Nested models were compared
with the aim of answering the following research questions: (1) Does the size of the
relationship between personality and well-being differ for subjective versus psychological
well-being? (2) Does the size of the relationship between personality and well-being differ for
particular personality traits? (3) Does the relationship between particular personality traits and
well-being differ for subjective versus psychological well-being? (4) Given a particular
personality trait (e.g., neuroticism), is the relationship between that trait larger for some well-
being dimensions (e.g., negative affect) than for others? That is, is the relationship larger than
the average personality-well-being relationship for that trait? They found that, overall, the
relationship between personality and well-being was larger for psychological well-being than
for subjective well-being. However, neuroticism showed a similar relationship to subjective
and psychological well-being, and extraversion and conscientiousness showed a slightly
stronger relationship with psychological well-being. Agreeableness showed a stronger
relationship with subjective well-being than with psychological well-being, while openness
showed a stronger relationship with psychological well-being. An examination of the overall
relationship between the personality traits and well-being revealed that neuroticism showed
the largest relationship with well-being, followed by extraversion, conscientiousness,
openness and agreeableness in that order. Furthermore, neuroticism was the strongest
correlate of both subjective and psychological well-being. Positive affect and negative affect
showed larger than average correlations with extraversion and neuroticism respectively;
personal growth showed a larger than average correlation with openness; positive relations
showed larger than average correlations with extraversion and agreeableness; and purpose in
life showed larger than average correlations with conscientiousness. Environmental mastery
and self-acceptance were not examined in this study.

EXPLANATORY MECHANISMS: MEDIATING PROCESSES IN THE

PERSONALITY-ILLNESS RELATIONSHIP
Research on stress has made an important contribution to our current understanding of
the role of personality in health and well-being,

―The association of increased stress with various illnesses is the single most important
finding in convincing adherents to the medico-mechanical model of disease that psychosocial
factors may play a role in the etiology of illness‖ (McClelland, 1985, p. 455).

The remainder of this chapter focuses on an overarching process model, describing the
effect of neuroticism on various intermediate mechanisms that tie situational stressors to
health and well-being. This model can be summarized as follows:
14 Sharon Grant

NEUROTICISM

Stressor exposure Cognitive appraisal (Stress ) Coping Reactivity Health / Well-being

Health behavior

The various subsections below outline how neuroticism is implicated in each of these
phases of the stressor-illness process. Note that research on stressor exposure and reactivity is
reviewed in the same section, given that studies have typically examined these two variables
concurrently.

Neuroticism and Stressor Exposure and Reactivity

Several studies indicate that neurotics report greater exposure to stressful life events and
daily hassles (David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 1997; Fergusson and Horwood, 1987; Gunthert,
Cohen, & Armelli, 1999; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Payot, 1993; Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991;
Poulton and Andrews, 1992; Zautra, Afflect, Tennen, Reich, & Davis, 2005) and are more
likely to react to these stressors with emotional distress (Brow, 2008; Bolger & Shilling,
1991; Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Malyszczak et al., 2007; Marco & Suls, 1993; Suls,
Martin, & David, 1998; Zautra et al., 2005). For example, longitudinal research has shown
that neuroticism is associated with greater exposure to stressful life events during adulthood
(Fergusson & Horwood, 1987; Magnus et al., 1993), and a daily diary study (Bolger &
Schilling, 1991) found that neuroticism was associated with greater exposure to stressors,
greater emotional reactivity to these stressors, and greater distress in general. Malyszczak et
al. (2007) reported that patients with higher neuroticism scores were more likely to develop
psychological distress under stress caused by somatic illness. A recent study (Brow, 2008) of
stress in the wake of 9/11 revealed that neuroticism was associated with greater emotional
distress.
Neuroticism is also associated with stressor exposure within particular life domains, such
as the work and interpersonal domains. For example, neuroticism has been linked with higher
occupational stress among managers (Ahmad, James, & Ahmad, 1991) and medical
consultants (Deary et al., 1996), and higher acculturative stress among international students
(Duru & Poyrazli, 2007; Mangold, Veraza, Kinker, & Kinney, 2007). One study (Andreassi,
2007) found that neuroticism predicted higher scores on four measures of work-family
conflict (work-to-family, family-to-work, strain-based, and time-based), while extraversion
was unrelated to the four outcome measures. Neuroticism has also been linked with higher
exposure to interpersonal conflict (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995) and other negative
relationship outcomes (Karney & Bradbury, 1995; Hellmuth, & McNulty, 2008). Zautra et al.
(2005) found that neuroticism was associated with negative events, relationship stress, and
negative affect but was unrelated to positive events or relationship enjoyment. In contrast,
extraversion was associated with positive events, relationship enjoyment, and positive affect,
but was unrelated to negative events, relationship stress, and negative affect. In addition,
neuroticism exacerbated the effect of a day‘s negative events on negative affectivity.
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 15

A study of the relationship between the Big Five and emotional reactivity to daily hassles
(Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998) found that those who scored high on neuroticism reported
greater exposure and emotional reactivity to daily hassles, and greater distress in relation to
recurrent hassles than those who scored lower on neuroticism. In addition, high neuroticism
and low agreeableness were associated with a lagged-effect of prior (negative) mood on
distress. In contrast, extraversion, conscientiousness and openness were unrelated to
emotional reactivity or distress.
Studies of personality and physiological reactivity to stress typically focus on
cardiovascular reactivity or immune system functioning (Friedman, 2000). Chida and Hamer
(2008) found that neuroticism was associated with decreased cardiovascular reactivity but
poor cardiovascular recovery in response to stress. Findings were explained in terms of a
heightened orienting response, whereby neurotics are highly attentive to external stimuli and
therefore exhibit a reduction in stressor reactivity but persistence of physiological arousal
after the stressor has been removed. Other studies have shown that neuroticism is associated
with blunted cortisol reactivity in response to acute stress and poor antibody response
(Phillips, Carroll, Burns, & Drayson, 2005).
In recent years, several studies have utilized Vollrath and Torgersen‘s (2000) 8
personality types to examine the combined effect of neuroticism, extraversion and
conscientiousness on stressor exposure (Grant & Langan-Fox, 2006; Lau, Hem, Berg,
Ekeberg, & Torgersen, 2006; Tyssen et al., 2007). The 8 types represent unique
configurations of high and low neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness. Although
the dichotomization of continuous personality variables into ‗high‘ and ‗low‘ categories can
compromise predictive power due to loss of information (Rovik et al., 2007), the general
thesis is that examining the interplay of traits (typological approach) provides a more
comprehensive and detailed picture of personality than single trait models (dimensional
approach), thus enabling the more reliable identification of those at risk (Tyssen et al., 2007).
Two studies have shown that types characterized by high neuroticism and low
conscientiousness report higher stressor exposure (Vollrath and Torgersen, 2000; Grant &
Langan-Fox, 2006). A study of stress during medical school training (Tyssen et al., 2007)
found that types combining high neuroticism with low extraversion and high
conscientiousness were at risk for experiencing more stress, whereas types combining low
neuroticism with high extraversion and low conscientiousness were protected against stress.
Similarly, Lau et al. (2006) reported that the combination of low neuroticism and high
extraversion was associated with lower stress among police officers, while the combination of
high neuroticism and low extraversion was associated with higher stress in this context.

Explaining the neuroticism-stressor exposure and reactivity link

Bolger and Zuckerman (1995) proposed that personality traits may influence (i) stressor
exposure only (Differential Exposure Model), (ii) reactivity only (Differential Reactivity
Model), or (iii) both exposure and reactivity (Differential Exposure-Reactivity Model).
According to the Differential Exposure Model, personality influences stressor exposure but
once these stressful events occur, everyone reacts in the same way. This model is consistent
with a mediated effect model in which personality predicts higher stressor exposure which in
turn predicts higher strain or illness. In contrast, the Differential Reactivity Model is based on
a moderated effect model in which personality predicts reactivity to stressors and therefore
moderates the effect of stressor exposure on strain. The research on neuroticism cited above is
16 Sharon Grant

consistent with a Differential Exposure-Reactivity Model (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), with
the trait affecting both the stressor exposure and reactivity phases of the stress-strain process,
thereby increasing susceptibility to stress-related illness and disease through both mediated
and moderated pathways. It may be that neurotics elicit more frequent, severe, or prolonged
stressful events through their own cognitive styles and behavior (c.f. Lemos-Giráldez &
Fidalgo-Aliste, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). For example,
dysfunctional thinking patterns associated with neuroticism may impair decision making,
leading to conflict or other problems that increase stressor exposure (Suls & Martin, 2005). It
is also possible that neurotics are more likely to self-select (or be selected) into high pressure
jobs or dysfunctional interpersonal settings.
An alternative explanation is that neuroticism predicts perceived stress (stress perception
hypothesis) rather than external stressor exposure per se (differential exposure hypothesis;
Conard & Matthews, 2008). Since stressor exposure is typically assessed via self-report
measures, it may be that neurotics do not experience more negative events at all but simply
have a lower threshold for appraising events as negative (Suls & Martin, 2005). For example,
chronic negative emotionally may mean that neurotics are more likely to notice and recall
negative information. Suls and Martin (2005) recommended the use of informants as a
potential strategy for tackling this methodological problem.
The effect of neuroticism on reactivity could arise from its influence on (i) coping
strategy choice (Differential Coping Choice Model), (ii) coping strategy effectiveness
(Differential Coping Effectiveness Model), or (iii) both coping strategy choice and
effectiveness (Differential Choice-Effectiveness Model) (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). In the
Differential Coping Choice Model, the effect of personality on reactivity is mediated by
coping choice: Personality predicts differential choice of coping strategies and these strategies
in turn lead to different health outcomes. In other words, once particular coping strategies are
chosen, these are equally as effective (or ineffective) for everyone. Thus, neurotics may
simply choose maladaptive coping strategies in response to stressful events, which in turn
lead to poor health outcomes. In the Differential Coping Effectiveness Model, personality
moderates the effect of coping on reactivity. According to this model then, neurotics may
experience more reactivity following a stressful event not because they routinely choose
maladaptive strategies but because they choose strategies that are ineffective for them alone.
Alternatively, it may be that neurotics try potentially effective coping strategies but fail to
persist with these due to low self-efficacy or chronic negative affect (Suls & Martin, 2005;
Tyssen et al., 2007). The relationship between neuroticism and coping is discussed in more
detail later in the chapter.
Another possibility is that the effect of neuroticism on reactivity reflects the presence of
an underlying third variable, such as an in-born defect or deficit that is responsible for both
the overt expression of neurotic traits, and the tendency to react more to stress (Friedman &
Booth-Kewley, 1987; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990; Wiebe & Smith, 1997). According to this
Constitutional Predisposition Model, neuroticism is a marker rather than a maker of
vulnerability (Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Recent work has supported the link between
neuroticism and autonomic nervous system deregulation, and genetics appear to be least
partially responsible for this effect (see Riese et al., 2007). A final possibility is that hyper-
reactivity increases neuroticism. However, neuroticism is likely to have causal precedence
(Suls & Martin, 2005). For example, Suls and Martin suggested that the vulnerability of
neurotics is likely to be rooted in biological or learned sensitivity to negative stimuli, for
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 17

instance heredity or early socialization. They noted that the vulnerability of neurotics seems
to extend to all types of stressors while other dimensions of personality, such as low
agreeableness, are associated with hyper-reactivity to particular kinds of problems only.

Neuroticism and Cognitive Appraisal

In addition to showing greater stressor exposure and reactivity, neurotics are also more
likely to appraise events as stressful and difficult to manage. A study of primary appraisal
among students (Gallagher, 1990) found that neuroticism was positively related to threat
appraisal and negatively related to challenge appraisal. In contrast, extraversion showed a
positive but weaker relationship with challenge appraisal. Hemenover and Dienstbier (1996)
found that students who scored high on neuroticism and low on extraversion rated an exam
stressor as more threatening (primary appraisal) and more difficult to cope with (secondary
appraisal). Similarly, neuroticism was positively related to appraised threat and stressfulness
among prospective students preparing to take a law school entry exam (Maxim, 2000). In the
occupational context, Deary et al. (1996) found that (negative) cognitive appraisal and
emotion-focused coping mediated the effect of neuroticism on self-reported stress.
Other studies have examined the effect of all Big Five traits on cognitive appraisal
simultaneously. A study of caregivers (Watson & Hubbard, 1996) found that neuroticism had
a negative effect on secondary appraisal while the remaining traits generally had the opposite
effect. Neuroticism was inversely related to perceived control and problem-solving
confidence, as well as an overall factor of perceived problem-solving ability. In contrast,
conscientiousness was positively related to perceived control, problem-solving confidence,
and problem-solving ability. Extraversion and openness showed a positive relationship with
perceived problem-solving confidence and problem-solving ability, and agreeableness was
positively related to perceived problem-solving ability only. Penley and Tomaka (2002)
examined the relationship between the Big Five and cognitive appraisal in relation to an acute
stressor: preparing and presenting a speech on a controversial topic. Neuroticism was
associated with negative secondary appraisal, whereas conscientiousness and openness were
associated with positive primary appraisal, and extraversion, conscientiousness and openness
were associated with positive secondary appraisal. In addition, neuroticism was positively
correlated with perceived (post task) stress, while extraversion, conscientiousness, and
openness were negatively correlated with this outcome variable.

Explaining the neuroticism-cognitive appraisal link

According to reward sensitivity theory, neuroticism and extraversion capture individual
differences in the functioning of two different brain systems: the Behavioral Inhibition
System (BIS) and the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) respectively (Smillie, Pickering, &
Jackson, 2006). The BIS causes the person to move away from goals in anticipation of an
emotional punishment and the BAS causes the person move toward goals in anticipation of an
emotional reward (McAdams, 2009). This theory suggests that the relationship between
neuroticism and primary appraisal could reflect a selective attention bias or underlying
appraisal tendency. That is, those who score high on neuroticism may be ‗punishment
sensitive‘, selectively attending to potential negative outcomes i.e., threat/damage or loss
(Gallagher, 1990; Hemenover and Dienstbier, 1996). In contrast, those who score high on
18 Sharon Grant

extraversion may be ‗reward sensitive‘, selectively attending to potential positive outcomes

i.e., challenge. Indeed, Hemenover (2001) found that the neuroticism-cognitive appraisal
relationship was mediated by a self-reported tendency to rely on negative information and
that the extraversion-cognitive appraisal relationship was mediated by a self-reported
tendency to rely on positive information. Kuppens and Van Mechelen (2007) suggested that
neurotics are more sensitive to potential personal threats present in unpleasant evaluative
events. They found that neuroticism was associated with higher appraised threats to self-
esteem.
With regard to neuroticism and secondary appraisal, the negative effect of neuroticism on
perceived coping ability may indicate a depletion of coping resources, due to the ongoing
management of chronic negative emotionality. Alternatively, it may be that neurotics have
fewer coping strategies available to them to begin with (Revenson, 1990). The original
formulation of the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping conceptualized coping as a
discrete, situation-specific response, however it is now reocgnized that coping is more likely
to be ‗dispositional‘ or trait-like in nature (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Cox &
Ferguson, 1991; Dewe et al., 1993; Newton & Keenan, 1990). Indeed, Carver and Scheier
(1994) found that dispositional coping was a significant predictor of situational coping.
Dispositional coping is defined as ―a characteristic or typical manner of approaching or
confronting a stressful situation and dealing with it‖ (Endler, 1997, p. 143). As discussed in
the next section, neuroticism is typically associated with maladaptive and ineffective coping
(e.g., Deary et al., 1996; Fickcova, 2001; McCrae & Costa, 1986; Shewchuck, Elliott,
MacNair-Semands, & Harkins, 1999). As such, neurotics may feel less efficacious in the face
of stressful events, based on past coping experience.
The relationship between neuroticism and cognitive appraisal is consistent with a Stress
Moderation Model of the personality-illness relationship (Wiebe & Smith, 1997). Within this
model, personality is theorized to (i) attenuate, exacerbate, or prevent the appraisal of a
situation as stressful, and/or (ii) guide the selection of more or less adaptive coping strategies
in response to stressful events, thus influencing physiological reactivity and subsequent health
outcomes (Wiebe & Smith, 1997, Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Statistically, this model can be
represented as a mediated, moderated effect model, in that personality moderates the effect of
stressor exposure on strain, an effect mediated by cognitive appraisal.

Neuroticism and Coping

While there are several typologies of coping strategies, a certain level of convergence has
emerged around the broad theoretical distinction between problem-focused and emotion-
focused coping strategies (Dewe et al., 1993; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Ingledew, Hardy,
Cooper, & Jemal, 1996). The former aim to alter or manage stressful events; the latter aim to
regulate the emotional distress associated with such events. Emotion-focused coping is often
subdivided into (a) reappraisal strategies, which aim to manage interpretation of the stressful
event e.g., ‗making the best of a bad situation‘, and (b) avoidance strategies, which aim to
minimize tension by evading the stressful event (Bowman & Stern, 1995; Cook & Hepner,
1997; Cox & Ferguson, 1991). Avoidance coping strategies include person-oriented
strategies, such as social diversion, and task-oriented strategies, such as distraction (Endler &
Parker, 1994). Problem-focused coping may be more adaptive when the stressor is changeable
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 19

or controllable, while emotion-focused coping may be more adaptive when the stressor must
be accepted and endured (Forsythe & Compas, 1987; Lazarus, 1990). Avoidance forms of
emotion-focused coping are generally considered to be maladaptive. While avoidance coping
may be effective in the short-term, it is likely to lead to poor adjustment in the long-term
(Hobfoll, 1988). For example, avoidance coping may be difficult to maintain when stressor
exposure is chronic or ongoing, such as in the occupational context (Bowman & Stern, 1995).
Indeed, studies have shown that avoidance coping exacerbates the effect of job-related stress
on strain (Long, 1993; Parasuraman & Cleek, 1984).
If coping is governed by dispositional styles rather than situation-specific strategies, then
it seems reasonable to assume that stable personality traits account for some of the stability in
coping (Bouchard, 2003). Indeed, past research has consistently shown that neuroticism is
positively related to emotion-focused and avoidance coping and negatively related to
problem-focused coping (see e.g., Bouchard, 2003; Deary et al., 1996; Hooker, Frazier, &
Monhan, 1994; Matthews et al., 1996; O‘Brien & De Longis, 1996; Vollrath, Torgersen, &
Alnæs, 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). For example, an early study (McCrae & Costa,
1986) found that neuroticism was positively related to escapist fantasy, hostility,
indecisiveness, passivity, sedation, self-blame, wishful thinking, and withdrawal, all of which
were perceived as ineffective in relation to problem-solving and distress reduction. In
addition, these strategies were negatively related to well-being. Subsequent studies have
reported similar findings: O‘Brien and DeLongis (1996) found that neurotics reported more
escape-avoidance and confrontive coping and less planful problem solving; Fickova (2001)
reported an association between neuroticism and maladaptive and ineffective coping among
adolescents; and Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that neuroticism was positively related to
emotional regulation and defensive coping among students. More recently, Brow (2008)
reported that neuroticism was positively related to use of maladaptive coping strategies, such
as denial and self-blame, and inversely related to effective coping strategies, such as
acceptance and active coping, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
Studies using the COPE Inventory (Carver et al., 1989), a widely used measure of coping,
have shown that neuroticism is positively correlated with behavioral disengagement, denial,
mental disengagement, substance use, and venting, and negatively correlated with active
coping, planning, positive reinterpretation, and suppression of competing activities in both
clinical and non-clinical samples (Vollrath et al., 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996). A recent
study of parents rearing children with disabilities (Glidden, Billings, & Jobe, 2006) found that
neuroticism was associated with accepting responsibility (self-blame) and escape-avoidance.
Escape-avoidance in turn predicted higher depression and lower current and child-related
subjective well-being.
Conscientiousness has also emerged as a powerful predictor of coping. In fact,
conscientiousness was the strongest Big Five predictor of coping in the Fickova (2001) study.
In contrast to neuroticism however, this trait is positively related to problem-focused coping
and negatively related to avoidance coping (e.g., Deary et al., 1996; Hooker et al., 1994;
Matthews et al., 2006; O‘Brien & De Longis, 1996; Penley & Tomaka, 2002; Watson &
Hubbard, 1996). For example, Watson and Hubbard (1996) found that conscientiousness was
positively related to active coping, planning, and suppression of competing activities, and
negatively related to behavioral disengagement, escape-avoidance, mental disengagement,
and substance use. The positive relationship between conscientiousness and problem-focused
coping has been replicated in the occupational context (see e.g., Deary et al., 1996) and is
20 Sharon Grant

consistent with the goal-directed and self-disciplined nature of those who score high on this
trait (Penley & Tomaka, 2002).
Extraversion is positively related to emotional and instrumental social support seeking
(e.g., Amirkan, Risinger, & Swickert, 1995; Fickova, 2001; Hooker et al., 1994; Vollrath et
al., 1995; Watson & Hubbard, 1996), however its overall relationship with coping is
somewhat inconsistent. For example, when controlling for other traits, O‘Brien and De
Longis (1996) found that extraversion failed to demonstrate an independent effect on coping,
and Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that extraversion was unrelated to coping. In contrast,
McCrae and Costa (1986) found that extraversion was positively related to positive thinking,
rational action, restraint, and substitution, all of which were perceived as effective in relation
to problem-solving and distress reduction.
The relationship between agreeableness and coping is modest. This trait is positively and
consistently related to social support seeking, and positively (though less consistently) related
to problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (e.g., Hooker et al., 1994; O‘Brien &
DeLongis, 1996; Penley & Tomaka, 2002). Watson and Hubbard (1996) found that
agreeableness was positively related to planning, positive reinterpretation, and negatively
related to substance use. In contrast, Fickova (2001) reported a weak relationship between
agreeableness and coping. Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that agreeableness was positively
related to passive endurance, which they interpreted as consistent with the compliant nature of
those who score high on this trait.
Openness is related to a range of coping strategies, though notably some research has
reported a weak association. In an early study, McCrae and Costa (1986) found that openness
was negatively related to turning to religion, a finding that was later replicated by Watson and
Hubbard (1996). In addition, openness was positively related to humour in the McCrae and
Costa (1986) study, and positively related to planning and positive reinterpretation, and
negatively related to escape-avoidance in the Watson and Hubbard (1996) study. Consistent
with Watson and Hubbard (1996), O‘Brien and DeLongis (1996) found that openness was
positively related to positive reappraisal, while Penley and Tomaka (2002) found that
openness was positively correlated with active coping and negatively correlated with passive
endurance. A study of coping with marital problems (Bouchard, 2003) found that openness
was positively related to planful problem solving.
A recent meta-analysis of the personality and coping literature (Connor-Smith &
Flachsbart, 2007) indicated that all Big Five traits predicted specific strategies. Neuroticism
predicted less problem-solving and cognitive restructuring, whereas extraversion and
conscientiousness showed the opposite pattern. In addition, neuroticism predicted
dysfunctional coping strategies such as wishful thinking, withdrawal, and maladaptive forms
of emotion-focused coping but, along with extraversion, it also predicted support seeking. In
addition, personality was a stronger predictor of coping in younger samples, stressed samples,
and samples that reported dispositional rather than situational coping.
Given that neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness tend to show the strongest
association with coping, some studies have examined the combined effect of these three traits.
Such studies suggest that personality types that combine high neuroticism with low
conscientiousness report less problem-focused coping and more avoidance coping than other
types (Grant & Langan-Fox, 2006; Vollrath & Torgersen, 2000).
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 21

Explaining the neuroticism-coping link

The relationship between neuroticism and coping is consistent with the Differential
Coping Choice and Stress Moderation models described earlier. That is, neurotics appear to
choose passive and maladaptive coping strategies, such as venting and avoidance coping, in
response to stress. Thus, neuroticism moderates the effect of stressor exposure on strain, an
effect mediated by coping.
The choice of emotion-focused coping strategies among neurotics may be driven by
chronic emotionality, with neurotics preferring to use strategies that regulate emotional
distress (Terry, 1994 cited in Bouchard, 2003). Connor-Smith and Flachsbart (2007)
suggested that personality may influence coping strategy choice via stressor exposure. For
example, given that neurotics report higher stressor exposure, they may choose avoidance
coping strategies to escape from an abundance of stressors, whereas those who experience
lower stressor exposure may be better placed to use other strategies. The strong and consistent
relationship between neuroticism and avoidance coping could also be driven by the anxiety
facet of the trait (Tyssen et al., 2007).

Neuroticism and Health Behavior

Health behavior refers to any behavior that has a consequence for health, though not
necessarily as a goal e.g., adherence to prescribed medical treatment, diet/eating, drinking,
exercise, general self-care, preventative health care e.g., medical screening, relaxation, sexual
promiscuity, sleeping, substance use, thrill seeking etc. (Friedman, 2000; Ingledew et al.,
1996). There is some evidence that personality precipitates dangerous or risky health behavior
(Lemos-Giráldez & Fidalgo-Aliste, 1997; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990), with neuroticism once
again exerting a negative or maladaptive effect. Vingerhoets, Croon, Jeninga, and Menges
(1990) found that adults who scored higher on neuroticism demonstrated poorer everyday
health behavior (i.e., sleeping, breakfast, snacking, good weight, smoking, alcohol, physical
activity) than those who scored lower on neuroticism. Similarly, Booth-Kewley and Vickers
(1994) found that neuroticism was negatively related to wellness behavior (e.g., exercise,
healthy diet, vitamin intake) and accident control, and positively related to risk taking.
Conversely, conscientiousness and agreeableness were positively related to wellness behavior
and accident control, and negatively related to risk taking. Openness was also associated with
greater substance-related risk taking, and was the only significant predictor of this aspect of
health behavior, suggesting that it also has a maladaptive effect in this context. Peltzer (2004)
found that neuroticism and psychoticism were inversely related to preventative health
behavior, while optimism was positively related to health behavior.
There is some evidence to suggest that the link between personality and health behavior
is established early, with some gender-specific differences. A study of the relationship
between personality and risky behavior in children (Markey, Markey, Ericksen, & Tinsley,
2006) indicated that risky behavior among girls was related to behavior patterns associated
with neuroticism, introversion and disagreeableness, while risky behavior among boys was
related to behavior patterns associated with extraversion and disagreeableness. A longitudinal
study of adulthood predictors of health-promoting behavior in aging (Holahan & Suzuki,
2004) found that neuroticism was negatively related to positive psychosocial behavior, while
easygoingness was positively related to positive psychosocial behavior and health practices.
22 Sharon Grant

There is also some evidence to suggest that health behaviors mediate between neuroticism
and depressive symptoms (see Gallant & Connell, 2003).
While the bulk of evidence suggests that neuroticism is associated with risky health
behavior, one study (Vollrath, Knoch, & Cassano, 1999) has reported conflicting findings.
Vollrath et al. (1999) investigated the relationship between personality and (a) perceived
susceptibility to health risks and (b) risky health behavior (being drunk, drunk driving, risky
sexual behavior, smoking) among university students. Neuroticism was positively correlated
with perceived susceptibility to three of the four health risks; however path models indicated
that this higher perceived susceptibility could not be explained by a higher frequency of risky
health behavior. In fact, those who scored high on neuroticism engaged in less risky health
behavior. In other words, they tended to worry about health risks despite being no better or
worse in terms of their actual health behavior. Agreeableness was the most consistent
predictor of perceived susceptibility to health risks and risky health behavior, such that those
who scored high on this trait were more optimistic about future health risks and engaged in
less risky health behavior. Findings for conscientiousness were similar to those for
agreeableness. Openness was unrelated to perceived susceptibility to health risks and actual
risky health behavior.
Friedman‘s (2000) commentary on the mechanisms underlying the relationship between
neuroticism and health behavior helps to reconcile these inconsistent findings. Friedman
suggested that neuroticism can lead people down two alternate pathways: On the one hand,
pessimism, resentment, and anxiety may lead neurotics to give up on medical regimens, turn
to substance abuse, and avoid interpersonal assistance. On the other hand, vigilance about
symptoms, advancement in medical practices, and adherence to treatment may lead neurotics
to avoid risky health behavior. These differential outcomes are likely to be influenced by
stress: Based on an analysis of data from the Terman Life Cycle Study, Friedman found that
neurotics who faced parental divorce as children were at increased risk for premature
mortality.
With regard to the combined effect of neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness on
health behavior, types combining high neuroticism with high extraversion or low
conscientiousness engage in more alcohol and drug abuse, drunk-driving, smoking, and risky
sexual behavior (Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002, 2008). High extraversion-low conscientious-
sness types also demonstrate more risky behavior.
Other typological studies have focused on the combination of high neuroticism with low
extraversion, or the so-called ‗Type D‘ personality. Denollet (1997) identified Type Ds as a
coronary heart disease (CHD) subgroup characterized by problems with negative emotionality
and self-expression and depressive symptoms. Williams, O‘Brien, and Colder (2004) found
that the combination of high neuroticism and low extraversion predicted poorer health
behavior self-efficacy. Controlling for the main effect of neuroticism, Type Ds reported
significantly less health behavior and less social support than non-Type Ds. Williams et al.
concluded that health behavior may play a role in explaining the link between Type D and
poor clinical prognosis among cardiac patients.

Explaining the neuroticism-health behavior link

The relationship between personality and health behavior may reflect individual
differences in how people respond to social regulation (Tucker, Elliot, & Klein, 2006). For
example, neurotics may react more negatively to overt attempts by others to influence their
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 23

health behavior (Tucker et al., 2006). In contrast, conscientiousness people may willingly
practice positive health behavior, due to a sense of obligation and responsibility to others.
Indeed, people who score high on conscientiousness tend to internalize societal norms
regarding sensible health-related behavior and to adhere to prescribed treatment
recommendations (Goodman & Friedman, 2006).
An alternative explanation is that neurotics engage in risky health behavior as a means of
dealing with stress. Coping strategies may include positive health behavior, such as exercise,
or negative health behavior, such substance use (Gallant & Connell, 2003), which is typically
conceptualized as a form of avoidance coping (Ingledew et al., 1996). In the Health Behavior
Model, a specialized version of the Stress Moderation Model discussed above, personality is
thought to guide the selection of more or less adaptive health-related coping strategies in
response to stress, thus influencing physiological arousal and subsequent health outcomes
(Wiebe & Smith, 1997). In addition, some health behavior may be directly beneficial or
detrimental to health, over and above any stress moderating effect (Ingledew et al., 1996). For
example, regular planned exercise to reduce tension may have a direct, positive effect on
health (Ingledew et al., 1996). Conversely, while alcohol and drug use may temporarily numb
psychological distress, excessive and routine use, such as in conjunction with chronic stress,
may have a direct, negative effect on health (Begley, 1998; Lepore, 1995). In support of the
Health Behavior Model, Korotkov (2008) found that emotional stability, introversion,
conscientiousness and openness were associated with higher engagement in health practices
under high stress/distress.

CONCLUSION
In summary, neuroticism is associated with a range of physical conditions as well as
psychopathology and impaired well-being. In addition, neuroticism has been linked with
heightened stressor exposure, negative cognitive appraisal, maladaptive coping, risky health
behavior, and exaggerated emotional reactivity. These findings suggest that neuroticism may
influence health and well-being indirectly, via stressor exposure or risky health behavior, or
in interaction with stressful events by moderating their effect on health and well-being, via
cognitive appraisal, coping, or reactivity (Bolger & Shilling, 1991; Bolger & Zuckerman,
1995; McCrae & Costa, 1991; McAdams, 2009; Magnus et al., 1993). In contrast, the
remaining traits, in general, appear to confer an adaptive advantage in relation to stress, health
and well-being. For example, extraversion and conscientiousness are associated with positive
primary and secondary appraisal and/or adaptive forms of problem-focused coping. In
addition, research suggests that the combination of high neuroticism with low extraversion
and/or low conscientiousness is associated with stress vulnerability, while the combination of
low neuroticism with high extraversion and/or high conscientiousness is associated with
stress resistance.
The aim of personality-illness research is to (a) identify the traits (or personality types)
that confer risk, (b) to elucidate the mechanisms underlying vulnerability, and (c) to develop
intervention strategies for preventing or managing illness and disease (Smith & MacKenzie,
2006). Research on personality and illness is particularly relevant to prevention and the early
24 Sharon Grant

diagnosis of those at risk, given that traits can serve as a visible marker of underlying or
emerging pathology (Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990).
Suls and Martin (2005) described the relationship between neuroticism and stressor
exposure, reactivity, cognitive appraisal, and coping as a ‗neurotic cascade‘ of reinforcing
factors: people who score high on neuroticism report more major life events and daily hassles,
show exaggerated affective reactivity to these stressors, appraise or perceive potential
stressors as more threatening, and choose maladaptive coping strategies or use coping
strategies ineffectively, making recovery from a negative mood more difficult. Maladaptive
coping efforts reinforce the neurotic‘s negative self-concept and sense of helplessness and
pessimism, making it more difficult to deal with recurring problems. Interventions to appease
the detrimental impact of neuroticism should focus on these multiple processes, in particular:
helping neurotics to alter dysfunctional thinking patterns and situational choices that increase
stressor exposure; recognize potential positive outcomes when interpreting events rather than
focusing on negative information; increase their problem-solving self-efficacy; expand their
coping skills, including choosing and persisting in the use of adaptive coping strategies; and
develop long-term strategies for managing anxiety and negative emotionality. With regard to
PDs, generic behavioral interventions could be targeted at those with high neuroticism and
low agreeableness, whereas specialized behavioral interventions may be required for
extraversion- and conscientiousness-related PDs (Saulsman & Page, 2004). Prevention
strategies should utilize scores on neuroticism as a screening tool for physical and mental
health problems, to identify early those who are likely to benefit from treatment.
The evidence reviewed above indicates that neuroticism is a consistent risk factor for a
range of negative health and well-being outcomes. Although several explanatory mechanisms
have been identified in the literature, few studies have evaluated these mechanisms directly,
prompting a call for future studies to address this problem (Smith & McKenzie, 2006). Given
that neuroticism is associated with a range of conditions, it is likely that the underlying
mechanisms are heterogeneous (Goodwin et al., 2006). These mechanisms may include
biochemical or psychophysiological pathways beyond the stress process (Goodwin et al.,
2006; Smith, 2006). For example, consistent with a direct effect or ‗top-down‘ or
dispositional model, both neuroticism and well-being measures show strong correlations over
time and strong genetic components in twin studies (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Jang,
Livesley, & Vernon, 1996; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Nes, Roysamb, Tambs, Harris, &
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2006; Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008), suggesting an underlying
genotype. Mechanisms underlying comorbid physical and mental health disorders also need
to be explored. A further issue is the direction of causality: ill health or its treatment may
increase neuroticism, due to factors such as discomfort/pain or functional limitations
associated with illness (Goodwin et al., 2006; Charles, et al., 2008). Equally plausible is a
positive or reinforcing feedback loop between negative emotionality and physical ill health.
As Smith (2006, p. 230), noted “the elucidation of mechanisms will be important not only for
the advance of basic science and its translation into risk reducing intervention; the issue of
mechanisms is also important for the credibility of the general perspective that personality
can influence health‖.
 Neuroticism: The Personality Risk Factor for Stress and Impaired Health… 25

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 37-58 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

SHAME IN CHINESE CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY: AN

INVESTIGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF MENCIUS

HuaNan Gong
Chinese Professor of Philosophy, Department of East China Normal University,
Translated from Mandarin by Chad Meyers
(MA Student in the Department of Philosophy of East China Normal University)

ABSTRACT
In the West, shame is believed to arise from feelings toward sex, which is the origin
of knowledge of goodness and evil as well as the origin of the conscience. In the Bible,
sexual shame is elevated as the beginning and the source of other types of shame, so at
the same time it is the prototype and standard of other types of shame. However, the
generality and power of sexual shame need not be universal. In Chinese traditional
thinking it is clear that shame is closely bound up with taste (eating), which occupies the
primal location and plays an important role in ―taste.‖ In ancient Chinese words and
expressions, the meaning of ―shame‖ is ―dedication‖ and ―delicious (food)‖ and the word
―shame‖ is used as both verb and adjective. Shame firstly involves delicious food.
Beginning with the Confucian Analects, ―shame‖ in relation to the meaning of delicious
food stirs feelings of morality. This reason for this association is that shame is related to
the delicious food that comes from ―sheep,‖ as well as the values of goodness, beauty,
and faith. Generally speaking, ―shame‖ is related to all valuable things. The shape of
―xiu‖（羞 means shame) in the Chinese ancient character shows an uncertain expression
of conflict when people decide whether or not to capture the sheep. In this sense, the
shame is derived from what one thinks and feels when a person faces beautiful and
valuable things. Mencius regards the concept of shame as a category of morality, and the
concept‘s role as an important source of human‘s nature and conscience is greatly
consolidated. Furthermore, shame is the basic foundation that defines man as man. The
Confucians decline the human‘s shield of morality in order to emphasize the effects of
shame. Under this teaching, they merged substance (体) with function (用): existing with
shame. For the Taoist who stresses the discipline of the mind, shame is taken as a defense
to retain the ―nativeness‖ of the mind.

Keywords: shame, self, having a sense of shame

38 HuaNan Gong

INTRODUCTION
Chinese philosophers attached much importance to ―shame.‖ Mencius, in particular, took
―shame‖ as one of the four innate principles, the transcendental ground upon which all virtues
and forms of virtuosity unfold, including appropriate actions and affirmative will.T Here, in
the thinking of Mencius, the origin and fountainhead of man‘s appropriate actions (义)
springs out from man‘s innate sense of shame and feeling of disgust in the face of everything
improper. Shame unfolds in the current of life‘s vital upsurge, actively receives the other and
greets the world, and thereby keeps a vigilant watch over the ascent of one‘s character as it
matures into full-bodied virtuosity. This chapter reviews the direction of this path mapped out
by Mencius, and aims at uncovering the dual significance of this path: On one hand, Mencius
finds an indispensible value in ―shame‖ as a beneficial ingredient in the cultivation of one‘s
virtue and the elevation of one‘s taste; and on the other hand, consolidates the elusive
dimension of ―the other,‖ the universal norms and principles difficult to implement within the
structure of the mind‘s willing disposition to ―take responsibility by oneself and for oneself‖;
this chapter strengthens these three dimensions along the path towards the social level, where
they can reach greater universality.

Part I. Shame of Sexuality and Shame of Taste

Everyone might initially think of shame in the sense of the ―shame of sexuality‖ in
association with the passions of both males and females. In fact, there is an intimate
connection between ―shame‖ and ―sex.‖ For instance, in German the word scham means
embarrassment, shame, shyness, and so on, but also simultaneously points to a human‘s
external genital area. Shame and one‘s genitals are not only interconnected semantically, but
are also intimately interrelated in thought. The German language emerged in a comparatively
recent age, and the German view of shame received deep influence from the biblical tradition.
The Bible‘s typical explications of sexuality and shame can be found in the third, fifth and
seventh chapters of Genesis: ―For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will open, and
you will be like God, knowing good and evil … then both of their eyes had opened and they
knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.‖
Scheler once gave an insightful account of the overall significance of this myth; he said, ―As
regards the genealogy of morals, the myths of the old testament present rather trenchant
wisdom through pictorial descriptions of universal truths, and show that the emotional

T
The ethical concepts (仁 ren) (义 yi ) (礼 li) are certainly three of the most important concepts in the Chinese
discursive tradition and have already been matched with numerous English counterparts throughout the history
of translation and cultural communication between the East and West. In this chapter, I will be rendering these
terms in the vein of the tradition inaugurated by philosopher David Hall and sinologist Richard Ames. The
latter two thinkers have offered translations that are the most sensitive to the unmatchable expressivity of
Chinese characters on one hand and the Christian character of their standard Western counterparts on the
other. As a reference for the explanation of these terms, please read: The Analects of Confucius: A
Philosophical Translation by Roger T. Ames. In addition, since this chapter takes the character of shame as a
guide through the ancient Chinese world of concepts, the work has a genuine genealogical flavor to it, and so I
chose to translate his work with the help of a variety of genealogical concepts cultivated by Gilles Deleuze in
his work, Nietzsche and Philosophy. So for reference of any of the concepts concerning will in this paper, for
instance, my employment of affirmative and active will can be traced by to prior definitions given by Deleuze.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 39

reaction of shame is the origin of knowledge concerning good and evil.‖1 A sense of shame is
initially a feeling of sexual shame as the origin of knowledge concerning good and evil, the
generator of conscience. In this myth, a feeling of shame for one‘s sexuality is elevated to the
genesis or beginning of any sense of shame in general, and because of this it becomes the
archetype and measure for all other senses of shame.
The feeling of shame for one‘s sexuality, this particular realm of shame, is without any
doubt a more common and rather intense sort of shame. However, the universality and
intensity of sexual embarrassment really doesn‘t imply that it is the universal source of
shame. We can see very clearly in the tradition of Chinese thought, for instance, that shame is
primarily bound up in an intimate bond with ―taste‖ (for food), and moreover that it occupies
its chief position and plays its most important role in just this sort of bond. In the pre-Qin
dynastic archives, the following senses of ―shame‖ were widely employed:

1: 惟羞刑暴德之人同于厥邦。（《书·立政》）
A leader merely offering (羞) to punish the morally inept as a substitute for moral
aptitude will be seen as morally inept by everyone in his land.

2: 可荐于鬼神，可羞于王公。（《左传·隐公三年》）

The delicious foods offered (荐) to the gods can be offered （羞） to noblemen as well.

3: 雍巫有宠于卫共姬，因寺人貂以荐羞于公。（《左传·僖公十七年》）

The lady YongWu was favored by the noble GongWei, because a eunich, Diao,
recommended (荐) her as a beautiful woman (羞) to the noble family.

4: 包羞（《易·否·六三》）

Pack (包)the delicious foods (羞)

In the excerpts archived above, the concept we have been reviewing through the Chinese
ideogram for shame (xiu 羞) has the significance of ―to offer‖ as in the first example, in
which shame was offered as punishment (羞刑). However, xiu (羞) has the meaning of
―delicious‖ (in the sense of food) in the fourth example of packing delicious food (包羞); in
the second citation, where the delicious foods offered (荐) to the gods were tasteful enough to
offer (羞) to the nobles; but also in the third passage, where xiu 羞 is employed

1
Scheller, Max: The Subversion of Values, translated from the Chinese version by TiLun Luo, Beijing. JiuZhou
Press; 2004, pp. 385.
40 HuaNan Gong

metaphorically to ―offer or recommend (荐) a beautiful woman (羞).‖ So, shame is employed
both as a verb and a noun. In the book The Explanation of Scripts and Elucidation of
Characters we find the following definition: ―xiu 羞; to offer. From 羊T1—lamb, which is put
forward as an offering—丑.T2‖ Taking xiu 羞 always and only in this sense of offering
obviously shrinks the bulk of this character‘s signifying capaciousness; however, the above
mentioned explication shows the bond of signification between xiu 羞—yang 羊—chou 丑,
and without a doubt brings our minds closer to the overflowing expressivity of xiu 羞.
Lamb—羊—is primarily valued for its sweet tasty flesh, and for this reason xiu 羞 is
predominantly bound up with taste in food. The character for so-called ugliness—丑—
considered as it is written in its radical form at the bottom of xiu 羞, does not signify the
distasteful opposite of beautiful and virtuous things here, but rather expresses the idea of
hands—手T3—or more precisely the idea of hands in movement, ―to raise one‘s hands.‖ In
the The Explanation of Scripts and Elucidation of Characers we find the following definition:
―Chou 丑 means the handling loop of a utensil —纽.T4 It also means December, when all
creatures initially spring into movement, use each other, and transform into events; —丑—is
formally traced back to the image of a hand—手; in time strokes were added: from hand—
手—to—>丑—and distinguished the concept of hands raising.‖ Corresponding to this, 羞
functions as a verb to point to the action of taking the things most beautiful and beneficial to
oneself and giving them up as an offering.
So at what point in time did the character xiu 羞 metamorphose at the level of
signification; when did its chief sense as a signfier for ―tasty‖ transform to express both
―shame (羞耻)‖ and ―humiliation (羞辱)?‖ First off it would be worthy for us to look at The
Book of Changes and this character‘s expressive value in the texts of later generations.

T1
羊 pronounced Yang (y-ah-ng) with a rising tone. 羊 is written alone as the word for lamb and sheep, but is also
written in its radical form as a conceptual addition to more complex ideograms such as in the character xiu 羞.
T2
丑 pronounced Chou with a falling-rising tone. When this character stands by itself in modern Chinese it means
ugly, but in the character xiu 羞 it is used as a radical and so it is used in a different sense, which will be
clarified in the following paragraph.
T3
手 is pronounced [Shou] with a falling-rising tone precisely as 丑 [Chou] is pronounced; it is just that a slight
difference has formed between them on the phonetic level: (Ch)ou 丑 is an affricate [ts ] whereas (Sh)ou
手 is a fricative [s ]. This is evidence pointing towards a prior conceptual bond in some form existing
between the two somewhere in the genealogy of their spoken and written lifeline, even though this conceptual
bond seems to have been disjoined or just simply forgotten in their common use today.
T4
纽 pronounced Niu with a falling-rising tone. The character contains moving hands—Chou 丑—as its chief
signifying part, and it is followed by the character for interwoven threads—糸—written in its radical form.
Altogether, 纽 forms the idea of hands interwoven, symbiotically woven together into webs of interaction.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 41

Turning to The Book of Changes section 93 we find the following passage on constancy—
恒T5—bu 不 heng 恒 qi 其 de 德, huo 或 cheng 承 zhi 之 xiu 羞 (as one fails to keep one‘s
powers in sound equilibrium and constant virtuosity, outsiders advance upon his tasty foods).
In this case xiu 羞 still expresses tasty foods just as it did in the earlier example we gave of
xiu 羞 in The Book of Changes section 63 where ―包羞”expresses the packing of tasty,
cooked flesh. In the seventh volume of Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes,
ZhiDe Lai appropriately pointed out regarding this section on Heng 恒 that ―If the wife of a
man cannot uphold her post with constant virtue, but instead loses chastity through
extramarital relations, then her husband will lose the potency required to tolerate her, and she
will be expelled as a result. Regarding the second line of the first passage on Heng—恒 : huo
或 cheng 承 zhi 之 xiu 羞; huo 或 means outsider; cheng 承 means to advance; xiu 羞 means
tasty, the image of food and drink. Since an outsider advances upon his taste for the wife,
instigating extramarital affairs, the outsider simultaneously advances shame (xiu 羞) upon the
husband… If we rely upon earlier commentary of this work, where xiu 羞 is interpreted here
as shame/humiliation, then…‖2 The people involved in the debate here concerning this
passage on Heng—恒—seem to have already noticed this kind of transformation of
significance attributed to this character xiu 羞.
To retrace our steps back to the origin of this transformation we cannot but open the
Confucian Analects. Everyone is familiar with the habit of pre-Qin thinkers to cite
authoritative texts in order to express their own thoughts. A successful citation at this time
was not sought via the simple reduplication of the already said, but was sought rather as an
appropriation of past writings; the aim was to raise the power of past writings, allowing them
to enter into an approximation with the living situation, so the past and present of thought
abut historically and contract together. In this respect, Confucius, Mencius, and Zhuangzi all
had a highly distinguished mastery over this art. In the Analects, Confuc
—恒—discussed above in The Book of Changes in order to express his virtue
oriented thought, and at the same time incorporate this passage into his ethical system, and
due to this xiu 羞 took its ethical turn being defined as ―shame‖ and ―humiliation.‖ This is
without a doubt one key transformation: xiu 羞 in the sense of delicious taste transformed
into xiu 羞 in the sense of ―shame.‖ Confucius gave xiu 羞 a new significance, yet in a way
that tightly integrated the concept of shame into the concept of good taste.

Duplicitously engaging social bonds has no integrity.

T5
恒 pronounced [Heng] with a rising tone. The character means keeping something in constancy and in some cases
eternity.
2
ZhiDe Lai: Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes; Beijing, JiuZhou Publishing House: 2004; pp. 385.
Translated by Chad Meyers.
42 HuaNan Gong

Feigning ritual propriety (li 禮) is shameful (xiu 羞).

Exploiting the force of bravery is furtive disloyalty (GuoYu: Volume Two3).
Although one‘s parents have already passed away.

So how was ―xiu 羞”in the sense of ―delicious foods‖ able to transform into ―xiu 羞”in
the sense of ―shame?‖ This question begs us to once again return to the Chinese character xiu
羞 itself. We said before that xiu 羞 is composed of the two characters yang 羊 and chou 丑
written in their radical form. The explanation given in the Artificer’s Record tells us: ―yang
羊; synonym for shan 善 (good or beneficial).‖ The Explanation of Scripts and Explication of
Characters4 states: ―yang 羊, synonym for xiang 祥 (auspicious).‖ ―yang 羊 (sheep)‖ is a
symbol of beneficence and auspiciousness. The reason why yang 羊 was able to become a
symbol for ―beneficence‖ and ―auspiciousness‖ on the one hand might be due to the meek
and tamable quality associated with the lamb, and the mellifluous taste associated with its
flesh. The Explication of Characters states: ―mei 美5 synonym for sweet; composed of lamb
(yang 羊) on top and big (da 大6) on bottom. Lamb is domesticated for the cultivation of
edible goods. The mei 美 and good (shan 善) are equivalent semantically.‖ In the same book,
we find more interrelated ways of explaining mei 美 such as: ―if the sheep is big, then it is
mei 美 (羊大则美)”and also ―the shepherd acts for mei 美 (羊人为美).‖ Looking at them
etymologically, ―shan 善 (good)‖ and ―yang 羊 (lamb)‖ are related. The Explication of
Characters states: ―shan 善 is a synonym for auspicious. From jing 誩 (to struggle), and yang
羊 (lamb); it is related to mei 美 and yi 義.‖7 We could even take notice of the character ―yi
義,‖ which is also related to yang 羊. The Explication of Characters states: yi 義 means a self
distinguishing itself in society through a dignified manner. Composed of wo 我 (self, I, me)
and yang 羊.‖ Xuanzhu Xu stated concerning yi 義 that, ―This character has the same
significance as shan 善 (good), because they both follow from yang 羊.‖ Xiu 羞 and yang 羊

3
Translated from the Chinese by Chad Meyers. In this paper, all of the citations from Classical Chinese texts are
my renderings.
4
说文解字 shuo wen jie zi. I will just use the following abbreviation hereafter: The Explication of Characters.
5
美 is pronounced mei (just like the English word: may) with a falling-rising tone. This character now commonly
expresses a sense equal to the word beautiful in English, but its sense in ancient writings is complex: it not
only expresses the aesthetic sense of beauty, but also refined virtuosity, as well as the refining process of
cultivation and the selective power of good taste needed to consummates all things beautiful, good, and
virtuous.
6
大 da means big, great, large, and even vast.
7
yi 義, simplified: (义) another Chinese Character without equal. Since it stands as one of the chief
characters/concepts in ancient Chinese writings, a whole philosophical system must be chosen to unfold the
layers of its sense. I will be following the philosophical tradition established by Roger Ames, and translate it
as ―fitting, appropriate,‖ ―appropriate actions,‖ and similar such renderings.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 43

these two things of good taste are related to the Chinese characters that express proper social
values such as goodness (shan 善), virtuosity/beauty (mei 美), and the appropriate integration
of self into society (yi 義). In a wider sense, xiu 羞 is related to everything valuable. A
fulcrum of this relation is in the significance of the radical for moving hands (chou 丑)
written at the bottom of xiu 羞. These valuable things all appear at hand, and must meet the
acceptance of social others; so those who have an ethical nature (or even those seeking moral
excellence) need to acutely perceive and consider many questions: what relationship do I
have to these valuable things? Is it mine? Should I take it or not? The character xiu 羞 shows
just this kind of hand raising the lamb to be weighed, at the precipitous moment when one
desires to take custody of a valuable without having yet appropriated it; xiu 羞 as ―shame‖ is
precisely this vacillating disposition extended through the senses and thoughts one has when
facing the lamb or any other thing of the beneficial and valuable sort. ―Having shame‖
manifests precisely this conscientious, turbulent mood, or shall we rather say the mood where
conscience emerges and its power activates. We can also weigh this sentiment within the
juncture of thought Confucius spoke of: ―view a gain and review its appropriateness (yi 義).‖
As it was shown above, the face value of the character yi 義 shows the self taking its own
lamb (yang 羊), one takes the things that belong to oneself, and by extension: do the things
that what one should do, and fashion the proper style to take care of them. The precondition
of acting up to this point is being able to contemplate if one should or shouldn‘t appropriate
something attainable in the face of it, what kind of style should be fashioned to go about
appropriating it, what significance this kind of action has, and so on; in a word, the
precondition of ―having propriety (yi 義)‖ is having shame (xiu 羞).
Following the analysis above we would only want to point out that ―shame (xiu 羞),‖
food, and delicious taste all share a fully intimate kinship in the world of Chinese thought.
The etymological nature of this intimate kinship shows, however, that within the world of the
Chinese language, the deepest sense of shame is not ―a sense of sexual shame,‖ but is much
rather a ―shame (xiu 羞)‖ tied to a sense for delicious foods. Even though the signifying
radical for food (shi 食) within the original Chinese ideogram (xiu 饈) was later cut off from
the ideogram we currently use (xiu 羞), this semantic differentiation just clarifies that thought
is in a process of differentiation, a refining process, but differentiation really doesn‘t write off
the genealogical kinship that ties them back together to their source: it is a relation of kinship
both in thought and linguistic sense. Ethics of food occupies the source, and becomes the
origin and springhead of other ethics (for instance sexual ethics).8
44 HuaNan Gong

Part II. The Role of a Sense of Shame: From Shame to Appropriate Conduct

In contradistinction to the ethics of Confucius, which emphasizes the internality of an

affirmative will (ren 仁) and the externality of appropriate conduct (义), Mencius reiterated
the immanence of affirmative will by emphasizing the co-immanence of appropriate action.
As regards the affirmative will and appropriate activity of this internal virtue, Mencius
distinguished ―four principals‖ of internal nature to serve as their transcendental ground; in
particular, he uncovered a ―sense of shame and disgust‖ as the origin and source of
―appropriate action,‖ posited ―shame‖ as an a priori ground, and thereby enlightened a by no
means inessential region of the will (xin 心). If we say that shame (xiu 羞) was still a rather
unimportant ethical category in Confucius‘ time, then it is here in the thought of Mencius
when shame‘s position and role as an ethical category was relegated to noble rank; it was
even treated as one of the vital wellsprings of man‘s natural tendency toward good; it was
treated as the origin of conscience, nay, it was treated as the chief basis through which
humans find a way to become humane.

All humans have a will that cannot hold back from helping humans … a will without a
compassionate sensibility is inhuman; without a sense of shame and disgust for the
inappropriate, there is no human either; a will that cannot politely decline is not actively
human; a will that is insensitive to the difference between true and false is inhuman. A sense
of compassion is the intrinsic potential of good in the affirmed will; a sense of shame and
distaste for willing the improper is the scale of values tipping in favor of appropriate action.
The will to politely decline is the balance of power necessary for integrating properly into the
ritual order; the will to sense true and false is the original scale of authenticity proper to
wisdom and wit. Four beginnings of good taste condition the human will, just as if it has four
bodies. If there are these four original sources of potential good, and the self‘s will says it is
unable, it is the self‘s reactive treachery upon itself; If there are these four potentials, and one
who has realized the active will to command is labeled impotent, then it is reactive treachery
against affirmative command. With all of these four powers conditioning the self, one‘s wit
will expand with adequate ideas, just as the fire‘s spark ignites the flammable, and the
spring‘s source unfailingly reaches the unfilled. If indeed some capacity can be fulfilled, it
will be reached by these four oceans; if indeed one doesn‘t fulfill some capacity, it will openly
disrespect one‘s progenitor‘s commands (Mencius: Gong Sun Chou: Volume One).

Modern researchers of philosophy continuously criticize this passage purely and simply
from logical terms to say, ―four senses of will (xin 心)‖ cannot serve as the necessary and
sufficient conditions of a human. However, what this argument, which hosts no shortage of
problems in logical terms, actually reveals to us is: a human without a sense of shame and
disgust isn‘t becoming as a human, or at the very least, isn‘t becoming of an ethical person,
which is to say that this human is not equipped with the resources and competence necessary
to become an ethical person. Using today‘s language to say it: a sense of shame and disgust is
the necessary precondition for an ―ethical human being.‖ ―Ethical humans‖ need to know ―the
should,‖ ―the appropriate action (yi 義),‖ and also must put each ―should‖ into will (xin 心).
―A sense of shame and disgust for willing the improper is the principle of appropriate action,‖
emphasizes precisely this internal equivalence between the imperative command ―should‖
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 45

and human nature. The ―appropriate action (yi 義)‖ here points at once to the appropriate
action to consummate the aim of any virtue internal to a person, the consistent and stable
character that each person has, and also points to the norms and standards of behavior that
exist in an external form. This transcendental ―principle‖ is the precondition, starting point,
and ground of virtuosity and universal moral standards. Or we could say that moralities,
norms, and behavioral codes will only have authenticity and real possibility after they have
been established upon ―principles (duan 端).‖
What is ―shame and distaste for the inappropriate‖ then? In Zhuxi‘s Collected
Commentary on the Four Books, he explained: ―shame (xiu 羞) is the humiliation felt for the
ill works of one‘s own authorship, disgust (e 恶) is the detestation felt for the ill deeds of
another.‖ Zhifu Wang completely inherited this explanation from Zhuxi. According to this
explanation, ―shame‖ and ―disgust‖ respectively point to different subjects: shame faces the
ill work one has done and develops, whereas disgust faces other people‘s ill doings and
develops. The ―ill works‖ here in ―the humiliation felt for one‘s own ill works‖ refers to
something unwell in the effect of some action, yet still could point to the ―ill motives‖ that led
to the action. The former points to the violation of objective norms and principles as so many
actualized disobediences that have already become facts; the latter points to the rehearsal
within one‘s mind where one unfolds behavior in conflict with norms, yet without any trace
of this behavior formed in actuality. ―Shame‖ could dispatch for ―the unwell potential for real
acts as well as real acts,‖ but will much more so arise in the case of ―still only half-willing to
do well.‖ ―Willing wellness only partially and half-way‖ is not necessarily ―willing illness;‖
affairs that have ―the capacity to be shamed‖ are still not necessarily ―shameful‖ or
―despicable.‖ Therefore the territory under the custody of ―shame‘s range‖ is much wider; its
ethical significance is much weaker in comparison to ―shameful‖ and ―malign.‖
The arising of shame is not exhaustively generated by infractions against moral standards
that have taken place, and its cause is also not exhausted by self-accusations for the things
one has done incorrectly; its arising more prominently leans toward the ―undeveloped,‖ that
is, it leans toward evaluations concerning several kinds of possibilities, at any time it may
take concern with what one has not done well, worrying about a potential loss of dignity or
respect. Because of this, shame primarily expresses itself in the spirit of conscious self-
protection. Speaking with regard to those who have ―shame,‖ they themselves know how to
do much better, the best, or rather how they could do much better in the future, but haven‘t
yet for that matter willed the force necessary to go do it; because of this, even though they
have not infracted against or disobeyed any norms clearly stipulated in writing, shame will
continuously reappear since they either do not fully affirm the will to do it or do it negatively
and thereby doom the potential for better situations to mere dreamscapes that are barren of
paths to realization. Thus, ―shame‖ is related to a hierarchical order of values. To be able to
realize much higher and more noble values, but in actuality fall into a lower degree of values,
or, to be just satisfied in a lower degree of values exhibit two modes of being subordinate to
the rank and file of ―capable of being worthy of shame.‖
Shame arises in the sinking potential of self-worth. ―Shame‖ is of course spiritual in the
vital sense (inspiring, expiring, and uninspiring); however, the body will also become the
origin of shame. Bodily defects, improper physical deportment, and the like all might
stimulate the upsurge of shame. A child gradually beginning to sprout self-awareness will
46 HuaNan Gong

become embarrassed due to the exposure of his or her own body parts (for instance, sexual
organs), and in the same way will become bashful, shy, and even ashamed due to self-
exposure in public in the case of saying and doing inappropriate words and deeds. ―A will
without a sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate is not human.‖ ―Shame‖ will arise
due to concerns over loss of self, and thus shame can prevent humans from sinking into the
―inhuman.‖
However, how can ―shame‖ prevent humans from sinking? In the end, how big of a role
can ―shame‖ play?
―A sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate‖ initially manifests itself as ―the fear
of shame.‖ People who have shame ―fear shame;‖ concerned with the result of ―feeling
ashamed‖ to effectively appear, however, the multiple attributes of shame that are feared stay
in the order of possibly occurring without having already occurred. As soon as what is feared
occurs, a person will directly ―blush,‖ that is, their ―sense of shame‖ will emerge. ―Fearing
shame‖ makes people circumspect, causes them to recoil with twangs of conscience, allowing
them to refrain from action and leave certain things undone. Being able to feel degrees of
shame for breaking a norm, or even for not being able to meet the expectations other‘s have
for oneself, on the one hand, reveals that the one who feels shame has self-worth, an acute
sensitivity to perceive and register the complex fabric of norms and standards, as well as the
level of attentiveness in the other‘s expecting gaze; and on the other hand, out of a care for
self-worth and concern for having and losing respect comes the correction of blunders and
errors. The people, who have a determinate social role, all have relatively determinate
expectations from society, including self-expectations, family expectations, and community
expectations concerning the capacities, identities, and virtues they must uphold. Having some
identity as a property of oneself means that this identity simultaneously demands things from
its owner, including demands upon the owner to adopt a kind of style to look at things, here
things, gesticulate, speak, and move; this is also to say, there are not only demands upon each
person to perform actions ―correctly,‖ but also for each person to perform all such acts
―appropriately.‖
Taking ―appropriate‖ (even ―the most perfect fit‖) as a measure, means ―the criteria for
things capable of causing shame‖ contains negative values, and therein contained are sexual
values. Thus, in the Analects ―ritual propriety‖ serves as the reference framework for
―shame‖: ―Duplicitously affirming social bonds has no integrity, defiling ritual propriety (li
禮) is shame (xiu 羞), exploiting bravery is treachery.‖ In the Analects, Second Section, the
listening, looking, speaking, and acting proper to observing ritual propriety is not only
―right,‖ but also ―just right,‖ graceful; due to this, observing ritual propriety sculps a tenor on
top of ―right.‖ Precisely for this reason, that which shame, in relation to observing ritual
proprity, touches upon or manages is the region of neutral taste relatively distant from
―disgusting.‖ The things that fall within this jurisdiction of neutral taste may not certainly be
―just right,‖ however they are all ―right.‖ These areas of ―shameful to act‖ counteract the
approach of ―disgust,‖ and the things that are left undone due to their being a ―shame to act‖
allow people to distance themselves from potential or actual ―disgust.‖ Thus, regardless of
whether you feel embarrassed due to having done something that was ―a shame to do,‖ it is
still due to ―a shame to do‖ that such things are left undone; a person capable of doing shame
always hosts a much wealthier will to intend towards benefaction and good taste.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 47

As Mencius expressed it, ―affirmatively executing appropriate acts‖ (―right‖) still cannot
outweigh ―virtuosity.‖ Genuine virtuosity requires ―an execution from affirmative
appropriation (―just right‖). Execute upon the overflowing potential of affirmatively
appropriating what is ―right‖ to do, that is, one must be sensitive of ones affirmative will to
carry out appropriate acts. To be aware of oneself doing something is admittedly of the
utmost importance, but doing something always has limits; ―not doing something,‖ however
points to the unlimited self-sensitivity of not willing to do ―inappropriate acts,‖ which
expresses much more depth of self-sensitivity in the actor‘s body. Thus, Mencius thought,
people who genuinely have the virtue of acting appropriately are acting forthright from the
upsurge of potential coming from what they are not willing to do: ―all humans have some
potential not willing to do many inappropriate and disgusting things, and extending this
potential in their active will is appropriate action‖ (Mencius: Fully Executing the Will). The
reason for ―not willing to do‖ is due to clearly understanding that ―doing‖ will fall into
―inappropriate action.‖ ―Those who are good to themselves can refrain from doing‖ (Mencius,
Ten Thousand Chapters: first section). The concern at every moment in the will of the self,
who loves its own will for being good to itself, really doesn‘t point to any actual ―ill-doing;‖
it points rather to potential ―ill-doing.‖ This kind of worry over ―inappropriateness‖ prevents
the undertaking of inappropriate acts, and for this reason, it is the power of undoing an act.
Why must the way connecting us to the ―will to action‖ be paved by the ―will not to act‖?
How do ―shame‖ and ―distaste‖ build the way connecting the ―will to action?‖ ―Disgusting
taste‖ is a repulsive and revolting sensation felt in relation to ―inappropriate actions‖; are
these repulsive and revolting feelings that rise up from within our will able to safeguard
humans from doing ―inappropriate things‖? Confucius said ―[o]nly those with an affirmative
will are able to love people and loath people‖ (Analects 理仁). ―Disgust‖ is an emotional
sensitivity that takes the self as the center, criteria, and point of departure. The average
person‘s emotional sensitivity is more often than not limited to him or herself, and only those
people who have genuinely affirmed human dignity are able to actively reach the unity of
emotions and reason (able to give free reign to desires without over-stepping the boundary),
an individual‘s loves and hates unfold in line with universal norms and principles. Good and
bad have the clear-cut distinction of personal characteristics. The Great Learning states:
genuine virtuosity ―is like enjoying good color, like repulsing disgusting smells.‖ ―Disgust‖ is
a scale to weigh the subject‘s level of virtue and ethical standards, and the ―ability to loath‖
marks the establishment of the subject‘s ethics and morals. But ―disgust‖ primarily points
toward the illnesses of other people; that which points toward oneself and is concerned with
the construction and protection of the subject‘s ethical capacities and standards, however, is
―shame.‖

Mencius said: All humans cannot bear to will something bad; if they extend this into the
area that bears the action of their will, it is affirmatively willing. All humans have some
potential they are not willing to enact; if they intensify this into what they are willing to enact,
it is appropriate action. Humans can realize the will that has no desire to do negative to
humans, and by realizing it, affirmative willing will becomes inexhaustible. Humans can
realize the will that does not speculate for the sake of profiting from actions, and by realizing,
appropriate action becomes inexhaustible. Humans are able to immunize their wills from the
suffering effects of inappropriate speech, so there will be no place where they will react
48 HuaNan Gong

inappropriately. If sophisticated people use language with others in some innapropriate

situation to procure some advantage, or in another situation uses silence for similar motives,
they will both be of the same type of speculative will discussed above (Mencius, Fully
Executing the Will).

So how to extend this ability to sense inappropriateness through the feelings of shame
and revulsion to the point where it becomes active in the willing execution of appropriateness.
Confucius thought, reaching a willingness to act from the will to not act inappropriately
allows one‘s sense of shame and repulsion for inappropriate actions to expand into an active
willingness to do what is appropriate. Not acting primarily points toward unsuitable actions,
that is, behavior that is prohibited by norms, but it also includes what cannot be done as well
as the things one is unwilling to do, that is, the actions that one‘s able forces cannot reach and
any behavior that one‘s will is unwilling to carry out. The consequence generated by acting
out what is unsuitable to do will be the other directing blame and the gaze of disrespect at the
actor. On the one hand the actor accepts the depreciation the other has for the actor, but facing
the judgments his or her conscience gives the actor is much more important. ―Unwilling to
act‖ is not merely being self-sensitive of acting unsuitably and the consequences resulting
therein, but is also being able to self-consciously author acts of refined taste and self-willingly
hold the ground of virtuosity. The unfolding of shame within a person is then ―like facing the
abyss, like treading on thin ice,‖ With a fresh and bright willingness, repulse
inappropriateness and safeguard the greatness of appropriate action.
However, ―to protect,‖ and ―safe guard‖ is still only negative in regard to the cultivation
of virtuosity, and shame still has a precious, positive value. Just as we posited earlier in this
essay, ―shame xiu 羞‖ is ―offering,‖ the offering of ―beautiful taste;‖ it is taking things that
have value and presenting them out into the open. With regard to human beings, it is precisely
making one‘s intrinsic values, the ―taste‖ appropriate to oneself emerge into sensible life.
This kind of offering from within one‘s will to the outside is without a doubt primarily based
upon intrinsic values with depth. Mencius thought the four potentials were just these values
with depth that every person inherits as an a priori property. ―Potential‖ is the beginning of
value; it is also the origin of value. (Mencius) said:

The resourceful spring undulating along, no need to rest from dusk through dawn. Fertile
for a thousand fields providing forth, depositing itself without reserve into the four seas.
Those with original sources are all this way, inheriting inexhaustible resources, giving forth
without taking away.

This wellspring of values is just like a spring in the mountain, under conditions without
small objects of desire to block it up, it will overflow with emergent potential from dusk
through dawn without exhaustion. However, this wellspring of values does not appear ready-
made; it requires persistently unearthing its clog without slack. Mencius used the metaphor of
―digging a well‖: ―[t]he one who can will to act appropriately is ground-breaking like a digger
of wells; digging a well and leaving nine stones to clog it, is the same as discarding the well‖
(Mencius: Fully Executing the Will, Volume One). With neither self-brutality nor self-
abandonment, plumb the depths of one‘s self to unearth the root of good taste within the will,
and realize the inherent good within the will, activate one‘s intrinsic property of good taste
out in the open, and for the sake of dignity ram down the bedrock foundation. To discover the
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 49

wellspring of values and the source of integrity one still needs to take one more step to make
the well fluidly gush-forth; Mencius said: ―[w]ith all of these four powers conditioning
oneself, one‘s wit will expand with adequate ideas, just as the fire‘s spark ignites the
flammable, and the spring‘s source unfailingly reaches the unfilled.‖ The four sources
manifest themselves like flames igniting and a springs filling. The people who have ―shame‖
will take the acute sensibility of their perceptive style and moment by moment retrieve
themselves back to recoil this original spring with the weight of its essentially good taste;
they will take every idea, every action, and every affair back to this inherent source of value.
And supposing that at once this upsurge discontinues or stops, then this spring has no way to
gush out, and thus embarrassment, a sense of shame will surge forth, flooding every nook of
one‘s passions. Shame will break through the object clogging the well, the object blocking the
will, and thereby allow inner virtue to unfold freely and fluently into an external form. In this
sense, ―shame xiu 羞‖ and ―appropriate actions yi 義‖ embody and manifest a homogeneous
value, and thus Mencius in (告子上) said: ―[a] sense of shame and distaste for willing the
improper is the will of appropriate action.‖ Here Mencius puts the two in direct equivalence,
and doesn‘t merely see the sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate as the
―source‖ of ―appropriate actions.‖
Just as Scheller had argued, shame originates from the imbalance and disequilibrium
between the spirit of a human‘s existence and a human‘s bodily demands.9 Within the
philosophy of Mencius, shame arises within the conflict between the ―big body‖ (―appropriate
action‖) and the ―small body‖ (―reactive bodily functions‖), an antithesis. ―reactive bodily
functions is my desire; appropriate action is my desire, the two of them cannot reach a
mutually acceptable contract, do not select the will to react to bodily functions and select the
will to act appropriately.‖ ―The desirable‖ (good) can will multiples (diversity) and is not just
one (monotony). Within a determinate social-historical assemblage, a diversity of desirables
has its gradient hierarchy, its order, and with regard to an individual person, there is also a
diversity of desirables and multiple hierarchies, and orders. These hierarchies and orders of
values shows that there will be difference in terms of individual bodies, however speaking
with regard to the integral members of an entire social body, there still remains a collectively
shared measure: its bottom line is having a sense of shame and distaste for the improper, its
ultimate degree then points to ―do not select reactive bodily functions, select appropriate
activity.‖ The human life that has significance moves unceasingly from the bottom line in a
tendency towards the approach of this aim of ultimate integrity. In actuality shame produces
in the reverse process: that is, from the highest, most noble degree of value tending to fall into
the decadence of the basest values. The role of a sense of shame occurs in preventing this
decadence and loss of integrity, maintaining and protecting the integrity of the highest values.
Only upon the condition that there is shame does appropriate activity become possible, and
this is what Mencius called: ―a sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is the
inherently potent source of appropriate activity.‖
In Mencius‘s view, the small body follows the development of elementary vital life and
unfolds, and a human will fall into the decadent danger of inhumanity at any random time for
this reason. During the process of using ritual propriety to cultivate the desire of the small

9
See for reference: Scheller‘s The Subversion of Values: p. 167. Translated by Chad Meyers from the Chinese
edition done by TiLun Luo, Beijing; 1997.
50 HuaNan Gong

body, the Confucian tradition enabled the big body to overflow with integrity through each
sliver of time, allowing the properties of diverse forces to integrate and fortify together into a
chi of unmatched refinement to drive away and disperse the chi of cults, the chi of brutality,
and by protecting the big body, this chi immunized it from the invasive, reactive forces of cult
illnesses. This mode of life allowed the fullness of internal values to radiate outwards to favor
each individual small body, allowing the big body to express its dignity through each small
body. In Fully Executing the Will, Volume One, Mencius said: ―The double affirmation of
human life in the appropriate activation of ritual propriety and wisdom is rooted in the will,
the four of these potentials together generate the colors of the face, and with bright cultivated
eyes it can be seen in the face. It is inherited from the genealogy leading you, it is deposited
in four substances, and these four substances express it clearly without a word.‖ After the
body has undergone a transformation of spirit, the differences between the body‘s shame and
the spirit‘s shame will gradually converge. When a human is ―ashamed to the point where
there is no place to host of self-toleration,‖ not only will the face flush read and the ears rose-
up crimson, but the eyes will lose all clue where to fall upon and refocus, the back will poise-
up stiff as if a sword-like gaze pierced it, and the hands and feet barren of any place of
employment. Even though the big earth stretches vastly into the distance, the arising of shame
in you will strip your feet of any place where you can stand your ground. Thus, the body can
have shame, and become ashamed due to physical causes; the body in the same way also
bears the shame of spirit, and infiltrates into a spirit‘s shame. Due to this, the protection given
to a person‘s spirit will manifest itself in ―the shame to due something,‖ that is, it will
consider the significance of doing something before it is actually done, ―a shame to‖ shows
that one‘s spirit is endowed with the wealth of elevated capacity to perceive itself. What
―由仁义行”emphasizes is not doing something wrong and feeling ashamed, but much more
importantly a sensitive forecast of ―shame‘s range.‖ Of course, a sense of shame, and the will
to shame can emerge to the foreground at any time: prior to doing something ―a shame to do,‖
during and after the event of doing something ―the shame for being able to will it,‖ and in the
same way it can protect inherent values. Thus, only after one has appropriated a sense of
shame and a will to shame can ―appropriate activity (义)‖ become ―intrinsic ethicality,‖ and
have significance (意义).
Comparatively speaking, ―appropriate action‖ is a property of rationality, universal
standards, and morality; whereas a sense of shame and distaste for the improper is a property
of an individual person‘s concrete existence, a property of a person‘s passions. The
significance Mencius communicated through both of them was in one aspect the universal,
formal standards laid a foundation for individual existence, and in another aspect very
different from the way Confucius integrated the external form (observing ritual propriety)
with the internal substance (affirmative will), Mencius emphasized the integration of rational
form (affirmative will, appropriate action) with emotional substance (a sense of compassion, a
sense of shame and disgust for the improper).
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 51

Part III. The Structure of a Sense of Shame: The Self without a

Need for the Other

In everyday life there often occurs the following kind of situation: someone did
something inappropriate or unseemly, and afterwards the doer of the deed will worry about
other people having seen, the gaze of the other makes him embarrassed beyond words and he
carefully checks the circumference of his locality, and when realizes there is no one to be
found, he will more often than not sigh a breath of relief. This is almost as if all of shame is
established upon the precondition of the other‘s existence. Just like Sartre said,

Shame is the comprehension of the unity of the three following dimensions: I; the
presence of others; I feel shame in the presence of others. If one of these three dimensions
10
disappears, then shame will also disappear.

Shame is shame ―I feel shame for myself,‖ and the subject of this statement ―I‖ is
pointing to the present self-reflective cognition and the I that has emotions, and the latter
―myself‖ is pointing towards the subject that speaks and acts. I self-reflect and cognize, judge
if words and speech are either suitable or unsuitable, and will have a corresponding emotional
reaction. Is the frame of reference for the self-reflective cogito ―an other person?‖ The other‘s
attentive gaze and even the other‘s existence can actually provoke me to reflect upon myself,
but is the other person able to adequately serve as the necessary conditions for the occurrence
of shame? With no such gaze of another person around, when I realize that I didn‘t uphold
even the bare minimum of moral code, when I blurt out a statement I can‘t even tolerate, or
do something even I feel is less than half- decent, I will independently still produce the
feeling and sense of shame. Most of the time, ―deeds that weigh on the conscience‖ are done
in situations where there are no others around, that is, they are done and the other cannot see
them or know about them. When the other is not around, the other will not attentively look at
me, but I myself, however, will be very clear about the significance of my words and actions.
To say that one‘s words and actions disobey a universal standard of conduct, we are saying
that this universal standard is external (the other‘s understanding and grasp), and also internal
(oneself understanding, grasping). According to the so-called ―the master advises not to will
some deed of ill-conscience, so as to avoid the midnight ghost from calling at the door,‖ the
arrival of the ―ghost‖ comes following self-will, that is, self-criticizing and self-evaluating
due to having done something that breaks a norm. The other person doesn‘t know, the other
person isn‘t around, and the self will still feel embarrassed, and even produce shame. For this
reason, ―having shame‖ isn‘t necessarily like Sartre‘s argument was able to prove ―the
existence of the other.‖ We should say rather, ―having shame‖ can only prove the existence of
―conscience,‖ proving the existence of ―emotions that respect norms and principles;‖ it also
proves the existence of norms and principles (―appropriate conduct‖). The other‘s existence
and the other‘s gaze are only the embodied manifestation of norms and principles. Because of
this, we can also without any difficulty the interrelation between ―shame,‖ ―respecting
elders,‖ and ―appropriate conduct.‖

10
Sartre, Jean-Paul: Being and Nothingness: p. 380. Translated from the Chinese version by XuanLiang Chen. An
Wei Literature Press, 1998.
52 HuaNan Gong

Of course, we also will say ―feel embarrassed for someone.‖ The shame of the
embarrassed person is instigated by the other person, but the subject of embarrassment is ―I,‖
it is ―I‖ feeling that the actions that some person willed did not meet what some person should
will to do. ―To feel embarrassed for someone‖ is actually to say: this someone under these
circumstances should ―be embarrassed‖ just the same as anyone with dignity would ―feel
embarrassed,‖ the person that should feel shame is this ―someone,‖ and should not be the
―substitute.‖ The precondition of shame is that there is a self with dignity, and substituting for
the other‘s sense of shame is doubtlessly a negation of this self with dignity; this is equal to
saying, you are a person without dignity, and if you had dignity you ought to feel ashamed.
Thus, this kind of saying ―feeling shame for someone‖ actually expresses the speaker‘s
attitude about what should have been done under some kind of circumstance. For instance, in
Mencius‘ Li Lou, he records such a situation of a Man of the Kingdom chi going out begging
for food and his wife felt shame for him. Mencius‘ critique goes like this: ―as the master of
appropriate action views it, the way a man seeks to achieve riches, recognition, and benefit
does not make a man‘s wife and concubine feel shame, but that it doesn‘t make them weep
together—how rare indeed!‖ The man of the kingdom of chi is actually injuring his own
dignity through the warped way he goes about getting wealth and riches, and thus it is this
man himself who ought to feel shame. The content and cause of the shame that is felt by the
wife and the concubine lay in the unhealthy way they deal with this man, not the crooked way
of searching for wealth and riches. For this reason, the shame that the wife and concubine
feels regard themselves respectively, and they don‘t feel ―shame‖ for this man of chi. Genuine
―shame‖ is something the other can‘t substitute, just like one can‘t feel the happiness of others
for them, or genuinely feel another‘s sadness. Although feeling shame for another person was
instigated by the appearance of that person, the shameful one is still oneself and can‘t be the
other. We can get a relatively clearer realization of this characteristic of ―shame‖ within a
passage Mencius wrote in a criticism of BoYi and LiuXia Hui:

Boyi wouldn‘t follow an order unless it came from a master of appropriate will, nor
would he give a hand to someone unless they were a friend. He wouldn‘t stand in the court of
an ill-willed ruler, nor exchange words with an ill-willed man. If he stood in the court of a
ruler of an ill will, or exchanged words with a distasteful man, it would be for him like taking
up the dynastic crown to go sit in a pit of ash, adorning the court robe just to go lay down in a
puddle of mud. His will was so sensitive to things of distaste he repulsed them away out of
intense disgust; if he were thinking where a fellow villager were standing, and the villager
dawned his hat improperly askew, the mere sight of such a scene would stain enough of his
nature for him to walk away with disdain. Accordingly, although a feudal prince would
summon him with an invitation of fine words, he wouldn‘t suffer it; he couldn‘t suffer it
because taking an order from a feudal prince just wouldn‘t be worth his while and that is all.
On the contrary, LiuXia Hui wouldn‘t feel a spot of shame under a decadent ruler, nor
would he make bureaucrat of the lowest office feel base. Holding office, he did not conceal
his considerable ability, but wouldn‘t swerve an inch from the path of his principles. If
overlooked, he would not complain; if he fell into poverty, he wouldn‘t ask for pity at all.
Thus he said, ―[y]ou be you, I‘ll be me. If you took off your gown and stood stark naked
beside me, how could you even sully my name at all.‖ Thus it was always out of his nature‘s
content to be in the company of any and all without losing anything of himself. If anyone
stopped him and asked him to stay he‘d stay, because there was nothing more worth of him to
go and that is all.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 53

Mencius said: Boyi‘s wills narrowness, LiuXia Hui wills no respect: two things a master
of appropriate willing chooses not to will.

As stated above, that which shame has an issue with is the self. LiuXia Hui didn‘t feel
shame for a corrupt prince, and the reason lies in the self-character of shame, your shame is
your shame, my shame is my own. From his view, when the other person was unclothing
right next to him, the person who should feel shame is the other person, but not himself. If it
is said that LiuXia Hui‘s way of doing things has problems, then his problem was in carrying
the self-character of shame all the way through to its extreme, and because of this, only
concentrating upon ―cultivating and repairing oneself‖ and not bringing that cultivation and
repair to bear upon the ―wellness of people,‖ ―the welfare of the commoners‖; LiuXia Hui
lacked the passion to realize the universality of ―appropriate action‖ in the greater public
realm. Speaking in regard to ―a sense of shame and distaste for the improper,‖ when this
sense falls short of the beneficence and loving concern proper to the nature of affirmatively
willing, ―exhausting‖ and ―achieving‖ can both be due to ―shame‖ and ―solely be of aid to
oneself,‖ but it cannot however ―affirm that aid twice for the public realm.‖ Confucius said of
LiuXia Hui that, ―his will descended to insult himself,‖ but there were ―ethics within his
words, and worries within his ways‖ (Analects). His body and will accepted disgrace but not
shame, the reason lies in that ―shame‖ is the shame of ―I‖ regarding itself: self-protecting not
to lose it, thus no feeling of shame, and disgust is also this way. Due to arising from itself,
within ―shame‖ and ―the things ashamed of‖ the concern and attention paid to the other
person been put into suspension. So-called ―narrow‖ and ―no respect‖ both touch upon
omitting the ―other‖ due to the omission of a loving will and a ―will with a sense of
compassion.‖ With regard to LiuXia Hui, the other person unclothing touches upon the other
person‘s shame, not his own shame.
We still ought to distinguish ―shaming others‖ and ―feeling shame for others.‖ The
former refers to me awakening the other‘s sense of shame, the other ought to feel shame for
himself. ―Feeling shame for others,‖ is actually the self taking a small sphere of its own sense
of ―good shame‖ to come and do the shaming of ―the other person‘s self.‖ Because of this,
what ―feeling shame for an other self‖ touches upon is still ―the other person‘s self‖ and not a
person besides this ―other person.‖ LiuXia Hui having ―no shame under the corrupt prince‖
refers to not shaming for getting along with the corrupt prince, the corruption is with the
prince but not with me. However, if shame is only blaming oneself, how then does the sense
of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate lead to ―appropriate action?‖ ―Appropriate
action‖ refers to each person‘s ―should,‖ the path that each person should follow. Serving as a
father, one should be ―merciful,‖ serving as a son, one should be ―filial.‖ The different
identity of each self and not another person‘s identity should determine the concrete content
of ―appropriate action.‖ The other omitted, ―appropriate action‖ has no concrete unfolding but
is still there. Because of this, Mencius posited ―carrying out action by affirmatively willing
appropriate action,‖ and opposed carrying out actions due to the other‘s face and the other‘s
gaze. What this kind of sense of ―appropriate action‖ is weighted upon is its own ―should,‖
but not a balance or equity between rights and duties. The individual person of itself respects
and carries the responsibility of ―laws‖ or ―duties‖; the individual internalizes ―appropriate
action‖ into ―conscience,‖ through ―self-cultivating‖ work. Upon the body of a person who
has morality, respecting and undertaking the responsibility for prescribed norms is embodied
as a relationship of ―I‖ towards my own conscience.
54 HuaNan Gong

What the Confucians continuously strived after and held in high esteem was a ―study of
being oneself,‖ and ―being a self‖ is constructing itself, building itself up, that is, establishing
an ―I and me‖ with dignity. This ―I‖ only takes responsibility for myself, taking responsibility
for absolute laws, and principles (appropriate action, nature). ―To cultivate chi, the greatest
and most unbending, crammed in between the heavens and the earth ….‖ ―Loved ones not
closely relating is against its affirmative will; rulers not ruling is against its wisdom;
observers of ritual propriety not responsive is being against its respect; those who have not
reached the object of their actions all reflectively demand their various selves, they correct
themselves and the great social realm returns it‖ (Mencius: Li Lou). Behavior having not
reached the intended effect primarily demands researching the self, scanning its own action. It
is needed at any time to accept the conscience‘s direction and retuning. ―Shame‖ shows the
self there is an attitude to deal with facts, and also at the same time declares an attitude of the
future. ―shame‖ isn‘t done for another person to see; it is overflowing from inside to outside.
The Confucian theory of ―being careful alone‖ has a deep explication with regard to the
significance of the self-other state of affairs. ―Not seeing what is hidden, not showing what is
subtle, thus the master of appropriate willing is vigilant of himself when alone‖ (Zhong
Yong). Zhuxi commented on this saying: ―Speaking within inaudible allusions, acting within
the imperceptibly minute; traces although unformed will converge at a time, then the self
moves; although the other does not know, the self alone knows this, then the work of unity in
the realm will have no one who can see it take place, but it passes into them. Thus the master
of appropriate willing is eternally vigilant, and within this vigil he adds circumspection, thus
he stops people‘s desires from grasping the sprouts, and doesn‘t allow them to nourish and
grow within this subtle, hidden realm, to the point of keeping them far away from the
principle of this path‖ (Zhong Yong). ―Concealing‖ is another kind of ―showing‖: that is, the
showing to oneself under the situation where there is no attention paid by the other; ―subtle‖
is another form of ―obvious‖: obvious in the sense of the self clearly and distinctly sensing it.
These two occupy the region of inaudible allusions that the other doesn‘t see and doesn‘t
know, and this is also to say, whether the other person appears or not, there will be no
influence upon the activity of the self‘s conscience, there will be no influence upon my
perception of ―appropriate actions.‖ In this sense, ―being vigilant alone‖ manifests the self-
sufficiently appropriate actions of the self.
Taking the ―sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate‖ to serve as one of
the four sources of good taste, focuses upon the role of ―shame,‖ and stipulating internal
willingness as its ultimate ground. Mencius‘ way of seeing ―shame‖ is doubtlessly heir to a
few consistent places of communication with ―being vigilant alone.‖ ―That which a person
has the capacity for without learning is its conscience‘s capacity. That which one doesn‘t
think about but knows, is the conscience knows. The baby picked up by a child isn‘t ignorant
of its love for its relatives, and the growing one‘s next to him, he not unknowingly respects
his brothers. Relatives closely relating is affirmative will. Respecting elders is appropriate
action. The absence of others is the arrival of the great public realm (Mencius: Fully
Executing the Will (trans. Chad Meyers). ―Appropriate action‖ is ―affirmative will‘s‖ natural
growth and extension, or this is to say, ―appropriate action‘s‖ ground and foundation is upon
―the affirmative willingness of relatives closely relating.‖ Even if it is like this, the two also
still can be equal. ―The sense of shame and distaste‖ of ―the beginning of appropriate action‖
is in a parallel beginning with ―the sense of compassion‖ of ―the beginning of affirmative
will.‖ The precondition of shame and the capacity of shame is knowing ―true and false,‖ and
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 55

knowing ―deference with refined language,‖ and because of this, the sense of shame and
distaste can cover up the will to refined deference and the sensitivity to true and false. If it is
said that ―the relating‖ of ―relatives relating closely‖ is a naturally occurring emotion, then
the content ―the sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate,‖ ―the will of refined
deference,‖ and ―the sensitivity to true and false‖ ―respect‖ could then be said to serve as the
rational emotions constructed upon the foundation of the seniority system. Having seniors and
inferiors, having order, having ethics and rational patterns thus it could be distinguished in the
―tranquility‖ relative to motion, and the ―purity‖ relative to filth. Those who have shame are
respectful of themselves, respect themselves and thereby honor themselves (having self-
honor): People who respect people are respected in return. Taking this as a ground, Song and
Ru traditions adopted ―respect‖ to replace Buddhist ―purity‖ and Daoist ―stillness‖ and served
as the most important work on the cultivation of the will‘s nature.

Section IV. Having a Sense of Shame and Having a Being of Shame

Moral cultivation requires a sense of shame persisting to continuously spring forth, and a
moment will not emerge merely having sense of shame and then a shameless springing forth
as Scheller and Sartre both understood the sense of shame: only when being seen by the
other‘s gaze will shame appear. For this reason, establishing the existence of the sense of
shame means establishing the sense of shame that springs forth ―without resting from dusk
through dawn,‖ which requires that ―shame‖ gather the stipulation and guarantee of substance
and function. Merely speaking with regard to activity, the emergence of shame might merely
be a sudden spur of the moment ―event‖; it might be a discovery made by suddenly turning
one‘s head back to look. Scheller said: ―In some kind of sense of the phrase ‗sense of shame,‘
the sense of shame is a kind of form of feeling ourselves, and due to this, it is attributed to the
region of self-feeling; this is the substance of the sense of shame. Since there is an event
occuring in all of our senses of shame, I want to call it ‗turning back to myself.‘‖ 11 ―‛Shame‘
is always shame for the sake of some thing; it is related some fact; this fact spontaneously
‗demands‘ shame, and this has absolutely no relation to our individual modes of ‗I.‘‖12
Scheller and Sartre have no way to accept that human‘s have innate goodness under the
theoretical tradition of original sin. They also have no way to accept ―the sense of
compassion, that all humans have it; the sense of shame and distaste for the inappropriate,
that all humans have it.‖ Scheller said: ―The mind‘s sense of shame takes the existence of
spiritual individuals as its precondition, therefore, the body‘s sense of shame ultimately
universally exists in the human body and at any point in time in human development…On the
contrary, the mind‘s sense of shame is definitely not a universal attribute of humans, and will
not appear at any stage of an individual‘s and race‘s development.‖13 Without a framework of
shame‘s substance and function shame will become a distinct event randomly emerging
within the process of individual and racial development, and due to this, Scheller has a ―turn
back to myself‖ speech about shame. On the contrary, in the Confucian tradition, shame is the
unified source of substance and function, this is just as MuZong San had summarized it:

11
马克斯·舍勒：(价值的颠覆), pp. 179-180. Trans. Chad Meyers
12
Same as above: pp. 184.
13
Same as above: pp. 197-198.
56 HuaNan Gong

―substance, that is, activity.‖ Confucians very early on determined a substance of shame‘s
―resourceful spring undulating along, no need to rest from dusk through dawn,‖ and only once
there is this ―substance,‖ is it possible for ―the acting self to have shame (Confucius),‖
―eternally bright and wise (Song Ming lixue),‖ and this is also to say, shame can and also
should unfold at any time in any circumstance of a human‘s development. Upon the
foundation of the sense of shame, these three: fearing shame, embarrassment and humiliation
unfold as a unified process and form; people with a sense of shame have concern over the loss
of self-dignity and the sinking of self-value, and therefore ―fear shame.‖ Due to fearing shame
there is the capacity not to act, having respect; because of this, fearing shame is subordinate to
the future. At the very moment when self-dignity is lost or falls, and at the very moment when
self-value sinks, one will deeply perceive the situation about to happen; it enacts an attack
upon positive self-perception, self-frustration, that is, emotive perception and emotional
reaction, and thus ―shy away.‖ The loss of self-dignity and the sinking of self-value are kinds
of facts that will persistently produce effects in my sense of shame: aftertastes, reflections,
being ashamed for what the past had expected out of my deepest sense of value; being
ashamed regards the sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper, and only due to it
can I feel ashamed. Shame and Being unfold the same path, fearing shame, embarrassment,
and feeling ashamed (these three) respectively correspond to dasein‘s three dimension: future,
present, and past. Due to having had an experience feeling ashamed now engenders concern
for the next repeat of self-dignity suffering an attack, then the fear of shame emerges out of
my concern over being ashamed again, and lastly, the feeling of shame emerges from being
afraid of shame … the sense of shame and distaste for willing the improper is substance
(being) flowing without rest from dusk through dawn, ceaselessly persistent to emerge with
functions.
Mencius took ―shame‖ to serve as one of the most important sources of dignity, and
values; ―shame‖ takes humans and sculpts them into moral people. A person with dignity, yet
without a sense of shame and distaste for willing the inappropriate, will decay towards natural
humans and even all the way towards beasts. Because of this, we can much more
appropriately understand the deepest layer of sense in Mencius‘ statement: ―A shameless and
tasteless will is not human.‖ Due to this kind of wellspring, people self-respect, self-form and
self-dignify, and thus are able to suppress the decadence of natural humans, thereby pulling
away with distance from the theory of ―life being called sex.‖ Mencius took shame to serve as
the source of values, the root of existence; the social order of values that it provides is the
content of a real sense of shame, and its universal significance then lies in taking shame to
serve as human existence‘s real form and source of inspiration.14
Speaking from existentialism, ―shame‖ is not only one of the most important modes of
self-unfolding, but it is also one of the most important modes of the self to pass along and
exchange ways of relating to the world: take shame to perceive the world, to respond to the
world. The ten thousand creatures and the others have all been pulled up to face my inherent
will; the ten thousand creatures and the others‘ emergence primarily act as entities that have
some kind of significance for me, capable of producing entities that have some kind of
function in relation to me.

14
Of course, in the framework of Confucian thought, the ten thousand things and the other person are able to
become existing beings that have taste, because they have the same kind of emotional connection to a sense of
compassion.
 Shame in Chinese Classic Philosophy 57

Our experience and rationality are both grounded in this kind of existential mode—in
other words, this kind of existent mode correspondingly sculpted a kind of special way to
experience and special way to think that is founded upon ―shame.‖ By using shame to receive
entities, the self-character of shame determines not only that entities that humans are
concerned about are objective self-existent substances, but rather entities that produce
interrelations with humans and generate effects upon humans; they are entities becoming
―events.‖ Taking shame to connect with entities makes entities become ―events‖: ―entities are
also events‖—this classic explanation precisely shows the special concern of this kind of
experiential mode and rational way to think.
Confucians tended towards the self-formation of human ethicality, and thereby they
broke open a function for the sense of shame. Due to this breaking through of shame‘s sense
into a function, they could sculpt an existence out of the unified source of substance and
function: the being of having shame. Speaking with regard to Daoists who were also
completely focused upon the will‘s self-formation, shame was also made to serve as a kind of
important mountain pass for protecting the nature of the will. In Zhuang Zi‘s Outer
Documents and Random Collections, shame had been taken several times out of Confucius‘
mouth for his own employment, but in a way that modified shame‘s significance from its
basic Confucian employment. For instance:

In the sheer proximity of an eloquent speaker, he even felt shame to open his ears to hear
it; and for paying an eloquent speaker like that a personal interview! How would he be able to
take it! (Zhuangzi: Ze Yang)

As a father, he must be able to make himself known explicitly to his son; as an elder
brother, he must be able to guide his younger brother. If a father cannot make himself known
explicitly to his child, or if an elder brother cannot guide his younger brother, then
relationships between father–son and elder brother–younger brother are worthless. Your
brother is a thief who steals very valuable things and harms the world; if you cannot guide
him out of this path, and you are a genius, then you should feel shame to be one (Zhuangzi:
Dao Zhi).
It isn‘t difficult to see that the region of shame in Daoism and the region of shame in the
mind of Confucians like Mencius cover similar ground; however, Doaists emphasized self-
guarding the naturally potent ―simplicity‖ of the will; they took speech, acts, and things that
injured the nature of the will‘s basic simplicity as their particular sensitivity to shame: lose
the simple inherent nature and feel shame. They had shame and there were many words and
actions they weren‘t willing to do, and only in this way were they able to protect themselves
and not lose. In Zhuangzi we find a story of a northerner who ran into a glimpse of the
emperor Shun; he saw it as an affair to mourn his principles over, he saw it as scraping the
self-protecting bottom line, and was therefore ―shamed to see it,‖ willing to make a move out
of the way to see an emperor and as a result through himself into the deep abyss. In Zhuangzi:
Make Way for the King someone carrying a jar knew about mechanical efficiency, and also
knew that mechanisms will bring along mechanical events, that mechanical events in turn will
generate a mechanical heart, and thus felt a ―shame to will‖ mechanically. ―Shame‖ then
became the safeguard of simple intrinsic nature, ―the range of shame‖ being the self-
protecting bottom line. Therefore, shame reached a concern of importance for the Daoist style
of cultivating the nature of the will. Because of this, it could be said that in Daoism the sense
58 HuaNan Gong

of shame generated a being of shame, which is without a doubt one more great principle of
understanding on this path of thought and existence.

REFERENCES

Du, Yu. (1997). Chuqiu Jing Zhuang Jijie 春秋经传集解 (Collected Commentaries the
Spring and Autumn Annals). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Press.
Guo, Qingfan (2004). Zhuangzi JIshi 庄子集释 (Collected Works of Zhuangzi). Beijing:
Zhonghua Shuju.
Jiao, Xu. (1996). Mengzi Zhengyi 孟子正义 (Commentary on Mencius). Changsha: Yuelu
Shushe.
Jiao Xun (2003).Yi Zhangju易章句 (Commentary on the Book of Change).
Kong Anguo,Kong Yinda (2000). Shangshu Zhengyi尚书正义 (Commentaries on the book of
history). Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Li Zhehou and Liu Gangji, eds. (1984). The History of Chinese Art. Beijing: Chinese Social
Science Press.
Ren Jiyu(1959). Laozi de Yanjiu 老子的研究 (A Study on Laozi). In Laozi Zhexue Taolun Ji
老子哲学讨论集 (a collection of essays on the philosophy of Laozi). Beijing: Zhonghua
Shuju. Zhenzhou: Jiuzhou Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1998). Being and Nothingness. Translated from the Chinese version by
XuanLiang Chen. An Wei Literature Press.
Scheller, Max (2004). The Subversion of Values, translated from the Chinese version by
TiLun Luo, Beijing. JiuZhou Press.
Wang Fuzhi (1996). Chuangshan Quanshu 船山全书 (Collected Works of Chuangshan).
Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
Xu, Shen (1963). Shuowen Jiezhi 说文解字 (The Explanation of Characters). Beijing:
Zhonghua Shuju.
Zhao, Qi. & Sun, Shi. (1999). Mengzi Zhushu 孟子注疏 (Commentaries on Mencius).
Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Zheng Xuan, Kong Yinda (1999). Liji Zhengyi 礼记正 (Commentaries on the Book of Rites).
Beijing: Beijing University Press).
ZhiDe, Lai (2004). Collected Commentaries on The Book of Changes. Beijing, JiuZhou
Publishing House. Translated by Chad Meyers.
Zhu, Xi. (1983). Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四书章句集注 (explanation and collected
commentaries on the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 59-83 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

THE MANIFESTATION OF NEUROTICISM IN THE USE

OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY

Lauren L. Saling1 and James G. Phillips2

1
School of Social Sciences and Liberal Studies, Charles Sturt University
2
School of Psychology, Psychiatry, and Psychological Medicine, Monash University

ABSTRACT
The present paper considers whether individuals with neurotic traits (anxiety,
depression, shyness, low self-esteem) are more prone to use information and
communication technology. We have previously found that individuals with low self
esteem and social anxiety are prone to use the internet. The internet offers the opportunity
to edit one‘s self-presentation through email and blogging benefitting the socially
anxious. As the internet serves to document behaviour, it also provides evidence of
emotional or irrational behaviours. Procrastinators prefer email, and those prone to panic
are more likely to post messages on discussion groups. There is also evidence that
neurotic individuals send more SMS. The present paper also considers the potential to
develop addictions to technology. There is limited research addressing neuroticism as a
predictor of the use of information and communication technology, nevertheless, this is
an area of potential interest, particularly as the internet serves to document behaviour and
self presentation in a way that was hitherto not possible.

The internet was initially a directory of searchable information, but increasing access to a
variety of social networking applications now means that not only can corporations decide
how they present themselves to the world, but individuals can also decide how they present
themselves. Given that personal information is now available on the world wide web, the
lives of individuals are increasingly subject to scrutiny. Some members of the community are
potentially more vulnerable to this phenomenon than others. As the ill-considered word or act
cannot be undone once in cyberspace, and can leave long lasting electronic traces, it is
important to understand how personal style can influence the use of information and
communication technology. Within this context the present chapter considers how neurotic
60 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

tendencies may manifest when using information and communication technologies such as
the internet and mobile phones.
The internet was the product of the efforts of computer scientists and it provides
increasing opportunities for government and commercial sectors to get their message out to
the general public. As such, the internet is of great interest to business, market researchers,
and psychologists. As the user base of this technology has shifted from highly trained
professionals, to the general community (and even to marginalised sections of the
community), there have been efforts devoted to standardisation and improving usability (e.g.
W3C) (Nielsen, 2000).
Psychologists in the area of Ergonomics and Human Factors have assisted in the
evaluation of the usability of technologies (i.e. human machine interaction). Nevertheless the
disciplines of Ergonomics and Human Factors are somewhat lacking in understanding
technologies that seek to enhance human to human interaction. This is an unfortunate
historical accident that arises because most ergonomics texts (e.g. Fitts & Posner, 1967;
Norman, 1988) overlooked interpersonal interaction, and until recently continued to do so
(e.g. Wickens & Hollands, 2000). This is increasingly becoming an issue in the face of the
emergence and widespread acceptance of the internet as a tool to support interpersonal
interaction. Indeed, within the commercial sector there has been a growing realisation that
usability alone does not determine internet use. Other factors such as affect and aesthetics
(Lavie & Tractinsky, 2004; Norman, 2002; Tractinsky, Katz, & Ikar, 2000) also appear to
drive the use of the internet and mobile phones. In particular, there is a growing need to
understand people‘s use of technology to support their social interaction.
Although overlooked by most, some early ergonomists made attempts to address
communication and social interaction (Argyle, 1967; Welford, 1966; 1968; 1987). This is a
useful starting point from which to consider people's use of information and communication
technology. Argyle (1967) and Welford (1968) attempted to extend ergonomic models of
human-machine interaction to human to human interaction (see Figure 1). Each person was
viewed as an information processing channel, and social interaction was modelled as an
interplay between two information processing channels, where one communication channel
represented person A and the other communication channel represented person B. The
communication channels incorporated what was known about human information processing
at that time, and involved stages responsible for encoding (perception), transmission
(interpretation or translation), and decoding (responding). The channels had limited capacity
for processing information and were perceived as involving feedback loops. For example, in
this case, person A's actions elicit responses from person B as feedback. Note that
information comes from A to B from a variety of sources verbal (intended) and non-verbal
(unintended), and social skill in part is reflected by the appropriate control of messaging
(Argyle, 1967). Hence within the context of the internet or mobile phones, it is likely that
emotional reactivity may influence the number of messages and the response to feedback,
whereas a willingness to self-disclose is likely to influence the choice of communication
channel (see Phillips, Saling, & Blaszczynski, 2008). Indeed, it is important to understand
such tendencies as they have a direct relevance to privacy legislation (Wang, Lee, & Wang,
1998) and an individual‘s franchise in an increasingly electronic government (Toregas, 2001).
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 61

Figure 1. Ergonomic Model of Human to Human Interaction.

Unfortunately the psychological disciplines most associated with the use of computer
technology (i.e. Ergonomics and Human Factors) have tended to overlook the reasons and
motivations underpinning behaviour (Skinner, 1985). Indeed a lot of current psychological
research addresses behaviours that are intrinsically motivated, and where primary, and even
secondary, reinforcers are not immediately apparent. Hence early attempts to address social
interaction borrowed concepts from Behaviorism (Argyle, 1967; Welford, 1976). Argyle
(1967) suggested that social interaction was likely to continue where interaction was
reinforcing and furthered an individual's goals (Argyle, 1967). Behaviorist theory would
suggest that the amount of interaction will depend upon reinforcement history, while the
communication channel chosen is liable to be that channel that maximises reinforcement
(Hernstein, 1961).
Nevertheless the concept of reinforcement is somewhat circular in usage. Reinforcement
is invoked to explain increases in behaviour, but when Behaviorists are asked to define
reinforcement, it is typically defined as that which increases behaviour (Meehl, 1950). In
other words that which is to be explained (explanandum) is also the explanation (explanans).
This problem was addressed by discussing tendencies for reinforcements to work across
situations (Hernstein, 1961; Premack, 1959), in other words to infer predispositions to
respond within the organism. This explains our current interest in personality as a potential
predictor of the use of information and communication technology.

Neuroticism as a Primary Personality Feature

Personality theories consider the relationships between a constellation of response

tendencies and predispositions as a method of predicting behaviours. Personality is typically
62 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

construed in the psychological literature as involving a number of dimensions (Eysenck,

1994; McCrae & John, 1992).
Eysenck (1991) postulated three primary dimensions of personality: Extraversion,
Neuroticism and Psychoticism. According to Eysenck‘s model, neuroticism, like extraversion
and psychoticism, represents a higher order personality factor that is comprised of a number
of lower order traits. According to this model, neuroticism is thought to include a number of
traits such as anxiety, depression, guilt feelings, low self-esteem, tension, irrationality,
shyness, moodiness and emotionality (Eysenck, 1994). Collectively these traits have been
understood to be markers of emotional instability. It should be noted, however, that not all
neurotic individuals will display all of the traits underpinning neuroticism.
Another broadly accepted model of the structure of personality, the five factor model
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) specifies five dimensions of personality, Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness. As is the case with Eysenck‘s model, each
of these higher order factors is comprised of a number of lower order traits. Therefore,
neuroticism is considered to be a primary personality dimension in both models of
personality.

The Biological Basis of Neuroticism

Eysenck‘s (1967, 1994) three factor model invokes a biological basis for personality
dimensions. Eysenck located the neural substrate for neuroticism in the hypothalamus and
limbic system and argued that differences in levels of neuroticism between individuals is due
to differing levels of instability associated with this system with respect to the stress response.
As such, Eysensk‘s model postulates that individuals with high neuroticism will typically
have an exaggerated response to stress and this response will manifest for a far longer period
than the exposure to the stressor.
Empirical studies have revealed conflicting findings with respect to stress reactivity in
individuals with high neuroticism. For instance, Bono and Vey (2007) found the individuals
with high neuroticism demonstrate an intense stress response, that manifests behaviourally as
anxiety or depression, and has been shown to correlate with a number of physiological
measures including increased heart rate. However, Chida and Harmer (2008) performed a
meta-analysis of 729 studies that investigated the relationship between personality variables
and stress response and recovery. The meta-analysis revealed that although individuals with
high neuroticism did not display a heightened stress response they were slower to recover
from stress-induced cardiovascular excitation (Chida & Harmer, 2008). Further the authors
postulate that the lack of stress reactivity in those with high neuroticism could be due to
continuous exposure to stress in such individuals which ultimately dulls their acute stress
reaction. Certainly, this analysis reveals that individual with high neuroticism have an altered
response to stress.
The biological basis of neuroticism has been addressed by investigating the brain areas
involved using imaging techniques. The neural correlates underpinning neuroticism and its
link to anxiety and mood disorders have recently been explored using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (Haas, Omura, Constable & Canli, 2007). Haas et al. (2007) investigated
the brain activation associated with an emotional conflict task in individuals with high trait
neuroticism. The authors noted that those individuals who obtained high scores on the
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 63

anxious form of neuroticism (as compared to the depressive form) displayed activation of the
amygdala and subgenual anterior cingulate, which are brain areas associated with anxiety and
mood disorders. As such, activation of these areas appears to provide the basis for the
connection between neuroticism and anxiety and mood disorders.
Kumari et al. (2007) found that when a stressful situation is merely anticipated, rather
than actually presented, individuals with high neuroticism experienced a greater intensity of
fear than individuals who scored low on measures of neuroticism. In this experiment,
participants were told that they would be experiencing an electric shock and self-report
measures as well as physiological measures, such as heart rate, were recorded. Interestingly,
individuals with high neuroticism reported a greater intensity of fear than that reported by
those with low neuroticism. In addition, there was decreased brain activation in those with
high neuroticism when compared to participants with low neuroticism. The authors explained
this finding as being due to suppression by the fear response, an avoidance mechanism often
employed by individuals with high ‗resting arousal‘. As such, individuals with high
neuroticism may have less effective coping strategies, and rely on avoidance coping
mechanisms (Robinson, Ode, Wilkowski & Amodio, 2007). This will be elaborated upon
later in this chapter.

Personality, Information Processing and Problem-Solving

As indicated previously, personality variables appear to be associated with the

individual‘s response to stress, in particular the way in which the individual manages stress
and their ability to process information when under stress as well as the problem solving
strategy adopted in stressful situations. Stress appears to have a number of different effects on
information processing. Where stress is acute and short-lived, it may improve task
performance as it serves to focus the individual‘s attention on task demands (Andreano &
Cahill, 2006). However, chronic stress, particularly where there is prolonged exposure to high
cortisol levels, results in performance decrements (Jelici, Geraerts, Merckelbach & Guerrieri,
2004). Even acute stress can result in performance decrements particularly in tasks of
working memory (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005). The working memory system is involved in
holding small amounts of information active for a short time period such that crucial
information can be selected for further processing. As such, decrements associated with
working memory will undermine information processing. It is thought that optimal
functioning of the working memory system is particularly important under conditions of
stress where the individual needs to efficiently process the essential features of incoming
stimuli. Thus, any compromise to this system when stressed, serves to compromise the
individual‘s ability to process information.
Stress and arousal are known to change how information is processed. With danger or
threat there tends to be a narrowing of attention (Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004, p. 330).
The range or breadth of attention is restricted, such that stressed or aroused individuals
concentrate very hard on the source of stress or how to avoid it, but there is a concomitant
tendency to ignore surrounding information. The tendency to ignore surrounding information
means there is a loss of "context" or situational awareness. When stress and arousal leads to a
focus upon a clear and functional solution then the tendency to focus can be useful. However,
when the solution is not immediately obvious, a focus induced by stress and arousal can
64 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

compromise efforts to problem solve. Focussed attention may not be appropriate when the
solution to a problem requires a broader integration of cues, an appreciation of context, or a
flexible approach to circumstances. In other words, stress and arousal are thought to cause a
rigidity or "cognitive tunnelling" such that people focus exclusively upon one issue to the
detriment of a more flexible consideration of a wider set of options (Wickens et al., 2004, p.
330).
Although, researchers have considered relationships between extraversion and
information processing capacity (e.g. Brebner, 1991), less has been done in terms of
furthering the understanding of how neuroticism influences information processing.
Extraverts have been considered to be under aroused and hence stimulus seeking to maintain
optimal arousal levels (Eysenck, 1967). However, Brebner (1980) refined this position,
invoking separate mechanisms for stimulus excitation/inhibition and response
excitation/inhibition. Brebner (1980) suggested that extraverts are predisposed to respond,
whereas introverts are predisposed to inspect stimuli. There is some evidence to support this
position (e.g. Brebner & Cooper, 1974; Brebner & Flavel, 1978).
Although Brebner primarily studied extraversion, he did propose a model of emotional
reactivity in the journal "Personality and Individual Differences" which has implications for
other personality types. Brebner (1998) proposed an adaptive model of decision making that
could be applied to emotional responses and hence can be used to draw inferences as to the
nature of information processing in individuals with high neuroticism. The advantage of such
a model is that it has been validated in other domains and hence can make some useful
predictions. Brebner‘s model implied that neurotic individuals were less considered in their
information processing, accumulating less information before reacting. On this basis, neurotic
individuals would be fast and inaccurate in their emotional responses. From this, one can
make predictions about their use of information and communication technology. For instance,
individuals with high neuroticism scores might be more likely to use the more immediate
SMS (text) rather than voice calls, and may use this technology in an ill-considered fashion.
This is reinforced by findings that under conditions of high stress, individuals typically
behave more impulsively as demonstrated by shorter reaction times (Duncko, Johnson,
Merikangas & Grillon, 2009) and individuals with high neuroticism act as if under stress
(hyper-aroused). Although, such behaviour may be adaptive in situations where there is a
genuine threat, it becomes maladaptive where the individual experiences constant high level
stress, such as that displayed by neurotics, and ultimately undermines functioning.

The Coping Style of Neurotic Individuals

Coping typically refers to the individual‘s ability to deal with stress. A narrow focus to
problem solving is typical of neurotic individuals and is associated with low emotional
intelligence and emotion-focussed coping (Brebner, 2001). There appear to be a number of
facets of emotional intelligence involving the ability to identify emotions, to integrate
emotions and thoughts and to manage emotions (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000). Matthews
et al. (2006) explored the relationship between emotional intelligence, personality and task-
induced stress. Emotional intelligence predicts coping such that individuals with high
emotional intelligence are better able to cope with stressful situations. In particular, the
authors investigated the five personality dimensions identified in the five factor model;
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 65

Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness (Costa &

McCrae, 1992). Matthews et al. (2006) found that neuroticism was related to distress, worry
and emotion-focussed coping. Such individuals therefore do not exhibit high emotional
intelligence but rather demonstrate difficulties in managing task-induced stress. Indeed, on
tasks requiring emotional regulation, those with high neuroticism tend to perform poorly
(Bono & Vey, 2007). Neuroticism has been found to reliably predict tense arousal in
performance-oriented settings (e.g. Thayer, 1989).
Connor-Smith and Flachsbart (2007) examined the relationship between coping style and
personality as personality features may either facilitate or sabotage coping. In particular, the
authors explored coping associated with the five personality dimensions (Costa & McCrae,
1992). Extraversion and conscientiousness predicted positive coping strategies including
problem solving. Neuroticism, on the other hand, predicted negative coping strategies
including withdrawal and emotion-focussed coping. Emotion-focussed coping typically
involves avoidance of the negative emotion associated with the stressful situation and tends to
be associated with a worse outcome than problem-focussed coping that aims to address the
source of stress.
In general terms, individuals with high neuroticism appear to experience more negative
affect and are typically less happy than those who attain low scores on measures of
neuroticism (Brebner, Donaldson, Kirby & Ward, 1995) and report higher levels of stress
(Costa, Somerfield & McCrae, 1996) which ultimately undermines their capacity to manage
stressful situations. Research implies that neurotic individuals would be predisposed to use
the internet for procrastination, and be less adaptive in their use of the internet. Perhaps
making more requests for assistance. As will be outlined later, there may be some evidence to
support this position.

Measuring Neuroticism

Two instruments are commonly used in psychological research and clinical practice to
measure levels of neuroticism. The NEO-PI-R is the instrument used to measure personality
that is based on the five factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1985), while the EPQ (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975) is based on Eysenck‘s three factor model. Like other personality measures,
the measurement of neuroticism involves self-report such that the individual endorses or fails
to endorse statements which are thought to encapsulate neuroticism. The more statements that
the individual endorses that are thought to reflect neuroticism, the higher the neuroticism
score the individual achieves.
In considering the relationship between neuroticism and the use of technology, it is
noteworthy that traits such as anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, irrationality, and shyness
also contribute to the construct of neuroticism (Eysenck, 1994; McCrae, 1990) and as such
the presence of these traits is taken to reflect evidence of neuroticism (Allred & Smith, 1989).
Therefore research incorporating these traits also requires discussion here.
66 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

Neuroticism as a Predictor of Psychopathology and Behavioural Problems

Individuals who obtain high neuroticism scores on measures such as the NEO-PI-R or the
EPQ, may display a predisposition for problematic behaviours including anti-social behaviour
and mood disorders. Thus for instance, antisocial behaviour in the workplace has been found
to correlate with high levels of neuroticism (Duffy, Shaw, Scott, & Tepper, 2006). This
behavior tends to be characterised by undermining others such that their ability to establish
positive social relationships and achieve work-related success is diminished. Other authors
have noted a correlation between intimate partner-directed violence and neuroticism
(Hellmuth & McNulty, 2008). Further, an individual displaying neurotic traits is more likely
to have difficulty in dealing with uncertainty (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008) and is prone to the
development of anxiety (Borkovec & Sharpless, 2004) and depression (Roelofs, Huibers,
Peeters, Arntz, 2008). It is of note, however, that the impact of neuroticism on behaviour
cannot be measured in isolation as other personality factors can mediate the effect of
neuroticism and vice versa. However, even when controlling for other factors, high
neuroticism certainly does appear to be associated with problematic behaviours, particularly
behaviours which impact on social relationships.
Given this, individuals with high neuroticism may find it difficult to establish social
networks. This is of particular relevance where the development of social connections relies
on face to face interaction. Such individuals may welcome the opportunity to foster social
relationships in an environment where they can edit their self-presentation. Various internet
applications, such as social networking sites, weblogs as well as mobile phone applications,
such as SMS, offer this. As such it is of definite interest to investigate personality variables
that predict the use of mobile phones and the internet. This is particularly pertinent with the
ever-growing ubiquity of such technology. To this end a variety of personality traits have
been examined such as self-esteem, perfectionism, extraversion and neuroticism. The present
discussion will be limited to neuroticism and its associated traits.

Personality Predictors of Internet Use

Early studies observed a tendency for shyness and loneliness to dispose people towards
internet use. For instance, Scealy, Phillips and Stevenson (2002) found that shy individuals,
particularly males, were more likely to use the internet for recreational activities. This finding
is of interest as it suggests that although the internet affords the opportunity for shy and
socially anxious individuals to pursue social relationships without the need for anxiety-
provoking face to face contact, this is not necessarily the pursuit of choice for such
individuals. Rather, they may pursue other internet-based activities including
leisure/recreational activities. Matanda, Jenvey and Phillips (2004) found that better educated
individuals were more likely to seek out entertainment on the internet, while the young and
lonely used the internet for entertainment. Thus it is not clear whether heavier internet use is a
cause or a consequence of neurotic tendencies such as social anxieties (Kraut et al., 1998).
Through its various applications, including social networking sites and weblogs, the
internet enables users to develop and maintain friendships without the need for face to face
interaction. Social networking sites such as Facebook allow users to create an online profile,
comprised of among other things, current relationship, vocational status, photos of the user
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 67

and family and friends (Zhao, Grasmuck & Martin, 2008). Personal blogs are used to convey
daily information, thoughts and aspiration, akin to a diary (McNeill, 2003). For both of these
applications, the user controls the content of information disclosed.
As such, individuals who find it difficult to establish social networks, due to social
anxiety, low self-esteem, shyness and the like, may find that the internet environment offers
an attractive alternative. For instance, Hertel, Shroer, Batinic and Naumann (2008) found the
individuals with high neuroticism showed a preference for the use of email over face to face
interactions. This was particularly obvious where there was the potential for social threats in
the communication situation.
Moreover, it has been noted that the self-efficacy and sociability of shy, socially-anxious
individuals is enhanced by establishing online social networks (Ando et al., 2004; Sakomoto
et al., 2002; Tidwell & Walther, 2002). Given that social anxiety results from a desire to
present oneself in a positive manner in combination with a lack of presentational confidence
(Leary & Kowalski, 1994), it naturally follows that socially anxious individuals would
explore online friendships. People who have high neuroticism and its associated traits of
social anxiety and low self-esteem, may feel very anxious following a face to face interaction
as they have little control over their self-presentation. It has been found that online
interactions cause less anxiety for such individuals than do face to face encounters (Rice &
Markey, 2009).
Given that such individuals may avoid face to face social encounters leading to social
isolation, it would appear that online friendships have the potential to enhance psychological
well-being by providing access to a social network. Some researchers argue, however, that
online friendships are of dubious quality and that there may in fact be detrimental effects due
to having large numbers of ‗cyber-friends‘ which distracts from ‗real‘ social relationships
(Cummings, Butler & Kraut, 2002; Kraut et al., 1998). However, there is growing evidence
that online friendships are often grounded in offline friendships, either because online
communication solidifies already existing weak face to face social networks or because online
friends may become offline friends (McKenna & Bargh, 2000). As such, online social
networks have the potential to avert loneliness and may assist in the development of social
skills (Ando & Sakamoto, 2008).
In addition to observations that internet use can be associated with social anxiety, there
are indications that internet use is also related to avoidance and poorer problem solving. For
instance, there are tendencies for the internet to be used for purposes of procrastination
(Lavoie & Pychyl, 2001). Procrastination is a form of task related avoidance (Mann, Burnett,
Radford, & Ford, 1997). Indeed, Phillips and Reddie (2007) noted that procrastination was a
predictor of higher amounts of email use in the work place. In particular, Baker and Phillips
(2007) found that people reported that they should have been doing something else when they
were responding to emails instead. Tendencies towards procrastination can ultimately detract
from productivity as time and resources are not devoted appropriately (Beswick, Rothblum, &
Mann, 1988).
Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) investigated the relationship between decisional style
and performance upon online assessments in university students using WebCT (an internet-
based application for assignment submission, discussion boards and subject evaluations
among other applications). Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) found that procrastinators were
less likely to submit their online assignments (see Rossett, 2000). Their response to the course
of study was also of interest. Phillips, Jory and Mogford (2007) found that procrastinators
68 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

were more likely to provide negative course evaluations. Research indicates that losers tend to
blame circumstance (Weiner, 1986), and in this case procrastinators potentially attributed
their poorer performance to features associated with the course of study (Higgins & Snyder,
1989) when in reality they were contributing to their poor performance through late
submission (or non-submission) of assignments (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988).
The consequences of avoidance within the educational sector are comparatively minor.
Nevertheless, the use of the internet as a form of task avoidance can be irrational and
maladaptive within the work place. For instance Lim (2002) observed that staff used the
internet at work for personal purposes to redress perceived workplace injustices. As the
browser history and download accounting keep records, this is potentially unwise.
There were other indicators of irrationality associated with internet use. Phillips, Jory and
Mogford (2007) considered whether decisional style (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997)
could predict the use of discussion groups. The authors found that students who scored high
on the decisional style of hypervigilance (characterized by a feelings of time pressure and a
tendency to a panic) were more likely to post messages on discussion groups. This is
interesting because Radford, Mann and Kalucy (1986) have previously found high
correlations between hypervigilance and scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (r=0.48)
and Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire (r=0.68) in 39 patients hospitalised for depressive and
psychoneurotic conditions.
Individuals with high neuroticism typically find it difficult to establish and maintain
social connections due to their negative affectivity (Stokes, 1985). Amichai-Hamburger and
Ben-Artzi (2000) explored the relationship between neuroticism and internet use. The authors
found that there was a positive correlation between high internet use, particularly of socially-
oriented internet sites, and high neuroticism particularly in females. In a follow-up study,
Amichai-Hamburger and Ben-Artzi (2003) examined the impact of internet use upon users‘
well-being, with a view to investigating whether internet use promotes well-being in users
who have high neuroticism scores. This study concurred with Stokes‘ (1985) model, and
indicated that high neuroticism and its associated loneliness, leads to a high uptake of internet
applications which ultimately promotes well-being.
Although, the use of internet applications to foster social networks may be beneficial for
individuals who find it difficult to develop social connections in more traditional contexts,
such individuals are also prone to the development of internet overuse. For instance, Jin, Su
and Cao (2007) found that neuroticism was a predictor of internet overuse.

Problematic Internet Use

Internet applications, particularly those that foster the development of social networks, be
they social networking sites or interactive gaming sites, provide an avenue for individuals
who have difficulties in forming offline relationships to nevertheless foster social
connections. Therefore, such activities have the potential to promote user well-being,
particularly in individuals who have high neuroticism, introversion, social anxiety and low
self-esteem. However, given that such individuals would be drawn to the internet, it is not
surprising that the use of such internet applications can become excessive and potentially
problematic.
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 69

Internet addiction (Young, 1998), like other addictive behaviours is characterized by

problematic overuse to the detriment of other activities. As such, other domains of the user‘s
life may be undermined by heavy internet use (Kraut et al., 1998). These include social,
educational, health-related and vocational dimensions.
Indeed, Suler (1999) outlines eight factors that may distinguish between pathological and
non-pathological internet use. Each of these factors is understood as a spectrum, ranging from
normal to pathological. The number and nature of other domains that are disrupted owing to
the pursuit of internet-related activities is of relevance to the classification of normal versus
pathological internet use, such that the more aspects of functioning affected, the more likely
the internet use is to be pathological. Another factor that Suler identifies is the number or
nature of needs served by the internet use. An individual whose needs are largely addressed
by their internet use such that their internet use becomes increasingly pervasive and necessary
(to avert negative affect), is more likely to experience pathological internet use. There is some
evidence for this position. For instance Ceyhan and Ceyhan (2008) found that loneliness and
depression were significant predictors of internet overuse and that in these individuals the
internet became a necessary tool to avert negative affectivity.

Personality and Self-Presentation

As indicated earlier, the internet provides the opportunity for user‘s to edit their self-
presentation. Of interest, it has been noted that individuals with high neuroticism and
introversion will locate their real selves on the internet rather than in more traditional social
interactions (Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel & Fox, 2002). This is because face to face
interactions impose many constraints on self-presentation, while the online interface enables
the user to present their ideal self, an identity that may not be possible to reveal in offline
interactions due to factors such as anxiety or shyness (Bargh, McKenna & Fitzsimmons,
2002). As such, the fact that the user has control over the nature of information revealed to
other users and the manner in which they market themselves to others, enables individuals
who find it difficult to establish social connections in face to face contexts, to connect with
like-minded individuals.
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that an individual‘s online persona may differ from
his/her offline persona (Suler, 2004). Using anonymous internet applications, such as chat
rooms, facilitates user control over self-presentation as there are no constraints applied. More
surprising is that even where the interface is not anonymous, such as social networking sites
(e.g. Facebook,), users may nevertheless construct an identity (Zhao et al., 2008). Suler
(2004) suggests that the change in identity demonstrated online is best understood as
disinhibition. Thus users say and do things that they would not say and do in a face to face
context. This disinhibition may be positively or negatively valenced such that people may
behave more kindly to others online than offline or rather may become more aggressive
online (Suler, 2004). Thus for instance, Whitty and Carville (2008) found that people reported
being more likely to tell a self-serving lie via e-mail, followed by phone and then face to face.
Interestingly, participants also preferred email when delivering harsh truths as well,
suggesting that people would be less inhibited in what they had to say to both strangers and
friends on-line.
70 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

The enhanced opportunity to control messages on the internet appears to influence the
choice of communication channel adopted (see Phillips, Saling, & Blaszczynski, 2008). Thus
individuals who want to control their self-presentation display a preference for the use of
SMS (text messaging) over phone calls (Rettie, 2007). Such individuals find the use of phone
calls to be anxiety provoking and hence opt for the use of messaging instead. Similarly,
weblogs are often used by those who wish to self-disclose in a non-face to face forum.

Psychological Predictors of Blogging

Blogs or weblogs are a relatively new internet application which involve a personalized
web page, typically belonging to a single author, where regular entries are made to update
readers about the area of the blogs content (Herring, Scheidt, Wright & Bonus, 2005). Blogs
take a number of forms including personal, political and interest-based blogs. The personal
blog, like a personal diary, facilitates the expression of the personal narrative and has been
demonstrated to provide catharsis and hence appears to promote psychological well-being.
However, unlike a paper-based diary, a blog is shared with the online community. Not only is
the blog read by others, but there is also an interactive feature associated with blogs such that
readers can comment on the blog‘s content (Miura & Yamashita, 2007). As such, blogs
enhance the development of social support and friendship with like-minded users.
Baker and Moore (2008a) investigated the change in psychological well-being for
bloggers and non-bloggers who used a social networking site (MySpace). The authors found
that only the bloggers had improved well-being, particularly with respect to social integration
and perceived social support. In contrast, there was no change in these measures for non-
bloggers. This suggests that blogs provide additional avenues for developing social
connections, over and above those offered by other internet applications including social
networking sites. However, in another study, Baker and Moore (2008b) asked MySpace users
if they intended to blog in the future. Those users who scored higher on measures of
psychological distress and lower on measures of satisfaction with current social integration
were more likely to express an intention to blog. This suggests that although blogging may
have beneficial psychological effects, it may also be the case that those individuals who are
attracted to blogging are experiencing greater psychological distress, have less social support
and fewer coping resources than non-bloggers.
Indeed, as is the case with other internet applications, certain personality features can
predict a tendency to engage in blogging. In particular, Guadagno, Okdie and Eno (2008)
found that individuals with openness to experience and high neuroticism were more likely to
be bloggers than those with low neuroticism. This effect was more pronounced for females as
compared to males. The authors postulate that given the difficulties which those high in
neuroticism experience with respect to establishing and maintaining face to face social
relationships, blogs provide a forum to foster social relationships. Thus blogs may be of
particular benefit to those individuals who find it difficult to make social connections in more
traditional ways.
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 71

Psychological Predictors of Mobile Phone Use and Overuse

The mobile phone is predominantly a device for social interaction (Bianchi & Phillips,
2005), but it does offer some potential for display in social settings. For instance Butt and
Phillips (2008) found that extraverts with low agreeableness scores were more interested in
ringtones and wallpaper. However it is likely that anxious or neurotic individuals use the
mobile phone for other reasons. Indeed Phillips, Butt and Blaszczynski (2008) observed a
tendency for neurotic individuals to be less interested in the new features of mobile phones.
Instead Plant (2000) reported the mobile phones were carried as a form of security in case of
emergencies. Although people may carry mobile phones as a form of security, this "safety
net" application does not correlate with actual mobile phone usage (Walsh, White, & Young,
2007), but it does suggest that neurotic individuals may spend time checking that they are
carrying their mobile phones and that the phone is charged.
Mobile phones have the potential to enhance psychological well-being by offering the
user an avenue for establishing and maintaining social contacts. Like the internet, mobile
phones enable users to keep in touch with family and friends without the need for face to face
interactions. This opportunity is heightened by applications such as SMS where only a few
words are needed to stay in touch. As is the case with internet use, there appear to be
personality variables that predict the use and potential overuse of mobile phones. Butt and
Phillips (2008) explored the relationship between personality factors and self-reported mobile
phone use in order to determine whether personality factors predict the pattern and nature of
mobile phone use. Indeed, personality variables did seem to predict both the amount of
mobile phone use and the nature of the communication used (i.e. SMS versus voice). In
particular, individuals with higher neuroticism and extraversion scores, or lower
agreeableness and conscientiousness scores spent more time messaging using SMS than
making voice calls on their mobile phones (Butt & Phillips, 2008).
Bianchi and Phillips (2005) investigated the relationship between personality variables
(low self-esteem, neuroticism and extraversion) and problem mobile phone use. Problem
mobile phone use was measured by asking participants questions about their mobile phone
use which indicated features of addiction. Questions addressed aversive consequences
associated with withdrawal from the mobile phone, using the mobile to escape from life
problems and negative life consequences associated with mobile phone use. The authors
found that low self-esteem and extraversion were predictors of problem mobile phone use.
Although, neuroticism was not found to be a significant predictor of mobile phone use, as
mentioned earlier in this chapter, low self-esteem is a trait of neuroticism and therefore, this
aspect of neuroticism does appear to predict problematic mobile phone use.
Ha, Chin, Park, Ryu and Yu (2008) investigated the variables associated with problem
mobile phone use. The authors found that excessive users reported more anxiety, depression
and lower self esteem than those who used their mobile phones moderately. These users
tended to experience the use of the mobile phone as excessive and uncontrollable. The users
demonstrated a strong attachment to their mobile phones, and the phones appeared to form a
strong part of their self-identity.
Similarly, Walsh and White (2007) examined problem mobile phone use from the
perspective of the importance of the mobile phone to the user‘s identity. In particular, Walsh
and White (2007) explored excessive mobile phone use in terms of the theory of planned
behaviour (Ajzen, 1988; 1991). The theory of planned behaviour postulates that there are
72 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

cognitions underlying behaviour such that the individual engages in a rational, systematic
evaluation of crucial information prior to acting (Ajzen 1988; 1991). The authors found that
mobile phone use was critically associated with self-identity such that individuals reported
that the use of the mobile phone was important to their lives. It appears that mobile phone use
was highly reinforced for these users and had become part of their identity. This suggests that
the users would not readily stop using their mobile phones even where the use of the phone
had become problematic (including financial difficulties due to excessive phone use,
dangerous use such as when driving and the like, Walsh & White, 2007).
Thus, although mobile phone use can have positive consequences in providing a forum
for individuals to maintain their social network, there is also the potential for negative
consequences to arise where mobile phone use becomes excessive. Thus rather than offering a
forum for individuals to maintain contact with friends and family irrespective of distance,
mobile phones can in fact interfere with social functioning. Indeed, mobile phone use can
become so excessive that it can be considered to be an addiction (Munoz-Rivas & Agustin,
2005). The kinds of problems that have been identified as arising from excessive mobile
phone use include dependence, prohibited or dangerous use of a mobile phone such as when
driving and financial difficulties leading to significant debt particularly for young people
(Billieaux, Van Der Linden & Rochat, 2008).

Neurotic Traits, Behaviours and the Use of Information and Communication

Technologies

As discussed above, neurotic traits such as shyness, anxiety, low self-esteem and
emotional lability potentially manifest as avoidance coping (procrastination). There may be
an interest in recreational applications of the technology, with a preference for text based
interactions over voice or face to face interactions, and ineffective coping strategies often
requiring increased assistance. This has been observed as higher use of the internet by the shy
(Scealy et al., 2002), socially anxious (Matanda et al., 2004), and those with low self esteem
(Armstrong et al., 2000). This can manifest as a preference for text based interactions on both
the internet (Baker & Moore, 2008b; Guadagno et al., 2008) and mobile phones (Billieux et
al., 2008; Reid & Reid, 2004). Poorer coping and greater levels of emotional distress can
manifest as panic (Phillips, Jory, & Mogford, 2007) and intentions to Blog (Baker & Moore,
2008b). These findings are summarised in Table 1.

Behavioural Mechanisms Contributing to Addiction

Addiction is defined as the compulsive engaging in a destructive behaviour which

persists in the face of aversive consequences (e.g. see Lemon, 2002). The behaviour is
detrimental to at least one aspect of the individual‘s functioning including social, vocational,
educational or personal domains. There is an urge to engage in the behaviour and the
individual will typically experience increasing tension if prevented from engaging in the
behaviour. In some cases there may also be a desire to avoid withdrawal (an aversive state
which may have different features depending on the particular substance or behaviour) or to
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 73

attain the pleasurable effects of the addictive behaviour, but this feature does not apply to all
addictions (Holden, 2001).
There are a number of models of addiction each of which has different implications for
the cause, management and prognosis of addictions. For instance, the disease model of
addiction situates the aetiology and management of addiction in the medical realm. Thus
addiction is viewed like any other disease requiring medical treatment and is thought to be out
of the control of the sufferer. The learning model of addiction, in contrast, locates the source
of addictive behaviours in the past experience of the individual such that the behaviour is
learned. Depending on the particular notion of addiction endorsed, the individual who
demonstrates the addictive behaviour may or may not be thought of as being in control of or
responsible for their behaviour (Cohen & Saling, 2008). There are distinctions drawn between
behavioural addictions (such as gambling, Shaffer, 1989 and overeating, Kelley, 2004) and
chemical addictions (drugs, alcohol) although there is considerable overlap between these
types of addiction both in terms of the manifestations and the underlying mechanisms (Marks,
1990). The technological addictions (Griffiths, 1995), a subset of behavioural addictions, are
of particular interest here.
Technological addictions, like other behavioural addictions are associated with the
formation of strong habits. Some have suggested that the technologies are addictive because
they are exciting (Shaffer, 1996). Others feel that as these behaviours occur in response to
recently developed technologies, they must be tapping into existing mechanisms and
predispositions (see Griffiths, 1996, 1998). According to Griffiths (1996) the technology may
afford access to the object of interest. While some have dismissed the technological
addictions as a byproduct of some other primary presenting problems (e.g. Shaffer, Hall, &
Vander Bilt, 2000), the pervasiveness of the technology may still pose additional risk. There
remains the possibility that we might overlook emerging areas of concern such as internet
overuse (Armstrong et al., 2000; Griffiths, 1998), or overlook specific categories of possibly
inappropriate use involving sex (Griffith, 2001) or gambling, that may be far more pervasive
when being offered on the internet (Griffiths, 1996) mobile phones (Griffiths, 2003) or on
television (Griffiths, 2007).

Table 1. Neurotic traits, behaviours and use of information and communication

technologies

Neurotic Trait Behavioural Manifestations Relevant Internet Research Relevant Mobile Phone
Research
Anxiety Avoidance Lavoie & Pychyl (2001) Butt & Phillips (2008)
(Procrastination) Phillips & Reddie (2007) (low conscientiousness)
Baker & Phillips (2007)
Shyness, Social Preference for text based Amichai-Hamburger et al Reid & Reid (2004)
Anxiety social interaction (2002) Rettie (2007)
Ando et al (2004) Butt & Phillips (2008)
Hertel et al, (2008)
Guadagno, Okdie & Eno
(2008)
Low self Preference for recreation Armstrong, Phillips, & Ha et al. (2008)
esteem Saling (2000) Bianchi & Phillips (2005)
Emotionally Requests for help (Panic) Baker & Moore (2008b) Billieux et al. (2008)
Labile Phillips, Jory, & Mogford.
(2007)
74 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

Learning theory can potentially account for addiction by invoking the Matching law
(Hernstein, 1961). The Matching law suggests that organisms choose behaviours that
maximise their levels of reinforcement (Hernstein, 1961). Under normal conditions, the
matching law operates to mediate the choice as to which behaviours to engage in, however,
this mechanism can also operate abnormally resulting in addiction (Heyman, 1996). In the
case of the addictions, it is argued that an inappropriately high weighting is assigned to the
object of addiction (Blum, Cull, Braverman, & Comings, 1996; Jacobs, 1986). In such
circumstances the addictive activity is pursued to the exclusion of more adaptive behaviours.
For instance, Billieux et al (2008) considered whether mobile phone use could be
predicted by features of impulsivity such as: reacting without thinking; lack of perseverance;
lack of premeditation; urgency: and sensation seeking. Indeed, Billieux et al. (2008) found
that features of impulsivity did predict excessive and problematic mobile phone use. The
urgency component of impulsivity was found to be the strongest predictor of problem mobile
phone use, while the other facets of impulsivity did predict various aspects of mobile phone
use. Urgency is defined as the tendency to experience strong impulses particularly under
conditions of negative affect. Thus mobile phone use appears to represent an activity upon
which the user becomes dependent as the user experiences a strong impulse to use the phone,
potentially to alleviate negative affect (see Jacobs, 1986).
As indicated previously, concepts of reinforcement can be somewhat circular in usage
(e.g. Meehl, 1950), hence we considered some factors that might predispose responding
across situations (Hernstein, 1961; Premack, 1959). As such, we have explored neuroticism
(and its associated traits) that may predispose the individual to technological addictions. At
least some of the phenomenology associated with the ‗irresistibility‘ of addictions can be
explained in terms of the automatisation of behaviour.

Addiction as Automaticity

Automatic behaviour refers to behaviour that has become habitual and therefore occurs
more readily than non-automatised behaviour. Traditionally, automaticity has been
conceptualised as being stimulus-driven, lacking intention, attention and awareness (Bargh,
1994; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), however, newer models of automaticity have arisen
suggesting that automaticity is a far more flexible process than earlier formulations implied
(Saling & Phillips, 2007). Setting this debate aside, automatic processes do offer behavioural
routines such that everyday behaviour can be readily performed (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
Email is proportionately the most common internet application (e.g. Scealy, Phillips, &
Stevenson, 2002) potentially eliciting frequent checking responses (Baker & Phillips, 2007).
Thus email use often becomes habitual. As such, email use may be engaged in
inappropriately, (for instance at work to the detriment of other work-related activities) and
excessively. As habits strengthen (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981) and behaviours become
automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) people experience less conscious involvement in the
task. Indeed, there can be a tendency for people to engage in automatic behaviour without
intention (Reason, 1979).
Behavioural addictions, therefore may be conceptualised as over-learned behaviours
(hyper-automatised) such that it becomes hard to resist engaging in these behaviours (see
 The Manifestation of Neuroticism in the Use of Information… 75

Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This would explain the phenomenology whereby some people
report a difficulty associated with suppressing the urge to perform an addictive behaviour.
Indeed, LaRose, Lin and Eastin (2003) postulate that addictive behaviours may become
conditioned responses such that the behaviour is regularly triggered by internal or external
cues and there is a reduction in self-regulation (see also Davis, 2001). This can be
compounded by the fact that the individual may have limited resources in the form of poor
self-esteem, negative affectivity and limited coping strategies. As we have discussed
previously in the present chapter, neuroticism is associated with low self-esteem, negative
affectivity and emotion-focussed coping, thus neuroticism appears to predispose people
towards addictive behaviours, in this case excessive internet or mobile phone use.

Implications and Future Directions

The previous section has demonstrated that Neuroticism may potentially predict the
amount and nature of use of information and communication technologies. Neurotic
tendencies such as procrastination and anxiety may predispose people to a greater tendency to
use email, engage in blogging and the use of social networking sites. In addition, tendencies
to panic may lead to posting more messages upon discussion boards. This is of note since
there is typically a permanent record of these behaviours on the internet, and tendencies to use
these technologies impulsively can lead to problems.
Gottschalk (2005) warns that it is difficult to delete potentially incriminating emails. Not
only can they be forwarded by recipients indefinitely, but they are backed up in multiple
locations such as on servers or on backup tapes. This makes inappropriate messages hard to
locate and delete. Thus it can be hard to take back the thoughtless message once sent.
In addition, Wang, Lee and Wang (1998) have drawn attention to potential misuse of
personal information. People may commit personal information to emails, or put it on social
networking or blogging sites. In addition, it may be reasonable for organisations to track
consumer behaviour for purposes of quality assurance. Nevertheless, personal information
and behaviour patterns may be made available to other individuals or organisations, either
inadvertently due to poor storage, or the information may be sold on to third parties without
the individual's consent. Hence there is potential concern as to the uses to which personal
information on the web may eventually be put (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 1998).
There are other reasons for considering how the construct of Neuroticism influences
internet usage. Neuroticism is also of interest as it may predict use of eGovernment services.
Governments are seeking to deliver services electronically in the interests of efficiency
(Toregas, 2001). Nevertheless democracies cannot deliver these services unless they are
accessible to all (due to considerations of principles of equal opportunity and the like). The
World Wide Web consortium (W3C) has developed guidelines to assist in enhancing the
usability of the web, but there remain concerns that sections of the community are not making
use of this technology. There is a concern that there is a digital divide between the
electronically franchised, and those that do not access and avail themselves of the benefits of
the technology. Heeks and Bailur (2007) indicated that far more systematic work is required
in areas of eGovernment and factors influencing uptake and use of eGovernment services.
Research indicates that one of the predictors of the use of eGovernment services is trust
(Horst, Kuttschreuter, & Gutteling, 2007). Given that neurotic individuals are prone to
76 Lauren L. Saling and James G. Phillips

anxiety, neuroticism is a potential predictor of an unwillingness to engage in electronic

transactions or use eGovernment services.
Alternatively neurotic individuals might be more likely to be respond rashly and require
assistance from help desks or other forms of government intervention (Toregas, 2001),
imposing greater burdens on help desks and call centres. Although western democracies are
based upon one person, one vote, it is sometimes the case that people ‗vote‘ frequently. For
instance, one person may attempt to overwhelm public officials on an issue by logging the
same complaint multiple times (Toregas, 2001). It is possible for multiple complaints to be
logged to make an issue appear more important than it actually is. As we have observed that
individuals who posted on discussion groups were more prone to panic (Phillips, Jory, &
Mogford, 2007), the suggestion that neurotic and irrational people should be able to
effectively make use of information offered by search engines and menus may be unrealistic.

CONCLUSION
Although more research has been devoted to social anxiety as a predictor of internet use,
there are some indications that other neurotic traits could be associated with greater levels of
internet use. The internet can be used as a tool for procrastination and as a method of
controlling self-presentation. Information and communication technologies, particularly those
fostering social connections can be of great benefit particularly to those shy and socially
anxious individuals who find it difficult to develop and maintain face to face social
connections. However, use of these technologies can become excessive and problematic,
serving to undermine the individual‘s functioning. This can occur in a number of ways, for
instance the individual may no longer devote sufficient time to other activities including those
in the vocational and educational domains. Further, neurotic individuals may be particularly
vulnerable to the creation of permanent electronic traces. If it is difficult to take back the
hasty and ill-considered word, it becomes an even more difficult proposition when the ill-
considered word is backed up on tapes, compact disks and servers all over the world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Rowan Ogeil.

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Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 85-107 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

COLLEGE STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF

REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING FOR CRIMINALS

Gina Robertiello
Felician College New Jersey

ABSTRACT
Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative
approach. The emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior; benefitting the
injured parties, as well as the offender. In Criminal Justice courses across the nation, this
topic has been hotly debated. Is restorative justice working? Is it fair to the victim? Does
it fulfill any of the goals of punishment? Although laypersons might feel differently,
those taking courses on crime and justice have discussed the topic at length, and many
have supported this approach. Some are working in the criminal justice system and some
are working on degrees in order to obtain a position in the criminal justice system. After
discussing the theory of restorative justice, especially the research of John Braithwaite, it
was the researcher's intention to determine student perceptions of restorative justice
efforts, and their views on the utility and success of this approach. This research was
conducted via the administration of a survey in courses at a private catholic college in
New Jersey, with social science and non-social science majors.
Results demonstrated that male and female social science students had similar
perceptions about the topic, and that their opinions were similar to those of the non-social
science majors as well. Almost all respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S.
should be to protect society. They thought prisons should offer programs to help
rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile
offenders. Most did not think that restorative justice efforts were fair to the victim
(because this effort is not punitive enough), and they did not think criminals were treated
too leniently today. However, most respondents did think that a victim should participate
in the punishment of their victimizer (i.e. they should have a say). They did not think
shaming criminals deterred the behavior of the criminal or the behavior of onlookers, or
that reintegrative shaming caused less stigma. Finally, most did not think that our current
punitive techniques caused offenders to think worse of themselves.
86 Gina Robertiello

INTRODUCTION
The retributive theory of the 1970‘s led to a major prison population increase via the
―get-tough‖ attitude and the war on drugs. Although retribution still dominates in our
correctional system today (and interestingly, among the current population of college students
surveyed), there have been many efforts to repair out criminal justice system. One of those
efforts has been the theory of restorative justice. It incorporates rehabilitative and retributive
elements, and can assist offenders to make changes. Research has demonstrated that police
and prison officials cannot convince offenders as well as their families and peers can. These
efforts can therefore unite communities (Yeh, 2008).
Studies on the use of alternative means of ―punishment‖ within the college environment
(and elsewhere) have been experimented with over the years due to worries about the
damaging effects of labeling the offender. A student conduct program at Colorado State for
example, with restorative justice sanctions, has been used for students involved in less serious
crimes like nuisance parties and open container violations. Colorado uses this technique more
than any other college in the country. In one particular situation, a student was drinking and
assaulted someone. He was assigned an alcohol management course, community service, and
the opportunity to meet with the family he victimized. He also agreed to speak with students
in the neighborhood about the perils of drinking, where he accepted responsibility for his
behavior. In another situation, this technique was used for students who released a snake into
the classroom, and in another where anti-gay slurs were used. In all of these cases, students
were given the opportunity to share feelings, admit guilt, and apologize. They only
qualification for this sanction is that they show remorse for their behavior. This program is
seen as a blend of mediation and restitution, where together the harms caused can be
identified, as well as a unique way to repair the harm. A facilitator is used to assist with this
process (Lipka, 2009). By reintegrating offenders back into the community, they are shown
consideration which may make them more likely to be repentant, and decrease their
recidivism rates.
Other colleges and universities have adopted the restorative justice model, including
Clemson, Guilford College, Skidmore, and Michigan State. In Michigan, facilitators are
utilized through the Office of Student Conflict Resolution. At Clemson, restorative justice
techniques are used for cases of vandalism, disorderly conduct, and other minor violations of
the law. At Wells College (New York), the program is customized and voluntary so there are
fewer repeat offenders and more success. One common thread within all of these schools is
allowing students to hear first-hand how their behavior affected others.

RESEARCH
Research on labeling theory demonstrates that shaming persons may cause more crime.
That ―label‖ is the social reaction, which might lead to more crime as the individual‘s reaction
to the label. It stigmatizes offenders, and might make the criminal an outcast. Therefore, if we
insulate offenders from counterproductive shame, reintegration instead offers an option that is
both disapproving and forgiving at the same time. According to Braithwaite‘s research, this
approach will control the individual from committing a crime again. If this is true, it would
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 87

demonstrate that deterrence theory works. Deterrence theory works through fear of shame,
especially if one has strong ties to the community (because they don‘t want to let people
down). In fact, families and peers may be more effective agents of social control than law
enforcement.
Briathwaite (1989) notes that shaming itself is necessary for social control, but stigma is
not. In fact, the stigmatized groups are often excluded from conventional society and
prevented from participating in conventional behavior. This could lead to those groups
banding together in negative ways. In fact, research on labeling shows that there is a stigma
attached to the label, and that individuals who are labeled a criminal will identify with that
stigma. They are then excluded from conventional roles, and their deviance may spiral. Their
opportunities to engage in crime become more attractive, and those labeled individuals tend to
cluster together to support each other. Of course, other situational variables need to be
examined to determine whether a label really has such a dramatic affect on individuals. For
example, media coverage and gossip might influence behavior. Opportunity is an important
variable as well; those with blocked opportunities might be more inclined to commit crime.
Shaming involves disapproval and an attempt to invoke remorse. The notion of
reintegrative shaming involves efforts to welcome the offender back into the community. A
key concept involved in reintegrative shaming includes interdependency or
closeness/attachments, which is similar to the work of Travis Hirschi. In his Social Control
Theory, people do not commit crimes because they are closely bonded to their community,
church, friends, family, school, sports, and work (Hirschi, 1969). Research also shows that
illegitimate opportunities increase where there is social disorganization and in societies where
there is residential mobility, there is more stigmatizing shaming. Restorative justice seeks
engagement with the offenders to take responsibility for the harm done and for them to
appreciate the consequences of their behavior.
According to Ruth-Heffelbower and Gaboury (2008), restorative justice views an offense
as collective—it is against a person or group. Thus, efforts to restore the offender involves
interaction between the offender and the community. Some programs that fit this model
include those that teach conflict resolution skills to prison inmates. Others teach them how to
reconnect with their families after incarceration. Studies show that instilling these skills can
help inmates change aggressive and violent behavior (Ruth-Heffelbower and Gaboury, 2008).
In the United States and Europe, victim-offender mediation has been used in a similar
manner. This option has enabled the victim and offender to share their feelings in the
presence of a mediator (Zehr, 2008). Parker (2008) discusses the utility of restorative justice
programs by telling the story of a mother whose fifteen year old daughter was murdered.
Through the Sycamore Tree Project, the mother was able to participate in a faith-based, in
prison program where she could address criminals similar to the offender who murdered her
daughter. This experience allowed her to let go of some of the anger, and allowed prisoners to
understand the perspective of the victim. This program was developed by Prison Fellowship
International, to bring together victims and offenders for meetings in the prison setting.
Topics discussed included the impact of the crime, confession, repentance and making
amends. In this particular case, both the offenders and the victim‘s parents benefited (Parker,
2008).
However, most research shows that even with these techniques in place, reform of
offenders is modest (Levrant et al, 1999; Andrews and Bunta, 2003). Further, there are some
concerns about the effect on due process rights. Zhang and Zhang (2004) conducted an
88 Gina Robertiello

analysis of reintegrative shaming via the National Youth Survey, and they found no effect on
predatory delinquency. Hay (2001) found no interaction effect of shaming and reintegration,
and no positive effects of parental disapproval. Interestingly, Hay (2001) examined
reintegrative shaming with parents in disciplining their kids. He found that forgiveness by
peers actually increased the likelihood of participation in further criminality! Further,
Botchkovar and Tittle (2005) for example, found that mediation for participating in gossip did
not reduce misconduct in Russian women, and that any shaming might have negative
consequences.
Another concern is net widening. Lo, Maxwell and Wong (2006) for example, found that
diversionary methods are more restorative, but more intrusive social control for minor
offenses makes it easier for offenders to violate their conditions. Miethe, Lue and Reese
(2002) concur. They tested this theory with juveniles in drug court, and found that drug court
is actually more stigmatizing than reintegrative. Thus, the risk for recidivism was higher
(because they were observed more and their treatment was less anonymous). Consequently,
there were more opportunities to observe new violations. Due to these findings, Miethe, et al
(2002) suggest the need to examine the form and contact of the type of social control. There is
also a danger in using restorative justice techniques with serious offenses because it might
trivialize those offenses.
According to Harris (2006), interviews with participants who attended a court case or
family group conference in Australia showed shame-related emotions for those who
perceived social disapproval for their driving while over the legal alcohol limit. The study
demonstrated that restorative justice interventions were more reintegrative in nature.
However, they were not perceived as less stigmatizing by the participants, reiterating the need
to examine the form and contact of the type of social control. In another study, Rodogno
(2008) examined the relevance and desirability of shame and guilt in restorative justice
conferences. It was found that this question is not easily answered. Instead, both emotions can
be beneficial or detrimental depending on the nature of the shame and guilt, as well as
cultural and situational factors.
In the corporate setting, Levi (2002) tested the theory of reintegrative shaming with
financial crimes. He found that large corporations are concerned about their reputations, so he
thought they would commit fewer violations. Although shaming would be a common
response by the media or social and occupational reference groups, he found that the threat of
stopping firms from doing new business was a more effective deterrent than shaming (Levi,
2002).
Some research on applying reintegrative shaming to the corporate world has been
conducted in an attempt to decrease criminal activities (Barnard, 1999). In one test of
Braithwaite‘s theory on tax offenders, taxpayers who thought their enforcement experience
had been reintegrative were less likely to report evading their taxes two years later. (Murphy
& Harris, 2007). Pynchon (2009) agrees that post-offender shame-reduction programs
necessary for restorative justice efforts to meet the goal of rehabilitation. She examined the
use of these efforts in Alcoholics Anonymous.
According to Van Ness and Weber (2008) Victim Offender Dialogue programs in prisons
provide victims and victim survivors the opportunity to meet with their offenders to discuss
the crime and issues surrounding it. Face-to-face meetings between inmates and victims (or
surviving family members) have been utilized in the name of restorative justice (Ruth-
Heffelbower and Gaboury, 2008).
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 89

Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) found support for this approach in other venues. For
example, they found greater compliance with standards in nursing homes when health
inspectors used the reintegrative shaming approach. Chen (2002) found support for
Braithwaite‘s premise that reintegrative shaming is more effective in preventing criminal
behavior (than the fear/threat of punishment) in Chinese society. This is due to the fact that
shaming is particularly meaningful in a society with strong social bonds. Chen (2002) found
that in Chinese society social norms are followed based on moral socialization. According to
Sampson and Laub (2005), reintegrative shaming describes a family environment where
informal social controls work. Sherman (1993) also found that reintegrative shaming
sanctions promote deterrence. Wheeldon (2009) found that restorative justice efforts can lead
to greater cooperation between individuals and the community. Interestingly, the majority of
states have used restorative justice language in law or policy documents (Zehr, 2008).
According to Ahmed and Braithwaite (2004), children who bully others are less likely to
acknowledge shame. By that acknowledgement, individuals take responsibility for what
happened and take steps to make amends. They found that the extent to which parents used
non-stigmatizing shaming in response to their children‘s bullying did decrease the bullying.
Robbers (2009) tested this theory with sex offenders and found that there are many barriers to
successful reintegration for these offenders due to labeling and the legal requirement for
registering as sex offenders. In addition, there are housing restrictions and community
involvement restrictions for these offenders that make it even more difficult for them to be
reintegrated back into the community. In Virginia, some sex offenders participated in a
residential treatment program and said it played a major role in preventing their re-offending.
Community involvement and church-related outreach has also been found effective in
limiting the public stigma associated with their crime; which is critical to reintegration.
McAlinden (2006) found that reintegrative shaming can be coordinated with retributive
framework to better manage the label and stigma associated with sex offenders. She found
that public awareness of sex offending leads to stigma. Stigma leads to social exclusion and a
possible return to offending. Thus, a restorative approach brings the informal justice process
closer to the community, increasing their involvement in the process of restoring and
reintegrating the offender. Since there are criticisms of the reintegrative approach, combining
it with current regulations rather than using it as an alternative, may be a step in the right
direction. (McAlinden, 2006).
A number of other researchers (Morris, 2002; Daly, 2002; Grasmick, Bursik and
Arneklev, 1993) have extended restorative justice techniques to the serious crime of sex
offending and domestic violence because current regulations are failing to reduce recidivism.
(In fact, some of the students surveyed in the current study thought it would be appropriate to
try with sex offenders).
Unfortunately, Vandiver, Dial and Worley (2008) found that the stigma associated with
the sex offender registry is difficult to overcome. The registry requirements have led to a loss
of friends (i.e. a very small support group), which hinders resources for success. Further, the
stigma in housing, employment and interpersonal relationships can be very damaging.
Vandiver et al (2008) found at least one negative effect of the registry on female sex
offenders, and difficulty for them to reintegrate back into their communities after this label.
Yet, they found that when members of the community take a strong stance to integrate the
offenders back, it does increase legitimate opportunities for employment and relationships,
decreasing their loss of self-esteem and feelings of being cut off from the community.
90 Gina Robertiello

UNIQUE PROGRAMS
Koss, et al (2004) examined the RESTORE program which is a community based,
restorative justice program for sex crimes including sexual assault and rape. The response of
the criminal justice system often disappoints victims since they have little control over the
proceedings, and sometimes assessments of the situation are flawed. Reintegrative
shaming says that those directly harmed should have a say (via the use of mediation and
sentencing circles). Their study found that there were more apologies in these conferences.
The use of a case manager as well as the use of impact statements by the victim, have also
been found to be beneficial. Interestingly, only 47% of the students in the current study
thought victims should have a say in the sentencing of their offender (see results below).
Circle sentencing is an alternative method of sentencing offenders, which involves the
community in the sentencing process. The offender and victim sit in a circle to discuss the
impact of the offense, and to determine an individualized sentence. The process is normally
used for less serious offenses (like assault and unlicensed driving). Pautz (2009) attempted to
implement ―circles‖ in the classroom to develop stronger relationships between students and
teachers, without turning conflicts into power struggles. Instead of using the standard
response of letting students rely on teacher intervention to solve problems, students can learn
to use other skills to deal with problems on their own. Problem solving-focused conflict
resolution methods can be accomplished in cooperation, and lead to students holding each
other accountable to develop their own solutions. With this technique, children can be
reintegrated back into the group when conflict occurs. Rather than treating ―behavior‖
problems with disciplinary action, use it as an opportunity to work together, and meet the
need to resolve emotions in the offender.
According to Wachtel and Mirsky (2009) restorative justice practices improve the
relationships between students, parents, teachers and administrators by incorporating
techniques that hold students accountable. Rather than punishing students when they
misbehave, efforts are taken to involve the student in repairing the harm they caused. This
helps to fix relationships and fosters a sense of responsibility and respect for others.
Other research on the use of restorative justice in the school setting has proven
successful. Rather than using retributive techniques (like punitive detention) to handle
children who misbehave, a school in South Dakota implemented an alternative called the
Circle of Courage (Brendtro, Broken-leg and Van Bockern, 2002). Instead, the Restorative
Justice Center responds more positively to heal and restore, and create a better school climate
(Van Bockern, Ashworth, Ailts, Donnelly, Erickson, and Woltermann, 2008). In particular, it
has been noted that the more punitive techniques are ineffective in changing behavior, and
might instill more trauma, fear and isolation. Researchers have noted that children can
develop problem solving skills and healthy self-concepts if their emotional needs are met
(Brendtro, Ness, and Mitchell, 2001).
Circles of Support have also been used with sex offenders for those at high risk for re-
offending. They offer a network of informal support and treatment which involves
moderating between the police, media and the community. In order to be successful these
alternatives must be voluntary in nature. There must be public awareness and media
management to understand the risks as well as the fact that most offenders will not re-offend
if given appropriate treatment and support (Grubin, 1998).
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 91

Fitzgerald (2008) did not find that the process of circle sentencing reduced the frequency
or the seriousness of offending, and there were no significant differences between the
treatment and control group in the percentage of offenders whose next offense was less
serious. However, this does not mean that circle sentencing is not meeting other objectives. It
might have a crime prevention value that is difficult to measure (if it strengthens the informal
social controls that exist in Aboriginal communities). Further, Menzel (2005) found that circle
sentencing helps the offender take responsibility for his or her behavior, but the results are
only short-lived. Offenders are only embarrassed and regretful at the time of their apology,
but not after.
In New Zealand, Family Group Conferences have been experimented with. They
originated in 1989, to be used for juvenile offenders. Courts served as a backup instead of the
norm, and Peacemaking Circles were utilized. The conference (or circle) allows the offenders
to admit their wrongdoing and acknowledge responsibility. A facilitator assists with the
process, where the focus is on the harm to the offender, and on taking proactive steps to
remove or transform shame. The community plays a vital role in this process, which has been
found more healing than the punishment-oriented model of most courts (Zehr, 2008).
Group Conferencing gives the victim a voice (which most students surveyed thought was
important), and makes the offender accountable. The offenders can hear how their behavior
impacted others, and the victims (or a representative for the victims) can hear the apology.
Outcomes are negotiated, and the support provided tends to decrease the seriousness and the
rates of re-offending because it diverts young people away from supervisory court orders and
from falling deeper into the criminal justice system. Interestingly, most victims/
representatives do participate in this process (Grant, 2008). It is also important to consider the
role of agents of the criminal justice system. Conti (2009) found that police recruits who were
exposed to degradation, developed maladaptive coping skills and increased hostility. Thus,
restorative justice training for correctional officers has also been assessed (Ruth-Heffelbower
and Gaboury, 2008).
Some studies show that youthful offenders that did not apologize during family
conferences were three times more likely to re-offend (Morris and Maxwell, 1997). Hosser et
al (2008) conducted a study of young prisoners in Germany to see if shame/guilt would be
related to criminal behavior after release. They found decreased recidivism with older
prisoners and decreased recidivism among prisoners with higher intelligence. They also found
a positive effect of shaming and a negative effect of guilt on recidivism, meaning that those
who expressed guilt were less likely to re-offend. Additionally, they found that shame and
guilt together contributed to a 14% difference in the proportion of recidivists twenty-four
months after release from a first prison term. It appears guilt supports pro-social behavior and
motivates people to admit mistakes (Hosser, et al, 2008).
According to Workman (2008), the first few months is the most challenging for released
prisoners since they need assistance with housing, employment and interpersonal
relationships. According to her research, if prisoners get help from mentors and the
community during this time frame, their chances of re-offending drops by almost 40%. This
can be accomplished through the use of a holistic approach to prisoner reintegration known as
―Restorative Reintegration‖ Operation Jericho, developed by the Prison Fellowship.
Anecdotal evidence suggests moderate success via the use of trained church-based mentors
who facilitate relationships with the prisoners and other community organizations in order to
reduce the barriers they face (Workman, 2008).
92 Gina Robertiello

Although this program in itself is not sufficient to sustain long term change, it has been
found that prisoners respond positively to this approach since it builds on existing strengths,
and assists with accommodating employment, social, financial, health and rehabilitative
needs, while including the community. Research suggests that restorative reintegration occurs
when the community is involved through informal support, with less stigma and shame. In
addition, by providing opportunities for praise and approval, mutual respect is promoted and
the offenders can reconcile with their victims (Workman, 2008). Radosh (2008), prison
programs for women that only address parenting and occupational skills are not enough to
reduce recidivism. Instead, a comprehensive approach that treats offenders in a humane and
supportive way is a more therapeutic response to their crimes.
According to Tosouni and Ireland (2008) restorative conferencing predicted more shame-
guilt than traditional court processing. In addition, feelings of shame-guilt significantly
lowered intentions of re-offending. Noll & Harvey (2008), found that restorative justice can
be applied to clergy-perpetrated sexual abuse because it can aid the healing process for the
victims as well as the church and the offenders. Grant (2008) examined two new restorative
justice approaches; ROPES and The Children‘s Koori Court. ROPES is a diversionary
program that involves interaction between young offenders and the police. When the program
is completed, charges are struck out and the offender has no criminal record. The program has
produced low rates of reoffending in pilot studies.

The Koori Court is another restorative justice approach that attempt to make the court
process less alienating. There is again communication between the defendant, the victim
and the community. In addition, defendants must acknowledge the authority of the
Elders/Respected Persons from the Aboriginal community. They must consent to
participate as well. After the open exchange of information, the judicial officer (who is
now better informed) will determine the appropriate sentence. The context of the
offending and the prospects for rehabilitation are better addressed, and the sentence can be
more individualized and appropriate than mainstream court. Because of this, cases in the
Children‘s Koori Court take much longer than normal court proceedings. However, the
pilot program showed that the proceedings help to understand behavior and change it
(Grant, 2008, Harris, 2006).
Unfortunately, evaluations of the Koori Courts pilot program (which showed that their
use reduced the levels of recidivism among Koori defendants) have been criticized for the
use of inadequate follow-up periods. Thus, findings cannot be taken as evidence of the
effectiveness of Koori Courts in reducing recidivism.

RESULTS
Summary of the Sample of 200 Students

A twenty question survey was developed to be administered at a private college located

in a mixed urban and suburban area of Northern New Jersey. The survey consisted of mostly
closed-ended questions to assess student perceptions of the utility of restorative justice
efforts, as well as some open-ended questions regarding which types of crimes and/or
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 93

criminals this effort would work best for. Included on the survey was a legend, with the
definitions of ―reintegrative‖ shaming, and some other important terms related to the contents
of the questionnaire. Two hundred surveys were administered to students at this college, in
fourteen different classrooms, over the course of three weeks.
The survey was completely anonymous, and students were required to be age 18 or older
to qualify to complete it. Both male and female students completed the survey, with a larger
percentage of female students overall. Approval from the college‘s Institutional Review
Board was obtained, and students were given Informed Consent forms before completion of
the survey. There were 141 females and 58 males in the sample (1 person did not answer the
gender question). Most respondents did not aspire to a career in Criminal Justice (163) or
81% of the sample, but 34 respondents did. Interestingly, those who did aspire to a career in
Criminal Justice were not all Criminal Justice majors. Some were Business, Psychology,
Sociology, Philosophy, Religion, Nursing, Physical Therapy, and Biology majors.
Overall, majors were very diverse. In the sample of 200 students, sixteen different majors
were represented. Most majors came from the Nursing Division (44 students). Twenty-six
were Business majors and another twenty-six were Education majors. There were nineteen
Criminal Justice majors, sixteen Psychology majors, and sixteen Biology majors. For a
complete list of majors represented, see Table 1.
It was hypothesized that Social Science students would have some prior knowledge about
the topic, since they have learned about restorative justice efforts in both their lower and
upper level criminal justice and sociology courses. Thus, the responses of Political Science,
History, Criminal Justice and Sociology students were examined separately from the rest.
First, the overall findings of the entire group will be summarized.

Table 1. Majors Represented in Sample of 200 Students

Majors Number of Students

Nursing 44
Business 26
Education 26
Criminal Justice 19
Psychology 16
Biology 16
No answer 15
Art 9
Sociology 9
History 8
English 6
Arts & Sciences 3
Communications 3
Philosophy 3
Political Science 2
Pre Med 2
Physical Therapy 2
94 Gina Robertiello

Overall, in the sample of 200 students, the majority agreed with question number 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 15 (see questionnaire in Appendix A). However, there were only three
questions in which 75% or more of the sample agreed with the question, and that was on
question #5, 10 and 15. On question #1, 121 respondents (or just over 60% of the total
sample) agreed that restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime.
Seventy-eight did not, and one ―no answer‖ response was recorded. On question #2, 113
respondents (or just over 56% of the sample) agreed that restorative justice efforts are fair to
the victim. Eighty-five disagreed, and there were two ―no answer‖ responses. On question #3,
127 respondents (more than 60% of the sample overall) thought criminals were treated too
leniently today, and 73 did not. On question #4, 129 (60% of respondents) thought the goal of
punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and 67 did not. Three respondents
did not answer the question, and one responded with ―depends‖. On question #5, 90% (or 181
respondents) agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society by
locking up offenders. There were fifteen respondents who disagreed, three who did not
answer, and one who answered ―depends‖. On question #6, 145 respondents (just over 70%
of the sample) agreed with the statement that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be
retributive. Fifty-one disagreed, three did not respond, and one said ―depends‖ again.
On question #8, 149 (just over 70%) agreed that criminals can change their behavior for
the better. Forty-seven disagreed, one said ―sometimes‖ and two said ―depends‖. On question
#9, 123 respondents (just over 60%) agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into
the community will help them to become better people in the future. Seventy-one disagreed,
two responded that it ―depends‖, and one responded ―sometimes‖. On question #10, 175
respondents (or 81% of the sample) agreed that prisons should offer programs to help
rehabilitate offenders. Twenty-five respondents disagreed. On question #12, responses were
almost evenly distributed, but a slightly larger percentage of respondents agreed that shaming
a criminal will deter the general public from committing crimes (i.e. general deterrence).
Fifty-two percent agreed and almost 48% disagreed with the statement. There was one
respondent who did not answer the question. On question #15, 157 respondents (or 75% of
the sample) agreed that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders.
Forty-two disagreed, and one person did not answer the question.
The majority of respondents disagreed with questions 7, 11, 13 and 14. On question #7,
responses were almost evenly distributed with 47% agreeing and almost 53% disagreeing
with the question of the appropriateness of the victim participating in the punishment of their
victimizers (one person did not respond to the question). On question #11, only 41% agreed
with the statement that shaming will deter the criminal from committing a future crime. The
majority (116 respondents) disagreed, and there were two respondents that left the question
blank. On question #13, 80 respondents (or 40% of the sample) agreed with the statement that
reintegrative shaming causes less stigma. One-hundred and seventeen disagreed, and three did
not answer the question. On question #14, responses were almost evenly distributed, but the
majority disagreed with the statement that using regular punishment techniques (that are not
reintegrative), causes offenders to think worse of themselves. Ninety-two respondents (or
46%) disagreed, and almost 54% disagreed with the statement. One did not answer the
question.
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 95

Table 2. Crimes that Reintegrative Shaming Will Work For.

Crime Number of Students

No Response 55
Theft 28
Juveniles 20
Drugs 20
Non-Violent Offenders 16
Robbery 14
Rape 9
Sex Offenders 8
Driving Under the Influence 5
Breaking and Entering/Burglary 5
Any Crime 4
Assault 3
Tax Evasion/Fraud 3
Murder 2
Crimes of Necessity 2
Abuse 2
Vandalism 1
Violent 1
Gun 1
Peeping Toms 1
To Prevent Future Crime 1

On Question #16, respondents were asked for which crimes or criminals ―reintegrative
shaming‖ would work best for. Although 55 respondents did not list a crime, the most
common responses were: Theft, Juveniles, Drugs, Non-Violent Offenders, and Robbery. See
Table 2 for a list of responses to this question. On Question #17, respondents were asked for
which crimes or criminals ―reintegrative shaming‖ would not work for. Many respondents did
not list any crime, but the most common response was Murder, then Rape, and then Sex
Offenders. See Table 3 for a list of responses to this question.
Question #18 examined the number of majors from each discipline (which are
summarized in Table 1), and Question #19 examined the number of students interested in the
field of Criminal Justice. Overall, there were 34 students who expressed an interest in this
field. One student did not respond and two were not sure (163 were not interested in Criminal
Justice). On question #20, the gender of the respondents was revealed.

Summary of the Male Students

Although males only comprised 29% of the sample, it is interesting to examine the
differences in their perceptions in comparison to the female students who were surveyed.
96 Gina Robertiello

Table 3. Crimes that Reintegrative Shaming Will Not Work For.

Crime Number of Students

Murder 63
No Answer 58
Rape 22
Sex Offenders 11
Major Crimes 9
Drugs 8
Abuse 4
Repeat Offenders 4
None 4
All 3
Non violent 3
Gang 1
Hate 1
Robbery 1
Hit and Run 1
Assault 1
No Family 1
Stealing 1
Adults 1
―Crazy‖ 1

Overall, in the sample of 58 male students, the majority agreed with question number 5,
6, 8, 9, 10, and 15. On question #5, 90% (or 51 males) agreed that the goal of punishment in
the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders. There were seven respondents
who disagreed. On question #6, 43 males (just over 74%) agreed with the statement that the
goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive, and fifteen disagreed. On question #8,
46 males (or 80%) agreed that criminals can change their behavior for the better, and twelve
disagreed. On question #9, 40 males (almost 70%) agreed that efforts to reintegrate the
offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future, and
eighteen disagreed. On question #10, 48 males (or 82%) agreed that prisons should offer
programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and ten disagreed. On question #15, 47 male (or 80%)
agreed that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders, and eleven
disagreed.
On question #1 and #14, only 29 male respondents (exactly 50% of the males) agreed that
Restorative Justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, and that using regular
punishment techniques (not reintegrative) causes offenders to think worse of themselves. On
question #2, 31 male respondents (or just over 60%) agreed that Restorative Justice efforts are
fair to the victim. Twenty-three disagreed, one did not answer the question, and one male
respondent ―depends‖. On question #3, 35 male respondents (just over 60% of the sample
overall) thought criminals were treated too leniently today, and 22 did not. On question #4, 36
(just over 60% of male respondents) thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to
rehabilitate offenders, and 22 did not.
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 97

On question #7, 11, and 13 less than 50% of the male respondents agreed with the
statements that shaming will deter the criminal from committing a future crime, that shaming
will deter the criminal from committing a future crime, and that reintegrative shaming causes
less stigma.
On question #12, thirty-five males (or less than 60% of them) agreed that shaming a
criminal will deter the general public from committing crimes (i.e. general deterrence).
Twenty-five males disagreed with this statement. Overall, there were eleven male respondents
who were interested in a career in criminal justice.

Males Aspiring to a Career in Criminal Justice

Of the eleven male respondents who aspired to a career in criminal justice, most agreed
with question number 1, 2. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 15. Ninety percent agreed with question #5,
which stated that agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society
by locking up offenders. Almost 82% of the males interested in a career in criminal justice (9
of them) agreed with questions #8, #9 and #10 (that criminals can change their behavior for
the better, that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to
become better people in the future, and that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate
offenders). On question #1 and #15, almost 73% thought restorative justice efforts are
working to control crime, and that reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile
offenders. Sixty-three percent of these males (or 7 of them interested in a career in criminal
justice) agreed with question #2 and #13 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim,
and that shaming causes less stigma). Fifty-four percent of the males interested in a career in
criminal justice agreed with question #6 and #12 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S.
should be retributive, and that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from
committing crimes).
Only 45% agreed with question #3, 4, 7 and 11 (that criminals were treated too leniently
today, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, that it is
appropriate for victims to participate in the punishment of their victimizer, and that shaming
will prevent future criminality). Finally, only four of the males interested in a career in
criminal justice (40%) agreed with question #14 (that using regular punishment techniques
(not reintegrative) causes offenders to think worse of themselves). Interestingly, those males
who expressed an interested in a career in criminal justice were not only criminal justice
majors; there were Accounting, Biology and Nursing majors in this group as well.

Male Social Science Majors

The researcher thought it would be interesting to compare the social science majors to the
non-social science majors in this study to determine if perceptions were different depending
on career choices. There were fourteen male social science majors in the sample, including
History, Criminal Justice, Sociology and Political Science. Some students were double majors
within the discipline. Overall, a large majority of these students agreed with question 1, 5, 6,
8, 9, and 10, and 14. On question #6, 93% agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S.
should be retributive, and on question #8 almost 86% agreed that criminals can change their
98 Gina Robertiello

behavior for the better. On questions #5 and #9, 79% agreed that the goal of punishment in
the U.S. should be to protect society by locking up offenders, and that efforts to reintegrate
the offender back into the community will help them to become better people in the future.
On question #1 and #10, 70% thought restorative justice efforts are working to control crime,
and that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders. Almost 65% agreed with
question #3 (that criminals are treated too leniently today), and almost 65% of the male social
science majors were interested in a career in criminal justice.
Only 56% of male social science majors agreed with question #2 and #4 (that restorative
justice efforts are fair to the victim and that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to
rehabilitate offenders). Exactly 50% agreed with question #7 and #12 (that the victim should
have a say in the punishment of their victimizers, and that shaming a criminal will deter the
general public from committing crime). Only 44% agreed with question #13 (that
reintegrative shaming causes less stigma), and only 35% agreed with question #11 (that
shaming will deter the criminal from committing future crime). Only 21% agreed with
question #14 (79% disagreed with the statement that using regular punishment techniques
causes offenders to think worse of themselves).

Male Non-Social Science Majors

There were 44 male respondents who were non-social science majors. Included in this
group were Business, Nursing, English, Teacher Education, Psychology, Communications,
Philosophy, and Graphic Design majors). Their opinions were slightly different from the male
social science majors. Overall, 91% of these respondents agreed with question #5 (that the
goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society) and 86% agreed with question
#10 and #15 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders and that
reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders). Seventy-seven percent agreed with
question #8 (that criminals can change their behavior for the better). On question #6, 68%
agreed that the goal of punishment should be retributive, and on question #9, 66% agreed that
efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better
people in the future. Almost 60% of respondents agreed with questions #3, 4, 12 and 14 (that
criminals are treated too leniently today, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to
rehabilitate offenders, that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a
crime, and that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to
think worse of themselves). Only 52% agreed with question #2 and 11 (that restorative justice
efforts are fair to the victim, and that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a
future crime). Only 46% agreed with question #13 (that reintegrative shaming causes less
stigma) and only 44% agreed with question #1 (that restorative justice efforts are working to
control or reduce crime).
Thus, the male non-social science students tended to agree with questions #5, 8, 10, and
15, where the male social science majors were more likely to agree with questions #1, 5, 6, 8,
9 and 10, and strongly disagree with question #14.
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 99

Summary of the Females Students

There were many more females in this sample of college students because there are more
female students at the college overall. One-hundred and forty-one female students were
surveyed (or 70% of the entire population examined). Overall, female students‘ perceptions
were similar to the males overall. They were most inclined to agree with questions #5, 6, 8,
10 and 15 (where the males overall were most inclined to agree with the same questions (in
addition to question #9). Ninety-one percent of the females overall agreed with question #5
(the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society), and 90% agreed with
question #10 (prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders). Seventy-seven
percent (or 109 females) agreed with question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works better
for juvenile offenders), and 72 agreed with questions #6 and #8 (the goal of punishment in the
U.S. should be retributive, and that criminals can change their behavior for the better). Sixty-
five percent agreed with questions #1, 3 and 4 (that restorative justice efforts are working to
control or reduce crime, criminals are treated too leniently today, and that goal of punishment
in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders).
Only 58% agreed with question #2 and #9 (that restorative justice efforts are fair to the
victim, and that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to
become better people in the future), and only 50% agreed with question #12 (that shaming a
criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime). Only 48% agreed with
question #7 (that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their
victimizers), and 45% agreed with question #14 (that regular punishment techniques that are
not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). The smallest percentage
(38%) agreed with question #11 and 13 (that shaming criminals will deter them from
committing a future crime, and that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma).

Females Aspiring to a Career in Criminal Justice

Sixteen percent (or twenty-three) of the females overall aspired to a career in the field of
criminal justice. Again, there were representatives from majors other than Criminal Justice,
and some double majors. Those majors included: Sociology, Business, Psychology,
Philosophy, Religion, Nursing, Physical Therapy, and Biology. Responses were similar to
their male counterparts. The majority agreed with question #1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 15. The
majority of males who aspired to a career in criminal justice agreed with some of the same
questions (#1, 5, 8, 10, and 15) as well as question #9. Ninety-six percent of these females
agreed with question #10 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders),
and 91% agreed on question #5 that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect
society. Eighty-three percent agreed with question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works
better for juvenile offenders), and 74% agreed with question #1, 2, 4 and 8 (that restorative
justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, that restorative justice efforts are fair to
the victim, that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and that
criminals can change their behavior for the better). On question #12, 70% agreed that
shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a crime, and 65% of female
respondents on question #9 agreed that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the
community will help them to become better people in the future. Sixty-one percent of
100 Gina Robertiello

respondents on question #6 and #14 agreed that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be
retributive, and that regular punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders
to think worse of themselves. On question #3 and #13, only 52% agreed that criminals are
treated too leniently today, and that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma. Forty-eight
percent agreed that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime on
question #11, and forty-three percent agreed that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in
the punishment of their victimizers on question #7.

Females Social Science Majors

There were twenty-one female social science majors in the sample, including those from
History, Criminal Justice, Sociology and Political Science. Ninety percent of them agreed
with question #10 (that prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders), and over
80% of them agreed with question #5 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to
protect society). Almost 80% of them (16 of 21) agreed with question #1, 4, and 15 (that
restorative justice efforts are working to control or reduce crime, that the goal of punishment
in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative shaming works better for
juvenile offenders). Seventy-one percent (15 of the 21 female social science majors) said they
aspired to a career in criminal justice. Sixty-six percent of the female social science majors
agreed with question #6 and # 12 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be
retributive, and that shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a
crime). Almost 60% of them (12 of the 21) agreed with question #2, 3, and 8 (that restorative
justice efforts are fair to the victim, that criminals are treated too leniently today, and that
criminals can change their behavior for the better). Fifty-percent of them agreed with question
# 9, 11, 13, and 14 (that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help
them to become better people in the future, that shaming criminals will deter them from
committing a future crime, that reintegrative shaming causes less stigma, and that regular
punishment techniques that are not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of
themselves). Finally, only 33% agreed that it is appropriate for victims to have a say in the
punishment of their victimizers, on question #7.

Female Non-Social Science Majors

When examining the female non social science majors, their opinions were almost
exactly the same as the male non-social science majors. They were most likely to agree with
questions #5, 6, 8, 10 and 15, with the same top four answers as their male counterparts. Of
the 120 females in this sample, 98% agreed with question #10 (that prisons should offer
programs to help rehabilitate offenders) and 93% agreed with question #5 (that the goal of
punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society). Seventy-eight percent agreed with
question #15 (that reintegrative shaming works better for juvenile offenders), and 75% agreed
with question #8 (that criminals can change their behavior for the better). Seventy-three
percent agreed with question #6 (that the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be
retributive), and 66% agreed with question #3 (that criminals are treated too leniently today).
 Table #4. Responses by Sub-Population of Sample.

Sample-> Entire Males Female Social Social Science Males Females Non Social Non Social
Question: Pop Science Females Aspiring to a Aspiring to a CJ Science Science
Males CJ Career Career Males Females
1. restorative justice efforts are working to 60% 50% 65% 70% 80%* 73% 74% 44% 63%
control or reduce crime
2. restorative justice efforts are fair to the 56% 60% 58% 56% 60% 60% 74% 57% 58%
victim
3. criminals are treated too leniently today 60% 60% 65% 65% 60% 60% 52% 60% 66%
4. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should 60% 60% 65% 56% 80%* 60% 74% 60% 63%
be to rehabilitate
5. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should 90%* 90%* 91%* 79%* 80%* 90%* 91%* 91%* 93%*
be to protect society
6. the goal of punishment in the U.S. should 70% 74% 72% 93%* 66% 74% 61% 68% 73%
be retributive
7. it is appropriate for victims to have a say in 47% 43% 48% 50% 33% 43% 43% 40% 50%
the punishment of their victimizers
8. criminals can change their behavior for the 70% 80%* 72% 86%* 60% 80%* 74% 77%* 75%*
better
9. efforts to reintegrate the offender back into 60% 70% 58% 79%* 50% 70% 65% 66% 59%
the community will help them to become
better people in the future
10. prisons should offer programs to help 81%* 82%* 90%* 70% 90%* 82%* 96%* 86%* 98%*
rehabilitate offenders
11. shaming criminals will deter them from 41% 50% 38% 35% 50% 50% 48% 52% 36%
committing a future crime
12. shaming criminals will deter the general 52% 60% 50% 50% 66% 60% 70% 60% 48%
public from committing a crime
13.re-integrative shaming causes less stigma 40% 49% 38% 44% 50% 50% 52% 46% 33%
14. regular punishment techniques (not 46% 50% 45% 21% 50% 50% 61% 60% 44%
reintegrative) cause offenders to think worse
of themselves
15.re-integrative shaming works better for 75%* 80%* 77%* 65% 80%* 80%* 83%* 86%* 78%*
juvenile offenders
102 Gina Robertiello

There was less support for the remaining questions. On question #1 (restorative justice
efforts are working to control or reduce crime), and question #4 (the goal of punishment in
the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders), there was only 63% support, and on question #9
(efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better
people in the future), there was only 59% support. Fifty-eight percent agreed with question #2
(restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim), and 50% agreed with question #7 (it is
appropriate for victims to have a say in the punishment of their victimizers). Less than one-
half of the female non-social science majors agreed with questions 11-14. Only 48% agreed
with question #12 (shaming a criminal will deter the general public from committing a
crime), and only 44% agreed with question #14 (that regular punishment techniques that are
not reintegrative cause offenders to think worse of themselves). Further, only 36% agreed
with question #11 (that shaming criminals will deter them from committing a future crime),
and only 33% agreed with question #13 (reintegrative shaming causes less stigma).

CONCLUSION
Overall, there were not many differences between the Social Science and non-Social
Science majors regarding their views on restorative justice. It appears overall support from
the entire sample (75% or more) existed on questions #5, 10 and 15. For the females overall,
there was a 75% or higher agreement on questions #5, 10 and 15 as well. For the males
overall, there was a 75% or higher agreement on questions #5, 8, 9, 10 and 15. When
examining the students who aspired to a career in criminal justice, there was 75% or higher
support for the males on question #5, 8, 9, 10 and 15, and for the females, there was 75% or
higher support on question #5, 10 and 15 (74% of them agreed with question #1, 2, and 8 as
well). When examining the social science majors, the males expressed a 75% or higher
agreement with questions #5, 6, 8, and 9.
Interestingly, 79% of them disagreed with question #14, and only 65% of them agreed
with question #15 (where most of the overall sample was very supportive). The female social
science majors expressed 75% or higher support for question #1, 4, 5, 10 and 15. Thus, they
felt a bit different than their male counterparts.
Finally, when examining the responses of the non-social science majors, there was 75%
or higher agreement with questions #5, 8, 10, and 15 for the males and #5, 8, 10 and 15 for
the females. It is apparent that the non-social science majors felt similarly, regardless of their
gender. In addition, it appears the non-social science majors were less likely to agree with
questions #1, 2, 4, and 9 than the social science majors and those who aspired to a career in
criminal justice. Table #4 summarizes the findings for each group.
To summarize, none of the sample (or sub-populations within the sample) demonstrated
75% or higher belief that restorative justice efforts are fair to the victim, or that criminals are
treated too leniently today. Thus, they were more likely to believe that a victim should
participate in the punishment of their victimizer, and did not think shaming criminals would
deter the behavior of the criminal or the onlookers. They did not think reintegrative shaming
causes less stigma, or that our current punitive techniques cause offenders to think worse of
themselves. In fact, the subjects of this study were a punitive group; a large majority thought
our criminals were treated appropriately (not too leniently) today. To take this a step further,
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 103

the Social Science Males demonstrated 75% or higher belief that the goal of punishment
should be retributive (although the rest of the sample did not go this far). Interestingly, the
Social Science Males were the only group most supportive of the belief that efforts to
reintegrate the offender back into the community would help them to become better people in
the future. Males (including those overall, those in and not in the social sciences, and those
aspiring to a career in the criminal justice system), were most likely to believe that criminals
could change their behavior for the better. Non-social science females also agreed with this
statement. Only Social Science Females demonstrated 75% or higher belief that restorative
justice efforts were working to control or reduce crime, and that the goal of punishment
should be to rehabilitate offenders.
The across-the-board support for questions #5, 10 and 15 were astounding. Almost all
respondents thought the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society. They
thought prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders, and that reintegrative
shaming would work better with juvenile offenders.

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Survey on Reintegrative Shaming (Please circle the appropriate response)

1. Do you think ―restorative justice‖ efforts are working to control or reduce crime?
YES NO
2. Are restorative justice efforts fair to the victim (does it fulfill the goal of punishing offenders)?
YES NO
3. Do you think criminals are treated too leniently nowadays?
YES NO
4. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to rehabilitate offenders?
YES NO
5. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be to protect society (by locking up offenders)?
YES NO
6. Do you think the goal of punishment in the U.S. should be retributive (punishment for the sake of
punishment---the criminal did something illegal, and should pay for the crime)?
YES NO
7. Do you think it is appropriate for the victim to participate (and have a say) in the punishment of their
victimizer?
YES NO
8. Do you think criminals can change their behavior for the better?
YES NO
9. Do you think that efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community will help them to become better
people in the future?
YES NO
10. Do you think prisons should offer programs to help rehabilitate offenders?
YES NO
11. Do you think ―shaming‖ a criminal will deter the criminal from committing a future crime (deterrence)?
YES NO
12. Do you think ―shaming‖ a criminal will deter onlookers/the general public from committing a crime at all?
YES NO
13. Do you think reintegrative shaming causes less stigma?
YES NO
14. Do you think using regular punishment techniques (not reintegrative) cause offenders to think worse of
themselves (what is called a self-fulfilling prophecy)?
YES NO
15. Do you think reintegrative shaming would work better with juvenile offenders?
YES NO
 College Students' Perceptions of Reintegrative Shaming for Criminals 107

16. For which crimes do you think reintegrative shaming would work best?
17. For which crimes do you think reintegrative shaming would not work?
18. What is your major _________________
19. Do you aspire to a career in the criminal justice system?
YES NO
20. Are you male or female?
MALE FEMALE
Key: Restorative justice is a theory of justice with a rehabilitative or reintegrative approach. The
emphasis is on repairing the harm caused by the behavior, benefitting the injured parties, as well as
the offender.
Shaming-is a show of social disapproval
Reintegrative Shaming-where the offender must own up to his/her behavior, but is then accepted back
into the community
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 109-128 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

BEHAVING AGGRESSIVELY: THE ROLE OF SHAME IN

PRISONER CONFRONTATIONS

Michelle Butler*
School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Queen‘s Univeristy Belfast,
6 College Park, Belfast, BT7 1LP, Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT
Numerous researchers suggest that the experience of shame is linked to aggressive
behaviour (see Scheff, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In
this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of
shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. The self-narratives
of 89 adult male prisoners were examined to determine whether the prisoners expressed
themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types of shame they experienced and if these
experiences of shame influenced their involvement in confrontations with other prisoners.
Results indicate that individuals expressing themes of shame in their self-narrative were
more likely to engage in confrontations than those who did not express such themes. In
particular, those who were insecure in their sense of self seemed to be more likely to
react aggressively to behaviours which undermined their identity and were more likely to
feel pressurised to conform to prisoner norms of masculinity and aggressiveness. This
suggests that the expereince of shame may predispose individuals with an insecure self to
engage in confrontations as a means of ego defence. Potential ramifications and
limitations are discussed.

Keywords: Shame: Sense of Self: Insecurity; Aggression; Prison

INTRODUCTION
For me […] when you are talking to someone you would like their attention, when you
call someone you would like them to answer you with respect. Well for me, I found it

*
Corresponding author: Telephone: 0044 798 6831727, E-mail: michelle.butler@gmail.com
110 Michelle Butler

disrespectful when he turned around and shouted ―WHAT!‖ at me. I felt like punching his
fucking lights out, pardon my language, that was what I felt like and I let him know as well.
[…] I don‘t take disrespect. I‘m from somewhere where we don‘t take disrespect. If you
disrespect me, I‘ll honour myself. But if I think it is not worthwhile, I will just walk away.
1
Know what I mean? That is the way it is. (Int. #63, age 31)

Shame is believed to be a painful emotion that is normally accompanied by a sense of

‗being small‘, shrinking, powerlessness and imagery of how one‘s defective self would
appear to others (Tangney & Stuewig, 2004). It is seen as involving negative comparisons of
one‘s self with others, resulting in feelings of worthlessness and inferiority (Tangney, 1990;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has also been conceptualised as a social emotion arising
from threatened social bonds and/or a detrimental change in social status (Cooley, 1902;
Lynd, 1958; Lewis, 1971; Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 2000).
Consequently, feelings of shame may arise from an individual‘s perception of themselves,
their behaviour, how they imagine they are perceived by others and how others behave
towards them (Lynd, 1958; Lewis, 1971). In recent decades the concepts of shame and
shaming have received considerable attention in the study of crime, conflict and violence
(Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff & Retzinger 1991; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Gilligan, 1996,
2001). In particular, researchers have explored the potential links between shame and
aggression with many arguing that the experience of shame and proneness to shame is linked
to aggressive behaviour (Katz, 1988; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Gilligan, 1996, 2001;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992; Wright,
Gudjonsson & Young, 2008). In this paper, the potential relationship between shame and
aggression is explored to examine how and in what circumstances shame may influence an
individual‘s involvement in aggressive behaviour in a prison setting.

Shame and Aggression

The experience of shame is believed to be linked to aggression, feelings of anger and a

reduced likelihood of dealing with anger in a constructive manner (see Gilbert & Miles, 2000;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al. 1992; Wright et al. 2008). Katz (1988) argues that
the transformation of shame and humiliation into rage is the primary cause of violence. He
believes that individuals experiencing shame and humiliation feel as if their sense of self is
being threatened and engage in confrontations to defend their claim to moral worth. In such
circumstances, Katz (1988) suggests that individuals will feel justified in hurting others in
order to regain a sense of dignity and control over their identity. Indeed, research indicates
that the experience of disrespect may make violence possible as it allows an individual to go
against his/her general moral inhibitions by providing a justification or excuse for aggression
(Butler & Maruna, 2009). Toch (1992) also examined the motivations driving an individual‘s
use of aggression and concluded that the majority of violent offenders engage in
confrontations out of a concern with defending, promoting, and/or compensating for their
identity. Similarly, Gilligan (1996, 2001) theorises that individuals experiencing the emotion
of shame tend to engage in confrontations as they attempt to deflect threats to their identity.

1
This notation is used to refer to interview with participant number 63, who was aged 31 years.
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 111

Accordingly, feelings of shame may lead to aggression as individuals engage in

confrontations2 as a means of deflecting threats to their identity arising from the experience of
shame.
However, as shame is thought to incorporate the view of the other, ―What brings shame is
taking toward oneself what one presumes is the view that others would have, were they to
look‖ (Katz, 1999: 149). Consequently, what is experienced as shameful will vary depending
upon one‘s point of reference, who ‗the other‘ in question is and the esteem within which ‗the
other‘ is held. As such, negative evaluations by well-respected peers may be experienced as
more shaming than negative evaluations by strangers and/or out-group members (Ahmed,
Harris, Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001; Ellemers Doosje & Spears, 2004). In this way,
shame, and what is experienced as shaming, may vary from one individual to another and
from one social environment to the next. Nonetheless, it may be possible to detect
commonalities in the experience of shame within a group of people from a similar social
environment.
Research suggests there are different types of shame which are believed to be
differentially involved in facilitating aggressive behaviour (e.g. Braithwaite, 1989; Harris,
2003; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Scheff and Retzinger (1991) propose two different types of
shame: resolved/acknowledged shame and unresolved/unacknowledged shame. According to
Scheff and Retzinger (1991), everyone experiences varying levels of personal shame but
some shame is acknowledged and can therefore be resolved, whilst other shame is denied
and/or not fully acknowledged, becoming problematic in its impact. Scheff and Retzinger
(1991) argue that while both types of shame may result in anger and aggression, it is the
experience of unresolved/unacknowledged shame which can lead to prolonged displays of
violent behaviour. Unresolved/ unacknowledged shame is thought to result in more
aggressive confrontations through the development of shame spirals. Shame spirals are
believed to occur when individuals behave aggressively to deflect feelings of shame but then
become ashamed of their behaviour and feel ashamed of feeling ashamed (Scheff &
Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 2000). Lewis (1971) had previously argued that it was not the
experience of shame per se that leads to confrontations but rather unresolved /
unacknowledged shame. Nevertheless, how the different expressions of shame may lead an
individual to engage in confrontations has not been fully explained.
Sullivan (1950) argues that individuals are motivated to achieve and/or maintain a sense
of security in their identity. When they are confronted with events that question, threaten or
challenge their identity, they will experience feelings of psychological anxiety which they
attempt to reduce through the use of ‗security operations‘ (see Sullivan, 1950). Examples of
security operations include rejecting one‘s rejectors or by forcing others to behave in a more
in a more ‗appropriate‘ manner in the future (de Zulueta, 1994; Gilligan, 1996, 2001; Sykes,
1958). Security operations involve distracting one‘s attention away from distressing events
and focusing on other thoughts and/or behaviours believed to return a sense of security and
power to the ego. Engaging in confrontations is thought to be one such ‗security operation‘
through its ability to distract an individual‘s attention away from feelings of psychological
anxiety and return a sense of agency and power to the self (Gaylin, 1984; Katz, 1988; de

2
Throughout this paper the term ‗confrontations‘ is used to refer to the occurrence of fights, assaults, arguments and
threats of violence. When the expression ‗prisoner confrontations‘ is used, it refers specifically to the occurrence
of confrontations between adult male prisoners.
112 Michelle Butler

Zulueta, 1994; Gilligan, 1996, 2001). Consequently, experiences of shame may produce
feelings of psychological anxiety, prompting individuals (especially men) to engage in
confrontations as a means of protecting the self.
de Zulueta (1994) suggests that damaged attachment bonds (i.e. damaged relationships
with others, especially parents) can result in feelings of shame and humiliation as parental and
cultural conditions fail to provide the individual with a sense of self-worth and self esteem.
Feelings of shame are also thought to arise from wider social processes, such as exclusion,
discrimination and stigmatisation, as society‘s perception of an individual can influence their
conceptualisation of themselves and their relationships with others (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;
Tajfel, 1981; de Zulueta, 1994; Young, 1999, 2003). This implies that problematic
relationships with others and/or experiences of stigmatisation, discrimination or exclusion
may result in feelings of shame and contribute to the development of insecure attachments
with other people.
Individuals with insecure attachments are thought to be unsure of themselves and their
moral worth (Crocker, Lee & Park, 2004). As a result, insecurely attached individuals are
believed to experience more feelings of shame and fear negative evaluations by others than
those who are securely attached (Wagner & Tangney, 1991; Mikulincer, 1998). Further,
researchers argue that an individual‘s relationships with others can influence the development
of their sense of self (see Fairburn, 1952; Mead, 1934). Attachment theorists, such as Bowlby
(1969), place a particular emphasis on early family relationships as being important for the
development of the self. Insecure attachments are believed to contribute to the development
of an insecure self (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978; Crocker et al. 2004; de Zulueta,
1994; Miller, 2001). Individuals insecure in their sense of self tend to hold less positive views
about themselves and seek external validation of their self-worth from others (Baumeister,
Tice & Hutton, 1989; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001; Crocker, et al. 2004). This need for external
validation can also lead these individuals to be more susceptible to conforming to social
norms in order to achieve status amongst their peers (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper &
Bouvrette, 2002; Crocker et al. 2004). This suggests that shame, particularly
unresolved/unacknowledged shame, may lead those who are insecure to engage in
confrontations as a means of defending and/or promoting their ego.
These studies, therefore, indicate that for those who are insecure in their identity, shame
may be experienced as threatening to their ego in the form of disrespect, being treated like a
‗nobody‘, a ‗loser‘, or somehow inadequate. In such circumstances, individuals may behave
aggressively in an attempt to gain some semblance of control over their identity and reassert a
sense of dignity and pride in their identity through being ‗hard‘ and/or a ‗badass‘ (see Miller,
2001; Young, 2003). However, these feelings may be further amplified in a prison setting as
imprisonment represents a symbolic rejection of the individual by society.

Aggression in Prison

Confrontations are a frequent part of prison life, with many prisoners engaging in
physical fights, assaults, arguments and threats at some point during the course of their
imprisonment (Boyle, 1977; Clemmer, 1940; Home Office, 2003; James, 2003; King &
McDermott, 1995; McVicar, 1974; O‘Donnell & Edgar, 1996, 1998; Sykes, 1958;). Sykes
(1958) argues that confrontations occur as prisoners struggle to deal with the ‗pains‘ of
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 113

imprisonment. According to Sykes (1958), prisoners‘ involuntary segregation from the

community, powerlessness within the prison regime and inability to demonstrate their
masculinity through heterosexual relationships may be experienced as psychologically
threatening to their sense of self (Sykes, 1958). Edgar, O‘Donnell and Martin (2002) built
upon this work to argue that prisoners use aggression to make statements about their identity,
place within the social hierarchy, power and reputation. These findings emphasise the
importance of defending one‘s identity, masculinity and possessions as a motivating factor in
prisoner confrontations.
Recent research by Crewe (2005) highlights how prisoners may engage in confrontations
not only out of a concern for their identity in the prison environment but also to protect their
reputation outside of the prison setting. Crewe states that in English prisons there appears to
be a decline in overall prisoner solidarity and a rise in solidarity amongst regional and ethnic
peer groups. As prisoners may already have friends and/or associates detained in the same
prison, how they behave in prison can impact upon their identity in the community. As a
result, prisoners can become involved in confrontations due to their friendship networks,
gangs and/or loyalties to regional or ethnic peer groups out of a desire to maintain their image
in front of these peers. In particular, incidents of disrespect and insults are believed to trigger
confrontations as prisoners attempt to ‗save face‘ by defending a specific image they are
trying to project (Bourdieu, 1965; Goffman, 1967; Luckenbill, 1977). Prison norms of
‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation also mean that status within the prison environment tends
to be based upon displays of physical strength. Consequently, many prisoners attempt to gain
status in the prison environment and deflect threats to their self-image and/or social status
through the use of aggression.
In addition, researchers state that when an individual‘s access to social capital and/or
symbolic indicators of social status is limited, being treated in a respectful manner becomes
especially important for indicating their social worth (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003;
Sennett, 2003). Prison is an environment where social capital is limited. As a result, threats
and challenges to a prisoner‘s identity may be experienced as particularly distressing for
prisoners. Anderson (1999) states that individuals with limited access to social capital may
use aggression as a means of demanding that others acknowledge their social worth and treat
them with dignity and respect. Within male prisons, the expression of masculinity is thought
to be largely limited to displays of ‗toughness‘ (Sabo, Kupers & London 2001; Sykes, 1958;
Toch, 1977). Therefore, confrontations for male prisoners can represent a particular way of
deflecting threats to their identity as they attempt to replace feelings of shame with feelings of
pride achieved through the aggressive display of ‗manly‘ behavior (see Gambetta, 2006;
Gilligan, 1996; Sim, 1994).
In particular, the nature of the prison environment appears to reinforce definitions of
masculinity based on ‗toughness‘, as the prison environment is predominantly a male working
class environment with a social hierarchy based on physical dominance and power (Scraton,
Sim & Skidmore, 1991; Sim, 1994; Sabo et al. 2004). This is evident amongst the informal
prison inmate code in which prisoners are expected to be ‗manly‘, tough and avoid displays of
physical weakness (Crewe, 2005; Sykes & Messenger, 1960). Prisoners who appear tough
and able to defend themselves from exploitation and/or manipulation achieve status while
those who do not are perceived as weak and an easy target for future victimisation (Sykes,
1958; McCorkle, 1982; Edgar et al. 2002). This can lead prisoners who would not normally
behave aggressively to ‗put on a front‘ and behave aggressively to achieve the respect of their
114 Michelle Butler

masculine peers and/or avoid appearing weak to others (Sykes, 1958; McCorkle, 1982). In
this way, the prison environment can place added importance on the use of aggression as a
means of achieving status and respect amongst their fellow prisoners, and to communicate
that they are men and should not be victimised (Gambetta, 2006; McCorkle, 1982).
In this paper, prisoner self-narratives are explored to determine whether the presence of
shame in their identity influenced their involvement in confrontations. A self-narrative is a
story that an individual constructs to explain their behaviours, feelings, motivations and
desires within a meaningful and sequential framework (McAdams, 1985, 1994, 2001). It can
provide an individual with a sense of identity and self as well as reflecting how an individual
views him/herself and their experiences (McAdams, 1985, 1994, 2001). Gilligan (1996)
proposes that individuals who express themes of shame in their identity tend to engage in
more confrontations than others. For this reason, prisoner self-narratives are investigated to
discover whether these individuals reported themes of shame in their self-narratives, the types
of shame they experienced and if these themes of shame influenced their involvement in
confrontations with other prisoners.

Prisoners‟ Experiences of Shame

Eighty-nine adult male prisoners were voluntary recruited using a random stratified
sampling technique from an English Category C3 prison. These participants were male and
ranged in age from 21-65 years, with a mean age of 31 years and a standard deviation of 9.39.
The majority were either white British or black Caribbean and were serving sentences for
burglary, robbery and drug-related offences. However, some were also serving sentences for
wounding with intent, harassment, grievous bodily harm and manslaughter. Over half stated
they were from a working-class background, while the remainder either reported a lower-
middle-class or middle-class background. The majority (over 80 per cent) had no school
qualifications, while 60 per cent had a history of drug addiction. They were asked to complete
various social and psychological questionnaires, whilst also taking part in semi-structured
interviews about their life experiences both in and outside of prison. The participants were
asked to think of their life as a story and to describe significant moments in their lives and
why these moments were important to them. All interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed
and then coded for themes of shame. These men were not asked to describe events within
which they had experienced shame. Rather, themes of shame were only coded if they were
already present within the men‘s self-narratives. One month later, the participants were also
asked to complete a self-reported involvement in prisoner confrontations questionnaire. This
was to allow a quantitative and qualitative exploration of the presence of shame in the
participants‘ self-narratives and the impact of this shame on their involvement in
confrontations.
An inductive content analytic approach was used to identify the different themes of
shame emerging within their self-narratives. The participants‘ responses to the life history
interview were first coded using open coding4 to identify the different forms of shame present

3
Category C prisoners are thought to lack the skills and/or motivation to escape and are therefore deemed as a
minimal threat to the public.
4
Open coding is a technique in which the data is grouped into different categories (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 115

within their self-narratives and then axial coding5 was used to organise the different forms of
shame by recurring themes. From examining the participants‘ life stories there appeared to be
two different categories of shame which could both simultaneously be present within the
men‘s self-narratives: unresolved/unacknowledged shame and acknowledged/resolved
shame6.
The participants‘ experiences of unresolved/unacknowledged shame appeared to fall into
two different sub-categories: a stigma sub-category and a deflected shame sub-category. The
stigma sub-category emphasised the stigmatising origins of unresolved shame and consisted
of feeling automatically judged by others, perceiving others as unfairly treating the individual
as inferior or feeling rejected by society and/or significant others. The following extracts
illustrate some examples of shame within the stigma sub-category:

Even without knowing what you have done, knowing that you have been in prison makes
you a bad person, you automatically become a criminal, you‘re automatically judged, that is
what it is, you can‘t avoid it, you can‘t get out of it and it makes a very big difference in my
life. (Int. #72, age 35)

I am making the effort but I don‘t know if anyone is going to give me a job when I get
out. […] I think that companies […] just treat you like shit knowing that you‘ve got a record
you‘ll suffer anything, do you know what I mean? And when they start treating you like shit
and you put your foot down and stop suffering, they turn around and say ‗Hey look we told
you, it is the type of person he is, good for nothing‘. (Int. #13, age 39)

Some people live on the outskirts of London, like the private places and that, some
people don‘t grow up to see things like some of us have seen, they don‘t care, they don‘t care,
do you get me? They just want us to kill each other and put the other person away. (Int. #21,
age 24)

The deflected shame sub-category focused on feeling disproved of as a person by others

for transgressing a social norm but no acceptance of responsibility for that transgression
and/or projecting blame on to others or refusing to accept responsibility when others feel the
individual is to blame. Examples of deflected shame included:

My dad used to hit me, sometimes when I was bad, sometimes, I‘m not saying for no
reason at all, but for silly things that were unnecessary. Hmm, that is kinda where my life, I
mean […] I wouldn‘t be here now if it weren‘t for that point in my life. […] I wouldn‘t say
I‘ve achieved my full potential. I wish sometimes if things could have been different, I mean
there are a lot of things surrounding what I have done and why I am here in prison that are not
entirely in my control. I mean there are a lot of things that are uncontrollable out there. (Int.
#1, age 22)

5
Axial coding builds on the categories identified through open coding and is used to organise these categories by
recurring themes to form a comprehensive scheme of categories and sub-categories (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
6
To assess the accuracy of the shame coding scheme an independent rater blind to the research questions and
hypotheses of the study was asked to randomly code one third of the participants‘ life history interviews. This
resulted in a Cohen‘s Kappa of .77 for themes of unresolved/unacknowledged shame and .82 for themes of
acknowledged/resolved shame, which suggests the shame coding scheme is more than adequate. Cohen‘s Kappa
is a statistical technique used to measure the degree of agreement by two different people over the coding of
items beyond that which would be expected by chance. Cohen‘s Kappa of .75 or above is considered to be very
good.
116 Michelle Butler

I was doing a lot of drugs, being mean, and aggressive, telling my [adoptive] mum that I
hate her and trying, trying to blame anyone that was close to me that it was their fault that I
don‘t know anyone of my family. (Int. #48, age 29)

Similar to the pattern found in unresolved/unacknowledged shame, the participants‘

experiences of resolved/acknowledged shame also appeared to fall into two different sub-
categories: an acknowledged shame sub-category and a ‗making good‘ (see Maruna, 2001)
sub-category. Within the acknowledged shame sub-category the participants acknowledged
their feelings of shame, disappointment, remorse, loss of status and/or accepted responsibility
for their behaviour. Examples of acknowledged shame were:

You start to think more and more, you know, turn my life around and be a better husband,
be a better father because I feel, you know, that I have let them down, you know, I feel
ashamed of myself because I think I‘m a dad, I‘m a husband and I‘ve let them all down. (Int.
#38, age 41)

I was just like, I was hurt, I was, I weren‘t even angry and that, I was just hurt. I felt like I
let everyone down, my mum and that, my friends and I let myself down because I do so well
to get my first job and get my first record out and that and then to get nicked for something
like drugs was just like, totally out of the question. (Int. #4, age 22)

Staying in those crack houses, I know I shouldn‘t say this now because I know it can
happen to anyone, but I used to always look at other people who used to stay in those houses
as scum. […] When I was working and coming into those houses to buy drugs I‘d be looking
at them and thinking ‗Go wash or something‘ […] and then a couple of years down the line
that was me. […] It took a lot of self-respect. I saw people who knew me as me and I couldn‘t
face them, do you get me, I‘d be walking down the street and I would see them coming and it
took a lot of respect from me. (Int. #76, age 34)

The ‗making good‘ sub-category involved an attempt to resolve feelings of shame by

endeavouring to deal with these emotions and/or attempting to make amends for their prior
behaviour:

She still loves me to death but I know deep down in her mind she has had a big shock
with this [watching him being arrested]. […] I‘ve apologised to her. […] I want to make her
as comfortable as she can be because I know that she is still suffering, she is still hurting, she
is still suffering. […] So, I just want her to be as happy as possible. (Int. #32, age 22)

I was looking at my life and I didn‘t really like what I saw and I‘ll tell you why, it was
because of my kids again, cause I wanted to set a good example and […] I weren‘t. […] Them
getting bigger you know at school when people would ask them ‗What do your parents do?
What does your mum do? What does your dad do?‘ and no answer for that. I was thinking
about those things. […]Yeah, I was thinking deep. […] I was really looking at life, like family
life […], responsibilities, real responsibilities, putting to rights first and foremost in my life
[…]. Trying to be a good role model for my kids and just to play a better part to society, you
know what I mean. (Int. #63, age 31)

Over 75 per cent of the men described experiencing some form of shame within their life
story without being specifically asked about their experiences of shame. Themes of either
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 117

unresolved/unacknowledged or acknowledged/resolved shame were present in almost half of

the men‘s self-narratives, while just over a quarter described experiencing both forms of
shame. A tobit regression analysis7 was used to test whether these themes of shame could
predict the men‘s involvement in prisoner confrontations during a one month follow-up
period, whilst controlling for possible confounding demographic, sentence and psychological
variables8. The regression analysis revealed that themes of shame significantly predicted the
men‘s follow-up involvement in confrontations, with those expressing themes of shame,
especially unresolved/unacknowledged shame, tending to engage in more confrontations than
those who did not express such themes (see Butler, 2007). These findings suggest that themes
of shame may predispose individuals to engage in confrontations and that a more in-depth
analysis of the men‘s self-narratives may help us to understand the relationship between
shame and aggression.

„Confrontational‟ Self-Narratives

The self-narratives of 20 confrontational men and 20 non-confrontational men were

analysed to explore how themes of shame may lead some men to engage in more
confrontations than others. A grounded theory approach was used to examine whether there
were consistent themes emerging within their self-narratives which could distinguish between
those who engaged in confrontations and those who did not. Using the participants‘ scores on
their follow-up self-reported involvement in prisoner confrontations questionnaire, the self-
narratives of 20 of the ‗most confrontational‘ participants (i.e. those who obtained the highest
scores) were identified. An analysis of these self-narratives revealed that there were three
emerging narrative themes which may further our understanding of how some men come to
engage in more confrontations than others: a disruptive family environment; feeling
stigmatised, discriminated against and excluded; and doubting their ability to succeed.
Twelve of the 20 confrontational men recounted experiences of a disruptive family
environment. These men appeared to be struggling with the memory of a difficult childhood
in which they recalled major family disagreements, being kicked out of the family home,
family break-up through divorce, feeling abandoned by being taken into care and the lack of a
secure and loving home due to being constantly moved in and out of foster homes and/or
penal institutions. The consequences of these experiences varied but in general the men
described these events as resulting in feelings of betrayal, distrust and a lack of security and
stability. In some cases, participants believed the distrust they felt for their parents resulted in
a general distrust of letting others get close to them. For example:

I didn‘t know who I could trust. All I knew was I could trust my brother, and me and him
had to stick together. […] I still don‘t forgive them for splitting up, I still don‘t forgive them
for lying to me. I don‘t forgive them for not listening to me when I needed help. Our
relationship just went downhill. […] I thought if you can‘t trust your mum and dad, who can

7
A tobit regression analysis is a specific type of regression analysis used on non-normally distributed data.
8
This regression model was found to be significant and accounted for 38.42 per cent of the total variance to be
explained (χ2 (5)= 32.52; p<.001). Themes of unresolved/unacknowledged shame significantly predicted the
men‘s follow-up involvement in prisoner confrontations (t = 2.10; p<.05) while themes of
resolved/acknowledged shame were found to marginally predict the men‘s follow-up involvement in prisoner
confrontations (t = 1.90; p<.10).
118 Michelle Butler

you trust. So I went around not trusting no-one, just doing my own thing. […] I wouldn‘t trust
other people or get too close to someone because you never know what they are going to be
saying. (Int. #16, age 21)

Some men also reported feeling rejected by their parents and/or significant others when
they were taken into care or remanded to a penal institution. These men described feeling a
lack of security and stability during their childhood years as they were constantly being
moved around from one foster home to another and/or from one institution to another. They
experienced this lack of parental love and affection as an obstacle to their own healthy
development. They were not secure in their environment and did not feel they had anyone
whom they could trust or depend upon:

By being put in an institution at a young age you just get placed in one institution after
another, I wasn‘t sure who I could talk to, friends were few and far between, never really had
anyone to talk to really. You are a person in a pack of people, you are not treated like an
individual really, you are just one of a group. I felt like prison was my home, institutions were
where I belonged, the next thing for me was a life sentence or dying. (Int. #88, age 47)

These early experiences are believed to be important as a lack of exposure to secure and
loving relationships with others can hinder the development of a secure sense of self (Mead,
1934, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; de Zulueta, 1994).
In addition, 11 of the 20 confrontational men recounted feeling stigmatised, discriminated
against and excluded. Such recollections mainly consisted of others behaving differently
towards them due to their criminal conviction and/or drug addiction. In particular, the men
expressed feelings of frustration due to the stigma associated with having a criminal
conviction and the problems they encountered when attempting to obtain employment:

Any main obstacles I can see coming up, well there is a few. When I get out I am going
to need housing, I am going to need employment without the snub nosed people who are
going to look at my record and go, ‗Oh, you‘ve got a criminal record, you can‘t work for us‘.
I‘ve got to find a decent employer who will accept me on the basis of how good I am as a
worker and what qualifications I‘ve got and not only on the offences I‘ve committed in the
past (Int. #16, age 21)

These men described feeling distrusted by the community regardless of how they
behaved:

They know when you are on drugs, well where I come from they do anyway, they just,
they whisper behind your back and things like that, they just don‘t trust you. (Int. #54, age 34)

These men appeared to be insecure in their identity and social positioning. However,
feeling stigmatised was not only a problem within the community. It could also occur within
the prison. For example, the men described the majority of prison officers as taking advantage
of their position, behaving unfairly and judging them to be inferior or ‗scum‘. Nevertheless,
while the majority of the men verbally protested about their treatment by the prison officers,
the fact they received such treatment led some to question whether they did indeed deserve to
be treated like ‗scum‘:
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 119

It‘s like the way they look at you and the way they talk to you as if you are scum like, do
you know what I mean, as if you are nothing. But you are, you are something, [sigh] I don‘t
know. (Int. #28, age 21)

According to Young (1999, 2003), recalling experiences such as these can be threatening
to the self as individuals feel their identity and social worth are not respected by others.
The last theme to emerge from the 20 confrontational men‘s self-narratives was a lack of
faith in their ability to succeed. Ten of the 20 confrontational men expressed doubt in their
ability to overcome obstacles. More specifically, they doubted their ability to overcome their
drug addiction, to control the direction their life was taking and to cope emotionally with
difficult situations:

I‘ve been involved in drugs since 1987 and I think it was three years after I got into drugs
that I realised I was addicted and it has been a big, big battle ever since to try and get myself
out of it. I thought it would be easy but it‘s not, it‘s really hard. I‘m determined to win the
war, no battle, no war because you can win the battles and lose the war. […] I mean it is very
hard to try and wean yourself off drugs in the community, very, very hard. Even when I get
out there is no guarantee that I will stay off drugs. (Int. #42, age 43)

This lack of faith in their ability to succeed seemed to result in feelings of shame as the
men acknowledged they had let themselves and others down, and attempted to deflect
responsibility for their failure to circumstances and events which were beyond their control.
In addition, their doubt in their ability to overcome an addiction, to control the direction their
life was taking and to cope emotionally with stressful situations may have contributed to the
development of an insecure self, as the participants did not trust themselves or their
capabilities.
All 20 confrontational men expressed at least one of these themes within their self-
narratives while 12 men expressed two or more themes. This suggests, therefore, that the
experience of shame may predispose those who are insecure in their identity to behave
aggressively in order to protect their fragile sense of self.

„Non-Confrontational‟ Self-Narratives

An analysis of the 20 non-confrontational men‘s self-narratives also revealed three

common narrative themes: being supported by family and friends; feeling proud, successful
and respected; and feeling confident in their ability to succeed. Eighteen of the 20 non-
confrontational men expressed at least one of these themes, with 16 men expressing two or
more themes in their self-narrative.
Sixteen of the 20 non-confrontational men described feeling supported and cared for by
family and friends. They recalled being supported by significant others through their
childhood, struggle with a drug addiction, imprisonment and/or trial:
My family has always provided for me, looked after me, I mean they have been through a
lot of rough times with me when I was younger. […] My family is very important to me. […]
The family is always there for you through good and bad times. […] I don‘t want to lose any
of my family. (Int. #39, age 21)
120 Michelle Butler

Some described the birth of a child as providing the loving and supportive family
environment they had always craved. Others recollected coming from a broken home, but
nonetheless, feeling supported and cared for by friends and the community:

Where I grew up, it was like 99% of everyone on my estate, they grew up like, single
parent with just a mum or just a dad, like when we were out playing together and doing things
together and that, we did it as family. We made our own little family, yeah, together like as
friends. (Int. #4, age 22)

These men felt supported and cared for by others which appeared to provide them with a
sense of security in their identity.
Another narrative theme emerging in seven of the men‘s self-narratives involved feeling
proud, respected and successful. While this theme was not as prevalent as the others, it was
included due to the importance the participants gave to these recollections in their life stories
and to the profound effect these memories appeared to have on the participants‘ sense of self.
These men recalled feeling that others looked up to them and valued their opinions. They
described feeling respected by others because they appeared to be successful in their lives and
were taking part in activities which were deemed respectful by the community. For example:

I got myself a car valeting job, was earning good money, was going out at the weekend
socialising, I had good friends about me, I had money, I had good clothes, I had the, ahh, the
general like […] I‘d give you […] how can I word it? I was respected in life; do you know
what I mean? I felt like I was going somewhere. I was a good, respectable member of the
community, you know, I was doing things that everyday members of the community were
doing. That‘s my highlight of my life. (Int. #12, age 29)

These men also reported feeling proud of their achievements as well as family members
and friends expressed pride at what they had accomplished:

I got a job as a bus driver and I never thought that I would get the job. […] I still
remember the first morning I drove the bus out of the garage I was happy, I done it for four
years. It was my best job and it made my gran proud and it made my mum proud, my friends
were proud, do you know what I mean? It was a good time in my life. […] Everyone was
proud of me, it was like a real credit to me. (Int. #20, age 35)

A small minority of participants also described obtaining some form of public recognition
which further strengthened their sense of pride in their achievements and their feelings of
being respected by others:

I started basketball when I was 11 or 12. […] So we had a tournament and we had to play
Sudbury and Bury St. Edmonds, and […] I remember playing as well as I could. You know,
making shots, scoring points, I wasn‘t greedy; I was just playing how I needed to. Anyway,
we knew we had won the cup match […] and then they said ‗And we‘ve got a trophy for the
most improved player in the whole tournament‘ or whatever, and you never think you are
going to win anything, do you know what I mean? And they called my name out and I thought
‗Yeahhhh‘. So I was kind of real happy and I thought […] I‘d done something I had enjoyed
and people recognised that. […] I‘d only been playing about four or five months and it was
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 121

good to know that they had noticed me as part of the team […] and that just made me real
happy. (Int. #16, age 21)

These participants appeared to feel appreciated and valued by others. Feeling appreciated
and valued by others is thought to facilitate a sense of security and stability in one‘s social
status and identity (Lind & Tyler, 1988). However, this does not mean that these men did not
also recall experiences of stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion within their life story.
Rather, they described having since been exposed to situations in which they felt respected
and valued by others which seemed to help counteract the potential destabilising effects of
stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion on their identity.
The last common narrative theme to emerge from the non-confrontational men‘s self-
narratives was a sense of confidence in their ability to succeed. Fifteen of the 20 men
expressed confidence in their ability to succeed and overcome difficult obstacles which they
might encounter. In particular, these men discussed their sense of confidence in their ability to
overcome their drug addiction, obtain employment and overcome obstacles more generally in
life. They described looking forward to their future and appeared confident in their ability to
overcome any obstacles which they may encounter. Unlike the confrontational men, they
believed they had the will power and control necessary to achieve their aims. They did not
believe their ability to overcome obstacles was due to chance or the right combination of
circumstances. Instead, they believed their ability to overcome obstacles was due to their own
ability to control themselves:

Well, it is all about controlling yourself and I think I can control myself, hmm, I‘m trying
to quit smoking right now, just out of the blue I said to myself I need to stop and in the last
five days I‘ve only smoked 3 roll-ups and I‘ve got lots of patches so that is the type of person
that I am, when I say I am going to do something I will control myself. (Int. #46, age 26)

A sense of confidence in their ability to succeed appeared to increase their faith in

themselves and their capabilities.
Although some of the non-confrontational men also recounted negative experiences, they
tended to downplay these experiences to focus more on areas of potential strength within their
self-narrative. This focus on the positive rather than the negative seemed to facilitate a sense
of security in their identity as they felt confident, supported and valued by others. Based on
these feelings, the non-confrontational men seemed to be less inclined to engage in
confrontations as, in their own words, they felt they had ―nothing to prove‖ (Int. #4, age 22).
These men already felt a sense of belonging and respect in their interactions with significant
others and did not feel a need to engage in confrontations in order to ‗prove‘ their worth
and/or demand respect from others. In addition, this sense of security seemed to lead the men
to be less likely to engage in confrontations in order to conform to prisoner norms of
‗toughness‘ as their feelings of confidence in themselves and their abilities appeared to
minimise potential threats to their ego and social status. Therefore, the experience of shame
may be less likely to lead to aggression amongst individuals secure in their identity as they
already feel loved and supported and do not feel a need to ‗prove‘ themselves to others.
In contrast, the confrontational men‘s self-narratives tended to focus on their more
negative experiences. They tended to emphasise the problematic areas of their lives more so
than areas of potential strength. This pessimistic focus appeared to affect their sense of self.
122 Michelle Butler

By focusing on their more challenging experiences, many of the men seemed to have
developed an insecure sense of self as they did not feel respected or valued by others. In
comparison to the non-confrontational men, their self-narratives did not appear to provide
them with a secure foundation upon which to build their identity. As a result, these men seem
to seek external validation of their status and self-worth from others. Unlike the non-
confrontational men, they appeared to place a greater importance on how they were treated by
others as they seemed to seek to reaffirm their identity through their interactions with others.
Accordingly, these men seemed to experience threats to their ego as particularly devastating
and engage in confrontations as a means of defending their identity and/or ‗proving‘ their
worth to others:

Yeah, hmm, it is easy for someone to like, to like disrespect me because everyone is
under pressure really and all it takes is one kind of mistake or word to perhaps upset someone
really and for me when people mention things about not having much or getting anywhere
then that hits on a raw nerve, or if they say anything about my family. (Int. #79, age 31)

Consequently, the experience of shame for these men seemed to lead them to be more
prone to using aggression as a means to combat threats to their identity and/or social status.
Further, this sense of insecurity also seemed to lead them to be more prone to succumbing to
prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation in order to gain the status and respect
of their fellow prisoners.

Fighting for Respect

These findings indicate that, for those insecure in their identity, the experience of shame
may lead to a greater involvement in confrontations as they attempt to use aggression to
deflect feelings of psychological anxiety and obtain the respect or approval of others.
de Zulueta (1994) argues that for those who feel insecure in their identity, feelings of
shame may trigger aggressive behaviour as these feelings can threaten their fragile sense of
self. For Mead (1934), identity develops from our early interactions with others. Secure and
stable interactions result in a secure identity, while insecure and unstable interactions
facilitate the development of an insecure self. Individuals with an insecure self are not only
believed to be more inclined to actively seek external validation of their self-worth from
others, but also hold less positive views about themselves and seek to enhance their self-
worth by obtaining positive interpersonal feedback from others (Baumeister et al. 1989;
Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988; de Zulueta, 1994; Crocker et al. 2004; Vohs & Heatherton,
2001). In this way, individuals with an insecure self seem to be more interdependent in their
self-constructions and base their identity and self-worth more so on the approval of others.
Indeed Crocker et al. conclude:

People whose sense of self-worth depends on external validation, achievements, or

accomplishments are more easily and frequently captured by the question of whether they are
wonderful or worthless and, hence, [are] more susceptible to the pursuit of self-esteem. (2004:
283)
 Behaving Aggressively: The Role of Shame in Prisoner Confrontations 123

Consequently, how individuals insecure in their identtiy are treated by others appears to
hold a greater significance for their identity and self-worth than would normally be expected,
leading them to be more prone to engaging in confrontations out of a psychological need to
protect the self and/or demand respect from other.
Further, this pursuit of social approval may lead individuals insecure in their identity to
be more susceptible to conforming to socio-cultural norms in order to achieve status amongst
their peers (Crocker et al. 2002; Crocker et al. 2004). Within a prison population, specific
socio-cultural norms tend to emerge (see Crewe, 2005; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messenger,
1960). In particular, within male prisons, there appears to be a culture of masculinity
encouraging some prisoners to base their status upon displays of ‗toughness‘ as well as
promoting prisoner norms of physical retaliation (Sykes, 1958; Sabo et al. 2001; Edgar et al.
2002). In the words of one participant:

If someone disrespects you, you‘ve got to put them in their place because otherwise it is a
bandwagon situation isn‘t it? You know, people will think he‘s an easy touch, we‘ll all have a
go so you got, you‘ve got to be on it [slaps his hand], you know, let him know okay you don‘t
what any trouble but you are quite prepared to ask him if he wants some. (Int. #26, age 48)

As individuals with an insecure self may be more vulnerable to conforming to social

norms in order to achieve status amongst their peers, prisoners with an insecure self may be
especially prone to engaging in confrontations out of a psychological need to appear ‗tough‘.
Thus, themes of shame may encourage individuals to engage in confrontations out of a
psychological need to protect their fragile sense of self, gain status by conforming to socio-
cultural norms and/or some combination of the above.
In contrast, as individuals who are secure in their sense of self tend to be less inclined to
constantly seek external validation of their self-worth from others, they also seem to be less
susceptible to conforming to social norms as a means of gaining status amongst their peers.
This suggests that within the prison environment such individuals may be less motivated to
engage in confrontations in order to demonstrate their masculinity and/or gain status by
conforming to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘ and physical retaliation. Therefore, individuals
who are secure in their sense of self may be less likely to succumb to pressures to appear
‗tough‘ as they have already developed a sense of self-worth, and do not need the same level
of approval from others as those who are insecure in their identity. One participant explained:

9
People have tried to diss me and I have just laughed it off because I know that no matter
what they say I know what‘s what, or whatever you say is irrelevant to me. […] I think it has a
lot to do with insecurity. (Int. #76, age 34)

Such individuals may occasionally engage in confrontations in an attempt to deter others

from attempting to intimidate, manipulate and/or exploit them. However, they may be less
likely to engage in confrontations out of a psychological need to defend their sense of self
and/or gain status amongst their peers.
Lastly, it is important to note that emotion of shame not only arises from how we imagine
others perceive us but also how others interact with us. As a result, feelings of shame may not
only arise from an individual‘s perception of themselves, their behaviour and how they
9
‗Diss‘ is a slang term used by the participants to refer to disrespect.
124 Michelle Butler

imagine they are perceived by others but also how others behave towards them. For example,
the men‘s belief that prison officers perceived them to be ‗scum‘ appeared to lead them to
question whether they were indeed ‗scum‘. In addition, the themes of stigmatisation,
discrimination, exclusion and lack of faith in their ability to succeed which emerged in the
men‘s self-narratives appeared to reflect broader societal views of offenders and their
behaviour. In this way, societal views, beliefs and perceptions may influence how individuals
conceptualise themselves, their relationships with others and how shame is expressed in their
self-narratives. Consequently: ―What is at stake in everyday violence is not a King‘s divine
right but the sacred core of respectability that the assailant is defending and defining through
his violence‖ (Katz, 1988: 35). Hence, intervention programmes attempting to address the
presence of shame within self-narratives must tackle not only how individuals conceive of
themselves but also how society perceives these individuals.
Regrettably, cognitive behavioural programmes aimed at reducing aggressive behaviour
tend to pathologise the individual by attributing aggressive behaviour to ‗errors‘ or biases
within their cognitions (Bush, 1995; Dodge, 2003; Kendall, 2002; Merrington & Stanley,
2000). As a result, the cause of aggressive behaviour is generally attributed solely to the
individual and their thinking patterns while potential social and cultural causes are ignored or
downplayed. Gadd (2004) reviewed the use of cognitive behavioural programmes and
concluded that these programmes failed to grasp how men‘s use of violence related to their
view of themselves and their masculinity. Consequently interventions aimed at addressing
psychosocial issues such as shame, masculinity and self-identity may be better placed to
reduce aggression than those focused solely on cognitions and/or situational interventions.
In conclusion, the findings from this research suggest that the extent to which some
individuals engage in more confrontations than others depends upon the psychological need
they feel to defend their sense of self and/or gain the approval of others. For those insecure in
their sense of self, themes of shame appear to predispose them to engage in confrontations as
they attempt to defend their identity from psychological threats and/or demonstrate their
masculinity. These men seem to use aggression as a means of reducing feelings of
psychological anxiety by attempting to transform feelings of shame into feelings of anger and
deflect and/or displace these feelings onto others. In addition, these feelings of shame can be
further amplified through their status as a prisoner and their symbolic rejection by society.
This can prompt them to be more susceptible to conforming to prisoner norms of ‗toughness‘
as a way of gaining status amongst their peers and returning a sense of self-worth and
respectability to their identity. Consequently, if attempts to change and/or reduce aggression
are to be successful, interventions should attempt to address how individuals understand and
construct their identity as well as what individuals are consciously or unconsciously
attempting to achieve through their use of aggression.

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128 Michelle Butler

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 129-149 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

NEUROTICISM AND POSITIVE PERSONAL

CHARACTERISTICS: TEST OF A TWO-FACTOR
MODEL OF THEIR EFFECTS ON AFFECTIVE HEALTH

Bruce W. Smith*, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

University of New Mexico

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of neuroticism and positive
personal characteristics on affective health in the context of a two-factor model. The
model posits that neuroticism will primarily impact negative affect while positive
personality characteristics will primarily impact positive affect. The relationship between
neuroticism, positive personal characteristics, and affective health was examined in three
large samples of undergraduate students. The positive personal characteristics assessed
included extraversion, resilience, optimism, spirituality, purpose in life, and indicators of
social and emotional intelligence. Multiple regression analyses were used to
simultaneously examine the effects of neuroticism and the positive characteristics on
negative affect and positive affect. The results consistently showed that neuroticism was
a strong predictor of negative affect while positive characteristics were generally not
related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. In addition, the positive
characteristics were still related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism.
Finally, neuroticism was not related to positive affect when controlling for all positive
characteristics at once but was usually related to less positive affect when controlling for
one at a time. The main implication is that neuroticism should be considered within the
context of both the positive and negative domains of human experience. Neuroticism may
have its strongest impact on negative affective health while positive characteristics may
have their strongest impact on positive affective health.

*
Corresponding author: Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131. Email
address: bwsmith@unm.edu, Office: 505-277-0643, Cell: 505-366-3766, Fax: 505-277-1394.
130 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

INTRODUCTION
What are the implications of neuroticism for psychological and physical health? Our
psychological health is closely tied to our emotional experience and the emotions we
experience have strong implications for our physical health (Frasure-Smith, Lespérance &
Talajic, 1995; Keefe, Lumley, Anderson, Lynch, Studts, & Carson, 2001; Pressman & Cohen,
2005). In order to understand the relationship between neuroticism and our emotional
experience, it is important to understand both the positive and negative aspects of our
emotional experience (Fredrickson, 2009; Peterson & Seligman, 2005; Zautra, 2003). These
two aspects of our emotional experience have been divided into what has been called positive
affect which includes emotions such as enthusiasm, interest, and pride and negative affect
which includes emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998).
This division between the positive and the negative is important because positive and
negative affect may operate independently and have different kinds of effects on health and
well-being (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). High negative affect is not always
associated with low positive affect and low positive affect is not always associated with high
negative affect. For example, a person may experience low negative affect and low positive
affect on a day when little happens and that same person may experience high negative affect
and high positive affect on the first day of a challenging new job (e.g., pride and fear). In
addition, while negative affect is generally related to forms of psychopathology such as
anxiety and depression and predictive of physical health problems (Clark & Watson, 1991;
Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe et al., 2001), positive affect may have different kinds of
effects on health and well-being including enhancing creativity and problem solving and
increasing resilience in times of stress (Fredrickson, 2001; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004).
Why is this important for understanding the implications of neuroticism on health and
well-being? There is strong evidence that neuroticism is related to adverse events and may be
related to various health problems. Neuroticism is the only one of the Big Five personality
factors that is consistently related to negative outcomes including negative affect, anxiety,
depression, and physical symptoms (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Charles, Gatz, Kato, &
Pedersen, 2008). However, knowing that neuroticism is related to more negative affect does
not necessarily mean that we understand its relationship with positive affect and other aspects
of psychological well-being. In order to fully understanding the implications of neuroticism
for health and well-being, it is important to examine how it impacts both the positive and the
negative dimensions. Unfortunately, although much is known about the relationship between
neuroticism and negative outcomes, much less is known about its relationship with positive
affect and well-being.
In an attempt to compensate for the traditional emphasis in psychology and psychiatry on
negative characteristics, the positive psychology movement was begun just before the new
millennium and has continued to grow over the past decade (Ryff & Singer, 1998; Seligman
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This movement has emphasized the study of ―positive‖ personal
characteristics such as optimism, spirituality, meaning and purpose, and emotional
intelligence rather than negative characteristics such as neuroticism (Peterson & Seligman,
2004). The movement has even resulted in a book that some have called the ―Un-DSM‖
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004) which focuses on human strengths rather than psychopathology
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 131

as does the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000).
The positive psychology movement has also focused on positive outcomes such as
positive affect and emotions (Fredrickson, 2009), various measures of well-being including
autonomy, positive relations with others, and self-acceptance (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and even
the ability to grow and change in positive ways following stress (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006).
However, just as psychology and psychiatry may have overemphasized the negative in the
past, so the positive psychology movement may be in danger of focusing too much on the
positive. Many studies by positive psychologists have not included an examination of
neuroticism and negative outcomes and risk providing only a partial picture of how positive
characteristics may play out in the lives and experience of human beings.
In order to fully understand the psychology of neuroticism in relation to positive personal
characteristics, it is important to consider them in the context of both the negative and the
positive aspects of human experience. There is a two-factor model that does include both the
positive and negative and which may provide a way to more fully understand neuroticism and
its implications for health and well-being (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). This model
is based on studies providing evidence for separate positive and negative domains of
personality characteristics, affect, and possibly even social interactions (Bradburn, 1969;
Davidson, 1992; Watson, Weise, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). These positive and negative
domains have been associated with approach and avoidance neural systems and behaviors
(Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000).
Similarly, Elliot and Thrash (2002) have provided evidence that personality constructs
can be divided into those associated with approach and those associated with avoidance. We
define ―positive characteristics‖ as qualities associated with approach behaviors involving
behavioral activation and appetitive motivational systems (Gray, 1982; Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 1998). These characteristics include extraversion and many of the characteristics
focused on by the positive psychology movement. Similarly, we define ―negative
characteristics‖ as qualities associated with avoidance behaviors involving behavioral
inhibition and defensive motivational systems (Gray, 1982; Lang et al. 1998). Neuroticism is
a prime example of a negative characteristic that is well-represented in personality theories
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and may be an important marker of
avoidant behaviors and motivational systems.
In the two-factor model, personal characteristics may uniquely influence affective
domains of the same valence (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Figure 1 provides an
illustration of this model. The solid lines from positive characteristics to positive affect and
from negative characteristics to negative affect illustrate the strongest relationships predicted
by the model. The dotted lines show what are predicted to be weaker cross-valence
relationships. The idea is that the positive and negative domains operate relatively
independently but must be considered within the context of both domains. Since neuroticism
is a prime example of a negative personal characteristic, the model would predict that
neuroticism would primarily be related to negative and not positive affect when considered
within the context of positive characteristics. Conversely, the model would predict that
positive characteristics would primarily be related to positive and not negative affect when
considered within the context of negative characteristics such as neuroticism.
132 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

+
Positive Positive Affect
Characteristics
_

Negative Negative Affect

Characteristics
+

Figure 1. Two-factor model of the relationship between neuroticism, positive personal characteristics,
and negative and positive affective health. The straight lines show the hypothesized paths and the
dotted lines show alternative pathways.

The problem with many studies of both neuroticism and positive characteristics is that
they are often not examined together or in relation to both positive and negative outcomes
(Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Viewed within the framework of the two-factor model,
there are several important dangers to not including both positive and negative personal
characteristics and outcomes. For those studying neuroticism, they may only see the effects of
neuroticism in increasing negative outcomes and miss its possible effects on positive
outcomes. Although it may be easier to assume that neuroticism would decrease positive
outcomes, it is possible that neuroticism may not be related to positive outcomes when
positive characteristics are also assessed.
For those studying positive characteristics, there are at least a couple of important
dangers. First, there is the possibility of overestimating the effects of positive characteristics
when not controlling for important negative characteristics such as neuroticism (Smith, Pope,
Rhodewalt, and Poulton, 1989). Neuroticism may be such an important personality
characteristics that it overwhelms the presence of positive characteristics such as optimism
and resilience. Second, there is the possibility of missing what the two-factor model would
predict as unique effects in increasing positive outcomes. For example, although positive
characteristics may not be as strong in predicting less negative outcomes when neuroticism is
controlled, they may still be strong predictors of positive outcomes such as positive affect.

The Current Studies

In order to examine neuroticism and positive characteristics in the context of the two-
factor model, we conducted three large studies with samples of undergraduate students at a
major university in the southwestern United States. We included three samples to determine
whether we could replicate the results with regard to neuroticism and included a variety of
different positive personal characteristics. In each of the three samples, we included measures
of neuroticism, negative affect, positive affect, and extraversion (Benet-Martinez & John,
1998; Watson et al. 1988). We included extraversion in each sample because, like
neuroticism, it is also a part of most major personality theories and may be uniquely related to
positive affect (McNiel & Fleeson, 2006; Rusting & Larsen, 1997; Uziel, 2006).
In addition, we included a full array of positive personal characteristics that have been the
focus of the positive psychology movement and which are frequently targets for
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 133

psychological interventions. These are all potential resources for increasing positive affect
and include optimism, resilience, meaning and purpose, and spirituality as well as social and
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1997; Goleman, 2006; Flach, 1997; Frankl, 1963;
Pargament, 1997; Scheier & Carver, 1985). In the first study, we included measures of
spirituality (Fetzer, 1999), social skills (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, &
Clubley, 2001), and broad measures of resilience and emotional intelligence (Connor &
Davidson, 2003; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornhein, 1998). In
the second study, we included a measure of optimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), a
measure of cognitive reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003) which is a target in cognitive therapy,
and more specific measures of emotional intelligence (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, &
Palfai, 1995). In the third study, we included more specific measures of social skills including
empathy and perspective taking (Davis, 1994), a more specific measure of resilience as the
ability to bounce back from stress (Smith, Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley, Christopher, & Bernard,
2008), and a measure of meaning and purpose in life (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).

Hypotheses

We had four hypotheses that were based on the two-factor model (Smith & Zautra, 2008;
Zautra, 2003). Each of the hypotheses was tested using multiple regression analyses to control
for neuroticism when examining the positive characteristics and to control for neuroticism
when examining the positive characteristics. The first hypothesis was that neuroticism would
be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive personal characteristics. The
second hypothesis was that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect
when controlling for neuroticism. The third hypothesis was that neuroticism would not be
related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics. The fourth
hypothesis was that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when
controlling for neuroticism.

METHODS
Participants and Procedures

The participants were from three separate samples of undergraduate students from the
University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Human Research Review
Committee at the University of New Mexico approved the studies and informed consent was
obtained by trained research assistants.

Sample #1
The first student sample consisted of 338 undergraduate students. The mean age was 20.3
years (SD = 3.6) and 65% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 39% white, 30%
Hispanic, 17% Native American, 3% Asian American, 2% African American, and 9% mixed
or other. Data was collected during the Spring of 2005. All of the participants were given
course credit for participating in the research. Participation in the study involved coming to
134 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

our research lab and completing a questionnaire with the neuroticism, positive characteristic,
and affect measures listed and described below.

Sample #2
The second student sample consisted of 289 undergraduate students. The mean age was
21.1 years (SD = 4.3) and 64% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 50% white, 34%
Hispanic, 9% Native American, 4% Asian American, 2% African American, and 1% mixed
or other. Data was collected during the Fall of 2007. Again, all of the participants were given
course credit for participating in the research and participation involved coming to the
research lab and completing a questionnaire with the measures described below.

Sample #3
The third student sample consisted of 259 undergraduate students. The mean age was
21.1 years (SD = 4.3) and 64% were female. The self-reported ethnicity was 51% white, 32%
Hispanic, 3% Native American, 3% Asian American, 2% African American, and 9% mixed
or other. Data was collected during the Spring of 2008. Once again, all of the participants
were given course credit for participating and participation involved coming to the research
lab and completing a questionnaire with the measures described below.

Measures

1. Neuroticism

Neuroticism was assessed in Samples 1, 2, and 3 using the Big Five Inventory (Benet-
Martinez & John, 1998). The eight items (e.g., ―worries a lot,‖ ―can be moody‖) were scored
on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha
was .849 in Sample 1, .845 in Sample 2, and .808 in Sample 3.

2. Affective Health

Negative Affect and Positive Affect. These were assessed using the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule in Samples 1, 2, and 3 (Watson et al., 1988). There are ten positive affect
items (e.g., ―enthusiastic‖, ―interested‖, ―proud‖) and ten negative affect items (e.g., ―anger‖,
―fear‖, ―guilt‖). The participants were asked how much they had experienced each of these
affects in the past two weeks. The items were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―very
slightly or not at all‖ to 5 = ―extremely.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha for negative affect was .840 in
Sample 1, .818 in Sample 2, and .840 in Sample 3. Cronbach‘s alpha for positive affect was
.865 in Sample 1, .861 in Sample 2, and .875 in Sample 3.

3. Positive personal characteristics

Brief Resilience Scale. This assessed resilience as the ability to bounce back from
stressful events in Sample 3 (Smith et al., 2008). The six items (e.g., ―I tend to bounce back
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 135

quickly after hard times‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5
= ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .836.

Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC). This assessed the personal characteristics

that compose resilience in Sample 1 (Connor & Davidson, 2003). The 25 items (e.g., ―I tend
to bounce back after illness or hardship‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―not true
at all‖ to 5 = ―true nearly all of the time.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .937.

Emotional Intelligence. This refers to the ability to appraise, express, regulate, and use
emotions and was assessed by the Schutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence Test in Sample
1 (Schutte et al, 1998). The 33 items (e.g., ―I know what other people are feeling just by
looking at them‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 =
―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .891.

Empathy and Perspective Taking. These were assessed using the empathy and
perspective taking subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1994). The
empathy subscale consists of seven items which assess the tendency to experience feelings of
sympathy and compassion for others in need (e.g., ―I often have tender, concerned feelings
for people less fortunate than me‖). The perspective taking subscale consists of seven items
which assess the degree to which an individual spontaneously takes the point of view of other
people in everyday life (e.g., ―I try to look at everybody‘s side of a disagreement before I
make a decision‖). The items for each subscale were scored on a five point scale from 1 =
―strongly disagree‖ to 2 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .747 for the empathy
subscale and .761 for the perspective taking subscale.

Extraversion. This was assessed in Samples 1, 2, and 3 using the Big Five Inventory
(Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). The eight items (e.g., ―is talkative,‖ ―is full of energy‖) were
scored on a five point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s
alpha was .839 in Sample 1, .852 in Sample 2, and .857 in Sample 3.

Optimism. This assesses positive expectancies about the outcome of future events and
was assessed by the Life Orientation Test in Sample 2 (Scheier et al., 1994). The six items
(e.g., ―I‘m always optimistic about my future‖) were scored on a five point scale from 1 =
―strongly disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .781.

Mood Clarity and Mood Repair. These were assessed in Sample 2 using the Trait Meta-
Mood Scale (Salovey et al., 1995). Mood clarity is the ability to be clear about one‘s
emotions and feelings and was assessed by 11 items (e.g., ―I am rarely confused about how I
feel‖). Mood repair is the ability to make ones self feel better when distressed and was
assessed by six items (e.g., ―When I become upset I remind myself of the pleasures in life‖).
The mood clarity and mood repair items were scored on a five-point scale from 1 = ―strongly
disagree‖ to 5 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .868 for mood clarity and .784 for
mood repair.

Purpose in Life. This is the belief that one‘s life has meaning and purpose and was
assessed using the purpose in life scale of the Scales of Psychological Well-Being (Ryff &
136 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

Keyes, 1995). The seven items (e.g., ―I have a sense of purpose and direction in life‖) were
scored on a six point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 6 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s
alpha was .710.

Reappraisal. This refers to the ability to changes one‘s emotional state by reappraising or
thinking about a situation in a different way. Reappraisal was assessed by the reappraisal
subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire in Sample 2 (Gross & John, 2003). The six
items (e.g., ―when I want to feel less negative emotion, I change what I am thinking about‖)
were scored on a seven point scale from 1 = ―strongly disagree‖ to 7 = ―strongly agree.‖
Cronbach‘s alpha was .810.

Social Skills. These were assessed using the social skills subscale of the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient in Sample 1 (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The ten items (e.g., ―I prefer to
do things with others rather than on my own‖) were scored on a four point scale from 1 =
―strongly disagree‖ to 4 = ―strongly agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .752.

Spirituality. This was assessed using three items that have frequently been used to assess
dispositional spirituality and religiosity in Sample 1 (Fetzer, 1999). These items are (1) ―to
what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?,‖ (2) ―to what extent do you consider
yourself a religious person?,‖ and (3) ―how often do you attend spiritual/religious services?‖
The first two items were scored on a seven point scale from 1 = ―not at all‖ to 7 = ―a great
deal‖ and the third item was scored from 1 = ―never‖ to 7 = ―more than once a week.‖
Cronbach‘s alpha was .757.

Statistical Analyses. First, correlation analyses were used to examine the zero-order
relationships between the measures of negative affect, positive affect, neuroticism, and the
positive personal characteristics. Second, multiple regression analyses were used to examine
the relative effects of neuroticism and each positive characteristic in predicting both negative
affect and positive affect. Third, multiple regression analyses were used to examine the
relative effects of neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics in each sample in
predicting both negative affect and positive affect. The alpha level for all statistical tests was
p < .05. The size of the correlations and regression coefficients are referred to as small = .10,
medium = .30, and large = .50 using Cohen‘s guidelines (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

RESULTS
The three studies are first presented separately and then the findings from all three studies
are summarized and integrated. The four hypotheses are addressed for each study and in the
summary and integration.

1. Study 1

The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 1 are displayed in Table 1.
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 137

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 1.

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Negative Affect 2.38 0.73 -
2. Positive Affect 3.50 0.70 -.181** -
3. Neuroticism 2.81 0.77 .594** -.373** -
4. Extraversion 3.37 0.72 -.141** .482** -.255** -
5. Resilience 3.85 0.48 -.270** .562** -.553** .445** -
6. Emotional 3.73 0.40 -.193** .475** -.348** .506** .663** -
Intelligence
7. Social Skills 3.01 0.44 -.180** .321** -.287** .670** .461** .578** -
8. Spirituality 2.94 1.09 .005 .130** -.062 .172** .242** .248** .186** -
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 2. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 1.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism and Extraversion
Neuroticism .597** -.267**
Extraversion .011 .414**
Neuroticism and Resilience
Neuroticism .629** -.102
Resilience .065 .508**
Neuroticism and Emotional Intelligence
Neuroticism .600** -.233**
Emotional. Intelligence .016 .394**
Neuroticism and Social Skills
Neuroticism .591** -.303**
Social Skills -.010 .234**
Neuroticism and Spirituality
Neuroticism .596** -.366**
Spirituality .041 .108*
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 3. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 1.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism .623** -.062
Extraversion .016 .359**
Resilience .079 .341**
Emotional Intelligence -.019 .144*
Social Skills -.044 .185**
Spirituality .033 -.022
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
138 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

Neuroticism had a strong positive correlation negative affect. All of the positive
characteristics except spirituality had weak to medium negative correlations with negative
affect. Spirituality was not related to negative affect. Neuroticism had a medium negative
correlation with positive affect. Extraversion, the CD-RISC, and emotional intelligence had a
strong positive correlation, social skills had a medium positive correlation, and spirituality
had a weak positive correlation with positive affect.
Table 2 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time.
When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of
more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In every case, the
regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were very small and non-
significant when predicting negative affect when neuroticism was in the equation. When
positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics were significant
predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was a significant predictor of
less positive affect four out of five times. Resilience reduced the relationship between
neuroticism and positive affect the most followed by emotional intelligence and extraversion.
Table 3 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the
same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong
predictor of more negative affect when all of the positive characteristics when in the equation.
At the same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics
were very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect with neuroticism in the
equation. Conversely, when positive affect was the dependent variable, all of the positive
characteristics except spirituality were still positively related to positive affect while
neuroticism was no longer related to less positive affect.
The first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling
for the positive characteristics was strongly supported. Neuroticism was still strongly related
to more negative affect when controlling for each positive characteristic separately and when
controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics
would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was also strongly
supported. None of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered
separately or together with neuroticism.
The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when
controlling for the positive characteristics was partially supported. Neuroticism was still
related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics except
resilience but was not related to positive affect when entered with resilience alone or all of the
positive characteristics at the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive
characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was
generally supported. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive
affect when entered separately and all except for spirituality were still related to more positive
affect when entered together and controlling for neuroticism.

2. Study 2

The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 2 are displayed in Table 4.
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 139

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 2.

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Negative Affect 1.73 0.55 -
2. Positive Affect 3.49 0.65 -.089 -
3. Neuroticism 2.69 0.71 .554** -.303** -
4. Extraversion 3.46 0.71 -.168** .388** -.268** -
5. Optimism 3.58 0.69 -.277** .365** -.301** .299** -
6. Mood Clarity 3.60 0.63 -.344** .283** -.487** .312** .340** -
7. Mood Repair 3.68 0.64 -.255** .393** -.348** .289** .660** .349** -
8. Reappraisal 4.77 1.05 -.166** .280** -.317** .165** .299** .215** .476** -
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.

As in Study 1, neuroticism had a strong positive correlation with negative affect and this
time all of the positive characteristics had weak to medium negative correlations with
negative affect. Again, neuroticism had a medium negative correlation with positive affect.
All of the positive characteristics had medium positive correlations with positive affect.
Table 5 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time.
When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong predictor of
more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In almost every case, the
regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were very small or non-
significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the equation. The only
exception was that optimism was a small but significant predictor of less negative affect.
When positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics were significant
predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was also still a significant
predictor of less positive affect every time.

Table 5. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 2.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism and Extraversion
Neuroticism .548** -.215**
Extraversion -.022 .330**
Neuroticism and Optimism
Neuroticism .517** -.213**
Optimism -.123* .299**
Neuroticism and Mood Clarity
Neuroticism .507** -.216**
Mood Clarity -.097 .180**
Neuroticism and Mood Repair
Neuroticism .530** -.190**
Mood Repair -.072 .326**
Neuroticism and Reappraisal
Neuroticism .557** -.239**
Reappraisal .009 .202**
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
140 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

Table 6. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 2.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism .499** -.097
Extraversion .018 .255**
Optimism -.119 .118
Mood Clarity -.073 .046
Mood Repair -.003 .148*
Reappraisal .041 .090
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 6 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the
same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a strong
predictor of more negative affect when paired with all of the positive characteristics. At the
same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics were
very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the
equation. When positive affect was the dependent variable, extraversion and mood repair
were still related to more positive affect while optimism, mood clarity, and reappraisal no
longer predicted more positive affect and neuroticism no longer predicted less positive affect.
The first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling
for the positive characteristics was again strongly supported. Neuroticism was still strongly
related to more negative affect when controlling for each positive characteristic separately
and when controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis that the positive
characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was
generally supported. Only optimism was still a predictor of less negative affect when entered
separately but not when entered with the other positive characteristics.
The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when
controlling for the positive characteristics was again only partially supported. Neuroticism
was still related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics
but was not related to positive affect when entered with all of the positive characteristics at
the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related
to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was partially supported. All of the positive
characteristics were still related to more positive affect when entered separately but only
extraversion and mood repair were still related to more positive affect when entered together
with all of the positive characteristics.

3. Study 3

The descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for Study 3 are displayed in Table 7.
Neuroticism had a strong positive correlation negative and all of the positive
characteristics except for empathy had weak to medium negative correlations with negative
affect. Empathy was not related to negative affect. Again, neuroticism had a medium negative
correlation with positive affect. All of the positive characteristics had medium positive
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 141

correlations with positive affect except for empathy which had a weak positive correlation
with positive affect.
Table 8 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and one positive characteristic at a time. As
in Studies 1 and 2, when negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was still a
strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with each positive characteristic. In
almost every case, the regression coefficients of the positive personal characteristics were
very small and non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in the
equation. The only exception was that resilience was a small but significant predictor of less
negative affect. When positive affect was the dependent variable, the positive characteristics
were significant predictors of more positive affect every time while neuroticism was still a
significant predictor of less positive affect every time except when it was paired with
resilience.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 3.

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Negative Affect 1.94 0.63 -
2. Positive Affect 3.52 0.68 -.134* -
3. Neuroticism 2.83 0.62 .473** -.352** -
4. Extraversion 3.46 0.65 -.177** .443** -.291** -
5. Resilience 3.55 0.67 -.377** .483** -.616** .296** -
6. Purpose in Life 4.19 0.70 -.170** .503** -.242** .321** .250** -
7. Empathy 3.90 0.54 -.009 .166** .070 .186** .069 .210** -
8. Perspective Taking 3.55 0.54 -.169** .371** -.192** .301** .295** .279** .359** -
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 8. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and One Positive Characteristic in Study 3.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism and Extraversion
Neuroticism .460** -.244**
Extraversion -.043 .372**
Neuroticism and Resilience
Neuroticism .388** -.088
Resilience -.137* .428**
Neuroticism and Purpose in Life
Neuroticism .459** -.245**
Purpose in Life -.059 .443**
Neuroticism and Empathy
Neuroticism .476** -.368**
Empathy -.042 .222**
Neuroticism and Perspective Taking
Neuroticism .456** -.292**
Perspective Taking -.082 .315**
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.
142 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

Table 9. Multiple Regressions Predicting Negative Affect and Positive Affect from
Neuroticism and All of the Positive Personal Characteristics for Study 3.a

Negative Affect Positive Affect

Neuroticism .381** -.009
Extraversion -.005 .208**
Resilience -.116 .298**
Purpose in Life -.033 .320**
Empathy -.001 .027
Perspective Taking -.050 .119*
Note: aStandardized regression coefficients are shown. *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 9 displays the results of multiple regression analyses in which negative affect and
positive affect were predicted from neuroticism and all of the positive characteristics at the
same time. When negative affect was the dependent variable, neuroticism was a moderate-to-
strong predictor of more negative affect when paired with all of the positive characteristics.
At the same time, the regression coefficients for each of the positive personal characteristics
were very small or non-significant when predicting negative affect while neuroticism was in
the equation. When positive affect was the dependent variable, all of the positive
characteristics were related to more positive affect while neuroticism no longer predicted less
positive affect.
As in Studies 1 and 2, the first hypothesis that neuroticism would be related to negative
affect when controlling for the positive characteristics was strongly supported. Neuroticism
was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for each positive
characteristic separately and when controlling for all of them together. The second hypothesis
that the positive characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for
neuroticism was generally supported. Only resilience was still a predictor of less negative
affect when entered separately but not when entered with the other positive characteristics.
The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when
controlling for the positive characteristics was again only partially supported. Neuroticism
was still related to less positive affect when entered with each of the positive characteristics
except for resilience and was not related to positive affect when entered with all of the
positive characteristics at the same time. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that the positive
characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism was
generally supported. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive
affect when entered separately and all of the positive characteristics except empathy were
related to more positive affect when entered together with all of the positive characteristics.

4. Summary and Integration

The three studies strongly supported the first hypothesis that neuroticism would be
related to negative affect when controlling for the positive personal characteristics. In each of
the studies, neuroticism was still strongly related to more negative affect when controlling for
each of the positive characteristics separately and together.
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 143

The three studies generally supported the second hypothesis that the positive
characteristics would not be related to negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. In the
first study, none of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered
separately or together when controlling for neuroticism. In the second and third studies, none
of the positive characteristics were related to negative affect when entered together. However,
optimism in the second study and resilience in the third study were still small predictors of
less negative affect when entered separately.
The three studies partially supported the third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be
related to positive affect when controlling for the positive characteristics. The results
depended on which and how many positive characteristics were controlled for. In all three
studies, neuroticism never predicted less positive affect when all of the positive
characteristics were controlled. However, neuroticism was still related to less positive affect
when controlling for all of the positive characteristics separately except for the two measures
of resilience (e.g., the CD-RISC in Study 1 and the Brief Resilience Scale in Study 3).
The three studies generally supported the fourth hypothesis that the positive
characteristics would be related to positive affect when controlling for neuroticism. All of the
positive characteristics predicted more positive affect when entered into regression equations
with neuroticism alone. When entered together, they still predicted more positive affect on 10
of 15 possible occasions. Extraversion and the measures of resilience still predicted more
positive affect each time they were entered with the other positive characteristics and
neuroticism. In addition, emotional intelligence, social skills, mood repair, purpose in life,
and perspective taking were also still related to more positive affect when they were entered
with the other positive characteristics and neuroticism.

DISCUSSION
Overall, the studies supported the two-factor model of the relationship between
neuroticism, positive characteristics, negative affect, and positive affect. The first hypothesis
that neuroticism would be related to negative affect when controlling for the positive
characteristics was strongly supported. The second hypothesis that the positive characteristics
would not be related to less negative affect when controlling for neuroticism was generally
supported with the exception that resilience was still a small predictor of less negative affect.
The third hypothesis that neuroticism would not be related to positive affect when controlling
for the positive characteristics was supported when controlling for all positive characteristics
but was not generally supported when controlling for only one positive characteristic. The
fourth hypothesis that the positive characteristics would be related to positive affect when
controlling for neuroticism was generally supported.
The strong positive relationship found between neuroticism and negative affect is
consistent with the relationship that has frequently been found between them (Watson et al.,
1998; Clark & Watson, 1991). However, the current studies have the added advantage of
controlling for extraversion and a wide variety of positive personal characteristics. In fact, the
relationship between neuroticism and negative affect was still nearly as strong even when
including five positive characteristics in the regression equations. While the correlations
(equivalent to a regression coefficient with one predictor in the regression equation) were
144 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

.594, .554, and .473 in the three studies, the regression coefficients when controlling for the
five positive characteristics were .623, .499, and .381. Since negative affect has been related
to a variety of measures of psychological and physical health (Clark & Watson, 1991;
Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe et al., 2001), our findings about the consistent, strong, and
unique effects of neuroticism provide added confidence that negative affect may be a vital
pathway by which neuroticism affects health and well-being.
Almost all of the positive characteristics (except spirituality and empathy) had small to
medium and significant negative correlations with negative affect. However, only optimism
and the Brief Resilience Scale still had significant relationships with negative affect when
neuroticism was controlled. This is a striking demonstration of the power and scope of
neuroticism and a clear example of the importance of controlling for it in studies involving
negative affect. This also provides a caution to the positive psychology movement and all
those who might endeavor to focus solely on the positive aspects of human personality and
functioning. Studies of laudable characteristic such as empathy, spirituality, and emotional
intelligence may appear to be important in isolation, but may fade in significance when
considered alongside a personality construct as broad and salient as neuroticism.
Alternatively, the small negative relationship that optimism and the Brief Resilience Scale
had with negative affect suggests that some positive characteristics may still have a limited
influence on the negative affective domain.
The findings regarding neuroticism and positive affect only partially support the two-
factor model (Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003). Although neuroticism was not related to
positive affect when controlling for all of the positive characteristics in each study at the same
time, it was generally related to less positive affect when only one of the positive
characteristics was controlled. This is consistent with some other studies that have found that
negative personality characteristics and events may sometimes be related to both more
negative and less positive affect (Karademas, 2007; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996). The fact
that neuroticism was still related to less positive affect when controlling for positive
characteristics like extraversion, optimism, and emotional intelligence is a testimony to the
power and breadth of neuroticism. The only exceptions were the two measures of resilience
which reduced the relationship between neuroticism and positive affect to a small and non-
significant relationship.
The findings regarding the positive characteristics and positive affect support the value of
positive characteristics while at the same time refining our understanding of how and why
they are important. All of the positive characteristics were still related to more positive affect
when controlling for neuroticism alone and they were related to more positive affect two
thirds of the time when five positive characteristics were entered together with neuroticism.
While the findings regarding the positive characteristics and negative affect are a caution to
the positive psychology movement, the findings regarding the positive characteristics and
positive affect may help to refine and direct positive psychology to a more limited but
realistic understanding of why positive characteristics may be valuable. In addition, they
provide additional data regarding which positive characteristics may be most important.
While it was surprising that optimism was not still related to more positive affect when all of
the positive characteristics were considered together, it was striking that resilience, purpose in
life, and extraversion were still relatively strong predictors of more positive affect.
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 145

The results regarding resilience may be particularly important and worthy of further
comment. First, both measures of resilience (the CD-RISC and the Brief Resilience Scale)
were still predictors of more positive affect when controlling for neuroticism and the other
four positive characteristics. Second, the Brief Resilience Scale was still related to less
negative affect when controlling for neuroticism and had the strongest zero-order correlation
of any positive characteristic with negative affect. The CD-RISC is a broad measure of
resilience that includes many factors that may increase resilience whereas the Brief Resilience
Scale is a more specific measure focusing on the ability to bounce back from stress. Although
it is a positive characteristic, the ability to bounce back from stress may affect the negative
domain more than other positive characteristics because it is most relevant for times of stress
which tend to be perceived as more often negative than positive. Thus, the ability to bounce
back from stress may be an important counterpoint to neuroticism during times of stress.
While neuroticism may make a person more vulnerable to the negative effects of stress
(Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995), resilience may enable a person to both reduce negative affect
and generate more positive affect in the context of stressful events (Zautra, Johnson, & Davis,
2005)

Implications

What are the implications of these findings for the psychology of neuroticism? The most
important implication is that it is important to consider neuroticism within the context of both
the positive and negative domains to fully understand its power and its limitations. Although
neuroticism is typically related to negative affect, the unique power of neuroticism as a
personality construct became apparent when controlling for the positive characteristics. Thus,
interventions that seek to improve psychological and physical health may benefit by focusing
more on the potential role of neuroticism in increasing negative affect and having adverse
consequences on health. Neuroticism may be an important moderator of the effects of
interventions in that people who are high on neuroticism scales may be less likely to have
reduced negative affect when interventions target only positive characteristics and factors. In
addition, although neuroticism is a stable characteristic (Costa & McCrae, 1992), there is a
large portion of the variance that may be due to environmental factors (Hettema, Neale,
Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006). Thus, it may be possible to target affective, cognitive, and
behavioral processes that may reduce neurotic ways of responding to the world. For example,
we recently completed a study showing that an eight week mindfulness meditation
intervention was associated with significantly reduced neuroticism scores (Smith, Shelley,
Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley & Bernard, 2008).
What are the implications for the relationship between the study of neuroticism and the
positive psychology movement? The most obvious implication is that psychology cannot
afford to neglect either the negative or the positive side of human experience. Although
positive psychology may be an attempt to balance the traditional focus on the negative, there
may be just as much danger in focusing solely on the positive. On the one hand, studies of
neuroticism should control for positive characteristics to avoid overestimating its effects
especially in relation to positive outcomes. On the other hand, studies of positive
characteristics should control for neuroticism to avoid overestimating their effects especially
in relation to negative outcomes. While this may dampen the enthusiasm of some for positive
146 Bruce W. Smith, Jennifer F. Bernard and J. Alexis Ortiz

psychology, it may also provide a more realistic focus and a truer appreciation of the value of
positive characteristics in relation to the positive affective domain. It provides further impetus
for whose who are working to better understand the unique effects of positive affect and
emotion on a variety of aspects of human experience and health and well-being (Fredrickson,
2001; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Smith & Zautra, 2008; Zautra, 2003).

Limitations

There are several limitations to these studies. The most important is that the studies were
cross-sectional and make it impossible to make strong causal inferences about the relationship
between the measures of personality characteristics and the measures of affect. It is possible
that the affective state of the participants could have influenced their response to the
personality measures. However, it is more likely the other way around because the personality
items were designed to tap relatively stable characteristics while the affect items were
responded to with regard to the participants‘ experience within the past two weeks. A second
limitation is that the samples were university students making it difficult to generalize to other
age groups and those who are less educated. At the same time, there was a relatively high
representation of minority students, especially Hispanic and Native American, due to the
southwestern U.S. location of the university. Third, while the outcome measures did tap both
the positive and the negative domains, they were limited to positive and negative affect. They
did not include other negative outcomes such as anxiety and depression and physical
symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1991) or other positive outcomes such as different aspects of
psychological well-being (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). However, there is strong evidence that
positive and negative affect may be central mediators of the effects of personal characteristics
on a variety of aspects of psychological and physical health (Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Keefe
et al., 2001; Pressman & Cohen, 2005).

CONCLUSION
The studies generally supported the value of a two-factor model in understanding the
psychology of neuroticism. They showed that neuroticism has a strong and consistent
relationship with negative affect that remains when controlling for important positive
personal characteristics. At the same time, the effects of the positive characteristics that are
focused on in the positive psychology movement were reduced to non-significance in
predicting negative affect when controlling for neuroticism. However, the results also showed
that the power of neuroticism to predict affective outcomes may be much more limited with
regard to positive affect, especially when considered within the context of positive
characteristics. The power of neuroticism may be seen most strongly with regard to negative
domain while the limits of neuroticism may be seen most clearly with regard to positive.
 Neuroticism and Positive Personal Characteristics 147

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evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 820-838.
Zautra, A. J. (2003). Emotions, stress, and health. New York: Oxford.
Zautra, A. J., Johnson, L. M. & Davis, M. C. (2005). Positive affect as a source of resilience
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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 151-167 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

THE DYNAMICS OF SHAME AND

PSYCHIATRIC ILL-HEALTH

Bengt Starrin1 and Åsa Wettergren2

1
Department of Social Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden and Faculty of Health and
Social Studies, Lillehammer University College, Norway
2
Department of Social Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden

ABSTRACT
In the Icelandic sagas shame, humiliation, respect and honour are central themes.
The sagas describe a culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how a man can
obtain and sustain his honour. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining
respect in the eyes of the other. An honourable man who has been humiliated and insulted
and has been unable to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation looses his status and
reputation as an honourable man. It leads to self contempt and deep depression.
Contrary to what was the case in the Icelandic sagas, shame and humiliation are
hidden and privatized in modern society. We feel ashamed of our shame. In this article
we explore the question if, parallel to the Icelandic sagas where shame without redress
could lead for instance to apthy, modern types of shame and shaming is equally
associated to psychiatric ill-health.

INTRODUCTION
In most cultures there seems to exist an unwritten ethical code, which states that when we
encounter another human being, we shall not deliberately act in a manner which will cause
the other person to lose face. If it does happen anyway, we must make an effort to lessen or to
hide the embarrassment. We should not embarrass or humiliate people, but show
consideration and respect (Riezler 1943; Goffman 1955). The basic idea behind the code is
that lack of respect leads to humiliation and humiliation creates shame. Shame generates a
need for vindication and acknowledgement. How central is this process to our well being?
Could a deeper understanding of the private and the social sides of shame and humiliation
152 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

contribute to an increased knowledge in the area of psychiatric ill health? These are some of
the questions that this essay will look at.
As far as we know, there are hardly any systematic studies that deal with the extent of
shaming such as humiliation and insult, and why we put people to shame. It has been
suggested that shame and humiliation, and its underlying reasons are some of the best kept
secrets in Western organisations and society. The reason is that we are ashamed of feeling
shame and we do not want to experience the humiliation of admitting our fear of humiliation
(Scheff 1990; Smith 2003).
Despite the fact that emotions like shame and humiliation were important to many of the
classical sociologist in understanding and explaining society, they then came to play a minor
part for many years. It is only in recent years that there has been a renewed interest (Barbalet
1999; Dahlgren & Starrin 2004).

Two Kinds of Shame in the Icelandic Sagas

In our discussion on the link between shame, humiliation and psychiatric ill health, we
have chosen to use the Icelandic sagas as our starting point. These sagas can perhaps teach us
quite a bit about the link between emotional processes and psychiatric ill health. The
Icelandic sagas consist of stories about life in Iceland during the 10th and 11th century. The
sagas describe a social culture where there are strongly regulated rituals for how an
honourable man can achieve and maintain dignity and honour. The Russian author Aron
Gurevitj states that what the Icelandic sagas really deal with, are stories about gaining respect
in the eyes of others and oneself. It is only possible to be happy with oneself after gaining
respect (Gurevitj 1997). The equilibrium of existence is disturbed when somebody humiliates
us. In order to restore honour it is, in most cases, absolutely necessary to first get revenge and
after that, reconciliation can take place. Taking revenge is not considered to be a primitive
action.
It is not only the person that takes revenge that gains honour, but also their family and
relatives. In other words, the society illustrated in the Icelandic sagas is a strongly patriarchal
one which also has a strong collective orientation. The family is the smallest building block in
society. The male head of the family is portrayed as an individual to a certain extent, but not
as an individual that is limited by his own body or actions. Instead, the head of the family
contains the entire family. The actions and slights of individual family members are also his.
It is his responsibility to get redress. Self respect and family honour are very closely linked.
The respect of others is achieved through following the rules about decency, honour, revenge
and reconciliation. Any man that does not follow these rules is not a man. For example, it is
considered a shame not to participate in a duel or combat or to lack strength and courage. The
opposite is also true, i.e. that which has a purpose and raises status is considered honourable
and is sometimes talked about as great achievements.
William Ian Miller writes about shame in the Icelandic sagas that it is important to
differentiate between the experience of the humiliated and shamed person who sees it as part
of an institutionalised system of norms, and the experience of shame as a consequence of
other people's judgement, confirmed by the individual himself and which means that he
cannot live up to what is expected of a fully moral and respectful individual (Miller 1993).
The first type of shame, associated with anger and indignation, is the shame experienced by
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 153

an honourable man who has been challenged and defeated. The other type of shame is associ-
ated with self contempt and self doubt and it is the shame experienced by a person who has
not been able to get revenge, compensation or reconciliation. In the first type, there is also a
sense of shame, but instead of self contempt, there is anger and indignation. The feeling of
self contempt is dormant and could develop at full strength if the individual is proven
incapable of getting revenge.
The person who has been subjected to humiliation by somebody else has to take action to
prove to him-self and to others that he is an honourable person. If he fails, he will end up with
the second type of shame. If there is no time for retribution, and no honourable reconciliation,
time will run out. The person will then be dishonoured and looses his status. The story of
Havard is an example of this. He is lying in his bed devoid of strength for an entire year. The
reason for this is the sorrow he feels over his son who has been killed, and his failure to get
compensation. Havard now thinks that luck has deserted him and he spends another three
years in his bed. Then, as he finally gets an opportunity to take revenge, his family cannot
believe their eyes. The broken individual is transformed into a powerful and youthful person
(Gurevitj 1997). Through this action, he has regained respect in his own eyes and in the eyes
of others.
It is significant that Havard's depression seems to be primarily about his lost honour, and
only secondarily about his dead son. In the Icelandic sagas, an individual's view of himself is
entirely dependent on how other people see him. His feeling of self is more or less a reflection
of how the group and the local community see him. The reason why humiliation is a frequent
occurrence in the Icelandic sagas is perhaps because it is through humiliation that a man is
given the opportunity to show his dignity, his manly courage. It follows on from this that
humiliation is not a secret. Shame is not a taboo. On the contrary, it is a feeling that concerns
those around him. The culture of honour revolves around compensation and/or revenge.

The Concepts of Shame and Humiliation

In the literature, there are different opinions as to whether shame and humiliation should
be regarded as feelings that are part of different "families of emotions" or the same "emotion
families". The Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit sees shame and humiliation as so called
red emotions, in the sense that other people's opinions are involved (Margalit 1996). Margalit
says that the person who is humiliated also experiences shame, but not the other way around.
In other words, a person feeling shame does not have to be humiliated. It is possible to feel
shame over a bad performance, but that is not humiliation. Humiliation is not a concept of
performance.
The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes in her book Hiding From Humanity
that humiliating somebody is to subject them to shame, and that to shame somebody is in
most cases the same as humiliating them, at least when the shaming is serious enough
(Nussbaum 2004).
Some of the authors that put shame and humiliation together are Donald Nathanson
(1992), Helen Lewis (1987), Thomas Scheff (1990) and Suzanne Retzinger (1991).
Nathanson states that even though it can be argued that emotional states such as shyness,
embarrassment and humiliation have their own names and characteristics, the main feeling in
154 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

these is still shame (Nathanson 1992). Turning the eyes away and lowering them and a
sunken neck and shoulders are seen as typical expressions of shame/humiliation.
Sociologists such as Thomas Scheff (1990) and Suzanne Retzinger (1991) regard
humiliation as a shame variant. They recommend a wide definition and are opposed to the
idea that shame is only about a serious crisis, dishonour or the loss of honour. The majority of
shame, according to Scheff and Retzinger, does not stem from crises and is not dishonouring
but more of an "embarrassment type". The broad definition of shame, suggested by Scheff
and Retzinger, contains a continuation between, on the one hand, the daily, less intensive,
short lived feeling of shame such as for example, awkwardness and on the other hand the type
of shame that is painful and long lived. It usually gives rise to general indignation and
constitutes a type that can be labelled dishonouring or humiliating shame. Scheff and
Retzinger suggest that a first step towards a scientific definition of shame would be to use
shame as a collective name for a large family of emotions that appear when regarding oneself
negatively, even if it is only slightly negatively, through the eyes of another, or even just the
expectation of such a reaction. Such a step would include less intense forms of shame, as well
as more intense ones.1
In Scheff and Retzinger‘s presentation, shame has a dual aspect. On the one hand, it is a
natural and normal feature of social life. It acts as a signal when there is a problem between
people and it draws attention to the risk of social ties dissolving unless something is done to
repair them. On the other hand, shame can be oppressive, destructive and excluding, and carry
a lot of negative consequences. And it is the suppression of shame that creates harmful
consequences. At the exact moment that an individual says to himself, and to people he can
trust ‖I am ashamed‖, the shame is already subsiding. The paradox lies within the fact that
while the individual‘s biggest fear is that his shame will become known, the solution is that
the person who hears the confession is someone that he can trust. Studies also point to
important biological changes taking place when an individual talks about traumatic emotional
events. Talking about painful events leads to a substantial drop in blood pressure, and muscle
tension decreases during, or immediately after talking about these events. These biological
effects seem to be most pronounced among those who express emotions. There is also a lot to
indicate that the long term effects are only visible in those who are encouraged to express
emotions. Research also shows that the vast majority of people share their emotional
experiences with other people. People talk about how different experiences affected their
emotions, if it lead to anger, sadness or happiness etc. Some studies, however, indicate that
this is not always true about shame. Shame seems to be an emotion that we would rather keep
to ourselves (Pennebaker 2002).
As previously touched upon, the different variations of shame have in common that they
are social emotions. Through shame, other people's gaze is directed towards the self; it relates
the self to other people, even if this only happens in the imagination. Experiencing shame
therefore constitutes the core of being social and of the need to feel affinity to other people.
As the feeling of shame is a complicated feeling as regards its consequences and as regards its

1
In daily language a number of related terms or substitute words are used to describe the feeling of shame i.e.
feelings that occur when an individual looks at himself negatively through someone else's eyes. Examples
would be "dismissed", "unworthy", "inadequate", "a failure", "lousy", "feeling left out".
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 155

relationship with others, there are in the literature many attempts at conceptual distinctions,
which we will not go deeper into in this chapter.2
The English term humiliation stems from humilis, which means standing low. To
humiliate is to put down. The original meaning of shame is to cover oneself, to hide. Shame is
considered a response to insecure and threatened social ties (Scheff 1990; Retzinger 1991). It
is also a response to a loss of status or the risk of such loss (Gilbert 1998). It would also seem
that shame appears more in the presence of people with a higher status than it does among
people with a lower status (Keltner & Harker 1998; Collins 2004).

Shame as a Regulator

Shame can be seen as the far most dominating feeling as it fills more functions than other
emotions. For example, shame plays an important part in regulating the expression and
consciousness of all our other emotions such as anger, fear, guilt and love. The extent to
which these are allowed to be expressed, depends on the degree to which we are ashamed of
them. Someone who is ashamed of showing anger will hold back that emotion. As pointed out
by Thomas Scheff, a person can be so ashamed of their emotions that they become
completely suppressed (Scheff 1990; Scheff 2001).
The subject of shame as a regulator has been extensively dealt with by a number of
writers, among them the German sociologist Norbert Elias, and the American historian Peter
Stearns. The type of shame that Norbert Elias puts forward in his work about the civilisation
process has both a social and a private side (Elias 1939/1991). The connection between the
two is described roughly as follows; The stronger the external force is transformed through
the social structure into internal self punishment and self control, and the more wide spread
the pressure to conform to conventions, the more we see the fear of breaking social norms or
rules manifest itself as feelings of shame. Elias' theory is that the history of the civilisation
process is a history containing increasing emotional self punishment and self control. The
threshold for what was considered embarrassing or shameful was gradually lowered. One
distinguishing feature was that there was an increasing tendency for self restraint, self control
and self punishment. One of Elias' most important contributions in his studies of the
civilisation process was that he discovered the social importance of shame, and the central
part played by shame in understanding changes in people's behaviour.
But the civilisation process has a paradoxical consequence in Elias' presentation. On the
one hand, it increases the interconnection between people, which means that people become
more dependent on each other. On the other hand, it increases people's feelings of being
isolated from each other. The civilisation process does not only increase the demand for
constraint and control of one‘s feelings but it also finds ways of doing this that lead to among
other things, more artificial, uninvolved and indifferent ways of relating to other people.
American historian Peter Stearns has similar ideas in his book American Cool. The new
emotional culture that emerged in modern society came to encourage a certain amount of
emotional passivity as a result of the lowering of the embarrassment threshold for intense
emotions. So called immature emotional expressions such as the display of anger and envy

2
Examples of such conceptual distinctions are: External shame – internal shame; functional shame – dysfunctional
shame; acknowledge shame – non-acknowledge shame; healthy shame – pathological shame.
156 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

were to be held back and corrected with the help of embarrassment. Embarrassment became
the technique that was to help reason to replace emotional action without triggering defensive
emotional expressions (Stearns 1994).
It seems that in modern society, shame and shame variants such as humiliation have
become invisible. Not because they are less frequent, but because it has become something of
a taboo to display shame and humiliation in front of others. In the world of the Icelandic sagas
shame was collectively regulated; shaming as well as the ways to regain respect and
recognition were public and ritualised. In the modern individualised society, shame is
associated with individual failure to live up to expected or desired status positions. The way
that individuals deal with shame and its effects for the self-image will also be dependent on
the individual‘s past history and position in the social hierarchy. It is argued that the lower the
social status somebody has, the lesser the respect received from others, and the more derision
and contempt (Scheff 1990). In this way, the feeling of inferiority and misery is cemented.
The person who is inferior and humiliated experiences faltering self confidence and does not
really dare to take any initiative. Persons and groups that are constantly reminded of their
inferior position in the societal hierarchy, either through individual superiors, or by an
abundance of regulations, eventually come to accept their inferior status (Ehrenreich 2002).
Thus shame is seen as a concern for the individual, and a result of his/her personal
shortcomings such as a lack of ability to be successful in life. It thereby becomes a feeling of
the stigmatised and marginalized.
Preliminary data from an ongoing study supports the statement that shame is an emotion
that we prefer to keep to ourselves.3 In the study, questions were asked about which feelings
would definitely be kept private, which could possibly be shown to other people, and which
could definitely be shown in front of others.4 Other people was explained as meaning study
colleagues and work colleagues who were not considered to be part of the closer circle of
friends. The four emotions that the respondents definitely wanted to keep to themselves were
jealousy, hatred, envy and shame. In relation to shame, 54 percent of women, and 53 percent
of the men insisted that they would definitely keep it to themselves. The corresponding
numbers for awkwardness were 35 percent and 45 percent respectively, and for
embarrassment 30 percent and 43 percent. Shame seems to be a more ―shameful‖ feeling than
awkwardness and embarrassment, in particular as far as women are concerned. Participants
also had to say how often they had experienced different feelings in the last seven days.
Happiness, pride, anger and sorrow were the most frequent emotions. Hatred, envy and shame
were the least frequent ones. In relation to shame, every third woman, or 33 percent, stated
that they had experienced shame at some point in the last seven days. For men, the figure was
45 percent. The corresponding figures for awkwardness were 56 percent and 64 percent
respectively, and for embarrassment they were 47 percent and 57 percent. It is more common
for men to feel awkwardness and embarrassment but it is also more common for these men to
keep it to themselves.

3
The study is conducted at Karlstad University and is aimed at undergraduate students.
4
The feelings that the participants had to comment on were jealousy, hatred, envy, shame, disgust, akwardness,
embarrassment, grief and joy.
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 157

How Common is Shaming?

There is limited knowledge about the extent to which people feel that they have been
patronised, been humiliated, or in any other way subjected to shaming. In order to throw some
light on this, we have processed some questions from the database Life & Health. It contains
epidemiological data from a population study conducted in the Swedish midlands and
covering over 40,000 people aged 18-84. We have combined two questions in order to get an
idea of the occurrence of humiliations. The first question is: Have you been humiliated in
front of others in the last three months? The second one is: Has somebody insulted your
honour? We have also included a question dealing with patronising. In Figure 1 it is apparent
that the proportion of people who have been insulted/ridiculed and been treated in a
patronising manner, follow roughly the same pattern. It decreases with an increase in age. The
connection is very clear. The figures can be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation
might be that with increasing age, we are less sensitive and less likely to consider something
insulting or patronising. Another might be that people learn the codes of tact through the
years, their purpose being for us to act in a way that does not deliberately humiliate people. A
third interpretation could be that there is more of a taboo around admitting to such events
when you are older
In his study on the institutionalised social care of those with dementia, British researcher
Tom Kitwood shows that subtle forms of humiliation and other types of shaming exist quietly
without becoming visible. Kitwood lists the following principles, used by institutions and
care workers: treachery, disempowerment, infantilisation, intimidation, labelling,
stigmatization, outpacing, invalidation, banishment, objectification, ignoring, imposition,
withholding, accusation, disruption, mockery, disparagement (Kitwood 1997).

Figure 1. Proportion of respondents who have been insulted/ridiculed and patronised in the last three
months, in different age groups n=43.589 (Life & Health, 2004).

In many workplaces, shame and humiliation would seem to be part of the social power
game and general scheming. American researcher Vincent Waldron gives detailed
descriptions of how this is done (Waldron 2000). In the struggle for power, positions and
authority, public humiliation is used, Waldron gives the example of Helen, who was a
department manager. During a management meeting, the Director talked about his plans for
158 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

the coming financial year and Helen thought she could see an error in the calculations. She
expressed her reservation during the meeting. The Director responded with a condescending
snarl and totally discarded her way of reasoning. Helen described how hurt, deflated and
shocked she was at this public dressing down. Waldron considers this type of public
humiliation as a form of emotional tyranny that seems to be fairly common. The emotional
reactions are serious depending on the distance between the leader and the person being
humiliated. He describes this type of public disqualification as being just as painful as a
punch in the stomach delivered by a heavy weight champion.
Organisations also use – deliberately or unintentionally – shaming and humiliation as a
means to maintain the desired form of social control. Scapegoats are created and guilt is
transferred onto a victim in a situation where the self image of the group/organisation would
otherwise be under threat and appear in an undesirable light. People who point out
wrongdoings in organisations are often seen as troublemakers. They are humiliated and run
the risk of becoming isolated (Douglas 1995; Pattison 2000).

The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill Health

Within the field of stress theory, it is assumed that an external pressure such as a danger
or threat can cause negative stress and lead to both physical and mental ill health. Research
seems to indicate that this assumption has empirical support primarily when the danger, threat
or strain contains an evaluating component directed at the social self and carries the risk of
severely damaging an individual‘s sense of self. The issue here is the potential risk that other
people might see the individual in a negative light. Research conducted by Sally Dickerson
and her colleagues points in that direction (Dickerson et al 2004). Her research focuses on
shame as a key response against threats to the social self.
There are studies indicating that people, who have been subjected to shaming in the form
of humiliation, ridicule and other forms of insult display more psychiatric problems than
people who have not been subjected to shaming. For example, studies show that shaming co-
varies with mental ill health among social benefit recipients (Starrin et al 2003), the
unemployed (Starrin & Jönsson 2006; Rantakeisu et al 1999) and the obese (Sjöberg et al
2005). Studies also show that shame (Gilbert 2000; Lewis 1981) and humiliation such as
being rejected by someone close, publicly snubbed, personal failure, and similar things seems
to be important factors for the onset of depression (Brown et al 1995; Kendler et al 2003;
Scheff 2001; Åslund et al (2007) and burnout (Eriksson et al 2008).

Markers of Shame in Two Case Studies

As mentioned earlier, several writers have pointed out that shame and its variants have
become less and less visible. Shame has gone underground and become more difficult to
discover. It seems to be the case that the more that the shame is connected to a behaviour or a
state that creates suffering, the harder it becomes to empirically show the importance of
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 159

shame. This is due to the fact that the connection between suffering and shame is made
invisible to the extent that even the person suffering becomes oblivious to the chain of events.
The Norwegian researcher and doctor Edvin Schei claims that patients go in and out of the
health care system, being investigated and treated without getting well, and without
recognition being given to underlying causal experiences of shame and self hatred (Schei
2006). The reason most shame states are not acknowledged is that they are covered over by
layers of defences, often many layers (Scheff 2009).
There have been some promising attempts to develop markers for shame, so that it is
possible to discover shame even when it is suppressed. Thomas Scheff used markers when he
conducted a new study of the interviews and observations that he carried out in a mental
hospital in the 1960s (Scheff 2001). What was characteristic for all these depressed men, was
that their social ties with other people were either cut off, or very weak. However, in most
cases, it did not seem that they were suppressing feelings of grief or sadness. Very few of
them had faces that displayed sadness, and none displayed anger. Most of them displayed
empty and emotionless faces. Their faces were devoid of expression but their bodies radiated
shame. According to Thomas Scheff, the behaviour of each of the older men during the
interview, can be interpreted as expressing chronic shame. Distinguishing features included
lack of eye contact, slow movements, nervousness and self accusations. These are all basic
shame indicators.
The behaviour and appearance of these men would indicate that they felt deep shame
during the interview. Despite the fact that suppressed sorrow and anger can be part of the
picture, the basic emotion is non-recognised unconscious shame (Scheff 2001). Scheff asks
himself why the men were ashamed? Because the observations were made in a mental
hospital, there is likely to be, according to Scheff, an element of shame for everybody in the
role of a psychiatric patient and all that it entails. Examples would be the fact that you are no
longer in charge of your own life, and that you are judged to be abnormal and incompetent.
But in addition to this, the men‘s situation was characterised by a lack of a secure and safe
relationship with another person. They were not part of any community. Those that were
married did not get on with their wives. The rest were widowers, divorced or unmarried. Very
few of the men were living with their children or other relatives. Even though some were
employed, they found no satisfaction in their work. Shame was a response to damaged social
bonds. The men were in a permanent state of shame primarily because their social bonds were
under threat or had been severely damaged.
In another study of around 30 people on long term sick-leave where all had been
diagnosed either as burned out or as suffering from other stress related afflictions, shame
markers developed by Suzanne Retzinger (Retzinger 1991) were used in order to trace shame
in the stories told by the interviewees regarding important events leading up to the sick leave
(Eriksson et al 2008). What they all had in common was that their workplaces had either been
subjected to substantial changes and/or a cut in staff numbers. Secure working groups had
been divided and the individuals had been incorporated into more lose groups with more
superficial contact. Conflicts and personal disagreements ensued and were never solved.
Relationships with co-workers, superiors and people in lower positions became increasingly
conflict prone, tense and insecure.
In their stories, there were expressions that directly indicate shame, such as words like
humiliated, hurt and offended. We will give some examples. Kajsa, who was a pre-school
teacher felt offended by her boss. She said that the boss put the blame on her and two others,
160 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

when parents protested against the closure of their section of the childcare facility. The mere
thought of her boss keept her awake at night, long after the events.
In the stories there are frequent mentions of words and expressions that indirectly
indicate shame such as the feeling of being on the outside, or not belonging, such as lonely,
deserted, let down, dumped, bullied, rejected. The two teachers, Adam and Jan felt left out.
Adam was bullied and Jan was left out in the cold. Inga-Lill, a school counsellor, was left out
in the cold after a conflict with a superior. Fia, who works in a council run day care centre,
was harassed. Lisbeth, a secondary school teacher, felt that she was being treated as invisible.
Gerd, another teacher, felt forgotten, deserted and downtrodden.
Words that express emotional hurt or threat are frequent in the stories. The pre-school
teacher Kajsa talked about how depressed she felt by not being seen. She felt invisible. The
same applied to Lisbeth. She felt that in the eyes of the school board she did not exist.
The stories contain words and expressions indicating a feeling of falling short of ideals
set by oneself and others, a failure to measure up, not being good enough. Kristina, a school
assistant said that she started to lose faith in herself as nobody ever told her she did anything
good. Pär, an IT worker, felt that younger workers were overtaking him. He started to feel
distinctly average. District nurse Erika became more and more worried about coping with the
simplest of tasks. Lotta, a medical secretary, started doubting herself. Fanny, a cleaner, was
never told she did a good job. She only ever heard complaints
In their stories, those on long term sick leave also described how badly affected they were
by all conflict and antagonism and how this affected their emotional state. Care assistant
Karin talked about people starting to ―chip away‖ at each other. Britta, a pre-school teacher,
was given out to by the boss. Helena was opposed by the older teachers in her school, and in
Maja‘s place of work, people started turning their backs on each other. Teacher Sigrid said
that she could not cope any longer. Britta, the pre-school teacher started to experience fear.
Her fear of something going wrong was so strong that she started to pray to God for help.
Many also talked about how their mood changed. Anger and sadness replaced each other.
David, an economist, told of how he was let down by a colleague. The workplace was full of
conflicts. Everything that happened lead to him starting to ―lose his temper‖. ―I gave out to
my sister-in-law‖. He does not understand himself how that could happen because he had
never done anything like it before. But he does remember being very irritable before going on
his sick leave.
For Lotta, the anger almost became part of her everyday life for a period. ― I came here
and worked and went home and was angry, and ate and slept and barked and was angry and
cried and that is the way it was the whole time‖. Kristina, a school assistant, points out that
her personality changed without her noticing it. Finally, her son asked her why she was so
angry all the time. He wanted to know why she never laughed anymore. Even her colleagues
wondered what she was angry for, as she frequently got annoyed and snapped if anyone asked
her a question.
Everyone in the study had experienced some sort of collapse, and it had been preceded by
tensions and conflicts in the social ties. Descriptions of the collapse and its aftermath contain
stories about muddled thought processes or a feeling of being absent. For many, the collapse
was preceded by a conflict with a superior. Britta had an argument with the boss. She left
work, took the car and ended up far from her home. She has no other memories of the drive
other than that she was crying. Karin told of having experienced a confrontation where she
left work in a very agitated state and never went back. She was ten weeks pregnant and
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 161

miscarried a few days later. The doctor said that it was probably caused by her pressurised
work situation. In all the presented descriptions Retzinger´s markers for shame were present.

Epidemiological Data

Epidemiological data from the earlier mentioned population study conducted in the
Swedish midlands confirms the link between shame and psychiatric ill health/ depression. In
the study, a collective measure for shaming was created.5 As is evident in Figure 2, the
proportion of people who have been troubled by depression or fatigue syndrome during the
last year, increases with an increase in shaming.

I. Not subjected to shaming II. Subjected to shaming in one respect

III. Subjected to shaming in two respects IV. Subjected to shaming in three respects
V. Subjected to shaming in four respects VI. Subjected to shaming in five respects

Figure 2. Exposure to shaming, troubled by depression and fatigue syndrome (Life & Health 2004, age
group 18-84, n=43589).

Out of those that have not been shamed in any way, around 5 percent have been troubled
by depression or fatigue syndrome in the last year. The corresponding figures for those that
have been shamed in five respects are 37 and 31 percent respectively.

Depression as a Stigma

Just over 40 years ago, American sociologist Erving Goffman published his book Stigma:
Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Goffman 1963). During a number of years, the
book came to be an important source of inspiration for a number of studies dealing with
vulnerable groups. Concepts like stigma and labelling were given a central role.

5
The following questions were asked: ‖Have you during the last 3 months felt …" That somebody has treated you
in a patronising manner?; that someone has embarrassed you in front of others?; that someone has insulted
your honour?; that somebody has made disparaging comments about you?; that anyone around you has
ignored you?. The possible answers were: ‖Never‖, ‖Once or twice‖, ‖Several times‖.
162 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

One distinguishing feature, considered to be stigmatizing, is that certain ―disadvantaged‖

groups are particularly subjected to shaming in the form of humiliations, belittling, and
condescending and patronising treatment. Many people would regard them as of lesser value.
Among these groups are for example, the poor (Dahlgren & Starrin 2004), the disabled
(Kirschbaum 1991), and so called minority groups considered to have special features as
regards for example race (Falk 2001), sexual orientation (Falk 2001) and those with mental
illness (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006).
Of those mentioned mental illness is perhaps one of the most discrediting attribute. It is
linked to an array of negative stereotypical traits such as that the mentally ill person is
potentially violent and dangerous, weak, incompetent and unpredictable (Corrigan & Lundin
2001; Scheff 1966). People with mental illness suffer the greatest impact from stigma. Stigma
robs people of rightful life opportunities such as employment and housing. Stigma also
interacts with violence issues to cause people with mental illness to have a distorted
experience with the criminal justice system (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006).
There has been an increase in the proportion of persons who associate mental illness with
perceptions of dangerousness, violence and unpredictability. When asked what ―mental
illness‖ meant to them, about 7 % of people asked in 1950 mentioned violent manifestations
or symptoms, compared to 12 % in 1996. On the other hand, public understanding of mental
illness such as depression has increased (Markowitz 2006).
Shaming, i.e. destructive shame appears not only as one of the mechanisms behind
psychiatric ill health, but for people who have been affected by psychiatric ill health and have
got a psychiatric diagnosis, shame is always lurking in the background.
A number of studies show that psychiatric patients lose their social status when the
diagnosis becomes public and there is a great risk of being patronised (Thiesen 2001). But
who is it that treats the psychiatrically ill or depressed person in a patronising manner?
In the earlier referred study, Life & Health, the question was asked whether you had been
treated in a patronising manner in the last three months. There was also an option to name by
whom (Table 1). Fourteen different sources were named.

Table 1. Sources of patronising treatment (Life & Health, 2004, 18-64 years).

Depression during the last 12 months

Women Men
% %
Family member./relative 23,0 13,1
Colleague/boss 16,6 16,6
Close acquaintance 15,5 13,0
Care staff 9,1 6,6

In table 1, four of the most frequent are shown. Among women who have been affected
by depression, the most common source of patronising is a family member or relative and for
men affected by depression, it is a work colleague or boss. 23 percent of women have been
patronised by somebody within their immediate family, or a relative. The corresponding
figure for men is 13 percent. The difference between men and women in that respect is
relatively large.
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 163

Society and Shame Related Processes

It is a well known fact that the occurrence of good health and disease is not evenly
distributed across all sections of people. In many cases, the inequality reflects the social and
financial status that the individual enjoys in society; whether he or she is employed or not, an
immigrant, rich or poor, whether he or she has a rich and well developed social network or is
socially isolated, if he or she has a high degree of influence over his own life or is powerless,
and whether he or she has a high or a low social standing (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson 2005).
A lot of research would indicate that people in subordinate and vulnerable positions are
more likely to end up in emotionally stressful situations that create processes of shame. When
for example the unemployed, the poor, the disabled or immigrants are treated in an arrogant
or condescending manner by people in powerful positions, they are often forced to control
their feelings of rage (Freund 1993). In addition to this, they also lack, to a higher extent than
people in higher social positions, the social resources necessary in order to protect themselves
from the negative effects of the actions of those in power. They lack what Hochschild calls
‖status-shields‖ (Hochschild 1983). It is also known that people who are further down the
social and financial hierarchy are increasingly subjected to health risks. But the question is
whether these risks are also related to emotional processes of a negative nature? If it is
assumed that certain emotions act as the connecting link between social stresses and
psychiatric ill health, it would logically follow that we would find a higher occurrence of
these emotions among those groups that also display more psychiatric problems.
This theory has some support in the data processed from the database Life & Health.
Figure 3 shows two interesting relationships. Firstly, the prevalence of reduced psychiatric
health as well as the experience of being shamed (insulted/ridiculed) are associated in a
similar way with social status. The prevalence is lowest among those with secure and
permanent, jobs and no financial problems, and highest among social welfare recipients.
Secondly, there is a surprisingly small difference between the prevalence of reduced
psychiatric health and shaming (insulted/ridiculed) for the respective groups. The figures very
obviously follow each other.

A. Secure and permanent job, no financial B. Unemployed C. Welfare

problems recipient

Figure 3. Reduced psychiatric health, insulted/ridiculed and social status (Processed data from Life &
Health 2004).
164 Bengt Starrin and Åsa Wettergren

The connection between social status and reduced psychiatric health is in line with
research that shows that health follows a social gradient as regards status and socio-
economical circumstances. Michael Marmot calls it the status syndrome (Marmot 2004), and
Richard Wilkinson names it the inequality thesis (Wilkinson 2005), which means than those
on the lower rungs of the ladder in society are in worse health that those higher up. But
existing data also show that a similar gradient exists for insulted/ridiculed and that this
corresponds with the gradient for reduced psychiatric health. In other words, shaming seems
to constitute one possible mechanism behind the connection between social status/social
position and reduced psychiatric health. Shaming means to put someone to shame and it is
assumed to be able to create psychiatric ill health when it is suppressed and not recognised
(Lewis 1987; Scheff 1990).
Seen from an emotional-sociological perspective, external ―pressure‖ or ―stress‖ in the
form of demands and expectations that society imposes on the individual is relayed to internal
psychiatric processes without exception by emotions, and there are different thought models
about how this happens. It would appear that shame is one of the more immediate responses
when the social self is under threat (Dickerson et al 2004), for example, the risk or event of
being dismissed by an important person, discriminated against, cut down to size or the subject
of the spreading of unflattering information about oneself which increases the risk of being
seen in a bad light (lose respect, status). Shame thereby becomes a signal that important social
ties are under threat or are unsafe and/or that an individual's social status is fragile.
Psychiatric ill health might then be the result of processes linked to the kind of shame during
which the self is subjected to attacks that it cannot untangle or defend against.
But shaming and ―the toxic shame‖ also seem to appear as a result of stigmatization of
the individual as mentally ill. It seems clear that stigmatization worsens the lives of people
experiencing mental illness (Corrigan & Kleinlein 2006) and that stigma is a strong barrier to
recovery from mental illness (Markowitz 2006).
The question that then has to be asked is how emotional processes can fit into the pattern
of mental health as being unevenly distributed among the population. Our suggestion is that
groups that display more psychiatric ill health (i) to a greater extent have been subjected to
circumstances that create shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes (ii) have had
access to less resources in order to protect the self from being subjected to circumstances that
create shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes and iii) have access to less resources
that can dissolve shame related psychiatrically unhealthy processes.

CONCLUSION
The Icelandic sagas indicate that shame, humiliation respect and honour played an
important role for understanding the everyday life of the people during the Middle Age.
Being humiliated and unable to cope with the shame in a way that was prescribed by the
cultural norms gave rise to psychiatric ill-health.
Today the social mechanisms behind shame and coping with it are different but the
psychological effects of unresolved shame are the same. In this chapter we have discussed
and explored the contemporary link between shaming and reduced psychiatric health. Both
qualitative case studies and epidemiological data indicate that shaming might be important to
 The Dynamics of Shame and Psychiatric Ill-Health 165

consider when understanding at least some forms of psychological problems. However further
studies are needed. Since the toxic variants of shame in many cases are extremely difficult to
detect as they are repressed and unacknowledged there is a need for a development of both
qualitative and quantitative methods.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Bengt Starrin PhD in Sociology, professor of Social Work at the Department of Social
Studies at Karlstad University, Sweden and adjunct professor of Social Policy at Faculty of
Health and Social Studies, Lillehammer University College. His major research interests
concern sociology of emotions, public health, social policy and welfare.

Åsa Wettergren, PhD, is a Research Fellow in Sociology at the Department of Social

Studies, Karlstad University, Sweden. Her main research interests are emotions and collective
identities (social movements, organizations, national identities); and emotions in and of
migration and social exclusion/inclusion. She was the coordinator of the European
Sociological Association‘s Research Network of the Sociology of Emotions 2005-2007.
In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 169-182 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 8

UNDERSTANDING NEUROTICISM IN EMERGING

ADULTHOOD: INTEGRATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF ERIKSON AND FROMM

Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

University of Detroit Mercy

ABSTRACT
This commentary will focus on an exploration of Eriksonian identity formation in
emerging adulthood with a special emphasis on how the unique epigenetic struggles of
this developmental period may lead to experiences of neuroticism and anxiety. Recent
lines of research (Arnett, 1998, 2000, 2001) suggest that emerging adulthood is a time of
profound identity exploration for young people. Emerging adults explore issues of
identity concerning work, love, purpose, and meaning amidst a period of life marked by
increased freedom and significant decision-making. However, contemporary western
society seems to foster a prolonged adolescence in emerging adulthood. While emerging
adults begin to make choices concerning their identities and their life course, they are
relatively free of adult responsibilities and commitments. Meanwhile, Erikson (1950,
1968, 1982) perceived the conflict between identity versus role confusion as an integral
struggle in adolescence.
With the shift in contemporary society toward a prolonged adolescence, many
emerging adults face questions concerning identity in a developmental period which
differs markedly from traditional conceptions of adolescence. Greater freedom afforded
by college, separation from parents, and increased autonomy to make life decisions
makes emerging adulthood unique. Erikson (1950, 1968) felt that lacking a coherent
sense of identity causes great anxiety, as does the struggle to achieve this sense of
identity. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955) suggests that freedom, while perceived
of as liberating, actually, causes a great deal of anxiety and that humanity tends to escape
from freedom rather than embrace and capitalize on its potential.
Therefore, the understanding of a great deal of anxiety and neuroticism in emerging
adulthood may lie in an integration of these theories. The increased freedom of emerging
adulthood, combined with the potentially stressful issues of identity, intimacy, and facing
the incoming commitments of adulthood, may contribute to increased experiences of
anxiety and neuroticism. The anxiety produced by increased freedom may lead some to
170 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

seek escape from this very freedom, which in turn, may cloud and disrupt identity
exploration and commitment leading to role confusion and even more anxiety. For
instance, automaton conformity (becoming totally immersed in one‘s culture and
forsaking an individual sense of identity) could alleviate the anxiety of freedom, but it
may exacerbate the anxiety of role confusion throughout emerging adulthood. Finally,
potential solutions for such neuroticism and anxiety are suggested based upon the
theories of Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941, 1955).

INTRODUCTION
Erikson and Identity

According to Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982), a unique, genuine, and individual adult identity
is the foundation to a healthy psychological life and ego integrity. Consequently, Erikson
(1950) felt that the key conflict of adolescence in psychosocial development involved the
formation of an individual identity with which to approach adulthood and relate to society,
versus a sense of role confusion. Erikson believed that a key concern of adolescents is how
they appear in the eyes of others in comparison to their own self-image. Furthermore, Erikson
suggests adolescents connect their skills from earlier in life to their future occupational role in
their social and cultural milieu. However, typically the adolescent rejects the continuity of
their previous life experience in a search for a new identity. This process of rejecting previous
life experiences leads to a period of exploration of various identity roles before committing to
and achieving a unique individual identity. Consequently, Erikson observed that western
society provides adolescents with a psychosocial moratorium, a period free of adult
responsibility and commitments in order to explore the possibilities of identity.
According to Erikson (1968), ego identity consists of an adolescent‘s inner sense of
identity matching with his or her present and previous life experiences. This sense of identity
expresses itself in a psychosocial context in relation with others and society itself. Ultimately,
Erikson surmised that this sense of identity crystallizes into a career and other significant
roles in adult life. Meanwhile, an adolescent actively searches for a set of beliefs and values,
while also coming to terms with societal norms.
The other possibility in this stage is role confusion. Role confusion according to Erikson
(1968) is the failure to explore and dedicate oneself to an occupational, ideological, or
personal identity. Consequently, in response to this role confusion, adolescents compensate
for their lack of individual identity by forming cliques and conforming into crowds. For
instance, adolescent conformity and hostility to those who are not part of their own particular
in-group are examples of a defense against the frustration over role confusion. Finally,
Erikson believed that adolescent love is an attempt by the adolescent to mirror their ego
identity onto another to clarify role confusion.
Erikson (1968) believed that the search for identity lies within the core of the individual
but will find expression in a cultural and historical context. This notion emphasized Erikson‘s
conception of psychosocial development. He believed humans develop within themselves and
within a specific cultural and historical period. Furthermore, Erikson considered the search
for identity to be a lifelong quest, coming to a head among adolescents in the identity crisis.
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 171

Erikson (1950, 1968) saw adolescence as a period of replaying the crises of earlier
psychosocial life. For instance, an adolescent must confront the issue of trust in finding faith
in an ideology. However, fearing a premature commitment, many adolescents display a
cynical mistrust toward adult ideology. An adolescent displays free will in deciding which
activities to put energy into, even if they do not coincide with their elders‘ expectations.
Meanwhile, a negative identity, formed when an adolescent indentifies with the
delinquent roles discouraged by parents or society, may provide an adolescent psychological
safety from the anxiety of a lack of personal identity. For instance, Erikson (1968) says that in
choosing a negative identity, an adolescent takes back control over their identity crisis.
Consequently, he suggests that it is easier to form a negative identity through identification
than face the difficultly and anxiety of forming an individual identity or the danger of having
no identity at all.
The psychosocial moratorium is the battleground of an individual‘s identity crisis.
Erikson (1950, 1968) conceived of the psychosocial moratorium as a second latency period
consisting of a prolonged adolescence allowing an individual to explore social roles and find
his or her unique niche in society. Furthermore, this moratorium period delays adult
commitments, providing an adolescent the opportunity to explore potential identity
commitments. Eventually, the adolescent explores roles and then makes a commitment to an
identity, entering adult society. However, Erikson warned that both a premature exit or an
excessive prolongation of the moratorium period could prove detrimental to the process of
identity development. Essentially, an emerging whose period of moratorium goes on for too
long could eventually form neurotic symptoms, such as depression or anxiety about their lack
of a commitment to, and definition of, an adult identity. Erikson (1968, 1982) suggested that a
great deal of human anxiety stems from an individual lacking a coherent sense of identity.
Without a resolution to this stage in development, an emerging adult will rely upon the
identity explorations common to the moratorium stage (such as freedom from responsibility,
freedom to explore multiple identities, and a lack of commitment) to defend against the
anxiety of identity development and exploration. However, this strategy may shift from an
ego-syntonic and appropriate aspect of development, to an ego-alien concern and conflict as
one begins to face adult responsibility and challenges. Lacking a coherent identity leaves a
young adult ill equipped to deal with the anxiety and stress of adult life (Arnett, 2000).
Therefore, prolonging the moratorium, delaying adult responsibility and development, and
relying on the moratorium as a defense against the anxiety of identity formation could
eventually lead to neurotic symptoms and personality organization. Moreover, as Erikson
(1968) suggests, a premature end to the psychosocial moratorium also has similar detrimental
consequences.

Marcia and Ego Identity Status

Marcia (1966) reviewed Erikson‘s (1950) theory of identity development and

conceptualized identity status consisting of two variables: crisis and commitment. Crisis
refers to an active search for identity among possible alternatives. Commitment, on the other
hand, refers to the presence of a decision related to occupational and ideological status.
By interviewing college students, Marcia (1966) posited four identity statuses based upon
whether individuals actively explored identity possibilities (crisis), and if they had made a
172 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

choice concerning their identity (commitment): identity achievement, diffusion, moratorium,

and foreclosure. Identity achievement refers to an individual who experienced a period of
crisis and has made a commitment to an ideological orientation and occupation. Identity
diffusion refers to an individual with both a lack of crisis and a lack of commitment. Identity
foreclosure involves a commitment without a period of crisis. Finally, identity moratorium
involves an active crisis, i.e. a search for identity, without any particular commitment.
Erikson (1968) implied that achieving identity consisted of resolving previous life
conflicts in order to achieve and ideological orientation and occupational relation to society.
However, a reliance on the moratorium, a prolonged crisis, and lack of a commitment could
potentially contribute to neurotic anxiety. That is to say, those with foreclosed or diffused
identities as well as those in moratorium may rely on an imperfect and neurotic strategies to
answer the question of identity development. Failure to explore or commit, and a reluctance
to resolve the key conflict of the moratorium with a genuine existential choice (Sartre, 1956,
1965) in an individual adult identity may lead to neurotic anxiety through the instability of
role confusion. This could especially be relevant as an individual faces adult issues and
responsibilities (especially intimacy and generativity) while lacking identity and fidelity as a
virtue and strategy to cope with these life stressors (Erikson, 1950, 1968).
Marcia‘s (1966) ego identity statuses helped give operational definitions to Erikson‘s
conceptions of identity, facilitating research on the process of identity formation. Arnett
(2000), however, proposes that identity crisis and commitment often take place for many
individuals in a period called emerging adulthood.

The Concept of Emerging Adulthood

Arnett (2000, 2001, 2005) suggests that because of changing demographic realities,
including a delay in the median age of marriage and age of first childbirth, the nature of
development in late teens and early twenties is changing in industrialized societies. He
suggests that the late teens and early twenties no longer involve either entering or settling into
adult roles, but are marked by intense exploration of identity. Therefore, Arnett suggests that
the period between the late teens and through the twenties is not adulthood or adolescence,
but a developmental era called emerging adulthood.
Demographically, Arnett (2000) argues that after age 18 several groups of emerging
adults radically differ from each other in terms of occupation, education, and residential
status. Those who go off to college experience a period of semi-autonomy, while others go
straight into the work-world and move out of their parents‘ homes. Increasingly, more
emerging adults attend college with a similar increase in graduate school attendance after
graduation. Furthermore, emerging adults frequently change living arrangements, coming and
going from home and living with roommates or romantic parents that frequently change.
Overall, emerging adulthood consists of increasing demographic instability and diversity,
implying a period of intense change and experimentation (Arnett, 2000).
Emerging adults, according to Arnett (2000), do not conceptualize themselves as either
adults or adolescents. When asked what they consider to be indicators of adult status,
emerging adults indicate that accepting responsibility for one‘s self, making independent
decisions, and being financially independent are more important to becoming an adult than
completing education, getting married, finding a career, or having children (Arnett, 2000).
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 173

Therefore, Erikson‘s (1950) suggestion that an occupational identity is essential to identity

formation may not indicate an achievement of adult identity in the eyes of emerging adults.

Identity in Emerging Adulthood

Arnett (2000, 2001) argues that much of the identity explorations Erikson (1950, 1968)
conceptualized as taking place in adolescence actually take place in this period of emerging
adulthood. Specifically, Arnett (2000) says that emerging adults explore and experiment with
orientations toward love, work, and worldview. Agreeing with Erikson (1968), Arnett (2000,
2001) acknowledges that society provides adolescents with a psychosocial moratorium.
However, Arnett asserts that this period of moratorium extends into the period of emerging
adulthood. He cites that emerging adults have less role commitments, allowing them the
freedom to explore and experiment with identity.
However, as Erikson (1968) suggests, shortening or prolonging the moratorium or failing
to resolve the crisis of identity with a genuine commitment may sometimes increase anxiety
or role confusion. Deficits in adult identity can lead to a reliance on developmentally
inappropriate life strategies and coping mechanisms as emerging adults enter adulthood. That
is to say, identity development is a necessary conflict in emerging adulthood involving a
stressful existential struggle resolved with an eventual commitment to an adult identity
(Arnett, 2000). The emerging adult views identity exploration and experimenting with
identity as an essential and normative aspect of this stage in life. However, eventually, as
emerging adults begin to face adult questions of intimacy, commitment, and face greater
responsibility, the cognitive attention devoted to identity exploration will shift toward coping
with the realities of adult life in contemporary society. With adult responsibilities comes
decreased time and freedom available toward forming a stable identity. A reluctance to make
choices and resolve this conflict within the freedom of psychosocial moratorium can lead to
existential angst and anxiety as one enters adulthood without a stable identity (Sartre, 1956,
1965). Moreover, the coping and defense mechanisms appropriate in emerging adulthood
concerning identity development crumble and become imperfect and neurotic patterns of
escaping from the anxiety, responsibility, and challenges of adulthood (Arnett, 2000, 2005;
Erikson, 1968).
Meanwhile, Erikson‘s (1950, 1968) notion that society, culture, and history affect the
psychosocial development of the individual gives Arnett (2000) reason to suggest that current
societal realities shift the period of identity exploration from adolescence to emerging
adulthood. Indeed, Arnett admits that identity explorations in love, work, and worldview may
take root in adolescence, but they achieve fruition in emerging adulthood. Arnett argues that
explorations of love become more intimate in emerging adulthood compared to adolescence.
Furthermore, he asserts that work experiences in emerging adulthood also allow an emerging
adult to explore various occupational identities while preparing them for the adult work
world. In addition, educational experiences in emerging adulthood, especially the tendency of
undergraduates to change majors in their first two years, involve a period of exploration into
what paths in occupation and identity an emerging adult may take. Emerging adulthood also
allows for an examination of worldviews, beliefs, and values. Typically, emerging adults
change their values, belief, and worldview from adolescence. Both emerging adults who
174 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

attend college and those who do not express that developing individual values and beliefs is
an integral aspect of achieving adulthood (Arnett, 2000).
Emerging adulthood provides an opportunity for intense identity exploration; however,
disappointments and failures are normative in the period (Arnett, 2000). Indeed, many
emerging adults may experience failures in their desired occupation or are unable to find
meaningful work. In addition, as Erikson (1968) suggested, a rejection and reconsideration of
earlier childhood ethics, morals, and worldview may result from exploring identity, leading to
a void in and emerging adult‘s sense of self, morals, and place in the world (Arnett, 2000).
Furthermore, many emerging adults spend much of their time alone, indicating that identity
explorations may be a lonely struggle without the traditional support of the family
environment in adolescence. However, this autonomy and independence allows emerging
adults the freedom to pursue identity explorations on their own, without input and criticism
from parents or other authority figures (Arnett, 2000).
Arnett (2000) observes and comments that emerging adulthood is not a universal concept
or period of development. On a societal level, emerging adulthood is more likely in
industrialized societies that allow for an extended psychosocial moratorium. Within these
societies, not all young adults experience this privilege. Arnett argues that the forgotten half
(those who do not go to college), minorities, and working class emerging adults lack the
opportunity to explore their identities to the extent of college bound and middle class
emerging adults.
If Arnett‘s (2000) suggestion that much of Erikson‘s (1968) notion of identity crisis takes
place in emerging adulthood, then emerging adulthood becomes the nexus of identity
formation. Therefore, an examination of the literature on identity and emerging adulthood
may shed light on how emerging adults achieve identity and ultimately enter adulthood.

Fromm and Escaping from Freedom

Fromm (1941) in Escape from Freedom outlines his theory of the fundamental aspect of
human nature, freedom, and the escape mechanisms individuals rely on in a social context to
ultimately escape the very freedom that makes us human. Here, Fromm touches on aspects of
emerging adulthood, especially in Western, individualistic society. Arnett (2001, 2001)
argues that emerging adulthood is a period of relative freedom, of not only relative freedom,
not only from adult responsibility, but the freedom to choose and develop an identity and
break free from childhood values and conceptions of the world and self. Ultimately, Fromm
(1941) posits that a major source of human anxiety is the conflict between the freedoms we
cherish (e.g. an adolescent who wants to be free from parental control) and the anxiety and
fear of freedom in face of existential dread (e.g. an emerging adult who does not know who
they are and feels lost and alone). The freedom espoused by the psychosocial moratorium
allows an emerging adult to explore the self and their place in society. As Arnett (1998, 2000)
suggests, emerging adults spend a great deal of time alone, constantly wondering about,
reworking, and exploring their identities and worldviews. However, as Fromm suggests, this
freedom to explore ultimately may lead to anxiety, especially when an individual fails to
embrace the freedom of human experience, and, instead, utilizes escape mechanisms to
relieve the anxiety of freedom. Consequently, the mechanisms of escape outlined by Fromm
(1941) may assuage the existential anxiety of prolonged freedom, but may exacerbate the
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 175

anxiety of identity formation. This leads emerging adults to face a double jeopardy of
neuroticism, bound by anxieties of freedom and identity that spring from the same source: the
period of emerging adulthood.
That is to say, faced with an enormous amount of important decisions in emerging
adulthood, especially concerning identity, an emerging adult, according to Erikson (1950,
1968), can become anxious and uncertain while exploring the overwhelming possibilities of
identity formation in emerging adulthood. Meanwhile, the immense freedom to choose and
explore these aspects of identity is another source of stress (Fromm, 1941). Together, the
anxiety and stress of exploring identity, combined with the unprecedented freedom for an
individual to shape their life course leads to tenuous crossroad between two integral sources
of potential neuroticism and anxiety in human life.

Freedom as a fundamental human condition. Fromm (1941) posits that man; free from
the instinctual mechanisms of lower animals, is separate from nature yet part of it. Humans,
therefore, through rationalization and self-realization feels small amidst nature and the
universe and is intensely aware of their own mortality. Consequently, humans are free to
make decisions and control their own destiny, yet this freedom causes a dreaded sense of
loneliness and anxiety, leading man to seek out ties to people and society. Fromm indicates
that primary ties are akin to the biological tie between mother and child in the womb. While
primary ties provide a sense of security, they ultimately limit freedom and full human
potential. Nevertheless, Fromm suggests that while modern humans are free from original
primary ties to nature, people ultimately seek out new ties in society. However, these new ties
are akin to primary ties to nature: they also serve ultimately to limit our freedom and
individuality while providing security against the loneliness of human existence. Therefore,
Fromm suggests that while modern humans are free-from the primary ties of nature, they are
not free-to achieve his greatest potential in productivity and love. For example, by submitting
to an authority, people escape from the very freedom that makes them human. Ultimately,
freedom-from nature, without a proper capacity to achieve freedom-to, motivates humans to
escape from their freedom to cope with the intense loneliness and isolation freedom implies.

Freedom-to choose and Existentialism. Ultimately, Fromm (1941) proposes a similar

philosophy to that of Existentialism (Sartre (1956, 1965; Kierkegaard, 1843). Namely,
humans are free to make their own identity, to give their individual lives meaning,
independently from outside authority or influence. For Sartre (1956, 1965) especially, life is
ultimately meaningless, except for the meaning an individual forms and projects into the
nothingness at the core of human existence. Existentialism combines the core conflicts of
both Erikson (1950, 1968, 1987) and Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955). Namely, the conflict
between finding meaning in one‘s life (identity) while embracing the freedom in which one
can create their own meaning, free from authority, dogma, or social forces. In emerging
adulthood (Arnett, 2000) this conflict between identity, choice, and freedom becomes a key
existential struggle. Meanwhile, Fromm (1941) argues that an individual will attempt to
escape from the anxiety of freedom and the immense responsibility of choice in choosing
one‘s life course and identity.

Mechanisms of escape. Fromm (1941) suggests that mechanisms of escape are ultimately
the result of insecurity in the isolated individual. A healthy person approaches their freedom
176 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

by applying themselves to love and work, becoming one with society but still maintain a
sense of self. They ultimately embrace their freedom and reach full human potential. In
contrast, a person utilizing escape mechanisms cannot stand the isolation of freedom and
relies on solutions to bridge the gap between themselves and the world. Consequently, these
mechanisms of escape are not true solutions, they provide the isolated individual security, but
they give up their sense of individuality and freedom.
Fromm (1941) also suggests that ‗healthy‘ individuals enmeshed in society may not be
entirely sane. The sane individual may give up part of their individuality and freedom to
conform to society. Moreover, the neurotic, according to Fromm, is unwilling to conform and
give away a part of themselves to societal norms. The neurotic then leans on escape
mechanisms as a fantasy to the solution to the problem of their human freedom.
Fromm suggested that there are three mechanisms of escape: authoritarianism,
destructiveness, and automaton conformity. In the context of emerging adulthood, these
escape mechanisms are possible neurotic solutions to the excess freedom afforded by the
extended psychosocial moratorium (Erikson, 1968; Arnett, 2000).

Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism as an escape mechanism occurs when one gives up

his or her individual self to someone outside of the self to acquire the strength the individual
himself lacks (Fromm, 1941). In authoritarianism, one seeks another secondary tie to make up
for the lack of primary ties.
Authoritarian tendencies primarily arise from two tendencies, masochism and sadism
(Fromm, 1941). Fromm suggests that masochists are those who feel powerless, belittle
themselves, and are dependent on sources outside of themselves for a sense of identity.
Masochists are afraid of their freedom and cannot bear being alone with their sense of self.
Therefore, by feeling small and helpless, they give up the power of the self and escape their
individuality and freedom. To compensate for their lack of individuality, masochists seek out
a power person or institution to instill in them the power they lack. They become one with the
outside source, losing their freedom in the process but gaining security.
In contrast, the sadist seeks a sense of identity in the domination of others (Fromm,
1941). They take complete control of others and make them dependent others dependent upon
themselves. Moreover, the sadist exploits others and wishes to see and make people suffer.
Fromm posits that most sadists are less conscious of their tendencies then masochists, leading
to rationalization of these tendencies through reaction formations.
Fromm (1941) suggests that the sadist and the masochist exist within a symbiotic
relationship. That is to say, as much as the masochist needs the sadist to foster their identity,
the sadist needs the masochist because his sense of identity relies upon up in the domineering
power they have over their subject. For instance, Fromm cites the example of the domineering
abusive husband who begs his wife to stay when she threatens to leave.
Finally, Fromm (1941) suggests that the sado-masochist character is analogous to the
‗authoritarian character.‘ Authority in this sense is negative authority, where the person in
power and the person subject to control have different aims and motivations and a sense of
hostility is present. Consequently, the subject develops a blind admiration for the authority,
giving it an almost magical quality. This authority can be either overt, through direct control
seen in Fascist governments, or covert, such as advertising and conformity in democratic
systems.
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 177

Destructiveness. In the destructiveness mechanism, one escapes feelings of

powerlessness and isolation by destroying the outside world in which they compare
themselves to (Fromm, 1941). Consequently, destructiveness, according to Fromm, is a
desperate attempt to save oneself from the world around them. Furthermore, this tendency
finds expression through two tendencies, anxiety and the thwarting of life. Anxiety is a
constantly feeling threatened by the outside world. Feelings of isolation and powerlessness
produce this anxiety and in turn, this anxiety fuels hostility and destructive tendencies.
Similarly, Fromm suggests that more the drive for life is thwarted the more destructiveness
and thwarting of life is present. Therefore, the more repressive society becomes against
humans reaching their full life potential, the more destructive tendencies will tend to emerge.

Automaton conformity. Fromm (1941) suggests that a majority of people in modern

Western society rely on automaton conformity. They cease to be themselves and become
totally immersed in the culture their society provides, becoming similar to everyone else in
the culture. Conformity is escaping the freedom of being unique and an individual. This
conformity provides security, but at the loss of individuality of human existence.
Fromm (1941) suggests that in modern society, even ‗individual‘ thoughts seen as
unique, may actually be implemented from outside the self. For instance, Fromm posits a
distinction between pseudo versus genuine thinking. Genuine thinking is coming to a unique
conclusion based upon rational thinking and utilizing evidence to support this conclusion. In
contrast, pseudo thinking is taking in outside opinions and sources of information and making
them your own without any rational or unique thinking. Fromm cites an example of pseudo
thinking as taking in political opinions from a newspaper and making them your own without
any rational or critical analysis.
Fromm (1941) also suggests that conformity breeds pseudo feelings and decisions in
contrast to genuine feelings and decisions. Fromm indicates that people mask their true
feelings to conform to expectations in social settings. Consequently, the suppression of these
feelings produces anxiety and loneliness, leading to an even greater emphasis on pseudo
feelings to defend against these real feelings. Furthermore, Fromm suggests that decisions,
which we seemingly make on our own, may actually be the result of outside pressures and
conformities. For instance, a choice in an occupation could be a ‗genuine decision‘ that may
be influenced by conformity. Making genuine life decisions implies a sense of freedom and
individual initiative that produce anxiety that pseudo decisions mask and assuage.
Ultimately, pseudo feelings, decisions, and thoughts lead to a pseudo rather than genuine
self (Fromm, 1941). Our genuine, thoughts, feelings, wishes, desires, and freedom are
suppressed and a pseudo self becomes dominate. However, this pseudo self produces anxiety
and a loss of identity. To cope with this anxiety and loss of identity, Fromm suggests that we
conform to the expectations of society in order to produce a sense of security. Still, like all the
escape mechanisms, security costs a heavy price, a loss of the freedom that defines are human
existence.

Escape Mechanisms and Identity in Emerging Adulthood

As Erikson (1950, 1968) and Arnett (2000) argue, the central crisis in emerging
adulthood is forming a genuine adult identity. Furthermore, personal identity and meaning in
178 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

life are key existential choices and struggles every emerging adult faces (Sartre 1956, 1965,
Kierkegaard, 1843). However, Arnett (2000) suggests that the increased freedom of
emerging adulthood, freedom that many emerging adults are experiencing for the first time in
life, can be overwhelming. Similarly, Fromm (1941) posits that the overwhelming freedom of
human existence leads individuals to escape from their freedom, through authoritarianism,
destructiveness, or automaton conformity. Ultimately, escaping from the freedom to choose
one‘s own identity forms a tenuous and potentially neurotic compromise. The individual
assuages the anxiety produced by the freedom to choose at the expense of sacrificing a
genuine, unique, and individual identity necessary to face the struggles and difficult choices
of adulthood.

Authoritarianism and identity. A potential neurotic solution to the crisis of forming an

identity in emerging adulthood is to give up the freedom to choose a genuine identity to an
outside authority. In other words, an individual‘s sense of identity, their beliefs, and their
ethics are not the product of individual reflection and choice, but pressed upon them from an
outside authority (Fromm, 1941). Potential sources influencing a sense of authoritarian beliefs
can vary depending on the emerging adult‘s life course. They could come from excessive
identification with parents, political groups, cults, the cumulative effects of advertising and
conformity to societal values, or an abusive romantic partner.
An example of this is the ego identity stage of identity foreclosure (Marcia, 1966). In this
stage, an individual has made a commitment to an identity, but has not experienced an
existential crisis in deciding between alternate identities and beliefs. In essence, the emerging
adult represses the conflict of identity formation and stays within a safe and set pattern of
beliefs and life course. Identity foreclosed individuals potentially experience choosing a
genuine identity as too overwhelming. Instead, they rely upon beliefs approved by an outside
authority from the individual‘s youth, such as parents or a religious group. Arnett (2000)
suggests that identity exploration in emerging adulthood involves a reflection and rethinking
of childhood beliefs and expectations from parental figures. However, emerging adults
forming a sense of identity from authoritarianism neglect to reexamine their values and sense
of self. Instead, they are individuals formed by the hands of others, unconsciously forced
down a path laid out for them. There is no choice, no individual meaning, no existential crisis
that the individual faces and overcomes (Sartre, 1956, 1965). Nevertheless, this compromise
rejecting individual identity and freedom of choice is preferable, from Erikson‘s (1968)
perspective, to having no identity at all.
A potential source of depression and anxiety, and a normative aspect of emerging
adulthood, is the stress of separating from one‘s parents and becoming an autonomous adult
(Nelson & Barry, 2005). Consequently, emerging adults relying upon authority to form an
identity for them may have issues related to separation and individuation (Nelson & Barry,
2005). That is to say, the freedom of choice to peruse an individual identity and reflect upon
past beliefs about the world may evoke a sense of separation anxiety from figures whom
provided comfort and stability in the past. This separation anxiety (Bowlby, 1969) may lead
to depression, anxiety, and other neurotic symptoms, especially as an emerging adult grows
older, becomes increasingly independent, and forced to make autonomous decisions,
especially concerning intimacy and love (Erikson, 1950; Fromm, 1956).
A sense of identity formed in the authoritarian escape mechanism can also lead to a rigid
sense of self, thinking, and beliefs. Similar to individuals with obsessive-compulsive
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 179

character (Shapiro, 1965), emerging adults with an authoritarian sense of identity could
potentially view every decision in the context of what their authority figure would say or do.
When faced with questions that the authority cannot readily provide an answer to, such as
what to do in ambiguous and unique situations, these individuals may become depressed and
feel a sense of emptiness. In contrast, emerging adults with an increased sense of self-agency
(responsibility for one‘s life course and beliefs) make more autonomous decisions, have
increased self-esteem and ego strength, and are more flexible and open to exploring identity
and beliefs than those lacking a sense of self-agency (Schwartz, Cote, & Arnett, 2005).

Destructiveness and identity. A grim but normative aspect of emerging adulthood is

increased risk-taking behavior, binge drinking, and substance abuse (Arnett, 2000, 2005;
Nelson & Barry, 2005; White & Jackson, 2005). Indeed, substance use and abuse reaches its
peak in emerging adulthood for most individuals (Arnett, 2005). However, while all of these
self-destructive behaviors may be normative in emerging adulthood, they have very serious
consequences. Besides the risk of harming themselves or others, emerging adults may rely
upon drugs, alcohol, or risk-taking behavior (especially sexual) as a coping mechanism to
deal with the stress of identity formation and the overwhelming freedom afforded by the
psychosocial moratorium by utilizing the escape mechanism of self-destructiveness (Arnett,
2000, 2005; Fromm, 1941). Instead of embracing their freedom to explore and choose many
different possible identities (Arnett, 2000), emerging adults utilizing this escape mechanism
withdrawal from the crisis of identity formation or form a negative identity, which is
preferable than having no identity at all according to Erikson (1968).
Arnett (2005) suggests that emerging adults abusing drugs and alcohol may well be
overwhelmed by their excessive freedom, the stress of forming an identity, and their
frustrations over the inconsistency of life in emerging adulthood. However, self-medicating or
acting out with self-destructive behavior to cope with the anxiety and uncertainty of emerging
adulthood exacerbates the crisis of identity formation. Consequently, emerging adults who are
self-destructive are possibly in the ego identity stage of identity diffusion (Marcia, 1966).
These individuals lack a commitment to any identity and withdrawal from the crisis of
searching for an identity (Marcia, 1966). From Fromm‘s (1941) perspective, these
individual‘s would rather destroy their freedom to choose an identity because of the
overwhelming anxiety and stress that comes along with this responsibility. However, from
Erikson‘s (1968) perspective, these emerging adults form a negative identity, one disapproved
and discouraged by society, in order to cope with the existential dread of role confusion.
The cost of self-destructive behavior as a solution to relieve the anxiety of forming an
identity is high. Excessive drinking and drug use can lead to long-term health problems,
decreased psychological well-being, anxiety, depression, criminal behavior, and even death
(especially drunk-driving accidents) (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Nelson & Barry, 2005; White &
Jackson 2005). Furthermore, the onset of severe psychopathology (such as depression) peaks
in emerging adulthood along with substance abuse (Arnett, 2005). Consequently, this
solution also contributes to increased role confusion. That is to say, when an emerging adult
chooses to withdrawal from the crisis of choosing an identity, they cannot make a genuine
commitment. Nevertheless, substance use and risky behavior tends to decrease as emerging
adults transition into adulthood and many emerging adults consider decreased risk-taking as a
criteria for becoming a true adult (Arnett, 2000, 2005; Nelson & Barry, 2005). Delaying the
transition to adulthood by escaping through self-destructiveness leaves an emerging adult ill
180 Adam C. Lorincz and Steven Abell

prepared for the challenges of adulthood because they will lack a genuine identity, a sense of
self-agency, and self-worth (Erikson, 1968; Arnett, 2000, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2005).

Automaton conformity and identity. At first glance, the escape mechanism of automaton
conformity seems similar to authoritarianism. Both lead to a pseudo, rather than a genuine
identity, however, the mechanism of escaping from the freedom of individual choice is
different. In authoritarianism, an individual gives up their freedom to choose to a specific
authority figure or group. In automaton conformity, the individual becomes completely
enmeshed in their culture, assuaging the anxiety of individual freedom and choice by
perceiving himself or herself as just like everyone else (Fromm, 1941). Much like
Kierkegaard (1843), Fromm (1941) felt that confirming to the expectations of society
provides a false sense of security and stability. Forming a genuine sense of individual identity
implies embracing the freedom to choose one‘s life course and values. Fromm (1941)
suggests that standing alone as a unique individual leads to anxiety and a sense of emptiness
that one must overcome by embracing the freedom of individual human existence. However,
in order to assuage this anxiety of freedom, many individuals, and conceivably emerging
adults, unconsciously conform to societal expectation at the expense of forming an individual
sense of identity (Fromm, 1941).
Fromm (1941) emphasizes that conformity encourages pseudo thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors that lead to a pseudo, rather than genuine, self. That is to say, an individual‘s sense
of ethics, their thoughts, and their sense of self conforms to societal expectation rather than
genuine choice, even on an unconscious level. Erikson (1950, 1968) also suggested that
individuals form an identity based upon the crowd in a compromise between genuine identity
and role confusion. Consequently, a risk of conformity in emerging adulthood is forming a
pseudo identity based upon societal and cultural expectations rather than a genuine
exploration of individual freedom (Schwartz et al., 2005). This pseudo identity, Fromm
(1941) suggests, leaves a person feeling empty and anxious, especially when faced with
existential choices common in emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000).
Schwartz et al. (2005) suggest that a lack of self-agency can potentially lead to increased
conformity in emerging adulthood. Individuals who conform tend to utilize default
individualization, that is to say, they rely upon social norms and convention in forming a
personal identity that forgoes genuine exploration and assertion of individual thoughts and
values. Essentially, default individualization is conforming to expectation rather than
embracing the freedom to choose.. In contrast, developmental individualization relies upon
free choice and genuine identity development free from expectation and norms (Schwartz et
al., 2005). Emerging adults high in both self-agency and developmental individualization tend
to have increased self-esteem and ego-strength, virtues necessary for embracing a genuine
identity while facing pressure to conform (Schwartz et al., 2005). In contrast, individuals who
conform tend to have decreased self-esteem and ego-strength, which potentially can lead to
depression, anxiety, and other neurotic symptoms (Schwartz et al., 2005).
One of the risks of living in capitalistic society is embracing materialism at the expense
of individuality. Bambery and Abell (2006) suggest that conforming to societal expectations,
especially materialistic values, can contribute to interpersonal problems and neurotic
character structure. Much like Fromm‘s (1947) marketing character orientation, individuals
become a commodity to be bought and sold rather than unique individuals with genuine
thoughts and feelings. Conforming to materialistic values may lead emerging adults to forgo
 Understanding Neuroticism in Emerging Adulthood 181

genuine and deliberate choice in forming an identity and, instead, form a pseudo identity
based upon materialistic rather than individual, humanistic values (Fromm, 1941, 1947).

Embracing freedom, choice, and identity. If the escape mechanisms are a neurotic
compromise between the freedom to choose and the crisis of identity formation, than a
healthy compromise is to encourage emerging adults to embrace their freedom and make
genuine existential choices concerning their identity, beliefs, and ethics (Fromm, 1941;
Erikson, 1968; Sartre, 1956, 1965). Both Erikson (1950, 1968) and Fromm (1941, 1947,
1955, 1956) believed that connectedness and identity can co-exist, leading one to form a
stable and individual sense of identity while still maintaining a healthy connection to others.
Identity exploration is a normative aspect of emerging adulthood but a profound existential
crisis with many potential solutions and conflicts (Arnett, 2000).
Rather than succumbing to authority, an emerging adult can reflect upon childhood
values and integrate them into a genuine sense of identity. Instead of using self-destructive
behavior to cope with the anxieties of freedom and identity formation, an emerging adult can
embrace this freedom and explore the possibilities and privileges of the psychosocial
moratorium. In spite of the immense temptation to conform blindly to societal values, an
emerging adult can think critically about their place in society and examine their occupational
choices and beliefs to maintain a sense of individual freedom in an increasingly materialistic
society (Arnett, 2000, 2001, 2005; Bambery & Abell, 2006; Erikson, 1950, 1968; Fromm
1941, 1955; Schwartz et al., 2005).

CONCLUSION
Arnett (2000, 2005) suggests that emerging adulthood is an age of possibilities and
discovery in life, one full of conflict and uncertainty, but also full of optimism and
opportunity. Ultimately, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1982) and Fromm (1941, 1947, 1955, 1956)
agree with Freud (1949) that psychological health and well-being (as opposed to neuroticism)
promotes one‘s ability to love and work. By forming a stable, genuine identity emerging
adults can prepare for Erikson‘s (1950, 1968) key conflicts in adulthood, intimacy vs.
isolation and generativity vs. stagnation. At the same time, embracing individuality and
freedom provides a definite and healthy closure to the psychosocial moratorium (and some of
the neurotic anxiety or depression that may develop during this time) and allows emerging
adults move on to the possibilities and opportunities of true adulthood (Arnett, 2000, 2001,
2005; Erikson, 1968; Fromm 1941).

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 183-195 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 9

THERAPY FOR SHAME-BASED PERFECTIONISM

Neil Pembroke
Pastoral Studies, The School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics,
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

ABSTRACT
Psychologists have been aware for a long time of the significant psychological
distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (K. Horney). The tyranny that
perfectionists subject themselves to often leads to self-condemnation and depression.
While perfectionism has been associated with guilt dynamics, the form of perfectionism
that is most frequently discussed by psychologists is connected to self-condemnation for
perceived failures to reach the high standard set for personal achievement. There is
therefore a strong link between perfectionism and inferiority shame. Three approaches to
the treatment of shame-based perfectionism are developed. The first approach is based in
cognitive therapy. It is argued that perfectionism is grounded in a faulty core belief about
the self—namely, ―I am what I achieve.‖ It is further argued that release from
perfectionism requires embrace of the belief that what is ultimately most important is a
personal conviction that one is good, worthy, and loveable.
The second method makes use of strategies developed by John Bradshaw for
accepting and affirming all one‘s sub-selves. Bradshaw‘s approach is critiqued, however,
for the way in which shame-based and guilt-based perfectionism are confused. This
confusion leads to significant deficiencies in his therapeutic system.
The third method is a modification and adaptation of Heinz Kohut‘s strategy of
―mirroring‖ developed for use in work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder.
Therapeutic mirroring is a stance of affirmation, acceptance, and admiration. It is
contended that shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between the
grandiose and idealizing selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation.
It is suggested that a strong therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace
condemnation with mirroring.

Psychologists have been aware for a very long time of the significant psychological
distress associated with ―the tyranny of the shoulds‖ (Horney, 1950, p. 65). The tyranny that
perfectionists subject themselves to leads to self-condemnation and depression (Dunn,
184 Neil Pembroke

Whelton, & Sharpe, 2006; Hawley, Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2006; Yoon & Lau, 2008; Wu &
Wei, 2008). Recent psychological research has produced a refinement in our understanding of
the meaning of perfectionism. It is now viewed as a multidimensional personality construct
whose central feature is ―the disposition to impose a standard that demands flawlessly
executed performance and superior achievements‖ (Dunn, Whelton, & Sharpe 2006, p. 511;
Cf. Flett & Hewitt, 2002).
Perfectionism has a strong link with shame (Sorotzkin, 1985, 1998; Pembroke, 2007). In
order to understand the nature of this connection, it is necessary to note that shame is not a
unitary entity, but rather an umbrella term for a variety of traits and tendencies associated
with feeling inferior or defective. Pattison (2000) is right to suggest that the best way to
approach shame is to adopt ―a kind of family resemblance theory‖ (p. 39). Two important
members of the shame family are inferiority shame and moral shame.1 The latter category is
associated with guilt-based perfectionism. In moral shame, both shame and guilt feelings
feature. Persons afflicted by guilt-based perfectionism have unrealistic expectations
concerning the quality of their moral living; as a result they are constantly assailed by guilt
feelings. The superego has gone into overdrive and these persons pay for it with feelings of
failure and unworthiness.
Shame-based perfectionism, on the other hand, is associated with inferiority shame. Here
the feelings of inadequacy flow from a sense of falling short of a desired level of
achievement. As Tomkins (1987) so neatly expresses it, ―desire has outrun fulfillment‖ (p.
155). Shame-prone perfectionists never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly
high levels of achievement. They strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to
establish a strong sense of self-worth.
Of course, everyone experiences failure in a task or project from time to time.
Perfectionism enters the picture when the sense of failure stems from a tendency to establish
unrealistic expectations for personal achievement and to strain compulsively to meet those
expectations.
I want to suggest that shame-based perfectionism can be traced to a faulty core belief
about the self—namely, ―I am what I achieve.‖ This core belief is fundamentally flawed
because it can never deliver what a human person needs most. I will argue that release from
the grip of perfectionism requires embrace of the belief that what is ultimately most important
is a personal conviction, affirmed by significant others, that one is good, worthy, and
loveable. This conviction refers to personhood and not to achievement. Others will respect
and admire our achievements; they will love and value the persons that we are.
The idea of a core belief comes from the school of cognitive therapy. There are, of
course, various approaches within this school of therapy; I have chosen to use the methods
developed by Aaron Beck and his associates. Their approach is built around three levels of
thinking: automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs, and core beliefs. I will show how shame-
based perfectionism can be challenged through the use of cognitive reframing worksheets.

1
Other members of the shame family are discussed by Karen (1992) and Fowler (1996). Karen suggests four
categories, namely existential shame (the individual suddenly becomes aware of his failings), class shame (the
class that one is born into becomes a source of shame), narcissistic shame (one‘s personal identity is shame-
based), and situational shame (those embarrassing moments—slurping one‘s soup in polite company, tripping
over one‘s shoe-laces at an inopportune moment, a joke falling flat—that come to us all). Moving from
―normal‖ shame to increasingly pathological variations, James Fowler describes five types and degrees. These
are: healthy shame, perfectionist shame, shame due to enforced minority shame (cf. Karen‘s class shame),
toxic shame (cf. Karen‘s narcissistic shame), and shamelessness.
 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 185

Along with this focus on cognition-based treatment, attention will be given to two other
useful approaches to dealing with shame-based perfectionism—namely, that of Heinz Kohut
and John Bradshaw. Kohut (1977, 1984) joins Bradshaw (1988) in concentrating on
acceptance and affirmation. Kohut refers to this process as mirroring. However, there is quite
a bit more psychological sophistication in Kohut‘s approach. He uses psychoanalytic theory
to build a bipolar theory of the Self. According to Kohut, the Self is made up of a grandiose
self and an idealizing self. Shame-based perfectionism is associated with conflict between
these two selves that expresses itself through criticism and condemnation. I suggest that a
very powerful therapeutic intervention is to help the client replace condemnation with
mirroring. This is facilitated through the mirroring stance adopted by the therapist.
Bradshaw (1988) makes the claim that an important step in experiencing liberation and
healing is coming to accept that all one‘s sub-selves are okay. I offer an analysis of his
approach. Such an analysis is useful for two reasons. First, Bradshaw presents a helpful
strategy for dealing with inferiority shame. Second, is the fact that attending to his approach
points up a very common problem—namely the inability to untangle moral shame from
inferiority shame. It is to a discussion of these issues that we now turn.

BRADSHAW AND ACCEPTING OUR INFERIOR SELVES

In his book on the healing of shame, Bradshaw avers that an essential part of the process
is ―making peace with all your villagers.‖ This is his way of saying that all one‘s sub-selves
need to be recognized and accepted. The starting point in this strategy is calling to mind all
the people you dislike (the person you have the strongest negative feelings about goes to the
top of the list). Then you attempt to identify the reprehensible traits in each person. Now you
ask yourself: What is the one trait that brings out feelings of righteousness and goodness most
strongly in me? The final step is to choose the one most despicable trait for each person.
Bradshaw (1988) supplies an example:

(a) Joe Slunk – Grandiose egomaniac

(b) Gwendella Farboduster – Aggressive and rude
(c) Maximillian Quartz – Hypocrite (Pretends to help people; does it for money.)
(d) Farquahr Evenhouser – Uses Christian facade to cover-up phoniness
(e) Rothghar Pieopia – A wimp; has no mind of his own (p. 148).

Bradshaw suggests that each of these personality traits represents a disowned self. He is
obviously working with Jung‘s shadow theory here. Not wanting to integrate a particular
―energy pattern‖ into your Self, says Bradshaw, you externalize it. Healing comes when these
disowned sub-selves are acknowledged and fully embraced.
Bradshaw (1988) goes on to enthusiastically affirm the guiding principle advocated by
Stone and Winkelman (1985):

[A]ll of our parts are okay. Nothing could be more affirming and less shaming. Every
aspect of every person is crucial for wholeness and completeness. There is no law which says
that one part is better than another part. Our consciousness with its many selves needs to
operate on principles of social equality and democracy (p. 145; emphasis in the original).
186 Neil Pembroke

Is it really true to say that all our sub-selves are ―okay‖? If a person has a dark self that is
hurting both him- or herself and those around him or her, surely this is not okay. A distinction
between morally neutral and morally relevant selves is important if we are to get beyond
blanket statements about the acceptability of every part of the Self. This distinction is directly
related to the difference between inferiority shame and moral shame. All sub-selves
associated with instances of inferiority shame are certainly okay; sub-selves linked to moral
failures are not. Bradshaw seems totally unaware of this fact.
At this point, some might wonder if I am guilty of the kind of moralizing that adds to the
burden of shame rather than reducing it. In response to this anticipated criticism, I want to
point out that there is an important difference between accepting a sub-self on the one hand,
and declaring that it is acceptable on the other. Bradshaw is saying that all our sub-selves are
acceptable; I think this is wrong. If I have a sub-self that expresses itself through, say,
malicious gossip, that self is not acceptable. However, I do need to accept it even as I engage
in the difficult task of reforming it. Self-loathing is a significant cause of emotional distress; it
is important therefore to love oneself despite one‘s failings. Having offered this caveat, let‘s
proceed to the task of distinguishing morally neutral from morally relevant selves.

Morally Relevant Selves

To help us in this task, I propose three places in which we can locate the variety of selves
that we all live with: competence, spirituality, and personality. This list is not intended to be
exhaustive; however, it will suffice to indicate the process of distinguishing morally relevant
selves from morally neutral ones.
Competence, firstly, refers to talents, abilities and achievements. We all have our
strengths, and we all struggle in certain areas. Some of us are great with language, but
anything to do with mathematics—or even more frightening, computers—leaves us feeling
totally incompetent. Others of us revel in figures and problem-solving, but unravel when we
are anywhere near a kitchen. Still others excel on the sports field and are good with most
intellectual tasks, but are all ―fingers and thumbs‖ when it comes to home maintenance. So
there are mathematical selves, computer selves, linguistic selves, culinary selves, sporting
selves, and ―handy‖ selves—to nominate just a few areas in which some people are
particularly competent. Clearly, we are in an area that is morally neutral. If I burn the roast I
have not committed a moral transgression. The fact that I can never remember my eight times
table should not be counted against me as sin. We all have our areas of gifting, and we all
have areas that are weak. There is no question of interpreting this fact in a moral context.
The second category, spirituality, is also morally neutral. Those who embrace the
spiritual life express their spirituality in different ways. There are many forms of positive
spirituality on offer today. Some of these a particular individual will connect strongly with,
and others less so. It may be, for example, that this individual—call her Jenny—has adopted
an activist spirituality; she likes to get to work on projects aimed at promoting peace and
justice in the world. Others may feel drawn to a quieter, more contemplative, approach to the
spiritual life. Still others will feel more at home with a charismatic spirituality. There is no
moral failure for Jenny associated with the fact that her spirituality is (mostly) of the activist
variety. She is perfectly justified in embracing her activist self, just as another person is
perfectly justified in embracing his contemplative self, and another her Pentecostal self.
 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 187

To be sure, it might be that this activist for peace and justice is lazy and undisciplined in
her spiritual life. At that point a moral concern seems to arise. But the lack of discipline is
almost certainly a factor in other areas of her life. That is, it is a personality trait and we have
entered our third and final area.
Under the rubric of personality I include the traits, attitudes and behaviors that are
defining of one‘s personhood. There are introverts and extroverts, passive aggressives and
active aggressives, optimists and pessimists, liberals and conservatives, the patient and the
impatient, the hard-working and the slothful, the rash and the prudent, the intimate and the
distant, the passionate and the ―cool,‖ the self-aware and the unaware, and so on.
Personality traits become especially important in the context of relationships. Our style of
relating is determined by our personality. Factors such as the way we deal with anger, our
capacity for openness and honesty, our negotiating style, the level of our self-esteem, and our
capacity for intimacy are highly significant in the context of interpersonal life. It will be
evident that in discussing personality traits and relationality we have entered a morally
relevant zone. Our personal failings cause harm not only to ourselves, but also to relationships
and to the people involved in those relationships. To acknowledge those sub-selves that wreak
havoc in our relationships and to take action on them is a moral imperative.

Right Strategy, Wrong Context

I would enthusiastically endorse Bradshaw‘s approach if he concentrated on inferiority

shame. If a person is to transcend her feelings of inferiority, it is very important for her to
view all her non-moral inferior sub-selves as okay. She needs to be able to feel that it‘s okay
that she is not amongst the elite in her chosen profession (let‘s say she‘s an accountant). If she
enjoys her work, does her best, and her output is generally good (without being great), she is
entitled to feel pleased and satisfied. There will likely be occasions when she makes mistakes;
some of them may even be big ones. Her tendency at those moments is to rush to the
conclusion that she is hopeless, a loser. She needs to resist this temptation. It‘s okay to be a
good accountant who sometimes makes mistakes. She needs to come to the point, too, of
accepting that it‘s okay that she is not the greatest tennis player to have ever graced the
courts. She hits her fair share of good shots and she can be satisfied with that. On the other
hand, she is great at gardening and pottery. What Bradshaw helpfully reminds us is that
healing inferiority shame requires a capacity to wholeheartedly accept and endorse all of
one‘s sub-selves.
If the focus is on inferiority shame, Bradshaw is right to advocate ―making peace with
our villagers.‖ The problem is that the ―villagers‖ that he lists suffer from moral flaws such as
aggression and rudeness, hypocrisy, and egotism. It is therefore not a matter of simply
declaring that these traits are okay; one also needs a commitment to reform them if one is to
be morally responsible. In a word, it‘s the right strategy, but the wrong context.
188 Neil Pembroke

GUILT-BASED AND SHAME-BASED PERFECTIONISM

The discussion of Bradshaw‘s approach indicates how easy it is to tangle up guilt-based
and shame-based perfectionism. In order to help us separate the two, we need to attend to the
differences between guilt and shame (recognizing, of course, that in relation to moral shame
there is an area of overlap). Guilt is commonly distinguished from shame through a reference
to the global scope of the latter (cf. Wurmser, 1987). Guilt can be localized, but shame affects
the whole person. That is, whereas I do bad things that cause me to feel guilty, I am my
shame. I feel guilty when I have morally transgressed, and what I need in order to feel better
is forgiveness. I have experienced a temporary drop in my self-esteem due to the feeling that I
have acted badly. For the person prone to shame, however, low self-esteem is an on-going
and pervasive problem. This is so because I am the problem. I feel inferior, inadequate, and
virtually worthless. My need is not for forgiveness but rather for love, affirmation and
acceptance. Helen Block Lewis brings out these distinctions very clearly when she compares
the self-reproaches in guilty thinking with those of ashamed thinking:

[Guilt-laden cognitions run thus:] ―How could I have done that; what an injurious thing
to have done; how I hurt so-and-so, what a moral lapse that act was; what will become of that
or of him, now that I have neglected to do it, or injured him. How should I be punished or
make amends? Mea culpa!‖ Simultaneously, ashamed ideation says: ―how could I have done
that; what an idiot I am—how humiliating; what a fool, what an uncontrolled person—how
mortifying; how unlike so-and-so, who does not do such things; how awful and worthless I
am. Shame!‖ (Lewis, 1971, p. 36; emphasis in the original)

With this information before us, it is quite easy to describe guilt-based perfectionism.
Those who suffer from this affliction are constantly setting their goals for good and right
living at an unrealistically high level. They are acutely aware of the need to express love,
integrity, and justice in order to actualize the good. If they could be content with
improvement in striving after the ideal, all would be well. But their problem is that they want
perfection. No matter what level of moral living they reach, it is never good enough. They
show compassion to others when they fail, but sadly they hold it back from themselves.
Shame-based perfectionism, on the other hand, is associated with inferiority shame. We
are confronted with our limitations quite early in life. It is when we begin school that we
become especially aware of the areas in which we are inferior, as Erikson (1968) has
observed. Erikson (1968) points to the fact that a tendency in some men (and today, of course,
we would include a growing number of women in this) to define identity in terms of work and
achievements has its origin in a certain form of education. An educational philosophy with
little or no appreciation for the importance of the development of the whole person will
contribute to a sense of identity shaped around the thought, ―I am what I can learn to make
work‖ (Erikson, 1968, p. 127).
Whereas guilt-based perfectionism is associated with moral improvement, shame-based
perfectionism is task-oriented and focused on achievement. In all the various tasks of life
there is scope for setting impossibly high standards. Perfectionism should, however, be
distinguished from striving for excellence (Cf. Au & Cannon, 1992). Working diligently on
the projects that we have chosen for ourselves is appropriate and it is not incompatible with
good mental health. We do need to check, however, whether or not we can still feel satisfied
 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 189

with our efforts despite some slip-ups. If this is the case, we are being realistic. Shame-prone
perfectionists, on the other hand, never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly
high levels of achievement. They strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to
establish a strong sense of self-worth. It is a desire to overcome feelings of inferiority and
inadequacy rather than a passion for excellence that primarily drives their striving.
The construction of the self developed by Heinz Kohut is helpful in understanding
shame-based perfectionism. It is to a discussion of his approach that we now turn.

THE BIPOLAR SELF

Kohut (1977) posits a bipolar self. This self is made up of a ―grandiose self‖ and an
―idealizing self.‖ What Kohut (1977, p. 171) calls the bipolar self accounts for two basic
psychological functions: healthy self-assertiveness in relation to the mother (usually) who
―mirrors‖ it, reflects it back, and affirming and healthy admiration for the father (usually).
Thus it is possible, theorizes Kohut, to identify a grandiose self that seeks admiration and
approval, and an idealizing self that aims at identification with an admired other. The
grandiose self wants to have its talents, abilities and achievements affirmed and valued. The
idealizing self seeks to merge with the significant other whose ideals, goals and ambitions are
valued. When these two basic psychological needs for admiration and merger are fulfilled in
infantile development, a ―cohesive self‖ emerges. Put simply, what a child needs most is to
admire and to be admired. If these needs are met through ―good enough parenting,‖ the self
will achieve wholeness or cohesion. When, on the other hand, there are extreme and regular
failures in nurturing the two selves, a tendency to shame results.

Mirroring as an Antidote to Shame-Based Perfectionism

Kohut (1977, 1978, 1984) describes the impact of the trouble in the tiny community
within the Self through references to terms such as inferiority feelings, embarrassment, and
low self-esteem. Though he does not use the actual word shame very often, his work is filled
with these cognate terms (cf. Morrison, 1986). Now either the grandiose or the idealizing self
may experience shame, depending on the circumstances (cf. Capps, 1993). A faux pas is an
example of the grandiose self experiencing shame. A speaker, for instance, has been talking
himself up in the course of his address, and then suffers the embarrassment in the question
time of having some glaring errors highlighted.
When, on the other hand, a person‘s actual performance is judged to be below the
standard established as ideal, the idealizing self is the locus of shame. A person is asked to
make an important presentation at work. She prepares long and hard because she wants her
work to be well received. As she is giving her presentation, though, she senses that she is
missing the target. There is a gap between the ideal she has set and her actual performance.
Whether it is the grandiose or the idealizing self that experiences shame, the end result is
the same: an experience of painful disharmony in the relationship between the two selves.
The grandiose self is rejecting of the idealizing self, and vice versa. What is required is
reconciliation between the two selves. The trouble comes because each self tends to be overly
190 Neil Pembroke

critical and harsh in relation to the other. Interventions by the therapist need to be directed at
helping the client to establish a mirroring relationship between her or his two selves. In this
positive relationship, the selves value and affirm each other rather than constantly being
critical and condemning.
Kohut (1977, 1984) avers that positive mirroring by the therapist (i.e. affirming,
approving, and admiring) will faciliatate the establishment of a mirroring relationship
between the two selves. The central element in this process he calls transmuting
internalization. Mirroring is expressed through empathic attunement. The therapist must be
able to consistently think and feel herself into the inner world of experience of her client in
order to communicate understanding and acceptance. Kohut (1984, pp. 98-99) provides the
outline of the healing process: (1) Optimal frustration in the mirror transference resulting
from inevitable small-scale empathic failures leads to (2) transmuting internalization, which
results in (3) the laying down of the missing psychological structure. When the mental
structure is built up the self becomes more cohesive, and a more cohesive self allows for self-
esteem regulation in the face of one‘s own failures and the assaults of others. A stronger,
more integrated self also means that there is relative harmony between its grandiose and
idealizing sectors.
We have been discussing approaches to helping people who suffer through constant and
intense warfare between their grandiose and idealizing selves. I contend that this type of
mental dysfunction has its source in the core belief that ―I am what I achieve.‖ As I indicated
above, the notion of core beliefs comes from cognitive therapy. It is to the issue of using this
form of therapy to help people overcome shame-based perfectionism that we now turn.

Cognitive Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism

There are, of course, a number of different approaches to cognitive therapy. I‘ve selected
the model developed by Aaron Beck and his associates. The first task is to present some of
the fundamental elements in their system. This is followed by a description of how cognitive
reframing worksheets can be used to help a person transcend her or his shame-based
perfectionism.

Three Levels of Cognitive Dysfunction

Beck‘s daughter, Judith, lists common cognitive distortions that lead to anxiety and
depression (my illustrations):

(1) All-or-nothing Thinking. Viewing a situation at its extremes rather than along a
continuum: ―If I‘m not perfect in my parenting, I‘m a bad Mom/Dad .‖
(2) Catastrophizing. You tend to always see disaster: ―I‘ve been messing up at work
lately; I‘m on a downward spiral.‖
(3) Discounting the Positive. You find ways to discredit your successes: ―Yeah okay,
I‘m good at home maintenance jobs, but all that takes is a bit of common sense.‖
 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 191

(4) Emotional Reasoning. You think something must be true because you ―feel‖ it
strongly: ―Others seem to rate me as competent in my job, but I still feel like I‘m not
making the grade.‖
(5) Labelling. You define yourself through a negative category, discounting evidence to
the contrary: ―I‘m a failure.‖
(6) Magnification/Minimization. When you evaluate yourself or a situation, you magnify
the negative and/or minimize the positive: ―Okay, it might be only one low grade, but
it proves that I‘m not really much good after all.‖ Or, ―I expected a good mark from
her; she‘s a soft assessor.‖
(7) Mind Reading. You believe that you know what others are thinking: ―My boss wasn‘t
very friendly during the coffee break this morning. That confirms my suspicions that
she isn‘t happy with my work.‖
(8) Overgeneralization. You make a sweeping negative judgement based on one bad
experience: ―I was tense and muffed a few of the lines in my talk; I don‘t have what
it takes to be good at public speaking.‖
(9) Personalization. You attribute the negative behavior of others to a personal lack or
failing: A friend is sounding a little emotionally flat on the telephone, and you
assume it‘s because he‘s disappointed with you.
(10) “Should” and “Must” Statements. You have a rigid understanding of how you
should think and act: ―I must always be nice in my relations with others, no matter
what.‖ (Beck, 1995, p. 119).

Aaron Beck started with the notion of automatic thoughts that run through our heads
(Beck, 1976), but later expanded his understanding of the cognitive model to include
intermediate beliefs and core beliefs. The thoughts that flash through a person‘s mind in any
given situation, shaping her feelings and her actions, flow from core and intermediate beliefs.
Judith Beck defines the three components in the cognitive model in this way:

Core beliefs are the most fundamental level of belief; they are global, rigid, and
overgeneralized. Automatic thoughts, the actual words or images that go through a person‘s
mind, are situation specific and may be considered the most superficial level of
cognition...Core beliefs influence the development of an intermediate class of beliefs which
consist of (often unarticulated) attitudes, rules, and assumptions (Beck, 1995, p. 16).

The relationship between the three dimensions in the cognitive process may be illustrated
with reference to a person who has a propensity for shame. He attempts to compensate for his
inferiority feelings by entertaining others. His humor is often inappropriate and not
particularly funny. The core belief that he operates out of is, ―I‘m inferior.‖ At the
intermediate level, there is the attitude, ―Other people tend not to like me‖; the rule, ―I must
use humor to impress others‖; and the assumption: ―Humor is necessary if I‘m to keep the
attention of others.‖ With these beliefs operating, when he finds himself in a situation of
making a new acquaintance, the automatic thought flashes through his head, ―She probably
won‘t like me but my only chance is to impress her with my wit.‖
192 Neil Pembroke

Cognitive Reframing Worksheets

Cognitive reframing worksheets can be used to assist a client in transcending his or her
shame-based perfectionism. They operate at the upper two levels of cognition. Consider the
following scenario. John is an executive in an electronics company. He was appointed as
chair of one the company‘s task groups six months ago. During this time, John has been
attempting to deal with two strong co-workers who exercise a disproportionate influence on
the group. At a meeting a held a couple of days ago, he was feeling a little tired and harried,
and as a consequence he wasn‘t as sharp as he usually is. His interventions from the chair
were not especially well timed. Moreover, they were wide of the mark and consequently
ineffective in restraining the power brokers and the meeting moved with them in a direction
that John felt was unhelpful. On the morning after he is kicking himself. He realizes that he
let the meeting get away from him and he feels like a total failure.
John has a tendency to shame. Though he is a competent person, he is plagued by
feelings of inferiority and inadequacy. John works extremely hard and sets himself very high
standards. His cover story is that he is striving for excellence in all that he does, and
especially in his job. If you asked him about his tendency to depression, he would say
something like this, ―Of course I get disappointed with myself sometimes. I set the bar high
and when I don‘t quite make it I feel a bit down. That‘s natural isn‘t it?‖ What is really going
on, though, is that John suffers from perfectionism. He needs his achievements in life to boost
his self-esteem and self-confidence. But when he reaches a particular goal that he has set for
himself he is disappointed with what is only a slight and temporary improvement in his self-
esteem. Consequently, he needs to keep lifting the bar higher. His pattern is to push harder
and harder in order to feel better about himself. Tragically, he is tying his self-worth to a
disproportionate degree to his level of skill and effectiveness in the tasks he performs.
John is trapped in this destructive pattern. Sadly, the only story that is available to him is
the one that tells him that if only he can lift his level of achievement he will find the inner
peace and positive self-esteem that have so far eluded him.
The thought that he can‘t keep going the way this way has been at the forefront of John‘s
mind for quite a long time. Two months ago he finally decided to take positive action; he
made an appointment to see a psychotherapist. This therapist takes a cognitive reframing
approach, and has been educating John in the use of belief modification. After a recent
session, John decided to use his disappointing experience in the meeting as a focus for
cognitive reframing. He works at the level of both intermediate and core belief. His
worksheets are set out below.
Through his reflections, John discovers that operating at a level higher than the belief ―I
am a failure as a leader‖ is the core belief ―I am what I achieve.‖ He realizes that he is
striving for perfection in a misguided attempt to boost his sense of self-worth. A deep
realization dawns that what he really needs is an inner conviction that he is right, good, and
full of quality. John is aware that this affirmation can only come through relationship. He
knows that he can look to friends and family for confirmation of his value as a person. In
reviewing the worksheets with John, his therapist affirms the fact that John is learning to the
value in ―uselessness.‖ She explains that a person is useless in the sense that those who love
him affirm him as full of worth and quality quite apart from anything he may achieve (Cf.
Jones, 1999).
 Therapy for Shame-Based Perfectionism 193

Through using these worksheets, John is able over time to reframe his intermediate and
core beliefs. As his core cognitions become healthier, more realistic, his perfectionism is
mitigated. But, of course, it is an ongoing struggle and living in a more wholesome way will
not come easily. Mayer (1999) uses the telling expression, ―recovering perfectionists.‖
―[L]ike the alcoholic—who, once aware of his or her problem, can maintain sobriety only by
admitting that he or she is never recovered but always working on it—the past perfectionist is
one who constantly feels pulled to slip back into the demanding, overly conscientious way of
thinking and behavior that makes life miserable but so well done‖ (Mayer, 1999, p. 6). The
recovering perfectionist needs to stick at the task of reframing his or her core cognitions to
avoid the pull back into destructive patterns.

John’s Intermediate Belief Worksheet

Situation Attitudes, Rules, and The Intermediate Adaptive Response Reframed

Assumptions
I wasn‘t able to Attitude: I messed I‘m a failure as a
effectively manage up; I really don‘t have leader.
the meeting what it takes to be a
yesterday. My leader.
interventions were
ill timed and wide Rules:
of the mark. Each and every time I
lead a meeting I must
operate at maximum
competency.
Assumption: The
fact that I didn‘t
handle the meeting
very well means that
I‘m a failure.
Belief Intermediate
Belief
Cognitive Distortions: I am an effective
Over-generalization. leader who
One lapse indicates total sometimes makes
failure in leadership. mistakes.
All-or-nothing thinking.
I am either a complete
success or a complete
failure.
Realistic Responses
One lapse does not
make me a failure.
To have an off day now
and then is to be human.
Feedback from others
indicates that I have
good leadership skills.

John‟s Core Belief Worksheet

Old core belief: I am what I achieve.

How much do I believe the old core belief at the moment? 80%
New belief: Before any achievement, I am worthy.
How much do I believe the new belief at the moment? 40%

Evidence that contradicts old Evidence that supports new belief

core belief and supports new belief
I work harder and harder; I achieve certain goals
that seemed so significant; and yet I still feel
unworthy.
I never feel satisfied with myself. I perform my
tasks well, but I know that I could have done
better. ―Good‖ is not good enough for me.
When I am pushing myself I tell myself that I will
celebrate when the task is finished. But after all the
effort, I‘m not as happy as I thought I would be. It
seems like I‘m looking in the wrong place.
I‘m much more than my talents and skills. My sense of
worth as a person does not depend on achieving at a
high level. Achievements are satisfying, but it‘s deadly
to build one‘s sense of self on them.
I know that when it‘s all said and done, the relationships
I have with my wife and kids, and with my good friends,
are what really count.
Achievements at work are important, but what is more
important is simply to know that I am loved and
accepted by those closest to me.
194 Neil Pembroke

CONCLUSION
Shame-based perfectionism is a significant problem today. Shame-prone perfectionists
never feel satisfied because they are striving for impossibly high levels of achievement. They
strive for a flawless performance in a desperate attempt to establish a strong sense of self-
worth.
Useful approaches to working with shame-prone persons have been developed by
Bradshaw and Kohut. These strategies can be adapted for work with people suffering from
shame-based perfectionism. Perfectionists are not satisfied with the fact that some of their
sub-selves are capable of excellence; they want all of them to be great. An adapted version of
Bradshaw‘s ―making peace with your villagers‖ technique can be used to help a perfectionist
accept and affirm all of her or his sub-selves.
In the framework of self psychology, the shame-prone perfectionist suffers through the
condemnatory stances that the idealizing and grandiose selves adopt in relation to each other.
A mirroring stance in therapy as advocated by Kohut leads to an internalization process in the
client, which in turn becomes the basis for positive mirroring between the two selves.
In the perspective of cognitive therapy, shame-based perfectionism is linked to the core
belief, ―I am what I achieve.‖ Belief modification sheets can be used to in reframing this
faulty core philosophy. A more positive core belief is, ―Before any achievement, I am
worthy.‖
These three approaches are complementary. Each one addresses a key area of
dysfunction. Positive mirroring is vitally important in therapeutic work with shame-prone
personalities; it is not optional. The decision to concentrate on cognitive reframing or on
affirming activities as developed by Bradshaw and others is a matter of personal inclination
and choice.

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 197-210 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 10

INCREASING THE PREDICTIVE UTILITY OF

NEUROTICISM FOR HEALTH BEHAVIORS: THE ROLE
OF IMPLICIT NEUROTICISM

Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

University of Melbourne, Australia

ABSTRACT
There is considerable evidence that neuroticism is associated with self-reported
physical health, although the exact mechanisms involved are not clear. However, self-
reports of neuroticism may be distorted by concerns about social desirability and/or lack
of awareness, thus potentially biasing its correlations with health behaviors. In this
chapter, we first review issues concerning the explicit (self-report) measurement of
neuroticism. We then review recent research which indicates that explicit and implicit
measures of neuroticism are at best weakly related. Discussion then focuses on how
implicitly assessing neuroticism might enhance our understanding its associations with
outcome variables, including health behaviors. This discussion also considers the
characteristics of two related implicit measures, the Implicit Association Task (IAT;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Go/No-go Association Test (GNAT;
Nosek & Banaji, 2000). Preliminary evidence is presented that suggests that the GNAT
may be a more appropriate measure than the IAT. We present evidence from two large
undergraduate samples that GNAT-assessed neuroticism predicts self-reported health
behaviors over and above self-reported neuroticism. The chapter closes with the
suggestion that measuring neuroticism both implicitly and explicitly is a promising
research strategy for understanding its associations with other variables.

INTRODUCTION
The utility of personality as a construct is premised on its ability to help us understand
―what people want, say, do, feel, and believe‖ (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2005, p. 402). In
particular, personality variables should help us to understand important life outcomes, such as
198 Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

health and physical well-being. The role personality plays in health has been a major topic of
investigation over the last several decades (Gunnarsson, Gustavsson, Tengström, Franck, &
Fahlke, 2008). Research has demonstrated that not only are personality traits related to a
range of illnesses, such as asthma, heart disease, and hypertension (e.g., Booth-Kewley &
Friedman, 1987; Räikkönen, Matthews, Flory, Owens, & Gump, 1999), but also they are
important predictors of mortality (e.g., Friedman, Tucker, Tomlinson-Keasey, Schwartz,
Wingard, & Criqui, 1993; Maier & Smith, 1999).
Of the Big Five personality factors, there is substantial evidence that neuroticism is
associated with reduced longevity (e.g., Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007;
Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2007), poorer mental health (e.g., Kressin, Spiro, &
Skinner, 2000), more physical symptoms (e.g., Feldman, Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, & Gwaltney,
1999; Larsen, 1992), and lower ratings of subjective global health (e.g., Benyamini, Idler,
Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2000; Moor, Zimprich, Schmitt, & Kliegel, 2006). However, the
evidence for the role of neuroticism in ill health is mixed (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005).
For example, Smith and Spiro (2002) noted that some studies have found links between
neuroticism and disease (e.g., Jones, Franks, & Ingram, 1997) whereas others have not (e.g.,
Zonderman, Costa, & McCrae, 1989).
Any associations between neuroticism and negative health outcomes occur, in part,
because those higher in this trait experience more negative affect and perceived stress (e.g.,
Mroczek & Almeida, 2004; Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998; Watson & Clark, 1994), both of
which are associated with physiological effects known to be related to poorer health (e.g., the
production of higher levels of cortisol or inflammatory cytokines; Segerstrom, 2000;
Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). However, these associations are also likely to be a result of those
higher in neuroticism engaging in behaviors associated with poorer health (Mroczek, Spiro, &
Turiano, 2009). For example, cigarette smoking (e.g., Goodwin & Hamilton, 2002; Saklofske,
Austin, Galloway, & Davidson, 2007) and alcohol use (e.g., Grekin, Sher, & Wood, 2006;
Read & O‘Connor, 2006) are associated with neuroticism and these behaviors partially
moderate the factor‘s association with mortality (Mroczek et al., 2009). Finally, neuroticism
is negatively associated with reporting that one engages in regular exercise (e.g., Courneya &
Hellsten, 1998; Saklofske, Austin, Rohr, & Andrews, 2007).
Results such as these have led some to suggest that interventions designed to change
health-damaging behaviors should target those high in neuroticism (e.g., Mroczek et al.,
2009). However, if interventions are to be maximally effective, it is important that these
individuals are identified through the use of appropriate measures of the trait.

Self-Report Measurement of Neuroticism

Most research examining the impact of neuroticism on health behavior (and other
behaviors) has used self-report measures to assess this trait. A number of these measures
exist. These include the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975)
and the NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the
International Personality Inventory Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999), which both measure variants
of the Five Factor Model of Personality (FFM; McCrae & John, 1992). Most research has
used such FFM measures (e.g., Artistico, Baldassarri, Lauriola, & Laicardi, 2000; Trobst,
Herbst, Masters, & Costa; 2002; Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002), because this model has
 Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for Health Behaviors 199

provided a ―much needed organization to the study of personality and health‖ (Smith & Spiro,
2002, p. 367).
The use of self-report measures of neuroticism (and other factors) is based on two
assumptions. First, individuals must be aware of how neurotic they are (i.e., they have access
to introspective access to information about their levels of neuroticism). Second, individuals
must being willing to accurately report this information. If these assumptions are not met,
self-report measures may not accurately identify those who are high on this factor and who,
thus, may benefit from targeted interventions designed to change behavior.

Introspective Access to Neuroticism

The issue of whether individuals have access to information about their personality has a
long history in psychology. Projective techniques, such as the Rorschach Inkblot Test and the
Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1938), are based on the assumption that individuals
have limited access to information about their personality. Researchers who favor the use of
these techniques, and those who do not use projective tests but employ more recently
developed measurement tools (e.g., Bing, LeBreton, Davison, Migetz, & James, 2007;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), argue that individuals have different types of information about
their personality which are acquired in different ways and become accessible as a result of
different processes. Some information is acquired over lengthy periods of time, is relatively
stable (i.e., resistant to change), and is elicited by effortless automatic processes initiated by a
triggering stimulus. This type of information, known as implicit cognition (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995), is presumed to exist outside conscious awareness and, thus, is inaccessible
through introspection. Other information is learned relatively quickly, is relatively malleable,
and is elicited by deliberative, controlled processes. Individuals are consciously aware of this
information, known as explicit cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This information is
accessible through introspection and forms the basis of self-reports.
The nature of the relationship between implicit and explicit cognitions has been the
subject of some disagreement among psychologists. Some propose that they are distinct (i.e.,
the full dissociation model) and argue that to fully understand how personality has an impact
on behavior it is essential that both types of cognition be assessed (e.g., Bing et al., 2007:
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Moreover, as implicit cognitions are unavailable to conscious
awareness, these must be measured indirectly (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These indirect
measures (hereafter referred to as implicit measures) are those that ―neither inform the subject
of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerning it‖ (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995,
p. 5).1
A related model is that which proposes that there are two independent representations of
constructs; those which are ―old‖ and are activated automatically and those that are ―new‖
and require cognitive effort to retrieve them from memory (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, &
Schooler, 2000). However, this model argues that at times self-reports draw on ―old‖
representations, specifically when individuals lack the cognitive capacity to engage in
deliberative processing or the motivation to engage in such processing. In contrast, when
deliberative processing occurs, self-reports draw on the ―new‖ representations.

1
Relevant indirect methods or implicit measures are discussed below.
200 Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

Another alternative is that of Smith and DeCoster (2000). They proposed that two
memory systems underpin implicit and explicit processing; one that slowly learns general
regularities and one that quickly forms new associations between unique or novel events.
Automatic or implicit processing involves the ―slow‖ system while conscious processing
involves both. Thus, implicit personality measures assess associations learned over long
periods whereas explicit measures (i.e., self-reports) assess both these older associations and
more recently learned information.
The final alternative is a model that assumes that individuals have access to all
information about their personality and, therefore, are capable of reporting it. However,
individuals may at times be reluctant to report this information. Such an approach is
embodied in Fazio‘s (1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) MODE model of attitudes. This
model assumes that attitudes and, by implication, personality are available to introspection.
However, as self-report measures involve verbal responses, individuals can modify these
responses to present a view of the self that is consistent with a particular self-presentation
goal (Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007).
Of these models, the last three imply that self-report (explicit) and implicit measures of
neuroticism should be, at least, weakly related. Furthermore, they suggest that particular self-
presentation goals or other factors that lead individuals to either modify self-reports or engage
in deliberative processing should moderate these associations. Thus, correlations between
implicit and explicit assessments should be relatively weak for personality characteristics that
are socially sensitive. Similarly, self-reports made under time pressure or cognitive load (i.e.,
those which are more spontaneous) should be more strongly associated with implicit
measures than those not made under these conditions.
Two published studies have examined the relationships between implicitly- and
explicitly-assessed neuroticism (hereafter referred to as implicit and explicit neuroticism).
Steffens and Schulze König (2006) found that these measures were weakly related (r (89) =
.24, p < .05). Similarly, Boldero, Rawlings, and Haslam (2007, Study 2) found a weak
positive correlation that approached significance (r (169) = .16, p < .10). Furthermore, in two
recent studies using relatively large samples of undergraduate students (N = 496 & N = 322,
respectively), we found that implicit and explicit neuroticism are significantly related, albeit
weakly (r = .12 & .17, respectively).
Recent studies have helped to clarify why implicit and explicit measures often have such
modest correlations. A meta-analysis of studies using implicit and explicit measures of a
range of constructs found no evidence that the extent to which the construct is more or less
socially desirable moderates their relationship whereas the extent to which self-reports are
made spontaneously does (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005a).
However, motivation to control prejudiced reactions moderates the associations between
implicitly- and explicitly-assessed attitudes to ethnic groups (Hofmann, Gschwendner, &
Schmitt, 2005b). Further, Olson et al. (2007) found that discrepancies between implicit and
explicit self-esteem were a result of reporting tendencies on the explicit measure. Those who
had relatively high explicit self-esteem and relatively low implicit self-esteem reported
having a self-aggrandizing self-presentation style (Study 1). Moreover, explicit and implicit
self-esteem corresponded for those individuals who were instructed to be honest when
completing the explicit measure whereas they did not for those not given this instruction.
Taken together, these results clearly indicate that implicit and explicit measures of
neuroticism are related in certain circumstances, contrary to models that propose a complete
 Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for Health Behaviors 201

dissociation between implicit and explicit cognition (e.g., Bing et al., 2007). However, study
findings do not allow discrimination between the alternative models. It is possible that
individuals have two different types of information about their personality, that which is ―old‖
and that which is ―new‖, and that ―old‖ information either influences only spontaneous self-
reports (Wilson et al., 2000) or has an influence on all self-reports (Smith & DeCoster, 2002).
Alternatively, individuals may have only one source of information and self-reports of this
information may be subject to modification when individuals have particular self-related
goals (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).

When Might Individuals Not Be Willing to Accurately Self-Report

Neuroticism?

The work reviewed above implies that explicit and implicit measures of neuroticism may
diverge and that one reason for this may be that self-reports are sometimes modified. As
laypeople evaluate traits associated with neuroticism negatively (Haslam, Bain, & Neal,
2004), it is possible that goals such as avoiding negative evaluations and presenting a socially
desirable face to the world bias self-reports of this factor (e.g., Cronbach, 1990; Orne, 1962;
Rosenberg, 1969).
First, evaluation apprehension effects occur for self-reports. Individuals tend to
exaggerate the extent to which they possess positive qualities while downplaying the extent to
which they possess negative ones (Paulhus, 2002), particularly in contexts where the
outcomes associated with these self-reports are important (e.g., when completing inventories
on which job selection may be based). Moreover, this occurs for self-report measures of the
FFM (e.g., Furnham, 1997).
Second, faking is possible. Those instructed to ―fake good‖ a Big Five measure of
neuroticism score higher on emotional stability (i.e., the positive pole of the neuroticism
dimension) than those not instructed to do so (Hirsh & Peterson, 2008). A recent meta-
analysis conducted in the personnel selection literature demonstrated that applicants
consistently report lower levels of neuroticism than non-applicants (Birkeland, Manson,
Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006).
It has been argued that indices of socially desirable responding which ―assess‖
individuals‘ tendencies to ―fake‖ their responses (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998) could be used
to ―correct‖ for this tendency. Indeed, personality test users in organizational psychology
favor the use of corrections for faking (e.g., Goffin & Christiansen, 2003). However, there is
evidence that such corrections do not necessarily increase the validity of responses on
personality inventories (e.g., Pauls & Stemmler, 2003; Reid-Seiser & Fritzsche, 2001) nor do
corrected scores approximate ―honest‖ scores (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999).
Rather than attempting to correct for the impact of social desirability on responses,
another strategy may be to use a neuroticism measure that is relatively resistant to faking. For
example, Stark, Chernysenko, Chan, Lee, and Drasgow (2001) argued that researchers
―should begin to consider alternative models or methods of test construction that could be
employed to develop personality measures that are less susceptible to faking than the
currently used inventories‖ (p. 592); a suggestion that is not new (see, for example, Cattell &
Warburton, 1967).
202 Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

Implicit Measures of Neuroticism as “Faking-Resistant” Measures

Within the literature examining implicit cognition, it is assumed that personality is ―an
associative network containing all associations of the concept of self with attribute concepts
describing one‘s personality‖ (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002, p. 381). Further, by using
tasks that assess the extent to which people automatically associate appropriate trait terms
with themselves, these tasks are relatively resistant to distortions associated with faking (e.g.,
Nosek, 2005). Thus, it is possible that they provide ―faking-resistant‖ measures of
neuroticism. We now consider whether the implicit measures used by Steffens and Schulze
König (2006) and Boldero et al. (2007) are resistant to attempts to present the self in some
particular way.
Steffens and Schulze König (2006) used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to assess neuroticism. This task, which is the most commonly
used implicit measure of personality, assesses relative associations between two contrasted
categories (e.g., self vs. others and neuroticism vs. emotional stability) by comparing
response times in two combined discrimination tasks. Individuals are required to sort target
items which represent each of the four concepts using two responses. One response is
assigned to a particular pairing of the two categories (e.g., self and neuroticism) and the other
to the other pairing (e.g., others and emotional stability) on one block of trials. In a
subsequent block, the response assignment is reversed. As a result, in a neuroticism IAT, on
one block of trials (i.e., the compatible block) words representing the self (e.g., ―me‖) are
paired with words representing neuroticism (e.g., ―worried‖) and words that do not represent
the self (e.g., ―them‖) are paired with words that do not represent neuroticism (e.g., ―calm‖).
Response latencies for correct responses on this trial block are compared with those on a
block of trials in which self words are paired with non-representative trait words and ―non-
self‖ words are paired with representative trait words.2 The basic assumption of the IAT is
that if two concepts (i.e., self and neuroticism) are highly associated, the sorting task will be
easier when the two concepts share the same response key (i.e., the compatible block) than
when they share different response keys (i.e., the incompatible block). Thus, the extent to
which responses on the compatible block are faster than those on the incompatible block is
taken as a measure of the extent to which an individual automatically associates the self with
the personality trait, providing the implicit measure of that trait.
Two recent studies (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Steffens; 2004) have demonstrated that,
inconsistent with assumptions, the IAT is not immune to faking. Fiedler and Bluemke (2005)
found that individuals, both with and without prior experience on the task, were able to ―fake‖
an attitude IAT by slowing responses on the compatible block and speeding up responses on
the incompatible block. Similarly, Steffens (2004) found that individuals who have prior
experience on an IAT can ―fake‖ a subsequent IAT by slowing responses on the compatible
block. Although faking on the IAT is not as easy or pronounced as faking on an explicit
measure (Steffens, 2004), ―experts‖ are not able to identify those who fake the IAT (Fiedler
& Bluemke, 2005).

2
Individuals who respond incorrectly are subsequently required to make a correct response. In some scoring
algorithms for the IAT (e.g., that recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), a time penalty is
imposed on initially incorrect responses.
 Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for Health Behaviors 203

Boldero et al. (2007) used an IAT variant, the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT;
Nosek & Banaji, 2001), to assess implicit neuroticism and other FFM factors. Like the IAT,
the GNAT assesses the strength of association between two target categories (e.g., self and
neuroticism). However, rather than requiring individuals to complete two blocks of trials in
which categories are paired, only one critical block is used. In this, only words that represent
neuroticism or self are used as targets and these are presented along with distractor words
(i.e., words that are neither neuroticism nor self words). If the presented word is a target
word, individuals are required to indicate this by responding within a relatively brief response
window. If the presented word is not a target (i.e., it is a distractor), they are required to do
nothing and the trial ―times out‖. The measure of association between the two target
categories is the degree to which target category terms can be discriminated from distractor
terms, which is assessed using error rates. The logic of the task is that stronger associations
facilitate discrimination (i.e., more correct responses relative to incorrect ones). Standardized
probabilities of correct and incorrect target term responses are used to compute the signal
detection theory index, d΄ (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). This measure, unlike reaction time
measures, is theoretically independent of participants‘ response criteria (Green & Swets,
1966), thereby eliminating a possible source of bias.
The GNAT differs procedurally from the IAT in two ways: two target categories not four
are used (i.e., self and neuroticism in the case of a neuroticism GNAT) and rather than
making one of two responses, only a single response is required. Specifically, when a term
belongs to either target category a response is required whereas no response is required if the
term belongs to neither category (i.e., a distractor). A single association is assessed using one
trial block. However, critical for the current discussion is the fact that responses on the GNAT
must be made within a relatively short response window (both Boldero et al., 2007, and our
recent studies used a response window of 700 msec). In contrast, the IAT offers individuals a
relatively large response window which allows faking via the slowing of responses.
Whether or not this is possible was examined with one of our recent student samples who
completed, amongst other tasks, a neuroticism GNAT. We asked half our participants to ―try
hard to correctly detect as many neuroticism and self items as you can‖. We chose this
instruction rather than one which asked participants to appear to be not neurotic as we
assumed that if they had any pre-existing biases which they employed on this task, they
would try to appear as less neurotic. The remaining participants were given no explicit
instructions about the task except that the target items were neuroticism and self terms.
Consistent with our assumption that it is not possible to control responding on the GNAT,
those given the instruction to try to correctly identify as many neuroticism and self words as
they could yielded d΄s (M = 1.79; SD = .85) that were no different to those not given this
instruction (M = 1.71; SD = .88), t (495) = 1.16, p = .247). Thus, it appears that because the
GNAT is based on correct responses which are made within a small response window, it is
difficult for individuals to modify their responses on this task. However, this conclusion must
be treated with caution and await additional studies the GNAT‘s fakeability.
Despite this reservation, it appears that, unlike the IAT, it is not possible to consciously
modify responses on the GNAT. If this is the case, this feature makes it a promising implicit
measure of neuroticism that may provide insights into the links between this personality trait
and behaviors that are associated with poorer health outcomes.
204 Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

NEUROTICISM AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS

When considering whether implicitly-assessed neuroticism is related to health behaviors,
it is important to recognize that behavior is likely to be a function of the working of two
different systems, one impulsive and one reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The impulsive
system relies on easily-activated behavioral schemata but not valence or expectancy
knowledge. The reflective system involves reasoning that ―leads to a noetic decision about the
feasibility and desirability of a particular action‖ (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p. 230). As a
result, implicitly-assessed neuroticism is likely to be associated with behaviors that are
spontaneous, automatic, and non-verbal whereas explicitly-assessed neuroticism is likely to
be associated with controlled behaviors. Consistent with this proposition, Steffens and
Schulze König (2006) found that implicit neuroticism correlated with indirect ratings of
subjective and observer-rated stress whereas explicit neuroticism did not.
As noted above, neuroticism has been found to be associated with cigarette smoking (e.g.,
Goodwin & Hamilton, 2002; Saklosfske et al., 2007), alcohol use (e.g., Grekin et al., 2006;
Read & O‘Connor, 2006), and not exercising regularly. If implicitly-assessed constructs are
associated with spontaneous behaviors, it is likely that implicit neuroticism will be associated
with cigarette smoking and drinking alcohol to excess, as these behaviors are likely to be
experienced as somewhat automatic or out of control. In contrast, as exercising regularly tends
to involve controlled behavior, we assumed explicit neuroticism would predict it.
To test these predictions, in one of our recent studies, we regressed people‘s responses to
several items (―I do not smoke cigarettes‖, ―I rarely get drunk‖3, and ―I exercise regularly‖)
on implicit and explicit neuroticism and their interaction in hierarchical multiple regression
analyses. Consistent with our predictions, implicit neuroticism was associated with
disagreeing that one rarely gets drunk and that one smokes cigarettes (β = .14, β = .11,
respectively). Neither explicit neuroticism nor it‘s interaction with implicit neuroticism was a
predictor of these behaviors (all βs < .09).
Again consistent with our predictions, explicit neuroticism was a predictor of agreeing
that one did not engage in regular exercise (β = -.28). However, although implicit neuroticism
was not a predictor (β = .06), the interaction term was (β = .16). Thus, implicit neuroticism
moderated the impact of explicit neuroticism. The nature of this moderation was that for those
low in implicit neuroticism (i.e., -1 SD), there was a relationship between explicit neuroticism
and not engaging in regular exercise whereas for those high in implicit neuroticism (i.e., +1
SD) there was not (see Figure 1). This indicates that explicit neuroticism is problematic for
those who are lower in implicit neuroticism. This suggests that implicit neuroticism somehow
counteracts the impact of explicit neuroticism on this type of behavior.
To investigate whether we could replicate these findings, we asked another sample of
student participants to complete Vickers, Conway, and Hervig‘s (1990) measure of substance
risk taking, which includes items such as ―I do not drink‖ and ―I do not smoke‖ (both reverse
scored). Consistent with the results, reported above, implicit neuroticism was associated with
increased substance risk taking (β = .12) whereas neither overt neuroticism nor the interaction
of implicit and explicit neuroticism were predictors (both βs < .06). This result is particularly
interesting when considered in the light of Booth-Kewley and Vickers‘ (1994) result that self-
reported neuroticism is unrelated to substance risk-taking.

3
We asked about getting drunk as moderate use of alcohol is not associated with health problems.
 Increasing the Predictive Utility of Neuroticism for Health Behaviors 205

Engagement in Regular Exercise

Low implicit neuroticism

High implicit neuroticism

Low High
Explicit Neuroticism

Figure 1. The relationship between engagement in regular exercise and explicit neuroticism showing
the moderating impact of implicit neuroticism.

Together the results of these two studies indicate that implicitly assessing neuroticism
enhances our understanding of how this factor is related to health-related behaviors. In
particular, they suggest that implicit neuroticism is associated with the use of substances that
are associated with ill health, and may be a better predictor of this risk behavior than self-
reported neuroticism, although the vast majority of previous research has employed such
explicit personality measures. Further, our findings suggest that implicit neuroticism may also
play a moderating role in the engagement of more deliberative and controlled health-
promoting behaviors (i.e., regular exercise).

CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have proposed that implicit measurement may be useful when
considering the relationship of neuroticism with health-related behaviours. Implicit measures
are a useful addition to research on this topic because individuals may have limited access to
information about how neurotic they are and may bias their self-reports of this factor. As a
result, if only self-report measures are used, the correlations between neuroticism and
behaviors may be attenuated and obscured. The results of our own and other studies which
have examined the correlations of implicit and explicit neuroticism provide some evidence for
the divergence of these measures and their complementary role in predicting health-related
behavior. As with other constructs, implicit and explicit measures of neuroticism have some
overlap but they also each have some unique predictive power.
Although several techniques can be used to implicitly assess neuroticism, our studies
suggest that the GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2000) may be particularly appropriate. Although
206 Jennifer Boldero, Nick Haslam and Jennifer Whelan

this measure, which assesses the automatic associations of self-related terms with neuroticism
terms, is a variant of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), we believe it is more promising
because recent evidence suggests that the IAT can be ―faked‖ by slowing responses. The
GNAT does not allow this form of faking, and our preliminary results support the assumption
that it is difficult to modify responses on it deliberately.
Despite the widespread use of implicit methods in other areas of personality and social
psychology, their utility as predictors of health behaviors has been neglected. Although some
studies have examined the associations of implicitly-assessed personality with other types of
behaviour (e.g., Steffens & Schulze König; 2006), to our knowledge no studies have
specifically considered those behaviors that are associated with negative health outcomes
(e.g., smoking cigarettes) which have been linked to neuroticism in other studies. The results
of our studies indicate the implicit neuroticism is associated with smoking cigarettes, drinking
alcohol to excess, and substance use-related risk taking. Further, although explicit neuroticism
was associated with less engagement in regular exercise, implicit neuroticism moderated this
relationship. This moderation was unexpected, but it demonstrates that it may be important to
consider the role of implicit neuroticism (and implicit measures of other personality factors)
in a range of health behaviors, including those which might be considered under deliberative
control.
The understanding of how personality is related to engagement in behaviors that are
associated with health and ill health is an important research endeavor. We urge researchers
to consider using implicit measures of personality in studies that examine this important
topic. We believe that this will lead to a fuller understanding of the role of that personality
plays as a determinant of health behavior and is an important next research ―step‖.

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 211-224 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 11

SHAME: A SELF-DETERMINATION
THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff and Martin Hagger

University of Nottingham, UK

ABSTRACT
Shame has been identified as an intense unpleasant emotion (Wicker, Payne, &
Morgan, 1973) with potentially deleterious effects on motivation and goal-striving
(Fischer & Tangney, 1995). This chapter aims to explore the utility of self-determination
theory (SDT) in understanding the experience of shame and the effects of being
motivated by shame avoidance. Key constructs and mechanisms from SDT that explain
the adaptive and maladaptive effects of shame experience and shame avoidance on
behaviour will be identified and discussed. Specifically, introjected regulation, one of six
regulatory styles specified by SDT, is particularly pertinent to well-documented
associations between shame, maladaptive coping, and avoidant behavioural tendencies
(e.g., Tangney, Fischer, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Introjected regulation is considered a
psychological mediator characterised by avoidance of thoughts of shameful experiences
or behaviours that could result in shameful emotional reactions in the future. The value of
SDT in explaining and evaluating behavioural consequences of shame will be discussed
using applied examples from educational, health, and resource conservation research. As
the regulatory styles proposed by SDT have differing patterns of associations with
psychological well-being, behavioural quality, and persistence, the theory can offer both
an account of the consequences of shame and methods through which to reduce
maladaptive reactions to this emotion. Ideas for further research approaching shame from
an SDT perspective will be proposed, including an examination of whether inducing
particular motivational orientations could serve as a buffer against the maladaptive
effects of shame.
212 Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff et al.

INTRODUCTION
Shame is a ―self-conscious‖ emotion (Fischer & Tangney, 1995), evoked through
processes of self-reflection and self-evaluation (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). It has
been defined as the ―failure to live up to an ego ideal‖ (Lazarus, 1991, p.246). Wicker, Payne,
and Morgan (1983) argued that shame is the most intense unpleasant emotion. Shame has
been associated with a range of maladaptive social and health-related outcomes, including
withdrawal, motivational inhibition, and avoidant patterns of behaviour (Wicker et al., 1983),
in addition to feelings of worthlessness, incompetence, and anxiety (Stern, 1999).
Furthermore, clinical and empirical evidence converge on the finding that those who
frequently experience shame are more prone to a variety of psychological problems.
However, shame has also been linked to adaptive motivational and behavioural outcomes
(e.g., Turner, Husman, & Schallert, 2002), emphasising the importance of gaining an
understanding of mechanisms and processes determining the outcomes of shame experience
and shame avoidance.
One factor likely to be pertinent to the experience and consequences of shame is
motivation. Emmons (1996) alluded to inextricable ties between motivation and emotion, ―At
a minimum, affect is related to goals in the following ways: It plays a role in determining
one‘s commitment to goals, it energizes goal-directed behaviour; and it serves as feedback
informing a person of the status of their goals‖ (p. 313). Pekrun (2006) also implies the
importance of accounting for emotions in motivated behaviour, asserting that emotions can
affect students‘ interest, engagement, achievement, and personality development. Many
theorists in the domain of motivation suggest that shame is the most likely of the negative
emotions to reduce or terminate motivated behaviour. Turner and colleagues (2002)
postulated that shame can incur devastating effects on ensuing motivation and goal-directed
behaviour, alluding to the need to understand mechanisms through which experiences of
shame alter motivational forces driving behaviour and to determine methods for instilling
shame resiliency. Although the shame literature has touched upon the relevance of self-
regulation and motivation (e.g., Turner et al., 2002), studies have not yet examined shame
from a global motivational perspective. It is here that self-determination theory (SDT; Deci &
Ryan, 1985, 2000) may offer a useful framework for exploring the underpinnings and effects
of shame-related events.
SDT is an organismic-dialectical theory that provides an account of the global
motivational forces underlying volitional behaviour. The theory proposes that individuals
have an innate tendency towards psychological growth and the mastery of challenges through
the satisfaction of three fundamental needs - autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The
need for autonomy, i.e., the need to experience oneself as the initiator and regulator of one‘s
behaviour, will be the main focus of this chapter with regard to motivational antecedents and
consequences of shame-related events. However, the needs for competence and relatedness
will also be discussed; the former referring to the necessity for individuals to feel that they are
functioning effectively in their environment and the latter referring to the desire to initiate and
maintain interpersonal relationships and a sense of connectedness to other people.
Central to SDT is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which is
often viewed on a self-determination continuum. Intrinsic motivation refers to engaging in
behaviour for motives that emanate from the self, such as for the enjoyment, satisfaction, and
 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 213

fulfilment that behavioural engagement provides, while extrinsic motivation describes

behavioural engagement that is driven at least in part by contingencies external to the self,
such as obtaining tangible rewards or personally-valued outcomes. The theory posits four
forms of extrinsic motivation that lie on the continuum: integrated, identified, introjected, and
external regulations. Integrated regulation represents the most autonomous form of extrinsic
motivation whereby behaviour has been assimilated with the self such that it is consistent
with one‘s values and goals. Identified regulation represents engaging in a behaviour for
reasons that are highly valued yet external to the self. Introjected regulation is the least
internalised form of extrinsic motivation and describes engaging in a behaviour for contingent
self-worth or to avoid negative outcomes such as guilt and shame (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Introjected regulation has been described as involving internal prods and pressures (Deci &
Ryan, 2000) arising from conflict between the demand of the regulation and the individual‘s
lack of interest in the behaviour itself. External regulation is the prototypical form of extrinsic
motivation and refers to engaging in behaviour for the acquisition of rewards or avoidance of
punishment. Movement along the continuum from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation is
facilitated by a process known as internalisation, in which an activity or behaviour is
gradually taken in to the self, thereby becoming congruous with existing values, goals and
aspirations. The continuum of behavioural regulation is shown in Figure 1.
One of the key tenets of SDT is that autonomous regulation is associated with more
adaptive outcomes, in terms of well-being and behavioural quality and persistence, than
controlling forms of regulation. Literature has supported this across a variety of domains,
including education, work, and health, showing that more autonomous forms of regulation are
related to more effective learning, higher interest, expending greater effort, higher quality
performance, increased satisfaction, good health, and superior psychological well-being
relative to controlling forms of regulation (e.g., Black & Deci, 2000; Edmunds, Ntoumanis, &
Duda, 2008; Kasser & Ryan, 1996).
In this chapter, an SDT approach will be applied to the understanding of the relationships
of shame experience and shame avoidance with various motivational, psychological, and
behavioural outcomes. Shame experience will be discussed as an important antecedent of
motivational and behavioural outcomes, including shame avoidance, while the avoidance of
shame will be directly linked to introjected regulation and associated behavioural
implications. An SDT perspective on the motivational and behavioural repercussions of
shame experience, as well as the motivational underpinnings and behavioural consequences
of shame avoidance, could be extremely valuable in applied areas, including academic, health
and workplace settings.

The Experience of Shame and Its Effects on Motivation and Behaviour

In order to gain a general understanding of the process by which shame can affect
motivation and behaviour, there is utility in assessing the role of shame on the processes
espoused by SDT. Although the majority of work examining responses to shame experiences
has documented their detrimental effects on future motivation and behaviour, a small body of
literature attests to the positive effects of shame experience on subsequent motivation and
behaviour.
214 Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff et al.

Figure 1. The SDT continuum of behavioural regulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985)

Negative effects of shame experience on motivation and behaviour

From an SDT perspective, the experience of shame will likely incur detrimental effects
on behaviour through fostering controlling or non-self-determined forms of motivation.
Literature documenting the effects of shame on subsequent and long-term behaviour supports
this assertion. Pekrun Goetz, Titz, and Perry (2002), for example, stated that shame may be
assumed to reduce intrinsic motivation due to its incompatibility with enjoyment and interest.
Further, Turner and colleagues (2002) documented the experience of shame leading to
diminishing pursuit of future goals, or cessation of striving completely. This is the trend in
behaviour expected if an individual is extrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000),
especially if the incentive for goal striving is subsequently terminated (Deci, Koestner &
Ryan, 1999).
Whilst the effects of negative emotions such as shame have been reported to reduce
intrinsic motivation, they may also foster states of motivated effort to avoid challenging
situations and outcomes of failure (Zeidner, 2007). The role of shame in prompting avoidance
behaviour has been widely documented. Performance-avoidance goals, defined as an
orientation toward avoiding incompetence, have been repeatedly linked with shame (Pekrun,
Elliot & Maier, 2009). This may be integrated well with the SDT literature, as competence is
an important social event that facilitates an autonomous motivational orientation. Therefore,
situations that engender incompetence in an individual are likely to lead to lowered intrinsic
motivation and increased extrinsic motivation, possibly leading to cessation of the behaviour
due to lack of intrinsic value (see Figure 1). In particular, shame is likely to elicit introjected
forms of extrinsic motivation. The extensively-documented link between shame experience
and performance avoidance is therefore consistent with SDT. As most individuals naturally
seek out behaviours and contexts likely to support their psychological needs, particularly
 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 215

autonomy, it is probable that they will avoid situations that are incongruent with their needs
such as those that foster controlling forms of motivation. Contexts that induce shame may
lead to the development of introjected regulation and motivation to avoid the context or
behaviour that leads to feelings of shame.
Aside from the possibility that shame prompts a range of maladaptive outcomes through
its damaging effects on autonomy, the experience of shame may also impact negatively on
well-being by obstructing satisfaction of the need for relatedness. In impairing individuals‘
ability to establish empathic connections with others (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007),
shame may reduce the number of opportunities for feeling involved with and close to other
people, thereby diminishing their sense of relatedness.

Adaptive effects of shame experience on motivation and behaviour

In a study carried out by Turner and Shallert (2001), students enrolled in a
psychopharmacology course were recruited to ascertain whether certain personality traits or
motivational orientations ameliorated the negative effects of shame on behaviour. Within the
group of participants who experienced high levels of shame following what they perceived to
be poor results, around 40% showed no improvement in their marks for their end-of-year
exams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that experiences of shame diminish motivation
and performance. By contrast, the remaining 60% showed an improvement following the
shame experience and significantly increased their grade. Turner and Shallert believed these
participants demonstrated shame resiliency, which lead to a reinvigoration of goal
commitment and goal-directed behaviour. In this case, rather than leading to reduced
motivation and avoidance, shame acted as greater impetus to achieving success. Essentially, if
experienced by an individual who is resilient, shame may be a positive experience leading to
improved future motivation and performance.

Shame Avoidance and Its Effects on Motivation and Behaviour

Introjected regulation and shame avoidance

It is important to acknowledge that shame can affect behaviour through anticipatory
mechanisms in which people receive feedback regarding their future behaviour in the form of
anticipatory shame. It is likely that that anticipated shame and past experience will induce an
introjected regulatory style, resulting in motives to avoid shame experiences. In support of
this, Assor, Roth, and Deci (2004) found that introjected regulations can be primed through
procedures that induce shame. It is probable that shame-prone individuals will anticipate
shame and become regulated by introjection for behaviours for which they have previously
encountered shame experiences. This is consistent with Schmader and Lickel‘s (2006)
postulation that shame is associated with avoidance responses intended to protect the self
from negative evaluation.
SDT may have much to offer in illuminating mechanisms between actual and anticipated
shame experiences and outcomes relating to health, well-being, and achievement, through the
mediating role of introjected regulation. In the academic domain, Pekrun and colleagues
(2002) highlighted the close link between students‘ emotions and their self-regulation,
supporting the importance of examining shame from an SDT perspective in this field.
216 Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff et al.

Engaging in studying behaviour to attain self-worth and avoid feelings of shame is a common
motivation in school pupils (Nicholls, 1989), thus shame is highly pertinent to the domain of
academic achievement. Assor, Vansteenkiste, and Kaplan (2009) have differentiated between
introjected avoidance and approach motivations, and it is introjected avoidance motivation in
which behaviour is driven by the desire to avoid low self-worth and shame. Assor and
colleagues illustrated introjected avoidance motivation in the academic domain with the
example of a pupil who works hard at school in order to avoid the shame associated with poor
grades. Pekrun, Elliot, and Maier (2009) suggested that the motivational effects of activating
negative emotions such as shame are complex, as they serve to reduce intrinsic motivation
and are therefore likely to incur negative effects on performance, but can also result in
increased effort in pursuit of a goal, in order to avoid failure. This is congruous with the
finding that introjected regulation is a predictor of short-term behavioural persistence
(Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & Briere, 2001).

Maladaptive effects of shame avoidance motivation on behaviour

Despite some evidence that in particular contexts or individuals shame avoidance is
associated with adaptive behavioural outcomes, a larger body of evidence attests to the
negative consequences of shame avoidance motivation. SDT also offers an account of
mechanisms and processes that may underlie the association of shame avoidance with
undesirable outcomes.
Shame avoidance is likely to be characterised by low intrinsic motivation, as focus is
removed from the relevant activity or behaviour and instead placed on external factors such as
avoiding peer disapproval or unfavourable comparisons with others. This focus engenders an
introjected regulatory style. In the academic domain, researchers have expressed concern that
shame experiences related to long-term goal striving could result in lowered standards
regarding goal pursuit or even its abandonment, which is consistent with the development of
introjected regulation. Pelletier and colleagues (2001) provided clear support for the
association between introjected regulation and behavioural desistance in the long-term. In a
study examining self-regulation in competitive swimmers, individuals displaying autonomous
forms of regulation showed greater persistence at both 10- and 22-month follow-ups than
those exhibiting more controlling forms of regulation. Introjected regulation was a significant
positive predictor of persistence at the 10-month follow-up but became non-significant at 22
months. Similarly, Vallerand, Fortier, and Guay (1997) discovered that introjected regulation
was significantly, positively associated with staying in high school over a twelve-month
period but ceased to be significantly associated with persistence at 22 months. Shame-prone
individuals are unlikely to show behavioural persistence (Thompson, Altmann, & Davidson,
2004), because of the development of an introjected regulatory style and the thwarting of
autonomy. It therefore seems crucial to provide such individuals with an autonomy-
supportive environment that facilitates the internalisation process, to shift regulation from
shame avoidance and other forms of introjection to engaging in behaviour for more
autonomous reasons.
Aside from behavioural desistance, introjected regulation has been associated with a
variety of maladaptive outcomes. For example, in the sports domain, introjection has been
associated with poor well-being, decreased vitality, and suboptimal performance among elite
athletes (Assor, Vansteenkiste, & Kaplan, 2009). In an academic context, introjected
regulation has been associated with school anxiety, ineffective coping mechanisms following
 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 217

failure (Ryan & Connell, 1989), and superficial as opposed to deep-level learning
(Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Soenens, & Matos, 2005). Further, performance avoidance
goals, which are closely linked with shame avoidance motivation by virtue of their focus on
avoiding feelings of incompetence and associated shame, tend to be negative predictors of
academic performance (Finney, Pieper, & Barron, 2004). These goals may undermine
intrinsic motivation by evoking perceptions of threat and eliciting anxiety and evaluative
pressure, which are likely to evoke introjection. Introjection may therefore mediate the
relationship between performance avoidance goals and the experience of shame and
associated detrimental outcomes. Pekrun and coworkers (2009) reported that performance-
avoidance goals were a positive and significant predictor of shame, which is likely to interact
with an introjected regulatory style and lead to maladaptive outcomes such as behavioural
desistance. Alternatively, introjected regulation may be induced following a shame reaction
and could serve as a mediator between shame and the development of performance avoidance
goals, consistent with processes proposed by Pekrun, Elliot, and Maier (2006). As
performance-avoidance goals are concerned with the outcomes of achievement-related
activities and linked with a relatively controlling form of motivation, they have been
associated with impaired progress, low vitality, lack of enjoyment, and suboptimal well-being
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). In contrast, Assor and colleagues‘ (2009) study of athletes found
that identified regulation exhibited far stronger associations with mastery goals, well-being,
and behavioural engagement than introjection, suggesting that shame avoidance motives
should be discouraged and identified regulation promoted in this context, perhaps through
helping athletes to perceive their sporting behaviour as consistent with personally important
values and aspirations.
Further undesirable ramifications of introjected regulation include instability of attitudes
(Losier, Perreault, Koestner, & Vallerand, 2001) and inconsistencies between attitudes and
behaviour (Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994). Koestner and colleagues (2001) emphasise the
fragility of attitudes and behaviours that are grounded in introjected regulation. Introjected
regulation and the undermining of intrinsic motivation could also elucidate the association
between shame-proneness and the tendency to procrastinate reported by Fee and Tangney
(2000). It is feasible that shame-proneness is associated with procrastination through
mediation by introjected regulation, as Fee and Tangney propose that individuals
procrastinate in an attempt to avoid the imminent possibility of shame experiences.
Introjected regulation is likely to foster avoidance of others‘ judgement through delaying
behavioural engagement. Research has documented a link between procrastination and
evaluative concerns; when the possibility of negative evaluation is feared, procrastination will
often ensue (Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995; Steel, 2007).

Adaptive effects of shame avoidance motivation on behaviour

Shame avoidance may not necessarily be associated with behavioural desistance if the
relevant behaviour comes to be assimilated with the self (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone,
1994). Burney and Irwin (2000) suggest that issues relating to body image are rooted in
shame avoidance, which may have significant implications regarding exercise behaviour. In
support of this, McLachlan and Hagger (in press) reported that striving primarily for
appearance- and weight loss-related outcomes in leisure-time physical activity was
significantly positively correlated with extrinsic forms of regulation and that individuals who
rated introjected regulation highly were nearly twice as likely to specify an appearance- or
218 Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff et al.

weight loss-related physical activity outcome as their primary goal. Although behaviour
regulated by introjection is less likely to be sustained than that governed by more autonomous
forms of regulation, there is evidence from exercise research to suggest that introjection can
be associated with adaptive outcomes. Gillison, Osborn, Standage, & Skevington (2009)
proposed that introjected regulation may play a central role in the initiation of health
behaviours in adolescents. These researchers showed that introjected regulation for exercise
in adolescents was associated with greater than predicted levels of sport and exercise,
irrespective of whether introjection was rooted in contingent self-worth or partial
internalisation of adaptive reasons for exercise. Returning to McLachlan and Hagger‘s (in
press) findings, it could be inferred that individuals exercising primarily for reasons
associated with shame avoidance are likely to demonstrate behavioural persistence, at least in
the short-term.
Further support for the association of adaptive behavioural outcomes with introjected
regulation comes from a study examining recycling behaviour (Koestner, Houlford, Paquet, &
Knight, 2001). Koestner and colleagues reported that introjection, as a form of regulation
characterised by partial internalisation of a behaviour, was significantly positively related to
recycling behaviour. Although it is possible that this would only be true of short-term
behaviour, as the study‘s dependent measure was current level of recycling, the study
provides some indication that shame avoidance motivation can facilitate and maintain
behavioural engagement.

The Moderating role of SDT variables in shame-related experiences

Individual differences in self-determined motivational orientations described by SDT
offer a dispositional account of the circumstances under which shame-related antecedents
result in a shame experience. The General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS; Deci &
Ryan, 1985) describes the relatively enduring individual differences in motivational
orientations that are likely to interact with different external contingencies that support or
thwart psychological needs and give rise to situational motivational regulations and
behaviour. Whilst the majority of research on SDT has focused on the effects of changing
these external contingencies, there is a relative dearth of research focusing on individual
differences in motivational orientations affecting motivation and behaviour.
In SDT, three categories of dispositional orientations have been identified: autonomy,
control, and impersonal. The autonomy orientation relates to the seeking of situations that
provide a sense of initiative and autonomy promotion. Autonomy-orientated individuals are
likely to feel less controlled by social events and environmental contingencies that affect
motivation and instead experience such contingencies as affirmation that their behaviour
emanates from the self (supports autonomy) or is informational about their performance
(supports competence). The controlled orientation reflects a tendency to interpret external
events as controlling, leading to an external locus of causality and the feeling that one should
or must behave in accordance with the desires of external agents or environmental
reinforcements. Finally, the impersonal orientation refers to the tendency for individuals to
experience their behaviour as being outside intentional control. Essentially, tasks are seen as
being beyond the individual‘s capacity to control or master, and can lead to a decreased sense
of autonomy and competence.
The general causality orientations facet of SDT provides an account of factors underlying
individual differences in shame resiliency and provides a useful framework for determining
 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 219

whether or not shame will have detrimental effects on motivation and behaviour. A certain
level of autonomous causality orientation appears necessary in facilitating shame resiliency.
Turner and colleagues (2002) argued that shame-resilient students are able to demonstrate
self-regulatory processes to adapt their behaviour to meet their goals. That is, they have a
number of strategies at their disposal with which they can augment their work following
failure, and feel capable of using these strategies to improve subsequent performance. If
students have some perception that they are the initiator and regulator of their own behaviour,
are capable of altering their examination results in future, and feel they have the necessary
tools available, they can increase the likelihood of shame resiliency and the elicitation of
constructive academic behaviour. Further, individuals who feel their performance in exams is
important to their future endeavours, and therefore exhibit an identified regulatory style,
appear sufficiently motivated to overcome shame experiences, without risking the damage to
the self-concept that seems to accompany a shame experience in those exhibiting an entirely
autonomous causality orientation.
However, Turner and colleagues (Turner & Shallert, 2001; Turner et al., 2002) found that
students who report an extrinsic causality orientation regarding their academic performance
and who are highly confident of their academic ability are most likely to be resilient to
reduced motivation brought about by shame. Shame resiliency was represented as increased
effort, motivated behaviour, and higher grades following a shame experience. It may be that
those who ascribe intrinsic value to their academic success assimilate instances of success and
failure too closely to their own self-worth, as academic behaviour and goals are more fully
integrated with the self. Experiences of failure and its concomitant feelings of shame are then
too ―close to the bone‖ for highly-intrinsically motivated individuals to recover. In contrast,
individuals with an extrinsic causality orientation might be less likely to experience the self-
damaging effects of shame. Such findings suggest that shame resiliency results from
interactions between regulatory constructs, involving the attainment of a balance between a
degree of autonomy in one‘s endeavours and the more extrinsic causality orientation that
protects the self from experiencing destructive outcomes following shame.
With regard to moderating influences on the effects of shame avoidance-induced
introjection on behaviour, the fit between goal content and the nature of the interpersonal
environment pertinent to those goals could determine the quality of effects of introjected
regulation on behaviour. This is based on a notion termed the match perspective (Sagiv &
Schwartz, 2000). Sagiv and Schwartz posited that detrimental effects associated with extrinsic
goal pursuit should only be true of contexts that emphasise autonomous over extrinsic goals.
In contexts in which extrinsic goals are paramount, the negative effects of extrinsic goal
pursuit, for example shame avoidance, should be reversed. In the same vein, Vansteenkiste,
Timmermans, Lens, Soenens, and Broeck (2008) suggested that the match perspective could
apply to individuals‘ chronic orientations towards intrinsic or extrinsic goals, such that
negative outcomes related to extrinsic goal framing and striving should disappear for
individuals whose goal orientation is primarily extrinsic.
It could therefore be the case that shame avoidance motivation may only be associated
with maladaptive motivational and behavioural outcomes in environments in which intrinsic
goals are more highly valued than extrinsic goals and in individuals more strongly oriented
towards the pursuit of intrinsic, relative to extrinsic, goals. In extrinsically-oriented
individuals and environments, the introjected regulatory style associated with shame
avoidance may not incur negative effects on behaviour.
220 Sarah McLachlan, David Keatley, Chris Stiff et al.

Future research directions

Empirical research is needed to further elucidate the role of behavioural regulations from
SDT in relationships between shame experience, shame avoidance, and behavioural and
psychological outcomes. Such research is critical in terms of its potential to provide methods
for attenuating or preventing the detrimental effects of shame experience and avoidance on
motivation, behaviour, and well-being. Suggestions for future research include examining
how the shame experience alters subsequent regulatory style from SDT and whether type of
regulatory style affects shame resilience, for instance by determining whether behavioural
regulation moderates the relationship between shame and various associated outcomes.
Experimental studies could manipulate regulatory style, for example through the provision of
autonomy support, and observe effects on the process of recovery from subsequent shame
experiences. In the academic domain, it would be beneficial to determine whether introducing
an autonomous approach to academic tasks, through emphasising enjoyment and mastery
outcomes and discouraging performance-avoidance goals, could serve as a buffer against the
negative impact of shame experiences on future motivation and behaviour. The positive
effects of autonomy-supportive contexts, which help foster autonomous forms of motivation,
have been widely discussed in the literature (Black & Deci, 2000; Deci & Flaste, 1995;
Pelletier et al., 2001).
Furthermore, associations between autonomy-support and increased perceived
competence (Ommundsen & Kvalø, 2007) offer an interesting possibility of intrinsic
motivation mediating and/or moderating the link between shame-induced introjected
motivation and behaviour. Essentially, if shame fosters feelings of incompetence, leading to
extrinsic motivation and avoidance behaviour, whilst autonomy-support increases one‘s sense
of competence, then it is possible that increases in autonomy may ameliorate the negative
effects of shame on behaviour. Turner and Husman (2008) allude to such strategies being
beneficial to students‘ future success. Pekrun and colleagues (2002) showed that while
positive emotions such as enjoyment and pride predicted high academic achievement,
negative emotions such as shame predicted lower achievement. As Pekrun and colleagues
argued that shame may impair achievement through the reduction of intrinsic motivation, it is
possible that the undesirable effects that a shame experience can incur on achievement could
be attenuated or eliminated through the provision of autonomy support. Thus although high
levels of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and mastery-orientation appear not to offer an immediate
protective effect regarding the experience of shame (Turner & Schallert, 2001; Turner &
Waugh, 2007), fostering autonomous forms of motivation may help ameliorate the more
maladaptive effects of this emotion.
Interventions to reduce or prevent shame experiences may therefore increase their
efficacy through promoting a more autonomous approach to tasks and behaviours. It is
possible that individuals regulated primarily by introjection, as a result of shame experiences,
would particularly benefit from autonomy support, to promote the internalisation of
behaviours and prevent the perpetuation of shame anticipation. It would also be valuable to
determine whether shame is more likely to be experienced by autonomously-motivated
individuals, due to the personal importance of goals, or whether autonomous behavioural
regulation serves as a buffer against shame and its negative repercussions.
 Shame: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 221

CONCLUSION
Bringing an SDT perspective to the study of shame yields an insight into motivational
processes that potentially mediate and moderate relationships between shame experience,
shame avoidance, and a variety of psychological and behavioural outcomes. In summary, the
experience of shame is likely to reduce autonomous forms of motivation and to encourage the
adoption of an introjected regulatory style, which has been associated with behavioural
quality and persistence in the short-term, but is unlikely to result in long-term behavioural
maintenance. Further, principles invoked from SDT provide methods for reducing the
anticipation and occurrence of shame, and also destructive outcomes following a shame
experience. SDT therefore provides an invaluable framework in which to situate future
empirical studies in the field of shame.

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 225-234 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 12

WHY NEUROTICISM MAY BE RELEVANT TO

UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO MEDITATION-BASED
INTERVENTIONS: A REVIEW OF SOME FORGOTTEN
LITERATURE

Brian L. Thompson
Portland VA Medical Center

ABSTRACT
Before the explosion of interest in mindfulness-based interventions (e.g. Hayes,
Follette, & Linehan, 2004), early meditation researchers explored the impact of
personality traits on response to sitting meditation practice, particularly with
Transcendental Meditation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of
that early research and explore how some of the findings of these often forgotten studies
may be incorporated into contemporary research on meditation-based treatments. Given
the incidence of depression in individuals high in neuroticism, particular emphasis is
placed on understanding how neuroticism might impact and be impacted by Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy for depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).

INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Mauphin‘s (1965) study of personality changes in undergraduates who
were taught Zen Buddhist meditation, a modest research literature has developed exploring
the relationship between personality and meditation. Unfortunately, most of the studies are
decades old, and the personality measures vary across the literature. The most consistent
personality construct measured across studies is neuroticism. A full review of the construct
neuroticism is unnecessary for the purposes of this chapter. In general, neuroticism refers to a
tendency to make negative attributions of experiences; it appears to be related to depression
and is an important factor in understanding how individuals cope with stress (Clark, Watson,
& Mineka, 1994; Watson & Hubbard, 1996).
226 Brian L. Thompson

With the growing influx of research on mindfulness meditation-based interventions (see

Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004), particularly those developed for treating
depression (see Coelho, Cantor, & Ernst, 2007), it is worth revisiting some of the older
research in order to develop an understanding of ways in which understanding the interaction
between neuroticism and response to meditation may inform treatment. There is evidence that
personality traits may impact treatment outcome for individuals with depression (Babgy &
Quilty, 2006), but none of this research has explored the use of mindfulness-based treatments.
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore the relationship between meditation and
neuroticism across a somewhat disjointed body of literature, the vast majority of which does
not fit in with the current wave of interest in mindfulness-based treatments, and to make an
argument for why neuroticism could be a worthwhile area of further exploration within
contemporary mindfulness meditation research. A literature search was conducted in
PsychINFO using the keys words ―meditation,‖ ―mindfulness,‖ and ―neuroticism.‖ The
search was restricted to studies that specifically measured neuroticism.

MEDITATION AND NEUROTICISM

The measures of neuroticism vary across the literature, as do the types of meditation
studied. It is useful to lay some groundwork in understanding the main types of meditation.
Researchers have distinguished between two types of meditation practices: concentration and
mindfulness or insight (Goleman, 1978). Concentrative meditation involves focusing on a
particular stimulus, such as a mantra or phrase. Mindfulness meditation differs from
concentrative practices in that, although mindfulness practitioner may begin by focusing on a
single object such as the breath, attention is eventually expanded to include other stimuli such
as bodily sensation, sound, thoughts, and feelings. Buddhist meditation, which has influenced
the current wave of mindfulness-based treatments, integrates the two (Brown & Ryan, 2004;
Goleman, 1978). The key commonality across meditative techniques is an emphasis on
attention (Rao, 1989).

Transcendental Meditation

Within the early personality literature, the most commonly studied meditation practice is
Transcendental Meditation (TM), a concentrative practice. TM practitioners mentally repeat a
Sanskrit mantra given to them by a qualified teacher, constantly bringing their attention back
when distracted. It is typically practiced twice daily for 20 minutes.
Tjoa (1975) is the earliest study examining the effect of TM on neuroticism. Using a
Dutch questionnaire, the Amsterdame Biogfische Vragenlijst, Tjoa found significant
decreases in neuroticism among a group of people attending a TM lecture, testing them prior
to starting TM and again one year later. Several subsequent studies using Eysenck‘s measures
of neuroticism had similar findings (see Taub, 1998 for a review of Eysenck‘s theories).
TM meditators exhibited decreases in neuroticism over time (Delmonte, 1980; Williams,
Francis, & Durham, 1976); however, beginning TM meditators scored higher on neuroticism
than the general population and continued to remain higher in neuroticism than the general
 Neuroticism & Meditation 227

population following TM practice, even though their scores decreased over time (Delmonte,
1980; West, 1980; Williams, Francis, & Durham, 1976). Higher scores on neuroticism among
TM meditators were related to a greater likelihood of dropping out (Delmonte, 1980, 1984a;
West, 1980). Exceptions to these trends were two studies using the Tennessee Self Concept
Scale, which found no difference in ―neurosis‖ between TM meditators and nonmeditators in
pre- and post-tests over time (Kline, Docherty, & Farley, 1982; Nystul & Garde, 1979).
However, as the other TM studies used Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism, this discrepancy
may reflect differences in personality measures. In summary, it appears that individuals
interested in TM tended to be higher in neuroticism than average, but those who were
particularly high in neuroticism were more likely to drop out.
Despite the availability of TM practitioners and receptivity to research of the TM
organization, Rao (1989) cites three main barriers to conducting TM research: 1.) TM has a
―quasi-religious‖ expectation associated with practice, which may influence outcomes; 2.)
TM mantras are kept secret by practitioners and consequently cannot be empirically
controlled; 3.) in order to receive permission to conduct TM research, research proposals
must be submitted to the TM organization, and researchers were rarely granted approval to
compare TM against any other technique. As a consequence of these restrictions, some
researchers developed their own ―TM-style‖ meditation in order to sidestep these difficulties.
Delmonte (1984a) referred to his as a ―non-cultic technique of mantra meditation closely
resembling Transcendental Meditation‖ (p. 276). The use of a ―non-cultic‖ form of TM
allowed for greater experimental control over assignment of participants to the experimental
condition. The findings of these TM-style studies were very similar to their TM counterparts
and provide some additional detail. Participants lower in neuroticism were more likely to
continue practicing meditation after three-months, but levels of neuroticism did not
distinguish compliance at subsequent intervals of 6, 12, and 24 months, (Delmonte, 1984b,
1988). An alternative explanation not addressed by the author is that, as the study began with
only 37 participants, and as the sample dropout rate decreased from 22-54% between 6 and 24
months, the researchers may have had insufficient statistical power to detect differences.
Two reviews of the TM and TM-style research conclude that higher scores on
neuroticism in practitioners are related to lower frequency of practice and greater likelihood
of discontinuing practice (Delmonte, 1987; Delmonte & Kenny, 1985). Delmonte noted TM
meditators exhibited decreases in neuroticism scores over time, but that prospective TM
meditators reported greater neuroticism than the general population. The author further
observed that, as TM has not been compared to other treatments, it is unclear whether TM
meditation is superior to other interventions (Delmonte, 1987).

Mindfulness Meditation

Beginning with Kabat-Zinn‘s (1990) Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR),

mindfulness-based treatments have proliferated in recent years (e.g., Hayes, Follette, &
Linehan, 2004). Mindfulness-based approaches have since been adapted for a variety of
populations and have been associated with improved outcomes (e.g., Grossman, Niemann,
Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Kenny & Williams, 2007; Melbourne Academic Mindfulness
Interest Group, 2006). In a meta-analysis of mindfulness-based treatments, Baer (2003) found
that rates of completion ranged from 60% to 97%, with a mean of 85%. Definitions of
228 Brian L. Thompson

mindfulness emphasize the maintenance of one‘s awareness within the present moment, and
applying an attitude of curiosity, acceptance, and nonjudgment towards all experiences
(Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The attitude of acceptance of phenomenon associated
with mindfulness makes the concept antithetical to neuroticism, which involves a tendency to
make negative attributions of experiences. Brown & Ryan (2003) suggest that neuroticism
may interfere with mindfulness, particularly worry and self-consciousness. They speculate
that the practice of mindfulness may reduce neurotic attribution.
In contrast to the TM literature, there are no published research studies using measures of
neuroticism in exploring outcomes of interventions using mindfulness meditation. The only
incorporation of neuroticism within the mindfulness literature can be found in studies using
measures of neuroticism to evaluate the construct validity of recently developed measures of
trait mindfulness. These studies relied on five-factor model (FFM) measures of personality.
The FFM attempts to describe a common taxonomy of personality traits derived from factor
analyses of personality descriptors found in language (John & Srivastava, 1999).
Brown and Ryan (2003) used Costa and McCrae‘s (1992) NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) as measures of well-being in
evaluating construct validity of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). Using
student samples, the researchers found that the MAAS was moderately correlated with lower
levels of neuroticism, which was supported by Thompson and Waltz (2007). Neuroticism was
also used to assess the psychometric properties of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness
Skills (KIMS), a four-facet measure of everyday mindfulness (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004).
Neuroticism, was negatively correlated with the ability to describe one‘s experience, a
tendency to act with awareness in everyday life, and an attitude of acceptance or nonjudgment
of phenomenon. Within a few years of developing the KIMS, Baer, Smith, Hopkins,
Krietemeyer, and Toney (2006) published the Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ), which was derived from a factor analysis of five previously developed mindfulness
measures, including the KIMS. The resulting five factor loadings from the factor analysis
were similar to the four KIMS subscales with one additional factor, nonreactivity, which was
not represented by items on the KIMS. Neuroticism was negatively correlated with all five
mindfulness measures, and with all FFMQ subscales except—as with the KIMS—the ability
to observe one‘s experience.
Additionally, there are a number of studies that suggest that mindfulness meditation
positively impacts affect. Following participation in an 8-week MBSR program, participants
exhibited increases in left-sided anterior activation associated with decreases in negative
affect and increases in positive affect (Davidson et al., 2003). Even a 15-minute focused
breathing task was associated with lower negative affect and emotional volatility, and an
increased tolerance of and greater tendency to view negative stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006).
Learning to label affective states during mindfulness meditation may improve the ability of
the prefrontal cortex in regulating limbic responses to daily experiences (Creswell, Way,
Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007), which could reduce negative response to external
environmental stimuli.
Perhaps the most consistent research exploring the use of mindfulness in treating negative
affect is Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression (MBCT), an eight-week
mindfulness-based treatment aimed at reducing depressive relapse (Segal, Williams, &
Teasdale, 2002). Research has found that MBCT reduces relapse rates in individuals with
three or more previous episodes of depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000),
 Neuroticism & Meditation 229

and there is recent evidence that MBCT is also effective for patients who are actively
depressed (Kenny & Williams, 2007).
Within the MBCT literature, it has been speculated that depressive relapse in individuals
is associated by the reactivation of autonomous processes such as rumination and that
mindfulness helps to disrupt the activation of these processes during periods of dysphoria (Ma
& Teasdale, 2004; Coelho, Canter, & Ernst, 2007). There is evidence that rumination
mediates the relationship between neuroticism and depression (Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, &
Arntz, 2008). Stressful events may activate rumination in individuals high in neuroticism,
increasing symptoms of depression (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005).
Roelofs et al. found that rumination on sadness was related to greater depression but
rumination on the causes of sadness was related to lower depression. They authors suggest
these results support Teasdale, Segal, and Williams‘ (1995) argument that mindful awareness
of emotional processes may be adaptive in regulating mood.
Individuals high in neuroticism are more likely to make negative attributions of
experiences such as emotions, life events, and the actions of others (DeNeve & Cooper,
1998). In others words, individuals higher in neuroticism perceive experiences as more
globally threatening. The practice of mindfulness may change core ways in which individuals
prone towards negative thinking relate to internal and external experiences. Less mindful
individuals tend to be more biased by their preconceptions in their perceptions of stimuli,
using an encoding style associated with higher scores on neuroticism (Herndon, 2008). By
contrast, more mindful people may draw from a greater range of environmental stimuli. Their
perceptions are likely to be less biased towards negative interpretation of events. Mindfulness
also appears to change how individuals retrieve memories. In retrieving memories, more
mindful individuals are more likely to retrieve specific memories, whereas less mindful
people are more likely to create a generalization than a specific memory (Williams, Teasdale,
Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). What this means is that when asked to retrieve a childhood memory,
less mindfulness individuals are more likely to recall having a ―bad‖ childhood, based not on
specific memories but on a negative composite memory. By contrast, more mindful
individuals are more likely to retrieve specific memories that may include both negative and
positive experiences in childhood.
For individuals high in neuroticism, participation in mindfulness-based treatments may
help reduce the incidence of depression, and may impact their degree of neuroticism.
Depressed individuals tend to rate high on neuroticism, suggesting that neuroticism is a
shared feature of negative affect (Weinstock & Whisman, 2006). Individuals high in
neuroticism are more likely to view daily life events as stressful and more likely to develop
depression following exposure to daily stressors (Hutchinson & Williams, 2007). Through the
cultivation of mindfulness, individuals high in neuroticism may cultivate greater acceptance
of experiences, reducing rumination and subsequent depression. This change in perspective
may in turn lower scores of measures of neuroticism. However, this is only speculation at this
time, as there is no supporting data. There is evidence that personality dispositions such as
neuroticism may change over time, but that they may be also resistant to therapeutic
interventions (Brody, 1994); consequently, it is unclear if mindfulness-based interventions
may actually impact neuroticism.
230 Brian L. Thompson

CONCLUSION
Although a significant body of research has appeared within the last 30 years exploring
the impact of meditation in individuals high in neuroticism, the study of neuroticism has not
extended into the current literature of mindfulness-based treatments except as a means to
assess the psychometric properties of self-report measures of mindfulness (Baer, Smith, &
Allen, 2004; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, et al., 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003). These studies drew
from Costa and McCrae‘s NEO questionnaires, the most validated Big Five personality
measures (John & Srivastava, 1999).
Although his review of the literature is outdated, many of the conclusions of Delmonte
(1987) remain relevant. For one, meditators appear to exhibit higher psychological distress—
particularly neuroticism—than the general population. Secondly, although meditation may
lead to a reduction in psychological distress, those with particularly high levels of distress are
more likely to stop meditating. Delmonte warns against prescribing meditation as a mean to
improve psychological functioning, stating that:

Meditation is a self-directed and active process in which a technique is used by a person (not
on a person) in the context of particular subjective expectations and objectives. For this reason
meditation may not be readily dispensed, like medication, to anxious or depressed patients if
they show little motivation to practice. (p. 132)

Given the success of mindfulness-based interventions such as MBCT in treating

depressive relapse (Segal et al., 2002), exploration of the impact of mindfulness meditation on
neuroticism—and neuroticism on the impact of mindfulness meditation treatment—may be a
fruitful area of continued study. To date, no research using measures of neuroticism has been
conducted within the context of mindfulness meditation-based interventions designed to treat
specific conditions. There is some evidence that personality traits can predict response to
treatment for depression, although the research examining the relationship between
neuroticism and treatment outcome for depression has not yielded consistent findings (Bagby
& Quilty, 2006).
A few suggestions for areas of future study will be made here. For one, as mindfulness-
based treatments have exhibited high retention rates in populations such as individuals with
chronic pain and those between depressive episodes (e.g., Baer, 2003), it would be
worthwhile to compare personality profiles of individuals who complete treatment against
those who drop out. It is possible that high levels of neuroticism may be a possible rule-out in
recommending individuals for mindfulness meditation. For example, Bagby et al. (2008)
found that individuals high in neuroticism may be too emotionally dysregulated to respond to
traditional CBT without first being stabilized on an SSRI. For individuals high enough in
neuroticism to become easily dysregulated, perhaps Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT)
mindfulness skills may be more clinically valuable than mindfulness meditation, as it was
developed for people who are too reactive to engage in sitting meditation (Linehan, 1993).
Individuals with high levels of psychological distress may still benefit from meditation, but it
may be prudent to begin orienting these individuals to mindfulness practices that are less
intense than sitting meditation (e.g., DBT mindfulness skills training).
Secondly, it would be interesting to track potential personality changes over time among
individuals beginning meditation. Although personality is considered stable after age 30, it
 Neuroticism & Meditation 231

has been suggested that psychotherapy may bring about changes in personality (McCrae,
1991). The response of neuroticism to mindfulness-based interventions is difficult to predict,
as research thus far has also suggested that neuroticism may be resistant to psychological
intervention (Brody, 1994). Nonetheless, some of the earlier research with TM suggests
regular meditation practice may reduce levels of neuroticism. As acceptance and mindfulness-
based treatments continue to proliferate (e.g., Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004), it is
important to determine who may benefit from them. The potential response of neuroticism to
mindfulness meditation is largely unknown, but there is enough research to suggest that
preliminary study is worthwhile.

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In: Psychology of Neuroticism and Shame ISBN: 978-1-60876-870-7
Editor: Raymond G. Jackson, pp. 235-238 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 13

NEUROTICISM AND PSYCHOTICISM AS CORRELATES

OF SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR

David Lester
The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey

ABSTRACT
A review of research indicated that suicidal behavior is consistently associated with
Eysenck‘s measures of neuroticism and psychoticism. It is suggested that future research
should explore the value of a zonal analysis involving these two traits in identifying
different rates and types of suicidal behavior.

INTRODUCTION
It is well established that suicidal behavior is more common in those who are
psychiatrically disturbed (Lester, 2000). A number of studies have explored the association of
suicidality with scores on Hans Eysenck‘s psychological inventories, and it is of interest to
explore whether suicidality is associated with the dimensions of neuroticism, psychoticism or
both. This paper reviews the research on this issue.

ATTEMPTED SUICIDES
Ashton, et al. (1994) found that a sample of English attempted suicides had higher
neuroticism and psychoticism scores than normal control subjects on the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (EPQ: Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Repeaters did not differ from first-timers in
neuroticism or psychoticism.
Roy (2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b), in large samples of American patients dependent on
opiates or cocaine, found that those who had previously attempted suicide were more neurotic
236 David Lester

on the EPQ. They also had higher psychoticism scores in one of the three studies. Black and
white attempted suicides did not differ in neuroticism or psychoticism scores..
Roy (1998) compared depressed American patients who had a history of attempted
suicide and those who had no such history with healthy controls on the EPQ. The three
groups did not differ in psychoticism scores, and the depressed patients who had attempted
suicide did not differ in neuroticism scores from the patients who had not attempted suicide
(but both groups had higher neuroticism scores than the healthy controls).
Lolas, et al. (1991) found that both neuroticism and psychoticism scores on the EPQ were
positively associated with past and current suicidal ideation in a sample of female women in
Chile who had attempted suicide within the past month. Psychoticism scores, but not
neuroticism scores, were associated with the number of prior suicide attempts. Nordstrom,
et al. (1995) found that a sample of Swedish attempted suicides scored higher on
psychoticism and neuroticism than surgical controls on the EPQ.

Self-Mutilators

Roy (1978) found that nonpsychotic self-mutilators (cutters) had higher neuroticism
scores than non-mutilating patients with personality disorders (and also had made more prior
suicide attempts) but did not differ in psychoticism on the EPQ as compared to other
psychiatric patients.

Normal Subjects

Mehryar, et al. (1977) found that American college students who had thought about
suicide had higher psychoticism and neuroticism scores on one of Eysenck‘s tests (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1968). In a sample of American college students, Lester (1987) found that a history
of threatening suicide or suicidal ideation, but not attempting suicide, was associated with
higher neuroticism and psychoticism scores using the same test.
Irfani (1978) found that Iranian college and high school students who had thought about
suicide had higher psychoticism and neuroticism scores on the EPQ than nonsuicidal
students. This result was replicated in a sample of Turkish college students. In a sample of
Australian adults, Ross, et al. (1983) found that those with a history of suicidal ideation had
higher neuroticism and psychoticism scores on the EPQ than those who had not.

DISCUSSION
The results of these studies are summarized in Table 1 where it can be seen that both
neuroticism and psychoticism are associated with suicidality in both normal subjects and in
psychiatric patients. There are occasional failures to find these associations, but it is too early
to speculate on the reasons for these occasional failures
 Neuroticism versus Psychoticism as Correlates of Suicidal Behavior 237

Table 1. A summary of the research

Suicidality & Suicidality &

neuroticism psychoticism
Attempted suicides
Ashton, et al. (1994) positive positive
Lolas, et al. (1991) current ideation positive positive
prior ideation positive positive
prior attempts ns positive
Nordstrom, et al. (1995) positive positive
Roy (1998) ns ns
Roy (2001) positive ns
Roy (2002) positive ns
Roy (2003a) positive positive
Self-Mutilation
Roy (1978) positive ns
Normal Subjects
Irfani (1978) positive positive
Lester (1987) positive positive
Mehryar, et al. (1977) positive positive
Ross, et al. (1983) positive positive
ns: no significant association or differences

Eysenck (1967) was interested in zone analyses, that is, combining extraversion and
neuroticism to form four types: stable introverts, stable extraverts, neurotic introverts and
neurotic extraverts. Eysenck never explored a typology based on neuroticism and
psychoticism. It would be of great interest to explore whether the rates and types of suicidal
behavior differ in the four types derived from such a typology (non-N and non-P, N and non-
P, P and non-N, and N and P). It is hoped that this paper will stimulate such research in the
future.

REFERENCES
Ashton, C. H., Marshall, E. F., Hassanyeh, F., Marsh, V. R. & Wright-Honari, S. (1994).
Biological correlates of deliberate self-harm. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 90, 316-
323.
Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1968). The measurement of psychoticism. British
Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 7, 286-294.
Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire. London: Hodder & Stoughton..
Irfani, S. (1978). Personality correlates of suicidal tendencies among Iranian and Turkish
students. Journal of Psychology, 99, 151-153.
Lester, D. (1987). Suicidal preoccupation and dysthymia in college students. Psychological
Reports, 61, 762.
Lester, D. (2000). Why people kill themselves. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas.
238 David Lester

Lolas, F., Gomez, A. & Suareez, L. (1991). EPQ-R and suicide attempt. Personality &
Individual Differences, 12, 899-902.
Mehryar, A., Hekmat, H. & Khajavi, R. (1977). Some personality correlates of contemplated
suicide. Psychological Reports, 40, 1291-1294.
Nordstrom, P., Schalling, D. & Asberg, M. (1995). Temperamental vulnerability in attempted
suicide. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 92, 155-160.
Ross, M. W., Clayer, J. & Campbell, R. (1983). Parental rearing patterns and suicidal
thoughts. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67, 429-433.
Roy, A. (1978). Self-mutilation. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 51, 201-203.
Roy, A. (1998). Is introversion a risk factor for suicidal behavior in depression?
Psychological Medicine, 28, 1457-1461.
Roy, A. (2001). Characteristics of cocaine-dependent patients who attempt suicide. American
Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 1215-1219.
Roy, A. (2002). Characteristics of opiate dependent patients who attempt suicide. Journal of
Clinical Psychiatry, 63, 403-407.
Roy, A. (2003a). Characteristics of drug addicts who attempt suicide. Psychiatry Research,
121, 99-103.
Roy, A. (2003b). African American and Caucasian attempters compared for suicide risk
factors. Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior, 33, 443-447.
 INDEX

age, 8, 29, 38, 93, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120,
A 121, 122, 123, 128, 133, 134, 146, 157, 161, 166,
167, 172, 181, 208, 230
abusive, 176, 178
agents, 87, 91, 218
academic performance, 34, 217, 219, 222
aggression, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 121, 122, 124,
academic success, 208, 219
187
academic tasks, 220
aggressiveness, xi, 109
accidents, 179
aging, 8, 21, 29, 32, 208, 210
accounting, 12, 68, 212
agreeableness, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20,
accuracy, 78, 115
21, 22, 24, 26, 71
achievement, xiii, 6, 9, 25, 27, 34, 35, 172, 173, 183,
aid, 53, 92
184, 188, 192, 193, 194, 212, 215, 217, 220, 222,
alcohol, 8, 21, 22, 23, 73, 86, 88, 179, 198, 204, 206,
223
209
ACM, 78, 83
alcohol consumption, 8
activation, 50, 62, 63, 78, 79, 131, 149, 228, 229
alcohol use, 198, 204
acute, 15, 17, 26, 32, 46, 49, 62, 63, 78
alcoholics, 30
acute stress, 15, 17, 32, 62, 63
algorithm, 208
adaptation, xiii, 25, 183, 222
alpha, 134, 135, 136
addiction, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 83, 119
altered state, 232
adjustment, 8, 12, 19, 25, 26, 208
alternative, 16, 23, 33, 67, 86, 89, 90, 132, 149, 200,
administration, xi, 85
201, 227
administrators, 90
alternatives, 90, 171
adolescence, xii, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 222
alters, 220
adolescents, 19, 27, 79, 170, 171, 172, 173, 195, 208,
altruism, 6
218, 223
American Psychiatric Association, 131, 147
adult, xi, xii, 31, 109, 111, 114, 169, 170, 171, 172,
American Psychological Association, 35, 126, 128,
173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182
165, 166, 194
adulthood, xii, 14, 21, 80, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174,
amygdala, 63, 79
175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182
anger, 27, 30, 31, 87, 110, 111, 124, 130, 134, 152,
adults, xii, 8, 21, 28, 169, 172, 173, 174, 178, 179,
154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 187
180, 181, 236
angina, 9
adverse event, 130
angioplasty, 9
advertising, 176, 178
animals, 175
aesthetics, 6, 9, 60, 80
antagonism, 6, 9, 26, 160
aetiology, 73
antecedents, 77, 212, 218
affective disorder, 28
antibody, 15, 32
affective reactions, 32
antisocial behaviour, 66
affective states, 228
antithesis, 49
240 Index

anxiety, x, xii, 6, 8, 9, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 35, 59, 62,
65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81,
B
82, 111, 122, 124, 130, 146, 147, 148, 169, 171,
back, 40, 41, 43, 44, 49, 50, 55, 75, 76, 86, 87, 89,
172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 190,
90, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107,
208, 212, 216, 224, 231, 233
118, 133, 134, 135, 145, 147, 149, 155, 156, 160,
anxiety disorder, 26, 35, 77, 231, 233
171, 188, 189, 193, 226
APA, 231
barrier, 164
appraisals, 25, 28, 29, 30
barriers, 89, 91, 207, 227
aptitude, 34, 39
basketball, 120
archetype, 39
Beck Depression Inventory, 68
arcus senilis, 28
behavioral effects, 34
argument, 6, 10, 44, 51, 160, 226, 229
behavioral medicine, 3
arousal, 9, 63, 64, 65, 82, 233
behavioral sciences, 147
artery, 28
behaviours, x, xi, xiv, 59, 61, 66, 69, 73, 74, 75, 80,
arthritis, 9, 149
109, 111, 114, 205, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217, 218,
ash, 52
220, 222
aspiration, 67
beliefs, 124, 170, 173, 178, 181, 184, 190, 191, 193
assault, 90
benefits, 75, 221, 231, 232
assaults, 111, 112, 190
benign, 4, 5
assertiveness, 6, 9, 189
betrayal, 117
assessment, 4, 5, 78, 206, 209, 231, 233
bias, 8, 17, 29, 201, 203, 205, 209
assessment tools, 5
Big Five personality factors, 32, 130, 198
assignment, 67, 202, 227
Big Five traits, 17, 20, 28
assimilation, 31
bile, 2
assumptions, 191, 199, 202, 222
binding, 28
asthma, 8, 198
binge drinking, 179
athletes, 216
biopsychology, 82
attachment, 71, 112
bipolar, 185, 189
attacks, 25, 164
birth, 3, 120
attitudes, 30, 80, 187, 191, 200, 207, 210, 217
BIS, 17
attribution, 228
blame, 19, 30, 48, 68, 115, 116, 159
authenticity, 44, 45
blaming, 53
authoritarianism, 176, 178, 180
blocks, 203
authority, 92, 157, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181
blog, 70, 81
autobiographical memory, 234
blogs, 67, 70, 79
automatic processes, 74, 199
blood, 2, 8, 28, 154, 209
automaticity, 74, 77
blood clot, 28
automatization, 81
blood pressure, 154, 209
autonomic nervous system, 5, 16
body image, 217
autonomy, xii, 11, 12, 131, 169, 172, 174, 212, 215,
bonds, 41, 46, 89, 110, 112, 159
216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223
borderline, 233
availability, 227
borderline personality disorder, 233
aversion, 81
bottom-up, 26
avoidance, xiii, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 63, 65, 67,
boys, 21
68, 72, 131, 147, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
brain, 17, 62, 63, 80, 232
217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223
breakfast, 21
avoidance behavior, 131
breathing, 228, 231
avoidant, xiv, 131, 211, 212
brothers, 54
awareness, xiii, 45, 63, 74, 89, 90, 197, 199, 208,
browser, 68
228, 229
brutality, 48, 49
buffer, xiv, 211, 220
bullying, 89
burglary, 114
 Index 241

burn, 186 combined effect, 15, 20, 22

burnout, 158, 165 commodity, 180
bypass, 9 communication, x, 38, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 71,
73, 75, 76, 79, 82, 92, 223
communication technologies, 60, 73, 75, 76
C communities, 86, 89, 91
community, 8, 27, 28, 46, 59, 60, 70, 75, 86, 87, 89,
cancer, 8, 210
90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
cardiology, 6
107, 113, 118, 119, 120, 153, 159, 166, 167, 189
cardiovascular disease, 8
community service, 86
caregivers, 17, 28, 29
compassion, 44, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135, 188
category a, 115, 116, 203
compensation, xii, 151, 153
catharsis, 70
competence, 6, 44, 186, 212, 214, 218, 220
catholic, xi, 85
competency, 27, 193
causal inference, 146
competitiveness, 6
causality, 24, 218, 219, 221, 223
compliance, 6, 89, 227
cellular phone, 79
components, 24, 166, 191
channels, 60
comprehension, 51
childbirth, 172
computer self-efficacy, 78
childcare, 160
computer technology, 61
childhood, 117, 118, 119, 174, 178, 181, 207, 229
concentration, 226
children, 19, 21, 22, 28, 89, 90, 159, 167, 172
conception, 170
cholesterol, 28
conceptualization, 6
chronic pain, 149, 230
concordance, 223
chronic stress, 23, 30, 63
concrete, 50, 53
cigarette smoking, 198, 204
conditioned response, 75
cigarettes, 204, 206
conditioning, 44, 48
classical, 152
condom, 210
classification, 10, 35, 69, 148, 182
Conduct Disorder, 125
classroom, 86, 90
confession, 87, 154
classrooms, 93
confidence, 17, 67, 121, 144, 156
clients, xiii, 183
conflict resolution, 87, 90
closure, 160, 181
conformity, xii, 170, 176, 177, 178, 180
cocaine, 235, 238
confrontation, 160
codes, 45, 157
confusion, xii, xiii, 169, 170, 172, 173, 179, 180, 183
coding, 114, 115
conscientiousness, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17,
coffee, 191
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 34, 65, 71, 73
cognition, 32, 36, 51, 77, 185, 191, 192, 199, 201,
conscious awareness, 199
202, 208, 221
consciousness, 81, 155, 185
cognitive ability, 209
consent, 75, 92, 133
cognitive capacity, 199
conservation, xiv, 211
cognitive effort, 199
consolidation, 25, 77
cognitive load, 200
constraints, 69
cognitive process, 191
construct validity, 34, 207, 228, 233
cognitive psychology, 210
construction, 47, 83, 106, 189, 201
cognitive style, 16, 30
consultants, 14
cognitive therapy, xiii, 133, 183, 184, 190, 194, 231,
consumption, 8
232, 233, 234
continuity, 170
cohesion, 189
control group, 91
cohort, 33, 210
convergence, 18
collaboration, 104
conviction, xiii, 118, 183, 184, 192
college students, 31, 86, 99, 171, 195, 210, 236, 237
coping strategies, 4, 5, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25,
colleges, 86
26, 27, 29, 30, 63, 65, 72, 75
colors, 50, 149
242 Index

coping strategy, 16, 21 decisions, xii, 169, 172, 175, 177, 178, 179
coronary artery disease, 28 decoding, 60
coronary heart disease, 6, 22, 26, 27, 34 defects, 45
corporations, 59, 88 defence, xi, 109
correlation, 13, 66, 136, 138, 139, 140, 145, 147, 208 defendants, 92
correlations, xiii, 11, 12, 13, 24, 68, 136, 138, 139, defense, x, 37, 170, 171, 173
140, 143, 144, 197, 200, 205 defense mechanisms, 173
corruption, 53 deficiency, 77
cortex, 228 deficit, 16
cortisol, 15, 32, 63, 198 definition, 4, 40, 154, 171, 231
costs, 177, 221 degradation, 91
courts, 91, 187 delinquency, 88
covering, 157 demand characteristic, 209
crack, 116 dementia, 29, 157
creativity, 130, 208 democracy, 185
credibility, 24 demographic characteristics, 9
credit, 120, 133, 134 demoralization, 5
crime, x, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, denial, 19
99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 110 dependent variable, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142
crimes, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 107 depreciation, 48
criminal behavior, 89, 91, 179 depressed, 2, 159, 160, 162, 179, 229, 230, 232, 234,
criminal justice, x, 85, 86, 90, 91, 93, 97, 98, 99, 236
100, 102, 103, 107, 162 depression, x, xii, xiii, xiv, 6, 8, 19, 25, 59, 62, 65,
criminal justice system, x, 85, 86, 90, 91, 103, 107, 66, 69, 71, 78, 82, 130, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153,
162 158, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 171, 178, 179, 180,
criminality, 88, 97 181, 183, 190, 192, 195, 208, 225, 226, 228, 229,
criminals, xi, 85, 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 230, 231, 233, 238
101, 102, 107 depressive symptoms, 22, 28, 195, 232
critical analysis, 177 deregulation, 5, 16
criticism, xiii, 3, 52, 174, 183, 185, 186 detection, 203, 207
cross-sectional, 30, 146 detention, 90
cross-sectional study, 30 deterrence, 87, 89, 94, 97, 107
crown, 52 diabetes, 9
crying, 160 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
cues, 64, 75 Disorders, 10, 35, 131
cultivation, 38, 42, 48, 53, 55, 229 diet, 21
cultural norms, 123, 164 differential treatment, 231
culture, xii, 27, 123, 151, 152, 153, 155, 170, 173, differentiation, 43
177, 180 diffusion, 172, 179
curiosity, 228 digital divide, 75
cutters, 236 dignity, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 110, 112, 113,
cyberspace, 59 152, 153
cytokines, 198 disabilities, 19, 28
disability, 206
disabled, 162, 163
D disappointment, 116
disaster, 190
danger, 49, 63, 88, 131, 145, 158, 171
discipline, x, 3, 6, 37, 95, 97, 187
dangerousness, 162
disclosure, 82, 148, 166
database, 157, 163
discomfort, 24
death, 8, 116, 179, 182
discounting, 191
debt, 72
discrimination, 112, 121, 124, 201, 202, 203
decay, 56
discrimination tasks, 202
decision making, 16, 64, 80
 Index 243

disease model, 73 elders, 51, 54, 171

disease progression, 9, 29 emotion, xiii, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 32, 54, 64,
diseases, 7 65, 75, 80, 83, 110, 123, 136, 146, 148, 153, 154,
disequilibrium, 49 155, 156, 159, 167, 210, 211, 212, 220
disinhibition, 69, 82 emotion regulation, 148
disorder, 9, 26, 35, 83, 221 emotional conflict, 62
disposition, 8, 35, 38, 43, 184 emotional distress, 10, 14, 18, 21, 27, 72, 186
dissociation, 199, 201, 206 emotional experience, 130, 149, 154, 223
distortions, 190, 202 emotional intelligence, xi, 64, 80, 129, 130, 133,
distraction, 18 138, 143, 144, 148, 149, 209
distress, 4, 7, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, 25, 34, 35, 65, 70, emotional processes, 152, 163, 164, 229
82, 230 emotional reactions, xiv, 158, 211
divergence, 205 emotional responses, 32, 64
diversity, 49, 172 emotional stability, 12, 23, 201, 202
division, 130 emotional state, 35, 136, 153, 160
divorce, 22, 117 emotionality, 7, 9, 18, 21, 22, 24, 62
doctors, 27 empathy, 133, 135, 140, 142, 144
domestic violence, 89 employment, 33, 38, 50, 57, 89, 91, 92, 118, 121,
dominance, 113 162, 209
double jeopardy, 175 empowerment, 83
dream, 222 encoding, 60, 208, 229, 232
drinking, 21, 86, 179, 182, 204, 206 endurance, 20
drug abuse, 22 energy, 135, 171, 185
drug addict, 114, 118, 119, 121, 238 engagement, 23, 29, 82, 87, 205, 206, 212, 213, 217,
drug addiction, 114, 118, 119, 121 218
drug use, 23, 179 entertainment, 66
drug-related, 114 enthusiasm, 130, 145
drugs, 73, 86, 116, 118, 119, 179 entrapment, 165
drunk driving, 22, 104 environment, 5, 34, 66, 67, 86, 111, 113, 118, 212,
DSM, ix, 1, 2, 10, 27, 33, 35, 130 216, 219
dualism, 2 environmental factors, 145
due process, 87 environmental stimuli, 229
duration, 4 epidemiology, 3
duties, 53 epigenetic, xii, 169
dynamical system, 223 equality, 185
dynamical systems, 223 equilibrium, 4, 41, 152
dysphoria, 229 equity, 53
dysregulated, 230 ergonomics, 60
dysthymia, 237 ester, 236
ethical standards, 47
ethics, 43, 47, 53, 54, 174, 178, 180, 181
E ethnic groups, 147, 200
ethnicity, 133, 134
ears, 50, 57
etiology, 5, 13
earth, 50, 53
evil, x, 37, 38
eating, x, 21, 37, 221
evolution, 25, 209
ecological, 33
excitation, 62, 64
ecology, 29
exclusion, 74, 112, 121, 124
education, 1, 33, 34, 93, 98, 104, 105, 221, 223, 224
excuse, 78, 79, 110
educational research, 222
execution, 46, 48
ego, xi, 109, 111, 112, 121, 122, 170, 171, 172, 178,
exercise, 21, 23, 192, 198, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209,
179, 180, 182, 212
217, 221, 222, 233
ego strength, 179
existentialism, 56, 182
elderly, 7, 206
244 Index

experimental condition, 227 foreclosure, 172

exploitation, 113 forgiveness, 88, 188
exposure, ix, 1, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, fragility, 217
25, 27, 34, 45, 62, 63, 78, 118, 229 framing, 219, 223
expressivity, 38, 40 franchise, 60
external environment, 228 free choice, 180
external validation, 112, 122, 123 free will, 171
extraversion, xi, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, freedom, xii, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178,
17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 33, 35, 36, 62, 64, 179, 180, 181, 182
66, 71, 81, 129, 131, 132, 138, 140, 143, 144, freedom of choice, 178
148, 210, 237 freedoms, 174
extrinsic motivation, 212, 214, 220 friendship, 70, 113
extrinsic rewards, 221 friendship networks, 113
eye contact, 159 frustration, 30, 56, 118, 170, 190
eyes, xii, 38, 50, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 170, 173 fulfillment, 184
functional magnetic resonance imaging, 62

F
G
fabric, 46
facilitators, 86 gallbladder, 9
factor analysis, 12, 228 gambling, 73, 79, 82
failure, 35, 119, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 170, 184, games, 81
186, 191, 192, 193, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219, 222, gangs, 113
223 gender, 8, 21, 93, 95, 102, 222
faith, x, 37, 87, 119, 121, 124, 160, 171 genealogy, 38, 40, 50
familial, 9 generalization, 193, 229
family, 14, 25, 39, 46, 67, 71, 72, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, generativity, 172, 181
112, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 152, 153, 154, 162, genetics, 16, 36
174, 184, 192 genotype, 24
family conflict, 14, 25 genre, 79
family environment, 89, 117, 120, 174 girls, 21
family life, 116 glasses, 149
family members, 88, 120, 152 goal-directed, 20, 212, 215
family relationships, 112 goals, x, 4, 17, 27, 35, 61, 85, 147, 188, 189, 193,
fatigue, 161 200, 201, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222,
fear, 46, 55, 63, 80, 87, 89, 90, 112, 130, 134, 152, 223
154, 155, 160, 174 goodness of fit, 28
fear response, 63 gossip, 87, 88, 186
feedback, 24, 60, 122, 212, 215 government, 60, 76, 79, 80, 82, 176
feet, 50 government intervention, 76
females, 38, 68, 70, 93, 99, 100, 102, 103, 147 grades, 216, 219
fidelity, 172 greed, 96, 99
financial problems, 163 grief, 156, 159
fire, 44, 48 groups, x, 59, 68, 76, 77, 87, 88, 113, 146, 147, 156,
firms, 88 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 172, 178, 192, 200,
first-time, 235 236
five-factor model, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 81, 207, growth, 4, 11, 12, 13, 54, 147, 195, 212
208, 228, 233 guidelines, 75, 136
flavor, 38 guilt, xiii, 62, 86, 88, 91, 92, 130, 134, 155, 158,
flooding, 49 183, 184, 188, 195, 213, 221, 222, 223, 224
flow, 184, 191 guilt feelings, 62, 184
focusing, 24, 111, 122, 131, 145, 218, 226 guilty, 186, 188
food, x, 37, 39, 41, 43, 52
 Index 245

humane, 44, 92
H humanity, xii, 169
humans, 44, 46, 47, 55, 56, 170, 175, 177
handling, 40
humiliation, xii, 40, 41, 45, 55, 110, 112, 151, 152,
hands, 40, 43, 50, 178
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165
happiness, 12, 29, 33, 52, 78, 154
husband, 41, 116, 176
harassment, 114
hypertension, 198, 208
harm, x, 4, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 107, 114, 187, 190,
hypochondriasis, 8
237
hypocrisy, 187
harmony, 190
hypothalamus, 62
hate, 116
hypothesis, 8, 16, 28, 133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 215
healing, 91, 92, 185, 187, 190
health behaviors, 29
health care system, 159 I
health effects, 166
health problems, 9, 24, 26, 29, 130, 179, 204 ice, 48
health psychology, 30, 31, 33 identification, 15, 171, 178, 189
health status, ix, 1, 7, 8, 30 identity, xi, xii, 46, 53, 69, 71, 82, 109, 110, 111,
health-promoting behaviors, 205 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,
heart, 6, 9, 22, 26, 27, 34, 57, 62, 63, 198 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178,
heart disease, 6, 22, 198 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 188
heart failure, 9 identity achievement, 172
heart rate, 62, 63 identity diffusion, 179
hedonic, ix, 1, 11, 33 identity foreclosure, 178
helplessness, 24 identity moratorium, 172
heredity, 17 ideology, 171
heterogeneous, 10, 24 imagery, 110
high blood pressure, 8 images, 191
high pressure, 16 imagination, 154
high risk, 90 imaging, 62
high school, 216, 223, 236 imaging techniques, 62
high scores, 9, 62 immigrants, 163
higher quality, 213 immune function, 232
HIV, 9, 29, 210 immune system, 5, 15, 209
holistic, 91 impairments, 78
holistic approach, 91 implicit association test, 207, 208
honesty, 187 imprisonment, 112, 119, 125
Hong Kong, 105, 106 impulsive, 204, 210
hormone, 31 impulsiveness, 6, 11
hospital, 159 impulsivity, 11, 74, 77
host, 50 in situ, 51, 64
hostility, 6, 11, 19, 27, 31, 91, 170, 176, 177 incarceration, 87
housing, 89, 91, 118, 162 incentive, 214
human, x, xi, 33, 37, 38, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, incidence, xiv, 27, 28, 225, 229
57, 60, 80, 82, 83, 129, 130, 131, 144, 145, 148, inclusion, 167
151, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 184, 193, incompatibility, 214
195, 209 indecisiveness, 19
human condition, 175 independence, 174
human development, 55 indication, 218
human dignity, 47 indicators, xi, 68, 113, 129, 159, 172
human experience, xi, 129, 131, 145, 174 indices, 201
human information processing, 60, 82 indirect measure, 199
human nature, 44, 174 individual differences, 8, 17, 22, 208, 218, 222
human will, 44, 49 individuality, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181
246 Index

individualization, 180, 182 intervention strategies, ix, 1, 23

induction, 231 interview, 57, 110, 114, 159
industrialized societies, 172, 174 intimacy, xii, 169, 172, 173, 178, 181, 187
inequality, 163, 164 intimidation, 157
inertia, 34, 210 intrinsic, 44, 48, 50, 57, 212, 214, 216, 217, 219,
infancy, 11 220, 221, 222, 223
inferences, 64 intrinsic motivation, 213, 214, 216, 217, 220, 221
inferiority, xiii, 110, 156, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, intrinsic value, 48, 214, 219
188, 189, 191, 192 introspection, 199, 200
inflammatory, 198 introversion, 21, 23, 68, 69, 238
information and communication technologies, 60, introvert, 77
73, 75 invasive, 49
information processing, 60, 63, 64 inventories, 201, 235
Information Technology, 79 irrationality, 62, 65, 68
informed consent, 133 irritability, 6, 25
ingestive behavior, 80 isolation, 66, 67, 90, 144, 175, 176, 177, 181
inherited, 45, 50
inhibition, 64, 131, 212
inhuman, 44, 46 J
initiation, 4, 218
job performance, 6, 29
inmates, 87, 88
job satisfaction, 6, 11, 25, 30
insecurity, 122, 123, 175
jobs, 16, 163, 190
insight, 221, 226
judge, 51
inspectors, 89
jurisdiction, 46
inspiration, 56, 161
justice, x, xi, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,
instability, 62, 172, 217
94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107,
institutions, 117, 118, 157
186, 187, 188
instruction, 200, 203
justification, 110
instruments, 31, 65
juveniles, 88, 103
insults, 113
integration, xii, 10, 43, 50, 64, 70, 136, 169, 210
integrity, 41, 46, 48, 49, 170, 188, 209 L
intelligence, 31, 64, 80, 91, 133, 148, 233
intentions, 72, 92 labeling, 86, 87, 89, 232
interaction, 23, 27, 40, 60, 61, 66, 67, 71, 73, 77, 87, land, 39
88, 92, 204, 226 language, 27, 38, 43, 44, 47, 54, 89, 110, 154, 186,
interaction effect, 88 228
interactions, 25, 67, 69, 71, 72, 81, 121, 122, 131, latency, 171
219 law, 17, 74, 81, 86, 87, 89, 160, 185
interface, 69 law enforcement, 87
internal value, 50 leadership, 193
internalised, 213 learning, 54, 73, 80, 192, 213, 217, 221, 222, 223
internalization, 190, 194, 221, 222, 223 learning process, 223
internalizing, 148 leg, 90
international students, 14, 27 legislation, 60
internet, x, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, leisure, 66, 217, 222
74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 liberation, 185
interpersonal conflict, 14, 34 life course, xii, 169, 175, 178, 179, 180
interpersonal relations, 12, 89, 91, 212 life cycle, 182
interpersonal relationships, 89, 91, 212 life experiences, 114, 170
interrelations, 56 life satisfaction, 11
intervention, ix, xiii, 1, 23, 24, 76, 90, 124, 145, 183, life stressors, 172
185, 221, 231 lift, 192
 Index 247

likelihood, 4, 5, 8, 88, 110, 219, 227 medical school, 15, 34

limbic system, 62 medication, 230
limitations, xi, 10, 24, 30, 109, 145, 146, 188 meditation, xiv, 145, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232,
linguistic, 43, 186 233
links, 110, 198, 203, 209, 210, 233 melancholic, 2
listening, 46, 117 membership, 10
liver disease, 9 memory, 63, 77, 78, 80, 117, 199, 200, 210, 229, 234
living arrangements, 172 memory performance, 78
local community, 153 men, 7, 77, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
location, x, 37, 146 121, 122, 124, 156, 159, 162, 188, 208
locus, 32, 34, 189, 218, 223 mental disorder, 9, 147
logging, 76 mental health, ix, 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 24, 164, 188, 198
loneliness, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 80, 82, 175, 177 mental illness, 162, 164, 165
long period, 200 mental state, 11
longevity, ix, 1, 3, 198, 207 messages, x, 59, 60, 68, 70, 75
longitudinal study, 21, 31 meta-analysis, 10, 11, 20, 26, 27, 62, 78, 200, 201,
love, xii, 47, 54, 118, 155, 169, 170, 173, 175, 176, 208, 227, 232
178, 181, 184, 186, 188, 192 metaphor, 48
lung, 8 middle class, 174
lung cancer, 8 middle-aged, 27
lying, 117, 153 midlife, 33
migraine, 8
migration, 167
M mind-body, 2
minorities, 174
magnetic resonance imaging, 62
minority, 120, 146, 162, 184
mainstream, 92
minority groups, 162
maintenance, 186, 190, 221, 228
minority students, 146
major depression, 29, 231, 233
mirror, 170, 190
maladaptive, ix, xiii, 1, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21,
mobile phone, 60, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81,
23, 24, 34, 64, 68, 91, 211, 212, 215, 216, 219,
82
220
mobility, 87
males, 38, 66, 70, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 147
models, 3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 21, 22, 30, 35, 60, 62,
malicious, 186
73, 74, 82, 148, 164, 200, 201, 210
management, 18, 73, 86, 90, 157, 209
moderates, 15, 16, 18, 21, 200, 220
manipulation, 113
moderators, 26, 30, 31, 32
manslaughter, 114
modern society, xii, 151, 155, 156, 177
marital quality, 29
money, 120, 185
market, 60, 69
mood, 4, 9, 15, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 43, 62, 66, 82,
marketing, 83, 180
135, 140, 143, 160, 195, 209, 210, 229, 231
marriage, 172
mood change, 160
masculinity, xi, 109, 113, 123, 124
mood disorder, 62, 66
mask, 177
moral code, 51
mastery, 11, 12, 13, 29, 41, 149, 212, 217, 220, 222
moral standards, 44, 45
materialism, 180
morality, x, 37, 50, 53
mathematicians, 147
morals, 38, 47, 174
mathematics, 186
moratorium, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181
meanings, 33
morbidity, 210
measurement, xiii, 32, 33, 65, 81, 197, 199, 205,
morning, 120, 191, 192
206, 207, 209, 232, 237
mortality, ix, 1, 7, 8, 22, 33, 36, 175, 198, 208, 210
media, 79, 83, 87, 88, 90
motion, 54, 147
median, 172
mediation, 31, 32, 86, 87, 88, 90, 103, 208, 217
mediators, 8, 146, 209
248 Index

motivation, xiii, 27, 80, 83, 114, 147, 148, 199, 200, normal, 7, 9, 69, 74, 92, 154, 184, 235, 236
207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, normal conditions, 74
220, 221, 222, 230 norms, xi, 23, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 89, 109,
motives, 45, 47, 207, 212, 215, 217 112, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 152, 155, 164, 170,
mouth, 57 176, 180
movement, 6, 40, 130, 131, 132, 144, 145, 146 nurse, 160
multidimensional, 27, 32, 184 nursing home, 89
multiple regression, 12, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, nuts, 165
141, 142, 147, 204
multiple regression analyses, 133, 136, 138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 204 O
multiple regression analysis, 12
obese, 158
multiples, 49
objectification, 157
muscle, 154
obligation, 23
mutual respect, 92
observations, 67, 159
myocardial infarction, 9, 26, 148
obsessive-compulsive, 178
occupational, 8, 14, 17, 19, 25, 28, 30, 32, 33, 88, 92,
N 170, 171, 172, 173, 181
oceans, 44
naloxone, 31 odds ratio, 9
narcissism, 195 offenders, xi, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96,
narcissistic, xiii, 183, 184 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 124
narcissistic personality disorder, xiii, 183 old age, 29
narratives, xi, 109, 114, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124 omission, 53
nation, x, 85 openness, 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 29,
National Youth Survey, 88 70, 187
Native American, 133, 134, 146 openness to experience, 70
natural, 44, 54, 56, 154, 192, 221 opiates, 235
natural science, 221 optimism, xi, 21, 30, 31, 129, 130, 132, 133, 139,
neck, 8, 154 140, 143, 144, 149, 181, 209
negative affectivity, 7, 14, 31, 34, 35, 68, 69, 75 optimists, 187
negative consequences, 72, 88, 154, 216 organic disease, 3, 8
negative coping, 65 organism, 61
negative emotions, 148, 212, 214, 216, 220 organizational justice, 80
negative experiences, 121 orientation, 152, 172, 180, 214, 218, 219, 220, 222
negative mood, 24, 195 outpatient, 232
negative outcomes, 17, 130, 131, 132, 145, 146, 213, overeating, 73
219
negative relation, 14, 144
negativity, 148 P
neglect, 145, 178
pain, 8, 24, 149, 230, 232
negotiating, 187
pairing, 202
nerve, 122
paradox, 80, 154
nervousness, 159
paradoxical, 155
neural systems, 131
paralysis, 3
neuroendocrine, 5
parental control, 174
neuropsychology, 148
parenting, 92, 189, 190
neurotic, x, 16, 24, 34, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75,
parents, xii, 19, 28, 42, 87, 88, 89, 90, 112, 116, 117,
76, 145, 149, 171, 172, 173, 176, 178, 180, 181,
118, 160, 169, 171, 172, 174, 178, 221
199, 203, 205, 228, 235, 237
passive, 20, 21, 187
next generation, 210
path model, 22
non-clinical, 10, 19
pathology, 5, 24
nonverbal, 166
 Index 249

pathways, 11, 16, 22, 24, 132, 210 plague, 194

patients, 9, 10, 14, 22, 26, 31, 68, 159, 162, 229, 230, planning, 19, 20
232, 234, 235, 236, 238 play, ix, 1, 8, 13, 22, 46, 116, 120, 131, 152, 205,
peer group, 113 218
peers, 86, 87, 88, 111, 112, 113, 114, 123, 124 police, 15, 30, 86, 90, 91, 92
penalty, 202 politics, 82
perceived control, 17, 25 poor, 15, 16, 19, 22, 68, 75, 162, 163, 215, 216
percentile, 8 poor health, 16
perception, 3, 7, 16, 28, 54, 56, 60, 80, 110, 112, poor performance, 68
123, 219 population, 2, 8, 9, 11, 27, 28, 36, 86, 99, 123, 148,
perceptions, x, xi, 85, 92, 95, 97, 99, 124, 162, 217, 157, 161, 164, 167, 226, 227, 230, 232
229 positive correlation, 68, 138, 139, 140, 200
perfectionism, xiii, 66, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, positive emotions, 6, 148, 149, 220
192, 193, 194, 195 positive relation, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 131, 143, 190
perseverance, 74 post-traumatic stress disorder, 9
personal goals, 27, 35 poverty, 52
personal identity, 170, 171, 177, 180, 184 power, x, 15, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 90, 111, 113,
personality characteristics, xi, 129, 131, 132, 144, 121, 144, 145, 146, 147, 157, 163, 176, 192, 205,
146, 200 209, 227
personality constructs, 11, 131 powers, 41, 44, 48
personality dimensions, 10, 29, 33, 62, 64, 65, 209 pre-adolescents, 223
personality disorder, ix, 1, 2, 9, 10, 33, 35, 236 prediction, 12, 82, 209
personality factors, 66, 71, 206 predictive validity, 3
personality inventories, 201 predictors, 11, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 69, 71, 75, 77,
personality measures, 3, 65, 146, 200, 201, 205, 206, 78, 79, 82, 132, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145,
225, 227, 230 148, 198, 204, 206, 208, 217
personality test, 201, 207 pre-existing, 203
personality traits, xiv, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29, preference, 67, 70, 72
31, 33, 34, 66, 185, 187, 198, 206, 209, 215, 225, prefrontal cortex, 228
226, 228, 230, 232 pregnant, 160
personality type, 2, 15, 20, 23, 35, 64 press, 217, 222
personhood, 184, 187 pressure, 8, 16, 68, 122, 154, 155, 158, 164, 180,
pessimism, 22, 24, 209 200, 209, 217
pessimists, 187 prevention, 23, 91, 233
pharmacotherapy, 231 prior knowledge, 93
phenomenology, 74, 75 prison environment, 113, 123
phenotypic, 28 prisoners, xi, 87, 91, 92, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114,
philosophers, 38 122, 123
philosophical, 42 prisons, xi, 85, 88, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103,
philosophy, 2, 44, 49, 58, 175, 188, 194 107, 113, 123
phlegm, 2 privacy, 60, 83
phone, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82 probe, 35
physical activity, 8, 21, 217, 222 problem drinkers, 30
physical attractiveness, 77 problem solving, 19, 20, 63, 64, 65, 67, 90, 130
physical education, 222 problem-focused coping, 6, 19, 20, 23
physical health, xiii, 7, 34, 130, 144, 145, 146, 197 procrastination, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76, 77, 80, 217, 223
physical well-being, 27, 198 production, 198
physiological, 3, 4, 5, 15, 18, 23, 26, 34, 62, 63, 76, productivity, 67, 175
78, 198, 232 prognosis, 22, 73, 148
physiological arousal, 3, 4, 5, 15, 23 program, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 222, 228
physiology, 3 projective test, 199
pilot studies, 92 proposition, 76, 204
pilot study, 149 propriety, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 53
250 Index

protection, 45, 47, 50 random, 3, 49, 114

prototype, x, 37 range, ix, 1, 8, 9, 20, 23, 24, 45, 50, 57, 63, 198, 200,
proxy, 30 206, 212, 215, 229
pseudo, 177, 180, 181 rape, 90
psychiatric diagnosis, 162 rash, 187
psychiatric disorder, 27 ratings, 198, 204
psychiatric patients, 9, 162, 236 rationality, 50, 56
psychological distress, xiii, 14, 23, 31, 32, 70, 183, reaction formation, 176
194, 230 reaction time, 64, 78, 203
psychological functions, 189 reactivity, ix, 1, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 32,
psychological health, 130, 181 34, 60, 62, 64, 210
psychological problems, 165, 212 reality, 68, 181
psychological stress, 2, 3, 26 reasoning, 158, 204
psychological variables, 117 recall, 8, 16, 121, 208, 229
psychological well-being, xiv, 11, 12, 13, 28, 33, 67, recalling, 119
70, 71, 80, 130, 146, 147, 148, 179, 211, 213, 231 recidivism, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92
psychology, 3, 5, 31, 36, 77, 81, 83, 130, 131, 132, recidivism rate, 86
144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 194, 199, 201, 221, 222, recognition, 52, 120, 156, 159
232 reconcile, 22, 92
psychometric properties, 222, 228, 230 reconciliation, xii, 151, 152, 153, 189
psychopathology, 11, 23, 25, 130, 166, 179, 182 recovery, 9, 15, 24, 62, 164, 220
psychopharmacology, 215 recreation, 73
psychophysics, 207 recreational, 66, 72
psychophysiology, 148 recurrence, 233
psychosocial development, 170, 173 recycling, 218, 222
psychosocial factors, 13, 26, 78 reference frame, 46
psychosomatic, 3, 30 refining, 42, 43, 144
psychotherapy, 33, 182, 231 reflection, 153, 178
psychoticism, xiv, 21, 62, 235, 236, 237 regional, 113
psychotropic drug, 78 regression, xi, 12, 117, 129, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
public, 45, 53, 54, 60, 76, 89, 90, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 141, 142, 143
101, 102, 107, 114, 120, 156, 157, 162, 167, 191, regression analysis, 12, 117
195 regression equation, 143
public awareness, 89, 90 regular, 23, 70, 78, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
public health, 167 107, 189, 198, 204, 205, 206, 231, 233
punishment, x, xi, 17, 39, 85, 86, 89, 91, 94, 96, 97, regulation, xiii, 6, 19, 22, 65, 75, 80, 82, 104, 148,
98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 155, 213 190, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,
punitive, xi, 85, 90, 102 220, 221, 222, 223, 231
pupils, 216, 222 regulations, 89, 156, 213, 215, 218, 220
regulators, 27
rehabilitate, xi, 85, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
Q 103, 107
rehabilitation, 88, 92
qualifications, 114, 118
reinforcement, 8, 33, 61, 74, 79, 81
quality assurance, 75
reinforcement history, 61
quality of life, 11, 208
reinforcers, 61
quantitative research, 222
rejection, 112, 124, 174
questionnaire, 80, 93, 94, 114, 117, 134, 226, 232
relapse, 228, 229, 230, 233
quizzes, 79
relationships, 31, 57, 61, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 78, 83,
89, 90, 91, 112, 113, 118, 124, 131, 136, 144,
R 148, 163, 187, 193, 200, 213, 220, 221, 223
relatives, 54, 152, 159
race, 55, 162 relaxation, 21
 Index 251

relevance, 60, 66, 69, 88, 212 school, 15, 17, 34, 80, 86, 87, 90, 114, 116, 159, 160,
religion, 20, 148 167, 172, 184, 188, 216, 221, 223, 236
religiosity, 32, 136 school climate, 90
remission, 9 scores, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71,
repair, 53, 86, 135, 140, 143, 148, 154 117, 145, 201, 227, 229, 235, 236
reputation, xii, 113, 151 search, 76, 82, 147, 170, 171, 172, 195, 226
resentment, 22 search engine, 76
reservation, 158, 203 searches, 170
residential, 87, 89, 172 searching, 52, 179
resilience, xi, 34, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, secret, 153, 227
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 220 security, 71, 111, 117, 118, 120, 121, 175, 176, 177,
resistance, 23 180
resolution, 87, 90, 171 sedation, 19
resources, 4, 5, 18, 26, 44, 48, 67, 70, 75, 89, 133, segregation, 113
163, 164 selective attention, 17
respiratory, 8 self esteem, x, 59, 71, 72, 73, 112
response time, 202 self image, 158
responsibilities, xii, 116, 169, 172, 173 self-accusation, 45
restitution, 86 self-actualization, 12
restructuring, 20 self-assessment, 206
retaliation, 113, 122, 123 self-awareness, 45
retention, 230 self-care, 21
retribution, 86, 153 self-concept, 7, 24, 90, 206, 219, 233
returns, 53 self-confidence, 192
rewards, 213 self-consciousness, 6, 228
righteousness, 185 self-destructive behavior, 179, 181
rigidity, 64 self-determination theory, xiii, 211, 212, 221, 223
risk behaviors, 31, 210 self-discipline, 6, 20
risk factors, 11, 28, 30, 167, 238 self-efficacy, 16, 22, 24, 67, 220
risk perception, 80 self-esteem, x, 18, 30, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72,
risks, 22, 35, 79, 90, 163, 180, 222 75, 78, 89, 122, 149, 179, 180, 187, 188, 189,
risk-taking, 179, 204 190, 192, 200, 208, 209, 220
robbery, 114 self-expression, 22
role conflict, 33 self-identity, 71, 72, 124
routines, 74 self-image, 113, 156, 170
rumination, 229, 233 self-monitoring, 77
self-organization, 223
self-perceptions, 32, 208
S self-presentation, x, 59, 66, 67, 69, 70, 76, 200
self-reflection, 212
sabotage, 65
self-regulation, 6, 75, 80, 82, 212, 215, 216, 221, 223
sacred, 124, 233
self-report, xiii, 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 63, 65, 71, 81, 114,
sadism, 176
117, 133, 134, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205,
sadness, 52, 154, 159, 160, 229
208, 230, 231, 232
safeguard, 47, 48, 57
self-reports, xiii, 197, 199, 200, 201, 205
safety, 71, 171
self-worth, 45, 46, 112, 122, 123, 124, 180, 184, 189,
sales, 25
192, 194, 213, 216, 218, 219, 221
sample, 27, 28, 31, 35, 36, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99,
semantic, 43
100, 102, 132, 133, 134, 136, 204, 210, 227, 233,
semi-structured interviews, 114
235, 236
sensation, 8, 47, 74, 226
sampling, 114
sensation seeking, 74
sanctions, 86, 89, 104
sensing, 54
satisfaction, 6, 11, 25, 30, 70, 159, 212, 213, 215,
sensitivity, 8, 16, 17, 33, 46, 47, 54, 57
223
252 Index

sentences, 114 social integration, 70

sentencing, 90, 91, 103 social isolation, 67
separation, xii, 169, 178 social life, 154
September 11, 25 social movements, 167
series, 30, 32 social norms, 89, 112, 123, 155, 180
serotonin, 28 social order, 56
services, 75, 80, 136 social organization, 127
severity, 9 social policy, 167
sex, x, 37, 38, 56, 73, 79, 89, 90, 105, 210 social psychology, 81, 166, 206, 207, 209
sex offenders, 89, 90, 105 social regulation, 22
sexual abuse, 92 social relations, 66, 67, 70, 78
sexual assault, 90 social relationships, 66, 67, 70, 78
sexual behavior, 22 social resources, 163
sexual behaviour, 210 social roles, 171
sexual orientation, 162 social sciences, 33, 103
sexuality, 38, 39 social skills, 67, 133, 136, 138, 143
shape, x, 37, 175 social standing, 163
shaping, 191 social status, 110, 113, 121, 122, 156, 162, 163, 164
sheep, x, 37, 40, 42 social stress, 163
shock, 63, 116 social structure, 155
shortage, 44 social support, 20, 22, 36, 70
short-term, 19, 216, 218, 221 social welfare, 163
shoulders, 154 socialization, 17, 89
shy, 45, 56, 66, 67, 72, 76, 79, 82, 206 socioeconomic status, 209
shyness, x, 10, 38, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 153 sociological, 164
signal detection theory, 203 sociologist, 152, 155, 161
signals, 78 sociology, 3, 93, 165, 167
similarity, 9 solidarity, 113
sites, 66, 68, 69, 70, 75, 80 sorting, 202
skill acquisition, 81 spectrum, 69
skills, 24, 29, 67, 79, 81, 87, 90, 91, 92, 114, 133, speculation, 229
136, 138, 143, 170, 193, 230, 231 speech, 6, 17, 47, 51, 55, 57
skills training, 230 speed, 78
smoke, 204 spiritual, 34, 45, 55, 136, 186, 187, 195
smoking, 8, 21, 22, 121, 198, 204, 206, 207 spirituality, xi, 129, 130, 133, 136, 138, 144, 186
SMS, x, 59, 64, 66, 70, 71, 81 sporadic, 5
sobriety, 193 sports, 87, 186, 216, 221
sociability, 67 spouse, 28
social anxiety, x, 59, 67, 68, 76, 77 springs, 38, 49, 55
social behavior, 66, 83, 91, 210 stability, 12, 19, 23, 29, 32, 35, 117, 118, 121, 178,
social capital, 113 180, 201, 202
social care, 157 stages, 60
social class, 8 standard deviation, 8, 114
social cognition, 77, 206, 208 standards, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 89, 188, 192, 216
social context, 174 statistics, 136, 138, 140
social control, 87, 88, 89, 91, 158 stereotypes, 8, 208
social desirability, xiii, 197, 201, 209 stereotypical, 162
social environment, 111 stigma, xi, 85, 87, 89, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
social events, 218 102, 107, 115, 118, 161, 162, 164, 165
social exclusion, 89, 167 stigmatization, 157, 164
social hierarchy, 113, 156 stigmatized, 87, 167
social influence, 81 stimulus, 4, 64, 74, 199, 226
social influences, 81 stochastic, 31
 Index 253

stomach, 9, 158 targets, 132, 203

storage, 75 task demands, 63
strain, 3, 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 28, 32, 158, 184 task performance, 63
strains, 34 taste, x, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54,
strategies, ix, xiii, 1, 4, 5, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 56
25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 63, 65, 72, 75, 172, 173, 183, taxes, 88
194, 219, 220 taxonomic, 79, 147
stratified sampling, 114 taxonomy, 228, 232
strength, 79, 113, 121, 148, 152, 153, 176, 179, 180, taxpayers, 88
203 teachers, 90, 160
stressful events, 2, 15, 16, 18, 23, 28, 134, 145 teaching, x, 37, 221
stressful life events, 14 teens, 172, 181
stressors, ix, 1, 2, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 24, 25, 30, 31, telephone, 191
32, 34, 172, 229 television, 73, 79
stress-related, 3, 5, 16 temperament, 11
stroke, 8 tension, 4, 8, 18, 23, 62, 72, 154
strokes, 40 territory, 45
students, xi, 14, 17, 19, 22, 27, 31, 34, 35, 67, 68, 80, terrorist attack, 25
82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, testimony, 144
102, 129, 132, 133, 134, 146, 156, 171, 195, 200, text messaging, 70, 81
210, 212, 215, 219, 220, 222, 223, 236, 237 theology, 195
subjective, ix, 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 19, 27, 28, 31, 32, therapeutic interventions, 229
34, 35, 149, 198, 204, 208, 221, 223, 230, 232 therapy, 77, 184, 190, 194, 195, 231
subjective experience, 8 think critically, 181
subjective well-being, 11, 12, 13, 19, 27, 34, 35, 149, thinking, x, 16, 19, 20, 24, 37, 38, 52, 74, 116, 124,
221, 223, 232 136, 177, 178, 184, 188, 191, 193, 229
substance abuse, 22, 179, 182 threat, 4, 5, 17, 34, 63, 64, 76, 88, 89, 114, 158, 159,
substance use, 19, 20, 21, 23, 179, 206, 208 160, 164, 217
substances, 50, 56, 205 threatened, 30, 110, 155, 177
substitution, 20 threatening, 4, 17, 24, 79, 112, 113, 119, 229, 236
substrates, 147 threats, 18, 67, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122,
suburban, 92 124, 158
suffering, 47, 56, 115, 116, 158, 159, 194 threshold, 16, 155
suicidal, xiv, 235, 236, 237, 238 time frame, 91
suicidal behavior, xiv, 235, 237, 238 time pressure, 68, 200
suicidal ideation, 236 tolerance, 228
suicide, 235, 236, 238 top-down, 24, 26
suicide attempts, 236 toughness, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124
superego, 184 toxic, ix, 1, 6, 164, 165, 184
suppression, 19, 63, 154, 177 toxic effect, ix, 1
surgery, 9 tradition, 3, 38, 39, 42, 49, 55, 77, 232
surgical, 236 training, 15, 91, 230, 231, 233
survivors, 88 trait anxiety, 7, 149, 209
susceptibility, 3, 16, 22, 35, 148 traits, ix, x, xiv, 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16,
swimmers, 216 17, 20, 23, 25, 34, 35, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73,
sympathy, 135 74, 76, 162, 184, 185, 187, 201, 208, 231, 235
symptoms, 3, 7, 8, 9, 22, 28, 29, 30, 36, 130, 146, trajectory, 31
162, 171, 178, 180, 195, 198, 207, 208, 229, 232 transactions, 76
syndrome, 77, 161, 164 transference, 190
transformation, 41, 50, 110
transgression, 115, 186
T transition, 25, 179
transition to adulthood, 179
tangible, 213
254 Index

translation, 24, 38, 60 violent, 87, 96, 110, 111, 162

transmission, 60 violent behavior, 87
trauma, 90 violent behaviour, 111
trial, 119, 202, 203, 231 violent offenders, 110
trust, 6, 75, 80, 117, 118, 119, 154, 171 visible, 24, 154, 157, 158
turbulent, 43 vocational, 66, 69, 72, 76
turnover, 25 voice, 64, 71, 72, 91
twin studies, 24 volatility, 228
twins, 33 vulnerability, ix, 1, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 29, 238
typology, 237

W
U
walking, 116
ulcer, 9 war, 86, 119
uncertainty, 66, 80, 179, 181 warfare, 190
undergraduate, xi, xiii, 129, 132, 133, 134, 156, 197, weakness, 113
200 wealth, 50, 52
undergraduates, 173, 225 weight loss, 217
underlying mechanisms, 24, 73 welfare, 53, 167
unemployment, 166 well-being outcomes, ix, 1, 24
universality, 38, 39, 53 wellness, 21, 25, 45, 53
universe, 175 wells, 48
universities, 86 wisdom, 38, 44, 50, 53, 232
university students, 22, 67, 82, 146 withdrawal, 10, 19, 20, 65, 71, 72, 179, 212
unpredictability, 162 wives, 159
women, 7, 77, 88, 92, 149, 156, 162, 165, 188, 221,
236
V workability, 4
workers, 157, 159, 160, 192
vaccination, 32
working class, 113, 174
valence, 131, 204
working groups, 159
validation, 35, 112, 149, 182, 195
working memory, 63, 78
validity, 3, 5, 28, 30, 33, 34, 201, 207, 209, 228, 233
workload, 26
values, x, 6, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 56, 125,
workplace, 66, 68, 81, 160, 213
170, 173, 174, 178, 180, 181, 213, 217, 222
worldview, 173, 174
vandalism, 86
worry, 8, 22, 47, 50, 65, 228, 233
variability, 12, 78
writing, 45, 81
variables, xiii, 3, 8, 14, 15, 27, 62, 63, 66, 71, 82, 87,
wrongdoing, 91, 223
171, 197, 218
variance, 5, 117, 145
variety of domains, 213 Y
vein, 38, 219
victimisation, 113 yang, 40, 42
victims, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102 young adults, 174
violence, 29, 66, 79, 110, 111, 124, 162